G.R. Nos.

L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI &
JUAN
LANGCAY,
petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD,
PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the
east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo
Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river
were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No.
5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner
Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on
the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878,
7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who
owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession
in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12
hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead
Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug).
Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. FBinayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on
its eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457
(Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo
Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned
to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo
Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were
transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots
they had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on
their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a
complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares
and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug
filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their
accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto
Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents
to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting
of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who
are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor,
Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan,
Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo
Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876,
7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together
with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly
proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 2425, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in
Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero
Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But
upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution
pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi
and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented
evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendantsappellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents'
estate as a result of accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to

pertain to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being
the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not
affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when
it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the
private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they
were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is
a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art.
457 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition
in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be
measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases
that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against
the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of
Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco
Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that
when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao
Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of
Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These
testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin
and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27,Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan
River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was
gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares
described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was
resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot
No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew
from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as
the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian

owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because,
if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers
as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right
of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).itc-asl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon
the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969
when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to
the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil
Code apply to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from
an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another
estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged
retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two
years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving
a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate
by the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result
of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private
respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private
respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157906
November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and
ROSALITA CARDAA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision1 dated October 18, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring petitioner liable for
negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin Cardaa, a school child aged 12,
enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque Elementary School, where petitioner is the

principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution2 dated March 20, 2003 denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the
San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a
resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree
posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the
principals office. The Cardaas averred that petitioners gross negligence and lack of
foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to
buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove
her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of
Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned
Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale.
In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. The appellate court
found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmins death, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita
Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence resulting to the death of Jasmin D.
Cardaa. She is hereby ordered to indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the
following amounts:
1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaa P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorneys fees and litigation 10,000.00.
expenses
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes before us
submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS--VIS THE SET OF FACTS
STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER
NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO
THE RESPONDENTS; AND
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth Division, in
CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 should be affirmed and
respected, thus remain undisturbed.6
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin
Cardaa.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she
had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaa, to see to its disposal; that despite her physical
inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any indication that the tree was
already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already
rotten;7 and that moral damages should not be granted against her since there was
no fraud nor bad faith on her part.
On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and
rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have done in the same situation.
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is a
question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and when this
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding
on this Court.8 However, there is an exception, that is, when the findings of the Court
of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower court.9 In our view, the
exception finds application in the present case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no knowledge
that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely informed her that
he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was an absence
of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that
required by the attendant circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting
and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree
removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaa. The appellate court ruled that
the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon after
petitioner had chanced upon it.11
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of
ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable
risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal,
or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in
the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a
more careful manner.12

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm
someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was
tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree
whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred.13
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead
and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an
obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res
ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character
as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference
that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death
of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of
the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening
of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that
it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would

not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioners negligence
is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply.
Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to
petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by
other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such
as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.16
Was petitioners explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed
immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was
unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why
she failed to be vigilant.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because
Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition. Neither
did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone.
She argues that she could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere
sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground inspections. She further
argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty
by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
We find petitioners explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to
oversee the safety of the schools premises.1wphi1 The fact that she failed to see the
immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the
responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she
exercises supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows that more than a month
had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaa on
December 15, 1992, to the time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly,
she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been
removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded
if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly sustained by the
claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or
omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.18 However, the person claiming moral damages must
prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always
presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,

mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.
Invariably, such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with
ill motive.19 Under the circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not
motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--vis respondents daughters death. The award
of moral damages is therefore not proper.
In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of Appeals
of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20 and P15,010 as reimbursement of
her burial expenses.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the award of moral damages is
hereby deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1067 December 31, 1976
A DECREE INSTITUTING A WATER CODE, THEREBY REVISING AND
CONSOLIDATING
THE
LAWS
GOVERNING
THE
OWNERSHIP,
APPROPRIATION,
UTILIZATION,
EXPLOITATION,
DEVELOPMENT,
CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES
Article 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private
lands, the owners of the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the
river to its former bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to
revert the river or stream to its former course. The owners of the land thus affected
are not entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However, the
former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion
to the area lost by each.
The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its
old bed at their own expense; Provided, That a permit therefor is secured from the
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and work pertaining
thereto are commenced within two years from the change in the course of the river
or stream.