Rule 65

CERTIORARI 5
RULE 65
CERTIORARI
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013
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VICTORINO
C.
FRANCISCO,
petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
Digested by: John Daryl Josol
Facts: The petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period of one
year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or
any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31,
1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00
for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of
position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining
the complainant and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was
ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after
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deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00
as attorney's fees, plus the Costs.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose
C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision. When the
defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987,
as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. He is now before us to fault
the respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial court.
His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
memorandum decision.
Ruling: No, in the case at bar because the decision of the Court of Appeals extensively quoted
from the decision of the metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by reference in the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless
available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has
validated the memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional
infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a
condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to
be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only
by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision
of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the
facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the
decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the memorandum decision
rendered by the regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent court
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such decision on the strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability and actual review of the
decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la
Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero decision was a valid act
at the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm
the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal trial was in accord
with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as
to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed
judgment as a lawless disobedience.
NEW
vs.
FRONTIER
SUGAR
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
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REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI BANK,
Respondents
G.R. NO. 165001 January 31, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts: New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of raw
sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
The Equitable PCI Bank (respondent bank), filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude
Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer
operate because it has no assets left. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the
proceedings and dismissing the case.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied by the CA per
assailed Decision dated July 19, 2004. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing
the petition, the same could not be corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA
was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not CA correctly ruled that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when it filed
a special civil action for certiorari.
Ruling: The CA correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action
for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal
from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition
for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
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JOHNSON
LEE
and
SONNY
MORENO,
petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 137914 December 4, 2002
CORONA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing, Inc.
(NMI), with the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence before the City Prosecutor issued a
resolution absolving the petitioners from criminal liability due to lack of malice on the part of the
petitioners in retaining the money of NMI. The appeal by NMI to the DOJ was denied on the ground
that the petitioners did not misappropriate corporate funds. NMI then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution., the DOJ ordered the reinvestigation of the case. The
petitioners filed at the DOJ petitions for reinvestigation of the cases but the same were denied on
the ground that the trial court's permission should first be secured before reinvestigation can be
conducted .Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the trial court on the
ground that there was a need for reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a SEC
case pending before this Court docketed as G. R. No. 112941. The SEC case questions the validity
of the dissolution of NMI.
Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation. But, on motion for reconsideration by the prosecutor, the trial court reversed itself,
set aside the previous order and scheduled the arraignment of the petitioners. On January 19,
1996, the petitioners filed another motion to suspend the proceedings, based on the same ground
that the prejudicial question in the SEC case would determine the petitioners' guilt in the criminal
cases, thereby necessitating the suspension of the same.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the first assailed order denying petitioners' motion to
suspend the proceedings. Arraignment was scheduled on June 28, 1996. But on the day of the
arraignment, petitioner Lee failed to appear. The trial court then issued the second assailed order,
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing an additional bond in the amount of P30,000
by petitioner Lee.
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The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, questioning the said orders of the trial court. However the petition is denied.
Issue: whether or not the appellate court correclty dismissed the petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Ruling: Yes, We have consistently ruled that certiorari lies only where it is clearly shown that there
is a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Certiorari
may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court's findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but
will also unduly burden the courts. We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient
grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER CORPORATION, PERFECT DEAL CORPORATION,
MARCOS C. YUEN doing business as PERFECT BYTE COMPUTER CENTER and HON.
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 255, Las Pias City,
respondents.
G.R. No. 148029. September 24, 2002
BELLOSILLO , J.:
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against
Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing
business as Perfect Byte Computer Center. It alleged that defendants without authority or license
copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into
computer units sold by them to their customers in violation of its intellectual property rights. It
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from
illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs.
The trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but at the same
time denied its application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code
does not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case, the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it. In the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court petitioner submits that the court a quo
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gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law
does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence.
Issue: Whether or not trial court acted with grave abused of its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling: No, Will the extraordinary writ of certiorari lie? For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
amending or nullifying the proceeding. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include correction of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings thereon.
The petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari.
We find that the court below acted within its jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint
for injunction and damages filed by petitioner.
MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner,vs.ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation Officer I

and/or OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA AGULO,
DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, and the BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
RENO CAPINPIN of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO
B. PRANTILLA, and NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 134372. August 22, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university. Respondent, Dr. Sixto
O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary
grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said
university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D., At the end of the semester, Dr.
Daleon gave the three final passing grades. They were graded without requiring them to attend
regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading
materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers. several doctoral students
complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were ghost
students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these ghost students, namely
Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes. The
matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University President,
Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the complaint.
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Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and violation of
R.A. 6770. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent
members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said
criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative
complaint. A Resolution was issued dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against
respondents.
Issue: Whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability
Ruling: No, A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an
extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Courts power of
judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be
subjected to our review under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. We note that
the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the
records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case. Petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of
Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest
partiality in the performance of their official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents
below from both administrative and criminal charges.
ROBERT DEL MAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 139008. March 13, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: After peaceful and continuous possession by petitioner of the subject properties for more
than twenty-two (22) years, a complaint for reconveyance was filed by private respondent against
petitioner on May 15, 1997, alleging, inter-alia, that petitioner obtained the aforementioned
Certificates of Title through fraud and deceit. Private respondent claimed that said properties were
left by her under the administration of petitioner, who allegedly transferred the ownership of said
realty in his name by causing the issuance of Certificates of Title in his name without her
knowledge and consent. However, records show that before she left for the United States, private
respondent executed the corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner. This case,
entitled Norma Ebersole del Mar represented by Gerald del Mar vs. Roberto del Mar and the
Register of Deeds, Province of Isabela was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Branch 35 and docketed as Civil Case No. 2373.
In his Answer, petitioner claimed that private respondent and her co-owner, Florence Ebersole
Finch, sold said properties to him before the former left for the United States. Moreover, the
properties were transferred for good, sufficient and valuable consideration, hence the sale was
lawful and valid. During the pre-trial conference, neither petitioner nor his counsel, Atty. Federico
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Abuan, appeared, by reason of which the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner as in
default. The non-appearance was due to the failure of Atty. Abuan, Jr. to inform petitioners
attorney-in-fact, Angelita Austria, of the scheduled hearing. Said petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied, and private respondent was allowed to adduce her
evidence ex-parte. On the same day that said motion was denied, the trial court rendered its
October 21, 1997 decision in favor of private respondent and against petitioner. Petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal. On January 7, 1998.The counsel for private respondent, moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that petitioner had failed to file the required brief within the reglementary
period, the CA granted the Motion to Dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling in favor of private respondent.
Ruling: No, Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of Court, expressly authorizes the CA to
dismiss an appeal for, inter alia, failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies
of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the following requisites concur: (a) a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no
appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for annulling or
modifying the proceeding.
LEUNG
BEN,
plaintiff,
vs.
P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY, judges of First Instance of city of
Manila, defendants.
G.R. No. L-13602 April 6, 1918
STREET, J.:
Facts: An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to
recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant
in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted ruing the two or three months
prior to the institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the plaintiff asked for an attachment,
against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the
Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued; and acting under
the authority thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the
defendant with the International Banking Corporation.
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The defendant thereupon appeared by his attorney and moved the court to quash the attachment.
Said motion having dismissed in the Court of First Instance, the petitioner, Leung Ben, the
defendant in that action, presented to this court, upon January 8, 1918 his petition for the writ of
certiorari directed against P. J. O'Brien and the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila. The provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be
a cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied. The contention of the petitioner is that
the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is that the statutory action to recover money
lost at gaming is no such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he therefore insists
that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid
thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of
attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise;
and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for his relief.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of certiorari is the appropriate remedy for the relief.
Ruling: No, when a court issues a writ of attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is
acting irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme
Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. In applying this proposition it is of course necessary
to take account of the difference between a ground of attachment based on the nature of the action
and a ground of attachment based on the acts or the conditions of the defendant. Every complaint
must show a cause of action some sort; and when the statue declares that the attachment may
issue in an action arising upon contract, the express or implied, it announces a criterion which may
be determined from an inspection of the language of the complaint. The determination of this
question is purely a matter of law. On the other hand, when the stature declares that an attachment
may be issued when the defendant is about to depart from the Islands, a criterion is announced
which is wholly foreign to the cause of action; and the determination of it may involve a disputed
question of fact which must be decided by the court. In making this determination, the court
obviously acts within its powers; and it would be idle to suppose that the writ of certiorari would be
available to reverse the action of a Court of First Instance in determining the sufficiency of the proof
on such a disputed point, and in granting or refusing the attachment accordingly.
In our opinion the cause of action stated in the complaints in the court below is based on a
contract, express or implied and is therefore of such nature that the court had authority to issue writ
of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore be denied and the
proceedings dismissed.
MARIANO TENGCO, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE JOCSON, judge of first instance of Bulacan, ANASTACIO SANTOS, and CIPIRANO
LOMOTAN,
G.R. No. 19427 September 2, 1922
JOHNSON, J.:
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Facts: This is an original petition in SC for writ of prohibition, to refrain respondent judge from
taking jurisdiction and deciding municipal election protest. Upon presentation of petition, an order
was issued to respondents to show cause why the prayer should not be granted. Respondents
Santos and CFI Judge Jocson filed separate answers.
On June 6, 1922, general election was held in municipality of Malolos. On June 8, 1922, the board
of municipal inspectors declared that petitioner Tengco had been duly elected as municipality
president. On June 15, 1922, respondent Santos presented motion of protest in CFI protesting said
election.
On June 23, 1922, petitioner Tengco had a general denial to the facts of the motion of protest and
alleged that the facts were not sufficient to constitute an election protest nor to justify judicial
investigation of said election, and prayed that motion of protest be dismissed. Petitioner theory is
that protestant did not allege in his motion that he was a registered candidate voted for such
election, that he has no right to present said motion, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
On July 7, 1922 or more than two (2) weeks after the election, respondent Santos presented
amended motion, changing the allegation that he was a candidate voted for to a registered
candidate voted for. CFI permitted said amendment and denied petitioners Motion to dismiss,
and directed that cause be set for trial .
Issue: Whether or not the CFI is given special jurisdiction in election protest cases, acquire
jurisdiction to hear and determine such protest when it is presented by any other person or persons
than those designated by the law
Ruling: No, It may be said that the Election Law makes the Court of First Instance a court of
special jurisdiction, and provides a special procedure for hearing and determining a motion of
protest in election cases. The Court of First Instance, being a court of special jurisdiction, has no
jurisdiction over an election protest until the special facts upon which it may take jurisdiction are
expressly shown in the "motion of protest." There is no presumption in favor of the jurisdiction. It is
a well-established rule that the records of a court of special jurisdiction must affirmatively show that
the court has jurisdiction. When a court is given special statutory jurisdiction, under proceedings
different from the ordinary proceedings, the special jurisdictional facts must appear. The special
jurisdictional facts must be shown by the records, both with respect to the jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, as well as with respect to the jurisdiction of the parties.
From all of the foregoing decisions, we must conclude that if the "motion of protest" does not show
upon its face that it was presented by "registered candidate voted for," the Court of First Instance
acquires no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition or motion.
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PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner,
vs.
SILANGAN INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INC. and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 167055-56 March 25, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner,
vs.
POLYGON INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INCORPORATED and SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 170673
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

Facts: G.R. Nos. 167055 and 167056 involve a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 21 June 2004 Resolution and 23 December 2004
Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. G.R. No. 170673 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 7 July and 25 October 2005
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
.
PCGG issued writs of sequestration against Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (Aerocom) and
Polygon. By virtue of the writs of sequestration, PCGG sequestered majority of Oceanics shares of
stock and took over its management. PCGG voted the shares of stock registered in the names of
Silangan and Polygon, reorganized the board of directors, elected its own set of officers, and
declared cash dividends.
On 1 August 1991, Jose, Nieto, Jr., Andres L. Africa, Aerocom, Polygon, Belgor Investment, Inc.,
and Silangan filed before the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against PCGG. The Sandiganbayan granted Silangans motion and released
the uncontested 49% of the cash dividends, with interest, declared by Oceanic. In its 25 October
2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs 20 July 2005 motion for reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan held that, "Since Polygon is not sequestered, its shares are not sequestered too,
and its dividends which follow the principal are not also sequestered, Polygon is entitled to receive
its share on the dividends declared by Oceanic to its Class "A" shareholders in the amount of
P25,786,357.59."
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Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
release of the cash dividends, with interest.
Ruling: No, In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show
that respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy
narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It
offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its
jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
JULIE'S FRANCHISE CORPORATION, ROBERTO R. GANDIONCO, JOSE ENRICO R.

GANDIONCO, CORNELIO R. GANDIONCO, JOSEPH R. GANDIONCO, PATRICIA CARLA G.
UY, VIRGILIO G. ESPELETA, EMMANUEL E. VIADO, ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, and
ATTY.
INOCENTES
C.
PEPITO,
JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CHANDLER O. RUIZ in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Dipolog City, HON. YOLINDA C. BAUTISTA in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Dipolog City, and RICHARD EMMANUEL G. DANCEL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180988 August 28, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
Facts: Respondent Dancel, as franchisee, entered into three franchise agreements with petitioner
corporation, as franchiser, over the bakeshop. In 2003, respondent Dancel decided to renew the
franchise agreements for the three Julies bakeshops. Three months before the expiration of the
franchise agreements, petitioner corporation evaluated the performance of the three Julies
bakeshops and the results were favorable. Respondent Dancel paid the renewal fees for the next
five years of the franchise agreements covering the three Julies bakeshops. However, when
respondent Dancel and his business partner Jose Rodion Uy dissolved their business partnership,
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petitioner corporation informed respondent Dancel that it was terminating the three franchise
agreements and that the extended term of the franchises would expire on 30 June 2005.
Respondent Dancel filed against petitioner corporation a complaint for Specific Performance with
prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order before
the trial court. The trial court denied respondent Dancels application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
resolved to grant the Temporary Restraining Order, effective for 60 days from notice, restraining or
enjoining petitioner corporation from terminating the franchise agreements. Respondent Dancel
filed with the trial court a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In a Joint
Resolution6 dated 19 July 2007, the trial court resolved to issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
accordance with the Court of Appeals Decision, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC acted without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction.
Ruling: No, the petitioner questions the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. We find no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court,
which merely issued the questioned Writ of Preliminary Injunction in accordance with the decision
of the Court of Appeals which has already attained finality. Such decision has become final and
executory after petitioner corporations appeal to this Court was denied for being filed beyond the
reglementary period. Except to correct clerical errors, a judgment which has acquired finality can
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct a perceived
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. There would be no end to litigation if parties are allowed to
relitigate issues which were already resolved with finality.
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction The writ of certiorari is directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.
SEVERINO
B.
VERGARA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174567 March 12, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
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Facts: The City Council of Calamba issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001. The resolution
authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real,
Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing on 3 October 2001, the choice
for the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin,
Calamba. The City Council passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to
purchase several lots owned by Pamana. Through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following
agreements: (1) MOA, (2) Deed of Sale, (3) Deed of Real Estate Mortgage And (4) Deed of
Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment.
On 19 November 2001, the above documents were endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner alleged
that all these documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted in an Audit
Observation Memorandum dated 9 August 2002 and issued by State Auditor Ruben C. Pagaspas
of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and mandamus against the City
Mayor, the City Treasurer, the President of Pamana, Inc., and the Vice President and Trust Officer
of the Prudential Bank for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding no probable cause to hold
any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the Ombudsman dismissed for lack of probable cause the case against
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ruling: No, In this case, the Ombudsman dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of probable
cause based on the Ombudsmans appreciation and review of the evidence presented. In
dismissing the complaint, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. We reiterate
the rule that courts do not interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsmans finding of probable cause,
or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
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CONCEPCION
V.
VDA,
DE
DAFFON,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA, DE DAFFON, AILEEN
DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE
DAFFON, respondents.
G.R. No. 129017 August 20, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom she begot one son, Joselito
Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmea, and they bore six children. Joselito died after his
father's demise. Respondent Lourdes, together with her six children, instituted an action for
partition against petitioner over the properties left by Amado which formed part of his conjugal
partnership with petitioner. Respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado and
petitioner be partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between
petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito, on the other hand. Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the same. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
also denied by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, but the latter dismissed the same.
Issue: Whether or not CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Ruling: For certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave
abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court
exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for
certiorari.
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GABRIEL
L.
DUERO,
petitioner,
vs.
HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: In a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership filed by petitioner Gabriel L.
Duero against private respondent Bernardo A Eradel and two others, private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file his answer. As a consequence, judgment was rendered in favor
of the petitioner. Private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, but was denied by the trial court.
Subsequently, he filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment based on the same ground as in his
motion for new trial. But the said petition was denied by the trial court. In a motion for
reconsideration, he alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the
land was only P5,240. Again, it was denied by the trial court. Private respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. The appellate court gave due course to the petition by maintaining that
private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Ruling: No, The Court could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC. The fundamental
rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or
even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at anytime and at any stage of the action. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. But
here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and
that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent
Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the law and
jurisprudence on the matter. Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.
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Dillena v. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 77660
Digested by: Dahn S. Uy
Facts: Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August 21,
1974, in Quezon City and Manila, respectively, leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon,
private respondent herein. On October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased
Rufino Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian Petition for Letters of
Administration" before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974, the said
court appointed Fausta Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose of receiving
and collecting all sums of money due and payable to the estate, in addition to the powers and
duties provided for under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. After hearing the petition and
the opposition therein, the lower court, on October 28, 1985, denied the petition and ordered
petitioner to return physical possession of the fishponds to private respondent. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the aforesaid order which was denied. On February 20, 1986, a petition for
certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the respondent Court of Appeals and as earlier
mentioned, the said court, on November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. The matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals in upholding the order of the trial court, deprived him of
his property without due process of law because he was not a proper party in the court a quo acted
with grave abuse of discretion
Held: the probate court still gave him fifteen (15) days to submit the required explanation and the
case was re-set to November 11, 1981. But then again, petitioner, despite receipt of the second
notice requiring his appearance, chose not to appear and totally ignored the order of the probate
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court to submit the explanation. One who was given full opportunity to present his evidence and
who failed to do so cannot complain that he was denied due process when the court rendered its
decision. Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a petition before the probate court, by way of
special appearance, precisely questioning the power of the said court to declare null and void the
sale of the fishponds involved herein. As has been stated, the lower court after hearing the petition
and the opposition thereto denied the same. Clearly, petitioner was given full opportunity to present
his case. Thus, We give no credence to petitioner's assertion that he was denied due process of
law. der dated September 13, 1984, nullifying the deed of sale had long become final and
executory for failure of petitioner to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period. On this score
alone, the petition for certiorari which was belatedly filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals
on February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari does
not lie where appeal has been lost. certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal.
VDA. De Caldito v. Segundo

G.R. no. L-58187
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Facts: Petitioner seeks to annul an order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V, in Civil Case No. U-3484 dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioner for
the recovery of damages for the death of her husband who was killed while riding a motorized
tricycle owned and operated by the private respondent when the same was bumped by a truck
while travelling on the public highway in Villasis, Pangasinan in the evening of December 19,1972
Issue: Whether or not the institution is barred by statute of limitation of 4 years on Quasi-delicts or
10 years based on a contract of carriage
Held: The petitioner is seeking to avail of the remedy of certiorari as a substitute for appeal. The
questioned order of dismissal is appealable and the proper remedy should have been to appeal the
same. No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not observed, nor to
justify a deviation from the same as to make available a petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an
appropriate appeal. As may be noted, the petition was filed almost one (1) year after the issuance
of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in situations wherein certiorari is allowed as a
remedy in lieu of appeal, said period may not be considered as a reasonable time within which to
avail of such a remedy. Moreover, the imputed error to the challenged order is not jurisdictional but
merely one of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
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MMDA v. Jancom Environmental Corp.

G.R. no. 14765

Facts:
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A build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste-to energy project was signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to President Ramos
for approval but was then too close to the end of his term that his term expired without him signing
the contract. He, however, endorsed the same to incoming President Estrada. With the change in
administration came changes in policy and economic environment, thus the BOT contract was not
pursued and implemented. JANCOM appealed to the President for reconsideration and despite the
pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused the publication of an invitation to pre-qualify and submit
proposals for solid waste management.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and JANCOM.
Held:
There is a valid and binding contract between JANCOM and the Republic of the Philippines. Under
Articles 1305 of the Civil Code, A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Art. 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is perfected by mere consent. Consent, on the
other hand, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract (Art. 1319, Civil Code). In the case at bar, the signing
and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the parties, there was a
concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of the contract, thereby
giving rise to the perfection of the absence of Presidents signature is untenable. Significantly, the
contract itself provides that the signature of the President is necessary only for its effectivity, not its
perfection.
There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent
of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. (Art. 1315) It is a general principle of law that no
one may be permitted to change hid mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to
proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
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Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 134278
Facts: On May 24, 1990, the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now
Philippine National Police or PNP, launched OPLAN AJAX to minimize, if not entirely eliminate, the
extortion activities of traffic policemen at the vicinity of Guadalupe Bridge, Makati, Metro Manila. On
July 5, 1990, at about three oclock in the afternoon, two operatives of OPLAN AJAX, namely, 2LT
Federico Bulanday, PC and Intelligence Agent Angelito C. Leoncio, both members of the CounterIntelligence Group (CIG) stationed at Camp Crame, Quezon City, were on board a car with Plate
No. NDK-238. They were traveling along J.P. Rizal Street, Makati, when they were flagged down by
three policemen in uniform. These were petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez, PFC Arsenio Silungan,
and PFC Rolando Pilandi. All were members of the Metropolitan Traffic Command assigned with
the Makati Police Station. An administrative case for grave misconduct was subsequently filed
against Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi, who was at large, with the National Police Commission
or NAPOLCOM. Docketed as Adm. Case No. 90-80, the case was assigned to Atty. Narzal B.
Mallares as hearing officer. A second administrative case was filed with NAPOLCOM against the
three erring police officers for their summary dismissal. A charge for robbery/extortion was filed with
Headquarters, PC-INP. It was docketed as Adm. Case No. 01-91 and assigned to P/Major Efren
Santos as Summary Hearing Officer. On July 13, 1998, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
under Rule 45.
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Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez
Held: Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is
affirmed by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the
dismissal with the DILG Secretary. That the NAPOLCOM Chairman is also the DILG Secretary is of
no moment, for under the aforecited laws and regulations, only the DILG Secretary can act on the
appeal. Besides, what is involved here is not the sole act of the NAPOLCOM Chairman, but the
decision of the Commission. Should the DILG Secretarys decision prove adverse to appellant,
then he as the aggrieved party may bring an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In instances
where the CSC denies the appeal, the remedy under R.A. No. 7902 would be to appeal the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. In the instant case, petitioner had three opportunities to
appeal the decision of the NAPOLCOM. He chose not to avail of them, but instead opted to file an
action for certiorari and mandamus with the appellate court. As we have stated in the Decision,
which is now under review, this Commission affirmed the summary dismissal from the service of
herein respondent-appellant, because he was caught in the act of committing robbery extortion in
an entrapment operation and, when subjected to laboratory examination, was found positive with
ultraviolet fluorescent powder on both palmary portions of his hands, face and arms, including his
left pants pocket, where pieces of P20.00 bills were found when searched. Wherefore instant
petition is denied.
Conejos v. Court of Appeals

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G.R. no. 149473
Facts: Respondent EUTIQUIO PLANIA alleged in his Complaint for specific performance/rescission
with damages filed with the municipal trial court that on 19 September 1989 he entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement with Teresita Pacaa Conejos whereby they agreed that each of
them would pay half of the purchase price of the 134-square-meter residential lot situated in Tisa,
Labangon, Cebu City, subject matter hereof, and that upon full payment they would equally divide
the lot and register it in their individual names. The Regional Trial Court, Br. 9, of Cebu
City reversed the MTCC. It ruled that except for the unilateral claim by Conejos that
the Memorandum of Agreement had been cancelled no other evidence was proffered to prove the
same. It ratiocinated that a written agreement like the subject Memorandum of Agreement could
not be considered abandoned by the mere say-so of one of the parties thereto. The Borromeo
Bros. Estate, Inc., need not even be informed of the Agreement for its validity because the latter
was not a party to it and as such the Agreementremained binding as between Plania and Conejos.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not ruling for the mutual cancellation by both parties of
the Memorandum of Agreement.
Held: The court held that there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as
one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant
case do not justify a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was filed way
beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor
any reasonable explanation being proffered by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she cited are
without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the issues raised before and judiciously resolved by
the courts a quo. The issues require a review of the factual findings which, verily, could not be done
because this Court is not a trier of facts. More importantly, a reading of the records of the case
strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate courts did not abuse their discretion
in assessing their factual findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by the records of the
case and grounded in law. The instant petition for certiorari is dismissed.
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Felizardo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 112050
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Facts: Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot located at No. 6320th St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with
an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner
Quintin Felizardo. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Olongapo City. On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner. On
September 17, 1992, upon motion of the private respondent, the court issued an order for the
execution of its decision. The matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari instituted by the petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City to challenge the judgment rendered by the court a quo
Held: It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available only where the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. It is also the rule that this special civil action should not be allowed as a
substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there are other remedies available.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the case lodged by the private respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had
filed his answer to the complaint. The only question is whether that court, in continuing to act on
the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary
appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner was the proper
remedy, the same cannot be granted as it cannot be said that the court a quo committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding the allegations for the issuance of preliminary injunction to be
sufficient compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. We agree with the Regional Trial
Court that: Thus, when the lower court allegedly disregarded the counterclaims of petitioner, when
it refused to rule on "compensation off-setting" and ruled that the application for a provisional
remedy in the complaint for ejectment was not sham or that it was not proved as such, and also
when said court failed to dismiss the case for lack of compliance with the requirement of PD 1508
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court . . . It cannot be said that
respondent judge acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner to be said to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Besides, as already pointed out, the petitioner had other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies available to him under Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules of Court.
Therefore the petition is denied.
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Escudero v. Dulay
G.R. no 60578
Facts: On 18 July 1979, petitioner Araceli D. Escudero, wife of petitioner Paterno D. Escudero,
executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale under Pacto de Retro" in favor of private respondents, the
Amistad spouses, over a parcel of residential land in Lapu-Lapu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9223 of the Register of Deeds of that city. The consideration stated in the
document was P42,350.00. Redemption was to be made by the vendors within three (3) months
after the execution of the Deed of Sale, at the same price of P42,350.00. The period of redemption
expired without an offer of repurchase being made by petitioner wife or her husband, petitioner
Paterno D. Escudero, who had earlier given his wife a special power of attorney "to sell, transfer,
mortgage and convey" the land subject of the pacto de retro sale, which was the spouses' conjugal
property. The respondent trial court rendered judgment against petitioners. The court held that the
interpretation by petitioners' counsel of par. 3 of Art. 1606 of the Civil Code was misplaced, as
decisions have uniformly held that the provision applies only to situations where there is a dispute
as to the nature of a transaction either as a true sale with right of repurchase or an equitable
mortgage, and not where the parties admit or agree that the transaction is a true sale, as
petitioners' counsel did admit or stipulate in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals and that the trial court erred in its decision
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Held: Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or
cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where,
however, the application of this rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule
may be relaxed. While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of
justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and
circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the
outright deprivation of their property through a technicality. The Court cannot close its eyes to the
petitioner wife's affirmative and special defense, under oath in her Answer before the respondent
trial court that her transaction with private respondents was not a pacto de retro sale but an
equitable mortgage. The Court cannot also but take note of petitioners' evidence to support such
verified defense, notably the incriminating note signed by the agent of both parties in which the real
nature of the questioned transaction is revealed. Therefore the appealed decisions are reversed
and set aside.
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Acain v. IAC
G.R. no. 72706
Facts: While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences
of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and
equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of
each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright
deprivation of their property through a technicality. The Court cannot close its eyes to the petitioner
wife's affirmative and special defense, under oath in her Answer before the respondent trial court
that her transaction with private respondents was not a pacto de retro sale but an equitable
mortgage. The Court cannot also but take note of petitioners' evidence to support such verified
defense, notably the incriminating note signed by the agent of both parties in which the real nature
of the questioned transaction is revealed. espondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private
respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
Issue: whether or not private respondents have been pretirite
Held: Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar
as the legitimes are concerned. In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited . It was denied by
the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to
dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial
on the merits of the case. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985. Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and
prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by
the trial court in not dismissing the case, and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari
may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. Petition
is denied for lack of merit.
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Saludes v. Pajarillo
G.R. no. L-1121
Facts: Conchita Vda. de Saludes, herein petitioner and appellant, brought an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on November 12, 1945, to annul a deed of sale a house and lot executed
by her in favor of the herein respondent and appellee, Gregorio Pajarillo. During the pendency of
the suit, respondent Pajarillo filed an action for ejectment in the municipal court of Manila against
petitioner Saludes to compel her to vacate said house and lot. Petitioner Saludes filed in that case
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a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was another action pending between the same
parties and for the same cause and that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. The motion
was heard and submitted for resolution. The municipal court, however, presided over by Judge
Vicente Bautista, without acting upon said motion for dismissal, and without a trial upon the merits,
rendered judgment ordering the defendant Saludes to vacate said premises, pay the rental at the
rate of eighty pesos per month beginning July 1st, 1946, until she leaves the premises and
surrenders possession thereof to plaintiff, plus costs of suit. Whereupon, Saludes filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial mainly upon the ground that the judgment was a patent nullity there
having been no trial on the merits wherein both parties could introduce their evidence. While this
motion was pending, Judge Bautista, upon motion of Pajarillo, and without notice upon Saludes,
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul said judgment. The
petition was denied upon the ground that the remedy was appeal. And Saludes appealed to this
Court.
Issue: Whether or not Saludes is entitled to the petition sought for
Held: It is only after the defendant has answered the complaint that the court may proceed to the
trial of the case on the merits. In the trial, first the plaintiff is entitled to testify and to introduce the
testimony of his witnesses, and next the defendant may also testify and offer the testimony of his
witnesses, and finally plaintiff may offer rebutting testimony. After testimony has been closed, the
parties or their representatives may be heard in argument . And at the conclusion of such trial and
not before, may the court render judgment according to the law and the facts proved by the
evidence duly presented by the parties . Thus, the trial to which a defendant is entitled is one in
which he has a full opportunity to present all the evidence he may have in support of all the
defenses or counterclaims duly pleaded by him. The court has no authority to hold the trial before
defendant had an opportunity to plead, and has no power to limit such trial to a mere questioning of
the parties as to what their stand on the case is, particularly when the questioning is made at a
time when a motion to dismiss is being heard, the parties having no idea at the moment that the
trial of the case is already being held and confined to such interrogatory. Under such
circumstances, in answering the questions of the court, statements may be made by the parties
which are not intended as a pleading or testimony and may thus be devoid of accuracy and
completeness; facts may have been stated without care, with omission of important circumstances
that may be of decisive influence; and since the parties, or at least the defendant did not know that
she was testifying in a formal trial, she may have failed to mention other issues and other
transactions that may affect or change the meaning of all the statements she has actually made.
We believe and so hold that such procedure is irregular and arbitrary, conducive to confusion and
injustice, and is null and void. Respondent contends that certiorari was improper because an
appeal from the decision of the municipal court was available. This contention is untenable. An
appeal under the circumstances was not an adequate remedy there being an order of execution
issued by the municipal court. Judgment appealed from is reversed and judgment of the mtc is set
aside.
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PNB v. Florendo
G.R. no 62082
Facts: Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located in the municipality of Mabinay,
Negros Oriental, whose previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the Philippine
National Bank . In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria
who assumed the mortgage with PNB. In 1974, defendant PNB requested defendant Provincial
Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the
failure of the owners thereof to pay certain amortization and the same was sold at public auction to
the defendant bank as the highest bidder . Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were already
brought under the Land Reform Program of the government, the PNB caused the titles to said
parcels of land transferred in its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs. The trial court ruled in favor
plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in admitting the First
Amended Complaint which adds another parcel of land not within the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. Jurisdiction, in general, is either one over the nature of
the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issue framed in
the. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the other hand, is conferred by law and does not
depend on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. The
order of the respondent Judge admitting the First Amended Complaint including therein said
questioned Lot 787-B-2-A which is a residential lot not falling within the ambit of PD 27, hence,
beyond CAR's jurisdiction, was issued in excess of jurisdiction. The term excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction
while acting. Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction. It is the proper remedy "where it clearly appears that the trial court is proceeding in
excess or outside of its jurisdiction, Since the "office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose", said
remedy is available in the instant case to keep the trial court from proceeding in the case in excess
of its jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted.
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Jose v. Zulueta
G.R. no. 6598

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Facts: Pursuant to a decision duly rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case
No. 11927 and affirmed by the Supreme Court, therein defendant Jose C. Zulueta was ordered to
pay therein plaintiff George Edward Koster, Inc. "the sum of P46,093.77 with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from September 27, 1949, with respect to the sum of P30,000.00; and from
December 8, 1949, as to the sum of P16,093.77, until the entire amount is fully paid." Said decision
having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on December 28, 1956. After
due hearing on the matter, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dated July 30, 1959, holding
that there was condonation of the interest payable by Zulueta effected prior to transfer of G. E.
Koster Inc.'s interest to the Exchange Investments, Ltd., and that the trial court, therefore, gravely
erred in issuing the alias writ of execution for the collection of said interest. The alias writ of
execution was set aside and the preliminary injunction made permanent. The petitioner now comes
to us seeking to nullify the said decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
Held: In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the trial court's order of January 16, 1959, directing
the issuance of the alias writ of execution in question, as well as that of March 12, 1959, denying
respondent Zulueta's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, not being interlocutory, are
appealable. No appeal from said orders, however, was interposed within the reglementary period,
nor any reason given for such failure. Under the circumstances, and the right to appeal having
been lost for reasons not herein proved to be excusable, a petition for certiorari is not proper.
Evidently, the above pronouncement contemplates of instances where there is right to appeal, said
right still existing and available, but would be inadequate to prevent the injury or wrong sought to
be corrected. Hence, this Court declared that certiorari may be allowed. This pronouncement
cannot be invoked in the instant case, because not only is there no showing that appeal from the
disputed orders would be inadequate and insufficient he right to such appeal, at the remedy, but
also that, the right to such appeal, at the time the petition for certiorari was filed, has already be lost
through respondent's own fault negligence and no longer available. Furthermore, the
execution of the order (to enforce collection of the interest) was made after the expiration of the
period to appeal without such appeal having been perfected. Clearly, respondent lost his right to
question the correctness of said order. The decision of the C.A. is reversed and set aside and the
decision of the RTC affirmed.
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Marcelo v. De Guzman
G.R. no. 29077
Facts: The antecedent facts are not disputed. At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of June 21,
1966, Sgt. Alejandro Quirante, a PC officer detailed with the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, PARGO for short, applied with Judge Jose C. de Guzman, presiding
judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch III, for a search warrant to search the premises of
the KANEBO Laboratory at No. 55 Times St., Quezon City. The application was filed in connection
with Criminal Case No. 558, wherein, curiously enough, the "KANEBO Laboratory" was named as
accused. Her motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, Marcelo filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a petition for certiorari and mandamus against Judge Jose C. de Guzman,
Bartolome Cabangbang, in his capacity as chairman of the PARGO, Capt. Reynaldo San Gabriel,
Sgt. Alejandro Quirante and their agents, deputies and/or representatives, praying that the warrant
in question be declared nun and void and that the personal properties seized thereunder he
restored to her. The petition was given due course and, after the answer of respondents was filed,
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the case was submitted for resolution on the bases of the parties' pleadings and memoranda. The
matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari.
Held: A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the
search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character because it
leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of
the accused therein. In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is
indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search
warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized"; and that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. Moreover, an appeal from the
order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of
the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in total
paralization of her business, and recourse in appeal would have unduly delayed recovery of the
articles and documents which had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot
afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to
prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. Petition is denied.
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St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos

G.R. no. L-38280
Facts: In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed
suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (or Memorial Park for short), Araceli Wijangco del
Rosario, National Investment and Development Corporation (or NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank (or Banco Filipino for short), the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City and the Sheriff of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-15001). In their amended
complaint, the spouses prayed that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the
Piedad Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceased
predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933; that the certificates of title over
said lot in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the
certificates of title from which these certificates were derived be declared null and void; that the
mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and
void; and that the Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. The amended complaint
likewise sought issuance of preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The lower
court ordered appointment of a receiver, but upon filing of a bond by the Memorial Park, the
receivership was lifted. After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Issue: whether or not the respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
joint appeal of the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974.
Held: As contended by herein respondents, the general rule is that the extraordinary writ
of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, we have granted the writ in
cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly
relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of to avoid future litigations, we
passed upon a petition for certiorari though the proper remedy was appeal. This rule for the
granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are
primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities. In making the foregoing conclusions, we do not by any means intend to prejudge the
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effect of such evidence on the outcome of the case. We are confining ourselves to the conclusion
that the evidence intended to be submitted, "would probably alter the result. We hold that
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, having
disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence. The case is
remanded to the trial court for new trial and the orders declared null and void.
Marahay v. Melicor
G.R. no. L-44980
Facts: petitioner filed with respondent court an action for recovery of real property against
Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later, the complaint was amended to implead and include other
defendants, the other private respondents herein, as indispensable parties. After the issues were
joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974, but this was deferred to a later date due to
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the absence of petitioner and her counsel. On April 4, 1975, the same case was again scheduled
for pre-trial but the same did not proceed due to the fact that petitioner appeared without her
counsel while only one of the defendants appeared with counsel. Later, informed of her lawyer's
inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer, Atty. Dominador
Monjardin, who was present at the next pre-trial conference held on October 9, 1975.Trial on the
merits commenced on November 13, 1975 with the petitioner taking the witness stand on direct
examination. The defense failed to cross-examine her since the proceedings were cut short for lack
of time and the continuation thereof was set for January 19, 1976. The motion to dismiss, which
was made orally in open court, was submitted for resolution by the trial court. As earlier stated, the
court below in its order dated February 27, 1976, dismissed the complaint. Two motions for
reconsideration were filed by petitioner but the same were denied by respondent judge, hence, the
present special civil action.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the case and, consequently, denying petitioner
the right to fully prosecute her case.
Held: While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the
exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or
scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. Further, when a party, without malice,
fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its
discretion if a reasonable opportunity is denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining due
process of law. Time and again, we have emphasized that the rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy but, more
importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. Therefore the
petition for certiorari is granted.
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Asian Trading Corp. v. Court of appeals

G.R. no. 76276
Facts: On November 25, 1983, Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank) filed a Complaint against the
petitioners, which was later amended, for the collection of the sum of P2,700,000.00 plus interest
and attorney's fees. Docketed as Civil Case No. 5775 before Branch 136 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. On July 25, 1985, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and rendered
judgment in favor of the Bank. The matter was elevated up to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that appeal was the proper remedy and not
certiorari
Held: The petition is devoid of merit. In dismissing petitioners's petition for certiorari, the
respondent court relied on Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribing the
requirements for a petition for certiorari, to wit (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Well entrenched to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that certiorari will
only lie if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when 'there is no appeal nor
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plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.' Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, Apt and proper is the
observation by the respondent court that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of or
appealing from, subject judgment, the petitioners resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
which is unavailable under the antecedent facts and circumstances. Anent petitioners's protestation
of deprivation of due process, the respondent court erred not when it considered the yearning of
petitioners to present evidence before the trial court, as an empty formality and exercise in futility. ".
. . The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Therefore the
petition is denied.
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Mangaliag v. Pastoral
G.R. no. 143951
Facts: On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The complaint
alleges that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., private respondent, together with Marco
de Leon, Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a tricycle driven by Jayson
Laforte; while in Pagal, San Carlos City, a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven by
her employee, petitioner Solano, coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake and bypass
a tricycle in front of it and thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the tricycle ridden by
private respondent; due to the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of petitioner Solano
in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and
permanent deformities; petitioner Mangaliag failed to exercise due diligence required by law in the
selection and supervision of her employee; private respondent was hospitalized and
spent P71,392.00 as medical expenses; private respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity
due to a fractured nose and suffers from severe depression as a result thereof, for which he should
be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral damages; as a further result of his
hospitalization, private respondent lost income of P25,000.00; private respondent engaged the
services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to 25% of the total award. On April 17, 2000, the
respondent RTC Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, issued the first assailed Order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: the court , as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases
of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. In the present case, no judgment
has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the
alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not
control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. In any event, the petition for certiorari is bereft of
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merit. The petitioners reliance in the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs.
Cyborg Leasing Corporation is misplaced. The claim for damages therein was based on a breach
of a contract of lease, not a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, as in this case. Besides, there
was no claim therein for moral damages. Furthermore, moral damages are generally not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract in view of the provisions of
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Wherefore the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Romero v. C.A.
G.R. no. 142406
Facts: On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract
to sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden. In said contract, private respondent proposed to
purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145269, for the total amount
of P17M. The contract stipulated that private respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M
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upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later than December 19,
1996 and that private respondent shall shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the
property. The motion for reconsideration was denied and the petition for certiorari was filed in the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering of the reannotation of the notice
Held: Petitioners contend that: the notice of lis pendens is not necessary in this case since the
complaint does not pray for an express award of ownership or possession; what is involved in this
case is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale, thus, no title has passed to private respondent
yet which needs to be protected by a notice of lis pendens; by ordering the re-annotation of the
notice of lis pendens, when private respondent did not even assert a claim of possession or title
over the subject property, the CA went against the doctrine in Villanueva vs. Court of
Appeals, where this Court held that the applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the
subject litigation, assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property in order to give due
course to his application; the CA, in concluding that there was no hearing before the annotation
was cancelled, overlooked the fact that the motion for cancellation was set for hearing on
November 12, 1997, that private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear, and that he was
able to file his opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which the RTC considered before
promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, 1997. Lis pendens, which literally means pending
suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a
suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy
and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is
in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so
at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. Whether or not
the claim of private respondent has merit is of no moment and should not affect the annotation of
lis pendens on the title of the subject property. There is nothing in the rules which requires a party
seeking annotation of lis pendens to show that the land belongs to him. There is no requirement
that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or interest over the property sought to
be annotated. Thus, we have held that even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice
of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral
attack against the certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis
pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. The rules merely require that an
affirmative relief be claimed since a notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor
creates a right or a lien. It only protects the applicants rights which will be determined during trial.
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens therefore the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
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Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor

G.R. no. 140954
Facts: On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed
Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction
and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo for brevity). They alleged that: they own a 1,399square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714;
sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period of
ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental
of P100.00 only, considering the close relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year
period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed
thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property. On January 21,
1999, the trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged from the records and the
nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees. Subsequently
they filed for petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case
to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the trial court had
earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all proceedings of the case and such
ruling was not contested by the private respondents.
Held: In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance
analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by the petitioners so as to justify direct
recourse to this Court. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals
in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for
the dismissal of the petition at bar. Moreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected
within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right
of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Noncompliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the trial
court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives
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or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.Thus, proper substitution of
heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any
future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not
authorize Atty. Petalcorin to represent him. To be sure, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow
in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. 57 It offers
only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its
jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,not to be used
for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of
law or fact. A contrary rule would lead to confusion, and seriously hamper the administration of
justice. Wherefore the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Law firm of tibayan v. C.A.

G.R. no. 143706
Facts: Petitioners Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan and respondent Erlando A. Abrenica
are the registered partners in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, a professional law
partnership duly organized under Philippine laws. On May 6, 1998, petitioners Tungol and Tibayan
filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint for accounting, return and
transfer of partnership funds with damages and application for issuance of preliminary attachment
against their partner, respondent Abrenica. Petitioners, plaintiffs therein, claim that a real estate
transaction entered into by the herein respondent Abrenica, defendant therein, was a law
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partnership transaction. The lower court ruled against the petitioner and hence the petition was
filed with the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not appellate erred in holding that SEC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
which was raised the first time.
Held: It is elementary that a special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction and an
error was committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. An error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action of
certiorari. Therefore, the SEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a non-jurisdictional issue in a special civil action for
certiorari. It sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of attachment, an error of
judgment which is clearly a factual issue involving appraisal and evaluation of evidence. No grave
abuse of discretion may be attributed to the SEC Hearing Officer/Panel simply because of the
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. Erroneous factual findings amount to no more than
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are beyond the ambit of the sole office of a writ of
certiorari, namely, the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuses
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All taken, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustained the Order dated September 17, 1999 of the SEC en banc in EB Case No. 666 which
ordered the discharge of attachment made on personal properties of respondent Abrenica.
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, there is no need to delve on the validity of the
SECen banc Order dated September 28, 1999. Therefore the petition is hereby granted.
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Fortune Insurance Corp. v. C.A.

G.R. no. 110701
Facts: On November 11, 1988, Isabela 1 Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO-I) secured Fire
Insurance Policy No. 9216 from petitioner for Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos. This was later on
changed to Policy No. 9218 with expanded coverage to include typhoons and floods. The period
covered by the said amended insurance policy is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of November 11, 1988 to
4:00 o'clock p.m. of November 11, 1989. The properties covered are all of ISELCO-I's distribution
lines, electric posts/poles, transformers and its accessories, towers and fixtures installed and/or
specifically situated in the towns of Alicia, Angadanan, Cabatuan, Cauayan, Cordon, Echague,
Jones, Luna, Ramon, San Isidro, San Mateo, Santiago, Reina Mercedes, San Guillermo and San
Agustin all in the Province of Isabela. On June 17, 1992, after trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
issuing the Special Order granting execution pending appeal.
Held: the court disagrees. Respondent judge exercised sound discretion in granting execution
pending appeal on the grounds that: (1) ISELCO-I is a cooperative of the people within the area of
coverage that is engaged in the business of retailing electricity to its members - a commodity basic
to their welfare and vital to the industries of the people; and (2) to deliver electricity to the people,
its electric lines, posts, transmissions, transformers and other accessories must always be
maintained in good order and condition. Finally, it must be stressed here that respondent Judge
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granted execution pending appeal based upon the evidence of those factual circumstances
mentioned above. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals affirmed those factual findings and
respondent Judge's conclusion that the same constitute good reasons contemplated by law for
granting execution pending appeal. It bears reiterating, therefore, that it is not the function of this
Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of
the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse
of discretion. In the same vein, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the
case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule, and this, petitioner has failed to
prove. Therefore the petition is hereby denied.
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Metro Transit Organization v. C.A.

G.R. no. 142133
Facts: Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. ("MTO" for brevity) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation operating a light rail transit ("LRT" for brevity), while petitioner Jovencio
Bantang, Jr. ("Bantang" for brevity) is an officer of MTO. Respondent Ruperto Evangelista
("Evangelista" for brevity) worked as a cash assistant in the Treasury Division of MTO.On
December 29, 1989, after completion of an inventory count of tokens, petitioners discovered that
2,000 pieces of tokens were missing. Petitioners conducted an investigation which resulted in
implicating Evangelista as one of the alleged perpetrators responsible for the loss of the tokens.
The evidence presented against Evangelista included three handwritten letters by three persons,
namely: George Kasunuran, a vault keeper of MTO; Renato Mendoza, a treasury personnel of
MTO; and Edgardo de Leon, owner of a token outlet. The labor arbiter ruled against petitioner and
the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in denying the petition for certiorari
Held: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if
any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions. Certiorari is
not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its decision, petitioners may not
arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or
not. The instant case, however, is a petition for review where only questions of law may be
raised.9 What petitioners are attempting to do here is to urge the Court to re-examine the probative
value or evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below. The Court cannot do this unless the
appreciation of the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. This is where petitioners fail.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that petitioners
failed to present substantial evidence to establish that Evangelista stole the 2,000 pieces of tokens.
The findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are binding
on this Court unless patently erroneous. In the instant case, we find no patent errors.It is not the
function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited only to reviewing errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower courts. Likewise, it is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting
evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field. Therefore the petition for certiorari is
denied.
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Government of the U.S. v. Puruganan

G.R. 148571
Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to
the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
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Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition
for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before
this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued
its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their
votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft
of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executor, and hence the petition was filed in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Held: courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every
little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also
sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a
dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation. At bottom,
extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. Therefore the petition
is granted.
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Butuan bay wood export corporation v. C.A.

G.R. no. L-45473
Facts: On April 1, 1976, private respondent Diamond Machinery Co., Inc. filed a verified complaint
for replevin against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 23226 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXIV, presided over by respondent Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero. On the same
day, private respondent filed its "Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal Property" in the amount of
P898,440.28, and on April 2, 1976, respondent Judge issued a writ of seizure.On April 8, 1976,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside the Order of Seizure.On April 19, 1976, private
respondent filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and to Set Aside Order of Seizure, to which
petitioner filed its Reply on April 26, 1976. The petition for certiorari was denied by the court
appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed order of June 1, 1976 was issued by the trial Judge without, or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
Held: Petitioner's allegation that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion or had
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction is without merit. As pointed out by petitioner himself, there
is a grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of a writ of certiorari where there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of
law. The case at bar evinces no proof demonstrating that respondent Judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment or that he exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal animosity. A sedulous perusal of the
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questioned order brings to the fore the lack of factual and legal basis of petitioner's assertion.
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all available
remedies must be exhausted. Likewise, in a host of case We ruled that before filing a petition for
certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed
error and its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be
denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to decide
should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court without first giving
such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation. Therefore the
petition is denied and the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
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Philippine Consumers Foundation v. NTC

G.R. no. L-63318
Facts: On April 14, 1982, the NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised
schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982 in the case of "Samuel
Bautista vs. NTC, et al.," 116 SCRA 411. The Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a
hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT so that the
public could air its opposition, particularly the herein petitioner and the Solicitor General,
representing the government. They should be given the opportunity to substantiate their objection
that the rates under the subscriber investment plan are excessive and unreasonable and, as a
consequence, the low income and middle class group cannot afford to have telephone
connections; and, that there is no need to increase the rate because the applicant is financially
sound. Petition for certiorari was filed.
Issue: whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the
Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and
regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217. Petitioner claims that these implementing
rules and regulations are mandatory pre-requisite for the approval of said SIP rates
Held: The court is not impressed. At any rate, there is no justification for the rate increase of the
revised schedule of PLDT's Subscriber Investment Plan. It is to say the least, untimely, considering
the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of
the decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. The State, in
Presidential Decree No. 217 promulgated on June 16, 1973, adopted the basic policies of the
telephone industry, which, among others, are: (1) the attainment of efficient telephone service for
as wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable costs to the subscriber; (2) the capital
requirements of telephone utilities obtained from ownership funds shall be raised from a broad
base of investors, involving as large a number of individual investors as may be possible; and (3) in
any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing will, in no case, exceed
fifty per centum (50%) of the cost of the installed telephone line, as may be determined from time
to time by the regulatory bodies of the State. Anent the question that petitioner should have
appealed the decision of respondent NTC, instead of filing the instant petition, suffice it to say that
certiorari is available despite existence of the remedy of appeal where public welfare and the
advancement of public policy so dictate, or the orders complained of were issued in excess of or
without jurisdiction. Therefore the decision of the NTC is annulled and set aside.
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Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation

G.R. no. 126731
Facts: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision [3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-2058,
entitled Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, et al., which included
Silverio as one of the defendants. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ
of execution was issued on September 17, 1992.Despite service of the writ and demand by the
sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay
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said judgment. The only asset of Silverio that could be found for the satisfaction of the judgment
was his proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Golf).
Accordingly, the sheriff levied upon the Silverio share on December 7, 1992. At the public auction
sale on December 29, 1992, Yau emerged as the highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at
P2 Million and the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his name.However, at the time of the
execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy
pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment dated March 27, 1999 and October 17, 1990
obtained by the Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City before which complaints for sums of money, docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 90-511 and 90-271,respectively, were pending, in which Silverio is also one of the
defendants. Petition for review is filed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
Held: Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the
purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by the
disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment issued by Branch 64 of RTC
Makati City, should a decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to
intervene to protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect
his interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. If we follow the
contention of Manilabank, this would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial
stability or non-interference.Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to
state that the rules now allow intervention before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After trial
and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the
provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of
discretion in permitting or disallowing the same.The rule on intervention was evidently intended to
expedite and economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or
anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits. Therefore the petition
is denied and the Judgment of the C.A. is affirmed.
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Aquino v. NLRC
G.R. no. 98108
Facts: It appears that petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal
against private respondent (NCR-2-396-87). He alleged that he was removed from the payroll in
January 1987 and was not paid his salary. Private respondent answered that petitioner had
abandoned his work after he was held accountable for advances amounting to P48,921.9. On May
30, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, finding petitioner's dismissal as illegal. The matter
was elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a memorandum on appeal due on a Saturday can be filed timely on the
following Monday.
Held: To remove any doubts that may possibly arise as a result of the obiter dictum in the cases
decided after Pacaa, we hereby reiterate the Pacaa ruling and uphold the amendment to Section
1 of Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC enforced on January 14, 1992 on the principle
that the law does not require the performance of an impossible act ( impossibilum nulla obligatio
est). The decision of the Labor Arbiter in this case included a monetary award, i.e., award for 3year back wages amounting to P80,820.00. Therefore, to perfect its appeal before the NLRC,
private respondent should have posted a cash or surety bond equivalent to the money judgment in
accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. In justification of the non-posting of the bond, both
respondents argued that the NLRC issued the rules implementing R.A. No. 6715 only on August
31, 1990, which took effect on October 9, 1990. They claimed that the requirement of R.A. No.
6715 on the filing of a bond was not yet in force when private respondent filed its appeal on June
25, 1990. The NLRC further alleged that it was not bound to follow the Interim Rules promulgated
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by its predecessor because it was the one created under R.A. No. 6715 and authorized to
promulgate the implementing rules. We agree with the Solicitor General that the provisions of
Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, requiring the posting of cash or
surety bond in appeals from decisions of Labor Arbiter granting monetary awards, are selfexecuting and do not need any administrative rules to implement them.The appeal made by private
respondent, not having been perfected on time for failure to file the appeal bond, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter became final and executor. Therefore the petition is granted.
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Bache & Co. v. Ruiz

G.R. no. 32409
Facts: On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote
a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file
the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.In the afternoon of the following
day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio, went to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Veras
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a
deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not
yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent
Judge. Petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his
witness.
Held: In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant and his witness. While it is true that the complainants application for search warrant
and the witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge,
the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis
for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the
participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings
before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient
facts. The transcript of stenographic notes taken at the hearing of this case in the court below
shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of
Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof
were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After
respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar,
complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judges chamber and informed the
Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer
to read to him her stenographic notes. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted.
Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void.
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National Electrification Administration v. C.A.

G.R. no. L-32490
Facts: The undisputed facts follow: On June 14, 1965, respondents Rural Power Corporation,
Eusebio E. Ferrer, Lourdes Sison, and Eduardo Ferrer (hereinafter referred to as Rural Power)
executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA)
in the sum of P985,000.00 for the purpose of improving the former's services to the public. On the
same date, Rural Power was required to execute two other real estate mortgages to secure two
other loans for the amounts of P98,000.00 and P81,000.00, but said amounts were never released.
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Of the three deeds of mortgages, only the first in the amount of P985,000.00 has been the object of
implementation. On May 27, 1970, petitioner instituted a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction before respondent Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court ruled that
the failure of petitioner to ask respondent Judge to reconsider his Order of March 4, 1970 before
resorting to the remedies of certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction was "fatal" to
petitioner's position.
Issue: whether or not respondent Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in holding that
petitioner's omission to move for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for
certiorari and mandamus was fatal to the petition.
Held: The court granted the petition. The error in toes case is purely technical, To take advantage
of it rather than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its present. ration as fatal to the
plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which
one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before
the court the facts in issue, and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels are not to be won by the rapier's thrust. Technicality when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice becomes its great hindrance and enemy, and deserves scant
consideration from the courts. There are no vested rights in technicalities. WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the Decision of respondent Appellate Court , dated August 17, 1970, is hereby
annulled and the Regional Trial Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan is hereby directed to transmit the entire original record of the case to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
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Vda. De Sayman v. C.A.

G.R. no. L-25596
Facts: The subject-matter of the instant proceeding is the writ of execution issued by the trial court
to enforce its judgment after the same became final and executory, but during the pendency of a
petition for relief from the same. The said order of execution was brought to the respondent Court
of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. In a decision of said court promulgated on December 14,
1965, the writ of execution issued by the trial court was annulled and set aside. The said decision
of the Court of Appeals is the subject of the petition for certiorari in the instant proceeding. The
petitioners assail the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals on three (3) principal grounds,
namely, (1) the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals should not have been entertained
inasmuch as the private respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order of
execution in the trial court; (2) the trial judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
authorizing the execution of its judgment; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
mere filing of the petition for relief will justify the stay of execution of the judgment complained of.
Issue: Whether a writ of execution may be issued despite the pendency of a petition for relief
against the judgment sought to be enforced. It is the rule that when a petition for relief is filed
Held: It is to be further noted that in G.R. Nos. L-29479 and L-29716, the right of the private
respondent to seek a review of the decision of the trial court in connection with its appeal from the
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denial of the petition for relief was sustained. The possibility which the respondent Court of Appeals
seeks to guard against still exists in greater likelihood. The judgment of the trial court the
enforcement of which is sought to be restrained has not yet attained the status of being beyond
modification or reversal. Hence, the enforcement of the same at this stage of the proceeding is
premature. In the least, to stop its execution as was ordered by the respondent Court of Appeals
may not be categorized as a grave abuse of discretion. Therefore the petition for certiorari is
denied.
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Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. C.A.

G.R. no. 92813
Facts: On December 6, 1982, herein private respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) sued
herein petitioners Peroxide Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc.
(Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and Rose U. Mapua (Mapuas) in Civil Case No.
48849 of the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila for the collection of an
indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound themselves to be solidarily
liable. Upon the filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was actually done on
January 7, 1983 after BPI filed an attachment bond in the amount of P32,700,000.00. Petitioners'
properties were accordingly attached by the sheriff. BPI sought for certiorari.
Issue:Whether or not The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying BPI's
urgent ex parte motion to suspend the order of August 23, 1988.
Held: the Supreme Court affirmed the findings and conclusion of respondent court that the order of
Judge Acosta, dated May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a lifting of
said writ which order, having likewise been issued ex parte and without notice and hearing in
disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment.
Said attachment continued unaffected by the so-called order or suspension and could not have
been deemed inefficacious until and only by reason of its supposed restoration in the order of
December 16, 1987 of Judge Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex parte discharge or
suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly administration of justice and nullifies the
underlying role and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the
parties pendente lite as an ancillary remedy. The proceeding in the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, as a mere provisional remedy, is ancillary to an action commenced at or before the
time when the attachment is sued out. Accordingly the attachment does not affect the decision of
the case on the merits, the right to recover judgment on the alleged indebtedness and the right to
attach the property of the debtor being entirely separate and distinct. As a rule, the judgment in the
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main action neither changes the nature nor determines the validity of the attachment. At any rate,
whether said petitioners are guarantors or sureties, there exists a valid cause of action against
them and their properties were properly attached on the basis of that indubitable circumstance.
Neither do we subscribe to petitioners' charge that respondent court injudiciously gave due course
to the aforesaid petition for certiorari without requiring the prior filing and resolution of a motion for
the reconsideration of the questioned orders of the trial court. There are, admittedly, settled
exceptions to that requisite and which obtain in the present case. A motion for reconsideration was
correctly dispensed with by respondent court since the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
had been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. Also, under the circumstances therein, a
motion for reconsideration would serve no practical purpose since the trial judge had already had
the opportunity to consider and pass upon the questions elevated on certiorari to respondent court.
Therefore the petition is denied.
THE CENTRAL BANK VS HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL

G.R. No. L-26971, APRIL 11, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.
Digested By: San Jose, Rica Pauline B.
Facts:
Banco Filipino is a savings and mortgage bank duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. CB issued, pursuant to Resolution No. 1769 of the Monetary Board, CB Cir No. 185.
Subsequently, however, within the same year, Banco Filipino changed its policy by compounding
and paying the interest on its savings deposits, at the maximum rate fixed by the Monetary Board,
from the quarterly to the monthly basis, and by paying, in advance, the maximum rates of interest
on time deposits.
THE Monetary Board approved a resolution, directing the Banco Filipino to comply strictly with
Central Bank Circular No. 222. Banco Filipino filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction against Petitioner herein and the Monetary Board,
"insofar as they restrict the payment of monthly interests on savings deposits and advance
interests on time deposits," and praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte to
restrain the Petitioner, its officials and/or agents from enforcing the aforementioned circulars and
resolutions to the extent that the same imposed said restrictions, or, should the court "require that a
hearing be conducted on the petition for a preliminary injunction, that a preliminary restraining
order to the same effect be issued pending such hearing."
Thereupon, Cloribel, as Judge of said court, issued ex parte the restraining order prayed for. After
the hearing and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, Judge Cloribel
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113
CERTIORARI 5
granted said application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the latter instituted the
order of November 23 and to meanwhile restrain its
enforcement, upon the ground that, in issuing said order, Judge Cloribel had committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Banco Filipino sets up, the following defenses, to wit: 1) that said petition should be dismissed,
because "petitioner has not exhausted all remedies in the Court of First Instance of Manila before
coming to this Honorable Court"; 2) that having heard the parties before issuing the contested
order, respondent Judge had neither committed a grave abuse of discretion, nor exceeded his
jurisdiction, in acting as he did; and 3) that the contested resolutions and circulars are null and void
for (a) they were issued without previous notice and hearing, (b) they impair vested rights, and (c)
the statutory power of the Monetary Board to "fix the maximum rates of interest which banks may
pay on deposits and any other obligations" does "not include the regulation of the manner of
computing and paying interest, since this function is not expressly granted petitioner."
Issues:
1. Whether or not petition is improper because CB has not exhausted all remedies in the Court of
First Instance of Manila?
2. Whether or not respondent Judge had neither committed a grave abuse of discretion, nor
exceeded his jurisdiction, in acting as he did?
Held:
1. No. It is true that Petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the order complained of, and
that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the respondent has
had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him. This rule is
subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following, namely: 1) where the issue raised
is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency. These
circumstances are present in the case at bar. Moreover, Petitioner herein had raised in its
answer in the main case and in the rejoinder to the memorandum of the Banco Filipino in support
of the latter's application for a writ of preliminary injunction the very same questions' raised in
the Petition herein. In other words, Judge Cloribel has already had an opportunity to considered
and pass upon those questions, so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order would
have served no practical purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an
exercise in futility.
2. Yes. It was, therefore, apparent from the pleadings and memoranda that Banco Filipino had no
cause of action against Petitioner herein to restrain the same from demanding strict compliance
with said circulars. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, "(a) preliminary
injunction may be granted ... when it is established" (1) that "the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded," which consists in restraining "the commission or continuance of the acts complained
of," and (2) that the commission or continuance thereof "would probably work injustice to the
plaintiff" or be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights" and tend "to render the judgment ineffectual."
Since Banco Filipino was clearly not entitled to the relief sought in said Civil Case No. 67181 and
no "injustice" to said institution would, accordingly, result from its compliance with the contested
resolutions and circulars, it follows that Respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its aforementioned order of November 23,
1966, in said case.
Page
114
CERTIORARI 5
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009
Corona, J.
Facts:
Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra (PRs) filed a illegal dismissal case against Laguna Metts
Corp (LMC). LA decided in their favor but the NLRC reversed the LA decision. PRs filed an MR but
it was denied. PRs counsel received the denial on MAY 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008 (the last day of
the 60-D filing period of a petition for certiorari), PRs counsel filed a motion for extension to file the
petition praying for an extension of 15 days. The Court of Appeals (CA) granted a non-extendible
15D period. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the resolution claiming that under the current
Sec 4 of Rule 65 as amended by AM 07-7-12 dated Dec. 4 2007, extension of time to file a petition
for certiorari is no longer allowed. CA denied LMCs motion and said that the new rule only
discouraged the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time but did not strip the CA of its
discretionary power to grant extensions in exceptional cases, in the interest of justice. Aggrieved,
LMC now files this petition for certiorari in the SC claiming GADALEJ of the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari is still allowed?
Held:
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115
CERTIORARI 5
No. The amended rules explicitly deleted the last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 65 allowing for an
extension of the period for not longer than 15 days due to compelling reasons. As a rule an
amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. If
the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Sec 4 of
Rule 65, the paragraph providing such authority would have been preserved. The removal only
meant that an extension is no longer allowed. The rationale for the amendment is to essentially
prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat
the ends of justice. When the CA granted the extension, it arrogated unto itself the power it did not
posses, a power only the SC may exercise. Even assuming, the CA retained the discretion to grant
extension, the reasons (see footnote 3 of the case: lack of material time due to voluminous
pleadings that have to be written and numerous court appearances to be undertaken; lack of
funds) of PRs counsel and PR did not qualify as compelling. While technicalities should not unduly
hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest which all
courts are devoted. Petition granted. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The petition of PR in
the CA case is ordered dismissed for having been filed out of time.
OUANO VS PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 134230, July 17, 2002
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.
Facts:
On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against
Jovenal Ouano, petitioner, for Recovery of ownership and Possession of Real Property and
Damages. In its complaint, PGTT alleged that it is the owner of Lots Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the
Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. Sometime in October of
1996, PGTT found that Ouano uprooted the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them and
planted corn thereon. Despite PGTTs demand that he can vacate the lots and restore them to their
original condition, Ouano refused claiming that he is the owner and lawful possessor of the 380
square meters he occupied. Due to Ouanos wrongful act, PGTT was deprived of the use of its
property and suffered damages in the amount of P100,000.00. Likewise, PGTT was constrained to
file the subject action and hired the services of his counsel for P100,000.00.
On February 5, 1998, Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over it considering the assessed
value of the lots involved is only P2,910.00, as indicated in the latest tax declaration, citing Section
19 (paragraph 2) and Section 23 (paragraph 3) of BP 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980), as amended by RA No. 7691.
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CERTIORARI 5
In its opposition to Ouanos motion, PGTT contends that the RTC has jurisdiction since the market
value of the lots is P49, 760.00. Besides, the complaint is not only an action for the recovery of
ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages exceeding P100, 000.00 over
which claim the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 19 (paragraph 8) of the same
law.
The trial courts ruled it has jurisdiction over the case because it is of judicial knowledge that the
real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher valuation than those indicated in the tax
declaration. The observation of plaintiffs (PGTT) counsel as to the issue on damages is likewise
sustained considering that, being a corporation, it may have incurred damages in the form of
unrealized profits.
Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1998 and May
27, 1998 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
No. The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. CEB21319. The complaint seeks to recover from private respondent the ownership and possession of
the lots in question and the payment of damages. Since the action involves ownership and
possession of real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is determined by
the assessed value, not the market value, thereof, pursuant to BP 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Section 33 (paragraph 3) of the said law, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction on all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20, 000.00 or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50, 000.00 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation, expenses and costs; Provided, that in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by the corresponding
tax declaration, is only P2, 910.00. As such, the complaint is well within the MTCs P20, 000.00
jurisdictional limit.
The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is higher than that indicated in the tax
declaration and that, therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly speculative. It is
elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.
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117
CERTIORARI 5
EMMANUEL RELAMPAGOS VS ROSITA CUMBA AND THE COMELEC

G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995
Davide, J.
Facts:
In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba were
candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning
candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the
petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a
margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on
12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial court
granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
execution which was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul
the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ
of execution. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor, pending resolution
of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed this special
civil action.
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118
CERTIORARI 5
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction?
Held:
The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not been
repealed by the Omnibus Election Code held that the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting
the petitioners motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any
motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. COMELEC has
jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
TRIFILO MONTEBON VS ATTY. TANGLAO-DACANAY AND THE OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 136062, April 7, 2005
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.
Facts:
Edwin Salimbangon concluded a Rattan Cutting Contract with the government through then
Undersecretary Victor O. Ramos of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Thereafter, Salimbangon entered into a Rattan Supply Contract with Tradewinds Rattan
and Handicraft, Inc. (TRHI) through its Vice-President Robert Lim. TRHI would supply
Salimbangon rattan poles for a period of one year.
As Vice President of TRHI, Lim appointed Trifilo Montebon, herein petitioner, as its agent to
process and follow-up pertinent papers for the supply and release of rattan poles shipment from
the source to the port of Cebu.
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119
CERTIORARI 5
Sometime in May, 1990, the officers of the DENR, headed by Alfredo Madrid, filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tagum, Davao a complaint for possession of rattan poles without
government permit, against petitioner, in violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines). During the preliminary investigation, the MTC issued an Order
directing petitioner to take possession of the seized rattan poles for lack of space in the court for
stock piling, but prohibiting him not to dispose the same until the case is resolved. Meanwhile, on
July 31, 1991, Lim cancelled petitioners authority to represent TRHI and subsequently appointed
Wilfredo Fortuna as its new agent. Fortuna was authorized to process and follow-up pertinent
papers for the supply of its rattan poles to the Port of Cebu.
The MTC found a prima facie case against petitioner. Hence, an information for the offense
charged was filed against him with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tagum, Davao.
Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that he had paid all the
forest charges and fees due the government.
Fortuna applied for a Certificate of Minor Forest Products Origin (CMFPO) with the DENR over the
unsplit rattan poles. Petitioner also applied for a CMFPO, claiming ownership of the unsplit rattan
poles. Petitioners application was denied because he had no more authority to represent TRHI.
When petitioner found that the poles were released to TRHI, he filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB-MIN) against Placido Huesca, DENR cartographer, and
Roger Cantuba, DENR Forest Conservation Unit Division Chief, for violation of Section 3(e) and (h)
of Republic Act 3019 (RA 3019) and robbery. Subsequently, petitioner filed a supplemental
complaint for the same charge against Robert Lim, Edwin Salimbangon and Alfredo Madrid.
Petitioner claimed that all of them conspired in releasing the rattan poles to TRHI. Thereafter, the
complaint filed by the petitioner was dismissed, thus, he filed for a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint?
Held:
No. Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989, the Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." Relative to this, the
court held that it is the consistent policy of this Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory powers.
In the present case, we cannot sustain petitioners contention that the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he approved the Memorandum of Atty. Corazon T. Dacanay, Legal
Counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman, recommending the dismissal of the complaint leveled
against respondents Lim and Salimbangon. A perusal of the said Memorandum does not show any
taint of grave abuse of discretion on his part. Neither is there an indication that he acted in an
arbitrary or despotic manner arising from passion or hostility when he approved Atty. Dacanays
Memorandum recommending the dismissal of the complaint against the two respondents.
Page
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CERTIORARI 5
VICENTE UY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 11544, July 6, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Respondent PIEDRAS is a sequestered corporation voluntarily surrendered by Mr. Roberto S.
Benedicto to the PCGG under a Compromise Agreement entered into on November 3, 1990.
PIEDRAS was the registered owner of 7,499,812,500 class A shares and 4,999,875,000 class B
shares of OPMC. On September 18, 1991, OPMC put out a notice of the issuance of additional
OPMC shares for which its existing stockholders may exercise their non-assignable pre-emptive
rights. As a condition for the additional subscription, fifty percent of the purchase price for the entire
subscription must be paid not later than 5:00 p.m. of October 31, 1991, and the other fifty percent
to be remitted upon call by the OPMC Board of Directors. In order to avail of the total shares it is
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CERTIORARI 5
entitled to subscribe to, PIEDRAS needed P124, 906,875.00. As PIEDRAS did not have sufficient
funds, it negotiated for RCBC and TRB to advance the needed amount. The agreements with the
respective banks were confirmed and authorized by the PCGG in an En Banc Resolution.
PIEDRAS likewise agreed to pay the capital gains tax due on the transfer of the OPMC shares
from it to RCBC. On the other hand, the SSA between PIEDRAS and TRB provided that TRB
would advance the amount of P5,000,000.00 in order to pay for the additional subscription by
PIEDRAS of 477,717,745 class B OPMC shares. The remaining unpaid amount for the
subscription shall be paid by TRB upon call of the OPMC Board of Directors.
On October 31, 1991, the deadline set by OPMC for the exercise of its stockholders pre-emptive
rights, RCBC and TRB advanced the total amount of P55, 957,562.50 to PIEDRAS as initial
payment for PIEDRASs additional subscription. Petitioner filed with public respondent
Sandiganbayan a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order assailing the actions of the PCGG in negotiating with respondent banks for the advance of
the funds needed by PIEDRAS to pay for its additional subscription.
Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
which involved the alleged disturbance of petitioners rights as a stockholder and the violation by
PIEDRAS of the exclusivity of the pre-emptive offering by OPMC. Sandiganbayan said, was a
purely intra-corporate matter which is outside of its jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan added that
assuming it did have jurisdiction over the case, the petition failed to show abuse of discretion on
the part of PIEDRAS or the PCGG. Moreover, petitioner, while a landowner and a taxpayer, does
not have the capacity to sue as his case does not meet the requisites for a taxpayers suit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
No. The Sandiganbayan stated that its jurisdiction pertains only to the determination of the
propriety of the sequestration made by the PCGG. It cannot assume jurisdiction over petitioners
case which essentially raises the issue of whether it was proper for PIEDRAS to exercise its preemptive rights. The PCGG, in its Comment, argued that PIEDRASs OPMC shares of stock had
been previously subject of a compromise agreement between itself and Mr. Roberto Benedicto. By
virtue of the compromise agreement, the shares were given back to the Philippine
Government. Necessarily, the issue of ownership of the subject shares had already been
determined. The Sandiganbayan no longer has jurisdiction over any action arising out of any
controversy regarding the exercise of ownership rights over said shares of stock. Furthermore, the
agreements were beyond the ambit of the COA Circular which requires public bidding since dacion
en pago transactions are expressly excempted therefrom. Finally, there was no violation of the
CARL since there was no disposition yet of ill-gotten wealth from which receipts may be applied
and used for the agrarian reform program.
Page
122

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CERTIORARI 5

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, petitioner,

MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner,vs.ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation Officer I

MARIANO TENGCO, petitioner,

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

JULIE'S FRANCHISE CORPORATION, ROBERTO R. GANDIONCO, JOSE ENRICO R.

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St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos

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THE CENTRAL BANK VS HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

OUANO VS PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION

EMMANUEL RELAMPAGOS VS ROSITA CUMBA AND THE COMELEC

TRIFILO MONTEBON VS ATTY. TANGLAO-DACANAY AND THE OFFICE OF THE