Consolidated Cases in Pale

Republic of the Philippines
ISABELA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
Cauayan Campus
CASE DIGEST in
Practical Areas in Legal Ethics (PALE)
Submitted by:
3rd yr. LLB students
S.Y. 2015-2016
LIST OF CASES
Cases from January to December 2010
Atty. Elmer Solidon Vs. Atty. Ramil Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February
24, 2010
Rural Bank Of Calape, Inc. (Rbci) Bohol Vs.Atty. James Benedict Florido
A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010
Spouses Virgilio And Angelina Aranda Vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda,
A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010
Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. Vs Judge Maria Clarita Tabin, A.M. No. Mtj-091736, July 25, 2011
Valentin C. Miranda V. Atty. Macario D. Carpio, A.C. 6281, September
16, 2011
Dalisay Capili Vs Atty. Alfredo Bentulan, A.C. No. 5862, October 12,
2011
Urban Bank, Inc. Vs Atty. Magdaleno Pea, G.R. No. 145817, October
19, 2011
Elpidio Tiong Vs Atty. George Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 12,
2011
Corazon Nevada Vs Atty. Rodolfo Casuga, A.C. No. 7591, March 20,
2012
Re: Report On Financial Audit Conducted At MCTC, Santiago-San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Cresencio C. Milla Vs. People Of The Philippines And Carlo V. Lopez.
G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012.
Hector Trenas Vs. People Of The Philippines. G.R. No. 195002. January
25, 2012.
Luis P. Pineda Vs. Neil T. Torres, Sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court In Cities,
Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027. January 30, 2012
Concerned Citizen Vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, Etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907.
January 31, 2012.
Re: Verified Complaint Of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman Of The
Board/CEO Etc. Against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. 11184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, Etc. Vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-112926, February 1, 2012
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February
8, 2012.
Aida R. Campos, Et Al. Vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan,
Agusan Del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012.
Sps. Democrito And Olivia Lago Vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br.
43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012.
Office Of The Adrministrative Services, Office Of The Court
Administrator Vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.
Martin Lahn III And James P. Concepcion Vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li.
Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Nesa Isenhardt Vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15,
2012.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Atty. Rene Medina, Et Al. Vs. Judge Victor Canoy, Et Al. A.M. RTJ-112298, February 22, 2012.
Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City,
Isabela Vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, Same Court.
A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Go, Et Al. A.M. No. MTJ-071667, April 10, 2012.
Maria Vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Araya. A.M. No. P-12-3053, April
11, 2012.
Attys. Gonzalez, Et Al. Vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, April 16, 2012
Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April
16, 2012.
Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. Vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-092720, April 17, 2012.
In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 In G.R. Nos.
145817 And 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan Vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk Of Court II,
MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18,
2012.
Ramoncito And Juliana Luarca Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC,
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato,
MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Evelyn J. Jailorina Vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San
Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012.
In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012
Dr. Ramie G. Hipe Vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court,
Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012.
Re: Complaint Filed By Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes
And Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-123058, April 25, 2012
Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio And Maria

Loudes P.A Sereno Dated September 16, 2011 Filed By Atty. Magdaleno
M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012
Leticia Jacinto Vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, Metc, Br. 40, Quezon
City A.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Re: Report Of The Judicial Audit Conducted In The Regional Trial Court,
Branches 72 And 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June
13, 2012
Pilar S. Tanoco Vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3,

Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012

Eladio D.Perfecto Vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No.

RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012
State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang And Ms. Victoria SunegaLagman Vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba
City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012
Filomena B. Consolacion Vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer,

MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas Vs. Lydia S.
Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July 3, 2012
Rhea Airene P. Katague, Et Al. Vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br.
48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012.
Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin Vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process
Server, Municipal Trial Court In Cities, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Manuel G. Villatuya Vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10,
2012.
Lambayong Teachers And Employees Cooperative, Represented In This
Act By Its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso Vs. Carlos P. Diaz, In His
Capacity As Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-062246, July 11, 2012.
Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo And Jun Basilio Vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro
A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012
Murphy Chu, Et Al. Vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, Metc,
Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.
Criselda C. Gacad Vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal
Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva
Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk Of
Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July
17, 2012.
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. Vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360,
July 24, 2012.
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco, A.C. No. 6116
August 1, 2012
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116,
August 1, 2012
Emilia O. Dhaliwal Vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390,
August 1, 2012..
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., Represented By Gabriel H.
Abad Vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012
Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don
Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental Vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC,
Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-123080. August 29, 2012
Manolito C. Villordon Vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal
Trial Court In Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August
10, 2012

Grace M. Anacta Vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No. 9074,

August 14, 2012.
Astorga And Repol Law Offices, Represented By Atty. Arnold B. Lugares
Vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati
City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012.
Memoranda Of Judge Eliza B. Yu Issued To Legal Researcher Marie Joy P.
Lagman And To Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, All Of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033,
August 15, 2012.
Jasper Junno F. Rodica Vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, Et Al. A.C. No. 9259,
August 23, 2012
Emilia O. Dhaliwal Vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing, A.C. No. 9390
August 1, 2012
Gerlie M. Uy Vs. Judge Erwin B. Javellana, A.M. No. Mtj-07-1666,
September 5, 2012
Mariano T. Ong Vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk Of Court, RTC, Br. 32,
Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
Re: Complaint Of Leonardo A. Velasco Against Associate Justices
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January
15, 2013
Re: Verified Complaint Of AMA Land, Inc. Against Hon. Danton Q.
Bueser, Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013
Kareen P. Magtagob Vs. Judge Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No.
11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
Re: Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) Of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C.
No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Sps. Arcing And Cresing Bautista, Et Al. Vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No.
5530. January 28, 2013.
Fe A. Ylaya Vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30,
2013
Anastacio N. Teodoro III Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760.
January 30, 2013
Geoffrey Beckett Vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24,
Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Anastacio N. Teodoro Iii Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales A.C. No. 6760,
January 30, 2013
Re: Request Of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban For ReComputation Of His Creditable Service For The Purpose Of ReComputing His Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12,
2013
Erlinda C. Mendoza Vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013
Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. Vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan,

Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13,
2013.
Victoriano G. Manlapaz Vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan,

Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013
Patrocinio V. Agbulos Vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February
18, 2013
Thelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong Vs. Court

Of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013
Ray Antonio C. Sasing Vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20,
2013
Missing Exhibits And Court Properties In Regional Trial Court, Br. 4,

Panabo City, Davao Del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013
Anonymous Vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City,

Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013
Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza,
Celedonio Alojado, Rosendo Villamin And Aurea Tolentino, Vs. Atty.
Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013
Gloria P. Jinon Vs. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013
Rodrigo E. Tapay And Anthony J. Rustia Vs. Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo And
Atty. Janus T. Jarder, A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-041785. April 2, 2013
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Et
Al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Sonia C. Decena And Rey C. Decena Vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC,
Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013
Efigenia M. Tenoso Vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April
11, 2013
Civil Service Commission Vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-082531. April 11, 2013
Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City Vs. Atty. Rogelio F.
Fabro, Etc., Et Al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Et
Al A.M No. Mtj-07-1691, April 2, 2013
Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena Vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, A.M
No. Rtj-10-2217, April 8, 2013
Rex Polinar Dagohoy Vs. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan, A.C. No. 7944, June
03, 2013
Pena Vs. Atty. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013
Julian Penilla, Complainant, V. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149,
September 04, 2013
Josephine L. Orola, Myrna L. Orola, Manuel L. Orola, Mary Angelyn
Orola-Belarga, Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip, And Karen Orola, (Heirs Of
Antonio) Vs. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11,
2013
Rex Polinar Dagohoy V. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3,
2013.
Civil Service Commission V. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, Et Al., A.M. No. SCC-0811-P, June 18, 2013.
Rodolfo C. Sabidong V. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25,

2013.
Josefina Caranza Vda De Saldivar V. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C.
No. 7749, July 8, 2013
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49,
Et Al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Concerned Citizen V. Nonita V. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br.
50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16,
2013.
Ferdinand A. Samson V. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16,
2013.
Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. V. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July
17, 2013.
Development Bank Of The Philippines, Etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July
31, 2013
Jaime Joven And Reynaldo C. Rasing V. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz And Frankie
O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Re: Cases Submitted For Decision Before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma,
Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.
Danilo E. Lubaton V. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Julian Penilla V. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4,
2013.
Czarina T. Malvar V. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., Et Al., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013.
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Donabel M. Savadera, Et Al., A.M.

No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No.

MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
Joseph L. Orola, Et Al. V. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860,
September 11, 2013.
In Re: Petition To Sign In The Roll Of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540,

September 24, 2013.
Mary Ann T. Mattus V. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1,

2013.
Re: Request For Guidance/Clarification On Section 7, Rule III Of
Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees To
Secure A Clearance Of Pendency/Non-Pendency Of Case/S From The
Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.
Jesus D. Carbajosa V. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-131834, October 2, 2013.

Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte V. Epifania Fanny Obias, A.C. No. 4945,

October 8, 2013.
Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher V. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No.
9532, October 8, 2013.
Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao V. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III,
Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October
14, 2013.
Joefil Baguio V. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Atty. Oscar L. Embido, Etc. V. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., Etc., A.M. No.
6732, October 22, 2013.
Ma. Regina S. Peralta V. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G.
Mendoza V. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra V. Judge
George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No.
RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.
Report On The Financial Audit Conducted In The MTCC, Tagum City,
Davao Del Norte / Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Ismael L.
Salubre, Et Al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618,
October 22, 2013.
Jocelyn De Leon V. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22,
2013.
Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda For: Odel L. Gedraga V. Judge Reynaldo
B. Clemens, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City,
Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Atty. Jessie Tuldague And Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. V. Judge Moises Pardo
And Jaime Calpatura, Etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague And Atty. Alfredo
Baldajo, Jr. V. Jaime Calpatura, Etc. / Re: Report On The Judicial Audit
And Investigation Conducted In The RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC,
October 25, 2013.
Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad Of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November
11, 2013.
Mariano Agadan, Et Al. V. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385,
November 11, 2013.
Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela V.

Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100,
November 12, 2013.
Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, San Mateo, Rizal V. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954,
November 13, 2013.
Azucena Segovia-Ribaya V. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965,
November 13, 2013.
Re: Application For Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act
9946 Of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse Of The Late Manuel K.
Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19,
2013.
Aurora H. Cabauatan V. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043,
November 20, 2013.
Eleanor P. Olivan V. Arnel A. Rubio, Etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November
26, 2013.

Mamasaw Sultan Ali V. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, Et Al., A.M. No. MTJ03-1505, November 27, 2013
Sps. David Williams And Marissa Williams V. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C.
No. 7329, November 27, 2013.
Judge Manahan V. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013
Cabuatan V. Atty. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013
Conchita Baltazar,Et Al. V. Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091,
December 11, 2013
Rose Bunagan-Bansig Vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera A.C. No. 5581 Jan.
14, 2014
Rose Bunagan-Bansig V. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581,
January 14, 2014.
Edgardo Areola V. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January
15, 2014.
The Conjugal Partnership Of The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo And Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo (Both Deceased), Substituted By Their Heirs, Namely:
Herminia, Pastora, Heirs Of Fructiosa, Heirs Of Raquel, Evangeline,
Vicente, Jr., And Armand, All Surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188.
January 15, 2014.
Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera V. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069,
January 20, 2014.
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino V. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3141. January 21, 2014.
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,
Etc., Et Al./Re: Report On The Financial Audit Conducted In The
Metropolitan Trial Court Etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118Metc. January 21, 2014.
Atty. Solidum, Jr. Failed To Fulfill This Duty. Natividad P. Navarro And
Hilda S. Presbitero V. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January
28, 2014
Edgardo Areola Vs. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza A.C. No. 10135. January
15, 2014
Natividad P. Navarro Vs. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum Jr., A.C. 9872, January 28,
2014
Carlito Ang V. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5,
2014.
Wilberto C. Talisic V. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12,
2014
Veronica F. Galindez V. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126,

February 4, 2014
Angelito R. Marquez, Et Al. V. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, Etc., Et
Al., A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014
Carlito Ang V. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5,
2014

Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano V. Clerk III Liza D.

Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No.
P-13-3119. February 10, 2014
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., Et Al. V. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant
IV And Efren R. Rivamonte, Etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11,
2014
Wilberto C. Talisic V. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12,
2014
Rex M. Tupal V. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842.
February 24, 2014
Patrocinio V. Agbulos Vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350 February
18, 2013
Nestor Figueras And Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. V. Atty. Diosdado B.
Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
Stephan Brunet And Virginia Romanillo Brunet V. Atty. Ronald L.
Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014
Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, Represented By Her Attorney-InFact, Vicente A. Pichon V. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359,
March 10, 2014
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014
Nestor Figueras And Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. V. Atty. Diosdado B.
Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
Licerio Dizon V. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12,
2014
Julieta B. Narag Vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, March 18,
2014
Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During The 2011 Bar
Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014
Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During The 2011 Bar
Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante,
Municipal Trial Court In Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ12-1806, April 7, 2014
Antonio M. Lorenzana V. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014
Adelia V. Quiachon Vs. Atty. Joseph Adora. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June
4, 2014
(Formerly Cbd Case No. 12-3615
Atty. Alan F. Paguia V. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4,
2014.
Gershon N. Dulang V. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014
Adelia V. Quiachon V. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4,
2014
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.

Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.
Erlinda Foster Vs. Jaime Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ATTY. ELMER SOLIDON VS. ATTY. RAMIL MACALALAD, A.C. NO. 8158,
February 24, 2010
FACTS:
In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil
Macalalad for the latter to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned
by the Solidons in Borongan, Samar. They agreed for a fee of P80k. Solidon
gave P50k as downpayment to Macalalad and the remaining P30k shall be
paid after Solidon shall receive the title over the said property.
But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave
an update to Solidon. It turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to
register the land.
Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon
alleged that Macalalad neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him
despite efforts from Solidon to communicate with Macalalad.
In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition
because Solidon failed to update him and that Solidon never gave the
documents he was asking for.
Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad
to be suspended for three months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended.
HELD:
Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his clients
cause. This is a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his
clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee. Further, there is also
negligence when he failed to update his client about the status of the case.
Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot
shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was
the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of the case. Even if the
client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main
responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to
acquire the required information. The act of receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services in handling Solidons case, and subsequently failing,
without valid excuse, to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated
Canon 18, he also violated Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidons
money. It appears he failed to return Solidons downpayment of P50k. A
lawyer, when he fails to render legal services, shall immediately account for
and promptly return the money he received from his client. Hence, on top of
the recommended 3 months suspension, Macalald was suspended for an
additional 3 months or for a total of 6 months.
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL vs.ATTY. JAMES

BENEDICT FLORIDO A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010
FACTS:
According to RBCI, respondent and his clients(Nazareno-Relampagos
group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly
took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly
evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks
vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent

explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him
by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of
Directors of RBCI. Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present
any evidence to prove their allegations.
Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were
never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies. IBP, through its
Commissioner, said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the
takeover of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance
of legality whatsoever. Respondent appealed from the IBPs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florido violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code
requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and
principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to
use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an
intentional wrong to their adversaries. A lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of
violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL F.

ELAYDA, A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010
FACTS:
In the Complaint of the spouses Aranda, they alleged that Atty.
Elaydas handling of their civil case wassorely inadequate, as shown by his
failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence. However,

they were surprised that an adverse judgment was rendered against them
resulting to the loss of their Mitsubishi Pajero. Apparently, Atty. Elayda failed
to inform the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of
judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was interposed by the
lawyer as well. In his reply, Atty. Elayda said that the spouses did not bother
to keep in touch with him and they were the ones who neglected their case
in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be sanctioned by the court.
HELD:
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold
and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious,
competent and
diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate
attention, care, and time to all the cases heis handling. As the spouses Aran
das counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said
spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or
defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses
Aranda. Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even
admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings
because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared
responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary
duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which
have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make
an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between
counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case,
as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is
elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact
details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with
each other. Again, address is simply unacceptable.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a
member of the legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to
exercise due diligence in handling his clients case but in fact abandoned his
clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer. On a final note, it must be
stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether or not it is for a fee or free. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended a 6 month suspension. This was adopted by the court.

ATTY. CONRADO GANDEZA, JR. VS JUDGE MARIA CLARITA TABIN, A.M.

No. MTJ-09-1736
July 25, 2011
FACTS:
November 2007, the cars of Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. and Paul
Casuga collided with each other. Later at the scene of the collision, Judge
Maria Clarita Tabin arrived. She was the aunt of Casuga. Atty. Gandeza
observed that the judge kept on reminding the investigating officer that the
driver of Gandeza was drunk.
Later at the hospital, blood alcohol test was conducted on the driver of
Gandeza. The initial result returned negative. But Judge Tabin insisted that
the doctor do a second test. This time, the result was positive.
About a week later, a criminal case was filed against the driver of
Gandeza. The wife of Atty. Gandeza, also a lawyer, later observed that a
court employee was bringing the records of the case outside the premises of
the court where the case was filed. The court employee said that the records
were requested by Judge Tabin. The case also went to mediation where
Gandeza also learned that Judge Tabin went to the mediation center and
inquired about the case.
All these acts of the judge led to Gandezas filing of an administrative
case against Judge Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge.
In her defense, Judge Tabin said that she never publicly made known
that she was a judge when she was at the collision scene. But she did admit
that the investigating officer as well as the doctor knew her to be such. She
also said that she merely borrowed the records of the case because she
learned that her nephew still did not have a lawyer. She also said that when
she was at the mediation center, she merely went there to assist her sister
(Casugas mom) as the latter did not know where the mediation center was
located.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge.
HELD:
No. But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of
the judiciary, she should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of
an investigation. She should always appear impartial this did not happen
when she interfered with the investigation and when she borrowed the
records as well as when she was at the mediation center inquiring about the
records of the case. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious
motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was
using her office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to
conduct the medical examination as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while Judge Tabins concern over the safety of her nephew and
the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have
disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of
the court. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the
Filipino culture, she, being a judge, should bear in mind that she is also called
upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire
Judiciary.
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, A.C. 6281,

September 16, 2011
FACTS:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of
land located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Complainant
initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case for the registration of the
property. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his
original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit, complainant and respondent agreed that
complainant was to pay P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P2,000.00 as
appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of
the case, respondent demanded the additional P10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen
complainant's position in the case, plus 20% of the total area of the
subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was
contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject
property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being
demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his coheirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands,
the latter became furious and their relationship became sore.
A Decision was rendered, granting the petition for registration, which
Decision was declared final and executory. The Land Registration Authority
(LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Las Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration
and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
Complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT).He was surprised to discover that the same
had already been claimed by and released to respondent on. Complainant
talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's
knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first
pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property in exchange for
which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once
again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Carpio violated Canon 20
HELD:
Yes. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would
legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives
what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a
lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were
never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of
all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case
and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for
the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay
respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of
additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit
has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used
as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his client." The principle of quantum
meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his
services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for
his services, as much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the parties
had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the
respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already compensated by
such agreement.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to
his client and imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said
title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered
to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of

the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
DALISAY CAPILI VS ATTY. ALFREDO BENTULAN, A.C. NO. 5862,

OCTOBER 12, 2011
FACTS:
Capili engaged the legal services of Atty. Alfredo Bentulan as her

counsel in a civil case. Capili lost in the trial court. She wanted to appeal but
despite her payment for the preparation and filing of an appeal brief, Atty.
Bentulan failed to file the said pleading. This resulted to the dismissal of her
appeal. Ten years after said dismissal, Capili filed a disbarment case against
Bentulan.
In his defense, Bentulan said that Capilis action is already barred by laches;
that in the first place, Capili knew that the appeal was unmeritorious; that
she never actually paid Bentulan for the preparation and filing of said appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Bentulan should be disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The lapse of ten years from the alleged misconduct does not bar
the filing of this case. Ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to
disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. These
proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits
in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the
defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of
the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers
expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law.
In preparing and filing the appeal brief, the question of whether or not
Bentulan was paid his legal services is of no moment. As a lawyer, he owes
fidelity to both cause and client, even if he is not paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Further, if he believed that Capilis case was
unmeritorious, he should have advised Capili accordingly.
The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal
constitutes inexcusable negligence. This violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall service his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

URBAN BANK, INC. VS ATTY. MAGDALENO PEA, G.R. NO. 145817,

OCTOBER 19, 2011
FACTS:
In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to
Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was
occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea
had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the said occupants,
knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize
Pea. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Pea
to negotiate with the tenants. Pea had to barricade himself inside the
property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so
that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Pea then had a phone
conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Pea explained
to him the situation. In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from
Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Pea also asked that he be paid
10% of the purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed
over the phone on the condition that Pea should be able to settle with the
tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Pea also asked that said
authorization be put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as
regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written
authorization released by UBI). Pea was able to settle and relocate the
tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally under
the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to UBI for the latter to
pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation
of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million.
But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea filed a complaint for recovery
against UBI.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a contract
of agency created between and UBI and that Pea is entitled to the 10% fee
plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial
court awarded him P28 million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It
ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea is entitled to
payment but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit, Pea should only be paid P3 million.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28
million.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable.
Pea is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent
of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit. In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony
of Pea, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that
Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written
authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to
negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of
agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should
be paid.
Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be
applied. In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his
services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Pea
didnt have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering. Hence,
he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is also entitled
to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property, to wit, P1.5
million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for
settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.
The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a

profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.

ELPIDIO TIONG VS ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, A.C. NO. 4428,

DECEMBER 12, 2011
FACTS:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses
Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two
years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair.
Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he
heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo
confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship.
Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which
was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that
they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave
Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case
against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already

pardoned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.
HELD:
No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis
case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of
undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the
offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the
ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendos act of having an affair with
his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the
trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful
and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be
also said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely a moment of
indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two years.
Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

CORAZON NEVADA VS ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, A.C. NO. 7591,

MARCH 20, 2012
FACTS:
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:
1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the
jewelries include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting
P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured
her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands, Casuga never
remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries.
2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with
Nevada (they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself
as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as
such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul;
that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00;
that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin
Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
3. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later
advised Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife;
that Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds;
that he still has possession of said jewelries.
4. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain
Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into
said contract of lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD:
No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized
representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced
evidence showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or Corazon.
He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he never received the P90k
from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did
receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and
his mere denial does not overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is
his duty as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that
may come to his possession. This is still applicable even though said
property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client
relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada
pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming
that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to return said
jewelries upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease)

in behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an
actual party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which
he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga
is guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that
disbarment is too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was suspended
for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise
revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving his
suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall
be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct borders on the criminal
and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO vs. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, April 16,

2012
FACTS:
On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan)
engaged the legal services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial
declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of
PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement was
entered into by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an
acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing
and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. Moreover for every payment that
Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her
case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were
already filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and waiting
notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty.
Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and
discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27,
2005, no petition has yet been filed for her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
RULING:
This court finds that Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn
duty as a member of the bar. In his Manifestation and Petition for Review, he
himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzettes case as well as to
account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for the
mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyers
oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of
his and his familys livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of
PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of
PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00.
Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of
Governors correctly recommended the appropriate penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility. As stated under Canon Law,
CANON 16 A lawyer shall not hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him. Canon 18- A lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information. Furthermore, a lawyer is obliged to
hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee
of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and
processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon
demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of
professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated
Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days
from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such
payment.
IN RE: RODOLFO PACTOLIN, A.C. NO. 7940, APRIL 24, 2012

FACTS:
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs
Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual).
It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as
evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow councilor
acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said
decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.
ISSUE:
What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin
considering his conviction?
HELD:
Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of
falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great
caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is
appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime

involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins situation is aggravated by the
fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not served his
sentence yet.
EMILIA O. DHALIWAL vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING, A.C. No.

9390 August 1, 2012
FACTS:
Emilia O. Dhaliwal (complainant) she engaged the services of Atty. Aberlardo
B. Dumaguing (respondent) connection with the purchase of a parcel of land
from Fil-Estate Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate). Atty. Dumaguing was then
given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). On September 22, 2000, respondent, on behalf of
complainant, filed with the HLURB a complaint for delivery of title and
damages against Fil-Estate. A week after, or on September 29, 2000, Atty.
Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the checks previously consigned. On
March 3, 2003, complainant informed the HLURB that respondent is no
longer representing her. On March 11, 2003, the HLURB promulgated its
Decision, finding the case for delivery of title and damages premature as
there was no evidence of full payment. Complainant then demanded Atty.
Dumaguing to return her the amount he earlier withdrew but responded did
not comply. Dhaliwal filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Dumaguing. Responded admitted all the allegations in the complaint. In his
defense, he claims that the amount of P311,819.94 was consigned to the
HLURB to cover the full payment of the balance of the purchase price of the
lot. Respondent allegedly filed a motion for reconsideration but HLURB has
not yet acted upon it. He attached a copy of the said motion in his answer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be disbarred.
HELD:
Yes. It was established that Atty. Dimaguing submitted a false and fabricated
piece of evidence because it did not contain proof that the same was filed
with the HLURB nor was there proof that the other party was notified. He
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that: Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule
16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. A lawyer's
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. He is
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered to return
to complainant said amount of P311,819.94 with legal interest.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, A.C.

No. 6116 August 1, 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Mariano Pefianco (respondent) undertook to give Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon (complainant) 20% commission which the respondent would
receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap, whom the
complainant referred. They had a written agreement dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay complainant the agreed commission.
Instead respondent was informed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same
after he agreed to reduce his attorneys fee from 25% to 17%. Complainant
demanded the payment of his commission but the respondent ignored.
Complainant also alleged that Atty. Pefianco has not lived up to the high
moral standards required of his profession. And he also accused respondent
of engaging in a money-lending business without required authorization. In
respondents defense, he claimed that the written agreement dated August
11, 1995 was forged and that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainants
commission. Respondent filed Motion to Dismiss. The case was referred tp
Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Respondent was recommended for one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law for violation of Lawyers Oath Rule 1.01,
Canon1; Rule 7.01, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent filed Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Mariano Pefianco be suspended from the practice of
law.
RULING:
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional
or in their private capacity. In the present case, respondent's defense that
forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied
by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar. Respondent did not deny abandoning
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress whom he begot four (4) children.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows
protected
by
the
Constitution
and
affirmed
by
our
laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." However, the court finds the charge of engaging in illegal
money lending not to have been sufficiently established. Respondent Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco is found guilty of violation of the Lawyers Oath, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and suspended from the active practice of law
one (1) year
GERLIE M. UY VS. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, A.M. No. MTJ-071666, September 5, 2012
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for
"gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence,
neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO
against Presiding Judge Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana,
Negros Occidental.
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
JAVELLANAS DEFENSE
In People vs. Cornelio (Malicious

Mischief)
-
Judge Javellana issued warrant

of arrest after the filing of a
certain criminal case despite
Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
- The necessity of holding the

accused in detention became evident
when it was revealed during trial that
the same accused were wanted for
Attempted Homicide in another case.
In People vs. Lopez ( Malicious

Mischief)
-
Judge Javellana did not apply

the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure
and
instead
conducted
a
preliminary
examination and investigation
in accordance with the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure,
then
set
the
case
for
arraignment and free trial,
despite
confirming
that
complainant and her witnesses
had no personal knowledge of
the material facts alleged in
their affidavits, which should
had
been
a
ground
for
dismissal of said case.
- Judge Javellana reiterated that a

motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure and he added
that he could not dismiss the case
outright since the prosecution has
not yet fully presented its evidence.
- The Lupong Tagapamayapa was not

a jurisdictional requirement and the
Judge Javellana did not grant Motion to Dismiss on said ground was
the motion to dismiss for non- a prohibited pleading under the
compliance with the Lupon Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
requirement under Sec. 18 and
19(a) of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
In Trespass to Dwelling
-
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD:
YES. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious
mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure.
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES A.C. No.

6760, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
In his complaint, Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as
counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed
against him. The first ccise, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, involved the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement
proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted Teodord-Marcial in filing

Civil Case No. 00-99207, for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of
the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum
shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales. Atty. Gonzales
admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He
asserted, however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the
cases were not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies.
Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant only filed the disbarment
case to harass him. The Investigating Commissioners Findings In our
Resolution dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation dated July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found
Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping. According to
Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case
No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela
held the Malate property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T.
Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial. In Special Proceeding No. 9995587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and TeodoroMarcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime,
Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate,
Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she
sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be inventoried
and settled in accordance with law. In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of
Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by Manuela over the
same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They
alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to
Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names. The
commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata
over the other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he
instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding
No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty.
Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping
and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one
month from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar
offense would merit a more severe penalty. The Board of Governors of the
IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. In a resolution dated
December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and
thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES, Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision
in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in
another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum
shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as
follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and
(c) identity of relief sought. Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales
committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending. Respondent was fully aware,
since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of trust with
respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and
that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment
case xxx To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum
shopping for the second case (annulment case) and state that there is no
pending case involving the same or similar issue would constitute
misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to
advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate
assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a
predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and
obedience to the law. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against
resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and
can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has
been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994. In engaging in forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. To
our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh
in light of all the circumstances of this case Lawyers are also censured for
minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or the client. As
earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to
obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. It
also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the
complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for
resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand
should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales personal file in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.

A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS vs. ATTY.
ROSELLER A. VIRAY
FACTS :
The case stemmed from a Complaint filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against
respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly
notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in violation
of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by
complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the
signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian
Anton. Complainant added that she did not personally appear before
respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that
respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said
falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property
registered in her name to that of Dollente.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of his indiscretion in admitted having
prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his client?
RULING: The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers
commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents without requiring
the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this
practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent
affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of
the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may
be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the partys free act and deed. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public
performs, to wit: x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe
and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn
oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their
offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that
recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six
months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself
prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without the
personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with
competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use
of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an
instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is
meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year.26 WHEREFORE, the Court
finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013 VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA

LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA, CELEDONIO
ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, vs. ATTY.
ANGELITO VILLARIN
FACTS :
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of
the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and
developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto Bassig.The HLURB
ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the
Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not
evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the property. Purence Realty
and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and
executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution. It was at this
point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent
Purence Realty. Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the
Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution for being null and void on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his
client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB. Respondent sent
demand letters to herein complainants. In all of these letters, he demanded
that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty
within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action
against them. True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent,
filed a Complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
against Trinidad, Lander, Casubuan and Mendoza. Aggrieved, the four
complainants filed an administrative case against respondent. A month after,
Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent.
As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and affirmed by its
Board of Governors, complainants asserted in their respective verified
Complaints that the demand letters sent by Villarin had been issued with
malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that the letters also
contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to
pay the balance of the purchase price of the subdivision lots.
Issue : Whether or not the respondent should be administratively
sanctioned for sending the demand letters?
Ruling: The respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin is clearly proscribed by Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Which requires that a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers
must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is
false.
A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 GLORIA P. JINON vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E.
JIZ
FACTS:
Gloria P. Jinon (Gloria) engaged the services of Atty.Leonardo E. Jiz (Atty. Jiz)
on April 29, 2003 to recover a land title which was a subject of dispute with
her sister in law Viola J. Jinon (Viola), for which she immediately paid an
acceptance fee of P17,000.00. In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured
the transfer of the title in Gloria's name. Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions,
remitted the amount of P45,000.00 to answer for the expenses of the
transfer. However, when she later inquired about the status of her case, she
was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling
the same. Moreover, when she visited the property, which has been leased
out to one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been
collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to October 2004, which
amounted to P12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals, Atty. Jiz gave
her only P7,000.00, explaining that the balance of P5,000.00 would be added
to the expenses needed for the transfer of the title of the property to her
name. The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal
services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of the amounts of P45,000.00 and
P5,000.00 through a letter dated September 22, 2004, which has remained
unheeded. Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover the land
title from Viola and effect its transfer in Glorias name, and has failed to
return her money despite due demands. Hence, the administrative complaint
praying that Atty. Jiz: (1) be ordered to reimburse the total amount of
P67,000.00 (P17,000.00 acceptance fee, P45,000.00 for the transfer of title,
and P5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the property); and (2) be meted
disciplinary action that the Court may deem fit under the circumstances. In
his Answer, Atty. Jiz asseverated that he was not remiss in his legal duties to
Gloria. Denying liability to reimburse Gloria for any amount, much less for
P45,000.00,he claimed that he had rendered the corresponding legal
services to her with fidelity and candor. Hence, he prayed that the complaint
against him be dismissed. After the investigation, Commissioner Cecilio A.C.
Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva) of the Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found Atty. Jiz to have
been remiss in his duty in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution stating that Atty. Jiz be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to
Restitute complainant the amount of P45,000.00 and 12% interest from the
time he received the amount until fully paid within sixty (60) days from
notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for
having been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with respect to the legal
services he had undertaken to perform for his client, Gloria.
HELD: YES. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in neglecting his
clients case and misappropriating her funds. He is found having clearly
violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 16 A LAWYER
SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxx xxx xxx
RULE 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. xxx xxx xxx CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx RULE 18.03 A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx xxx xxx Atty. Jiz is
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely
and is ordered to return to complainant Gloria P. Jinon the full amount of
P45,000.00 with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of demand on
September 22, 2004 up to the finality of the decision and 12% per annum
from its finality until paid.
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, received an
Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a
counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
affidavit to attest to such fact. Using the affidavit from Atty. Bancolo, Tapay
and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the
same, presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's

instructions. Tapay and Rustia later on filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to
a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. The complainants also maintained that not
only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people. In their answer, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants
before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff
to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However,
due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
After investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her
Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code and recommended that Atty. Bancolo
be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary
of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor
lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia
were signed by his secretary, notwithstanding his tolerance. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Atty.
Bancolo is suspended from the practice of law for one year effective upon
finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The complaint against
Atty. Jarder is dismissed for lack of merit.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et

al A.M No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The judicial audit team created by the Office of the Court Administrator (or
OCA) reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
several branches of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City. Also, certain package
fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant
marriages. A female and a male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as
a couple looking to get married. The female lawyer went inside the branch to
inquire about the marriage application process. A woman named, Helen,
approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if
the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the
marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate
would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen
also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand
pesos only. Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis and Judge Rosales
were asked by the OCA to submit their comments against the formal
administrative complaint by the judicial audit team. OCA also suspended the
judges pending resolution for the cases against them. In its memorandum
and supplemental report, 643 marriage certificates were examined by the
judicial audit team and that 280 out of 643 were reported to have been
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. There is also an unusual

number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the
towns of. Barili and Liloan, Cebu. Also, There were even marriages
solemnized at 9AM with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. OCA
recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court
employees , and the suspension or adominition of others for being guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents; for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee
has been paid; for gross ignorance of law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both parties were minors during
cohabitation and; for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in
Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or
gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service.
RULING:
The Court held that the judges were guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of
duty and gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed from the service. The
Court listed the following liabilities of the judges: First, Judges Necessario,
Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
The actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v.
Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence,
ignorance, and carelessness. Second, The judges were also found guilty of
neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones
attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of
the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage
documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was
made for marriages performed on different dates. Third, Judges Necessario,
Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his
or her embassy. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are
required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of
duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the
documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities
would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract
marriage. Lastly, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of
gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect
to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. Moreover, the Court
held that the respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in
the performance of their duties. The Court previously said that Ignorance of
the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity. In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered
a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an
ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and
more importantly of justice. The Court further said that the actuations of
these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
SONIA C. DECENA AND REY C. DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO A.

MALANYAON
A.M NO. RTJ-10-2217, APRIL 8, 2013
FACTS:
Sonia and Rey Decena have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct
unbecoming a judge against Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur. The complainants
had brought an administrative case in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge
Malanyanon's wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon. The complainants averred that
the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wifes
administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary. During the
hearing of the administrative case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter,
Atty. Kristina Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the administrative
case filed against her. Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some
piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her
daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to
speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the
paper given by Judge Malanyaon. When the principal counsel of the
complainants, Atty. Zamora, arrived, she inquired regarding the personality
of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyers bench beside Atty.
Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and
manifested that he was the counsel of the respondents counsel. Atty.
Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaons sitting with
and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary,
to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular
rule that prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers bench.
He insisted that he was merely assisting her daughter, who just passed
the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend
herself. The Court administrator reiterated a recommendation by
recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
misconduct and fined P 50,000.00.
ISSUES: Whether or not the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING: The Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur,
administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him
with a fine ofP40,000.00 The Court held, that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the following
reasons set below: First was Judge Malanyaons occupying a seat beside his
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the hearing. Such act
displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to
thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wifes cause. That
impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial
officer was presumed to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an
incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have
acted with greater circumspection and selfrestraint, simply because the
administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be
partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of
suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his
part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing himself. Second was Judge
Malanyaons admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his
daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching
his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the
counsel of the respondents counsel upon his presence being challenged
by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for
having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded
on a filial duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough
reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting
judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being
all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was
the private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,
Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition
is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full
time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must
accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire
period of his incumbency as a judge. To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon
engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wifes
administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or
posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he
prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria,
collaborating counsel of the complainants principal counsel, should produce
his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily and knowingly,
in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the
counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his
response to the query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to
Atty. Malanyaon thereat. Third was Judge Malanyaons admission that he had
already engaged in the private practice of law even before the incident now
the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that it is strange
for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing
law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife
and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal
problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on
their behalf. He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the
prohibition against the private practice of law during his incumbency on the
Bench. Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical
injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would give no ground for
reproach is always worthy of condemnation. We should abhor any
impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. Fourth was Judge
Malanyaons display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his
reaction to the opposing counsels query on his personality to sit at the
counsel table at the hearing, to wit: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah,
of the respondents counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And
so what?!! Judge Malanyaons uttering And so what? towards the opposing
counsel evinced his instant resentment towards the adverse parties counsel
for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel
of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after
he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he
was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all
times. It is true that the challenge of the opposing counsel might have
slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that he was still
a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint.
He thereby ignored the presence of the hearing officer, appearing to project
that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion rightly
called for from him and the others just because he was a judge and the other
side was not. He should not forget that a judge like himself should be the last
person to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued tyrant. Judge
Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial
obligation to assist his daughter, then only a neophyte in the Legal
Profession. We would easily understand his insistence in the light of our
culture to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family members and
other close kin, even risking our own safety and lives in their defense. But
the situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer
who came under the stricture that uniformly applied to all judges of all levels
of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private practice
of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his
wife or daughter or other members of his own family.

REX POLINAR DAGOHOY vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, A.C. No.
7944, June 03, 2013
FACTS:
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in
connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the father of
complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted of theft
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte.
According to the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San
Juans failure to file the appellants brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San
Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the CAs order of
dismissal.6 The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful
in dealing with him and Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that
Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real status of Tomas
appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for committing gross
negligence, in connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA)
HELD: Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath
that requires him to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of
(his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to (his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, We deny Atty. San Juan's motion to
lift the order of suspension. Atty. San Juan's self-imposed compliance with the
IBP's recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension was premature.
The wordings of the Resolution dated April 16, 2012 show that the Court
merely noted: (1) the IBP's findings and the recommended penalty against
Atty. San Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the case back to the Court for its
proper disposition. The IBP findings and the stated penalty thereon are
merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline
erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct.
23 Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the
recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the
Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper
subject of implementation or compliance.24 WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court resolves to: 1. NOTE the Report and Recommendation
dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar Confidant; 2. SUSPEND from
the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for
violating his Lawyer's Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely; and 3.
DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan in the letter dated August
28, 2012 that he be allowed to return to the practice of law.

PENA VS. ATTY. PATERNO, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina
C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Notarial Law. Complainant , the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C,
Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244, Register of Deeds
of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon.
The complainant alleged that she gave respondent her owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as
collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the
safekeeping of respondent for seven years. Despite repeated demands by
complainant, respondent refused to return it. Yet, respondent assured
complainant that she was still the owner.
Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her
property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight
years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan
application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said
property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that
the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan
application.
In the course of investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Krausto sell
complainant's land to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced
by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the
property described therein to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd. for
P200,000.00. Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale
in her presence inside her office. However, respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct
examination, but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not denying
that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. Estrella Kraus'
affidavit supported respondent's defense.
Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party,
Anita Pea, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in
fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover,
respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register. Recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the
notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that
respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary
public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence showing
that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by(a)
deceiving complainant Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and
Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in
his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
HELD:
As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice
of law, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial
commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually
REVOKED.

JULIAN PENILLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR.,

A.C. No. 9149, September 04, 2013
FACTS:
The respondent was complainants counsel for the case of breach of contract
with the Garin spouses. He filed a criminal case, overcharged him with
attorneys fees and filing fee, and imposed that the Asst. City Prosecutor Jose
C. Fortuno would be more in favor of the complainants case if they would
give liquor to the said judge. The case was rendered unsuccessful. After the
hearing, the respondent asked for more fees, and reasoned him with more
filing of litigations. He suggested that they should file a civil case and to have
the complainant follow up about it in his office. Complainant asserts having
made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of the
case and meet with respondent at his office. The complainant went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and learned that the respondent has been lying to
him about the legal fees. The complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant
administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross
misconduct for violating the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for six months for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and
transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, The
IBP-CBD decided that the respondents violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. On
April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration and asked that the
penalty of suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days,
or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Motion
for Reconsideration Upon Leave of Office. The IBP Board of Governors
denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Respondent
filed a second Motion for Reconsideration which was no longer acted upon.
.According to the IBP, the respondent committed professional negligence
under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17
and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE: Is Atty Quintin P. Alcid Jr. Guilty of gross misconduct?
RULING:
1. The respondent, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. was found GUILTY of gross
misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyers Oath. 2. The
Court hereby imposed upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. 3. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and 4.
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY

ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND
KAREN OROLA, (Heirs of Antonio) vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS,
A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Atty Joseph Ador Ramos was charged for his violation of (a) Rule 15.03 of the
Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case;
and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. The Antonio
heirs first filed a hearing with the IBP. IBP found the respondent guilty though
there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The IBP
imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Rules of Court?
RULING: The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension
to three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the
following factors: a. Respondent is a first time offender; b. It is undisputed
that respondent merely accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings
due to her lawyers unavailability; c. It is likewise undisputed that respondent
had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from
Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first
appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that
he acted in good faith; and, d. Complainants admit that respondent did not
acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use
against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his
subsequent engagement with Emilio. 2. The Court also served the ruling as a
warning to the respondent and that the next case would be dealt more
severely
JUDGE MANAHAN V. ATTY. FLORES, A.C. NO. 8954, NOVEMBER 13,

2013
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant
in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold
Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court
of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). xxx During the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order dated January 12, 2011,
whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said
Order reads in part, viz: More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores)
unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his
own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would
amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for
disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
During the Preliminary Conference, respondent Atty. Flores entered his
appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE
compliance. The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11,
September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his
Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo
likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving
respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern
warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number
which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of

his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
again failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE
compliance. Instead, sending the courts a manifestation for refusing in
proceeding to serve his client dated September 14, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Flores is held liable for his unethical and
contemptuous actuations against the legal profession, client and judges?
RULING: Yes. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial
courts order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not
because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the
respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of
the Government. xxx Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that
branch the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which
has instituted the judicial system." xxx Atty. Flores also employed
intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores
is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Atty. Flores failed in this respect. xxx However, we find the recommended
penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions committed by
the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by
respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing,
we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to
remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court
processes. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
CABUATAN V. ATTY. VENIDA, A.C. NO. 10043, NOVEMBER 20, 2013

FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) received a Complaint filed by Aurora H. Cabauatan
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida for serious
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. x x x Complainant alleged that she
was the appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024 entitled Aurora Cabauatan, PlaintiffAppellant vs. Philippine National Bank, Defendant-Appellee. The case was
originally handled by a different lawyer but she decided to change her
counsel and engaged the services of the Respondent x x x. Complainant was
then furnished by the Respondent of the pleadings he prepared, such as
"Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel and a Motion for
Extension of time to File a Memorandum." Complainant made several followups on her case until she lost contact with the Respondent. Complainant
alleged the gross, reckless and inexcusable negligence of the Respondent
that led to the case is x x x deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED on
authority of Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996 Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x
Certified on March 31, 2006. Respondent did not submit any pleading with
the Court of Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was
not among those furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment hence it is
crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of Appearance with the Court
of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. Respondent
assured the Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case,
nevertheless, later on Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the
fact that he was not one of the parties furnished with a copy of the Entry of
Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the Respondent. x x x
ISSUE: Is respondent can be held liable for his gross negligence and inaction
against his clients case?
RULING: Yes, It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of
respondent to handle her case which was then on appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he
will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Complainant also
established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the
latter merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling
her case. Thus, complainant was surprised when she received a notice from
the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal had been abandoned and
her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and executory. This is a
clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the
status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients'
request for information. The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently
provides: Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Canon 18 A
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x Rule
18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is SUSPENDED from the
practice o law for one year effective immediately, with WARNING that a
similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to
this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let a copy of this Resolution
be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar,
and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA BALTAZAR,ET AL. V. ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, JR ., A.C. NO.
9091, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in
connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants
signed a contract of legal services, where they would not pay acceptance
and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would
pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later,

however, complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable
settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their
complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him alleging that
the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorneys charging lien
was the legal problem preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their
property.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract of legal services entered into between the
complainants and Atty. Baez, Jr. is champertous.
HELD:
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to
intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his
compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall
have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case
in which his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however,
the contract for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract an
agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the
proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to
have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public
policy and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not
lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the
client. Thus, the Court held that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA A.C. NO.

5581 JAN. 14, 2014
FACTS:
In complaint of Banasig, she narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and

Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced
by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife
of respondent. However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with
Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of
the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan
was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that respondents act
of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting,
constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require
respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint. Respondent failed to
appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite
several notices
ISSUE: 1. Whether the respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court due to the act of committing bigamy. Violating the code of
Professional Responsibility Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. The failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of the Court, which is under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
The certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified
xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient
to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him
unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. And respondents cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution
is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to
comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof." In View of all foregoing , the judge
finds respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, guilty of grossly immoral
conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
EDGARDO AREOLA VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA A.C. NO.

10135. JANUARY 15, 2014
FACTS:
Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO)
for violation of her attorneys oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He said
that hes filing the said complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda,
Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez.
Areola claimed that when Atty. Mendoza visited the Antipolo City Jail and
called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza stated
the following in her speech: O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may
pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto
ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang
pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako
na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga
detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo
si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon. In her
unverified Answer, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the
latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts
including the jail warden where Areola was previously detained. Nonetheless,
Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal to beg and cry so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed.
To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as
the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence
of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner recommended
that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) months.
ISSUE: 1. Atty. Mendoza is guilty of her attorneys oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of CourtNo for lack of evidence 2. Atty. Mendoza is guilty
of violating Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
ResponsibilityYes.
HELD:
1st Issue No. The Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty.
Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees.The Court agrees with the IBP that
Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He
is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint
on behalf of his co-detainees, but it is apparent that no document was
submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.
Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements, especially as regards
Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money. 2nd issue Yes. Atty. Maria Vilma
Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mendoza
admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. Atty. Mendoza made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics
such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. Atty. Mendozas improper advice
only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be
free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is
uncalled for. It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. Penalty: penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely Basis of the Penalty: In several
administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondents length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or
her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other
things, have had varying significance in the Courts determination of the
imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive
in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of
livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and
the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to
modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO VS. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM JR., A.C. 9872,

January 28, 2014
FACTS:
In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan

Solidum, Jr. to help her in the quieting of her title over a parcel of land.
Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee.
In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged
the services of Solidum for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however
asked the help of her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the case. Hence,
Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses.
Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2
million from Navarro. The loan was covered by two Memorandum of
Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that
the monthly interest shall be 10%.
Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same
period. He again drafted a MOA containing the same terms and conditions as
with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum mortgaged his 263hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero.
Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since
Solidum did nothing after receiving the acceptance fee.
In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later
found out that the land was already registered to someone else. Navarro
claims that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised
her of the status of the land.
Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned
the terms of the loans as he claimed that the interest rate of said loans at
10% is unconscionable.
Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against
Solidum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.
HELD: Yes.
Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a

total of Php3 million from Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his private capacity. The test is whether
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by Solidum merited his
disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both
in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his
private capacity with respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro
allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Solidum drafted
the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro
is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo
case.
In Presbiteros case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA,
Presbiteros interest was not fully protected because the property Solidum
mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth
P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only P150,000.00. Clearly,
Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidums ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

CARLITO ANG V. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, A.C. NO. 4545.

FEBRUARY 5, 2014.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint 3 filed by complainant Carlito
Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other
heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and
William Magpayo, executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and
Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of 6,258 square
meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No.
2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon. 5 However, when
he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT No. (T22409)-6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs 6 had
been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia
Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a
direct participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because
he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss 7 and Deed
of Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang
pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by
Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria
Magpayos signature was forged as clearly shown by the Certification 9 issued
by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu.
Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of
respondents Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not
refer to the Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit. As to the Affidavit of
Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April
29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she Diedthree years
prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself
the attorney-in-fact of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia
Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and
pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of
Sale selling Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10,
1995. Ang complained that the sale was made even though a civil case
involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of Mandaue
City, Cebu.
In his Comment, respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is
merely using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the
defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to
accede to his wishes.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation finding
respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that
respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an
instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale
executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a
pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gupana is disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation
of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary
public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
from the practice of law for one year are in order.

WILBERTO C. TALISIC V. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. NO. 8761,

FEBRUARY 12, 2014.
FACTS:
Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind
as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely:
Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his
fathers death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of
the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto
believed that his fathers signature on the deed was authentic, his and his
siblings supposed signatures were merely forged. Wilberto also pointed out
that even his name was erroneously indicated in the deed as "Wilfredo".
For his defense, Atty. Rinen denied the charge against him and explained
that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of the transaction
between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in
his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized.
His clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered the
parties to his office for the administration of oath. 6 The deed contained his
certification that at the time of the documents execution, "no notary public
was available to expedite the transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid
by the parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the
Municipality of Real, Quezon.7
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
(Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation 8 dated
November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinens notarial commission
and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year. 9 The report
indicated that per Atty. Rinens admission, the subject deed was prepared in
his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of
forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the
deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinens failure
to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the
inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the
execution; 1995 when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the
notarial book x x x."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rinen be disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
The Court said yes.
In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the
parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts
a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.

In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the
identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he were disqualified from being commissioned
as a notary public for one year.

NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. V. ATTY.

DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ,A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014.
FACTS:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of
the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On
January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit
for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag 8 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall
which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The
spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in
violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the
closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community
street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the
legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record
and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision 10 on
October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the
appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for
extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the
grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions
for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution
became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and
Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint 12 for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his
negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an
officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, 13 respondent denied
administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the
homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually
handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of
the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and
signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of
the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on
the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and
spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at

no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the
Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in
the election for President of the homeowners association in 1996, Figueras
and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association
dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members
of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued
by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case
against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of
the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the
Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass
him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the
disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise
no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
ISSUE:
.Whether or not the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does
applies in disbarment cases.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the
disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary
civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit
does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged
to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on
behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only
suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one.

RE: MELCHOR TIONGSON, HEAD WATCHER, DURING THE 2011 BAR

EXAMINATIONS, B.M. NO. 2482, APRIL 1, 2014.
FACTS:
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) designated Tiongson, an employee of
the Court of Appeals (CA), to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar
Examinations on 6, 13, 20 and 27 November 2011. Tiongson, together with
the designated watchers, namely, Eleonor V. Padilla (Padilla), Christian Jay S.
Puruganan (Puruganan) and Aleli M. Padre (Padre), were assigned to Room
No. 314 of St. Martin De Porres Building in UST.
On 13 November 2011 or during the second Sunday of the bar examinations,
Tiongson brought his digital camera inside Room No. 314. Padilla, Puruganan
and Padre alleged that after the morning examination in Civil Law, while they
were counting the pages of the questionnaire, Tiongson took pictures of the
Civil Law questionnaire using his digital camera. Tiongson allegedly repeated
the same act and took pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after the
afternoon examination.
On the same day, Padilla reported Tiongsons actions to Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, who immediately
investigated the report. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre subsequently executed
separate affidavits confirming Tiongsons actions. Upon demand by the OBC
to explain, Tiongson admitted that he brought his digital camera inside the
bar examination room. He explained that he did not surrender his new digital
camera to the badge counter personnel because the counter personnel
might be negligent in handling his camera.
In a Memorandum dated 16 November 2011 addressed to the CA Clerk of
Court Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongsons
designation as head watcher for the remaining Sundays of the bar

examinations.
In a Resolution dated 10 April 2012, the Court, upon recommendation of the
Committee on Continuing Legal Education and Bar Matters, required
Tiongson to file his comment. In his Comment dated 25 May 2012, Tiongson
restated his admission that he brought his digital camera inside the bar
examination room. Tiongson reiterated his explanation for bringing his
camera and apologized for his infraction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiongson is liable for misconduct?
HELD:
The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is
the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is
satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the
established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson
committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct
only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with
substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to
uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be
an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary.
A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014 JULIETA B. NARAG vs. ATTY.
DOMINADOR M. NARAG
FACTS:
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she
accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who
was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a
member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an
amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) a 17year old first
year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already
abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent denied
the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were
mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her
concoct stories against him. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a
Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined
that the respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he
abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that
the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Reopening of the
Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the
Decision was filed by the respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he
was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as he
was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce

additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no substantial arguments to
warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the motion
with finality in the Resolution dated September 22, 1998. On November 29,
2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar.
The respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and
remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his
wife Julieta and their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at
their residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated
affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the
truth of the respondents claim. The respondent averred that he has been
disbarred for 15 years already and that he has been punished enough. He
alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating
osteoarthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his arthritis
and his right knee injury. He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine
Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various
rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted the
various recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his
petition for readmission.
ISSUE: Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will
depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved
even with the applicants reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must,
like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. The
extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on account of
his having committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e., abandoning his wife
and children to live with his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could
be more reprehensible than betraying ones own family in order to satisfy an
irrational and insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondents
act was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of
the noble legal profession. More than 15 years after being disbarred, the
respondent now professes that he had already repented and expressed
remorse over the perfidy that he had brought upon his wife and their
children. That such repentance and remorse, the respondent asserts,
together with the long years that he had endured his penalty, is now
sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law.
RULING:
The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted
to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed;
that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make
him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent,
while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour the
woman for whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show
that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings. That he
was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not be
sufficient ground to grant respondents plea. It is noted that only his son,
Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the
forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and
the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise
forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the
respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still
committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other
than his wife. Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will
wherein he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is quite
immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his
ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from later on executing
another last will and testament of a different tenor once he had been
readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the Court is not convinced that the
respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had
already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal
profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display
unassailable character. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED. SO ORDERED.

QUIACHON V. ATTY. RAMOS, A.C. NO. 9317, June 4, 2014

FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her lawyer Atty.
Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special
proceeding case before the RTC. Complainant charges respondent with gross
negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
IBP conducted an investigation on the disbursement case filed by the
complainant against her lawyer and the report found out that the respondent
had been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to
the cases being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a
failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that
thereafter prevented the client from exercising her options. There was
neglect in that regard.
However inspite of finding neglect on respondents part, the
complainant during the pendency of the proceedings, withdrew the
disbarment case.
ISSUE:
Whether the withdrawal of the disbarment case will terminate or abate
the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
No. The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not
terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an
administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to
the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be
imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the
charges.

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA V. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA , A.C. NO. 9881,

JUNE 4, 2014.
FACTS:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound
named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the
following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr.
And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo
Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners
save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times
Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on
matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate,
assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of
complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former
did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving
legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among
neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into
for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All
homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu
filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief
that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case,
was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit
was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent,
were dismissed.
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this
time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu
had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles
directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to
Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to
respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12
December 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrative complaint for dishonesty against Atty.
Molina will prosper?

HELD:
The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to
administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden
of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without
factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in
this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare
allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing
that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is
presumption of good faith.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. SARAH P. AMPONG,

ETC., A.M. NO. P-13-3132, JUNE 4, 2014.
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against
Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November
1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn
B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to
having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution
dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to
such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers
(PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when
the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the
judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction
over her. Ampongs motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampongs petition and affirmed her
dismissal from service on the ground that she never raised the issue of
jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped
from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc
denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal
from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the
OCA, which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampongs
dismissal, continued to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view

of Judge Infantes letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a
Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting
June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampongs salaries and allowances.8
In her Comment dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court
revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead
to unwarranted complications in its enforcement. Moreover, Ampong
reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the
case against her
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ampong be held liable for dishonesty?
HELD:
The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that
Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and
taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers
on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal
carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation
or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly
suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set
for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS, A.C. NO.

9317, JUNE 4, 2014
(FORMERLY CBD CASE NO. 12-3615)
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon (complainant), against
her lawyer, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The latter represented
complainant, who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding
case filed before the Regional Trial Court (R TC). Complainant charges
respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision on 26
November 2007. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in
its Decision dated 25 July 2008. 3 On 24 October 2008, the NLRC also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf.
A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it
affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA
Decision was received by respondent on 23 November 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask
respondent about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there
was no decision yet. Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in
respondents office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed a mailman
delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon.
Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the envelope and
was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CAs
Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but
to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that
"it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were
ever communicated to complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed
it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was
also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision.
Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant
Complaint5 against respondent.
filed
the
instant
disbarment
In his Comment, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the

status of the case. He claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot
cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court;" thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the decision of the Court
of Appeals." Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the
instant disbarment Complaint for lack of merit. During the pendency of the
proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer will
terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an
administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar?
HELD:
The court said no.
The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate
penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the
withdrawal of the charges.

ERLINDA FOSTER VS. JAIME AGTANG, A.C. NO. 10579, December 10,
2014
FACTS:
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a
realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtangs acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee.
He also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the
judge and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to
Agtangs demands.
various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his
personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster,
being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtangs
negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out
that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned
out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked
Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she
filed an administrative complaint against Agtang.
IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return
the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed
from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be
suspended for three months only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD:
No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light.
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the
high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by
court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and
even had the temerity that it was all the clients idea. . A lawyers failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various
amounts from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he
could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his
client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to
pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at
all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in
his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty
to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed
from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the
Court is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive
respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly
with the Court.
Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of

the Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez for violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
his negligence in handling an appeal in a case involving the Association and
willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the
disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary
civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit
does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged
to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on
behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only
suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one month. Nestor
Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No.
9116, March 12, 2014.
Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the
Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000, failed to perform his
obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling
of complainants lot. The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren
admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case
for the titling of complainants lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for six months.Stephan Brunet and
Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10,
2014.
Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. The Supreme Court held that once a lawyer takes
up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite
the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing
of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full
payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorneys fee. Such
justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from
liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that
complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should
have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the
insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron
obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed
incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. A lawyer should
never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence
renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from
three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended from
the practice of law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M.
Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was
filed against Atty. Cabucana, Jr. for falsification of public document. The
requirement of personal appearance of the affiant is required under the
Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of
2004. The Supreme Court held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr.
should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the
truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the partys free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was
found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as
a notary public for two years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014.
Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge
Larida, Jr. was charged for committing various anomalies and irregularities.
The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of
locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders.
Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and
regulations issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts,
to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his
Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit
the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma
to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding
Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the
responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed
employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr.
contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to
take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.

Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. An administrative complaint was filed

against Judge Bitas for fixing the accuseds bail and reducing the same motu
proprio. In this case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which
under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and
a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more than P5,000,000. Thus, by
reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital
offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong. The Supreme Court
held that not only did Judge Bitas deviate from the requirement of a hearing
where there is an application for bail, he also granted bail to Miralles without
neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge
Bitas acts are not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on
his part, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City
Prosecutors Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC,
Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5,
2014.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against
Melchor Tiongson, a Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be
the head watcher during the 2011 bar examinations. The complaint alleged
that she brought a digital camera inside the bar examination rooms, in
violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in
administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof
required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if there is
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the
established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson
committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct
only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with
substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to
uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be
an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re:
Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M.
No. 2482, April 1, 2014.
Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court held that the truth about Judge Austrias alleged partiality cannot
be determined by simply relying on the verified complaint. Bias and
prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judges sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect
to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of
partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and
judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were
grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to
adduce proof indicating the judges predisposition to decide the case in favor
of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was
filed against Judge Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit
that he had a number of cases pending for decision, some of which the
reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a
primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised
and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently
mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. A
member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement;
he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and
demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory
period for disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case within the
required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge
Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative
sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-121806, April 7, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge
Austria for impropriety for posting her details as judge in Friendster and
posting a picture with an indecent attire for the publics consumption. The
Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited
from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them
in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. However, Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this available for
public viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br.
2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The
Court held that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of
proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this case,
the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of

duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of
merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austrias bad faith,
malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on
mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not
sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the
exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a
disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a
judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Effect of withdrawal. A disbarment case was filed by
Quiachon against her lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case
before NLRC and a special proceeding case before the RTC. During the
pendency of the proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case.
The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate
penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the
withdrawal of the charges. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos,
A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014.
Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative
complaint for dishonesty was filed against Atty. Molina for having advised his
clients to enforce a contract on complainants client who was never a party
to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that
when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be
considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence;
and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was
without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not
substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding
hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his
clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without
any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default
rule is presumption of good faith. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T.
Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil Service
Commission for dishonesty, however, remained employed in the RTC. The
Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong
was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of
one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the
following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility;
(b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every
employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-133132, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with
misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for failing to act on a writ of execution. The Supreme Court held that
the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment
has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30
days, is mandatory. Contrary to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one
return of writ of execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other
report to the court. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of
justice because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts.
Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for
simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v.
Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No.
P-13-3123, June 10, 2014.
Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An
administrative complaint was filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The
Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the
efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those
traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the
litigants. In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution.
Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure
which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite
this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years later. While
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy
disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court
has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been
understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time
due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any
acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus,

making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014.
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty.
Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
provides:
CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him.
Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, a
counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is
good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by
affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the
penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C.
No. 9604. March 20, 2013.
Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the
complaint, on its face, lacks merit. For resolution is the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal of the Complaint
for disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers. Complainant
claims he was denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to file a
Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved the
disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been
submitted for resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for
disbarment when on its face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in
International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice
Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form
and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the
instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In
fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then,
after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same
although not in complainants favor. Based on the Complaint and the
supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the
respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to
respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required
complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing
of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on the
pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainants mistaken notion,
not all petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage.
Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion either to
proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective
responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can
proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the
case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty.
Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in
Del Mundo v. Capistrano that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal
profession, the court and society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with
CBDs directives for him to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend
hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also his disrespect
for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a
lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of
the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of
the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E.
Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of
land title, but not used for the purpose, should be returned to the client
immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure
to return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latters demand,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and professional
ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to
keep and maintain a general docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves
admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a general docket of cases

assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty under
Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of
which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single
case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order
in which they were received, and under the heading of each case, a
complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or
judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by
reference a single page the history of the case may be seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to
schedule the promulgation of cases. In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of
scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the
unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was serving
her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading
it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is
his duty to calendar the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules
of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the
decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated
first. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City
and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect
of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a
task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less
grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six
months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves
past administrative cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has
not reformed. He has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and he
appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received.
Mr. Teves repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper
public service which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted
with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The
OCA found that the court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep
track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr. Teves as the
Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the
members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves
repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases
pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an
efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary
responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed
to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status
of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars for her failure to comply with her duty to provide an efficient court
management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of
docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the
warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the
accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the
opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November
15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal
cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge
is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with
the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under
Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits;
(2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis
work history which reflects how she performed her judicial functions. We find
that there are several administrative cases already filed against her, with
most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her
inability to properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past
infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she
committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella
M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente,
an inhibition must be for just and valid reason. Complainants mere
imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the Court with
extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno
F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the
judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of
decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are
resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide
and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The
mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate.
Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of
the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants
the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting
magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City
and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in
resolving the cases pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his
residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not
absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a
single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An
inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the
following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the
reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the
delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous
circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first
infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15 years in the service. The
Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent judge
exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Courts directives as
contained in the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a
justification for the delay. Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the
consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was
suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months.
Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in
cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the
Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another
violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to
avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that
she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even
prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella
M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative
matter was instituted against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial
audit conducted after his retirement. According to the Supreme Court, for it
to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must
be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee.
This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the
holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once
jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the
public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the
case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively barred the Court from
pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his
tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and
regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions
committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint
against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.
Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Private
respondents were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA
dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present certified true
copies of the documentary evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule
130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Run After the
Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as
counsel for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the
elementary rules shows that the case against respondents was doomed by
design from the start. This stance taken by the lawyers in government
service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration
of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive
branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from
whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not
close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the governments
goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and
similar activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS
lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. People of the Philippines v. The
Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013
Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of
Atty. Baez, Jr. in connection with the recovery of their properties from
Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal services, where they would
not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the
docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract,
complainants would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and
entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the
withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case
against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien was the legal problem preventing them from
enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in
a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon
all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his
services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract
for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to
enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the
thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus
void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to
a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus,
the Court held that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Baez,
Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty.
Macapagal. He was charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of

Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when
he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same
case. The Supreme Court held that these issues are proper subjects of and
must be threshed out in a judicial action. However, since Atty. Macapagal
failed to file a comment and his position paper despite his receipt of Notice,
he was reprimanded for failing to give due respect to the Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty. Ciriaco A.
Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged
Respondent Esponilla, Legal Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54
of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC
Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint
was in connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly
rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The Supreme Court
held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good faith
the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he
himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject
administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved that he
exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion
all in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was
suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Elpidio Sy, President,
Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal
Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11,
2013.
Attorney; Due diligence in handling clients case. Respondents were charged
for gross negligence in handling the labor complaints of complainant. The
Supreme Court held that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led
to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his
part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially
with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule
10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In this case, Atty. Quesadas failure to attend the
scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper
justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing
his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T.
Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The
Supreme Court issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint
of Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals Justice Veloso. The Resolution
directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of
indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after
Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The
complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main
cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of
Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should
have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. If they doubted the
legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute
for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so
within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his
client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to
encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to
impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified
Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re:
Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty.
Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for
violation of the Lawyers Oath due to the latters failure to pay a loan. The
Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct. The deliberate
failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. The prompt payment of financial obligations is
one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and
issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of
Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or
private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him
as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer professional

dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy
of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria C. Heenan v.
Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since Judge
Cajigals appointment as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the
latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to resolve within the
prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover, complainant questions
the propriety of the Judges decision in a case he is involved in. The Supreme
Court held that the charges of ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge
Cajigals order was issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and
as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially
considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of
the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be
administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of
showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or
a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter
of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal,
RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4,
2013.
Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias
because he voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only
after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions.
The Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice Hernando voluntarily
inhibited himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not establish his
bias against Rallos and her co-heirs considering that the inhibition was for
the precise objective of eliminating suspicions of undue influence. The
justification of Justice Hernando was commendable, and should be viewed as
a truly just and valid ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in
a specific case. Further, Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed
about the inhibitions of the Justices and about their reasons for the
inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V or in any other part
of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the
party-litigants be informed of the mandatory or voluntary inhibition of a
Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed of the
inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition must file a motion
for inhibition in the manner provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or
proceedings should be immediately notified of any mandatory
disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in
any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification
or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that
the disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B.
Rallos, for alleged acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s)
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio
Abarintos and Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel
Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T.
Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CAJ/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving
the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members
of the Supreme Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a
member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with.
Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past
two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and
standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should
be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been informed of
any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous
practices unsuitable to a member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate
to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been
shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re:
subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A.
Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano & Evangeline
J. Lozano-Endriano against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-113-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases. In
Section 3, it provides that, Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is
substantial evidence. For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required
to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense charged against her. In
the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules
of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative
investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence. Dela Cruzs Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint

affidavit of arrest executed by the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report, photocopy of the marked money, the Complaint Sheet, and the
photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruzs house, and the contents of
Malunaos bag after receipt of the money, all prove by subsantial evidence
the guilt of Malunao for the offense of grave misconduct. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz
vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit
for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states:
Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on
any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence
their official actions. Respondents use of her position as Clerk III in Branch
28 to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision
violates Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and
constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of
dismissal. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch
28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Judges; judicial clemency. In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge
Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency), the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills),

as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in
petitioners request. A review of the records reveals that petitioner has
exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10)
years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for
additional time to resolve the cases then pending in her sala, the Court noted
that she had disposed of the same within the extended period sought, except
in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her compliance beyond the
approved 45-day extended period. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently
shown diligence in the performance of her duties and has not committed any
similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of
pending cases was acknowledged and she was even commended for her
good performance in the effective management of her court and in the
handling of court records.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has
shown its high regard for petitioner per the letter of support signed by a
number of its members addressed to the IBP dated October 15, 1999 during
the pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11,
Series of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of
Tagbilaran City. Re: Petition for judicial clemency of Judge Irma Zita V.
Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012.
Administrative Complaint; moot and academic. The Court dismissed the
complaint filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice
Renato Corona for being moot and academic after considering the judgment
of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, which found the Chief Justice
guilty of the charge under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, with the
penalty of removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under
the Republic of the Philippines as provided in Section 3(7), Article XI of the
Constitution. Re: Complaint Against the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational
Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC. June 13, 2012
Attorneys; disbarment cases imprescriptible. The defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do
not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar
would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No.
6368, June 13, 2012.
Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is
a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat
to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges
on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar
case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do
was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.
Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012.
Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients
cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to
fulfill this duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband,
they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on
ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44
requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know
this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the
facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code
provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer
from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from
his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did
not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was
approached by complainants husband only two days before the expiration of

the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a
motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever
pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of
Appeals.
Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their
case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code,
which reads:
18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he
was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take
this measure proves his negligence.
The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the
Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary
action. Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a
lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and
unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. Emilia R.
Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012.
Contempt; unauthorized practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court
ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill. The OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized
practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of
attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their
attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other
pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or
representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the
pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or
MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions,
he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person
assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of
the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge
Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks
of court have no authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness
of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Compliance with
the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels. And whether
these conform to the rules concerning substance and form is an issue that
only the judge of the court has authority to determine. The duty of clerks of
courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely
ministerial. Although they may on inspection advise the parties or their
counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file, which may
be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the
filing party refuse to receive the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that
court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as
courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos was counsel in a case before
Teves branch. He was an officer of the court who expressed a desire to have
the presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see and consider the
same. Teves arrogated onto himself the power to decide with finality that
the presiding judge was not to be bothered with that motion. He denied Atty.
Ramos the courtesy of letting the presiding judge decide the issue between
him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu, Jr., an employee of the
judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and right of others at
all times, and his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are absent in this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official
duties as a light offense, the penalty for which is reprimand for the first
offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the second offense, and dismissal for
the third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave
misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court
meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution
of October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided these cases and warned
Teves to change his ways more than a year after the September 8, 2008
incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored
with respect to that incident the warnings given him in the subsequently
decided cases. Still those cases show Teves propensity for misbehavior.
Thus, the Court imposed on Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court of

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, the penalty of 30 days suspension
with warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B. Ramos vs. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City. A.M. No.
P-12-3061, June 27, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. The image of a court of
justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and
men who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
Like the rest of the personnel of the Court, the shuttle bus drivers are
expected to observe the norms and ethics of conduct of public officials and
employees. Judiciary employees should be circumspect in how they conduct
themselves inside and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act
that may erode the peoples esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an
employee. Court employees are supposed to be well-mannered, civil and
considerate in their actuations.
Laribo Jr.s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and cast aspersion upon
Diomampos character. The Court cannot countenance such behavior. The
Court sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his disgraceful and immoral conduct. Since
such conduct is classified as a grave offense, the penalty for the first offense
is suspension from 6 months and 1 day to one year. But the Court tempered
OCAs recommended penalty and imposed a penalty of one month
suspension, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely, taking into account that this is Laribos Jr. first
infraction. Shirley D. Diomampo, Records Officer II, Sandiganbayan vs. Felipe
C. Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M. No. SB-12-18-P. June 13,
2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And
no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. Persons
involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest
clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness
and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is
impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest
standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law.
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of
an additional sentence in the trial courts order. Dishonesty has been defined
as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and
straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her act, she has compromised
and undermined the publics faith in the records of the court below and,
ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such act would open the
floodgates to fraud by court personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court,
regardless of the reason is not among respondents duties. A legal
researchers duty focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting
memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial,
and keeping track of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court
held that courts have the inherent power to amend and control their process
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. But such power
rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only perform adjudicative
support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the
power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher. It is
well to remind that court personnel are obliged to accord the integrity of
court records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the
dispensation of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena,
Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M.
No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, promulgated by the Civil Service Commission
through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the
Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to
the presence of mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a firsttime offender, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the
respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be
visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the laws concern for
the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment
brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Considering that this is respondents first offense in her twenty-two (22)
years of service in the Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere
apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same mistake in
the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the only one
supporting her five children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a
period of six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth
Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio
City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and
passed the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her
constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and

otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of
its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
Here, Aguam failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
employee and does not therefore deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and
Concerned Citizen v. Dominga Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the
employees found guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim
masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service examination in behalf
of Cruz. The Court said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of
dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else took the Civil Service examination for
Sta. Ana. The Court dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad, the evidence
disproved Abads claim that she personally took the examination. The Court
held that for Abad to assert that she herself took the examination when in
fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for
her offense. The Court found no reason to deviate from these consistent
rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for
the first offense. Under Section 58(a) of the same rules, the penalty of
dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. The OCA properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits,
pursuant to the Courts ruling in Sta. Ana and Abad. The Court also
consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on employees found
guilty of an offense of this nature is dismissal from the service. Lourdes
Celavite-Vidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No. SCC-10-13-P, June 26, 2012.
Court personnel; Disrespectful behavior. Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, requires that court personnel shall carry out
their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible.
The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Court personnel must
at all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and
rebuild the publics trust in the judiciary as an institution. The Court would
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the judiciary.
Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, discourtesy in the course of official dutiesis
classified as a light offense. A first-time violation of this rule warrants the
penalty of reprimand. Considering a) respondents apology and admission of
his mistakes; b) his retirement from service on 1 July 2011 after long years of
employment in the Judiciary; and c) this case being the first complaint
against him, he should be held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the
penalty of reprimand.
Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk
of Court. Instead of strictly observing the required number of working hours
in the civil service, he left his post in the middle of the day to attend a social
event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter the judges
chambers while under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a
direct violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly
Section 1, Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, which states: Court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours. Judge Ethelwolda
Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of Court, MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P12-3035, June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a
grave offense. The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave
because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the
same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service
regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct
offenses, but both may be committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards
of public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public
office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these
standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws, so
that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles. This Court, in
the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, should articulate and apply
these principles to its own personnel, as a way of bridging actual reality to
the norms we envision for our public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite
respondent Kasilags resignation, more than two years after he was directed
to file his Comment. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be
answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of
separation from service may no longer be imposed, there are other
penalties which may be imposed namely, the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There are no mitigating
circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying
detract from the notion of public accountability, as implemented by our laws.
We apply the law as it is written. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jaime
Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila. A.M. No. P-082573, June 19, 2012.

Court Personnel; gross insubordination. Respondent failed to explain why,

despite her receipt of the Notices, she did not comply with the directives of
this Court to submit her comment. The records show that the OCA had sent
notices to her at RTCBranch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna, where she is the
branch sheriff. While she apologized to this Court for her failure to submit her
comment, she did not explain the reasons for her non-submission thereof
and only averred that it was the first time she learned of the Complaint
against her. The OCA did not find her explanation satisfactory, because she
did submit her Comment, but only after a Show-Cause Order had been issued
to her and almost a year after the first directive requiring her to file the
Comment. Respondents prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the
directives of the Supreme Court constituted willful disrespect of its lawful
orders, as well as those of the OCA. Respondent committed the infraction
twice, yet failed to fully explain the circumstances that led to the repeated
omissions. Hence, there no reason to overturn or mitigate the penalty
recommended by the OCA. Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma.
Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent to an administrative
complaint and to resolutions requiring a comment thereon. The offense is
deemed punishable, because every employee in the judiciary should not only
be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty; more than anyone
else, they are bound to manifest utmost respect and obedience to their
superiors orders and instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Consuelo
Jole A. Fajardo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna. A.M. No. P-123064, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel stresses that employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it. No other
office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. Thus,
the failure of judicial employees to live up to their avowed duty constitutes a
transgression of the trust reposed in them as court officers and inevitably
leads to the exercise of disciplinary authority. By these standards,
respondent was found wanting, as she never denied the allegations that she
had stolen and encashed the 30,000 check payable to Judge Rojas. She did
not even refute the allegations of Dauz and Corpuz that she misrepresented
to both of them that she had authority to encash the check. Worse, neither
did she ever deny the allegations pertaining to her previous acts of stealing
from and paying off her obligations to other trial court judges. She has
virtually admitted her wrongdoing.
Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation to Judge Rojas,
and to the other trial court judges for that matter, will not exonerate her from
any administrative wrongdoing. This Court in Villaseor v. De Leon has
emphasized that full payment of an obligation does not discharge the
administrative liability, because disciplinary actions involve not purely
private matters, but acts unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled
that respondents admitted acts of pocketing checks and later encashing

them for her benefit constitute grave misconduct. The Court has defined
grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer;
and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are considered acts of
gross dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the personnel who work therein. Court employees are enjoined
to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of the court of justice. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are
grave offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.
Penalties include forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government
service.
The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate a court
employee from the consequences of his or her acts. The Court has often
ruled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy
way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
Thus, respondent was still held administratively liable for gross misconduct
and dishonesty.Her resignation, however, would affect the penalties the
Court may impose. The penalty of dismissal arising from the offense was
rendered moot by virtue of her resignation. Thus, the recommendation of the
OCA is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court imposed upon
respondent the penalty of a fine in the amount of 40,000 with forfeiture of
all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, if any. The 40,000 fine
shall be deducted from any such accrued leave credits, with respondent to
be personally held liable for any deficiency that is directly payable to the
Court. She was further declared disqualified from any future government
service. The Court emphasized that all court employees, being public
servants in an office dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree
of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance
with the law and court regulations. To maintain the peoples respect and faith
in the judiciary, court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness
and honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts. Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas,
Jr. RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC,
Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-10-2867, June 19, 2012
Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court
defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker who
had no authority to take custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs
of his office mates, let alone case records. Yet, respondent, taking advantage
of his position as a Utility Worker and the access to the court records and
documents which such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on
the proper administration of justice by taking case records outside of the
courts premises and preoccupying his office mates with the time-consuming
task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions constitute grave
misconduct which merits the penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his
resignation, the Court found it proper to instead impose on respondent the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal
liability he may have already incurred.
As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the
Court deemed it proper to order complainant to explain why she should not
be disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent failure on her part to
exercise due care in the custody of the said case records. Our courts of
justice, regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice, cannot
afford and does not have the luxury of offering excuses to litigants for
negligence in its role of safekeeping and preserving the records of cases
pending before it. The consequences of such failure or negligence, if there
be any, are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved but worse,
for our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin
D. Cardeno, Utility worker I, Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No.
P-12-3036, June 20, 2012.
Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and
processes. There was a valid substituted service of summons in this case. As
a rule, personal service of summons is preferred as against substituted
service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the process server
if personal service cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of
substituted service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service
of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who
is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is

likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officers return.
Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to personally serve the
summons to Spouses Tiu as indicated in his Sheriffs Return of Summons.
When it was apparent that the summons could not be served personally on
the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the summons through Bauco, their
employee, at the office address of the couples business. It was evident that
Bauco was competent and of sufficient age to receive the summons on their
behalf as she represented herself to be their General Manager and Caretaker.
The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior coordination as
mandated in Administrative Circular No. 12 which lays down the guidelines
and procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes in
the reorganized courts. Documentary evidence indeed discloses that Sheriff
Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the Sheriff of Pasig City before he
implemented the writ of preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the
Clerk of Court of Pasig City attested to the fact that Sheriff Villar formally
coordinated with their office in connection with the implementation of the
writ of attachment. Attached to said certification is a certified true copy of
Sheriff Villars request for coordination on which the word received was
stamped by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff, RTC Pasig
City.
By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the seized properties
absent any instruction to the contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary
attachment authorizing the trial court to legally hold the attached items was
set aside by the RTC Order dated July 8, 2010 specifically ordering Sheriff
Villar to immediately release the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The
instruction of the trial court was clear and simple. Sheriff Villar was to return
the seized properties to Spouses Tiu. He should have followed the courts
order immediately. He had no discretion to wait for the finality of the courts
order of dismissal before discharging the order of attachment. Nevertheless,
Sheriff Villar showed no deliberate defiance of, or disobedience to, the
courts order of release. Records show that he took the proper step under the
circumstances and filed with the trial court his Sheriffs Report with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in
consulting the judge before taking action on a matter of which he is not an
expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and Jennifer Tiu vs. Virgilio Villar, Sheriff IV, RTC,
OCC Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decisions. Judges are continuously reminded to
resolve cases with dispatch to avoid any delay in the administration of
justice. Thus, under Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious charge.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of action would have been
for Judge Asis to request an extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013
instead of disposing the case only after being prompted to file a comment on
the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless deemed it proper to reduce
the fine, considering the existence of factors that mitigated the commission
of the offense, namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b) his delay in the
disposition of the case resulted from his serious medical conditions. Leticia
Jacinto vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved withinthree months from the date they are submitted
for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the
receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, within which to render judgment. As a general principle,
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters
pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the
disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts.
In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more
reminds all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions
and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. Prompt disposition of
cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases
is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be
imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty
and responsibility that her position requires. The case was submitted for
resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed
the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained
unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010.
More than four years after being submitted for resolution, the case was still
awaiting decision by respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide
the case within the 30-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule
on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed,
respondent even failed to decide the case within the three-month period
mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve
cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to
report and request for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for
which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00. Given
that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty
of suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon
respondent, for her undue delay in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum
amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe
Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012.
Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the
contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by
Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition
for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated
with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was
justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor
Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action.
However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA
enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12,
2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CAs disquisition is clear and categorical. In
complete disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen
proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in
court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking State
Prosecutor Comilangs explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring
his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his
attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1,
2007 Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days
imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his nonfiling of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance
before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in
finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued
subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of
preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.

Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them
properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover,
refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt,
as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive
order issued by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belens
actuations cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law
or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt
notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction
demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for
which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our
conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of
the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law.
Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous
infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been
severely warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to mete
the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to
be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State
Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs.
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ10-2216, June 26, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against
judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in
nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme
Courts Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is
in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his
actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of
General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order, sent under
Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence
that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could
not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard
considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo
summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants.
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General
Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned
for gross ignorance of the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt,
she betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic procedural rules
such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court.
She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to
move ex parte to have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the
court (through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case
for pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion. The
respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the case to
her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she
should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their
answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not moved
in the respondents court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards
of competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in
her handling of the petition for contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should
be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears stressing that
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge
Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012.
Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the
main cases. The allegations in the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the
allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion to Expunge Motion for
Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated November 13, 2002 and the
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus
Motion filed in the main cases. These were in fact decided already on
October 19, 2011. The Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly
refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main
cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly
worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. The charge is purely
conjectural and the Court, in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No.
6332 has already ruled that the charge has no extrinsic factual evidence to
support it. Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and
Maria Loudes P.A Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno
M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case
disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more
than four months since the last submission of the parties position paper. The
pretrial Order was purportedly issued on 26 January 2010, or more than three
months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that within five days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled Guidelines to
be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreAtty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, mandates that a judge

must issue a pretrial order within 10 days after the termination of the
pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell under the Rules on Summary
Procedure, respondent judge should have handled it with promptness and
haste. The reason for the adoption of those Rules is precisely to prevent
undue delays in the disposition of cases, an offense for which respondent
judge may be held administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious
charge, which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with
suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than 10,000, but
not exceeding 20,000. Considering that the instant administrative charge is
only the third against respondent judge (the first has been dismissed, while
the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the
judiciary starting in 1997, he may be reasonably meted out a penalty of
5,000 for being administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision. Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3,
Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012.
Judge; unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Judges have the sworn
duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice
denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the
rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major
culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system.
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve
cases within 90 days from submission. Corollary to this constitutional
mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness. In Office of the Court Administrator
v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline for
deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is
unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for
good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on
the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for
an extension of time to decide and resolve most of the cases pending before
him, save only for one instance. Having therefore failed to decide cases and
resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross inefficiency,
warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds

reasonable under the circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional trial Court, Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan Ilocos
Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012.
Public Officials; SALNs. While no prohibition could stand against access to
official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to
regulation. Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation
and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and
employees as well as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
6713. The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents
stems from the inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal
documents, to control its very office to the end that damage to, or loss of,
the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be
prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection
may be insured. In this connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173 provides for
the penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN and the
information contained therein. The Court found no reason to deny the public
access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other
magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and
prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and
regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.
The Court noted the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the
possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such
personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public
documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and
objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material
injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law. While public officers in the custody or control of
public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records
may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion
does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection,
examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines:
1.
All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court Administrator; and
for attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices.
2.
Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the
members, officials and employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only
previous records if so specifically requested and considered as justified, as

determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of
these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
6713.
3.
In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the Court En Banc.
4.
Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific purpose and
their individual interests sought to be served; shall state the commitment
that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and shall be submitted
in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use
of the information secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5.
In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media,
their interests should go beyond pure or mere curiosity.
6.
In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally
be supported by proof under oath of their media affiliation and by a similar
certification of the accreditation of their respective organizations as
legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media,
must have no derogatory record of having misused any requested
information previously furnished to them. Re: Request for copy of 2008
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data
Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers
and Employees of the Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheets of the Court of Appeals
Justices, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13, 2012.
Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation. Resignation and
retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time,
retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements
specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees
own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement
takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to ones employment,
resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in general; in
retirement, the employment relationship endures for the purpose of the
grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of
retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from judicial
service or resigned from judicial office. In case of retirement, a justice or
judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1
imposes the following minimum requirements for optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the
Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously
rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the
rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The
Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and
justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was
held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. 910, as amended must
have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the
involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would
not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence
of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambons case
does not render him eligible to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First,
Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement since he was less
than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service
requirement not having been in continuous service with the Judiciary for
three (3) years prior to his retirement. Second, Judge Macarambons
resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and
volition. Thus, the ruling in Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case
since his resignation was voluntary. Third, there are no exceptional reasons
to justify Judge Macarambons request. Judge Macarambon failed to present
similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and sufficient
accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age
requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the
time he left the Court Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and
79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in the age of
retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to
the COMELEC upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No.
910, as amended, he may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents
he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
requirements under the said law. Re: Application for Retirement of Judge
Moslemen Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19, 2012.
Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against
Atty. Rinen for falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which
allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. In Bautista v.
Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to
the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts
a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the
identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public for one year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C.
No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana
of forgeries and falsifications in the notarization of certain documents. The
Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana administratively liable under Section 1 of
Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, for violation of his
notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria
Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly
executed on April 29, 1994.
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation
of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary
public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
from the practice of law for one year are in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James
Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
Service. An administrative complaint was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of
a Metropolitan Trial Court for unauthorized/unexplained absences and other
infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn over the partial settlement
amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn over the
payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court held that
the acts of Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It
implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise
fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that
is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong
result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.
However, Salamancas dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit
court funds because the money she received from the litigants did not
acquire the status of court funds as no official receipt therefor was issued by
her. While Salamancas complained acts involved technically private money,
the deceit she pulled off disrupted the publics faith in the integrity of the
judiciary and its personnel. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of
her public office and violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, Section 4(c) which commands that public
officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D.
Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-133119. February 10, 2014.
Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN). Sheriff Collado was charged with failing to disclose in her SALN
for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits, among others. The
Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all public officials
and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their
assets and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption, as well as
at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such
disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the
affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and
balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of
income.
The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, all other
assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the
like, should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN. In this case,
however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of her
time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose
the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly,
Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713
and thus should be held administratively liable for said infraction. Angelito R.
Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903,
February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De
Vera for soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court.
The court held Susbilla-De Vera guilty of the most serious administrative
offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust and confidence of the
people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the public
to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead others to believe
that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to
influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the
expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had
deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the
complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew. Section 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel
from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from service. Veronica F.
Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against
respondents who are employees of the Court of Appeals for transacting
with partylitigants with a pending case before the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court held that the court personnels act of soliciting or receiving
money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving
money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a
court employee. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court
personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates
that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot
take advantage of the vulnerability of partylitigants. In this case,
respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV
and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014.
Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed
against Judge Rojo for notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized, in violation of Circular No. 190 dated February 26,

1990. Circular No. 190 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries
public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official
functions and duties.
The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 190, and of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not
connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that
lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. As
a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together
for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines
does not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of
cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the
duty to examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing
officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine
and review the affidavits statements before performing the marriage
ceremony. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from office.Rex M.
Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24,
2014.
Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty.
Fortun filed a petition for contempt against respondents for publicizing the
disbarment case against him in media.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the
Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. The
purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its investigations
free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the
personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the
baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or
portions thereto without authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or
verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in
newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature
publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or
imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. However, Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from
making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In
the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint,
members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself
a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty. Fortun himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a
matter of public interest, media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et
al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.
Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is

expected to champion the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care,
and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense including the institution of an
ejectment case that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court
of Appeals, the court held that in the full discharge of their duties to the
client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease
the general public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation
that lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law.
They should only make such defense when they believe it to be honestly
debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarins act of issuing demand
letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally
sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes
necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to
any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to maintain his clients
disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the
complainants as an illegal occupant when the final and executory HLURB
Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer. Given that he
knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means
that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers
must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is
false. Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva
Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310.
February 27, 2013.
Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiants personal appearance; nature
of notarization; penalties when a notary public fails to discharge his duties. A
notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the personal appearance of the person who actually executed the
document, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the partys free act or deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public

document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties;
otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and
respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn
oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their
offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary
public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of
revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension
from the practice of law for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller
A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013.
Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution
states that a public office is a public trust. It enjoins public officers and
employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people.
As front liners of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always
strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. As agents of
the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and
implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of
justice.
Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to

discourtesy. A simple note as to where their personal effects were
temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their belongings were not
confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a
sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the
information to the other court staff to address Sasings concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in

the course of official duties which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1), is a light offense. The
penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the first
offense, a suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and
dismissal from public service for the third offense. In this case, the court
admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part to
meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on the second
scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C. Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032.
February 20, 2013.
Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less
than the Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and employees
should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for public office is a
public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the
Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they
must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they
are officers of the Court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or
omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty
of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil Docket Clerk for
the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July
7, 2008 Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a
Friday, he should not have proceeded to mail the same; but instead, should
have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the herein
complainant. Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was
mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to
him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate
lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates
that Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and
with diligence. Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the performance of his
duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office.
Esguerras acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards
required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra,
Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967.
February 13, 2013.
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a
hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that [T]he
requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the
issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined
requiring him to comment on the said application within the period of not
more than ten (10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on
the application for injunctive writ, since the so-called new and substantial
matters raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in
the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents
Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on the
said application, at the time when the said subsequent matters were
already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S.
Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public
records of indubitable integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against
judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to
be offered by the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative
proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by
indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The
complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth
during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made against
him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he
reared fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly
failed to abide by Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine
Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no
clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and
betting, he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting
cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect
due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be
individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should
behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and
not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.
Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent
motion alone or with another member present. There is nothing in the
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required the Division Clerk
of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present
regular members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe.
The complainants would have been correct if the absent member of the
Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other members. This
implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or
with another member present, provided that the action or resolution is
submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the
Division for ratification, modification or recall.
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage
of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve
his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are
passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the
rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main
controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere
interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of things
prior to the RTCs Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez,
Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon
M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19,
2013.
Judge; government employee vis--vis government officer; liberal treatment
upon retirement claims of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice
Panganiban requested that the government service which he rendered from
January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its
Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can
meet the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to
retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government employee
includes any person in the service of the Government or any branch thereof
of whatever grade or class. A government officer, on the other hand, refers
to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance
of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or
not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description
and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a
governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ
Panganibans government service as legal counsel and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal
treatment in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1)
waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or death
while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave
credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for
retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years
of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement
upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering
legal counseling work for a government body or institution as creditable
government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of
Re-Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12,
2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for
damages in the exercise of judicial functions. The court held that Judge
Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of
the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and is
punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a
relative by affinity within the sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have
inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as mandated by Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the
court explained that in civil actions for damages, judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do in the exercise
of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers
and jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E.
Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs.
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 072618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M.
No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.

Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule

140 of the Rules of Court, there are three ways by which administrative
proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by
the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein
or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CAs former Special 14th Division since
they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not permitted to
harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the
issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate
cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous
order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge cannot be held to account
civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by
him in good faith. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the
consolidated CA petitions was discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in
nature, and equally importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action of
the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an
administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute
for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong
vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just
debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges. Manlapaz charged
Judge Sabillo with serious and gross misconduct for failure to return an
amount arising from a transaction.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the
unpaid debts of its officials and employees, but has nevertheless provided for
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its officials and
employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section
provides that willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary
action against judges and justices. Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1)
claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and
outside of official transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public
officials private lives; they simply look at their actions from the prism of
public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official. These
rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted
with public duties and who, even in their private capacities, should
continually act to reflect their status as public servants. Employees of the
judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the

performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings
with others so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the
courts in the community. Here, the complainants claim is a just debt. The
willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his continuous failure to
settle despite demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed the
penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC,
Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013.
Judge; judicial audit; courts jurisdiction over an administrative case;
presumption of regularity. The OCA submitted its memorandum to then
Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012 more than two years
and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his
incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the
alleged violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the
present, the OCA has not commenced any formal investigation or asked
Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge
Grageda must be dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that this Court
concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial
audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to
recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind
the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda
which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of
action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations
when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be
conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. We
recognize that effective monitoring of a judges observance of the time limits
required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas
right to due process.
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the
complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once
jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondents cessation from
office. In this case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the OCA
of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his
compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative
jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative case against him after he
has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file the appropriate civil
or criminal case against him for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence
that he committed an offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he
regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the Court held that, In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in

administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined
for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent. Missing
Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City,
Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013.
Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue
delay in rendering a Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment
is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 which provides
that within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment. This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an
ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision or an order is classified as a less serious charge, punishable by
either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000
but not exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and
acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J.
Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court,
Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.
Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin
undertook to process the registration and eventually deliver, within a period
of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land)
in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late
Isabel Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of
P15,000 and P39,000 to cover for the litigation and land registration
expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to fulfil his undertaking
and failed to return the money to complainant. The Supreme Court held that
Atty. Lawsins failure to properly account for and duly return his clients
money despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainants purported act of maligning
him does not justify the latters failure to properly account for and return his
clients money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyers duty to his client is one
essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the
former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance.
Azucena Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965,
November 13, 2013.
Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a
complaint for dishonesty against respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly
making untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against them. The
Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within the
ambit of the Courts disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain
a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On
its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams
against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the
Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of

ownership must first be settled. The issue of ownership of real property must
be settled in a judicial, not administrative, case. Sps. David Williams and
Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27,
2013.
Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida
for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that
she engaged the services of respondent to handle her case before the CA but
the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case was dismissed. The
Supreme Court held that this is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their
clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information. Respondents refusal
to obey the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes
utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H.
Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013.
Attorney; Mishandling of Clients Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an
administrative case against Atty. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction
of duty for mishandling their case. The Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty
of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day
period given to him to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence
pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty.
Dublin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18
and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file
the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were
fabricated and the same would be refused admission by the RTC. However, if
respondent truly believed that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by
his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such
as [w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with
the matter he is handling or [w]hen the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules. Thus, Atty. Dublin was
imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 6 months.
Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M. Dublin, A.C.
No. 5239, November 18, 2013.
Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint
against Atty. Kilaan for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit.
Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the
application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate
a public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that
the Verification in Batingweds application for CPC was notarized by Atty.
Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However,
upon verification of Atty. Kilaans Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the
said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of
Batingweds application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is
personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial
Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondents explanation that he is
burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of
his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I
and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep
and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act.
His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial
commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano
Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11,
2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to
give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to
submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the courts
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several
opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the
judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As
an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his
language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo
Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of
grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme
Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct.
Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement on any material fact
and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in
2003 which resulted in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless,
respondents acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned
government agencies/officials. Respondents deportment under the
circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of

the service. Respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the
disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure
and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and
decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino Teves, represented by Paul John
Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M.
No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that
the respondent failed to execute the decision in a land registration case
despite receiving an amount for the implementation of the Alias Writ. The
Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of expenses incurred in
enforcing writs are governed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as revised by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff
executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred,
and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval,
the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and
ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy
sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation upon the return of the writ.
In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and received from
complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of
Court as it was not even accounted for earlier in his Manifestation. He merely
reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his liquidation of expenses only after
complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judges
directive. The Court has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in
excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful
exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A. Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26,
2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed
against Ibay, Clerk II of MTCC, for stealing a check. The Supreme Court held
that in the absence of substantial defense to refute the charges against her,
Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery of De Ocampos
signature, leading to the checks encashment. The case against Ibay is
bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between
her handwriting in the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the
check. Thus, there is substantial evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of
dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service provides that dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service even when committed for the first
time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official
to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity,
probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. The
Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary deserves the
best from all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br.
20, Cauayan, Isabela v. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan,
Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013.
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted
authority to travel until February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work
on February 16, without securing an extension of his authority to travel
abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and
Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for
an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be
received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the
original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond
the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a
position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay abroad.
Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series
of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without
approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to
the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel
Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio
City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held
administratively liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court
laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
(1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking
for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There
must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalnas petition is not
supported by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore,
must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et
al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013.
Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump
sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010,
Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946
which provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits,
among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January
17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received
1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April
2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated
January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the law accommodates the
heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity
benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not
entitled to the survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that
Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer
needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January
2011 to April 2012 amounting to 1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the
past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who received
survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such
pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic
Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K.
Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.
Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint

against Atty. Gonzales was filed for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed. The court held
that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has
repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the
practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful
and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or
indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying
a case by misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales
to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No.
6760. January 30, 2013
Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Gacott who allegedly deceived the complainant and her husband into signing
a preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent converted into a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another an
act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal malpractice.
While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs
and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the
complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as
the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due
diligence in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a
lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact
formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a
lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy
v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per
se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar
to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without
any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf
of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No.
6475. January 30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against
Atty. Cefra for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The court held that Atty. Cefra
was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants case. His acts in the
present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his
duties as an officer of the Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. In addition, a lawyer has the duty to keep the client informed of
the status of his case. Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as
shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of
documentary evidence within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to
comply with the two orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal offer
of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion
or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision; (4)
He failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial
measure to contest the RTCs decision which was adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and inattention
to his duties as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has
repeatedly held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps.
Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No. 5530.
January 28, 2013.
Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving

requests for judicial clemency; good moral character requirement. In Re:
Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills),
as well as potential for public service.
(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any
other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of
law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and
a third marriage with one Constantino while his first marriage to Esparza was
still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral
conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his
remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his
personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the
herein attached pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and
taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and
thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer
II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve
to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan
Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent
likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors
and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed ways such as: (1)
Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3)
Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from the Municipal Local
Government Office.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the
IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish
priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines
of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support to his children in compliance with the Decision dated
February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time
respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer
product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of
dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation
Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways as in this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was,
however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements. Florence
Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for
Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22,
2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official
duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court are primarily
responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and
writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are
charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court,
issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies
of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high
degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to

help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use
reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of her officially-designated
duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue
the alias writs of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case,
despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required
comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey
the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of
interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the
charges. Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br.
32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by
a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous,
administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the
respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or
attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in
this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct
of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly
shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In
the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs bare and
self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged
except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has
regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re: Verified complaint of AMA
Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202CA-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross
ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty.
The court held that the judge did not commit gross ignorance of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling
lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established
jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
fairness of the court which he personifies. The complaint states that
respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own September 25, 2006
Decision which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue
of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the
judgment on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him since there is no finding of strong reasons to rule
otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he
desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously
granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent.
Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu
City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate

violation of a rule of law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be
established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the
execution of the final judgment against accused Velasco were shown to be in
respectful deference to the Courts action on the various petitions filed by
the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the
Sandiganbayan Justices administratively liable for grave misconduct. Re:
Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary
appointment. Complainant, a former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed
to show any proof that she was entitled to a permanent position. Other than
her allegation that she was given two very satisfactory and one
satisfactory rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met the
prescribed qualification standard for the position. Such standard is a mix of
the formal education, experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical
health and attitude that the job requires. Respondent judge, who is the
immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to observe the
fitness, propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be
impressed upon complainant that her appointment in the Judiciary is not a
vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply for the reason
that she had been in the service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the
PAO-Virac) manifests complainants propensity to file complaints whenever
she does not get what she wants. Such attitude should not be tolerated.
Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will
threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their
judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case
against her should be dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be
reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as not to give the
impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge
Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a

contingency basis. The Supreme Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of 2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the
latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo
hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to
pay their lawyer 2,000.00 as attorneys fees should the case be decided in
their favor. Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter
one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is
champertous and is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to
conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to
save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds
of the judgment is obnoxious to the law. The rule of the profession that
forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in
litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyers expense is
designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and
his client. The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and
Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely:
Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente,
Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Deceitful and Dishonest Conduct. A Complaint for
Disbarment was filed against Atty. Solidum, Jr. The Supreme Court held that
Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a
lawyers professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. The Supreme Court found Atty. Solidum, Jr. guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with
respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Atty.
Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr.
drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later,
using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his sons account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is

nothing in the records that will show that he paid or undertook to pay the
loans he obtained from complainants. The fiduciary nature of the relationship
between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to fulfill this duty. Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S.
Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Gross Immoral Conduct. A Petition for Disbarment was
filed against Atty. Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first
marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. The Supreme Court held that
for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing
the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence to prove
that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member
of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A.
Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Willful Disobedience. A Petition for Disbarment was
filed against Atty. Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first
marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. Atty. Celara failed to file a
Comment despite numerous Notices from the Court, stating that he never
received such Notices. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, Atty.
Celera just disappeared. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Celeras acts
were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the
disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions.
Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot countenance. Atty. Celeras acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Atty. Celeras conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No.
5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Malpractice. A Complaint was filed against Atty. Mendoza of the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) for violation of the attorneys oath, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. One of the charges against Atty. Mendoza which she admitted
is telling her clients Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02

and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate
of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule
15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness. However, while her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she
was only reprimanded and sternly warned. Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria
Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A complaint for grave
misconduct was filed against Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Clerk III of the Regional
Trial Court. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the States policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And
no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. The
Supreme Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these
exacting standards. The inculpatory acts committed by Dela Cruz are so
grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and
grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a grave offense, carry the
extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. This penalty is in accordance with
Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc.,
A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and
Making Untruthful Statements was filed against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV,
assigned at the Regional Trial Court. Complainant alleged that Pallanan
should not have implemented the writ of execution in the unlawful detainer
case since there was a pending motion for reconsideration with the court.
Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial
evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
The Supreme Court ruled that Pallanan did not commit grave misconduct. In
ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can
only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Such provision was not complied here.
The sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion
whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his
hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in

accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the
order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein
where the nature of the case requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO,
an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. Atty.
Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20,
2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. The audit of the financial
transactions of Maniquis, former Officer-in-Charge, Clerk of Court III, and that
of his successor Atty. Buencamino (Atty. Buencamino), Clerk of Court IV
uncovered shortages in the books of accounts of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Mapue, Clerk III, admitted her fault.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not
exculpate Atty. Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk of court has
general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the court. The
administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court
funds and revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds
that are collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a
duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Atty.
Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court.
Atty. Buencamino failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the
court funds entrusted to her, enabling Mapue to misappropriate part of the
funds. Atty. Buencaminos failure to properly supervise and manage the
financial transactions in her court constitutes simple neglect of duty. Simple
neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a
duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is a less grave offense punishable
by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et
al./Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court
etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014.
Attorney; Attorneys Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a

final decision with the Court of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar,
however, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents
pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvars counsel filed a
Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorneys Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of
the tendencies of clients compromising their cases behind the backs of their
attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting to
naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorneys Rights as a measure of protecting the
Intervenors right to his stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the
interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional

services on contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the
payment of the counsels adequate and reasonable compensation could not
be annulled by the settlement of the litigation without the counsels
participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the compensation, and
his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers of
the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against
their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of the Court is not only
to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to
see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of
the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
withdrawal of the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed
against respondent Atty. Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the
same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the afore-cited
rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The
prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos justification
that no confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since
the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition from
representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. Thus, a
lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latters
opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador
Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr.
violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he filed a criminal case for
estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil
case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was
dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil
case for specific performance and damages before the RTC, when he should
have filed it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not
also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only
guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in
dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession

dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord
the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the clients
interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in
order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and
failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration
of the Lawyers Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149,
September 4, 2013.
Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in
1979. He took the Attorneys Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the
Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such Notice and
realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to
allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while
an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to
know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar candidates.
Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign
one (1) year after receipt of the Courts Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team
discovered cash shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily
accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether personally received
by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and
control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of
said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an accountable
officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging
to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility
upon the occurrence of the shortages. The Supreme Court held that no
position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of
justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of
responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live
up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in
mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-041903, September 10, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in
the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had
resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the
purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The
Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge
should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge
cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional
time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her
time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that
may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific
to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to
disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance
with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large
volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for
her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to
Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure
to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The
Supreme Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need
to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept
that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance
of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge Balumas gross
inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the
reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re:
Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge,
Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355,
September 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases
submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at
the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge Soriano
has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Sorianos
unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions,
and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory
retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated.
Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Sorianos inefficiency in managing his
caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of the
records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or
reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was
responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery
of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge

Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law,
and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from his retirement
benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedrea, a Public Attorney,

was charged for sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that the
records show that the respondent rubbed the complainants right leg with his
hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand
and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her
private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts
were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and
grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In
this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency. Atty. Pedreas misconduct was
aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to
provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that
complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public
officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate
need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted out the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v.
Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an
inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court held that the respondent
was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the
decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all
times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act
that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the
purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. Thus, the Court disbarred the respondent. Atty.
Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October
22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and
inexcusable negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of
which the complainants were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable
negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients
cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object
or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference
towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of
his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut
the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a
lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case
entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his clients cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v.
Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of
gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his
part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to
attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court
found that the respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause since he: (1) failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice
beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his clients cause while
the grave coercion case against them was pending. Maria Cristina
Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8,
2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for
grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that
since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she
also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities
attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal
documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate
transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the
category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with

employment is established.
the
consultation,
then
the
professional
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and
18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale
covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of
sale over the same property in favor of another person. It is a core ethical
principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was
disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny Obias,
A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was
accused of receiving payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the
money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December
2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of
Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government Officials and
Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance
payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial
fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that
payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of
Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an
official transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court.
Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for
judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover,
the issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be construed as having
been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only remitted
the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed
judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had been filed against her.
Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe
Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No.
P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue
presented in this case is whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154 applies
to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject
provision which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior
clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among
others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.
To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined
power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court
personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted
that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative
supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance

requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the
appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on
retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys
power of administrative supervision. Re: Request for guidance/clarification
on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring
Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Case/s from the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1,
2013.
Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was
accused of failing to serve summons to the defendant in a case where he
asked for transportation expense, and despite being given an amount. The
Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to the defendant in a
case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the
complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the
clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person
serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant efficiently
and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which
is the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of
him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments
from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They
cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without
observing the proper procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali
Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M.
No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross
ignorance of the law and violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit since the acts of
Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify
any administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of the TSN reveals
that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the
manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with
dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN
showed that the respondent Judge was very much concerned with following
the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of
Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact
that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3)
hours. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge
Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog
City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge
Patricio accusing him of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and
partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was already final and
executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby

becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that
Judge Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to
execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against the accused.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know
how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance
of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In
other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement
the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise
implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios
acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law. Jesus D. Carbajosa v.
Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo
did not deny that Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for
probation in his sala, went to his house, had a drinking spree with him and
stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge Pardo
liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a
judges acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond
office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant
constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was held liable for
misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits
given by the litigant. Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v.
Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty.
Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
and Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25,
2013.
Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty.
Grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge
Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found guilty, even if committed for
the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries with it the forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. As to Judge
Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their deaths, the supreme penalty of
dismissal cannot be imposed on them anymore. It is only the penalty of
dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are not in the
service anymore, but it is still within the Courts power to forfeit their
retirement benefits. Report on the financial audit conducted in the MTCC,
Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ismael L. Salubre, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618,
October 22, 2013.
Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross
ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was
filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the
filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting
the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety,
where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be
considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial
remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or
denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to
the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with,
except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v.
Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio /
Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-112259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; failure to account

Responsibility provides:
for
money.
The
Code
of
Professional
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence
in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty.
Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012.
Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to
protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The
Court cited the case of In Re: Sotto and ruled that One of the qualifications
required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good
moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar
clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral
principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his
dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of
professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty
of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the
preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its
powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily
abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but
also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may
either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest
acts. This rule provides that in any of the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral
conduct;(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyers oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and
discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No.
9074, August 14, 2012.
Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined
for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent
violated the Lawyers Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C.
No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly

fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct,
act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on
the erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is
that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether
documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for
the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their
relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and
erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same
into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Santos
Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represented by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty.
Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012
Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondents defense that
forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied
by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainants commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been
defined to include not only sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Respondent
engaged in sexual relations with a married man which not only violate the
moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel
must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties
in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also
judged by his private morals. The exacting standards of morality and
decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in
the service of the Judiciary. Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not
live up to her commitment to lead a moral life.
Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and the degree of
morality, which every official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the
Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward
conduct affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while holding office

should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant
circumstances taken into account. Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding
Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental vs.
Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis
Occidental. A.M. No. P-12-3080. August 29, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Willful
concealment of facts in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental
dishonesty amounting to misconduct. Likewise, making a false statement in
ones PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact. Dishonesty evinces a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or
defraud, deceive or betray.
Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement
for employment in the government. Hence, making false statements in ones
PDS is ultimately connected with ones employment in the government. The
employee making false statements in his or her PDS becomes liable for
falsification. Moreover, for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal,
her dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of official duty.
As the Court has previously ruled: The rationale for the rule is that if a
government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or
grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with
his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot
tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given
more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow
men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his
grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to
resist
and
to
counteract
his
evil
acts
and
actuations.
When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a third person is
irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith
and the destruction of the truth as claimed in that document.The act
undermines the integrity of government records and therein lies the
prejudice to public service. The act need not result in disruption of service or
loss to the government. It is the act of dishonesty itself that taints the
integrity of government service. A government officers dishonesty affects
the morale of the service, even when it stems from the employees personal
dealings. Such conduct should not be tolerated from government officials,
even when official duties are performed well.
Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees
are expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times .
An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public officers,
especially those in the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Manolito C.
Villordon vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the
failure to give attention to a task or the disregard of a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas: The Court
cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens
the peoples confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration
of justice. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public
servants must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the
constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda
of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to
Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of
Court clearly mandates the sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and
when necessary, periodic reports, with the court which issued the writ of
execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the court immediately
after the judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied 30 days after the officers receipt of the
same, said officer shall file a report with the court stating the reasons
therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall periodically file with the court a
report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until said
writ is fully satisfied or its effectivity expires. The officer is further required to
furnish the parties with copies of the return and periodic reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution
of a writ do not excuse respondents total inaction. Neither the Rules nor
jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by
sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an
empty victory for the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that
they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost
dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in
accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they
should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as
speedily as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of
sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads,
Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold B.

Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012.
Attorney; representation of non-client. Atty. Espejos claim that he drafted
and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant
consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases,
even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to
the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latters right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as
defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by
counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded.
It would have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer,
which, however, is not the case.
The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not
their law firms client and without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, gave in to Rodicas request for him to indicate in the said motion
the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of
giving more weight and credit to the pleading. As a member of the bar,
Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are
acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the
reputation of the law firm or the lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he
should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in
misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said
law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first
and foremost an officer of the court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a
high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds
of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth
and justice. Jasper Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No.
9259, August 23, 2012
Attorney; accounting of funds. When a lawyer collects or receives money
from his client for a particular purpose, he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure
either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a lawyer has
the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. The
issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a
counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is
so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved
client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner was given
opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by the
court. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former
counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.
Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No.
188726. January 25, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings
with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise,
of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the
first offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules, dismissal carries with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Thus, the
respondent is dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take the
Civil Service Sub-professional Examination on her behalf. Concerned Citizen
vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012.
Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a
sheriff performs a very sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is
duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of
execution, and should, at all times show a high degree of professionalism in
the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was
promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution of court writs
and processes in courts and to better serve the public good and facilitate the
administration of justice. Paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 12
provides that All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court
processes and execute all writs of their respective courts within their
territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same circular
provides that No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside
his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the
assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place.
It is clear that respondents act of implementing the subject writs in San
Fernando City, when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles
City, is a violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of authority.
While respondent claimed that he personally informed the OCC of San
Fernando City, he, however, failed to prove that he made written notice as
required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of the copies
of the court processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice
requirement. The requirement of notice is based on the rudiments of justice
and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the
execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T. torres,
sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P12-3027. January 30, 2012
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very
delicate function as the custodian of the funds and revenues, records,
property, and premises of the court. He is liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue delay
in the remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes
misfeasance. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the
goal of an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith
can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full
accountability for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92
mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the
Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized
government depository bank which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The
respondents failure to remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. Moreover, the failure of a public
officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima
facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property
to personal use. Re: Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, SantiagoSan Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of
resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. A judges failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will
make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered
untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be imposed only when
the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident
bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and
norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of
procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. Re: Verified
complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against
Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty,
and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R.
No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.
Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers
are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge
motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at
the expense of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for
using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for
Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his
malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in
fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition
of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer
be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently
cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter disregard of his
duties and responsibilities to the Court.

Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the

Court that cannot be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to
practice law in the country. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April
2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect
in handling ones case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept
cases as much as he can efficiently handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty.
Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged to
hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee
of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and
processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon
demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of
professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16,
2012.
Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. To be held accountable under this rule, it is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the
suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. Anion vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No.
5098, April 11, 2012.
Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification,
subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent
Pea submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the
time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected
from members of the legal profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no
falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the

court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusions. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. In the instant
case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of
a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability
of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful
reproduction of the ponentes Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to
Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been
inexistent in the courts records.
The Court noted that respondent Pea has not explained, to the
Courts satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and
confidential documents.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal
court records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering
his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents has not been
properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this
Courts confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently
falling into respondents lap through registered mail and that the envelopes
containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives
the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules have been
violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent
Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal
documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude
that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal
Code and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting
from the same. Respondents actions clearly merit no other penalty than
disbarment. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos.
145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of a court personnel. Respondent is
liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee for his continued refusal to
coordinate with complainants in the implementation of the writ of
possession, despite numerous attempts on their part to get in touch with
him. It may be recalled that complainants endeavored, no less than four (4)
times, to communicate with respondent for the proper and expeditious
execution of the writ, but each time, respondent rebuffed their efforts.
Finally, on25 April 2011, the day respondent finally implemented the writ,
respondent refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of the
intended implementation and opted to be accompanied by an ordinary bank
employee to witness the enforcement of the writ.
The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with complainants in the
implementation of the writ runs afoul of the exacting standards required of
those in the judiciary. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy
burden of responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to

perform. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. This is so because the image of the court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work there. The conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the
courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciarys good
name and standing as a true temple of justice. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been
defined to include not only sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. There is no
doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a
violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary, but
is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this
Court abhors and is, thus, punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle TaneoRegner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23,
2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Falsification of daily time record constitutes
dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty probity or
defraud, deceive or betray. Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (MC No. 19, dated September 14,
1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even
for first time offenses. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Araya. A.M. No. P12-3053, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most
junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must
be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and
maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say,
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
Respondents shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting
complainant to the police after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and
refusing to talk with complainant judge are not only acts of discourtesy and
disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.

High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service

where the personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all
times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Such conduct is
exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the publics respect for
and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with respect to
a court employees dealings not only with the public but also with his or her
co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and
surely erodes respect for the courts
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer;
and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules. Thus, considering respondents transgressions, i.e., disrespectful
conduct, solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no
question that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. Judge Salvador R.
Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-09-2720, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized
as follows: First offense Reprimand; Second offense Suspension for 1-30
days; Third offense Dismissal from the service. Since it was proven that the
present case is the second offense of Gareza for being habitually tardy, the
OCA correctly recommended for the penalty of suspension for 30 days with
warning that a similar offense in the future would be meted a more severe
penalty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-123058, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; official and personal conduct. Respondent took more than
six years to pay their obligation to the complainant. Also, one of the land
titles that respondents gave as collateral turned out to have been
encumbered. While they have already paid their obligation, such payment
was conditioned upon the complainants execution of an Affidavit of
Desistance.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary,
diminishing the honor and integrity of the offices they hold. This is especially
true because respondents were admittedly given the loans because they
were considered prominent persons in the community; and that they were
considered as such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary.
In Villaseor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that to preserve decency
within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual
obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the
Court said that respondent was expected to be a paragon of uprightness,
fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her
personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as
to avoid becoming her courts albatross of infamy. Re: Complaint filed by
Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M.
No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as
judicial officers entrusted with the delicate function with regard to collection
of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Delay in the
remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff:
first, to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all
persons claiming under him vacate the property within three (3) days;
second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all
persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal
belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the
improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to
execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ
and every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its
effectivity expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties:
he unilaterally gave the occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days
provided by the Rules, to vacate the property; when he did evict the
occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal effects was
padlocked, therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements
introduced on the property; finally, respondent failed to make a return on the
writ of possession after he implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure
to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No.
P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an
employee should submit in advance, whenever possible, an application for a
vacation leave of absence for action by the proper chief of agency prior to
the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that Dacsig had
failed to acquire the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or
explanation for failing to obtain the necessary authorization for his leaves.
Thus, he is guilty of taking unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A)
(17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
provides that the penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first
offender is suspension for six months and one day to one year. Judge Andrew
P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, MagddelaNagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.

Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in
summary procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than
30 days after the last answer has been filed. Considering that no preliminary
conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently
failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should
accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literatos inaction in Civil Case No.
632 for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of an
ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack
of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the
palm of a judges hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively guilty of
gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in
rendering a decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato,
Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April
25, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a
judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with
the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination.
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Courts
pronouncements. He did not file the required comment to the Courts showcause resolutions despite several opportunities granted him. His willful
disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions constitutes grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and
integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded
several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long
pending before his court and to comply with the directives of this Court, but
he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This continued
refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that
he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he
purports to belong. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued
decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been
paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4)
hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision.
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on
the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such
cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross

misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23
May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan
V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the
case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian
Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that
petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of
the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling
dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-102232, April 10, 2012.
Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of
their official functions. Judge Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing to
serve as one of Lucky Corporations alternate bank signatories even if he
may not have performed such service for the corporation. He has no
business agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense
constitutes a violation of Administrative Circular 5 which in essence prohibits
public officials from performing or agreeing to perform functions or services
outside of their official functions for the reason that the entire time of the
officials and employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official work
to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Ramoncito and
Juliana Luarca vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the
document. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial
acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of
documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the
notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed
on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a
public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need
for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not
be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act.
A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts
they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in
ascertaining the true identities of the parties executing the document before
them, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as this Court will
deal with such cases more severely in the future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No.
7880, April 11, 2012.
Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its
focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership
in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the
case.Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements
indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross
ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage
under the old Civil Code provisions. Respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July
10, 2012.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The lawyers final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment
follows as a consequence of the lawyers conviction of the crime. Atty.
Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24,
2012.
Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite
appellants brief amounted to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v.
Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to protect his clients
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of
respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent
indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been
exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. Isaac C.
Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910.
July 11, 2012
Attorney; representation of conflicting interest. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule
6.03. Rule 15.03 also provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts. in Hilado v. David, the Court held that an attorney is
employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary
statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as
when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients
pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court. Hence the
necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This
stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars
wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. The prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys
intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan,
Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal
services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng
v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10,
2012.
Attorney; solicitation of clients. Based on the facts of the case, respondent
violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases
for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business
or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is
of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with

the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when
the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of
professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled
by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the
client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This
duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason
is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. Manuel G.
Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to acts or
omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
tend to diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary. If an employees
questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he
is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The basis
for his liability is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Code, particularly
its Section 4(c), commands that public officials and employees shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to public safety and public interest.
The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone
involved in the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the strictest norm of competence,
honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of every court
personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause
to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their
official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties
and functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to conduct
themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for
the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both
official and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of
that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their
conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and
decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. The Court does not
hesitate to condemn and sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of
those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of
public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the
public in the Judiciary. Filomena B. Consolacion vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court
Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas vs.
Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M.
No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July 3, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. In Alenio v. Cunting, the

Court defined dishonesty and grave misconduct as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from
the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officers
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In
Judge San Jose, Jr. v. Camurongan, the Court held that, The act of taking
monetary exhibits without authority from their custodian constitutes theft.
Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II RTC,
Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024,
July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, gross neglect, grave misconduct. Section 1,
Article XI of the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and
all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The
demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for the members and
personnel of the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. The
conduct of court members and personnel must not only be characterized
with propriety and decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any act of
impropriety ca seriously erode or diminish the peoples confidence in the
judiciary. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to
the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records,
property and premises and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction
or impairment of such funds and property. In Re: Report on the Judicial and
Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte, it was held that the
failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect
of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. In this case, Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty, gross neglect of
duty, and grave misconduct for her: (1) non-remittance of collections of
judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance of official receipts and non reporting in the
Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the
collections; and (3) erroneous reporting in the Monthly Reports and
Collections and Deposits of some of the collections. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, E1 NidoLinapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The Sheriff disregarded the procedure

for the execution of judgments as mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to make an estimate of the expenses
which shall be approved by the court. It is only after the approval of the court
that an interested party shall deposit the amount with the clerk of court.
Upon the return of the writ, the sheriff must submit a liquidation and return
to the interested party any unspent amount. The Sheriffs act of receiving
money from the party for the expenses to be incurred in the execution of the
writs, without first making an estimate and securing prior approval from the
MTCC, as well as his failure to render accounting after its execution, are clear
violations of the rule. Even if conceding that the sum demanded by Sheriff is
reasonable, this does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid down
by the rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of the complainant, before
or after the implementation of the writ will absolve him from liability. The
mere act of receiving the money without the prior approval of the court and
without him issuing a receipt therefor is considered as a misconduct in office.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive any voluntary
payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties.
Corollarily, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a
party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming
that such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, such fact
alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less
than noble purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line
representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of care and
diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed
on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise,
of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As
such, the Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or
employees which would tend to or actually diminish the faith of the people in
the Judiciary. Lambayong Teachers and Employees Cooperative, represented
in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P. Diaz, in his
capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July
11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The manner in which a writ of
execution is to be returned to the court, as well as the requisite reports to be
made by the sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. In accordance with this rule, periodic reporting must be
done by the sheriff regularly and consistently every thirty (30) days until the
judgment is fully satisfied. It is mandatory for the sheriff to make a return of
the writ of execution, so that the court and the litigants may be apprised of
the proceedings undertaken in the enforcement of the writ. The return will
enable the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the speedy
execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the
status of a writ of execution warrants administrative liability.

The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the
progress of his implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of
duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task
expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged
with the knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions
on the writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as well with the
knowledge of what they are bound to comply with.Sheriffs are expected to
know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the
court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all
times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their
duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court
is
misconduct
that
warrants
disciplinary
action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48,
Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital
to the administration of justice. A process servers primary duty is to serve
court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part by ensuring
that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. Unjustified
delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. All employees in the judiciary should
be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is through the
process server that defendants learn of the action brought against them by
the complainant. It is also through the service of summons by the process
server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is
therefore important that summonses, other writs and court processes be
served expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent
performance of ones public duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every
government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty will
always use this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great
prejudice of public service
The Court has defined dishonesty as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not
only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by
the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. It was never alleged, much less established,
that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to
commit said errors or to favor any party or litigant. Hence, he was found
guilty only of negligence in the performance of his tasks, and not of
dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee

to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes
Dela Cruz, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis is also liable for gross
ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail
being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an
opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. His Order
granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one
prosecution witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe
the proper procedure in granting bail. His act is not a mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known
rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference
of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the
law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. Judges are
reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a judge, they owe it to
the public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct demanded from them.
Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the
respondent judge, in that case, may not be held liable for extortion and
corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made accountable
for gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge in meeting a litigant in a case
pending before his sala, and telling her, Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson
nato ni sila (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them) constitute gross
misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with ones performance
of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The
arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his
impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3 and Section 1
of Canon 4
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must
also appear to be impartial at all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the
public, his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and
measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Needless to state, any
gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC,
Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was
promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the
cases that it covers. The respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the
way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case. Under
Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary
conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed. The respondent set the case for preliminary conference at a
time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period. Another of the
respondents procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date
of the preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his
authority in expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound
practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the
proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary
postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the
performance of their solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue
delay in the administration of justice erodes the peoples faith in the judicial
system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of
justice in this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however unfair,
of ulterior motives on the part of the Judge. Judges should always be mindful
of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law. Murphy
Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon
City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes,
Jr. was charged for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship between
an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations
due his client is per se a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for
six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes,
Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013
Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was
fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all
the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the
relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount
in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to
Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years. Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty.
Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The
burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on
the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power
only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further
presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge their
burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a much
later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending
the ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and
conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O.
Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are
officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth
and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any
falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts
and their clients. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C.
No. 6942, July 17, 2013.
Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty.
Respondent, a court stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in
connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of causing
another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead.
Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned.
The Supreme Court held that the respondents resignation from the service
did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this
administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening
resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was
still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility
for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her
eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her
disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be
perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of
dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is
imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound
discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 021321-P, July 16, 2013.
Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Effect of death in an administrative
case. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. A misconduct is grave or gross if
it is out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful or such
conduct as is not to be excused. Respondent Ongs and Buencaminos acts
of using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their
safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. These
are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced.
Respondents acts warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule 10,
Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of
the Complaint against him. Respondent Buencaminos acts take away the
publics faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his
death.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of public trust and are under
obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the
best of their abilities. Being frontline officials of the justice system,
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in
the performance of their duties. Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R.
Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases; Mitigating circumstances. The Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) charged respondent Sheriff lV Famero with Gross
Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to implement
the Writ of Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme Court
held that the respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to make
periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
For the respondents lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the
writ of execution, he was found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as
the failure of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him.
Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the imposition of
the appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining
authority to consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent.
The court considered his length of service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment
of infractions, remorse and other family circumstances, among others, in
determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to the
following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in
the Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than for the present infraction which is
his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal settlers to leave the
property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he
could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After
considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court
also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the
respondents work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension.
Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of suspension from service.
Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV,
RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of
cases. As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act
with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the
law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence
ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he
can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in
him and the institution he represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of
cases. Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges
and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do
is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the
Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonells failure to
decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and
credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge
Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have
greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial
judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court
reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re:
Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for
Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando,
La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal
constitutes inexcusable negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L.
Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief resulting in the
dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the
Court cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client
in failing to provide him a copy of the case records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San
Juans control and is a task that the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that
filing an appellants brief within the reglementary period is critical in the
perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of the appellants brief
are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and
responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts
and procedures necessary and incidental to the perfection of his clients

appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to
inform Tomas of the progress of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse,
he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for the Court of Appeals
dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for
reconsideration, or otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might
have protected his clients interest.
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath that
requires him to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his)
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
(his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V.
San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases
against lawyers are only recommendatory. IBPs recommended penalty of
three (3) months suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to
the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant the
imposition of a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty. San
Juan were considered: first, the negligence in handling his clients appeal;
second, his failure to act candidly and effectively in communicating
information to his client; and more importantly, third, the serious and
irreparable consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client
of legal remedies in addressing his conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension
from the practice of law on a lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found
guilty of gross negligence in handling his clients case. With this case as the
norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his clients
case.
Moreover, IBPs findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory;
only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline erring lawyers and to
impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until finally acted upon
by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty
imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus,
the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of
implementation or compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San
Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the
Sharia Circuit Court, represented that he took and passed the Civil Service
Professional Examination but evidence showed that another person took the
exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the use
of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali
failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required of an employee
in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil
Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali,
et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the
public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to
believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of
his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainants family
completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected
from the premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court
Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server,
RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to preserve
decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In
that case, the court held that court employees are expected to be paragons
of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but also
in their personal dealings, including business and commercial transactions to
avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates
that public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-011448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within
the jurisdiction of their courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property

involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The
rationale is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and
the peculiar control exercised by these persons. In so providing, the Code
tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for
fraud, which is what can and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994,
the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31,
1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the
property is no longer in litigation at that time considering that it was part
of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under
judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court
issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The
rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining
estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Rodolfo C.
Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public
interest and a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also
to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration
of justice as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless
act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof
of its authenticity and due execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed partylitigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary
documents posing as public instruments. Respondent committed acts of
deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondents conduct falls

miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should be sanctioned. Efigenia M.
Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013
Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the
Court defined dishonesty as intentionally making a false statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud
in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus,
dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.
Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. Evidence showed that respondent was not
the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court,
citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, stressed that its employees
should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the
esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any
form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service Commission
vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge
of the court records failed to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals
within the prescribed period due to the alleged heavy workload. The Court
held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform
their duties properly and with diligence at all times. The administration of
justice is an inviolable task and it demands the highest degree of efficiency,
dedication and professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the
number of cases filed and pending before it. However, unless proven to exist
in an insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot serve as an excuse
to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every government employee
faced with negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to
evade punishment, to the detriment of the public service.
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the
failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, thus
signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating
and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime shall
be considered. The Court has mitigated imposable penalties for various
special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary,
acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among
others, in determining the applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a

second time offender for simple neglect of duty, her long years of service in
the judiciary and the admission of her negligence are circumstances to
mitigate her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs.
Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross
inefficiency. In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, the court held that: Any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions
must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and questionable. Their actions
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the
payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,
defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task
expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents show that
official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by
batches was made for marriages performed on different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his
or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect of duty of the
judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article
34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where
legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of
one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when
she said she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same
day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000.
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court
personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any
explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as a
grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
even on a first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons
21 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity
and probity in the performance of their duties. Ignorance of the law is a mark
of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance
thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with
this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon
assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she
becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of
justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et
al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held
that the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy,
considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties,
powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure
that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent
them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote
the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept
that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby
suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of
his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but
extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same,
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special

proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by
assisting his daughter at his wifes administrative case, coaching his
daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer,
and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C.
Decena and Rey C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili,
Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013
Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving the
Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court held that public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to
the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the
occupant than does the judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and
collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice. The
act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the
commission of even the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded
court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of
Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government
depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not
authorized to keep funds in their custody. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2, 2013
Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period . The two-year
prescriptive period for initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment
or suspension provided under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline should be construed to mean two years
from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt
vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not
notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person who
executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and
the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the partys free act. The duties of a notary
public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not
a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by
parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment
that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was
intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant
to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What
is being penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document despite the
absence of one of the parties. A notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe
the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence
of the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs.
Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service.
Where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III
and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No.
7430, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being
part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose
decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases. While a judge may not always be held liable for
ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded
insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together
with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would
clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to
the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter
Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service. Given the total absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it
appear he was at the office on February 26, 2010 when he was in fact absent
still prevails. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary.
Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant

must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no
less than the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and
all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency. Leave Division, Office of the Adrministrative Services, Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, misrepresentation . OCA Circular No. 49-2003
provides that court personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel
authority from the Office of the Court Administrator. Section 67 of the
Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that any violation of the leave laws, rules
or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in connection with an
application for leave shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The respondent
court stenographer traveled without securing a travel authority and did not
state her foreign travel in her leave application. She is guilty of violating at
least two office rules and regulations. This shows deception amounting to
dishonesty.
Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to
ones office or connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence
of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith. The
discrepancy in the respondents date of birth in her records does not amount
to dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No deliberate intent to
mislead, deceive or defraud appears from the cited circumstances of this
case. The respondents date of birth is not a fact directly relevant to her
functions or qualification to office or connected with the performance of her
duties. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago
City, Isabela vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, same court.
A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002
provides that an employee is considered habitually absent if the employee
incurred unauthorized absences exceeding the 2.5 days allowed per month
for three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during
the year. In imposing penalty of habitual absenteeism in administrative
cases, however, the court may take into consideration mitigating
circumstances. The presence of factors such as length of service in the
judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, and family
circumstances, among other things, play an important role in the imposition
of penalties. Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No.
P-11-2926, February 1, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of law and undue delay. Well- settled is the rule that
an injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a property
to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal
title has not been clearly established. In this case, respondent judge
evidently disregarded this established doctrine when he granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When

the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is the
disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. When the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority. A judge may also be administratively liable if
shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption
in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.
Atty. Rene Medina, et al. vs. Judge Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298,
February 22, 2012.
Judges; delay in conducting summary hearing to extend the 72-hr TRO; gross
ignorance of law; requirement of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.
Judges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the
exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge
in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Complainants failed to adduce proof to show that
respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive
when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In addition, respondent
judge should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary
hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the
Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the
expiration of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with because of the
remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties addresses.
Sps. Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43,
Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012.
Judges; immorality vs. simple misconduct. The New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a
judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the
judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. There was no
evidence that respondent judge engaged in scandalous conduct that would
warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. His admission of

homosexuality does not make him automatically immoral. However,
respondent judge is guilty of simple misconduct in causing the registration of
title in his sons name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgmentobligee. Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of
action, an unlawful behavior, or negligence committed by a public officer.
Aida R. Campos, et al. vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision. Judges must resolve matters
pending before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally
mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they
should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious
grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should
be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on
them.
Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the
absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the
imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were
never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the
judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them
should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the
violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are
due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at
least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February 8, 2012.


Consolidated Cases in Pale

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Consolidated Cases in Pale

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Republic of the Philippines

ISABELA STATE UNIVERSITY

Cases from January to December 2011

Cases from January to December 2012

Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio And Maria

Pilar S. Tanoco Vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Eladio D.Perfecto Vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No.

Filomena B. Consolacion Vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Grace M. Anacta Vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No. 9074,

Cases from January to December 2013

Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. Vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan,

Victoriano G. Manlapaz Vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan,

Thelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong Vs. Court

Missing Exhibits And Court Properties In Regional Trial Court, Br. 4,

Anonymous Vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City,

Rodolfo C. Sabidong V. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25,

Office Of The Court Administrator V. Donabel M. Savadera, Et Al., A.M.

Office Of The Court Administrator V. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No.

In Re: Petition To Sign In The Roll Of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540,

Mary Ann T. Mattus V. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte V. Epifania Fanny Obias, A.C. No. 4945,

Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela V.

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Cases from January to December 2014

Veronica F. Galindez V. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano V. Clerk III Liza D.

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL vs.ATTY. JAMES

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL F.

failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence. However,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

ATTY. CONRADO GANDEZA, JR. VS JUDGE MARIA CLARITA TABIN, A.M.

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, A.C. 6281,

immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of

DALISAY CAPILI VS ATTY. ALFREDO BENTULAN, A.C. NO. 5862,

Capili engaged the legal services of Atty. Alfredo Bentulan as her

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

URBAN BANK, INC. VS ATTY. MAGDALENO PEA, G.R. NO. 145817,

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

ELPIDIO TIONG VS ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, A.C. NO. 4428,

Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

CORAZON NEVADA VS ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, A.C. NO. 7591,

3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease)

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO vs. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, April 16,

professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession

IN RE: RODOLFO PACTOLIN, A.C. NO. 7940, APRIL 24, 2012

appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime

EMILIA O. DHALIWAL vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING, A.C. No.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, A.C.

In People vs. Cornelio (Malicious

Judge Javellana issued warrant