2

attended by several collateral issues that complicate

its resolution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her
half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7
his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and
the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS

DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA.
DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO
and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON
DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPOREIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS,
FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,
Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN
and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS
OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA
RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO
RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA
RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to
the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado
was never married to Lucio Campo (second man),
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only
man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa
Delgados union is in dispute.
Luis Delgado is Josefa Delgados half-brother. The
son borne by her mother to Ramon Osorio, previous
man.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13

DECISION
FACTS OF THE CASE

If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been

validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado
was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado
and therefore excluded from the latters intestate
estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the
principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate

estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6
The main issue in this case is relatively simple:
who, between petitioners and respondents, are the
lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is

couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his

heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within
the illegitimate line.

among their relatives and friends to have in fact been

married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated
[December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo,
then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa

Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the
date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear,
however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado.
So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on,
when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14
stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"
(the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly
omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence
of a record of the alleged marriage did not
necessarily mean that no marriage ever took
place.

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to

Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval
Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4,
004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States
of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in
Manila on 3 June 1919;18

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a

will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia
executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the
remaining properties comprising her estate.

4. Titles to real properties in the name of

Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa

Delgado

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took
into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia
Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known
in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed

marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage
in fact took place is disputed. According to
petitioners, the two eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove
their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of
the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.

Josefa Delgado dont have any natural children.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19
the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with
one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own
flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in
1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of
their children. Also, her report card from the

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand,

insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did
not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired.
They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then
on lived together as husband and wife until the death
of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period
spanning more than half a century, they were known

University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo

Rustia as her parent/guardian.20

A presumption is an inference of the existence or

non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit

((verb) (logic) a proposition that is accepted as true
in order to provide a basis for logical reasoning) that
Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate
of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend
that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the
documents she presented were not the authentic
writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death

of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition
for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he
ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on
February 28, 1974.

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves

as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without

a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24

Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be

doubted.
Their family and friends knew them to be married.
Their reputed status as husband and wife was such
that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao
in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Supreme Courts Ruling:

Hence, this recourse.

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and

Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;

They make much of the absence of a record of the

contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38
attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.39

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of
administration.

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa

Delgado

always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40

Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the
marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of
identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo
Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name
of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,"
more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome
the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners.

October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973
affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia
shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased her,
also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled
to share in her estate.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness

whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and
that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.

3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its

one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia,
Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and
whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia
vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
are now deceased, their respective shares
shall pertain to their estates.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive

proof only of the baptism administered by the priest
who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried
("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had
no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In
this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to
be in fact married. This is the usual order of things
in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant
violation of the common rules of law and propriety.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.47

4. Letters of administration over the still

unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond
in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to

reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed

SO ORDERED.

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6
Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.

3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as

1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage
and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that
his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIARECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the

couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence,
like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the

Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked
and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

The Facts

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed

Decision and Order.

The trial court patently and grievously erred

in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.

Ruling of the Trial Court

"5

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the

ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in
an essential element of the marriage; that is,
respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing

that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto (adverb: ipso facto (by that very fact or act)
capacitated the parties to remarry, without
first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our
courts."19

Hence, this Petition.18

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of
this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
"I

The Court's Ruling

The trial court gravely erred in finding that

the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with the petitioner.

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and
Editha Samson

"2

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the

divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues
that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1)
the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.

The failure of the respondent, who is now a

naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the
respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the
application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where
they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In
effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in

"4

question to the legal requirements of the place where

the marriage was performed.

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting

parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal

principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and
1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of
the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.27

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of

absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries
of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect their persons."

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far

as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the

Australian divorce decree is a public document a
written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country.32

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52
of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other

hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is

required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx

xxx

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

xxx
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and

"(5) If previously married, how, when and

where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;
xxx

xxx

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

xxx

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha

Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce

decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient
proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)

of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab

initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.

Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien

and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.40

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict

legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are

Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak

of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and

(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

The first kind terminates the marriage, while the

second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.

The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges

the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving
the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an

interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes and practices, still

restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,

remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again.
The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.47

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that

proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January
12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c)
Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City
Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto
and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e)
Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1"
Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3"
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration
of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto
and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree

contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that

respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's
contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with
the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her

marriage to respondent null and void on the ground
of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under
Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence,
if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract

marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article
21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
for a marriage license.50

obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro

Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure

and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as
above discussed. No costs.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION

SO ORDERED.

QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
1.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III

married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the
Philippines was blessed with a son and a
daughter.

2.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United

States and discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.

3.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano his wife had

obtained a divorce decree and then married.

4.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court

a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN

REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there
is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.6

10

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not

directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.7

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph

2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case
of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how
this provision had come about in the first place, and
what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to

remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

RULE 63
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR

REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the

original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.8

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity
to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear

to govern the situation presented by the case at hand.
It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized,
the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity
to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

11

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on

the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine

law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.12

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against

those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to

avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its

origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements

for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the

time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the

parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case

of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as

an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.

12

As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife

subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
5
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1. Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue,
Cebu City. They had five children.
2. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a
nagger ((noun) someone (especially a woman)
who annoys people by constantly finding fault)
and extravagant."
3. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children to the care of respondent Crasus.
4. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that
Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child.
5. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with
her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in
Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk
to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to
bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.

13

6. Fely returned to the Philippines several times.

brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of

the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare
her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and
that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus,
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.

7. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13

years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them.
8. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their

respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence.
Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of
evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he
essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,
such marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely
openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.9

9. Fely refuted the other allegations made by

respondent Crasus in his Complaint, that she was no
more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she
may had been indignant ((Adjective) Showing
anger or indignation, especially at something
unjust or wrong.) at respondent Crasus on certain

occasions but it was because of the latters

drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort
to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have
been extravagant since the family hardly had enough
money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad
for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole
breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
support their family. Although she left all of her
children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to
bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one,
Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.
While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce
from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent
Crasus himself was presently living with another
woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of
P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the

Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a

Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon
written interrogatories, before the consular officers of
the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A,
where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12
and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon
written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it
had been over a year since respondent Crasus had
presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert
effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an
Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to
have waived her right to present her evidence. The
case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:

The RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void
ab initio, on the basis of the following findings

14

The ground bearing defendants psychological

incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As
observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible.
The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect,
help and support. From the evidence presented,
plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of
her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.

these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the

marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15

Court of Appeals Ruling:

The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30
July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the
RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even
offered additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee
abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee
categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been

apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of
the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible

wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is
the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant
is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with
her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is shown
by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff.

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD
BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM
OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is

defendants psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely
Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the

above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at
bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husbands citizenship and thus has become
an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to
a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly

credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability.
That such incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for

15

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these

circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to
honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage
that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him
to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent ((adj) offensive to the mind) and will
not countenance (sanction, countenance, endorsement,
indorsement, warrant, imprimatur). Justice dictates that
plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.16

After having reviewed the records of this case and the

applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds
the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines,
reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08

March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before
this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes

psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its
existence.

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of

respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar.18

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term

psychological incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support.

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus

maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial
court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the

law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized
by

16

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the

party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;

incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the

application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the

history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at

"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it

were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves
to be reproduced below

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about

the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

17

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should

be given great respect by our courts

grave mental illness that prevented her from

assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.24

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the

Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.26
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in
previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that

there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician
or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the aforementioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore,
there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed

acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and
the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established
as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at
the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by
a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by
virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29
respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and
that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

The only substantial evidence presented by

respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being selfserving, in the absence of any other corroborating
evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with
the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage
being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest
son, in which Fely used her American husbands
surname. Even considering the admissions made by
Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a

18

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of

the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on

behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC
may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. Article 48 provides

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the

Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.34

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a

special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner
at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established,
Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States
in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the

Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
thwart it.

III

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor

General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the

19

Philippines once the case is brought before this Court

or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf
of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the
case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the
case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein
to better guarantee the protection of the interests of
the State.

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes
the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and
take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC
and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent
provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below

In fact, this Court had already recognized and

affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages that were appealed before it, summarized
as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall

serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such
service within the same period.

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268

SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the

parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After
the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will
be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and

the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear
in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall
be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355

SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in
Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State
37

20

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of

fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any
of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the

Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a
conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to
what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the
Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.

21

divorce decree took effect a month later, on January

8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on
and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

6.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged
her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a partyin-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied

Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino

citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4
He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada

and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

22

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with

the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the

legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of
defective marriages void15 and voidable16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.
Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present
petition.13

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in

marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is

essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest,
to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino.
The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING

23

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino

spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment,

and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence
of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was

included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between
the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before
the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon
a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

Additionally, an action based on the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

(b) In case of a judgment or final order

against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

24

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject

of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared,
no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27

evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to

remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course
of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties,
as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign

divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven
as facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the aliens applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The
recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is

served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition
and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce

decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign

divorce decree

(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody

of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that

the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had
been done.

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by

the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts,

events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations,

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition

a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting

25

more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily

terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not."35

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment,

adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce
decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decrees registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated
the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a

foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established
for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was

aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in
the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry

in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages solemnized
but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

26

correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It

also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39
and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been
met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling

should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January
2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and
its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review

on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Civil Registrar General. No costs.

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese

national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

The Case

The Facts

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi

Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married
on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3

SO ORDERED.
7
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able

to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family

June 26, 2013

27

court in Japan which declared the marriage between

Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office
of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

RTC took the view that only "the husband or the

wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He
argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and
not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish:

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

(1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and

Marinay as husband and wife and

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriages.

The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment

was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

(2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family

Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the
words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in
the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material
interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.

xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or

Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the

28

"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register

Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the
Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty
on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where
the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18
The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court
on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal

of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25
The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction
of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack
on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28
Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated
as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also

asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on
its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the
"trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio (on his own impulse; of one's
own initiative) dismissing the case."20 Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the

Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to
file their comment on the petition for review.30 The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny

petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for
a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial
court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack
of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The
RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did
not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground
cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He

prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 0211-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32
The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:

29

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take

action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy
is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the

Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied
that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v.
Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition
of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned
a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the
civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is
a Filipino citizen.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior

marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article
407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the
civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is

no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41

I.

30

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment

relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the
rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of
a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a

petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow
its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation
of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the
trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount
to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring

a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides
that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts
are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

31

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63

Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.65

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only

requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."67

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to

simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

II.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the

32

spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited

instances68) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69
These property interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71

and preventing crimes, he is also personally

interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage
is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and
is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no
more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.

Property rights are already substantive rights

protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to
the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack
on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not
involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares

bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can
file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason
to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of

an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the

33

investigation of the public prosecutor to determine

collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
"where the corresponding civil registry is located."87
In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry
of marriage in the civil registry.

Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign

divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a
corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose
laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."91

However, this does not apply in a petition for

correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code

applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in
the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on

Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy.
A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine

34

public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the

Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is
not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

be an inconsistency between the recognition of the

effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice
to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine

courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule
of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the

Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order
dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only

determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and

SO ORDERED.

(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an

extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of
a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will

35

canceled at the expiration of the

period if the contracting parties have
not used it. The expiry date must be
stamped in bold characters on the
face of every license issued. (Article
20)
What are the requirements if a
foreigner wants to get married
here in the Philippines?
When either or both of the contracting
parties are citizens of a foreign
country, they must submit a
certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular
officials, before a marriage license can
be obtained.

What are the requirements of the

Local Civil Registrar if either of
the contracting parties was
previously married?

Stateless persons or refugees from

other countries must, instead of the
certificate of legal capacity, submit
an affidavit stating the
circumstances showing their
capacity to contract marriage.
(Article 21)

The previously married applicant must

furnish ((verb) give something useful or
necessary to), instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse, or
the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage.

What are the rules for marriages

entered into by Filipinos in
foreign countries?
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines under the laws in force in
the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such,
are also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

In case the death certificate cannot be

secured, the party must make an
affidavit stating this circumstance,
actual civil status, and the name and
date of death of the deceased spouse.
(Article 13)
What is the effectivity of the
marriage license once issued?

Where a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is afterwards
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine

The license is valid in any part of the

Philippines for a period of one
hundred twenty days from the
date of issue, and it is automatically
36

law. (Article 26, as amended by

Executive Order 227)

cultural communities may be

performed validly without the
necessity of marriage license,
provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. (Article 33)

Under what circumstances will a

marriage license no longer be
required?
In case either or both of the
contracting parties are at the
point of death, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license and will remain valid
even if the ailing party subsequently
survives. (Article 27)

No license is necessary for the

marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties must state
these facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer must also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (Article
34; please read Quickie marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code: Is
the marriage void if the affidavit of
marital cohabitation is false?)

If the residence of either party is so

located that there is no means of
transportation to enable the party
to appear personally before the
local civil registrar, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity
of a marriage license. (Article 28)
Marriages among Muslims or
among members of the ethnic

37