PROJECT CODE: 000200

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF QUINES

CONFIRMATIONAL HOLISM

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ABSTRACT
Quine thesis on holism is considered to be trivial. In his
Two Dogma of Empiricism he rejected two dogma of
analytic philosophy. The first dogma which is cleavage
between truths that are analytic and truths that is
synthetic, while the second dogma is the radical
reductionism. The second dogma also implies the first as
championed by the logical empiricist. It is pertinent to
delineate the holism as a criterion of meaning for Quine,
and how it debunked the two dogmas of empiricism.
Holism in a brief sense is taking the whole not the part
to address an issue or find meaning. In this sense, we
aim to evaluate Quines holism to bring out its
implications.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover page i
Title page ii
Certification
iii
Dedication iv
Acknowledgements
v
Abstract
viii
Table of contents x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study 1.2 Statement of the Problem 1.3 Purpose of the Study
1.4 Significance of the Study 1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study
1.6 Methodology of the Study
1.7 Literature Review CHAPTER TWO: QUINES BIOGRAPHY AND BACKGROUND
TO HIS POST POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY

2.1 A Brief Biography of Quine

2.2 General Discussion on Positivist Philosophy2.3 Exposing Duhem Thesis 2.4 Traditional Explanation of kinds of Proposition
2.5 Naturalistic Theory of Analyticity
CHAPTER THREE: QUINES CONFIRMATIONAL HOLISM:
A DISCOURSE
3.1 The Background to Quines Confirmational holism3.1.1 Quines on Analytic/Synthetic distinction 3.1.2 Distinction between Two Types of Sentence 3.1.3 Quines Attack on the Two Dogmas of Empiricism 3.2 Holism as the Criterion of Meaning 3.3 Linking Confirmation and Meaning 3.4 Quines Shift from Meaning to Interpretation
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CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

4.1 Implications of Quines Conformational holism
4.2 Summary 4.3 Evaluative Discussion 4.4 Conclusion WORKS CITED -

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
In

the

domain

of

philosophy

of

language,

philosophers have propounded different theories of

meaning as well as criteria of meaning by which we say
a sentence or a proposition is meaningful either taken
individually or collectively. This has been the business of
scholars from the classical age till today. Quine
postulates his holism as a theory of meaning, the actual
scientific practices or methodology for determining the
meaning of a sentence and as a guiding principle or
solution in researches and problem solving in all spheres
of life. According to Smith, Willard Van Orman Quine
was one of the most influential American philosophers of
the twentieth century (1). Propounding confirmational
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holism was as a result of the individualistic notion of

atomism and empiricists criterion of meaningfulness and
meaninglessness. The process of knowledge acquisition
was engulfed chiefly with the dichotomy between
rationalism and empiricism. Gabriele says, Rationalism
is the idea that all valid knowledge can only be obtained
through reason (8). And empiricism is the view that
only sense experience can give us valid knowledge
through perception (Gabriele, 8). The empiricists claim
that the senses are the sources of all valid knowledge
has influenced the positivists who claim that science is
the only valid way of knowing. It, likewise, was the
controversy between truth of reason and truth of facts
by Leibniz, relations of idea and of matters of facts as
David Hume was a proponent of both, and the
analytic/synthetic distinction to which Immanuel Kant
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became
relations

great

of

defender.

ideas,

truth

As

of

highlighted

reason

and

above,
analytic

propositions assert statement whose truth or falsity

depends on the meaning of terms, which cannot be
denied without contradiction. As for matters of facts,
truth of fact and synthetic propositions, represent those
that their truth or falsity depend on experience. These
sets can be denied without contradiction. In as much as
there are many logical empiricists, they are of the view
that

meaningful

synthetic,

and

intentional.

proposition
the

This

verificationist

is

meaning

is

criterion

the
of

of

either
a

analytic

or

proposition

is

reductionist

approach/

meaningfulness

and

meaningless.
The

analytic/synthetic

distinction

(cleavage

between truths) coupled with the reductionist approach

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by

the

logical

empiricist

necessitated

Quines

confirmational holism. Quine was so disappointed with

the assertions by philosophers before him on the
cleavages of truth and on the method of confirmation
and disconfirmation of propositions. According to Taylor,
In his landmark article, Two Dogmas of Empiricism,
W.V.O. Quine, pushed analytic philosophy into its postpositivist phase by rejecting two central tenets of logical
empiricism (40). Quines stance was to show that the
cleavage of truth and reductionist approach was a
misconception by the logical empiricist. The main goal of
this research is to formulate confirmational holism as
clearly as possible, and to argue against the notion of
scholars who take confirmational holism to be trivial and
ill founded doctrine and to show that holism is a good
replacement for atomism.
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The whole work is structured onto four chapters.

The first chapter deals with issues on the general
background to confirmational holism, the problem the
work wants to solve, i.e. the dichotomy between
individualism and collectivism, the significance of an
individual sentence in a whole system. The objective is
to show extensionality of meaning, and the active role of
individual sentence within collectivism or web of belief.
The significant of this work is to show that collectivism
in any field of endeavour aid rapid growth and problems
can easily be fashioned out. The scope and limitation is
within philosophy of language, philosophy of science and
epistemology, as well as methodological research. The
second chapter deals with the biography of Quine,
positivism, its kinds, beliefs and claims about science,
and positivists criteria of meaning. Duhem thesis as a
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precursor or an earlier version of Quines holism.

Traditional definition of proposition which covers issues
on the cleavage between truths from Leibniz, Hume to
Kant, as well as the naturalistic theory of analyticity are
discussed.

The

third

chapter

examines

Kantian

distinction between truths that are analytic and synthetic

as background to Quines confirmational holism. Quines
explication of the two dogmas, kinds of sentences:
observational and theoretical sentence, critique of the
cleavage of truth that is analytic and synthetic, a general
issue on holism as a way of confirmation and infirmation,
as well as Quines shift from meaning to interpretation
are also discussed. The fourth chapter examines the
implications of holism as it affects all human endeavours.
It

takes

philosophy

cognizance
of

of

science,

philosophy
epistemology,
10

of

language,
social

life,

PROJECT CODE: 000200

environment, political society and the economy. More so,

ending with a concluding remark.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Quine in his idea of holism shows that meaning of
a sentence is reflected in a collective whole. Against the
empiricist view, there is a problem of dichotomy between
individualism and collectivism. If our sentence faces the
tribunal of experience not as a single entity but as a
corporate body experience, how then do we identify an
erroneous theory? We are faced with the problem of
indetermination. What determines how we should revise
our belief in the light of errors? What is the relevance of
individual sentence in a corporate body of experience?
Our research is to examine to what extent collectivism

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does not undermine individual sentence, and a proper

way of revisiting our theory.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
Quines confirmational holism is a guiding principle
to show that the meaning of a word, in reality is not
embedded in a single sentences but a whole sentence.
There are varieties of objectives which this work aims to
achieve, and they are stated below:

To show that meaning is not intensional. This work

aims to show that meaning in reality is not to be
found within the context of a single sentence. A
single sentence has no far reaching consequence,
unlike a body of sentence taken collectively. A
theory cannot be made using just a single
hypothesis. There are other assumptions to be
considered. The hypotheses, auxiliary hypotheses
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taken collectively yield a good result of experiment.

Meaning is something extensional, our sentences
have meaning in relation to other sentence in our
external world.

To show that collectivism does not undermine the

active role of individual sentence. This aims to show
that within the realm of collectivism, individuality
or individual sentence has a significant role to play
and cannot be undermined. It has meaningful goals
but that active role of an individual sentence is best
explained when put to test among other sentences
in our world of experience.

To show that collectivism best explains the world.

Although individuals have difference in values and
definitions in a social context, it can properly be
understood taken collectively as that enhances
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development and best explains the thing of the

world. Applied to meaning, individual sentences
have potentials, but these potentials manifest
within the system as a whole. We cannot just rely
on what we get of the meaning of a single sentence
but we subject it to test within the context of other
sentences.
1.4 Significance of the Study
This work is important because it is a critical
analysis of Quines confirmational holism. When applied
to philosophy proper, it shows the danger inherent in
taking up a part for a whole. As it concerns meaning, it
shows that the meaning of a word, sentences or
proposition shall be properly understood when taken as
a whole. In the realm of science, tests or experiments
best explain issues and are problem solving when the
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researcher considers all hypotheses and auxiliary

hypotheses collectively in the face of experience. In the
larger society, it shows that social problems of the world
although

may

individually

evolve,

they

are

best

explained and solved in a unified whole.

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study
This work is discussed within the realms of
philosophy

of

language,

philosophy

of

science,

epistemology and social philosophy. We examine holism

in respect to meaning within the context of philosophy
of language, collectivism as a method of confirmation in
the

realm

of

philosophy

of

science.

Applied

to

epistemology, we get at pragmatic approach to revision

of our basic beliefs, and collective way of explaining and
solving problems in our world. It is limited within the

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discourse

of

Quines

confirmational

holism

about

language meaning in our world of reality.

1.6 Methodology of the Study
This work is a positive outcome using the method
of analysis. The method of analysis involves a critical
and logical construction of argument and relevant ideas.
This method houses the descriptive and expository
approach and it is useful to the success of this work as
it would enable us determine the essential features of
confirmational holism and its implications to reality as a
whole.
This collection of materials from the library as well
as internet sources also suffice in this work.

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1.7 Literature Review

Some substantial amount of literature is reviewed
to enhance this work.
According to Chalmers:
By middle of the twentieth century
Quine saw Descartes project as
barren and deeply flawed. A major
problem
was
its
radical
subjectivismQuine
sought
to
ground knowledge outside the
individual, justifying our picture of
the world from what C.S. Peirce
called a community of inquirers
(95).
The author did not assent to Quines critique
against certainty and advocacy for a revision of our
belief.

Though

the

author

stresses

on

radical

subjectivism (projecting from the self), that does not

make Descartes to be subjective.

17

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Peter Hylton in his article Analyticity and Holism in

Quines Thought says:
Now it is a direct consequence of
Quine Holism that the notion of
claim upon reality at least, hence
the idea of a claim upon reality does
not fit with our taking individual
sentences
rather
than
wider
theories as relevant units (Hilton,
13).
The author in his work lays emphasis on the
concept of analyticity and how it is denounced by Quines
holism. He explicitly gives a clue of holism. The claim of
reality applies only to sentence taken as a whole not in
parts, but fails to show how Quine shifted from meaning
to interpretation. This lapse is what this project intends
to correct.
According

Soames,

another

reason

to

be

suspicious of holistic verification is that it leads to

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paradox. Suppose since two theories that mean the

same thing must make the same claim about then
world, they must agree in truth value (17-8). It is a
way Soames outrightly opted to discredit Quines holism
and indeterminacy principle. But it does not mean that
the

theories

are

synonymous

because

they

are

consistent. Their consistency shows their role in the vast

web and their incompatibility shows that they are
alternative theories. This project aims to show that the
consistency of theories signifies the role they play in the
web.
The work of Jan Dejnozka titled Observational
Ecumenicism, Holist Sectarianism. The Quine - Carnap
Conflict on Metaphysical Realism is helpful to the
understanding of Quines holism and debates with
Carnap. The author explicitly discussed Quine on holism
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and interpretation but had a rough understanding of

Quines definition of empirical content. According to
Dejnozka, Quine seems confused when he defines a
theorys empirical content as the synthetic observation
categorical

(e.g.

if

smoke,

then

fire)

it

implies

(Dejnozka, 1973). The author is wrong in his assertion

because Quine is not confused about the empirical
content of a theory. The empirical content of a theory is
its synthetic observation categories.
According to Pagin, because of confirmational
holism ... therefore the meaning of a sentence depends
on the meanings of other sentences (3). The author
made a precise formulation of an alternative nihilist
view of Quines holism by according meaning to
individual sentences. Pagin says on this alternative,
too, meaning is assigned to individual observation
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sentences not just to the totality (17). This is a wrong

assertion on Quines holism. We aim to show that
Quines holism favours statements of sentences as a
whole not in parts.
According to Sandikcoiglu, Analytic and synthetic
statements may be confirmed or disconfirmed on
pragmatic grounds but making change in the former
necessarily others a whole system of belief while making
change in the latter does not (11). Sandikcoiglu misses
the point in trying to affirm the analytic/synthetic
distinction. This project aims to show that it is a whole
system that is revised, the analytic/synthetic statement
is part of the whole system and alteration of the whole
system is a matter of degree based on pragmatic
conveniences.

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Rogerio passes Severo in his book Confirmation

Holism and Underdetermination in Quines thought gave
a precise understanding of Quines holism defending
Quine against his critics, evaluating holism digging deep
into Duhem thesis, Quines thesis and a rejection of
Carnap

Aufbeau

stating

the

implication

of

confirmational holism. According to Severo All the

sentences that make up the corpus of a scientific theory
are justified by net empirical implication of that theory
(110). This is right of holism because holism implies that
empirical

implication

is

to

theory

not

individual

sentences.
A review of Holism about Meaning and about
Evidence by Okasha, S., shows the attempts to defend
Quines semantic holism from the attack of Fodor and
Lepore. According to Okasha, though the revisability
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thesis may itself be technically trivial, it does not follow

that the revisability thesis itself does not express the
point (50). The author shows that Quines reversibility
thesis is not flawed. This project tends to show that the
concept of revision is in the whole of reality, our revision
of a theory or web leads to progress.
Greg Taylor in his article Two Dogmas of Analytical
Philosophy did an exposition of Quines criticism
against the dogmas of empiricism. The author did not
support or refute Quine clearly but proposed solution to
construct an adequate account of meaning using Kants
and Davidsons philosophies of content. The author
affirms that Quine cannot be disposed of so easily by
critics. According to Taylor, he was right to note the
connection between these notions. What we need now
is a reason for neither accepting nor rejecting the whole
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slew of them (11). But Taylor despite emphasis not to

argue against Quine pointed out two dogmas which are
committed to Quine. Apparently, these two dogmas
accredited as a problem of Quine is not a real problem
and they are trivial. Our aim is to show that holism is an
adequate account of meaning which Taylor has failed to
note.
According to Kelly:
The metaphor of the web thus
represents
the
kind
of
fundamentality in spatial term: the
more a particular web is implicated
in our overall view of the world, the
nearer it is to the centre while less
fundamental beliefs are located
nearer the periphery of the web (34).
The author explains Quines rejection of first
philosophy. It is in accordance with what Quine stresses
that we sometimes take a sentence as superior to others
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but they are equal. To this reason, we think that

statements in the centre of the web that are not revised
based on choice are analytic. We aim to show that what
Quine affirms as revision in the web is true and based
on matter of choice.
According to Silva:
Quines empiricism led him to
elaborate an account of observation
sentences; instead of describing
two faces of the same entity, we
may say that Quine is in fact
describing two (quiet) different
entities. We can conclude that he
failed in providing the same entity;
we may say that Quine is in fact
describing two (quiet) different
entities. We can conclude that he
failed in providing a satisfactory
account of theory-free, empirical
basis of science (190).
This version trivialises and ridicules Quines view. It
is not a mistakes claim of observational sentence having
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two facts but we aim to analyse properly Quine on

sentences to show what he meant by observational
sentence which is not properly understood by scholars.
According to Breckenridge, Quine uses holism to
show that certain definitions of analyticity cannot work,
but to overlook the fact that the same holism can be
used to give definitions that do (3). Any definition of
analyticity is circular, and we cannot define analyticity
using holism. The author is wrong in his view of giving
a definition of analyticity.
According to Resnik:
When I speak of holism here, I shall
intend epistemic or conformational
holism. This doctrineis different
from another view frequently
attributed
to
Quine,
namely,
meaning holism, which is roughly
the thesis that an expression
depends upon the entire language
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PROJECT CODE: 000200

containing it
(Resnik, 44).

for

its

meaning

Though, the author sees the significance of logic

and mathematics in Quines web, he fails to see that
Quines confirmational holism encompasses the idea of
semantic holism. This we show in our writing how
confirmational holism encompasses both meaning and
semantic holism and its implication to various fields of
study.

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References
Brecknridge, Wylie, on Quine, Analyticity and
Meaning, http//:
wylieb.com/../Quine.pdf, accessed: 08/09/2013.
Chalmers, C. Clark, Willard Orman Quine, Great
Thinkers A-Z,
Jullian Baggini and Jenemy Strangroom (eds.),
London: Continuum, 2004.
Dejnezka, Jan, Observational, Ecumenicism, Holist
Sectarianism: The Quine Carnap conflict on
Metaphysical Realism, Philo: Vol.9, No.2, 2006.
Gabriele, Gava, C.I. Lewis on the Task of Philosophy,
Goethe
Universitat
Frank
Furtamman,
http//:nordprag.org/papers/epc1/
gava.pdf, accessed: 15/02/2014.
Hylton, Peter, Analyticity and Holism in Quines
Thought, The
Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol. 10, 2002.
Kelly, Thomas, Quine and Epistemology, Gibert
Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.) Blackwell Companions
to
Philosophy,
Princeton
University,
http//:Princeton.edu/~tkelly/qae.pdf, 06 Dec 2013,
accessed: 15/ 02/2014.

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Okasha, S., Holism about Meaning and about Evidence:

in Defence of W.V. Quine, Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic publishers, Erkenntniss 52, 2000.
Pagin, Peter, Quines Definition of Synonymy,
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2000.
Resnik, D. Michael, Quine and the web of Belief: The
Oxford handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and
logic, Stewart Shapire (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Sandikcioglu, Pakise Arikan, Holism and the Analytic
Synthetic Distinction, in Ethos: Felsefe ve Topwmsal
Bilimlerde Diyalogor, Sayi: 4, 2001.
Severe, R.P., Confirmation Holism and
Underdetermination in Quines Thought; Folosofin
Unisinos, Vol.13(2), 2012.
Silva, Rui, Quine and the Vienna Circle; Delfim Santos
Studies ANO1, NUM-1, 2013.
Soames, Scott, The Place of Quine in Analytic
Philosophy, A companion to W.V.O Quine, Ernest
Lopero and Gilbert Harman (eds.), John Wiley and Sons
Publishers, 2012.
Smith, P., Kirk on Quines Reason for indeterminacy of
Trans29

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lation,
http//:resources.etapress.com/pdfpreview, accessed:
20/02/2014.
Taylor, Greg, The Dogmas of Analytical Philosophy:
Macalester
Journal of Philosophy: Vol.16; TSS:/ Article5,
http//:digitalcolomons.macalester.edu/philo/vo/16/ISSI/5,
2007.

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