Community and Communalism in the Information Age

Community and
Communalism in the
Information Age

SHANTHI KALATHIL
Associate
Project on the Information Revolution and Wold Politics
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

A
s the birthplace of the Internet, the United States has grown accustomed
to its role as the world’s leading information aggregator and disseminator.
Many have extolled America’s ability to wield not only hard military
power but soft power, the less easily quantifiable ability to influence, persuade
and shape opinion through culture, diplomacy, and diffuse information flows.
Optimistic observers have envisioned the global impact of the information
revolution as a technologically enhanced Pax Americana, in which borders
disintegrate and democratic values spread rapidly throughout a networked world.
Yet since 11 September, policymakers and the public alike have been confronted
with the flip side of that assumption. Whether manifested through terrorists
pontificating globally on satellite television or seething anti-Americanism on
the Internet, the back alleyways of the so-called global village are now bluntly
evident.
Policymakers have thus been forced to dismantle some cherished
notions, and are beginning to pose in their wake new questions. Has the
information revolution truly helped expand U.S. cultural and diplomatic power
abroad? Are the technologies thought to be fostering greater global interchange
—such as the Internet and satellite television—being used largely to promote
ideals of global community, or are they being harnessed by forces bent on
communalism? Do information and communication technologies (ICT) enhance
global integration or global segregation?

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Unfortunately, such starkly framed questions can rarely be satisfied with

tidy answers. Analytical assessments, however, are clearly necessary as the United
States focuses anew on innovative ways to monitor worldwide opinion and
expand public diplomacy programs abroad. Clearly, technology has helped
empower all kinds of political actors, whether they comprise individuals, civil
society organizations, terrorist cells, or even states and their various institutional
components. While past analysis has concentrated heavily on civil society,
particularly ICT use by transnational advocacy groups, the events of 11
September and their aftermath have focused policy and academic attention on
other ICT users. The questions of which groups or individuals are utilizing ICT,
in what fashion, and for what purpose, have become tangibly relevant. Deeper
understanding requires examining not only how technology is strategically utilized
by terrorist groups—i.e., through steganography, encryption, etc.—but the
broader political ramifications of widespread ICT use among various regional
or global populations.
It has been argued that the information revolution has helped create a
multicentric, fragmented world, in which the concept of sovereignty has retreated
in favor of an a-territorial, neo-medieval system of overlapping jurisdictions
and loyalties.1 Here, I shall posit that, while the information revolution has
indeed helped to de-emphasize sovereignty, enhance global dialogue, and
empower transnational advocacy, it has simultaneously amplified the ideological
power and cohesion of diaspora communities—physically dispersed populations
residing outside their home countries. Through the use of ICT, these diaspora
groups can often project and reinforce traditional and nationalistic loyalties.
Since these groups can enhance both global community and global communalism,
their growing international visibility presents new opportunities and challenges
for U.S. foreign policymakers and public diplomacy specialists.

Nation-Building and Nationalism Across Borders

In some cases, the Internet may disproportionately leverage the ideological and
political power of diaspora communities relative to native communities, since
access may be banned or sparse in the home country. At other times, diaspora
communities may engage with wired and informed domestic populations who
share common cultural, ethnic, or ideological bonds. Their combined activity
can range from extremely broad discussions, fostering ideological and nationalist
unity, to promotion of specific political aims such as regime transition in a
common homeland. The political goals and discourse promoted by these groups
can at times dovetail with civil societal efforts to promote democratic change
and global engagement, and at times work in favor of isolation, balkanization,
and militant nationalism. States, corporations, and other institutional actors

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have been increasingly forced to monitor and respond to this activity, posing
ramifications for U.S. policy.
Here, three distinct examples—the Burmese, Chinese, and Middle
Eastern online communities—help illustrate how the information revolution
has facilitated the growing relevance and visibility of these groups on the world
stage. In particular, parts of these communities have used the Internet to
contribute to direct political action or transnational political discourse with
potential policy outcomes for the United States.
In at least one case, a networked diaspora community has combined
with transnational civil society to produce tangible results. The seeds of overseas-
based political opposition to Burma’s government began with a small group of
pro-democracy exiles who strenuously opposed what they viewed as an
illegitimate regime in power in their native country. Internet use by these exiles,
initially through e-mail listservs that shared information on conditions inside
the country, formed the catalyst for what grew to become a transnational civil
societal movement to delegitimize the ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) in the eyes of the world. While initially composed primarily of
Burmese exiles, the Internet-based Free Burma Movement rapidly expanded to
include people who had never been to the country, many of them college students.
Now, through the use of listservs, web pages, and email petitions that augment
traditional lobbying, various campaigns have linked together to form a
transnational movement that has pressured the SPDC and U.S. policymakers to
an extent many assert would have been impossible before the Internet.
In fact, what started as a form of protest by exiled, pro-democracy
Burmese seeking to instigate political change in their homeland has turned into
a prime example of how U.S. institutions and policy can be affected by the
snowballing of this community online. Although the campaign has not resulted
in large-scale political change in Burma to date, it has successfully shamed U.S.
corporations such as PepsiCo and Apple Computer into pulling out of Burma.
Scores of U.S. cities have also passed legislation barring contracts with companies
doing business with Burma. More recently, in October of 2001, San Francisco-
based Pottery Barn decided to pull Burmese-made products from its collection
following threats from the Free Burma Coalition to mount protests at the store’s
outlets nationwide.
The Burmese case illustrates how ICT can augment an exiled community’s
political aims through connecting that group with the organizational power of
Western pro-democracy activists. To a lesser degree, this has also been the case
with the overseas or ethnic Chinese online community, which is often more
vocal in its criticism of the policies of the People’s Republic of China than the
country’s own residents, who fear government retribution. As with Burma,
overseas dissidents leverage their influence by joining forces with international

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human rights groups, who use the Internet to inform foreign publics and lobby
governments and corporations. Others use e-mail to connect with pro-democracy
activists residing inside China in the hopes of generating political change from
within, although this practice is closely scrutinized by the Chinese government.
Recently, however, it appears the Chinese government is less worried
about the efforts of overseas pro-democracy dissidents than the potentially
explosive fusion of diasporic online Chinese nationalism with mainland Chinese
nationalism. As Hughes notes, during the May 1998 riots targeting ethnic Chinese
in Indonesia, the Internet enabled overseas Chinese to spread both accurate and
false information about the attacks, spurring Chinese all over the world to protest.
Although the mainland Chinese press remained close-lipped about the events in
Jakarta, the Internet helped to inform and politicize Internet users in the People’s
Republic, culminating in a student-led demonstration in Beijing to protest the
government’s lack of action toward Indonesia.2 The rapid evolution from
overseas Chinese fist-shaking to concrete protest at the center of power both
surprised and worried Chinese leaders.
Because of recent rapid Internet growth inside China, domestic web
bulletin boards and chat rooms are proving to be another staging ground for this
phenomenon. In 1999, the state-sponsored People’s Daily newspaper set up a
web forum, entitled “Strong Country Forum,” to stoke nationalism after the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. That and other web forums
witnessed an outpouring of vitriolic jingoism and anti-Americanism following
the downing of the U.S. EP-3 plane on Hainan Island in 2001, while similar
postings also rose in volume following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the
United States. On both occasions, official censors struggled to keep up with the
scope and scale of comments, often deleting the most extreme anti-American
postings.
Such incidents illustrate how the Internet has helped mesh overseas and
domestic dissatisfaction with the Chinese government, while amplifying, however
artificially, nationalistic sentiment. When dissatisfaction and nationalism overlap,
they can place significant pressures on the Chinese leadership, which has
historically used nationalism to bolster its public support and divert attention
from domestic problems. The leadership is still trying to finesse the delicate line
between massaging nationalism to boost regime legitimacy, and inadvertently
encouraging overly militant public opinion that questions the regime’s
qualifications and capacity to lead. Although the opinions expressed online may
not necessarily represent those of the domestic or overseas ethnic Chinese
population at large, web forums have undoubtedly helped magnify nationalistic,
and recently anti-American, public opinion.
Online Chinese nationalism thus poses ramifications for U.S. foreign
policy. Domestic and overseas Chinese nationalistic sentiment is often

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manifested in calls for the Chinese leadership to take a tougher foreign policy
course against perceived American hegemony. Although the authoritarian Chinese
government is under no obligation to take account of popular opinion, its desire
to avoid mass unrest means its policy choices are increasingly influenced by
popular sentiment, which it is beginning to monitor through the Internet. The
leadership is currently trying to dampen anti-Americanism in an effort to improve
relations with the United States, but it may well find that it has nurtured a
phenomenon, at least domestically, that could restrict future diplomatic options.
Pan-Arab nationalism has also historically threatened the authoritarian
regimes of the Middle East. Since Internet use within the Middle East itself is
still relatively low, domestic online nationalism does not appear to be a worrying
factor for the leadership of many of the region’s authoritarian regimes. As is the
case with China and Burma, overseas dissidents play a role in helping to rally
overseas opposition to Middle Eastern governments. London-based Saudi
Arabian dissidents, for example, use web sites, chat rooms, and virtual lectures
to keep in constant touch with followers back home. Despite their efforts,
however, dissidents looking to change political structures in the Middle East
have seen little reward for their efforts.
Yet, on a more general level, the visibility of both domestic and overseas
Arab opinion has been enhanced by the information revolution. The global
Middle Eastern diaspora has been active in using ICT to help construct and
relay nationalistic, pan-Arab or pan-Islamist sentiment, thus making it visible
and relevant to foreign overseas policymakers. Politically oriented Middle
Eastern-themed
newsgroups have
been around for When dissatisfaction and nationalism
over ten years. overlap, they can significantly pressure
Regional Middle the Chinese leadership, which has his-
East newspapers
have also created torically used nationalism to bolster its
online presences public support and divert attention.
that contribute to
news and debate. Apart from the Internet, satellite television and other “mid-
tech” media play a part in fostering nationalistic or pan-Arab political discourse
both inside and outside the Middle East.3 As some scholars note, the emergence
of satellite television and other ICT has transformed the so-called “Arab street”
from a figment of the imagination into reality.4
In the wake of 11 September, this discourse has become a force that
U.S. foreign policymakers must monitor and engage. Recently, Middle Eastern
diaspora groups—who, unlike residents of authoritarian Middle Eastern
countries, are not under speech restrictions—have made use of the Internet

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and other technologies to express their predominantly negative views on American

foreign policy and conduct in the ongoing war on terrorism. Some groups have
expressed virulently anti-American opinion, inciting followers to holy war against
the United States. At the same time, these groups tend to be equally vocal in
their criticism of the leadership and government structures of Middle Eastern
authoritarian regimes.
The example of satellite television station Al-Jazeera, whose programming
reaches Arabic-speaking audiences worldwide, may best illustrate how ICT can
be simultaneously interpreted as an instrument of both global engagement and
communalism. Prior to 11 September, the independent Qatar-based station was
lauded in the West as being one of the few media operations in the Middle East
that dared criticize the region’s authoritarian regimes. After 11 September, the
anti-American tone of its programming was increasingly criticized by the U.S.
government, and the station slowly became perceived by the United States as a
force contributing to greater global balkanization. Although it is debatable
whether Al-Jazeera accurately conveys the opinion of the “Arab street,” it has
certainly been successful in casting itself as representative of that constituency’s
concerns and viewpoints, especially to mainstream U.S. audiences and
policymakers. Its growing influence is the reason high-level U.S. officials now
make an effort to appear on its programs.
While much of the attention here has concentrated on ethnic or diaspora
groups and their influence, it should be noted that the information revolution
can also empower specific individuals to reach and affect a global audience. No
doubt the most celebrated instance of the moment is Osama bin Laden himself,
whose media savvy and targeted use of older ICT such as videotapes has
broadened the range of his audience while taking both the U.S. government and
private broadcast networks by surprise. His strategic use of ICT has demonstrated
that even individuals with few traditional information resources at their fingertips
can use technology to reach and galvanize a global audience.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Enhanced in their reach by the information revolution, diaspora communities

are emerging as forces of soft power in their own right, both promoting global
dialogue and contributing to worldwide balkanization. The juxtaposition of the
two is not necessarily a contradiction, since the effects of technology are rarely
if ever unidirectional. As Anderson notes, globalization in the information realm
may reverse some trends associated with nationalism, while augmenting others.5
Whether characterized as forces for worldwide cohesion or fragmentation, the
various discourses and their policy outcomes have warranted increased attention
from U.S. policymakers and the private sector.

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At the same time, ICT-amplified diasporic discourse, regardless of its

nature, does not necessarily represent the entirety of any particular community,
or even its majority. It is perhaps easy, particularly when confronted with
extremely polemical narratives on satellite television, online forums, or elsewhere,
to ascribe those views to an entire community. For example, viewed through the
prism of government-monitored chat rooms, Chinese nationalism may appear
to be a much larger or at times smaller phenomenon in Chinese society than it
actually is. Yet this type of political communication represents only a portion
of the community of Chinese Internet users, which itself is an elite minority.
The so-called global digital divide, or gap between technological haves and
have-nots, ensures an irregularity of participation that should be noted in any
discussion of global trends.
That said, these groups can provide U.S. policymakers with a window
into the attitudes and political advocacy positions of influential populations.
The unevenness of the information revolution may disproportionately facilitate
the discourse and actions of a relatively privileged community, but by the same
token, these groups may be trendsetters, foreshadowing mass sentiment on the
horizon. Diaspora members—particularly in the three examples laid out in this
essay— tend to be better educated, more informed about the world, and likely
to set agendas in discussion and debate.
So what can U.S. foreign policymakers and public diplomacy practitioners
learn from these groups? In recent years, U.S. public diplomacy efforts have
tended to concentrate on the leadership and policy elites of other countries,
while outreach to mass audiences has declined. Passive forms of communication
have been highlighted over active ones. While this approach has undergone
much rethinking since September 2001, U.S. public diplomacy specialists still
appear to be unsure about the best ways to utilize ICT to connect anew with
targeted global audiences.
The ICT-facilitated influence of diaspora groups is not only a noteworthy
political current in its own right, but may provide an important example of how
to effectively project and retain soft power despite a relative lack of resources.
As a nation with immense information resources, the United States should be
studying and perhaps copying from relevant examples, doing all it can to utilize
its own touted soft power. Ultimately, policymakers should bear in mind that if
America does not effectively craft its image in a globalizing, information-rich
world, there are others more than happy to take up the task—with the potential
for significantly different results. WA

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Notes

1. For instance, see Ronald J. Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia; Communication
in World Order Transformation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, and Stephen
Kobrin, “Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy,”
Journal of International Affairs 51.2 (Spring 1998): 361-6.
2. Christopher Rene Hughes, “Nationalism in Chinese Cyberspace,” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Spring-Summer, Vol. 13, No. 2.
3. Jon B. Alterman, “The Middle East’s Information Revolution,” Current History, January
2000.
4. John Kifner, “The New Power of Arab Public Opinion,” New York Times, 11 November 2001.
5. “New Media & Globalization in the Internet Age,” keynote speech by Jon Anderson at the
Middle East Virtual Community (MEViC) Inaugural Conference, 1-15 August 2000.

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