Proceedings of the 2015 Joint Rail Conference

JRC2015
March 23-26, 2015, San Jose, CA, USA

JRC2015-5615

CRASHWORTHINESS PROGRESS: U.S. FREIGHT LOCOMOTIVES, 1990-2014

Michael Iden, P.E.
Union Pacific Railroad
Melrose Park, Illinois, USA

Peter French
Association of American Railroads
Washington, D.C., USA

ABSTRACT
The design of freight locomotives for U.S. railroads began
changing in late-1990 with the introduction of the first industry
crashworthiness standard for the front nose of newlymanufactured freight. Between 1990 and 2008, that industry
standard was revised and upgraded four times. In 1995 an
industry standard for the crashworthiness of fuel tanks mounted
underneath newly-manufactured freight locomotives was also
introduced. Effective at the end of 2008, both of the industry
standards were incorporated by reference into a new U.S.
federal regulation mandating crashworthiness features on
newly-manufactured locomotives effective with deliveries to
railroads in 2009.

effectiveness of the various crashworthiness design changes in

saving lives and reducing injuries of in-cab railroad employees.

In addition to the crashworthiness-specific design changes,

in 1992 and 1993 both of the major U.S. locomotive
manufacturers introduced new designs for the attachment of the
truck (bogie) assemblies to locomotive underframes; these
changes were to facilitate the use of new trucks (bogies)
producing higher adhesion for greater tractive effort. The deep
traction pin designs also had a positive effect on the
crashworthiness of new fuel tanks by reducing the chance of
truck separation from the underframe (and impacting the fuel
tank) during accidents. The changes cited here were for newlymanufactured freight locomotives, with retrofit to older
locomotives impossible or extremely difficult to accomplish
with similar results.

The major freight railroad trade group Association of

American Railroads (AAR) has defined locomotive
crashworthiness as being to minimize the potential for
injuries and fatalities to train crews and others involved in the
transportation of freight and passengers.2

It is believed that this paper is the first and only assessment

to date of cumulative U.S. freight locomotive crashworthiness
progress and its statistical impact on locomotive crew safety
since the early 2000s.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS CRASHWORTHINESS?

Crashworthiness, in general, can be defined as the degree
to which a vehicle can protect its occupants from the effects of
an accident.1

The U.S. railroad industrys safety regulator, the Federal

Railroad Administration (FRA), has regulatory language
which refers to the mission of locomotive crashworthiness
design as being to help protect locomotive cab occupants in
the event that a locomotive collides with another locomotive or
piece of on-track equipment, a shifted load on a freight car on
an adjacent parallel track, or a highway vehicle at a highwayrail grade crossing.3

This paper briefly reviews the introduction of the

crashworthiness features described, and also offers the first
retrospective look at (a) how extensively the evolving
crashworthiness features have reached across the U.S. freight
locomotive fleet (through acquisition of newly-manufactured
freight locomotives) and (b) attempts to measure the

U.S. RAILROAD SAFETY, IN-CAB EMPLOYEES

Figure 1 shows the annual fatalities of railroad employees
occupying locomotive cabs at the time of accidents (including
train-to-train collisions and accidents involving trains striking
motor vehicles at grade crossings).

Copyright 2015 by ASME

when a (steam) locomotive pulled the first American train on a

railway line between Baltimore and Ellicott Mills, Maryland5.
The first recorded collision between two (steam)
locomotive-propelled trains operating in opposing directions
(known as a head-on collision) occurred on March 2, 1836,
on the Camden & Amboy Railway near Burlington, New Jersey;
the first recorded collision between a (steam) locomotivepropelled train colliding with the rear-end of another train
(known as a rear-end collision) occurred near Wellesley,
Massachusetts, on January 9, 18435.
Diesel-electric locomotives in North America have been
commercially manufactured since before World War II and the
operator cabs and fuel tanks (located underneath the underframe
and between the trucks or bogies) have undergone numerous
design changes and improvements over time.

Fig. 1: U.S. railroad in-cab employee fatalities, 1995-20144

On November 24, 1971, the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) issued a safety recommendation6 to the FRA
and the railroad industry to continue and expand
their cooperative efforts toward the timely improvement of the
crashworthiness of railroad equipment, particularly as it
relates to the protection of the occupants of locomotive control
compartments. That safety recommendation resulted from the
Boards investigation of a low-speed (19-to-20 miles per hour)
rear-end collision of two freight trains at Riverdale, Illinois, on
September 8, 1970.

The overall trend, over the past 20 years, for fatal injuries
occurring to railroad employees in the cab of locomotives is
downward. This long term improvement has been the result of
several factors, such as:
x

Upgraded track and structures, and more

maintenance, leading to fewer train derailments

Improved operating practices and adherence to

operating rules

Expanded use of locomotive simulators to train

and improve the skills of locomotive engineers

Replacement of train order movement authority

with direct communication between train
dispatchers and (train) locomotive crews,
including the use of Direct Train Control
practices, and improved radio communications

Improvements in locomotive crashworthiness,

affording greater protection in the event of traintrain and train-vehicle collisions

In that accident, the caboose (occupied crew car) on the

rear-end of one train moving backwards at about-17 miles per
hour collided with the crew-occupied switching locomotive on
another train moving at about 2-to-3 miles per hour, at a
crossing between the two railroad companies. In the 1971
Riverdale collision, the caboose overrode and destroyed the
operator cab of the struck locomotive, fatally injuring the train
conductor in the caboose and the locomotive engineer in the
locomotive, and seriously injuring two other employees. See
Figure 2.
The locomotive destroyed in the 1971 accident was
originally built in 1948, with the operator cab at the extreme
rear-end (it did not have any carbody structure or nose on that
end of the locomotive).

This paper attempts to assess the impact of locomotive

crashworthiness improvements, first implemented in 1990, on
the safety and survivability of in-cab employees during train-totrain collisions.
BACKGROUND
Railroad transportation, involving locomotives as the
means of propelling a train, has a long history, dating back to
September 26, 1825 when a (steam) locomotive pulled the
worlds first train on the Stockton & Darlington Railway in the
United Kingdom, and in the United States on August 28, 1830

Copyright 2015 by ASME

perceived safety problems; identify cost effective solutions

based on the agreed-upon facts; and identify regulatory options
where necessary to implement those solutions. In determining
whether regulations are necessary, the Committee shall take
into account section 1(a) of Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review).8
The purpose of the LCWG was described as To promote
the safe operation of trains and the survivability of locomotive
crews where train incidents do occur.9
The RSAC LCWG membership included
representatives from the FRA, AAR, AAR-member railroads,
railroad operating and non-operating labor unions, the
American Association of State Highway Transportation
Officials (AASHTO), the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA), the American Short Line & Regional
Railroad Association (ASLRRA), the Railway Supply
Institute (RSI), various RSI-member locomotive
manufacturers and the NTSB (as a non-voting associate
member).

Fig. 2: locomotive cab damage, 1971 collision at Riverdale, Illinois6

Between 1971 and 1990, a number of government and

industry efforts researched potential improvements to
locomotive crashworthiness.
The first industry-wide standardized attempt to improve
locomotive cab crashworthiness during manufacturing came
with the introduction of the AAR Standard S-5802
(Locomotive Crashworthiness Improvements) in 1989
(effective for newly-manufactured locomotives built after
August 1, 1990), mandating specific design and strength
requirements for the front nose which is located ahead of the
operator cab (on the designated front end of a locomotive). As
noted previously, the front nose design and/or strength
requirements in AAR S-580 were ultimately upgraded a total of
4 times by 2008.

The LCWG had three task phases9: (1) review historical

railroad accident data and formulate the most prevalent
accident scenarios involving injuries and deaths, (2) work
with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
(VNTSC) to perform detailed analyses of how design
improvements/additions to S-580 would affect the probable
resulting injuries/deaths in each of five accident scenarios
and (3) to analyze and deliberate the proposed costs and
benefits to determine the effectiveness of each of the proposed
changes to S-580. AAR Standard S-5506 for fuel tanks
naturally also came under review by the LCWG.

Likewise, in 1995, the AAR introduced a voluntary

standard to improve the crashworthiness of newly-manufactured
freight locomotive fuel tanks, which became designated
Standard S-55067. Although originally issued as an AAR
recommended practice [RP-5506] in 1995, the fuel tank
improvements were immediately applied to almost all newlymanufactured freight locomotives before becoming a standard
[S-5506] with definitive applicability to all newly-manufactured
freight locomotives in 2001.

Under the RSAC LCWG process, the working group was

initiated on June 24, 1997, and given a target date of January,
1999 for its recommendations on locomotive crashworthiness
(July 1998 for emergency cab egress).

Between 1998 and 2005, a Locomotive Crashworthiness

Working Group (LCWG or working group) was formed
and held 12 meetings (24 working days) as part of the Rail
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) process which was
established by the FRA in 1996.

The LCWGs actual work extended well beyond the

January, 1999, target, as the working group ultimately
scheduled twelve (12) separate meetings (consuming twenty
four (24) working days) through its final meeting on June 29,
2005. The group reached a consensus agreement on a future
federal regulation on locomotive crashworthiness. The actual
seven (7) year process to reach consensus on a locomotive
crashworthiness regulation (as compared to the targeted 18
months) was reflective, in the authors opinion, of the
complexity of the topic.

The general purpose of the RSAC process was (and

continues to be) to develop new regulatory standards
through a collaborative process, with all segments of the rail
community working together to fashion mutually satisfactory
solutions on regulatory issues The Committee shall seek
agreement on the facts and data underlying any real or

In order to give locomotive manufacturers time to revise

their latest S-580 and S-5506 designs for the final consensus
changes, the federal regulation incorporating S-580 and S-5506
(and stronger traction pin attachment strength of trucks) by
reference became effective with newly-manufactured freight
locomotives manufactured after December 31, 2008.

Copyright 2015 by ASME

Both of the AAR crashworthiness Standards were, for the

first time, incorporated by reference in U.S. federal regulation
49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 229.20510 (Railroad
Locomotive Safety Standards) General requirements and
229.20611 Design requirements for new and remanufactured
locomotives effective January 1, 2009.

5.

Offset collision between locomotive and freight

car (Madrone, New Mexico, October 13, 1995).

Figures 3 and 4 show pictorially14,15 the five generic

accident scenarios which were selected by the Engineering
Review Task Force and presented to the working group, noting
that Each scenario presents a significant risk of injury or
death to locomotive cab occupants, and the Working Group
recognized that effective reduction of this risk is the primary
goal
when
considering
locomotive
crashworthiness
standards16.

New locomotive obviously means a locomotive

manufactured and delivered to a customer at the beginning of its
life cycle. The FRA regulations12 define remanufactured as
being a locomotive rebuilt or refurbished from a previously
used or refurbished underframe (deck), containing fewer than
25% previously used components (measured by dollar value of
the components).
For calculation purposes, the percentage of previously used
components is determined with equivalent value of new parts
and is calculated using dollar values from the same year as the
new parts used to remanufacture the locomotive. 8
FOCUS OF CRASHWORTHINESS ACTIVITIES
The working group also formed a small subgroup known as
the Engineering Review Task Force which analyzed a list of
twenty three (23) locomotive-related accidents considered by
the FRA as being most relevant for technical review, and
Collective discussion of these accidents with railroad and
labor members of the Engineering (Review) Task Force helped
to flesh out all the details of the locomotive types and
designs13 (which were involved in the 23 accidents).

Fig. 3: Accident scenarios 1, 2 and 3

The 23 collisions were then categorized by the LCWG

Engineering Task Force into five scenarios:
1.

Coupled locomotive override resulting from a

head-on train-to-train collision (based on the
example of an accident at Smithfield, West
Virginia, August 20, 1996);

2.

Colliding locomotive override resulting from a

head-on train-to-train collision (West Eola,
Illinois, January 20, 1993);

3.

between
a
Rear-end/overtaking
collision
locomotive and a freight car (Phoenixville,
Pennsylvania, August 23, 1996);

4.

Oblique/raking collision between a locomotive

and a freight car or part thereof, at a switch or
upon passing a train on an adjacent track (Selma,
North Carolina, May 16, 1994); and,

Fig. 4: Accident scenarios 4 and 5

The final result of the process (the regulation issued in

2008) focused on strengthening the locomotives front nose
(and front door) and the collision posts (large structural
barriers inside the front nose behind the exterior skin of the
nose), attachment of the collision posts to the roof of the front
nose, impact-protection of the fuel tank, emergency egress from
the operator cab (including emergency lighting), securement of
cab appurtenances including seats, strength of the locomotive
underframe strength and longitudinal/lateral attachment strength
of trucks (bogies) to the underframe.

Copyright 2015 by ASME

EXAMPLES OF HOW TECHNICAL & OPERATIONAL

CHANGES CAN AFFECT STANDARDS &
CRASHWORTHINESS PERFORMANCE
During the LCGWs life, most rear-end collisions involved
a following trains leading locomotive striking the rearmost car
of a freight train ahead, thus creating a locomotive-to-freight
car collision (most manned cabooses had since been
eliminated as the industry migrated to caboose-less
operations). Starting in the mid-1990s, however, the western
Class I railroads16 in particular began implementing the use of
rear-end distributed power (DP) locomotives, controlled by
radio by the locomotive engineer on the leading locomotive
unit. DP locomotive operations have expanded considerably
since then, particularly in the western U.S., especially on coal
trains.
Fig. 5: Changes in truck attachment to locomotive underframe

The collision of one train into the rear end of another train
equipped with a DP locomotive on the rear end is, in effect, like
a head-on collision (albeit with only one locomotive manned or
occupied). Therefore, although this analysis and paper attempts
to look at head-end and rear-end collisions separately, the rearend collision data increasingly contains a skewing of results, in
effect, because of the gradual shift from all rear-end collisions
being locomotive-to-freight car to locomotive (manned)-tolocomotive (DP, remotely controlled, unmanned).

An additional technical change which has impacted freight

train operations and collision risks has been the gradual
reduction in the number of 4-axle (4-motor) freight
locomotives, with no new 4-axle freight locomotives having
been manufactured for U.S. freight railroads since 1991-1992.
Four-axle locomotives (such as the 2238 and 2686 kW [3000
and 3600 horsepower] EMD GP40-2 and GP50, and GE B30-7
and B40-8, respectively) were often acquired and used by
freight railroads.

This paper refers to traction pin attachment of trucks to

the locomotive underframe. While this was not a
crashworthiness design feature when introduced by EMD and
GE in 1992 and 1993, respectively, the improved attachment of
the trucks to the underframe did have an unintended positive
impact on locomotive crashworthiness, by reducing the risk that
a locomotive truck could become partially disconnected from
the locomotive underframe and move backward into the front
wall of the fuel tank, damaging the fuel tank and leading to a
fuel leak (and possibly a fuel fire).

In fact, prior to the mid-1970s, the majority of freight

locomotives acquired by U.S. railroads were 4-axle designs.
Beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s, however, the U.S. railroads
gradually shifted to purchases of larger (longer) and heavier 6axle (6-motor) freight locomotives for several reasons:

Figure 5 shows the difference between older locomotives

with center plate and center bowl engagement of underframeand-truck, and newer locomotives with traction pin engagement
of underframe-and-truck. The authors believe that the AAR fuel
tank Standard S-5506, combined with the greater strength of
truck-to-underframe attachment using the traction pin concept,
has led to a large reduction in collision-related fuel spills and
fires. I.e., the benefits of S-5506 have been magnified by the
traction pin concept. (Traction pins are not considered
retrofittable to older locomotives.)

1.

Four-axle locomotives were limited to about

13,627 liters (3,600 US gallons) of fuel capacity;
longer 6-axle locomotives have fuel tanks now
typically having capacity of 18,927 liters (5,000
US gallons) of diesel fuel. More diesel fuel
translates to longer operating range and increasing
locomotive flexibility, and also reducing
somewhat train delays needed for refueling.

2.

Many U.S. freight train operations have

experienced a gradual shift toward heavier freight
cars and heavier trains. The average U.S. freight
train has grown from 68.9 cars in 1990 to 73.0
cars in 2012, a 6 percent increase in number of
cars, and the average freight load (lading) carried
from 2,499 metric tonnes (2,755 tons) to 3,137
metric onnes (3,458 tons), a 26 percent increase in
weight, over the same time period.17 Larger morepowerful 6-axle (6-motor) locomotives have been

Copyright 2015 by ASME

This is, however, another positive news point, as even though

freight train miles have increased tremendously, the numbers of
train accidents have declined over the same period of time.

one tool for handling these larger, heavier freight

trains.
3.

The introduction of greater diesel engine power

(into the 2984-to-3282 kW [4000-to-4400
horsepower] range), combined with the need for
larger engine cooling systems to meet morestringent exhaust gas emissions standards, plus the
addition of additional power electronics to support
alternating current (AC) traction motors has
essentially made a contemporary U.S. 4-axle
freight locomotive impossible to design. The
collective addition of the additional equip, plus
the operational desire for larger fuel tanks and
longer operating range, has resulted in 6-axle
freight locomotives now weighing 191-to-196
metric tonnes (210-to-216 tons) when fully
stocked with supplies, which is at the technical
limit for axles and axle-end roller bearings. In
contrast, the heaviest 4-axle freight locomotives
ever built (and which could be built today)
weighed around metric 127 tonnes (140 tons).

FREIGHT RR COMPLIANCE WITH THE EVOLVING

CRASHWORTHINESS STANDARDS & REGULATION
Based on data reported annually by US Class I16 member
railroads to the AAR17, the aggregate freight locomotive fleet
has grown by 33% 1990-2013 (data for 2014 had not yet been
released as this paper was being written), from 18,835 inservice units in 1990 to 25,033 as of January 1, 2014.
During that period of time, more than 15,936 newlymanufactured freight locomotives were placed into service by
the Class I US freight railroads.18
Figure 6 (below) graphically portrays the change in
composition of the U.S. freight locomotive fleet between 1990
and 2013 (data for 2014 was not available when this paper was
published), as various crashworthiness features and
enhancements have been included during manufacturing of new
freight locomotives. The gray bars represent older precrashworthy locomotives remaining in service.

What is the significance of the gradual increase in freight

locomotive weights, especially in a collision situation?
Additional weight increases the forces generated during a
collision, and that means a greater reliance on crashworthiness
features to maintain or improve survivability.
A 127 tonne (140 ton) 4-axle locomotive moving at 48
kilometers per hour (30 miles per hour), and stopping in 0.3
second during a collision, will produce 8,562 Newtons
(1,925,000 pounds) of decelerative force which must be
dissipated.
A 6-axle locomotive weighing 191 tonnes (210 tons) in the
same scenario will produce decelerative force equal to 12,538
Newtons (2,818,750 pounds) which must be dissipated during
the stop. Thus, the 6-axle locomotive can develop 46 percent
greater forces in the same collision scenario.
Therefore, improved locomotive crashworthiness has
concurrently become an important advantage as the weight of
the most common freight locomotives weights has increased.
The final observation regarding technological change is
that only a small number of 4-axle freight locomotives were
manufactured with any AAR crashworthiness features. The
locomotives were built between the middle of 1990 and the end
of 1991, after which EMD and GE built no additional 4-axle
road freight units for U.S. railroads.

Fig. 6: Crashworthiness composition of US freight locomotive fleet, 19902013

As shown, at least 64% of the in-service U.S. Class I

freight locomotive fleet now meets a combination of AAR
Standards S-580 and S-5506 along with stronger traction pin
attachment of trucks (bogies) to underframe (as of 2013).
Figure 6 also shows that the U.S. freight railroads have been
acquiring large numbers of newly-manufactured locomotives
meeting the ever-evolving crashworthiness requirements over
the past 23 years.

One additional operational change has played a part in train

collisions: since 1990, freight train miles operated in the U.S.
has grown by 32 percent17, producing an increase over time in a
potential exposure rate for collisions if no other factors change.

Several discussions during the RSAC LCWG process

suggested that the federal regulation being recommended make

Copyright 2015 by ASME

mandatory the placement of only locomotives meeting the

crashworthiness requirements as the leading (occupied cab)
units on freight trains. That requirement was not included in the
regulation.

power locomotive unit(s) on the rear-end, making for a variant

of a head-on collision involving two locomotives), and sideswipe or raking collisions (in which the front or lead locomotive
unit of one train strikes the side of a second train).

Because of the evolution of crashworthiness features (in

sequence: stronger front nose in 1990, traction pin truck
attachment in 1992 and 1993, a revision to front nose strength
in 1994, stronger fuel tanks in 1995, another increase in front
nose strength in 2001 and 2005, and finally the federal
regulation in 2008), it is exceedingly difficult to assess how
each individual change affected the safety and survivability of
locomotive cab occupants (crews).

Only those collisions occurring on main tracks were

analyzed; other collisions, such as on designated (low-speed)
yard tracks, industry tracks and locomotive servicing area tracks
were not included.
In order to correctly classify the involved locomotive units
as being crashworthy (defined as combinations of S-580, S5506 and traction pin truck attachment), each of the 708
locomotive units reported in the FRA accident data base as
being involved in one of the collisions was checked in a lengthy
and time-consuming manner using a variety of information
sources (official railroad rosters, published books on
locomotive models, railroad industry magazines, internet
photograph files, etc.) to determine adherence to
crashworthiness standards. The majority of the locomotives
built new since 1995, for example, have all of the basic
crashworthiness features (strengthened front nose and fuel tank)
plus stronger truck-to-underframe attachment.

To put this into perspective, Figure 7 (below) shows the

timeline of locomotive crashworthiness changes since 1990:

The numbers of such reported accidents, and the division

between locomotives defined as having crashworthy features
(S-580, S-5506 and traction pin truck attachment) and other
older units involved, are:
Accident type
Head-on
Rear-end
Side/raking
Total

Fig. 7: Timeline of changes in U.S. freight locomotive crashworthiness,

1990-2014

# events
Pre-Crashw.
156 collisions
141 units
234 collisions
115 units
216 collisions
120 units
606 collisions
376 units

Crashworthy
72 units
156 units
104 units
332 units

U.S. freight railroads have been increasingly focused the

newest freight locomotives with evolving crashworthiness
features as leading units on freight trains. This is due to the
accumulative process by which successive versions of new
locomotive units are generally equipped with the mostproductive technologies and other features making their use as
leading (crew occupied) locomotives most practical. (This
includes distributed power, DP, the ability to control other
unmanned locomotive units located elsewhere in the train
such as mid-train and/or at the rear-end of the train.)

The following three graphs (Figures 8, 9 and 10) show the

distribution of locomotive types involved in the various
collisions, separated as to:

ANALYSIS OF LEAD LOCOMOTIVES IN ACCIDENTS

Using the railroad accident data base maintained by the
FRA, the authors analyzed all of the (566) reported train
collisions between January 1, 1990 and October 31, 2014,
classified as head-on (two trains in opposing directions
colliding at their front or lead locomotives), rear-end (two
trains in the same direction colliding, the front or lead unit of
the rearmost train striking the rear-end of the forward-most
train, which, since, the mid-1990s may have a distributed

Figure 8 shows lead locomotives involved in head-on

collisions 1990-2014. The color coding used (in Figures 7, 8, 9
and 10) is as follows:

Number of axles (4-axle versus 6-axle)

Having general crashworthiness features (labeled

crashworthy) versus not equipped (labeled precrashworthy)

x
x
x
x

Light blue =
4-axle pre-crashworthy locos.
Blue patterned = 4-axle crashworthy locos.
Red =
6-axle pre-crashworthy locos.
Red pattern =
6-axle crashworthy locos.

Copyright 2015 by ASME

Figure 9 shows lead locomotives involved in rear-end

collisions 1990-2014.

Fig. 8: Head-on collisions 1990-2014, and types of lead/occupied units

involved at points of impact

Fig. 9: Rear-end collisions 1990-2014, and types of lead/occupied units

involved at points of impact

Several things are immediately apparent:

1.

2.

Head-on collisions are now about 82 percent less

frequent than in 1990.

3.

Very few crashworthy 4-axle units have been

involved (given their small population) in head-on
collisions. Most 4-axle freight units in recent years
tend to be used for shorter-haul freight trains,
very-short range local trains and even in yard
switching service.

4.

As with the analysis of unit involved in head-on collisions,

several conclusions are apparent looking at the rear-end
collision data:

The number of lead units involved has been

declining over time. Because each head-on
collision involves two leading locomotives, the
number of head-on collisions in any calendar year
is generally equal to one-half the number of
leading locomotive units involved. The number of
leading units involved has declined, for example,
from 22 (11 accidents) in 1990 to 4 (2 accidents)
in 2014. Although there are year-to-year
variations, the general trend in accidents is
downward.

The number of pre-crashworthy 4- and 6-axle

locomotives involved in head-on collisions has
been declining over time. This reflects the fact that
these older locomotives have increasingly been
shifted by railroads away from service on longerhaul freight trains and also away from lead
service. The majority of lead units involved in
head-on collisions are increasingly the 6-axle
crashworthy units.

1.

The data for rear-end collisions and units involved

must be reviewed with awareness that rear-end
collisions have (as noted previously) involved a
number of trains equipped with unmanned rearend DP locomotives. As noted before, a rear-end
collision between a manned lead locomotive (on
the following train) and an unmanned DP rear-end
locomotive (on the struck train) is like a de facto
head-on
collision,
i.e.,
locomotive
to
locomotive, not locomotive to car.

2.

Although rear-end collisions are also trending

downward in occurrence over time, the trend has
not been as pronounced as with head-on
collisions.

3.

The drop in 4-axle pre-crashworthy units in rearend collisions is even more pronounced than in
head-on collisions. The authors found no 4-axle
units involved as cab manned/leading or cab
unmanned/DP rear-end in the past 8 years.

4.

The number of 6-axle crashworthy units involved

(both manned/leading and unmanned/DP units) is
much greater, again because of the influence of a
growing population of DP-type freight trains in
the U.S.

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Figure 10 shows lead locomotives involved in side-andraking collisions 1990-2014.

Loco. Model
SD40, SD40-2
Dash-9
AC4400CW
SD70M
SD70MAC
Total, 5 models

Crashworthy? # involved in accidents*

No
126 units (most prior to 2006)
Yes
69 units
Yes
56 units
Yes
42 units
Yes
33 units
326 units (46% of total*)

*using FRA accident data, as analyzed for this paper.

These five locomotive models were or are the most
commonly built and used locomotive models in the U.S.
The SD40 was manufactured by the EMD 1966-1972
(1,268 built) and the successor SD40-2 was manufactured
1972-1989 (5,250 built); together, these two pre-S-580
locomotive models were the most common freight locomotive
in the U.S. during the 1970s and into the 1980s. All of these
units were built (for U.S. railroads) with narrow noses which
did not meet any AAR S-580 criteria for crashworthiness. Most
SD40 units have long been retired (scrapped) and at least onehalf of all SD40-2 units have probably been retired (scrapped)
as newer, more productive 6-axle freight locomotives entered
service, particularly starting in the mid-1980s and with
retirements accelerating greatly with the introduction of AC
traction motor-equipped locomotives starting in the early/mid1990s.

Fig. 10: Side-and-raking collisions 1990-2014, and types of lead/occupied

units involved at points of impact

Analysis of the side-and-raking collision data shows:

1.

The 216 reported side-and-raking collisions have

almost always involved only 1 unit among the 2
trains involved, i.e., the manned/leading unit on
the striking train. The authors found less than 10
accidents in which a locomotive struck another
locomotive in a side or raking style collision.

2.

Side-swipe or raking collisions are now about 67

percent less frequent than in 1990.

3.

The involvement of 4-axle pre-crashworthy and

crashworthy locomotives has steadily declined
over time.

4.

The population of units involved in side-or-raking

collisions is increasingly made up of crashworthy
locomotives.

The Dash-9 (DC motor) and AC4400CW (AC motor)

locomotives, by contrast, have been the newer, GE
crashworthiness equivalent of the older SD40 and SD40-2,
with all of both models built with some form of AAR S-580
crashworthiness compliant front nose, most having AAR S-5506
fuel tanks, and all having traction pin attachment of their trucks.
An estimated 3,500-plus Dash-9s were built, along with an
estimated 2,598 AC4400CWs, between 1993 and 2004, for a
total of about 6,098 units. Structurally, the (AC traction motorequipped) AC4400CW and (DC traction motor-equipped)
Dash-9 locomotives are quite similar (front nose, cab, carbody
structure, underframe, trucks or bogies, etc.). Both of these
models were superseded in manufacturing in 2005 by similar
models with lower engine emissions.

WHICH LOCO. MODELS ARE MOST INVOLVED?

Using the FRA train accident data base for 1990-through2014, an analysis was made of the manufacturers model of
each locomotive involved in the head-on, rear-end and sideswipe/raking collisions. This was accomplished by carefully
analyzing the build date of each of the 708 locomotive units
reported (based on the reporting marks, i.e., the railroad
initials and road number, such as BNSF 1234 or UP 6789).
(Only the 5 most-common locomotive models in the 606
reported accidents are listed.)

The SD70M (DC motor) and SD70MAC (AC motor)

locomotives are the EMD crashworthiness successors to the
older SD40-2s, and were built as competitive products vis a vis
the GE Dash-9 and AC4400CW. A total of 1,646 SD70Ms, and
1,109 SD70MACs were built, between 1992 and 2007, all with
some version of AAR S-580 crashworthy compliant front nose.
They also have been superseded in manufacturing by similar
models with lower engine emissions.

Copyright 2015 by ASME

This concentration of a handful of locomotive models

shows how cumulative purchases of these models have affected
train collision outcomes: increasingly, train collisions have
involved primarily the 4 newer models (Dash-9, AC4400CW,
SD70M and SD70MAC), and they all have most-or-all of the
crashworthy features described.

In several reported accidents, train collisions that were

found to be misclassified as to type (head-end, rear-end or
side/raking) were reclassified and placed in their appropriate
categories. The FRA accident records were then manually
enhanced with additional data (as described previously,
regarding the crashworthiness status of the leading locomotives)
to permit analysis of the crashworthiness performance of the
lead locomotives involved and to address other questions.

ANALYSIS OF CAB OCCUPANT FATALITIES &

INJURIES, RELATIONSHIP TO LOCOMOTIVE
CRASHWORTHINESS
To document and evaluate railroad employee casualties in
locomotive cabs, the analysis for this paper used the Federal
Railroad Administrations Equipment Accident/Incident
database, referred to here as the train accident database, for all
years after 1989. It selected all reported accident records
meeting the following criteria:
x
x
x
x

In addition, the fields RREMPLKLD and RREMPLINJ in

the FRA data base were corrected to render them consistent
with the TOTKLD and TOTINJ fields so that the number of
employees reported fatally injured killed or injured in a given
train consist were accurate. Otherwise, they would normally be
accurate for all consists in the accident taken as a group, but
often inaccurate for particular consists (example, one of two
trains in a head-on collision).
Closing speed initial default values for each reported train
were as follows:

TYPEQ=1, i.e., the accident involved at least one

freight train
ACCTRK=1 or 3, i.e., the accident occurred on main
or siding track (not in a yard)
ENGRS>0, i.e., there was at least one engineer on at
least one of the trains involved at the onset of the
accident. I.e., the train was manned or attended.
TYPE=02 (head on collision), 03 (rear end collision),
04 (side collision) or 05 (raking collision)

As described previously, the research for this paper

included reviewing the recorded facts for 606 reported train
collisions involving 708 lead locomotive units (either
manned/leading a train or unmanned/DP remote units on the
rear-end of trains). The authors believe that including the
unmanned/DP rear-end units in the analysis was important
because locomotive-to-locomotive collisions tend to produce
the greatest collision forces, and collision forces are what
crashworthiness features must resist to improve crew
survivability.

Head on collisions: we used the sum of the

speeds of the two striking trains;

Rear end collisions: the speed of the

striking train speed minus the speed of the
struck train;

Side collisions: striking train speed alone;

and,

Raking collision: case by case depending on

direction of the trains involved (i.e., same
direction or opposing directions)

These speeds then had to be adjusted as necessary based on

narratives and other accident characteristics. For example,
indications in the narrative that a train was standing still when
struck would, in some cases, cause the authors to reset that
trains reported speed to zero and affect other calculations.

In reviewing the 606 reported accidents, it was often

necessary to review NTSB accident reports or other records of
the accidents (sometimes including published and internet
accounts or articles) to gather additional or enhanced
information, such as the reporting marks and road number of a
reported locomotive, if the FRA accident data base appeared to
have an erroneous entry.

As noted previously, S-580 and S-5506 status were based

primarily on year built and on locomotive model. The authors
were able to assign such status to almost all of the 708
leading locomotives in the FRA database.

SAFETY ANALYSIS
With this enhanced database, the authors developed a
breakdown of in-locomotive-cab railroad employee fatalities
and injuries by accident type and closing speed bracket for nonS-580/non-S-5506 locomotive units compared with S-580/S5506 units, as summarized below:

The greatest task which the authors had in making the

analysis was, again, assigning a crashworthiness or precrashworthiness notation against each of the 708 locomotive
units involved in the 606 accidents. This was a complicated and
time consuming task in itself.

10

Copyright 2015 by ASME

speeds. At collision closing speeds above, say, 60 mph, even the

most crashworthy locomotives are likely to have high occupant
fatality rates, i.e., above 20%. When we look just at those
collisions at closing speeds below 40 mph, S-580/S-5506 cabs
achieved a rate of 0.7%, compared with a rate of 2.5% for nonS-580/non-S-5506 cabs. Those numbers represent a percentage
decline in fatality rates of 74%. So, since the introduction of the
S-580 cab/front nose and S-5506 fuel tank standards in the
early-and-mid-1990s, these standards have prevented an
estimated 11 crew member fatalities out of a possible 14
fatalities at below-40 mph speeds had the pre-S-580/pre-S-5506
fatality rates remained in place.

Percent of In-Cab RR Employees

Suffering Fatal Injuries

Type of Collision

Non-S-580/
Non-S-5506

S-580/
S-5506

All 3 collision types:

4.0%
All 3 collision types <40mph 2.5%

3.2%
0.7%

Head-on
Head-on <40mph

6.5%
4.9%

10.9%
0.0%

Rear End

2.4%

1.6%

Side/Raking

2.6%

0.6%

Statistically, S-580 cabs actually suffered a higher rate

of fatalities in head-on collisions overall. But, as with the
comparison over all collision types, they achieved a lower
fatality rate in head-on collisions and collisions generally at
closing speeds below 40 mph, as well as in side and raking
collisions.
The S-580 cabs also achieved a slightly lower injury
rate in most collision categories. However, the FRA Train
Accident Database contains no information on the severity of
the injuries.

Percent of In-Cab RR Employees

Suffering Non-Fatal Injuries

Type of Collision

Non-S-580/
Non-S-5506

S-580/
S-5506

All 3 collision types:

34%
All 3 collision types <40mph 30%

30%
25%

Head On
Head-on <40 mph

47%
42%

50%
46%

Rear End

32%

27%

Side/Raking

21%

22%

CONCLUSIONS
Railroads, railroad employees and the public have a joint
interest in achieving the safest possible operations.
The U.S. railroad industry safety record has been
improving over the long term, with the traditional industry
measures (accidents per million train-miles, and injuries and
illnesses per hundred full-time employees) continuing a
downward trend reaching back several decades.
Train collisions in particular have declined greatly, the
probability of such collisions occurring is very small. However,
train-to-train collisions do have the potential to generate large
collision forces resulting from the growing size and mass of
locomotives and freight cars.

Overall, locomotives equipped with S-580 cabs and S-5506

fuel tanks have provided greater protection to cab occupants
than did non-S-580 locomotives. For all three collision types
taken together, 3.2% of crew persons in S-580/S-5506 cabs
suffered fatalities, compared to 4.0% in non-S-580/non-S-5506
cabs. That improvement sounds modest, but represents a 21%
decline in fatality rates overall.

Locomotive manufacturers have made significant

improvements in freight locomotive designs since 1990 to
enhance the performance of operator cabs, front noses and fuel
tanks in accidents. Most of these improvements are not
retrofittable to older locomotives.
The collaborative RSAC effort on locomotive
crashworthiness (1998-2005) involved the industrys safety
regulator, the railroads, railroad labor organizations, locomotive

Arguably, the primary benefits of crashworthy

locomotives emerge more at medium rather than high closing

11

Copyright 2015 by ASME

11. US regulation 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

229.206.
12. United States regulation 49 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 229.5.
13. United States Federal Register, volume 71, number
124, June 28, 2006, page 36891.
14. United States Federal Register, volume 71, number
124, June 28, 2006, page 36894.
15. United States Federal Register, volume 71, number
124, June 28, 2006, page 36893.
16. Freight railroads in the United States are classified by
the Surface Transportation Board (STB, responsible
for economic regulation of the industry) according to
annual operating revenues. A Class I railroad is
defined as having annual operating revenues (for 2012)
of US$452.7 million or more.
17. Association of American Railroads, Railroad Facts,
2014 Edition, pages 38, 40, 36 and 51.
18. Railroad Equipment Report, 2014 Edition, AAR,
August 2014.

manufacturers and other interested parties, and it achieved a

consensus on locomotive crashworthiness features for newlymanufactured locomotives which was codified in U.S. law in
2006.
The freight railroads have made large investments in
acquiring new locomotives since 1990. Almost two-thirds of the
in-service U.S. freight locomotive fleet now has
crashworthiness design features which have been evolving and
improving since 1990. As newly-manufactured locomotives are
acquired and placed into service, and as older locomotives are
removed from service and retired, that ratio will continue to
increase. Data on train accidents also shows that the freight
railroads have increasingly focused the use of the newer
locomotives as the leading (cab occupied) unit on trains.
This paper defines crashworthy locomotives as being
newly-manufactured since 1990. The assignment of the term
pre-crashworthy to locomotives newly-manufactured prior to
1990 means those locomotives do not have the same design
features.
The statistical risk of train accidents, particularly train-totrain collisions, is very low, and is trending downward over
time. The implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) on
much of the U.S. railroad network is expected to further reduce
the already small number of train-to-train collisions.
Analysis of data from the U.S. rail safety regulator shows
that locomotive cabs and front noses meeting AAR S-580 and
fuel tanks meeting S-5506 do provide an improvement in
survivability for locomotive cab occupants.
REFERENCES
1.

Oxford Dictionaries,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/c
rashworthiness
2. Association of American Railroads Standard S-580,
Section 2.0, 2008
3. US regulation 49 Code of federal Regulations part
229.201(a).
4. AAR analysis of FRA Train Accident Database,
October, 2014.
5. Shaw, Robert B., 1961: Down Brakes, P. R.
MacMillan Limited, London, UK, pages 30 and 96.
6. NTSB Recommendation R-71-044 dated November
24, 1971.
7. Association of American Railroads Standard S-5506,
Section 2.0, 2001.
8. https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/about.php
9. https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/tasks.php
10. United States regulation 49 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 229.205.

12

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