G.R. No.

L-22174

July 21, 1967

ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN, plaintiff,

vs.
FRED M. HARDEN, ET AL., defendants.
AURORA R. DE RECTO, Administratrix of the Estate of Claro M. Recto, claimant-appellee,
vs.
JOSE SALUMBIDES, oppositor-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Fred Harden, an American citizen, and Esperanza Perez were married in the Philippines on
December 14, 1917. They lived together, acquiring considerable conjugal properties, until 1938
when they separated. In July 1941, Mrs. Harden hired the late Claro M. Recto as her counsel in the
suit she was contemplating to file against her husband. In their contract, she agreed, inter alia, to
pay Recto 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. On July 12, 1941, Mrs. Harden, thru Recto,
filed her complaint for administration and/or accounting of the conjugal properties against Mr.
Harden, and Jose Salumbides, herein oppositor-appellant, as his attorney-in-fact. The war
suspended the proceedings. After liberation, the records of the case were reconstituted and on
November 20, 1946, the conjugal properties of the Harden spouses were placed under receivership.
On October 31, 1949, the lower court rendered judgment for Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden appealed to
this Court1 and then left the Philippines. Mrs. Harden must have followed her husband for in January
29, 1952, an amicable settlement was effected between them in Canada. As a consequence thereof,
Recto was instructed by Mrs. Harden to discontinue the proceedings.
On February 20, 1952, Recto filed a motion in the Supreme Court to establish his attorney's charging
lien. The Hardens opposed. This Court, by resolution dated July 22, 1952, remanded the case to the
trial court to determine the amount of Recto's attorney's fees. But all the ancillary writs and
processes issued in the case were dissolved except the receivership on the conjugal properties,
which was maintained. Subsequently, the lower court, after hearing, held that Recto was entitled to
P384,110.97 as counsel fees. Mrs. Harden appealed to this Court 2 which upheld Recto but modified
the amount of P304,110.97 only.
On January 22, 1957, Recto moved for execution of the judgment. The lower court having granted
the motion, the Hardens went on certiorari3 to this Court. We dismissed the petition on August 2,
1957 for lack of merit. Recto was then able to secure an alias writ of execution. Again this was
questioned on certiorari4 by the Hardens in this Court. On February 10, 1958, We upheld Recto once
more. This finally enabled the latter to levy upon the stocks and other properties of the Hardens, the
public sales of which realized P100,805.00. A balance of P203,305.97 thus remained in Recto's
favor.
1wph1.t

On July 2, 1958, Recto moved ex parte to levy on other shares of stock owned by the Hardens but
registered in the name of Salumbides, including the 410,638 shares in the Surigao Consolidated
Mining Co. Upon being notified that the 410,638 Surigao shares, inter alia, were to be sold a t public
auction, Salumbides filed an opposition claiming that he owned said shares, the same being
registered in his name. This was denied. His motion to reconsider the denial also met the same fate,
the lower court holding that Salumbides did not own the said Surigao shares of stock. Whereupon,
Salumbides appealed to this Court.5 We dismissed the same on December 22, 1958 for being
frivolous. The motion to reconsider subsequently filed failed to save the appeal. On April 21, 1959,
the said 410,638 shares were sold at public auction for P147,679.97 [sic] leaving an unsatisfied
judgment balance of P55,624.00 in Recto's favor.

The next incident concerns the return to the receiver of the P20,581.90 cash dividends from
December 14, 1955 to December 14, 1956, received by Salumbides on the same 410,638 Surigao
shares. As early as April 4, 1957, Recto had already moved that Salumbides be ordered to deliver to
the receiver all the dividends from the said shares which were under receivership. On July 1, 1957,
the lower, court issued an order requiring Salumbides to "turn over to the receiver x x x all the
dividends he has already received from the Surigao Mining Company, Inc." Salumbides' motion to
reconsider this order was denied.
On February 10, 1958, Recto moved for a writ of execution to implement the order of July 1, 1957.
This was approved on February 21, 1958. Salumbides filed a motion to reconsider, claiming that he
owned the dividends pertaining to the 410,638 shares. On July 30, 1959, the lower court ordered
Salumbides to comply with the order of July 1, 1957 by depositing P20,531.90 in the Commercial
Bank & Trust Co. The latter moved for reconsideration alleging, inter alia, that he had spent
P45,900.99 as expenses for the Hardens from 1955 to 1957 and for which he must be reimbursed.
When this was denied, a second motion to reconsider was filed, Salumbides claiming that the
P20,531.90 cash dividends had already been disbursed for the benefit of the Harden family. On
August 29, 1961, the lower court, after hearing and presentation of evidence, denied the second
motion to reconsider, holding that the alleged incurring of expenses by Salumbides was a mere
afterthought concocted by him.
Preliminary steps were taken by Salumbides to appeal this order. Meanwhile, on October 2, 1960,
Recto died and his wife, as his administratrix, was substituted as claimant. On October 7, 1961, the
lower court required Salumbides to submit a P25,000.00 supersedeas bond to prevent execution
pending appeal. This compelled Salumbides to abandon the intended appeal. On October 23, 1961,
he deposited P20,531.90 in the bank in compliance with the order of August 29, 1961. On November
21, 1961, Mrs. Recto, with court approval, withdrew P25,000.00 from the Harden funds under
receivership in the bank, thus reducing the judgment balance to P30,624.00.
On November 27, 1961, Mrs. Recto moved for full compliance with the order of July 1, 1957 to
satisfy the remaining judgment balance, relying upon a statements 6 issued by the Surigao
Consolidated that from April 15, 1950 to July 2, 1955, Salumbides had received all the cash
dividends on the 410,638 shares, amounting to P60,797.29. Resolving the motion and opposition
interposed by Salumbides, the lower court on December 11, 1962 ordered Salumbides to deposit
P30,624.00 in the Commercial Bank and Trust Company for final satisfaction of the judgment
balance in Recto's favor. This is the incident under the present appeal, first taken to the Court of
Appeals but subsequently certified to Us.
Appellant Salumbides first submits that the order of July 1, 1957 which is sought to be fully enforced
did not include the cash dividends received by him before December 14, 1955 since Recto's motion
of April 4, 1957 was limited to those dividends received after said date. This is without merit. The
dispositive portion of the order of July 1, 1957, which reads:
Finding the said petition to be well founded this Court hereby orders Jose Salumbides to turn
over to the Receiver, Atty. Juan S. Ong all the dividends that he has already received from
the Surigao Consolidated Mining Company, Inc.
clearly includes all dividends received as of then by Salumbides. The Surigao Consolidated
statement dated April 5, 1957 shows that the cash dividends on the 410,638 shares from April 15,
1950 to July 1955 had also been delivered to and already received by Salumbides. And the lower
court found, in its order of August 29, 1961, that Salumbides never appealed the order of July 1,
1957. Hence, the same can no longer be questioned now.

Salumbides would also argue that those dividends had already been disbursed by him for the benefit
of the Harden family. This question, however, had already been raised and argued twice before the
lower court which tried and decided it adversely in the order of August 29, 1961. Although
Salumbides filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond, the appeal was never really pursued. In fact,
on October 23, 1961, he manifested to the lower court that he had already complied with the order of
August 29, 1961, thus making the same final and conclusive as against him.
The defenses of (a) bar by prior judgments, (b) prescription, extinctive and acquisitive, (c) laches,
and (d) waiver, set up by Salumbides, are without merit. For the first, he would rely upon the lower
court's orders of December 7, 1953 and January 24, 1956, which declared that the receivership did
not include future dividends on the shares of stock. But the more recent order of August 29, 1961
expressly declared these orders erroneous and already superseded and reversed by the later court
orders of December 14, 1955, July 1, 1957 and February 21, 1958.
There could be no prescription, extinctive or acquisitive. Even if the period for bringing the action be
five years as appellant suggests, still the same has not yet lapsed. The dividends being litigated
were declared from April 15, 1950 to July 2, 1955. But the receiver's letter of May 9, 1953 7 asking for
the dividends and claimant's motions of November 4, 1953, December 15, 1955, April 4, 1957,
February 10, 1958 and November 27, 1961, to the same effect, seasonably interrupted the
prescriptive period. These extra-judicial and judicial demands also negative laches on claimant's
part.
Salumbides could not acquire the dividends in question by prescription since he possessed them,
not in concept of owner, adverse to the Hardens, but rather as attorney-in-fact of Mr. Harden. He first
claimed ownership only in his omnibus opposition dated July 1, 1957. But two years later, or on
August 24, 1959, in his motion to reconsider, Salumbides admitted that these dividends belonged to
the Hardens.
Neither is Recto's demand for the P20,531.00 cash dividends which were declared from December
14, 1955 to December 14, 1956, a waiver of the previous dividends. He merely wanted to satisfy his
judgment credit from among any of the Harden assets available. Since the later dividends failed to
fully satisfy the judgment, Recto could still enforce his valid claim against the previous dividends. As
to the cash dividend of October 3, 1955, the order of December 14, 1955 is very clear that it "shall
not constitute a precedent with respect to the disposition of all dividends whether already declared or
to be hereinafter declared." The defense of waiver, therefore, fails.
Lastly, appellant would insist that upon the death of Mr. Harden in Canada on May 1, 1959, or during
the pendency of the proceedings, Recto's claim should have been forthwith dismissed and filed in
the administration proceedings of Mr. Harden's estate. But appellant erroneously assumes that
Recto's claim is a "money claim" under the Rules8 when it is neither a claim nor a judgment for
money directed against the decedent, Mr. Harden. Recto's claim is founded on a personal obligation
of Mr. Harden. But granting that Recto's claim is a money claim against Mr. Harden, that would not
help appellant any. We have already ruled9 that a charging lien established on the property in
litigation to secure payment of attorney's fees partakes of the nature of a collateral security or of a
lien on real or personal property, the enforcement of which need not be made in the administration
proceedings.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against oppositor-appellant. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her
own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita
Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the
defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named
plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita
as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the
amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer
of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco
as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs,
dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from
so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that
feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a
considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber
shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of
June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in
this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted,
as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her
pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to
China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a
paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good
condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising

to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory
preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera
to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's
Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a
house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular
family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a
second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that
should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had
charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him,
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It
is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before
us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is
not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not
capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in
June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in
the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which
the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed
by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her
womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous.
In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged
her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the
Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of
indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that
the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In
the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padreand the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus.
There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by

the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The
facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant
had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts
found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the
defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant.
This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when
the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this
case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the
appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages
to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not
satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point
out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as
to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the
award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of

the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of thespes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or
the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz
as the facts may warrant.

G.R. No. L-2935

March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The defendant
appealed. On the 12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the
clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905, the appellant filed his brief with the
clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in
said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909,
when the respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the appeal under the penalty
of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the
caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the
United States, the defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant
was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff,
and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said
city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the
defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by
way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such
period.
Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903,
and was paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine
Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and
refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract.
Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount
the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago
to Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224
should constitute a part of said contract.
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in
his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and

No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the
time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court
sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause,
the lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff
there was due him from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in
the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment the defendant appealed and made the following
assignments of error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the
legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80
and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or
changing the terms of the contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No.
80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended.
These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were
enforceable in favor of the defendant.
The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could
not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in
the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract.
The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine
Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority
until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the
laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted
that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity to
make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is
made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as
the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)
The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at
Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff
attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.
Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:
First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract
in question; and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time
the contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is
being enforced.
We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-12767

November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicantappellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibaez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,
and for Simeona Ibaez, appellees.

STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of
an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic
instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to
wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section
618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen
of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with
the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice
was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the
court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon
March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. At the
same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of
the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor
Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate
stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of
P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum
of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains
single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.

The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are these:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United
States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married
to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in
the Army of the United States. As a result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a
daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. This child was
christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live
in the Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a
decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A
little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a
certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have gone to Sweden, where a
photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his
father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in
Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in
business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez, by whom he had
three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and
Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the
deceased by Simeona Ibaez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other
admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate
the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917, this motion
was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree
of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the
establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may be
stated, in the same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at
the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the
probate of wills. The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with
the third and must be considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and
fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more fundamental implications, over the
first two; and a logical exposition of the contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following
propositions:

(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void
because made without notice to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the
testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the
laws of that State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the order last
above indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an
inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as
prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect and that the probate was
effected in external conformity with all legal requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however,
pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made the
order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that
as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted
that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to
permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure
of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of
the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and
that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to
allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a
will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in
determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it
has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a
statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed
by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's
death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for
the petitioner to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was
nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of
law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs.Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of
California, the petitioner had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to
contest the will; and this was stated as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner
provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. This
case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required by law. It was
insisted that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right to contest the
will within a year was a complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the
due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the
American Union, contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate

proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance
improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a general nature
authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any judgment, order, or other
proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative
from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on
the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its
operation is not to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal service of process. In
other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but extends to all sorts of
judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this Code
shall be liberally construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice.
We think that the intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and
we hold that the word "party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the judgment, order, to other
proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time within
six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in
the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting
the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of
facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a
rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of
time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the
proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the
time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and
the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact
here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the
proceedings in the court below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained
relief from the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though the period within
which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was both possible and
practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in
question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system of procedure had contained no
such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we need not here consider.

Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which may be
properly discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only
to wills of liens; and in this connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section
speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body
of the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not applicable to the will of
a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.
lawphil.net

We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most reasonable
interpretation of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the
United States and the States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not
limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of
low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible
meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the
operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of
his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this
section in the courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this
discussion, which raises the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding
on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of
the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in
question was executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the testator
was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State. Upon the last point the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator
was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he
was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting of the
certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in the United
States and for one year within the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization
papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person
naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the
United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert
that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is
said on this point is he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became

and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible
with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the petition on this point
are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the
will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly
admitted to probate. And how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will
of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and
mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is
involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive.
(Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong JocSoy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montaano vs.Suesa, 14
Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated
according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account
of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the
action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never been called upon to decide
whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief could be granted in some
other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were
alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In Austruavs. Ventenilla (21 Phil.
Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of
a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in conformity
with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the
judgment upon an unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the
judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had not contained these
recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission of the will to probate as the will of
a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921),
"There is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every
act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied
to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to
their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is
silent with respect to any fact which must have established before the court could have rightly acted,
it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in
its faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious
litigation. The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the
propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was
probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling is, however, necessary on this point.

What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon
the order of probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the
judgment reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial court especially on the question
of the citizenship of the testator are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's
reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is not possible to reverse the original
order on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by the proof adduced before
that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by appeal, and
the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The
present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the
order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is
not possible to review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based. To permit this
would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of the
petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection
with the allegations of the petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial
court was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter
which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this connection we shall for a moment
ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this
point in the trial court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in
the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date
stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and inferentially also a citizen of said
State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the
United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he came
as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these
Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the
time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the
State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that
at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Illinois, how has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is
no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of
the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to
expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United
States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his
citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would be
novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose
their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in
another State with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his
new domicile. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the
State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is that a person transferring his
domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon
acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship
extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a

citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new
citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will
was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois.
This, in connection with the circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such
citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates
the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the necessary citizenship on the part of the
testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify
any relief whatever.
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the
State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the
subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of
Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he
was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among
other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts
can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States.
Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge
"similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any
action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law
of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the
petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from
what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant
in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have
acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be
set aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil
procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass
real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits
by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no
authority in the appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to
probate because it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the
Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she
cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will does
not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as
regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121;
Limjuco vs.Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)

If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or
other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten
that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not,
as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for
in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on
October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will
in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error
apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new
evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this latter aspect the
petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from
is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 95122-23

May 31, 1991

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD

OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN,respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN,
REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13

May 31, 1991

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et
al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de
la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained
petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the
deportation of respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of
respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise
enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian,
and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners,
et al., over his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition.
The Court considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and
petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board,
Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose
Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian
(Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from
Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with
them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based
on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano,
and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the
immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on
review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed
the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings
had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of,
among others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6,
1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . .
has now become final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6,
1962 or July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21
SCRA 532) wherein this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of
Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for
review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant
of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case
against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the
recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen
and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of
Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in
relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as
the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation *issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian
(Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20,
1990 and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed
as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7,
1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong
Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged,
among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of
deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction
over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate
jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have
jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the
authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian,
and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his
discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence
and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs.
Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have
dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence
on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed
with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2)
petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the

deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground
for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or
commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not
in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or
commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the
third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively
appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their
enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We
ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from
quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any provision of existing law or Rules of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award,

order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of

Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known
as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic
Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act";
the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may
appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and
law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts,
jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the
corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the
National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable
by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land
Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the
Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative
bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional
Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions
are directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434,
provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land
Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the
said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and
are logically beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by
law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact,
its decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the
1987 Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of
the Rules of Court.

Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus
modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be
subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to
review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC
except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is
not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a
special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao
Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to
divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs.
Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as
deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee
is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of
citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665
[1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the
unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas
corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen
and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on
time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative
officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of
only after the Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's
name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation
proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs.
Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases
where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a
competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of
citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings
instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court
of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for

prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the
pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Cocases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented,
We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not
without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73
Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
1wphi1

In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On
many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA,
112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security
Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central
Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the
case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial setup is that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act
with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230
and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29,
1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also
before Us in the form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special
Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counterpetition) before the Bureau of Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce
evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke
that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled
respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship
specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past
thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved
therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of
Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it
appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby
making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the

decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much
less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro
Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision
rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one
thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
Secondly, the doctrine of res judicatadoes not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs.
Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA
478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner
of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248
[1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this
Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship
in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the
question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following
must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in
the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was
not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with
the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of
1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act
insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants
of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong
vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa,
24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27
[1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74
SCRA 96 [1976]).
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not
indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot
pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counterpetition) issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only
for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the
mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx

xxx

xxx

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for
violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial
interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to
counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6,
1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of
exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which
petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of
respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for rehearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5",
counter-petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board
of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No.
1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that
the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was
dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I.
citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the
issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized
travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact
that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition)
which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent
Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government
on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino
citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent
William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a
Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the
July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening
paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one
Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that
they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian
as a Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants
being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961
(Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine
citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a
Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No.
28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his
affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted
on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide,
Jr., proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case,
where it is not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino
citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do

not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twentyeight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil.
1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the
resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she
admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a
Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother
can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than
5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was
divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with
the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the
immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother
was found to be married to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned
a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a
month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not serious
enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly
documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why
two years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to
institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the
mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance
into the Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say
unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to
the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to
set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be to
condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to
a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or
oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for
reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo
only on August 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent
William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled
and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by
the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the
BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid
in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to
said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation
is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other

than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation
proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal
sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00
and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely
appears in the name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing
under an assumed name; fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized
by law to receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading
representation or wilful concealment of a material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine
citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or
representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration
clearance certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of
an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos,
and imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal
Code); correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; .
. ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated
in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act
being a special legislation.

The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant
of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides
for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to
prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or
forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the
date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only
by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an
action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of
Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962
before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William
Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an
action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art.
1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously
resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition)
with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a
Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11",
counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided
and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in the
Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer.
Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment
provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously
enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners
initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the economy of the country by providing
employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the
government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any
alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is

an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The
action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position,
petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the
marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not
supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing
what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to
be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein
the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages
cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship
of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's
marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their
mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam
Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises
the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much
more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as
records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws
of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco
Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless,
the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not selfserving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or
tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence
finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil
Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and

the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis
supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he
who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is
likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a
Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by
petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason
that the parties therein testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly
is not among those authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now
Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523
for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 9054214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in
his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN
MAMASIG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts
of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private
respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in
pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began
discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent
separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising
both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980,
conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]." 2
On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint,
docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and
bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE"). After several
unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties
to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted
its position paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual
absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects";
and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials
to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both
private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.
In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them
of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their
employment contracts; the payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the
value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each of the private
respondents equivalent to their one-month salary. 4 The Order stated that private respondents had
attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service;
that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and void as
violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and
casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from
the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE,
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's award
save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay each of the
complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the
contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5
In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and the
Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been rendered
without support in the evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing
officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's
rights under the employment contracts with private respondents.
1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction over
the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the complaint was initiated
in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were rendered on January 1981 (by
Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr.),
the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.
Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees
with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and
Employment:

Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . .

(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his
establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at least one
year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service is continuous or
broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance with such rules and
regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied)
Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made
clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director
was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of
backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction
over such termination cases:
Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal
without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of
employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case order the
immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the
time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly
very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of employment
cases:
Under PD 850, termination cases with or without CBA are now placed under
the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive suspension cases, now
made cognizable for the first time, are also placed under the Regional Director.
Before PD 850, termination cases where there was a CBA were under the jurisdiction
of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while termination cases where
there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section.
In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its implementing
rules and regulations with respect to termination and preventive suspension cases
are:
1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for clearance,
whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction, still
his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural
due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the
Regional Director to submit not only its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have.
Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its
assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to
explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. 7

There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the time
the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the Regional
Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as noted above,
specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional Director was required in such case
to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time
of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule,
the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in
view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law
and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 8 the Court
pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, the termination of
[an employee] which was without previous clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed
to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however
strong."
3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment
with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was
governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.

Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible by
agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other
provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any time by
giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-months salary.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the
law between the parties. 10 The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute
principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations as they may deem convenient, "providedthey are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is
the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected
with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. 11 Put a little differently, the governing principle is
that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing
with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly
such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact
of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the
contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine
law and regulations.
As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held that paragraph
5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code as they
existed at the time the contract of employment was entered into, and hence refused to give effect to
said paragraph 5. These Articles read as follows:
Art. 280. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement.
Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged

to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)
In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al., 12 the Court had occasion to examine in
detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the above quoted
provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive examination of the history and development of Articles
280 and 281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing for employment with a fixed
period was not necessarily unlawful:
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition
of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as
contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law
is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist e.g. where
it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the nature of
the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a specific project, a
definite date of termination is a sine qua non would an agreement fixing a period be
essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema Would such an agreement come within
the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention
of the right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of
the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the
gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an
anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right
of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement,
it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided.
The law must be given reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its
application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot
the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a
means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off
the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the
head.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have
been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be
secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling
out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment
as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code

itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of
tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily
appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal
terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the
latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes
other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and
arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended
consequences. (emphasis supplied)
It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or absence of
a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment agreement was designed
to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees which is provided for in Articles 280
and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the
agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement,
or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to evade.
Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner
PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so
read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively
neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from
the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such
period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be
authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month
period, or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court
considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in
favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, 13 and thus to escape
completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies,
firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of
Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of
Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the
relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws
and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern
their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the
Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even
a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive
contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was
also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents,
while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the
Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts
point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the

employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable
provisions of Philippine law. 14
We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public
respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act
without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should
their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view
of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner
should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary
for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Order
dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or qualification; and (2)
should reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially equivalent
positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation
pay amounting to one (1)-month's salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for
the three (3) years putative service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
on 13 September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.