1.

5. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a

car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:

March 14, 2000

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional

Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as

Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a

cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
1. Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974.

(2) Whether or not the second

marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void
ab initio;

Petitioner ENGRACE NIAL is the child

of Pepito Nial to Teodulfa Bellones .

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are

estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1

2. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in

her death on April 24, 1985.
3. On December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license.

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners

should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment
of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review

4. In lieu (stead, position, place, lieu) thereof,

Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license.
1

with this Court grounded on a pure question

of law.

marriage due to the publication of every

applicant's name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye
of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.

Supreme Courts Ruling:

The two marriages involved herein having
been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. 5

The only issue that needs to be resolved

pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of

marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
6
the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8

Working on the assumption that Pepito and

Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation
as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the
marriage.

The requirement and issuance of

marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9
However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14
referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid

This 5-year period should be the years

immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken.

It should be noted that a license is required

in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17
The Civil Code provides:

Pepito and his first wife had separated in

fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time
when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his
lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request

all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any
alleged impediment to the marriage,
the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This
notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Having determined that the second marriage

involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of

any impediment known to the local
civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .

The next issue to be resolved is: do

petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling,
Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at anytime before the death of either party"
is inapplicable.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and

respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that
3

Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods

and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage.

properties of the alleged spouses, regarding

co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article
43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

Voidable and void marriages are not

identical.
1. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place 21 and
cannot be the source of rights.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death

of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed
as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.

2. The first can be generally ratified or

confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be
ratified.
3. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states

that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A
void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring
of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose,
its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage

4. Consequently, void marriages can be

questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22
5. That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes.
6. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
7. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the
4

may be material, either direct or collateral,

in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of
the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage 27
and such absolute nullity can be based only
on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29
Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground
for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

necessary even if the purpose is other than to

remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case
is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

However, other than for purposes of

remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise
in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is

RE S O LUTI ON
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
1. On 21 May 1966 HERMINIA BORJAMAN married to David Manzano and had 4
children.
2. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.3
Court Administrator recommendation:
That respondent Judge be found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered
to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely.
Supreme Courts Ruling:
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8,
2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO,
petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,
Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

For this provision on legal ratification of

marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
6

1. The man and woman must have

been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the
marriage;

who have obtained a decree of legal

separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage
tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more
when the separation is merely de facto, as
in the case at bar.

2. The parties must have no legal

impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must
be present at the time of marriage;

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on

the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license.
It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.

4. The parties must execute an

affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must
execute a sworn statement that he
had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in
the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent
Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact
of their prior existing marriage. Also, in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that
both were "separated."

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated

gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses
no one" has special application to judges,8
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It
is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal
principles.9 And when the law transgressed
is simple and elementary, the failure to know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know

that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.7
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been
living apart from their respective spouses for
a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of

the Court Administrator is hereby
7

ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that

the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO,

petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A.
De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until
properly nullified by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the
records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to
the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus,
in order to push through with the plan, in
lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective

3.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172
2008

February 13,

homes and did not live together as husband

and wife.

petitioner and respondent is not valid

because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child,
and thus obliged to give her support.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave

birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent
has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from
her private practice.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal.
Prompted by the rule that a marriage is
presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was
born during the subsistence and validity of
the parties marriage.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a

complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (trial court.3 In her complaint,
respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged
((verb) fail to fulfill a promise or obligation) on
his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as
his child."4

Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the

affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted
that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this
case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as
null and void in the very same case.

Petitioner denied that he is married to

respondent, claiming that their marriage is
void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he
was merely prevailed upon by respondent to
sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and
that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen
nor acknowledged the child.

There was no participation of the State,

through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between
the parties, as required by the Family
Code in actions for declaration of nullity
of a marriage.
The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it
is a matter that can be raised in an action for
declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings.

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:

The proceedings before the trial court should
have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the

trial court ruled that the marriage between
9

on the basis of the marriage apparently and

voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

court had jurisdiction to determine the

invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in
the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void
marriage can be the subject of a collateral
attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another
case for declaration of nullity where the
same evidence and parties would be
presented would entail enormous expenses
and anxieties, would be time-consuming for
the parties, and would increase the burden of
the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in
view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the
childs paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child
as his legitimate child.

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, National Capital
Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between
the appellant and the appellee valid
until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose. Costs
against the appellant.8
Supreme Courts Ruling:

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the

Court required respondent and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their
respective comments on the petition.13

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial

court properly annulled his marriage with
respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the
marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license. He stresses that the affidavit they
executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth
being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false
affidavit should never be allowed or
admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of
a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally
argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this
case because it is only an ordinary action for
support and not an action for annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
In any case, petitioner argues that the trial

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that

the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic
to thwart the finality of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and
rulings of the appellate court, she argues that
the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be
attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she
pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the
challenge from her and from the trial court,
10

marriage may be collaterally attacked.19

Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

petitioner strongly objected to being

subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity
and filiation.15

However, other than for purposes of

remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of

Appeals erred in holding that it was
improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that
courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the
right to support from petitioner hinges on
the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover,
the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that
the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a
marriage license, and that their affidavit (of
a man and woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years) was false.
Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly
held that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the
OSG agrees with the findings of the trial
court that the child is an illegitimate child of
petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Issues:

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21

the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of two marriages despite the main case
being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating
Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon
the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of

Two key issues are presented before us.

First, whether the trial court had the
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent
in an action for support and second, whether
the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the
trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent. The validity of a void

11

grounds rendering such a marriage an

absolute nullity.22

and embarrassment concomitant with the

scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicants name for a marriage
license.26

Under the Family Code, the absence of any

of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a
defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable.23

In the instant case, there was no "scandalous

cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was
no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage
has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap
of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure
to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

In the instant case, it is clear from the

evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license
when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more
than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination, thus

Anent the second issue, we find that the

child is petitioners illegitimate daughter,
and therefore entitled to support.

ATTY. CARPIO:
Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.27
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation
through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.28

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that

you have not been living together as
husband and wife for the last five
years on or before March 13, 1995,
you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A

Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be

considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage.

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child

lists petitioner as the father. In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional
tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child,
thus stating:

The aim of this provision is to avoid

exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
12

1. I am the legitimate father of

REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995
at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro
Manila;30

69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of

the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig
City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October
2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

We are likewise inclined to agree with the

following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the
respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony
of the latter, but also by respondents
own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend.
While they were sweethearts, he
used to visit petitioner at the latters
house or clinic. At times, they would
go to a motel to have sex. As a result
of their sexual dalliances, petitioner
became pregnant which ultimately
led to their marriage, though invalid,
as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal
otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1"
and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2,"
"F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In
one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1"
and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting
the wedding ring on petitioners
finger and in another picture (Exhs.
"E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is
seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.31

4.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581

March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in

part. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.

G.R. No. 179474

13

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a

Decision8 dismissing the Complaint.
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version
of the story as implausible, and rationalized.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot
(Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void
ab initio.

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC

ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It
cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of the
fraud.
Court of Appeals Ruling:

1. On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa

were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu
of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from

is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code
to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The appellate court observed
that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under
Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in
the marriage between the parties. Further, it
ruled that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud was filed
beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Joses appeal in the following manner:

2. Felisa expounded that while her marriage

to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990.
3. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose.
4. On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4
for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25.

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud

or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil
Code provides that the action for annulment

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:

14

of marriage on the ground that the consent

of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said
party within four (4) years after the
discovery of the fraud and within four (4)
years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within
which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza

belonged. According to the Court of
Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting
parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officers church or religious
sect. The prescription was established only
in Article 718 of the Family Code which does
not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His
central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the
case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by
him and Felisa was false.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not

accept Joses assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage
was solemnized under Article 7616 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional character,
with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to
the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period
required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the
solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner,
the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the
dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage,
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion

for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August
11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa
C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of
Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in
Nial v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
15

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting

parties to a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other.

The Republic of the Philippines propounds

the following arguments for the allowance
of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO
OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
TO FELISA.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that

a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21

II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME
TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.

Felisa sought reconsideration of the

Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated
10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED
FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24

____________________________________
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before
this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that
the Court of Appeals Amended Decision
dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa be declared valid
and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No.
179474, similarly assailing the appellate
courts Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of
the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that

the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had
an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation
with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose
only sought the annulment of their marriage
after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against
him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of
their marriage would exonerate Jose from
any liability.
16

Supreme Courts Ruling:

the signature of the parties and their

witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further
fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name
as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192,
Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
indicating Felisas name as his wife.

For our resolution is the validity of the

marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach
a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that
several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Courts ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress
its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated
24 November 1986, attesting that they have
lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a
marriage license.

The first assignment of error compels this

Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose
and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November
1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs
their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage
as a contract:

It is the Republics position that the falsity

of the statements in the affidavit does not
affect the validity of the marriage, as the
essential and formal requisites were
complied with; and the solemnizing officer
was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained.

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized

unless all these requisites are complied with:

The Republic opines that as a marriage

under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so
must a marriage not be invalidated by the
fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least
five years. In addition, the Republic posits
that the parties marriage contract states
that their marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting

parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person
performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
17

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage

shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of
an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28
Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage
contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old
Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the
Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after
the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage.32

husband and wife for at least five years,

desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the
Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of
Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that "they
have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and
that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other."37

Under the Civil Code, marriages of

exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72
to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.34

One of the central issues in the Petition at

bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit
of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum
five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.

The instant case pertains to a ratification of

marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be

necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as
18

general rule, should be strictly38 but

reasonably construed.39 They extend only so
far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the
court will not curtail the former or add to the
latter by implication.41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

contracting parties and that he found no

legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and
Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also
noted Felisas testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March
1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The
appellate court also cited Felisas own
testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45

A strict but reasonable construction of

Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to
marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation.
No other reading of the law can be had,
since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention
that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and
that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question

as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need
to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review.47 It is already well-settled
that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is
when the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48

19

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated

24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement
of a marriage license, is beyond question.

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which

spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil
Code51 that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation
of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage
under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils
that the law sought to prevent by making a
prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.52 The protection of marriage as
a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to
protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set
forth in our laws.

We cannot accept the insistence of the

Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with.
The argument deserves scant merit. Patently,
it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that
they should have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, so as to be
excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the
presumption of marriage, this Court holds
that the same finds no applicability to the
case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married.50 The
present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question
that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or

Similarly, we are not impressed by the

ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant
((adj) conspicuously and outrageously bad or
reprehensible). The former is with reference

20

to an irregularity of the marriage license,

and not to the absence of one.

Jose seven years before he sought the

declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had
set in.

Here, there is no marriage license at all.

Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception
to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to
a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of

marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and
Felisas marriage was celebrated sans
((Preposition) Without, lacking.) a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. In
this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has
laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration
of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within
the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.58

In its second assignment of error, the

Republic puts forth the argument that based
on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing.
This is a misplaced invocation.
It must be stated that equity finds no
room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.

The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CAG.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void
ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

The Republic further avers in its third

assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding
Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took

SO ORDERED.

21

solemnized during the effectivity of the

Family Code, except cases commenced
prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared
in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review
on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside
the summary judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a
child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
5

The events that led to the institution of the

instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia

died intestate ((adj) having made no legally
valid will before death or not disposed of by a

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179922
2008

legal will).

They left six parcels of land to

their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:

December 16,

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as
FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.

Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA
ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.
6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of
Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to

sever the marital bond for marriages

Parcel No. 2

22

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B),

being a portion of Lot 159, situated
in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality
of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x
x containing an area of Thirteen
Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.

PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50,
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela
36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y
por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas.
Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en
el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds.
01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman
las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.

Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the
subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the
SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on
the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3;
on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B1 (Road widening) all of the subd.
plan, containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51,
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela
37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por
el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas.
Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en
el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds.
01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman
las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension
superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.3

PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the
subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a
portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate,
L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded
on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East &
SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata
River; and on the West., along line 61, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x
x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS.

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he

agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the
23

payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in

turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed

a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between
them.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land

were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo

v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of
plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000square meter portion was later divided
between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a
supplemental compromise agreement
executed on August 17, 1994, with respect
to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties
submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved
accordingly.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of

petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT
No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He
was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6
were registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively,
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two

more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of
land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an
action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo
with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status
of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against

respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In
the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise
agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares
in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of
the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of
said land.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the

marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in
view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his
deceased brother was neither the natural nor

24

the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo

Carlos II.

submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of

respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the
late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of

the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real
properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued
in the name of respondents. He argued that
the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the

motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for
summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar
of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification

as and by way of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs of suit.

Petitioner also incorporated in the countermotion for summary judgment the testimony
of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said
testimony was made in Civil Case No. 892384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the
RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her
testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated
that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child
with Teofilo.5

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted

their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of
details regarding the requisite marriage
license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared
that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of
the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.

Subsequently, the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the
trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion
between the parties.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action

and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the case before the trial court. They also
asked that their counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees, be granted.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered
judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendant's
(respondent's) Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied.
Plaintiff's (petitioner's) CounterMotion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary

But before the parties could even proceed to

pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the
affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
25

judgment is hereby rendered in favor

of plaintiff as follows:

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex

"K" of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and
void, and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT
No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo
Carlos, and to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein;

1. Declaring the marriage between

defendant Felicidad Sandoval and
Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced
by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void
ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M

of the complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and
void;

2. Declaring that the defendant

minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E.
Carlos;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT

No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to

pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint
until fully paid;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT

No. 210878 in the name of defendant
Sandoval and defendant Minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein.

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and

exclusive owner of the parcel of
land, less the portion adjudicated to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975,
covered by TCT No. 139061 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City,
and ordering said Register of Deeds
to cancel said title and to issue
another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;

Let this case be set for hearing for

the reception of plaintiff's evidence
on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the
CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter
alia, that the trial court acted without or in
26

excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary

judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo,
Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II
as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

Yet, the affidavits annexed to the

petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and

set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:

We are not unmindful of appellee's

argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage
herein impugned. The fact, however,
that appellee's own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of
their marriage is the very means by
which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the
estate left by the former call for a
closer and more thorough inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding
the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo
resolved the issues in the case, the
rule is to the effect that the material
facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should
always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19
of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:

WHEREFORE, the summary

judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein
appealed summary judgment by the
court a quo contrary to law and
public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it
was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee. Not
being an action "to recover upon a
claim" or "to obtain a declaratory
relief," the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that
no genuine issue was presented and
the desire to expedite the disposition
of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101
of the Civil Code expressly prohibit
the rendition of decree of annulment
of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment.

"Section 1. Judgment on the

pleadings. - Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for
27

annulment of marriage or for

legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)

Felicidad Sandoval, but the

number of said marriage
license was inadvertently not
placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it
was the Office Clerk who
filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in
turn, may have overlooked
the same."

Moreover, even if We were to sustain

the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage
license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on
the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside
from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed
by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of
the Peace who officiated the
impugned marriage, to wit:

Rather than the inferences merely

drawn by the trial court, We are of
the considered view that the veracity
and credibility of the foregoing
statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the
case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the
marriage contract - the primary
evidence of marriage - is not proof
that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants' nonpresentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the
same was not procured. The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof
also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party,
the same may be said of the trial
court's rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II
and his putative father on the basis of
the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's statements.

"That as far as I could

remember, there was a
marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed
by Teofilo Carlos and
28

Although it had effectively

disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the
answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind,
did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellant's
illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved

for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner
hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside
the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution,
Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are
different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner
probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;

Without trial on the merits having

been conducted in the case, We find
appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient
to support what could well be a
minor's total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the
fact that, during the last eight years
of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed
said appellant the use of his name
and the shelter of his household. The
least that the trial court could have
done in the premises was to conduct
a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.8

2. That in setting aside and reversing

the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section
1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34)
of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of
29

Rule 35 governing Summary

Judgments;

adverse party's pleading, the court

may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.

3. That in reversing and setting aside

the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground
of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9
(Underscoring supplied)

He argues that the CA should have applied

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not
limit its finding solely within the provisions
of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on
summary judgments, to wit:

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve

whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of
one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.

Moreover, even if We are to sustain

the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x11

Our Ruling
But whether it is based on judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment, the CA
was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both
the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases
of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute

nullity of marriage must be proved.
Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section
1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,

known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even
judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity

SECTION 1. Judgment on the

pleadings. - Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the
30

or annulment of marriage has been stamped

with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17,
viz.:

evidence before the judgment was

rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code
ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no
suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence,
the public prosecutor has to make sure that
the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding

judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of
evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment
shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)

To further bolster its role towards the

preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear
at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

Likewise instructive is the Court's

pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage
from the application of summary judgments.

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the

court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State
during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Prescinding from the foregoing

discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity
or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the

public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.16

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial

court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated
by the declaration of the public prosecutor
that no collusion exists between the parties.
The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting

II. A petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-1131

10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated

during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

courts. On the other hand, the

concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring
supplied)

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:

The new Rule recognizes that the husband

and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who can decide when and how
to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their
marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial
true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and
should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by
law.

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
(Underscoring supplied)

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.18

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole

right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse
may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without
any recourse under the law. They can still
32

protect their successional right, for, as stated

in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration
of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.19

person can bring an action for the

declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of
a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.26

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule

does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule
which became effective on March 15, 200320
is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,21 viz.:

Interest within the meaning of the rule

means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When plaintiff is not the real partyin-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.27

As has been emphasized, A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines,
and is prospective in its application.22
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of
marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place.23

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan

v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code
which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate "proper interest"
can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like
any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name

The marriage having been solemnized prior

to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as
to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any

33

of the real party-in-interest and must

be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held
that the children have the personality
to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.

III. The case must be remanded to

determine whether or not petitioner is a
real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that
when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
law on succession, successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called
to succeed by operation of law.30

xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the
trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same
did not allow respondent Orlando's
remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondent's marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan
lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his

property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These
heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo
II, as the surviving spouse and child,
respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who
are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and
descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing,
legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children,
and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children
referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.31
34

Clearly, a brother is not among those

considered as compulsory heirs. But
although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:

so, considering that collateral relatives, like

a brother and sister, acquire successional
right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the
direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was
predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is
finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half
of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek
the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage
is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.

ART. 1001. Should brothers and

sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other
half.
ART. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)

It bears stressing, however, that the legal

personality of petitioner to bring the nullity
of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

Indeed, only the presence of descendants,

ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the
estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.33

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate,

illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage
of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that
he has no successional right to be protected,
hence, does not have proper interest. For
although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still,
petitioner would not inherit. This is because
the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or
even an adopted child35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and

finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to
seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. This is
35

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the

case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is
called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if
it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner.

credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty

provided by Article 167 of the Family Code
to protect the status of legitimacy of a child,
to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be
considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)

IV. Remand of the case regarding the

question of filiation of respondent Teofilo
II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as
to the other causes of action before it.

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration

against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is
the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law
is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother
against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.37

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose

as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand
of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding,
We should not leave the matter hanging in
limbo.

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in

favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its
finding that the marriage in controversy was
null and void ab initio.

This Court has the authority to review

matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on
the merits having been conducted in the
case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a
total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not
inclined to support its pronouncement that
the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance
of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is

MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court in regard to the
action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be
the legitimate, or illegitimate, or
36

legally adopted son of the late

Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly
INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to

conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and
to give this case priority in its calendar.

3. The disposition of the RTC in

Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

No costs.

37