Persons Marriage Case 3 - 2

5
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in

turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land

were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179922
2008
December 16,
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as
FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of

petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT
No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.
DECISION
3. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate.

He was survived by respondents Felicidad
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6
were registered in the name of respondent.
REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to
sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the
Family Code, except cases commenced
prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared
in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
4. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against

respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa
City. In the said case, the parties submitted
and caused the approval of a partial
compromise agreement.
5. Petitioner and respondents entered into
two more contracts in August 1994. Under
the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of
land.
The Facts
1. Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa
Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels
of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos.
6. In August 1995, petitioner commenced an

action against respondents before the court a
quo.
2. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he

agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the
1
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the

marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in
view of the absence of the required
marriage license.
Petitioner also incorporated in the countermotion for summary judgment the testimony
of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said
testimony was made in Civil Case No. 892384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the
RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her
testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated
that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child
with Teofilo.5
He likewise maintained that his deceased

brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.
Subsequently, the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the
trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion
between the parties.
7. On October 16, 1995, respondents denied

the material averments of petitioner's
complaint. Respondents contended that the
dearth ((noun) an insufficient quantity or
number) of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate
Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.
RTC and CA Dispositions

Regional Trial Courts Ruling:
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered
judgment, disposing as follows:
But before the parties could even proceed to

pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the
affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the
late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendant's
(respondent's) Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied.
Plaintiff's (petitioner's) CounterMotion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff as follows:
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the

motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for
summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar
of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
1. Declaring the marriage between

defendant Felicidad Sandoval and
Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced
by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void
ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant

minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E.
Carlos;
annulment of a marriage upon a

stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed
to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole

and exclusive owner of the parcel
of land.
Rather that the summary nature by

which the court a quo resolved the
issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged
in the complaint for annulment of
marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
Court of Appeals Ruling:

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:
"Section 1. Judgment on the

pleadings. - Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the summary

judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition ((noun) an
explanation of something that is not
immediately obvious)
of the herein
appealed summary judgment by the
court a quo contrary to law and
public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it
was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee.
While it may be readily conceded

that a valid marriage license is
among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation
to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of
the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although
The first paragraph of Article 88 and

101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of
3
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee

represents it to be. Aside from the
dearth ((noun) an acute insufficiency)
of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of
the existence of said marriage license
is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed
by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of
the Peace who officiated the
impugned marriage, to wit:
Considering that the burden of proof

also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party,
the same may be said of the trial
court's rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II
and his putative father on the basis of
the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's statements.
Although it had effectively
disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment
((noun) a declaration that is made
"That as far as I could

remember, there was a
marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed
by Teofilo Carlos and
Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage
license was inadvertently not
placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it
was the Office Clerk who
filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in
turn, may have overlooked
the same."
emphatically (as if no supporting

evidence were necessary))
in the
answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind,
did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellant's
illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, We find
appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient
to support what could well be a
minor's total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the
fact that, during the last eight years
of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed
If the non-presentation of the

marriage contract - the primary
evidence of marriage - is not proof
that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants' nonpresentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the
same was not procured. The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
4
said appellant the use of his name

and the shelter of his household. The
least that the trial court could have
done in the premises was to conduct
a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.8
thereof, entering another remanding

the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section
1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34)
of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of
Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved

for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
3. That in reversing and setting aside

the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground
of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner
hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside
the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution,
Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are
different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner
probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve

whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of
one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.
Supreme Courts Ruling:
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage must be proved.
Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
2. That in setting aside and reversing

the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
5
summary judgment is allowed. So is

confession of judgment disallowed.
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both

the rules on judgment on the pleadings
and summary judgments have no place in
cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of
marriage.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section

1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. - Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,

known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even
judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped
with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17,
viz.:
He argues that the CA should have applied

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding

judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of
evidence to a commissioner shall
be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the
spouses.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not

limit its finding solely within the provisions
of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on
summary judgments, to wit:
(2) The grounds for declaration of

absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment
shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We are to sustain

the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal ((noun) reading
carefully with intent to remember) of
the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would
still not be warranted. x x x11
Likewise instructive is the Court's

pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage
from the application of summary judgments.
But whether it is based on judgment on the

pleadings or summary judgment, the CA
was correct in reversing the summary
Prescinding from the foregoing

discussion, save for annulment of
6
marriage or declaration of its nullity

or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
prevent suppression or fabrication of

evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the
public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings
for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.16
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial

court has divested ((verb) take away
possessions from someone) the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the
case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between
the parties. The State should have been
given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.15
II. A petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC; and
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code

ordain that the court should orde r the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no
suppression of evidence. Concomitantly
((Adverb) at the same time as), even if there
is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before
the court is not fabricated.
(2) Marriages celebrated during the

effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:
To further bolster (support and strengthen) its

role towards the preservation of marriage,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear

at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the
court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State
during the trial on the merits to
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole

right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
7
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse

may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring
supplied)
of the Family Code which took effect on

August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without
any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated
in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration
of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.19
The new Rule recognizes that the husband

and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who can decide when and how
to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their
marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial
true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and
should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by
law.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule

does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule
which became effective on March 15, 200320
is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,21 viz.:
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity
As has been emphasized, A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines,
8
and is prospective in its application.22

in-interest, the case is dismissible on the

ground of lack of cause of action.27
Petitioner commenced the nullity of

marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place.23
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan

v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code
which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate "proper interest"
can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like
any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest and must
be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held
that the children have the personality
to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
The marriage having been solemnized prior

to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as
to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence
of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.26
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the
trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same
Interest within the meaning of the rule

means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When plaintiff is not the real party-
did not allow respondent Orlando's

remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondent's marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan
lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
(1) Legitimate children and

descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing,
legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children,
and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children
referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those
considered as compulsory heirs. But
although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:
III. The case must be remanded to

determine whether or not petitioner is a
real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that
when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
law on succession, successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called
to succeed by operation of law.30
ART. 1001. Should brothers and

sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other
half.
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his

property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These
heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo
II, as the surviving spouse and child,
respectively.
ART. 1003. If there are no

descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who

are compulsory heirs, to wit:
Indeed, only the presence of descendants,

ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
10
collateral relatives from succeeding to the

estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.33
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,

adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage
of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad.
This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although
the marriage in controversy may be found to
be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or
even an adopted child35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and

finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to
seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. This is
so, considering that collateral relatives, like
a brother and sister, acquire successional
right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in
the direct line.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the

case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is
called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if
it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner.
The records reveal that Teofilo was

predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is
finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half
of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek
the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject
marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the

question of filiation of respondent Teofilo
II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as
to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or
interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on
the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
It bears stressing, however, that the legal

personality of petitioner to bring the nullity
of marriage case is contingent ((adj) possible
but not certain to occur) upon the final
11
notwithstanding, We should not leave the

matter hanging in limbo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is

MODIFIED as follows:
This Court has the authority to review

matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.36
1. The case is REMANDED to the

Regional Trial Court in regard to the
action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
We agree with the CA that without trial on

the merits having been conducted in the
case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a
total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not
inclined to support its pronouncement that
the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance
of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty
provided by Article 167 of the Family Code
to protect the status of legitimacy of a child,
to wit:
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be

the legitimate, or illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly
INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in
Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and
to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be

considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
SO ORDERED.
6.
6
SUPREME COURT
Manila
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration

against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is
the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law
is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother
against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.37
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
12
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,
respondents.
time by long distance telephone. She promised

to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under
the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get
in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most

likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O.
No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come

home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court
of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her

answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming,
in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in
fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at

the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in
his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
A possible collusion between the parties to

obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences

had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither
appear nor submit evidence.
1. On 20 September 1986, Lequel Santos

married Julia Rosario Bedia.
2. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
3. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the

United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally

dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
4. Seven months after her departure, or on 01

January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first

13
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The

latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
4
described in legal terms. This particular type of

incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap;
The petition should be denied not only because

of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91,
which requires a certification of non-shopping,
but also for its lack of merit.
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer

to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring;
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return

home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a

psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty
of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates
a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of
giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently
of the possibility of being bound by these
duties.
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for

(him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate
with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term

"psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the

work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries

on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,
Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
This incapacity consists of the following:
(c) incurability.
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the

essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can
be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
The incapacity must be grave or serious such

that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party
14
antedating the marriage, although the overt

manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the

inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family

Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not

necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"

should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential

parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or
even desirable.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of

the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime

commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
This pschologic condition must exist at the time

the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not
15
subject to stipulation, except that marriage

settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family

as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV,
1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so

distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the
tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no

measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.
7
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
16
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAOTSOI, respondents.
a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on

January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was
kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by
which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate.
Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is

impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man.
Facts:
1. On May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her

husband.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the

same room for the first night of their married
life.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the

defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault
lies with his wife.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to

her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then
turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage

with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and,
They slept together in the same room and on the

same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
(3) since the relationship is still very young and

if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will
not be cured. He further claims, that if there is
any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for

medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag,
The defendant admitted that since their marriage

on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
17
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact

between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime
he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife,
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested

that there is no collusion between the parties and
that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
she always avoided him and whenever he

caresses her private parts,
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila,
before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila.
she always removed his hands.

The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she did
not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and,

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision.
(2) that her husband, the defendant, will

consummate their marriage.
Supreme Courts Ruling:
The defendant insisted that their marriage will

remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of

Appeals erred:
I
The defendant submitted himself to a physical

examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out
whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court

that there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent
to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof
thereof is totally absent.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to

masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
18
in affirming the annulment of the marriage

between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation

on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
We find the petition to be bereft (deprived of

or lacking something) of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent
has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis
for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. 3
The case has reached this Court because

petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was
affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But
in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment
on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial.
The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner
to present his side. He admitted that since their
Petitioner further contends that respondent court

erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have
19
sex with each other constitutes psychological

incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or
other discomforts, why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span
of 10 months.
it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not

psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court

nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus ((Noun) The act of sexual
Evidently, one of the essential marital

obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
procreation between a man and a woman,

requiring insertion of the penis into the vagina
and culminating in ejaculation of semen.)
between them. At any rate, since the action to

declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
Petitioner claims that there is no independent

evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted
to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not
be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
An examination of the evidence convinces Us

that the husband's plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire
belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but
he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989) that he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330).
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so,

petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He
never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover
what the problem with his wife could be. What
he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical
Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was

suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations
20
of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's

inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of
the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it
were not necessary to put her life in order and
put to rest her marital status.
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep

sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view
the relationship with love amor gignit amorem,
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment
to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that

what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act,
which is not phychological incapacity, and
which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of
cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act
with his wife whom he professes to love very
dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed

relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment
of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES ,
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
While the law provides that the husband and the

wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is
an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
8
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
It appears that there is absence of empathy

between petitioner and private respondent. That
is a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
21
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
1. Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April

14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
2. that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since
he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an
entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the
recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases.
In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
the Solicitor General has labelled
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his

job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family;
4. that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged;
5. that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a
king to be served;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage
of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Family Code.
6. and that it would be to the couple's best

interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to
be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989,
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to
The Facts
(1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on

maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage;
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990

with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially,
the petition alleged that
(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her

marital duties such as cooking meals; and
22
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and

handle their finances.
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that

"the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the

following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married
on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the

respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application
of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more

than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her
and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for
damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view

psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of

her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present
any evidence as he appeared only during the pretrial conference.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a

whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave
the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge

committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered

judgment declaring the marriage void.
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these

discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the
The Issue
23
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their

responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
to be incapable of doing so, due to some

psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified: 8
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity
. . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
This psychologic condition must exist at the

time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that
"the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by
A There is no hope, the man is also living with

another woman.
(a) gravity,
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for

their professions?
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the

parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other
parties?
(c) incurability."
A Yes, Your Honor.
On the other hand, in the present case, there is

no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity.
The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that
his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the
part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if

not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown
24
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes

of the beloved.
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly

explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go

beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case
vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view
of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and
the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing

at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
From their submissions and the Court's own

deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional

edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring

about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
(2) The root cause of the psychological

incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
25
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be

accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
remaining independent, separate and apart from

each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be

those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,

we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use
of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
The following are incapable of contracting

marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature. 14
SO ORDERED.
Since the purpose of including such provision in

our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
9
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
This is one instance where, in view of the

evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church while
G.R. No. 136490
26
October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to

the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted
to petitioner subject to the visitation rights
of respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy

each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for

declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.
"SO ORDERED."
The Case
The Facts
Before us is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals

are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the
parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized
by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park,
Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D,
E and F).
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is

set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the
December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying
her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between
petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared
null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of
the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if
any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the

Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973.
Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps
27
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After

the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
she was discharged from the military

service, she concentrated on her business.
Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able
to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both

of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and
he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took

place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid.
The following day, October 17, 1994, she
and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982,

they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he
left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that
did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that
their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit
and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus,
for several times during their cohabitation,
he would leave their house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself

[to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together
with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them,
he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she
and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the
business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military,
she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacaang. When
"In the case study conducted by Social

Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically
28
abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85100).
in the petition, established by evidence and

explained in the decision.
"The appellee submitted herself to

psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records,
pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not

subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee.

Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of
them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations
he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her x x x unable to assume them.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be

psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and
their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to

show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his
supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly,
there is no evidence at all that would show
that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or
mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he
was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and
[was] incurable."4
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that

psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is
the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
Hence, this Petition.5

Issues
It must also be grave enough to bring about

the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225
of the Family Code and such non-complied
marital obligations must similarly be alleged
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for

this Court's consideration the following
issues:
29
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the

guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9
were laid down by this Court as follows:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable

Court of Appeals could set aside the
findings by the Regional Trial Court
of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did
not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
"1) The burden of proof to show the

nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the
foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,'
thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be
'protected' by the state.
II. Whether or not the totality of

evidence presented and the demeanor
of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the
merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal
medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such
incapacity.
xxx
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal

Medical Examination
xxx
xxx
2) The root cause of the

psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and

the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken
those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely
on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit
himself to such tests.
30
assuming, or knowing them, could

not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
raise his/her own children as an

essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
3) The incapacity must be proven to

be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
6) The essential marital obligations

must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
4) Such incapacity must also be

shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and
7) Interpretations given by the

National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxx
31
xxx
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."10
psychological incapacity, then actual

medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the
totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this
Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted
to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic

requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11
"psychological incapacity must be
characterized by
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be

attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.
(a) gravity
(c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that
a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was

traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or

clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
Equally important, there is no evidence

showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed
as a taxi driver.1wphi1
32
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is

not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED

and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as

to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles
68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.12
At best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation,
not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a
convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.
33
34

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5

payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in

Republic of the Philippines

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of

3. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate.

REYES, R.T., J.:

4. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against

6. In August 1995, petitioner commenced an

2. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the

He likewise maintained that his deceased

Subsequently, the Office of the City

7. On October 16, 1995, respondents denied

RTC and CA Dispositions

But before the parties could even proceed to

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the

1. Declaring the marriage between

2. Declaring that the defendant

annulment of a marriage upon a

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole

Rather that the summary nature by

Court of Appeals Ruling:

"Section 1. Judgment on the

WHEREFORE, the summary

While it may be readily conceded

The first paragraph of Article 88 and

irregular, is not as fatal as appellee

Considering that the burden of proof

"That as far as I could

emphatically (as if no supporting

If the non-presentation of the

said appellant the use of his name

thereof, entering another remanding

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved

3. That in reversing and setting aside

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve

2. That in setting aside and reversing

summary judgment is allowed. So is

judgment rendered by the trial court. Both

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,

He argues that the CA should have applied

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not

(2) The grounds for declaration of

Moreover, even if We are to sustain

Likewise instructive is the Court's

But whether it is based on judgment on the

Prescinding from the foregoing

marriage or declaration of its nullity

prevent suppression or fabrication of

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial

II. A petition for declaration of absolute

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code

(2) Marriages celebrated during the

To further bolster (support and strengthen) its

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse

of the Family Code which took effect on

The new Rule recognizes that the husband