The Latin maxim Generalia Specialibus non Derogant which means that; general things will

derogate away from special things i.e. general law yields to special law should they operate in
the same field on same subject. Therefore, whenever there are two provisions or statutes on
same subject matter/ field then the special law will always prevails over the general
provisions. This is because the special provision acts as a proviso to the general provision and
encompasses certain requirements in order to combat with a particular or a specific situation.
For example, Section 409 of IPC provides for prosecution of a public servant, later
Prevention of Corruption Act was passed in order to define acts that constitute crimes of
corruption with the aim of preventing corruption. Section 5 (1) (c) of the same act, like IPC
also deals with prosecution of public servant for taking illegal gratification. IPC in such
situations deals with general provisions for the prosecution of public servant for taking illegal
gratification, but the P. C Act being a special statute deals with specific situations that fall
under the acts constituting crimes of corruption. But both the Acts provide different penalties
for the same act, which leads to the confusion as to which act would prevail. For these
instances the said Maxim has been used and it has been held in various cases that special law
will over-ride general laws.
The principle descends clearly from decisions of the House of Lords in Seward v.
Owner of "The Vera Cruz", (1884) 10 App Case 59 and the Privy Council in Barker v Edger,
[1898] AC 748 it has been affirmed and put into effect on many occasions. If Parliament
has considered all the circumstances of, and made special provision for, a particular case, the
presumption is that a subsequent enactment of a purely general character would not have
been intended to interfere with that provision; and therefore, if such an enactment, although
inconsistent in substance, is capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending
to the case in question, it is prima facie to be construed as not so extending. The special
provision stands as an exceptional proviso upon the general. If, however, it appears from a
consideration of the general enactment in the light of admissible circumstances that
Parliament's true intention was to establish thereby a rule of universal application, then the
special provision must give way to the general."
Section 41 of the Indian Penal Code defines special Laws as a law applicable to a particular
subject. In other words, the word "special law" refer to a law which is not applicable
generally but which only applies to a particular or specified subject or class of subjects.

The Rajasthan Municipalities Act (1959) is a special law, as well as local law within the
definition of Sections 41 and 42, Penal Code and as such the application of Section 64, IPC,
cannot ordinarily be ruled out to the offences under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, but in
view of the special provision in Section 265(2) of the R.M Act which provides a special mode
for the recovery of fine imposed under the R.M Act, Section 64, IPC, which deals with the
power of the Criminal Court, for awarding sentence of imprisonment in lieu of the fine,
cannot apply to the cases where fine is imposed under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act
(1959)1.
Craig and Maxwell laws of England:
Craig, page 315: In Middleton v. Crofts, (1786) 2 Atk. 650, Lord Hardwicke said :
'Subsequent Acts of Parliament in the affirmative giving new penalties & instituting new
modes of proceeding, do not repeal former methods & penalties ordained by preceding Acts
without negative words. However, Lord Campbell said in Mitchell v. Brown (1859) 28 L. 3
M. O. 53, "a later statute again describes an offence which had been previously created by a
former statute & affixes a different punishment to it & varies the procedure, or if the later
enactment expressly altered the quality of the offence and by making it a misdemeanour
instead of a felony or a felony instead of a misdemeanour, then later enactment must be taken
as operating by say of substitution & not cumulatively.
Maxwell, page 195: "Indeed, it has been laid down generally, that if a later statute again
describes an offence created by a former one & affixes a different punishment to it, varying
the procedure, for instance, an appeal where there was no appeal before the earlier statute is
impliedly repealed by it."
The General Clauses Act, 1897 Section 26 provides , Where an act or omission constitutes
an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted
and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished
twice for the same offence.

2001 (3) WLC 575