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BALOGBOG VS.

CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an
action for partition and accounting against
their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for
partition and accounting of their grandparents
estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia
and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals
but the latter affirmed the lower courts
decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died
intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and
Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935.
Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that
they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and
Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their
brother has 2 sons and that he was married.
They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself
admitted during a police investigation
proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew
as the latter is the son of his elder brother
Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to
prove the validity of their parents marriage,
they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then
mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and
Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew
Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife
and that they have three children. Catalina
herself testified that she was handed a
receipt presumably the marriage certificate
by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the
war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her
brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate
from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the
effect that the office did not have a record of
the names of Gavino and Catalina which was

prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan


Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and
54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was
the law in force at the time of the alleged
marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated
under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in
the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof
have not been kept or have been lost, or unless
they are questioned in the courts, in which
case any other proof, such as that of the
continuous possession by parents of the status
of husband and wife, may be considered,
provided that the registration of the birth of
their children as their legitimate children is also
submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas
marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the
trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and
thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third
of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of
the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country.
Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into
force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage
must be determined in accordance with the
present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as
they related to vested rights, and the rules of
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, failure to
present it would not mean that marriage did
not take place. Other evidence may be

presented where in this case evidence


consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was
held competent to prove the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have
three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at
the age of six and that they are recognized by
Gavinos family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

solemnizing officer instead they just merely


signed a marriage contract. The petitioner
does not need to file declaration of the nullity
of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not
commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case
filed.

GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN


STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:

MORIGO VS. PEOPLE


GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete
and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in
1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario
Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with
bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed
a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his
marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for
the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen


who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005,
he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto.
Tomas. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after their wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
her wife but was shocked to discover that
Daisylyn was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went
back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce
and was granted.
Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with
another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new
Filipina fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on their marriage certificate.
Despite its registration, an NSO official
informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists
under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable,
the foreign divorce decree must be judicially
recognized by a Philippine court.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn
offered no opposition and requested for the
same prayer.
RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that
Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to
aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45.
ISSUE:

Whether the registration of the foreign divorce


decree was properly made.
HELD:
Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412
of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may
be annotated in the civil registry.

GARCIA VS. RECIO


G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a
Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a
decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired
Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino. Since October 1995,
they lived separately, and in 1996 while in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In
1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy,
claiming that she learned of the respondents
former marriage only in November. On the

other hand, respondent claims that he told


petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before
they were married. Respondent also contended
that his first marriage was dissolved by a
divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that
the first marriage was dissolved on the ground
of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
petition was forwarded before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity
to marry Grace Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective
laws. Therefore, before our courts can
recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree
between the respondent and Samson appears
to be authentic, issued by an Australian family
court. Although, appearance is not sufficient,
and compliance with the rules on evidence
regarding alleged foreign laws must be
demonstrated, the decree was admitted on
account of petitioners failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not
registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted as
evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law. Even
after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they dont absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry.

LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS

illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal

345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)

administratix of the estate.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy

Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit

enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua,

from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the


outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and

HELD:

Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo


became an American citizen on November 30, 1943.

Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues

Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo

arising from the case are governed by foreign law.

was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in

The CA and RTC called to the fore th er en voi

the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in

doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law

with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945,

of the decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine

Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate

law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus,

saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers

the Philippine law applies when determining the

name was left blank.

validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to


the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the

On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a

will of the deceased.

written agreement, dissolving their marital union,


suspending his support upon her, and waiving his
authority to file a case of adultery against her.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in
1951 which was granted in 1952.

Mallion v. Alcantara
GR No. 141528October 31, 2006
Facts:

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno,

petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos

Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional


Trial Court seeking adeclaration of nullity of his
marriage with Editha Alcantara due
topsychological incapacity. The RTC denied the
petition.As the decision attained finality,
Mallion filed another petition for a declarationof
nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his
marriage was null and voiddue to the fact that
it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.

estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving

Issue:

in

the Philippines;

afterwhich,

they

bore

three

children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo


executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia
and three children. Before the proceeding could be
terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a

spouse.
In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that
Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia

Does a previous final judgment denying a


petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of lack of marriage license?

was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their


conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate the

Held:

two-thirds would be divided equally among the

Res judicata applies. Mallion is simply invoking


different grounds for the same cause of action

which is the nullity of marriage. When the


second case was filed based on another
ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action
which is prohibited. He is estopped from
asserting that the first marriage had no
marriage license because in the first case he
impliedly admitted the same when he did not
question the absence of a marriage license.

Ninal vs. Bayadog


328 SCRA 122

Pepito and Norma had started living with each


other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to
Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one
of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones
on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.
Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa,
the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace
Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least
5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of
Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased
may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for
absence of the marriage license. They cannot
be exempted even though they instituted an
affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months
had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both

REPUBLIC VS IYOY (G.R. NO.


152577)
Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General on certiorari praying for thereversal of
the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the
marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and
Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada
Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5
children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe
same year she sent letters to Crasus asking
him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus
learned that Fely married an Americanand had
a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the
marriage of one of her children inwhich she
used her husbands last name as hers in the
invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family
and were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage
contract, and the invitation where Fely used
her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that
Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job,
and thatsince 1988 she was already an
American citizen and not covered by our laws.

The RTC found the evidences sufficient and


granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se
constitute psychological incapacity?

Republic v. CA and Molina


GR 108763, 13 February 1997

Held:

Facts:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail


to establish psychological incapacity.

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo


Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave
birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on
the early stages of the marriage, observed
from his tendency to spend time with his
friends and squandering his money with them,
from his dependency from his parents, and his
dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986,
Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio
City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week
later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more
than three years.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates


downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a
divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting aparty even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified


petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for
Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of
two of her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pretrial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial
court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the
RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities
should be construed as psychological
incapacity
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the
Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws
on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of


one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the
very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v.
Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity, existing at the time
the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. In the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears
to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any
visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity
must be clinically or medically permanent or
incurable; (5) such illness must be grave
enough; (6) the essential marital obligation
must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and
Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7)

interpretation made by the National Appellate


Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church,
and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the
State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and
reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.

Republic vs. Orbecido


472 SCRA 114
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and
Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
bringing along their son and after a few years
she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido
learned from his son who was living with his
wife in the States that his wife had remarried
after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter,
he filed a petition for authority to remarry with
the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the
Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur
granted the petition of the respondent and
allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor Generals motion for
reconsideration was denied. In view of that,
petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant
case.

Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under
Article 26(2).
Ruling:
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies
to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26
does not apply to the instant case.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove
as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred
from remarrying.
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of
proof, failed to submit competent evidence
showing his allegations that his naturalized
American wife had obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried.