Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1NCs
crisis resembles that of the 1930s, as described by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation.1 Now,
relentless push to extend and de-regulate markets is every- where wreaking havoc
destroying the livelihoods of billions of people; fraying families, weakening communities and
rupturing soli- darities; trashing habitats and despoiling nature across the globe. Now, as then, attempts
to commodify nature, labour and money are destabilizing society and economy witness the destructive
as then, a
effects of unregulated trading in biotechnology, carbon offsets and, of course, in financial derivatives; the impacts on child care, schooling, and
care of the elderly.
Now, as then, the result is a crisis in multiple dimensionsnot only economic and
Moreover, our crisis seems to share a distinctive deep-structural logic with the one
Polanyi analysed. Both appear to be rooted in a common dynamic, which he called fictitious commodification. In both eras, ours and his ,
consensus exists. Political elites are explicitly or implicitly neoliberaloutside Latin America and
China, at least. Committed first and foremost to protecting investors, virtually all of them
including self-professed social democratsdemand austerity and deficit reduction, despite the
threats such policies pose to economy, society and nature. Meanwhile, popular opposition fails to
coalesce around a solidaristic alternative, despite intense but ephemeral out- bursts , such as Occupy and
the indignados, whose protests generally lack programmatic content. Progressive social movements are longer-lived and
better institutionalized, to be sure; but they suffer from fragmentation and have not united in a
coherent counter-project to neoliberalism . All told, we lack a double movement in Polanyis sense.3 The result, therefore, is
a curious disjuncture. While todays crisis appears to follow a Polanyian structural logic, grounded in the dynamics of fictitious commodification, it does not manifest a Polanyian political logic, figured by the double movement.
Lifting the embargo destroys the Cuban revolution, which is key to worldwide antineoliberal revolution.
Wenston & Woods 08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of the leading
members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British affiliate group Socialist
Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down
http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)
If the Cuban revolution were defeated, as happened in Russia, it would have a demoralizing effect
first of all on the workers, youth and peasants of the whole of South America, and even on a world
scale. On the other hand the regeneration of the Cuban revolution and the victory of the Venezuelan
revolution would completely transform the situation on a world scale.
Now there are important capitalist elements in Cuba. There is an increasing number of small
traders, the people who hold dollars, black marketeers, who are increasingly interwoven with the
party and the state. And that is the real threat to the Cuban revolution. A while back the
leadership took measures to restrict the growth of the dollar economy. That will no doubt have an
effect for a time, but in the long run it cannot stem the tide in the direction of a market economy.
One of the main reasons for this is the increased participation of Cuba on world markets, which
they are compelled to do now with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have no alternative.
We are not against that. In and of itself it would be a progressive development. The Bolsheviks
attempted to trade with the capitalists on the world market. Lenin and Trotsky actually offered
American capitalists the possibility for them to conduct business in places like Siberia: to open
up whole parts of Russia and lease it to them as concessions rather it lease it to them to be
correct, not give it to them. And that was absolutely correct, as long as the Bolsheviks
maintained the firm control of the state. But the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet state in its
infancy was a direct threat, and therefore the American, British and French bourgeois would not
trade with them. They wanted to crush the Bolshevik revolution because it was a threat.
The Cuban revolution represents a threat to capitalism and imperialism because it gives an
example. Therefore the American imperialists at this stage they do not want to trade with Cuba,
they want to throttle Cuba; they want to destroy Cuba.
If the truth were to be told, the American ruling class are a little bit lacking in mental equipment. If
they were a bit more intelligent they would not blockade Cuba. On the contrary, they would
promote trade with Cuba . That would materially assist the bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces
inside Cuba. But because they are all a little bit thick and the big boss in the White House is
exceptionally thick they do the opposite of what is required, from their class point of view.
(Dana Cloud, associate professor of rhetoric, UT Austin, Dana L. Cloud (2006) The Matrix and
Critical Theory's Desertion of the Real, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 3:4, 329354, DOI: 10.1080/14791420600984243)
Perry Anderson argues that, after World War II, Western Marxism began an unending detour
into a discursivist anti-humanism that paved the way for poststructuralist and post-Marxist
theory.1 Further demoralized by the defeats of 1968, an increasingly elite group of intellectuals
became detached from actual political practice during the long post-war boom in liberal democratic
societies. Disillusioned by Stalinism, they distanced themselves from the classical Marxist
the Matrix. Early in the first film, Morpheus (Lawrence Fishburne), an underground social
movement leader, offers its protagonist, a hacker named Neo (Keanu Reeves), the red pill of
truth as an antidote to the illusion (represented by a blue pill) of a constructed social world.
This illusory world resembles that of early-21st-century capitalism, where people go to work and
engage in all the activities of daily life. Morpheus exposes Neo to the lie (or exposes the lie to
Neo) of his existence: In the real world outside of the Matrix, people's physical bodies serve as
organic batteries for sentient machines while their disembodied consciousnesses occupy the
Matrix.4 Exposed to what Morpheus names the desert of the real,5 Neo realizes that what he
thought was real was illusion; eventually he commits himself to resistance against the machines
on behalf of a captive humanity. By the end of the Matrix trilogy, however, illusion has blurred
with reality, and Neo's resistance turns out to be folly in an inescapable world of discursive
discipline. In the more optimistic first film, Neo's transformation from nighttime rebel to full-
time revolutionary requires his knowledge that the reality of human subjugation contradicts what
is in the true in the Matrix.6 Guided by Morpheus, he experiences the real world marked by
deprivation, struggle, and the life-sucking exploitation by the machines. He chooses to remain in
this reality of danger and desperation, because knowing what is real and what is not is the
condition of possibility for his freedom. The capacity, illustrated in the films, to distinguish
between ideological mystification and real relations of power is the subject of this article.
Of necessity, attention to the films here is curtailed in favor of my main purpose, namely to
narrate the trajectory of contemporary theory through the narrative of the films, rather than to
interpret the films through the lens of the theories.7 The films as metonym represent an uncanny
and cogent compression of the arc of critical theory over the last several decades. As the Russian
revolutionary Leon Trotsky argued in his writings on literature and art, cultural works (including
academic theories) are bound to the historical conditions of their production; we must attend to
their collective influence not as the vanguard of social change but as ideologies that may
legitimate and sustain existing social relations.8 Taken together, the films and contemporary
critical cultural and communication theory alike emerge out of an historical moment of political
and intellectual pessimism on the Left and express deep skepticism about the possibility of
mobilizing people against real oppression. Both narratives, one in popular culture and one in the
academy, risk perpetuating an ideology of resignation to existing social relations disguised as
critique and resistance.
The films offer two versions of the real. One is an experiential real, in which knowledge of the
material base of oppression contra mystification generates critical insight and the capacity for
action. The film also invokes a Lacanian Real, in which the psychic residue of the lack of wholeness
in the Symbolic and the experience of trauma leave persons/subjects uneasy .9 In the first film, for
example, Neo experiences vague unease with his daily life in the Matrix and begins to hack
into the computer-driven system. While he remains in the symbolic world of the Matrix, he is
incapable of fighting it in a systematic way, because his suspicions are quite literally groundless
until he is unplugged from ideology.
In contrast to a Lacanian perspective, this article defines reality as the site of lived experience , the
place where the embodied experience of labor generates contradictions with regard to knowledge
and consciousness.10 In capitalism, the division of society into classes and the divergent experiences
of members of those classes are real. This definition of the real is standpoint-based, resting on
fundamental and divergent interests in a particular society .11 Marxists are concerned with
epistemology, questions of what is true and what is false. But epistemological questions always beg
the ontological: true or false to what or whom? Although there is no permanent, essential, or
universally experienced reality, the category of reality is necessary to political judgment even as it
finds intelligibility, conscious meaning, and strategic import in discourse . As the Marxist theorist
Georg Lukcs explains, lived experience is the dialectical springboard for the production of
oppositional truth and action.12 No matter how complex the process, dialectical materialism
asks, quite simply, for a reality test of political discourses and ideologies from the standpoint
of ordinary people.13
While film and theory alike proclaim the end of any such reality, this article advances an
argument for a classical Marxist understanding of the rhetorically mediated relationship between
reality and consciousness.14 Classical Marxism addresses the lacuna of agency in poststructuralist
and post-Marxist theory in ways that avoid the pitfalls of relativism and anti-humanism. To the end
of understanding this problem, the article first surveys theoretical conceptions of reality and
agency in structuralist and poststructuralist theory alongside their representations in The Matrix,
Matrix: Reloaded, and Matrix: Revolutions. While the first Matrix film begins to articulate a
dialectical, interested, and solidaristic version of agency, this vision, as in contemporary theory,
falls by the wayside as the heroes of the story conclude that there is no way out of the Matrix.
The films engagingly represent critical theory's retreat from notions of truth and reality as
sources of agency, and, as Ellen Meiksins Wood and others have argued, from class-based theory
and politics.15
The second major section of the essay explores the realist philosophy of classical Marxism,
particularly the rhetorically rich concepts of real class interests (rather than identities) and
solidarity among those who share real interests. These concepts provide bases for identification
and conjoint action across identity differences, avoiding the traps of identity essentialism, antihumanism, and nave individualism. Interests and solidarity are the building blocks of a Marxist
rhetoric and of a realpolitik of class utterly necessary to challenging the oppression and exploitation
of capitalism today. This project has been devalued and dismissed in theories with anti-humanist
and nearly exclusively symbolic commitments that give away the ground for political
instrumentality. Even rhetorical theory, originally the study of practical interventionist politics, has
allowed agency to wither away in the shadow of structuralism and relativism.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs Penn
State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on
Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment industry. Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie. Rooted in
everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged . Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has been described by him as a violence
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate
change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time from which the human is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender
studies, and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised across the
globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by her in the film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the
night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the
Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the
way she looks tonight.2 This entirely commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process
wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex
semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning the event and its perpetrator.
The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific
events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the
image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos
such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less
despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their
final entry into the sign system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household
names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as
naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets
buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon
displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The
cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the remediation of increasingly
macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become a
if not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major
consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played by
children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie,
Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it
blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not
going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of
its main commoditiesand one that is internationally consumed. However, there is some reason
to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural
consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of
moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the
solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because
of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet
Tarts away from children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in
understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more
pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with
eating candy, you can consume violence at your own risk. Neoliberal economic practices have
increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of neoliberalism have been well documented.
Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux, everything either is for sale or is plundered for
profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate
ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large
corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a
new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks
the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profitmaking just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public
services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly
resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,
increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties
that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic
transformation of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war of the United States has
benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization as a marketing dream.
Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values increase in
times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing
opportunities for corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of
violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent resurrection of
Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys
past, than a market-driven embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic
culture.
Latin America is the nodal point for resistance to neoliberalismally yourself with
the forces of new political possibilities.
MACLEOD 2013 (ALAN, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models
was one of the great errors of the socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook.
No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every community, from
our people. Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing governments
dubbed the Pink Tide by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldnt stomach the
word red). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuadors radical young economist, Correa to the Workers Party and Lula in Brazil , but basic
principles of equality and integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to
corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an attack on the pure liberty of
the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in Latin America. It
was in the Empires Workshop where Thatcher and Friedmans ideas were first implemented .
After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same
things Chavez did, dictator General Pinochet invited protgs of Friedman and Hayek to Chile.
There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the Generals brutal suppression of
the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and
poverty, falling industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had
been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small section at the top of society.
Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an
economic miracle, but lamented that Britains democratic institutions and the need for a high
degree of consent made some of the measures taken quite unacceptable. Likewise in
Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedmans students, imposed a
sweeping austerity packet on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price
controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where ordinary Caracas residents
spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti-
neoliberal ticket, calling the bankers and economists genocide workers in the pay of economic
totalitarianism during his election campaign. Desperate Venezuelans began rioting for food, but
their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The
military was called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of
war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times Bart Jones speaks of Red Cross workers being
gunned down in the street, mass graves being filled with mutilated corpses, tied up corpses
with bullets in the back of their heads and children being gunned down as the armies fired
indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps 3,000 were killed, a
similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40
times smaller. So it was not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against
neoliberalism occurred. And it was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which
spurred Chavez onto the political stage. Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in
economic terms. After decades of brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought
back. Similar ideas have begun to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which
swept America and Europe last year. Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if
it is what not to do. The Guardian released a piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed
a 65% increase in British poverty, from 13 to 22% of the population. Inequality, as measured by
the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry
led to record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more
people dependent on the welfare state than previously. In contrast, even Thatchers allies at the
World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in poverty, and a 65% decrease in
extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to 7.6% in
2009. Venezuelas inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the most
admired country in Latin America. A similar story is being played out in other Latin American
countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in shifting the political discourse to
the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record corporate profits and increased
concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were pushed to one side and Tony
Blair became leader of a New Labour, largely indistinguishable from the Conservatives. When
asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded Tony Blair and
New Labour. Benn agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift
of the media, too. The free-market has led to independent media bought up or swamped by
massive conglomerates. Media outlets are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising.
Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy, leading to even supposedly left-of-centre newspapers
wondering if we should be worried by the rise of the populist left in Latin America. It is
becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of countries of Latin America in solving age
old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of neoliberal economics. But the media
continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavezs irresponsible handouts, while the
Washington Post insists he remains in power only by showering the poor with gifts. What are
these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us: lavishing state funds on projects like
operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in
Western intellectual culture that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious transgressions on freedom. This has been
lampooned by FAIR, in their article Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could
Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers. Despite Thatcher insisting that there is no alternative, Latin
America is providing a model for a different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being
waged. And we all must choose sides. Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the
21st century will be decided on which one of these ideologies prevails.
Total rejection is key the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
alternatives that are none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players.
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
Western civilization and European values. This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of
our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
shift away from strict monetarism and laissez-faire policies toward Keynesian demand
management. More important, for many it delegitimized the capitalist system itself, paving the way
for the rise of radical and antiliberal movements around the world .
This time around, there has been no violent rejection of capitalism, even in the developing world. In
early 2009, at the height of the global financial panic, China and Russia, two formerly noncapitalist
states, made it clear to their domestic and foreign investors that they had no intention of
abandoning the capitalist model. No leader of a major developing country has backed away from
his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system. Instead, the established
Western democracies are the ones that have highlighted the risks of relying too much on market-led
globalization and called for greater regulation of global finance.
Why has the reaction in developing countries been so much less extreme after this crisis than it was
after the Great Depression? For one, they blame the United States for it. Many in the developing
world agreed with Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis
caused by people, white with blue eyes." If the global financial crisis put any development model
on trial, it was the free-market or neoliberal model, which emphasizes a small state, deregulation,
private ownership, and low taxes . Few developing countries consider themselves to have fully
adopted that model.
Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from it. The financial crises
of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the ideas associated with the
so-called Washington consensus, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital. By
2008, most emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
by accumulating large foreign currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their
banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were
vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets
have posted much better economic growth numbers than their counterparts in the developed
world.
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least no longer
dominant. In the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to modify their
approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated with the freemarket model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of competitive
pressures and global economic trauma. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital,
more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net programs, and more
active in supporting domestic industries. And they will be even less inclined than before to defer
to the supposed expertise of the more developed countries , believing--correctly--that not only
economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed.
wing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions are
now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a civilizing
process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such intellectuals
when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States invaded Iraq
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production of violence against the
poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age, gender, race, ethnicity,
and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a politics in which
radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern equality, justice, or freedom,
but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation. This is a politics that hides its
own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of public spectacles. As Susan
George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or does not" (1999,para.34).
Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical formula or defended
through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor is it a paragon of
economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising prosperity for all who
are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an
ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market economy
that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven society. More important, it is an eco
nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made visible, critically engaged, and shaken
from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national and global life. As such,
neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social agency necessary for
reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global
public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a larger
democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth, resources,
and power.
2 Hegemony - The desire for hegemonic stability is motivated not by great power
politics, but rather the endless need for wealth accumulation and control over the
flow of global capital, requiring endless violence.
Haug 2011
Wolfgang Fritz, former professor of philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, Empire or
Imperialism boundary 2 http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/38/2/1.short
The greatest contradiction, howeverthe historical dynamic of which has been only gradually
revealed, until the collapse of the New Wall Street System announced it with a world historical
thunderclap54was held in store by the political economy of the superpower. It reminds us of
Hegels description of the Master-Servant dialectic . This is so because it is exactly at the point where it is
triumphant, and where its triumph is literally enjoyed in the form of consumption, that the reasons
for its unsustainability are located. The United States is a superpower only with regard to the
paradoxical price of its overconsumption. It borrowed the financial basis for its consumerism and
also for its military might from its vassals. In this regard, of course, the Cold War provided the USA with a glorious
opportunity.55 Indeed, as always, Marxs phrase about competition applied: One capitalist always strikes down many others (Capital, 1:929).
However, at the same time, all capitalists feared expropriation by their common enemy, the Soviet Union. The
of an unlimited world capitalism, its emancipation from national border regimes, within the limits
of its own interests. Unlimited free trade is something that applies to others, not to the United States. In this regard, the WTO itself,
which a short time ago was its instrument, became bothersome.
per cent compound growth will require a new basis for profit-making and surplus absorption. The
irrational way to do this in the past has been the rough the destruct on of the achievements of
preceding eras by way of war, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity,
abandonment and other forms of 'creative destruction', The effects are felt not only throughout the world of commodity
production and exchange. Human lives are disrupted and even physically destroyed, whole careers and
lifetime achievements are put in jeopardy. deeply held beliefs are challenged, psyches wounded and~ respect for
human dignity is cast aside. Creative destruction is visited upon the good, the beautiful the bad and the ugly alike. Crises, we
may conclude, are the irrational rationalisers of an irrational system. Can capitalism survive the
present trauma? Yes. of course. But at what cost? This question masks another. Can the capitalist class reproduce its power
in the face of the raft of economic. social. political and geopolitical and environmental difficultiess? Again, the answer is a resounding Yes it can:
This will however, require the mass of the people to give generously of the fruits of their labour to
those in power, to surrender many of their rights and their hard -won asset values (in everything
from housing to pension rights) and to suffer environmental degradations galore, to say nothing of
serial reductions in their living standards which will mean starvation for many of those already
struggling to survive at rock bottom. More than a little political repression, police violence and
militarised state control will be required to stifle the ensuing unrest . But there will also have to be wrenching and
painful shifts in the geographical and sectoral locus of capitalist class power. The capitalist class cannot, if history is any guide, maintain its
power without changing its character and moving accumulation on to a different trajectory and into new spaces (such as east Asia). Since much of
this is unpredictable and since the spaces of the global economy are so variable, then uncertainties as to outcomes are heightened at times of
crisis. All manner of localised possibilities arise for either nascent capitalists in some new space to seize opportunities to challenge older class and
territorial hegemonies (as when Silicon Valley replaced Detroit from the mid-1970s onwards in the United States) or for radical movements to
challenge the reproduction of an already destabilized and therefore weakened class power. To say that the capitalist class and capitalism can
survive is not to say that they are predestined to do so, nor that their future character is given. Crises are moments of paradox and possibility out
of which all manner of alternatives, including socialist and anti-capitalist ones, can spring, So what will happen this time around? If we are to get
back to 3 per cent growth, this will mean finding new and profitable global investment opportunities for $1.6 trillion in 2010, rising to closer to
$3 trillion by 2030. This contrasts with the $0.J5 trillion new investment needed in 1950 and the $042 trillion needed in 1.973 (the dollar figures
are inflation adjusted). Real problems of finding adequate outlets for surplus capital began to emerge after 1980, even with the opening up of
China and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The difficulties were in part resolved by the creation of fictitious markets where speculation in asset
values could take off unchecked by any regulatory apparatus. Where will all this investment go now? Leaving aside the
undisputable constraints in the relation to nature (with global warming of obvious paramount
importance), the other potential barriers of effective demand in the market place, of technologies
and of geographical geopolitical distributions are likely to be profound. Even supposing - which is unlikely - that
no serious active oppositions to continuous capital accumulation and further consolidation of class power materialise. What spaces are left in the
global economy for new spatial fixes for capital surplus absorption? China and the ex-Soviet bIoc have already been integrated. South and southeast Asia are filing up fast Africa is not yet fully integrated, but there is nowhere else with the capacity to absorb all the is surplus capital. What
new lines of production can be opened up to absorb growth? There may be no effective long-term capitalist solutions
(apart from reversion to fictitious capital manipulations) to this crisis of capitalism . At some point
quantitative changes lead to qualitative shifts and we need to take seriously the idea that we may be at exactly such all inflexion point in the
history of capitalism. Questioning the future of capitalism itself as an adequate social system ought,
therefore to be in the forefront of current debate. Yet there appears to be little appetite for such discussion, even as
conventional mantras regarding the perfectibility of humanity with the help of free markets and free trade, private properly and personal
responsibility and low taxes and minimalist state involvement in social provision sound increasingly hollow. A crisis of legitimacy
looms. But legitimation crises typically unfold at a different pace and rhythm to stock market crises. It took. for example, three-e or four Years
for the stock: market crash Of 1929 to produce the massive social movements (both progressive and fascistic) that emerged after 1932 or so. The
intensity of the current pursuit by political power of ways to exit the present crisis measures the political fear of looming illegitimacy. The
existence of cracks in the ideological edifice does not mean it is utterly broken, Nor does it follow
that because something is clearly hollow people will immediately recognise it as such. As of now,
faith in the underlying presumptions of free market ideology have not eroded too much. There is no
indication that people in the advanced capitalist countries (apart from the usual malcontents) are looking for radical changes of lifestyle, although
many recognise that they may have to economise here or save money there. Those foreclosed upon in the United States (so preliminary surveys
tell us) typically blame themselves for their failure {sometimes through bad luck) to live up to the personal responsibilities of homeownership.
Where there is anger at bankers duplicity and populist outrage over their bonuses., there seems to be no movement in North America or Europe
to embrace radical and far-reaching changes. In the global south, Latin America in particular, the story is rather different How the politics will
play out in China and the rest of Asia, where growth continues and politics turns on different axes, is uncertain. The problem there is that growth
is continuing, though at a lower rate. The idea that the crisis had systemic origin is scarcely mooted in the mainstream media. Most of the
governmental moves so far in North America and Europe amount to the perpetuation of business as usual, which translates into support for the
capitalist class. The moral hazard' that was the immediate trigger for the financial failures is being taken to new heights in the bank bail-outs. The
actual practices of neoliberalism (as opposed to its utopian theory) always entailed blatant support for finance capital and capitalist elites (usually
on the grounds that financial institutions must be protected at all costs and that it is the duty of state power to create a good business climate for
solid profiteering). This has not fundamentally changed. Such practices are justified by appeal to the dubious proposition that a 'rising tide' of
capitalist endeavour will 'lift all boats: or that the benefits of compound growth. will magically trickle down' (which it never does. except in the
form of a few crumbs from the rich folks' table). Throughout much of the capitalist world, we have lived through
an astonishing period in which politics has been depoliticised and commodified. Only now, all the
state steps in to bail out the financiers, has it become dear to all that state and capital are more
tightly intertwined than ever both institutionally and personally . The ruling class, rather than the political class that
am as its surrogate. is now actually seen to rule.
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly oninternationalbiodiversity conservation this alliancedriven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnershipshas been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion. The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Bscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008). While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization , as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sectorwhich have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to NGOs
moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. The
second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect the
environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this aim .
To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the 1980s, the
Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the same time, in
an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to private
contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID funded
conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many of the
environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the 1970s
shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to protesting
World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOsnow with a
special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity fundingto take up the endeavor to promote
environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global environmental
agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the privileging of
NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from USAID funding.
In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity funding in the late
1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They consolidated this campaign
during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard for environmental issues and
massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding. In the twenty-first century,
the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political support behind USAID's
biodiversity program. Based on the analysis presented in this article, I make three broad claims
that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal conservation. First, throughout
these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized visions of themselves as
representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private interests thought to be
behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access to policy-makers and
influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships that characterize the
BINGOs twenty-first century operations. Second, the strict focus oninternationalbiodiversity
has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the BINGOs, USAID, corporate
leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental foreign aid. By defining the
environment as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away from competing economic
and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied partners have enticed US
politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid. They have created an
avenue through which they can become environmentally friendly without confronting the
environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA or the foreign
and domestic investments of US corporations. These successful political strategies, aimed at
mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by which
environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I contend
that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and material
spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental stewardship
for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical territories for
capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of common lands as
protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming around the
concept of biodiversity conservation
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie. Rooted in
everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged . Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has been described by him as a violence
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate
change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time from which the human is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender
studies, and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised across the
globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by her in the film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the
night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the
Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the
way she looks tonight.2 This entirely commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process
wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex
semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning the event and its perpetrator.
The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific
events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the
image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos
such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less
despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their
final entry into the sign system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household
names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as
naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets
buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon
displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The
cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the remediation of increasingly
macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become a
if not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major
consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played by
children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie,
Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it
blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not
going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of
its main commoditiesand one that is internationally consumed. However, there is some reason
to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural
consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of
moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the
solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because
of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet
Tarts away from children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in
understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more
pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with
eating candy, you can consume violence at your own risk. Neoliberal economic practices have
increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of neoliberalism have been well documented.
Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux, everything either is for sale or is plundered for
profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate
ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large
corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a
new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks
the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profitmaking just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public
services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly
resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,
increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties
that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic
transformation of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war of the United States has
benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization as a marketing dream.
Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values increase in
times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing
opportunities for corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of
violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent resurrection of
Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys
past, than a market-driven embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic
culture.
Our alternative is democratic socialism only a transfer of power from elites to the
people holds out the hope for political formations that can avoid the immanent
global suicide.
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs107-108
They are likely to turn with more frequency to violent methods in defense of their interests.
These groups' resistance to change is likely to take increasingly extra-institutional forms
especially in those cases where the threat they face, beyond redistributive reform, involves
property relations. Recent anti-terrorism laws have been passed in most Latin American
countries that criminalize social protest, such as in El Salvador, where terrorism is defined by
such legislation as "any pressure on authorities to make certain decisions" (COMPA, 2007). In
the Venezuelan countryside and in Bolivia's eastern region landlords have already
organized armed paramilitary squads that have clashed with peasants demanding
agrarian reform. We cannot rule out military intervention and new coup d'etats in countries
such as Bolivia and Ecuador. In Colombia, upwards of four million people have been violently
uprooted from the countryside by state security forces and right-wing paramilitary armies to
make way for transnational agribusiness and mining concerns, while it has been disclosed that
such TNCs as Coca-Cola, Chiquita Brands International, and several U.S.-based mining
companies have regularly hired the paramilitary armies to block unionization and eliminate
dissent among their workers (Hylton, 2006). 3. GLOBAL ANTI-CAPITALIST ALTERNATIVE
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PROJECT What configuration of social and political forces
could bring about a postcapitalist global order? It is an irony that the crisis of global
capitalism has followed in the wake of the crisis and collapse of the Left in most countries
around the world and the discrediting, until recently, of socialist ideology. In Latin America a
twenty-first-century neofascist project is taking place in Colombia while right next door, in
Venezuela, a twenty-first-century socialist project is under way. A socialist alternative is
not at odds with a struggle for global reformism, and in fact such an alternative would
most likely snowball out of efforts to bring about a reform of the system, such as we may
be seeing in Venezuela, and perhaps even in Bolivia and Ecuador. What is crucial is for
popular, radical, and socialist-oriented forces in the global justice movement to put
forward an alternative vision that goes beyond reformism and to have such a vision
achieve hegemony within any counter-hegemonic bloc to global capitalism. Redistributive
reform, it is worth reiterating, is not viable without structural changes that move a counterhegemonic bloc from challenging the "fairness" of the market to replacing the logic of the
market with a social logic. A democratic socialist alternative would require a renewal of
critical and radical thinking along with a capacity to operate as much on the cultural and
ideological as on the political terrain. More than ever before, political and economic
processes are globalized, as Levine (2005) observes, to the extent that they are
"culturized." Global accumulation is increasingly reliant on symbolic and cultural
exchanges that make possible the rapid circulation of commodities. But that alternative also
requires renovated political vehicles that provide the popular classes in civil society with
instruments for invading state structures. Moreover, no matter how unpopular with postmodernists, a global transformative project requires, as Boswell and Chase-Dunn argue, a new
universalism. The axis of an anti-capitalist and universalist struggle must be the new global
working class, with its rainbow and heavily female face, one that is transnationally
organized. I am convinced that if there can be no socialism without democracy in the
twenty-first century it is equally true that democracy is not possible without socialism. A
democratic socialism founded on a popular democracy is in my view the only real
alternative to disaster to collective suicide .
Total rejection is key the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
alternatives that are none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players.
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
Western civilization and European values. This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of
our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies . In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism . The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves . It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life . It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle . No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left." The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet (until
her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabar Vazquez (and now Ios Mujica), and Brazil under Lula (and
now Rouseff), for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must fashion
institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of markets .
The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas orthodox neoliberals
in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of property rights, contract
enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns the state an important
auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political intervention to
construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy " (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts" between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
territory, such as still existed in many regions of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, or a
sector or market within capitalism that has not been fully exploited or proletarianized . Additionally and
importantly, however, capitalism can actually manufacture it (ibid.: 141). Through a combination of
mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues to shape the violent bouts of predation on
existing dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed
accumulation. Within the underdeveloped world, many forms of primitive accumulation that would be
recognizable to Marx are still operating today: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family farming
by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of proletarianization and reproletarianization, the wholesale
privatization of common property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption and so on. At the same time,
however, and relating to the mass consumer societies of the developed world, certain aspects of primitive accumulation have been adapted and
expanded. The credit system and finance capital, for example, have opened up new zones of predation. Stock promotions, mergers and asset
stripping have accompanied the active promotion of high levels of debt peonage. Corporate fraud and dispossession through credit and stock
manipulation, including the raiding and decimation of pension funds by stock and corporate collapse are all central features of what
contemporary capitalism is about (ibid.: 147). Indeed, the reversion to private hands of public entitlements won through political struggle, such
as a state pension, social welfare and national health care has been the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of
neoliberal orthodoxy (ibid.: 148). New global mechanisms for dispossession have also opened up, for example regarding intellectual property
rights, patenting and the licensing of genetic material such as seed plasma. Biopiracy by international pharmaceutical companies and the pillaging
of the worlds genetic resources are rampant, creating means ofgovernance that can now be used against whole populations whosepractices had
played a crucial role in the development of those materials (ibid.). The wholesale commodification of life, including its many natural and cultural
forms, histories and intellectual creativity, is currently under way. When coupled with the deepening international privatization of common goods
and entitlements such as land, water and public utilities, Harvey has argued that capitalism has launched the world on a new
wave of enclosing the commons (ibid.). From political economy one could argue that accumulation by
dispossession, in continually evoking a surplus population, not only provides development with an
object, it is one that is constantly being renewed. A superfluous and potentially dangerous waste-life
is continuously thrown off as markets are relentlessly made and remade in the endless search for
progress. This concern arising from political economy is recognized by policy makers. Politicians
are fully aware, for example, that while globalization brings many benefits, if badly managed it can
exacerbate inequality and instability (Biccum 2005). This contemporary ambivalence towards
globalization returns development once more to its founding design of reconciling the need for
order with the challenges of progress. Because surplus life is continuously produced, development
also periodically reinvents itself. While the context, words and emphasis may change, the central meaning remains
the same. In terms of basic tenets this process, since 1949at least, has been well documented by William Easterly (Easterly 2002).
Following decolonization, when it vectored into an interstate relationship, development has
regularly reinvented itself within a limited set of axioms. Like penal reform, the endless rediscovery of
development has produced a a monotonous critique (Foucault [1975]: 266) which, in this case, invariably calls
for an increase in aid spending, a renewed focus on poverty reduction, the delivery of more effective
aid, the necessity of better coordination between donors, aid agencies and recipients, the
importance of recipients being receptive to policy change and, not least, debt relief. The periodic
repackaging of these aims over the past half-century has been helped by developments
organizational preference for limited agency competition, low public accountability, institutional
amnesia and a willingness to engage in obfuscation and spin control, allowing practitioners always
to describe aid efforts as new and improved (Easterly 2002: 228).
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly oninternationalbiodiversity conservation this alliancedriven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnershipshas been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion. The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Bscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008). While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization , as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sectorwhich have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to NGOs
moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. The
second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect the
environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this aim .
To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the 1980s, the
Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the same time, in
an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to private
contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID funded
conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many of the
environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the 1970s
shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to protesting
World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOsnow with a
special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity fundingto take up the endeavor to promote
environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global environmental
agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the privileging of
NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from USAID funding.
In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity funding in the late
1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They consolidated this campaign
during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard for environmental issues and
massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding. In the twenty-first century,
the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political support behind USAID's
biodiversity program. Based on the analysis presented in this article, I make three broad claims
that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal conservation. First, throughout
these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized visions of themselves as
representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private interests thought to be
behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access to policy-makers and
influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships that characterize the
BINGOs twenty-first century operations. Second, the strict focus oninternationalbiodiversity
has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the BINGOs, USAID, corporate
leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental foreign aid. By defining the
environment as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away from competing economic
and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied partners have enticed US
politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid. They have created an
avenue through which they can become environmentally friendly without confronting the
environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA or the foreign
and domestic investments of US corporations. These successful political strategies, aimed at
mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by which
environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I contend
that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and material
spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental stewardship
for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical territories for
capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of common lands as
protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming around the
concept of biodiversity conservation.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs Penn
State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on
Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we are in one of the most violent eras in human
history. The scope of violence today is global and its magnitude immense. It is seen in the death
counts from perpetual wars and the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked
waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the
screams of women subject to sexual violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is
in the blood we are served by televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment industry. Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie. Rooted in
everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged . Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has been described by him as a violence
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate
change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time from which the human is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender
studies, and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised across the
globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by her in the film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the
night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the
Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the
way she looks tonight.2 This entirely commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process
wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex
semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning the event and its perpetrator.
The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific
events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the
image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos
such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less
despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their
final entry into the sign system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household
names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as
naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets
buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon
displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The
cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the remediation of increasingly
macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become a
if not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major
consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played by
children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie,
Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it
blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not
going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of
its main commoditiesand one that is internationally consumed. However, there is some reason
to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural
consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of
moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the
solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because
of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet
Tarts away from children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in
understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more
pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with
eating candy, you can consume violence at your own risk. Neoliberal economic practices have
increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of neoliberalism have been well documented.
Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux, everything either is for sale or is plundered for
profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate
ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large
corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a
new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks
the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profitmaking just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public
services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly
resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,
increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties
that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic
transformation of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war of the United States has
benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization as a marketing dream.
Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values increase in
times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing
opportunities for corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of
violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent resurrection of
Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys
past, than a market-driven embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic
culture.
Total rejection is key the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
alternatives that are none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players.
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
Western civilization and European values. This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of
our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies . In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism . The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves . It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life . It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle . No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left." The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet (until
her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabar Vazquez (and now Ios Mujica), and Brazil under Lula (and
now Rouseff), for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must fashion
institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of markets .
The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas orthodox neoliberals
in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of property rights, contract
enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns the state an important
auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political intervention to
construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy " (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts" between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
The assertion that more reliance on elite controlled mechanisms will provide
sufficient correction to past neoliberal practices is misguided. True democracy
emerges from continued radical resistance, not gradual constitutionalism.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt.
This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
structure, and
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
The US-Jordan FTA agreement cited as the model for the plan by their Robinson
evidence proves our point Neoliberal promises work in service of elites and not the
people
Ny Times 06- An ugly side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03clothing.html?
pagewanted=all
Propelled by a free trade agreement with the United States, apparel manufacturing is booming in
Jordan, its exports to America soaring twentyfold in the last five years. But some foreign workers in Jordanian factories
that produce garments for Target, Wal-Mart and other American retailers are complaining of dismal
conditions of 20-hour days, of not being paid for months and of being hit by supervisors and jailed when they complain. An
advocacy group for workers contends that some apparel makers in Jordan, and some contractors that supply foreign
workers to them, have engaged in human trafficking. Workers from Bangladesh said they paid $1,000 to
$3,000 to work in Jordan, but when they arrived, their passports were confiscated, restricting their
ability to leave and tying them to jobs that often pay far less than promised and far less than the country's minimum wage. "We used to
start at 8 in the morning, and we'd work until midnight, 1 or 2 a.m., seven days a week," said Nargis Akhter, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi who, in a
phone interview from Bangladesh, said she worked last year for the Paramount Garment factory outside Amman. "When we were in Bangladesh
they promised us we would receive $120 a month, but in the five months I was there I only got one month's salary and that was just $50."
The advocacy group, the National Labor Committee, which is based in New York, found substandard conditions in
more than 25 of Jordan's roughly 100 garment factories and is set to release a report on its findings today. Its findings
were supported in interviews with current and former workers. Such complaints have dogged the global apparel
industry for years, even as it has adopted measures intended to improve working conditions in
factories that produce clothing for American and European consumers . But the abusive conditions
that the guest workers described show how hard it is to control sweatshops as factories spring up in
new places, often without effective monitoring in place. In recent years , Jordan has become a magnet for apparel
manufacturers, helped by the privileged trade position that the United States has given it, first
because of its 1994 peace accord with Israel and then because of a free trade agreement signed
with Washington in 2001. Jordan's apparel industry, which exported $1.2 billion to the United States last year, employs tens of
thousands of guest workers, mainly from Bangladesh and China. In interviews this week, five Bangladeshis who used to work in Jordanian
apparel factories and four who still do had similar tales of paying more than $1,000 to work in Jordan, of working 90 to 120 hours a week, of not
being paid the overtime guaranteed by Jordanian law, of sleeping 10 or 20 to a small dorm room. The National Labor Committee helped arrange
interviews with the Bangladeshi workers, who spoke through interpreters. The largest retailer in the United States, Wal-Mart, and one of the
largest clothing makers, Jones Apparel, confirmed yesterday that they had discovered serious problems with the conditions at several major
Jordanian factories. In addition, a factory monitor for a major American company confirmed that Jordanian factories routinely confiscated their
guest workers' passports, doctored wage and hour records and coached employees to lie to government and company inspectors about working
conditions. The monitor asked not to be identified because the company had not given authorization to speak publicly. Beth Keck, a
spokeswoman for Wal-Mart, said the company did not own or manage factories, but tried to improve working conditions in Jordan and elsewhere.
"It is a continuous challenge, not just for Wal-Mart but for any company," she said, noting that the most commonly observed problems included
failure to pay proper wages, "egregious hours," and "use of false or insufficient books or documentation." Charles Kernaghan, executive
director of the National Labor Committee, which has exposed mistreatment in factories in Central
America and China, said he was shocked by what he discovered in Jordan. "These are the worst
conditions I've ever seen," he said. "You have people working 48 hours straight. You have workers
who were stripped of their passports, who don't have ID cards that allow them to go out on the
street. If they're stopped, they can be imprisoned or deported, so they're trapped, often held under
conditions of involuntary servitude." Mr. Kernaghan said Bangladeshi workers had contacted his organization to complain about
working conditions in Jordan. He then traveled to Jordan and met quietly with dozens of workers. He said American companies,
despite their monitoring efforts, were often slow to uncover workplace abuses because workers
were coached to lie to them or were scared to speak out. Moreover, factories often send work out to
substandard subcontractors without notifying American retailers. Several factory owners in Jordan insisted that
they treated their workers properly. "Some people are always making allegations," said Karim Saifi, the owner of United Garment
Manufacturing, a factory near Amman that workers criticized for long hours and wage violations. "As far as we know, we follow all the labor
laws here. If we were not abiding by all of the local Jordan laws, we would not be able to operate." Several foreign apparel workers said that
while their factories required them to stay until midnight, the Jordanian workers were usually allowed to leave at 4 p.m. Two large industrial
zones outside Amman are thriving, having geared themselves to the American apparel market. They have attracted dozens of garment
manufacturers, some with 200 workers, some with 2,000, that say they produce clothes for J. C. Penney, Sears, Wal-Mart, Gap and Target. "It
would be wrong to think that problems at a few places are representative of the 102 apparel factories in my country," said Yanal Beasha, Jordan's
trade representative in Washington. Jordan's ambassador to the United States, Karim Kawar, said "If there are any violations of our labor laws,
we certainly take it seriously." Mr. Beasha said Jordanian government inspectors monitor the working conditions in factories. But several guest
workers said factory managers hid abuses by coaching workers to lie. Mr. Beasha said the Jordanian government cared about the welfare of
foreign guest workers, noting that it enforced overtime laws and recently increased the minimum wage for citizens and guest workers. But
Mohammed Z., who has worked for more than a year at the Paramount Garment Factory, said that even though he worked more than 100 hours a
week normally from 7 to midnight seven days a week the company refused to pay him overtime when he did not meet production targets.
He asked that his last name be withheld for fear of retribution. Having paid $2,000 to work in Jordan, he said, in an interview from
Amman, "I'm not earning enough to repay my loan or to support my wife and son." Unhappy that
his passport has been confiscated, he said: "My identity has been taken by the company. I have no
freedom because I have no freedom to move to other places." M ohammed Saiful Islam, 30, a Bangladeshi who
was production manager at Western Garment, said that several times the workers had to work until
4 a.m., then sleep on the factory's floor for a few hours, before resuming work at 8 a.m . "The workers got
so exhausted they became sick," he said. "They could hardly stay awake at their machines." Mr. Saiful, who is in the United States to highlight
poor working conditions in Jordan, pointed to a yellow and black fleece sweatshirt that he said his factory made. It had an Athletic Works label
made for Wal-Mart, selling for $9.48. "Sometimes when companies sent in monitors, the workers were instructed what to say," Mr. Saiful said.
Mohamed Irfan, who in a telephone interview from Jordan said he was Western's owner, said, "The workers get the minimum wage, and all times,
there is no problem in our factory." Mohamed Kasim, Paramount's owner, said his factory also paid its workers properly. Mr. Kasim and other
factory managers said workers received free room and board and sometimes medical care. But several workers said that when
they were sick they did not receive medical care, but were instead punished and had their pay
docked. Several Bangladeshis said there were terrible conditions at factories that made clothes for Wal-Mart and Jones Apparel, which owns
brands like Gloria Vanderbilt and Jones New York. Ms. Keck, the Wal-Mart spokeswoman, said company inspectors recently identified "serious
violations" of its labor rules at three Jordanian factories. At Honorway Apparel Jordan, for example, which manufactures sleepwear for Wal-Mart,
inspectors found employees working off the clock, managers who refused to pay overtime and wages that "could not be verified," Ms. Keck said.
At the Ivory Garment Factory, which Wal-Mart ceased working with two years ago, inspectors found "egregious working hours." Joele Frank, a
spokeswoman for Jones Apparel, said the company had also found "serious problems" at the Ivory Garment Factory, which produces Gloria
Vanderbilt clothing, and said it would "monitor the situation closely." A spokesman for Sears Holding, said the company was investigating
potential problems at Honorway, which produces clothes for Kmart, a division of Sears Holding. A Kohl's spokeswoman denied workers'
accusations that clothing sold by the company was made at several Jordanian factories with poor conditions. Target said it worked with only one
factory that has come under criticism Al Safa Garments, which Wal-Mart recently cited for labor violations. Many retailers said
their policy was, after discovering violations, to work with a factory to improve conditions, rather
than automatically withdraw their business. Wal-Mart says it gives factories a year to fix serious
problems, reinspecting them every 120 days. "Our business with the factory is the only leverage we have to push for
improvement," Ms. Keck said. After The New York Times asked about the accusations on Monday, Wal-Mart dispatched two inspectors to
Jordan. Hazrat Ali, 25, who worked from September 2004 to March 2005 at the Al Shahaed factory,
said he sometimes worked 48 hours in a row and received no pay for the six months. "If we asked
for money, they hit us," he said. Nasima Akhter, 30, said that the Western factory gave its workers
a half-glass of tea for breakfast and often rice and some rotten chicken for lunch. "In the four
months I was in Jordan, they didn't pay us a single penny," she said. "When we asked management
for our money and for better food, they were very angry at us. We were put in some sort of jail for
four days without anything to eat. And then they forced us to go back to Bangladesh."
Third, the affirmatives organization plan is a dead end. Civil society is too easily
isolated and tokenized as it shields elites from direct confrontation.
Brand, 06
(Ulrish Brand, Brand has a PhD in Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt/M, The
World Wide Web of Anti- Neoliberalism, page 236-237)
The brave new world of neoliberalism has been battered by the crises of South East Asia and other countries, and by the protests in Seattle,
Genoa and else- where, even in the public opinion of Western countries. Hardly a politician or corporate executive can mount a public podium
without speaking of the problems and dangers of capitalist globalization, although as a rule they append the corollary that nevertheless there is
no alternative. This much is clear, however: while the critique of neoliberal globalization in general, and of certain actors in particular, is
enjoying increasing attention in the media, and networks like Attac use it quite cleverly, there are few changes to the general structural
transformations in train or in neoliberal power relations. It would, of course, be nonsensical to lay this at the feet of a new, and still developing
movement. It is nevertheless necessary to register the dangers and dead-ends which may lie ahead. One of the chief
dangers facing anti-neoliberal movements is surely that
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
supposed wars, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs Penn
State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on
Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we
are in one of the most violent eras in human history. The scope
of violence today is global and its magnitude immense. It is seen in the death counts from perpetual
wars and the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of the Gulf of
Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the screams of women subject
to sexual violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is in the blood we are served
by televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven entertainment industry.
Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our
world is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with a complete set of data on it.
For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many
more, violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie. Rooted in everyday institutional
structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that bonds Americans
together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a multiracial and
multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to individual and social well-being as well as to
democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestations
another must be to work toward its elimination. And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize
the public sphere through print and social media to bring about a better understanding of the
dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence.
Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored
and hidden . The violence that is unseen and unknown must be engaged just as much as the
violence that is seen and known. While violent video games and movies premised on the spectacle of
violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence of closing off
consideration and understanding of other forms of violence, in particular the myriad types of
violence that cannot be staged. Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a
temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has been
described by him as a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the twentieth-
century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time from which the human is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender studies,
and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised across the globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of revulsion and attraction when presented
to us by the American entertainment industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been transformed into
the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to the image of Wournos presented by her in the film, Monster
(2003). She is my favorite of the night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the Golden
Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the way she looks tonight.2 This entirely commonplace
comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately confused. In
the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning
the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific events in which
they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the
culture industry, American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less despicable objects
of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign system of celebrity entertainment is
signaled by becoming household names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average culturally literate
American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness of these
killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon displaces any
remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the
remediation of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become aif not the
standard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real violence of many
of the video games played by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children watch, there is no
escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one torture scene (a crime
syndicate tortures a car until it blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not going to be a
surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of its main commoditiesand one that is internationally
consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural
consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer
facilitated this discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because of its
alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from children in an effort to stop tooth
decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more pernicious
neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence at your own risk.
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux,
everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging
companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large corporate interests without a
dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function as
circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza partiesthat is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test
scores. (2004, xii-xiv) When
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to
be avoided. As neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent
resurrection of Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys past, than a market-driven
embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
Vote negative and do not allow elites to clarify their interests. Total rejection is
key the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the
allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
alternatives that are none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake. Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it
creates makes it impossible for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the
corporations harmless players. There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of
neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism
is that it reveals the truth about Western civilization and European values. This means that
people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of
our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coercion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies . In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism . The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves . It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life . It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle . No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left." The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet (until
her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabar Vazquez (and now Ios Mujica), and Brazil under Lula (and
now Rouseff), for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must fashion
institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of markets .
The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas orthodox neoliberals
in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of property rights, contract
enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns the state an important
auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political intervention to
construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy " (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts" between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba
with cash and let the process unfold.Thatiswhyit is even more disgustingwhen we hear some
reformist elements on the left advocating such engagement. What they are actually doing is
giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side .All this talk of democracy is
in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. NotsolongagotheFinancialTimeswasgivingmoresoberadvice.They
weresuggestingaChineseroadforCubaaccompaniedbyaliftingoftheUSsponsoredembargo.TheChinesemodelwouldenvisagean
openingupofCubatocapitalismaccompaniedbyafirmgriponstatepoweratthetop.
While the 1AC held us captivated with elite concerns, it also minimized and
obscured the horrific violence neoliberalism inflicts on billions of people everyday.
Have the courage to ignore the affirmatives inflated threat scenarios and concern
yourself with ending neoliberal exploitation, including the compelled march toward
extinction
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and
Philosophy at the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of
international affairs and directs Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as
its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on Violence symploke, Volume 20,
Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that we
are in one of the most violent eras in human history. The scope
of violence today is global and its magnitude immense . It is seen in the death counts from
perpetual wars and the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of
the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the screams of
women subject to sexual violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is in the
blood we are served by televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment industry. Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and our social and physical sciences
capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and
no report can present us with a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat,
something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie.
Rooted in everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic
glue that bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and
building a multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to individual
and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy must be to reveal
its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination. And progressive intellectuals
must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social media to bring about a better
understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating the
toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it is also
everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen and unknown must be engaged just as
much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent video games and movies premised on the
spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence of
closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of violence, in particular the myriad
types of violence that cannot be staged. Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens
on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has
been described by him as a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the twentieth-
century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time from which the human is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender studies,
and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised across the globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of revulsion and attraction when
presented to us by the American entertainment industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to the image of Wournos presented by her in the
film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at
the Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the way she looks tonight.2 This entirely
commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of
signification concerning the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the
horrific events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the image. Carefully packaged, promoted
and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become
less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign system of celebrity
entertainment is signaled by becoming household names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the
realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage
soon displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The cultural celebration of violence though
does not end with the remediation of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become
aif not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real
violence of many of the video games played by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one
torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It
is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of its main commoditiesand one that is
internationally consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of
repeated cultural consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this
past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters
because of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from children in an effort
to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and
more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence at
contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function
as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza partiesthat is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher
test scores. (2004, xii-xiv) When
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to
be avoided. As neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent
resurrection of Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys past, than a market-driven
embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people. Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed the Pink Tide by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldnt
stomach the word red). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuadors radical young economist, Correa to the Workers Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the Empires Workshop where Thatcher and Friedmans ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protgs of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
Generals brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an economic miracle, but
lamented that Britains democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent made some of the measures taken quite
unacceptable. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedmans students, imposed a sweeping austerity
packet on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where
ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal ticket,
calling the bankers and economists genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times Bart Jones speaks of
Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, mass graves being filled with mutilated corpses, tied up corpses with bullets in the
back of their heads and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last year.
Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian released a
piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty , from 13 to 22% of
the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry led to
record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on the welfare state than previously.
In contrast, even Thatchers allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in
poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to
7.6% in 2009. Venezuelas inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the most admired country in Latin America. A
similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in
shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record
corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were
pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a New Labour, largely indistinguishable from the
Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded Tony Blair and New Labour. Benn
agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too. The freemarket has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates. Media outlets
are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy , leading to even
supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be worried by the rise of the populist
left in Latin America. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of countries of Latin
America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of neoliberal economics.
But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavezs irresponsible handouts, while the Washington Post
insists he remains in power only by showering the poor with gifts. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us: lavishing state
funds on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in Western intellectual culture
that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious transgressions on freedom.
This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers.
Despite Thatcher insisting that there is no alternative, Latin America is providing a model for a
different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And we all must choose sides.
Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st century will be decided on which
one of these ideologies prevails.
This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
structure, and
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
Total, unconditional, and unflinching rejection is required the only way to produce
real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the allure of half measures and the
propaganda of profit.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss alternatives that are
none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a return to Keynesianism;
a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of socialism. Such ideas ignore
reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it creates makes it impossible for neoliberalism to justify itself.
Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players. There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply
lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about Western civilization and European
What is really
needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy alone, or a
different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact opposite of
neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of our alternative must be one that
values. This means that people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism .113 Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life
for all beings on this planet upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are experiencing is indeed a
reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our politicians. But even
The objective limitations of projects of popular transformations at the level of the nationstate are apparent in Cuba. Despite the inevitable (and some not so inevitable) problems the Cuban revolution
has faced in its half century of existence Cuban society is perhaps the most egalitarian in the hemisphere
and certainly one of the most developed in terms of quality of life indicators. Cuba's efforts to transition from a capitalist to a
revolutionary socialist society ran up squarely against the limitsnay, the corrosive
influenceof global capitalism in the 1990s and on. With no choice but to integrate into world
capitalist markets the Cuban government attempted to create a sort of dual economy: one
capitalist, linked to the global economy and driven by the law of value; the other socialist,
internal, driven by a social logic. Thus it promoted the tourist industry, created a parallel dollar economy where those with
access to foreign exchange could purchase scarce goods and services, relaxed controls on private money-making undertakings, and allowed,
all efforts to challenge global capitalism must address: in an age when "de-linking" or withdrawal
from the system is not a viable option, how is transformation from within managed in such a way
as to not reproduce the very social and political forces that reproduce global capitalism?
How to
supersede a system from which one cannot yet de-link, does not control, and cannot confront in its entirety? How to build a democratic
socialism in the midst of a global capitalist milieu from which there is no flight? If
is becoming transnationalized then any challenge to (global) capitalist state power must involve
a major transnational component . Struggles at the nation-state level are far from futile. They
remain central to the prospects for social justice and progressive social change. The key point is
that any such struggles must be part of a more expansive transnational counter-hegemonic
project, including transnational trade unionism, transnational social movements,
transnational political organizations, and so onable to link the local to the national, the
regional, and the global. And they must strive to establish sets of transnational institutions
and practices that can place controls on global market and rein in some of power of global
capital. This is why permanent mobilization from below that pressures the state to deepen
its transformative project "at home" and its counter-hegemonic transnational project
"abroad" is so crucial.
Second, the 1AC is the logic of neoliberalism: privatizing activism, fetishizing the
risks of depoliticization, and expansive nostalgic analogies work in service of elite
interest. The affirmative imports the consumptive subject at the expanse of the
organizing activist.
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
10)
When ones opponent takes over ones position, one is confronted with its realization, with its repercussions. This is what many of us dont like;
this is what we want to avoid. So we say No! Thats not it, but because our enemy has taken over our language, our ideals, weve lost a capacity
to say what we want, even to know what we want. we cant even dream some thing else. Zizek writes: In a radical revolution, people not only
have to realize their old (emancipatoryg etc.) dreams; rather, they have to reinvent their very modes of dreaming.18 Such a
reinvention
is an enormous, perhaps impossible task . Its not furthered, though, by the diagnosis of
depoliticization , a diagnosis offered by political theorists the increased currency of which calls out for critique. If
depoliticization means anything, it is the retreat into coward ice, the retroactive determination of
victory as defeat because of the lefts fundamental inability to accept responsibility for power and
to undertake the difficult task of reinventing our modes of dreaming . Depoliticization is a fantasy;
an excuse whereby the left says We know collective action is possible theoretically but we dont
believe we exist. The _term marks the gap between the commitment to common approaches to
systemic problems constitutive of left thought for over two centuries and the isolating individualism
of consumption and entertainment-driven communicative capitalism. The very diagnosis of
depoliticization functions fetishistically to prevent the left from confronting the truth of its victory .
This view of depoliticization as an excuse or fetish covering over a failure of responsibility however,
is not widely shared. On the contrary depoliticization and the correlative notions of post-politics,
de democratization, and post democracy are offered as terms for designating what is specifically
new in the current political-economic condition. Over the past decades, a number of political theorists have attempted to
analyze the contemporary conjuncture as post-political or postdemocratic. Reversing the terms of the end of ideology
thesis offered by neoconservative (Francis Fulcuyama) and third way (Anthony Giddens) thinkers, these theorists
critically redescribe the orientation toward consensus, ad ministration, and technocracy lauded as
benefits of the post- Cold War age. Several aspects of this redescription stand out, namely, the
primacy of the economy, the individual, and the police . The current conjecture is post-political,
the argument goes, because the spread and intensification of neoliberal economic policies have sub jected
states to the demands of corporations and the seemingly inevitable logic of the market. To the extent that state authority is
increasingly less able to constrain corporate power, politics matters less . This inability of
democratic politics to produce viable solutions to_ social and economic problems, moreover,
r esonates with the celebration of the individual in communicative capitalism. The individualization of
politics into com modifiable lifestyles and opinions subsumes politics into consumption. That consumer choices may have, a
politics-fair trade, green, vegan, woman-owned-morphs into the sense that politics is nothing but
consumer choices, that is, individuated responses to individuated needs. Zygmunt Bauman makes the point
well: being an individual de jure means having no one to blame for ones own misery seeking causes
of ones own defeats nowhere except in ones own indolence and sloth, and looking for no other
remedies other than trying harder and harder still. With eyes focused on ones own performance
and thus diverted from the social space where the contra dictions of individual existence are
collectively produced, men and women are naturally tempted to reduce the complexity of their
predicament. Not that they find "biographic solutions onerous and cumber some: there are, simply no biographic solutions to systemic
contradictions, and so the dearth of solutions at their disposal needs to be compensated for by imaginary ones .... There is therefore a
demand for individual pegs on which frightened individuals can collectively hang their individual
fears, if only for a brief moment. with politics seemingly reduced to consumer choice, government
similarly contracts, now concerning itself with traumatized victims. Its role is less to ensure public
goods and solve collective problems than to address the personal issues of subjects . Accordingly, pollsters
assess individual preference and satisfaction, as if the polled were the same as the politicized people. Finally insofar as the economy alone
cannot fulfill all the functions of government, one element of the state rises to the fore-security. Thus, accompanying diminished political
influence on economic and social policy is the intensification and extension of the state as an agency of surveillance and control. The neoliberal
capitalist economy; the fragile, consuming individual, and the surveilling, controlling state are aspects of the diagnosis of de politicization well
worth emphasizing. Yet
persistently fight across a broad spectrum of political fronts-including local school boards, statewide ballot initiatives, judicial appointments, and
mobilizations to amend the Constitution. The left-wing lament regarding post-politics not only overlooks the
reality of politics on the ground but it cedes in advance key terrains of activism and struggle . Not
recognizing these politicized sites as politicized sites, it fails to counter conservative initiatives with a coherent alternative.
Third, the affirmative SHOULD be concerned with the material effects of their
political demand. Neoliberal vultures would love the opportunity to stop circling
and feed on newly opened Cuban markets
Wenston & Woods 08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of
the leading members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British
affiliate group Socialist Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro
steps down http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-afterfidel-castro-steps-down/)
They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting
for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba . What they are after is the end
of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return
to Cuba.Thatiswhattheymeanbydemocracy! Another fashionable term these days is engagement. While Bush sticks to his guns and
insists on the embargo being stepped up, the more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are
raising the need for engagement, i.e. on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels.
Does this wing of the bourgeois have different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of friends that
the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba
with cash and let the process unfold.Thatiswhyit is even more disgustingwhen we hear some
reformist elements on the left advocating such engagement. What they are actually doing is
giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side .All this talk of democracy is
in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. NotsolongagotheFinancialTimeswasgivingmoresoberadvice.They
weresuggestingaChineseroadforCubaaccompaniedbyaliftingoftheUSsponsoredembargo.TheChinesemodelwouldenvisagean
openingupofCubatocapitalismaccompaniedbyafirmgriponstatepoweratthetop.
Neoliberal violence is everywhere and nowhere while the 1AC holds us in thrall of
political theory, the slow violence of neoliberalism infects every area of the globe,
producing billions of anonymous victims beyond the reach of our moral concern.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at
the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of international affairs and directs Penn
State's Center for Global Studies as well as its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on
Violence symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
are in one of the most violent eras in human history. The scope
of violence today is global and its magnitude immense . It is seen in the death counts from
perpetual wars and the injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of
the Gulf of Mexico and the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the screams of
women subject to sexual violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is in the
blood we are served by televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven
entertainment industry. Though our various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and our social and physical sciences
capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and
no report can present us with a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat,
something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie.
Rooted in everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic
glue that bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and
building a multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to individual
and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical pedagogy must be to reveal
its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination. And progressive intellectuals
must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social media to bring about a better
understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to work toward eliminating the
toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is everywhere more apparent, it is also
everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen and unknown must be engaged just as
much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent video games and movies premised on the
spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the unintended consequence of
closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of violence, in particular the myriad
types of violence that cannot be staged. Much of the violence that is unseen and unheard happens
on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has
been described by him as a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not
viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super
twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic
drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the twentieth-
century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of
time from which the human is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to
reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of
theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender studies,
and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of violence that are visible and seen and felt by women,
children, and the disenfranchised across the globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence
and transforming the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption and
celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of revulsion and attraction when
presented to us by the American entertainment industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to the image of Wournos presented by her in the
film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at
the Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the way she looks tonight.2 This entirely
commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex semiotic process creates multiple layers of
signification concerning the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the
horrific events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the image. Carefully packaged, promoted
and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become
less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the sign system of celebrity
entertainment is signaled by becoming household names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as naming three talk show hosts. However, the
realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage
soon displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The cultural celebration of violence though
does not end with the remediation of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become
aif not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real
violence of many of the video games played by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one
torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It
is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of its main commoditiesand one that is
internationally consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of
repeated cultural consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this
past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters
because of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from children in an effort
to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and
more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume violence at
your own risk. Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The devastating
effects of neoliberalism have been well documented. Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux,
everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging
companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large corporate interests without a
dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major
corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function
as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza partiesthat is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher
test scores. (2004, xii-xiv) When
given a reprieve from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human
rights and economic justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to
be avoided. As neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised
and the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of
human rights is often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic transformation of the country. Arguably, the
state of permanent war of the United States has benefited an entertainment industry which views
increased militarization as a marketing dream. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and
its values increase in times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for corporations
endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent
resurrection of Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys past, than a market-driven
embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
Latin America is the nodal point and model for successful resistance. Have the
courage to support movements for collective organization and material change.
Unflinching rejection of neoliberal politics, in all its manifestations, is the most
preferable strategy.
MACLEOD 2013
(ALAN, social commentator, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths;
counterpunch http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
But Chavez
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people. Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed the Pink Tide by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldnt
stomach the word red). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuadors radical young economist, Correa to the Workers Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the Empires Workshop where Thatcher and Friedmans ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protgs of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
Generals brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an economic miracle, but
lamented that Britains democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent made some of the measures taken quite
unacceptable. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedmans students, imposed a sweeping austerity
packet on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where
ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal ticket,
calling the bankers and economists genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times Bart Jones speaks of
Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, mass graves being filled with mutilated corpses, tied up corpses with bullets in the
back of their heads and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last year.
Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian released a
piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty , from 13 to 22% of
the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry led to
record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on the welfare state than previously.
In contrast, even Thatchers allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in
poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to
7.6% in 2009. Venezuelas inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the most admired country in Latin America. A
similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in
shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record
corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were
pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a New Labour, largely indistinguishable from the
Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded Tony Blair and New Labour. Benn
agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too. The freemarket has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates. Media outlets
are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy , leading to even
supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be worried by the rise of the populist
left in Latin America. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of countries of Latin
America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of neoliberal economics.
But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavezs irresponsible handouts, while the Washington Post
insists he remains in power only by showering the poor with gifts. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us: lavishing state
funds on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in Western intellectual culture
that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious transgressions on freedom.
This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers.
Despite Thatcher insisting that there is no alternative, Latin America is providing a model for a
different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And we all must choose sides.
Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st century will be decided on which
one of these ideologies prevails.
Using the debate space to analyze and connect to real world struggles and
organizing is a valuable contribution to the global struggle. Voting negative
establishes a competitive and preferable role for activism and education.
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University,
West Chester University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Fortunately, the
corporate capitalist fairytale of neoliberalism has been challenged all over the globe by
students, labor organizers, intellectuals, community activists, and a host of individuals and groups
unwilling to allow democracy to be bought and sold by multinational corporations, corporate swindlers,
international political institutions, and those government politicians who willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and
rapacious profits. From Seattle to Genoa, people engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up
the challenge of neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it
takes place. Political culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers, schoolteachers with parents, and
intellectuals with artists. Groups protesting the attack on farmers in India whose land is being destroyed by
the government in order to build dams now find themselves in alliance with young people resisting
sweatshop labor in New York City. Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of
organized labor as well as groups protesting Third World debt. The collapse of the neoliberal
showcase, Argentina, along with numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including Enron),
reveals the cracks in neoliberal hegemony and domination. In addition, the multiple forms of resistance against
neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused exclusively on particularized rights and interests. On the contrary,
identity politics is affirmed within a broader crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with the
collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties. Central to these new movements is the notion that
neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political
agency. Democracy in this view is not limited to the struggle over economic resources and power;
indeed, it also includes the creation of public spheres where individuals can be educated as political
agents equipped with the skills, capacities, and knowledge they need to perform as autonomous
political agents. I want to expand the reach- es of this debate by arguing that any struggle against neoliberalism must
address the discourse of political agency, civic education, and cultural politics as part of a broader
struggle over the relationship between democratization(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy)
and the global public sphere.
demand management.
. No leader of a major
developing country has backed away from his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system.
with Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis caused by people, white with blue eyes."
adopted that model. Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from
it. The financial crises of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the
ideas associated with the so-called Washington consensus
By 2008, most
emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital.
currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets have posted much better economic growth
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least
no longer dominant the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to
modify their approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated
with the free-market model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of
competitive pressures and global economic trauma
And they will be even less inclined than before to defer to the supposed
numbers than their counterparts in the developed world.
. In
. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital, more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net
, believing--correctly--that not only economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed.
Fredric Jameson has argued in The Seeds of Time, it has now become easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (1994,
xii). The breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality spewed forth by the mass media, right-
wing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions are
now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a civilizing
process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such intellectuals
when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States invaded Iraq
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
under the administration of President George W. Bush. Within this polit ical culture, not only is democracy subordinated
to the rule of the market, but corporate decisions are freed from territorial constraints and the demands of public obligations, just as
economics is disconnected from its social consequences. Power is increasingly removed from the dictates and control of nation states and politics
is largely relegated to the sphere of the local. Zygmunt Bauman captures brilliantly what is new about the relation ship among power, politics, and
the shredding of social obligations: The mobility acquired by "people who invest"?those with capital, with money which the investment requires?
means the new, indeed unprece dented ... disconnection of power from obligations: duties towards employ ees, but also towards the younger and
weaker, towards yet unborn genera tions and towards the self-reproduction of the living conditions of all; in short the freedom from the duty to
contribute to daily life and the perpet uation of the community. . . . Shedding the responsibility for the conse quences is the most coveted and
cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. (Bauman 1998, 9-10) Corporate power increasingly frees
itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into place an utterly
privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let alone the
transformative power of collective action. Once again, demo cratic politics has become ineffective, if not banal, as civic language is impoverished
and genuine spaces for democratic learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television networks, and other
public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject to corporate ownership . Under the aggressive politics and
culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production of violence against the
poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age, gender, race, ethnicity,
and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a politics in which
radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern equality, justice, or freedom,
but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation. This is a politics that hides its
own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of public spectacles. As Susan
George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or does not" (1999,para.34).
Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical formula or defended
through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor is it a paragon of
economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising prosperity for all who
are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an
ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market economy
that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven society. More important, it is an eco
nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made visible, critically engaged, and shaken
from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national and global life. As such,
neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social agency necessary for
reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global
public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a larger
democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth, resources,
and power.
the treatment of
labour as a commodity leads to social dislocation, then moves to rebuild dierent social
networks to defend against such a threat become increasingly likely.
democracy as repression is to the totalitarian state.51 Therefore, bourgeois political parties can even accept a defeat at the polls as long as they
continue to control most of the mass media. The media, from the moment of such a defeat, work to win back the hearts and minds of those who
made the mistake of electing a leftist head of government. That is the reason why visceral reactions, such as those we have seen in a number of
countries, follow any measure taken by left governments to censure the medias disinformation campaigns and efforts to incite violence, or to
create legal instruments that protect the people's right to receive accurate information. The powerful international media echo these reactions. For
todays political battles are not won with atomic bombs but with media bombs. An example of
these media bombs is the campaign to make people think that Venezuela is engaged in an arms race
that threatens the region. Allusion to Venezuelas recent weapons purchase from Russia buttresses
the allegation. However, if CIA data are consulted, it is clear that the situation is completely
different . Using these data, Belgian economist Eric Toussaint reports: Venezuelan military spending is the sixth highest in the region behind
that of Brazil, Argentina, Chile (a country with a much smaller population than Venezuelas and considered to be a model country), Colombia,
and Mexico. In relative terms, comparing military spending to GDP, the Venezuelan military budget is
the ninth largest in Latin America. Have people been able to read this in the most important
international papers? Absolutely not. What was reported in August 2009 is that Sweden had asked Venezuelan officials to
respond to a Colombian allegation that Venezuela was supplying arms to the FARC, and that Sweden had in effect told Colombia that SAAB
missiles found in a FARC camp had been supplied by Sweden to Venezuela. However, was anyone able to find an article reporting the detailed
and concise reply given by Hugo Chvez? The missiles in question had been stolen from a Venezuelan port in 1995, four years before Chvez
took over the presidency.52 It would seem that today the election of left candidates is better tolerated because these have fewer and fewer real
possibilities of modifying the existing situation.
The Impact
While the 1AC held us captivated with elite concerns, it also minimized and
obscured the horrific violence neoliberalism inflicts on billions of people everyday.
Have the courage to ignore the affirmatives inflated threat scenarios and concern
yourself with ending neoliberal exploitation, including the compelled march toward
extinction.
Di Leo and McClennen 2012
(Jeffrey R., Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English and
Philosophy at the University of HoustonVictoria; Sophia A. professor of
international affairs and directs Penn State's Center for Global Studies as well as
its Latin American Studies program; Postscript on Violencesymploke, Volume 20,
Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 241-250 (Article))
we are in one of the most violent eras in human history. The scope of violence today
is global and its magnitude immense It is seen in the death counts from perpetual wars and the
injury reports from fierce protests; it is found in the oil-soaked waters of the Gulf of Mexico and
the radiation-contaminated earth of Japan; it is heard in the screams of women subject to sexual
violence and the children who are the victims of predators. It is in the blood we are served by
televised news and the brutal visions of an increasing violence-driven entertainment industry.
Violence is everywhere. It could be argued that
Though our
various critical and cultural studies relate features of it, and our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with a complete set of data on it. For many,
Rooted in everyday
institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that bonds
Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy
One of the
imperatives of critical pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestationsanother must be to work
toward its elimination. progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public sphere through
print and social media to bring about a better understanding of the dangers of an increasingly
violent world and to work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While
violence is everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored and hidden The violence that
is unseen and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known.While
games
premised on the spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they often have the
unintended consequence of closing off consideration and understanding of other forms of violence,
in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged Much of the violence that is unseen
and unheard happens on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of our senses
slow
violence has been described as a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of
delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically
not viewed as violence at all (
the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more, violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie.
(2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself.
And
violent video
and movies
, it
by him
Nixon 2). The slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters, earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i);
[C]limate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes (Nixon 2).
. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as geological
rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time from which the human is viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape promises to reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the exanthropic
violence of climate change is the future of theory, what of the anthropic violence that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender studies, and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of violence that
are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised across the globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our entertainment
industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming the most violent and morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption and celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became the object of
revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to the image of Wournos
presented by her in the film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the way she looks
tonight.2 This entirely commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex semiotic process creates
multiple layers of signification concerning the event and its perpetrator. The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the image. Carefully
packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry,American psychos such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their final entry into the
sign system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as naming three talk show
hosts. However, the realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The cultural celebration of
violence though does not end with the remediation of increasingly macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become aif not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major consumers of this violence.
From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played by children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie, Cars 2 (2011), featured two
deaths and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of its main commodities
and one that is internationally consumed. However, there is some reason to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of moviegoers in Aurora,
Colorado this past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet Tarts away from children
in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with eating candy, you can consume
(2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the
publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust;
public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations;
schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza partiesthat is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test scores.
(2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a
reprieve from moral indignation Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and
economic justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be
avoided.As neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised and
the disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world.
Moreover, the celebration of violence in the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal
the state of permanent war of the United States has benefited an entertainment
industry which views increased militarization as a marketing dream
. Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values
increase in times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing opportunities for corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent resurrection of
Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys past, than a market-driven embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic culture.
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people. Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed the Pink Tide by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldnt
stomach the word red). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuadors radical young economist, Correa to the Workers Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the Empires Workshop where Thatcher and Friedmans ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protgs of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
Generals brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an economic miracle, but
lamented that Britains democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent made some of the measures taken quite
unacceptable. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedmans students, imposed a sweeping austerity
packet on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where
ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal ticket,
calling the bankers and economists genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times Bart Jones speaks of
Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, mass graves being filled with mutilated corpses, tied up corpses with bullets in the
back of their heads and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last year.
Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian released a
piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty , from 13 to 22% of
the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry led to
record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on the welfare state than previously.
In contrast, even Thatchers allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in
poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to
7.6% in 2009. Venezuelas inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the most admired country in Latin America. A
similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in
shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record
corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were
pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a New Labour, largely indistinguishable from the
Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded Tony Blair and New Labour. Benn
agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too. The freemarket has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates. Media outlets
are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy , leading to even
supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be worried by the rise of the populist
left in Latin America. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of countries of Latin
America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of neoliberal economics.
But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavezs irresponsible handouts, while the Washington Post
insists he remains in power only by showering the poor with gifts. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us: lavishing state
funds on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in Western intellectual culture
that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious transgressions on freedom.
This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers.
Despite Thatcher insisting that there is no alternative, Latin America is providing a model for a
different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And we all must choose sides.
Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st century will be decided on which
one of these ideologies prevails.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt.
This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
structure, and
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
Total, unconditional, and unflinching rejection is required the only way to produce
real alternatives to neoliberalism is to refuse the allure of half measures and the
propaganda of profit.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at
the University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences
and Some of its Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism.
BA)
Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players. There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply
lie about what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about Western civilization and European
What is really
needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy alone, or a
values. This means that people now have the chance to draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact opposite of
neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of our alternative must be one that
completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism .113 Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life
for all beings on this planet upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are experiencing is indeed a
reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our politicians. But even
Theses
shift away from strict monetarism and laissez-faire policies toward Keynesian demand
management. More important, for many it delegitimized the capitalist system itself, paving the way
for the rise of radical and antiliberal movements around the world .
This time around, there has been no violent rejection of capitalism, even in the developing world. In
early 2009, at the height of the global financial panic, China and Russia, two formerly noncapitalist
states, made it clear to their domestic and foreign investors that they had no intention of
abandoning the capitalist model. No leader of a major developing country has backed away from
his or her commitment to free trade or the global capitalist system. Instead, the established
Western democracies are the ones that have highlighted the risks of relying too much on market-led
globalization and called for greater regulation of global finance.
Why has the reaction in developing countries been so much less extreme after this crisis than it was
after the Great Depression? For one, they blame the United States for it. Many in the developing
world agreed with Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva when he said, "This is a crisis
caused by people, white with blue eyes." If the global financial crisis put any development model
on trial, it was the free-market or neoliberal model, which emphasizes a small state, deregulation,
private ownership, and low taxes . Few developing countries consider themselves to have fully
adopted that model.
Indeed, for years before the crisis, they had been distancing themselves from it. The financial crises
of the late 1990s in East Asia and Latin America discredited many of the ideas associated with the
so-called Washington consensus, particularly that of unalloyed reliance on foreign capital. By
2008, most emerging-market countries had reduced their exposure to the foreign financial markets
by accumulating large foreign currency reserves and maintaining regulatory control of their
banking systems. These policies provided insulation from global economic volatility and were
vindicated by the impressive rebounds in the wake of the recent crisis: the emerging markets
have posted much better economic growth numbers than their counterparts in the developed
world.
Thus, the American version of capitalism is, if not in full disrepute, then at least no longer
dominant. In the next decade, emerging-market and low-income countries are likely to modify their
approach to economic policy further, trading the flexibility and efficiency associated with the freemarket model for domestic policies meant to ensure greater resilience in the face of competitive
pressures and global economic trauma. They will become less focused on the free flow of capital,
more concerned with minimizing social disruption through social safety net programs, and more
active in supporting domestic industries. And they will be even less inclined than before to defer
to the supposed expertise of the more developed countries , believing--correctly--that not only
economic but also intellectual power are becoming increasingly evenly distributed.
Thesis Policy or K
Neoliberalism is the defining crisis of the contemporary age- we are forced with
make a choice to align ourselves with the forces of social devastation or the
mobilize a coherent challenge to the forces of radical privatization.
FRASER, 13
(Nancy, quails not needed but Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and
Social Science at the New School, "A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of
Crisis after Polanyi," New Left Review 81, May/June, P 119-21)
In many respects, todays
crisis resembles that of the 1930s, as described by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation.1 Now,
relentless push to extend and de-regulate markets is every- where wreaking havoc
destroying the livelihoods of billions of people; fraying families, weakening communities and
rupturing soli- darities; trashing habitats and despoiling nature across the globe. Now, as then, attempts
to commodify nature, labour and money are destabilizing society and economy witness the destructive
as then, a
effects of unregulated trading in biotechnology, carbon offsets and, of course, in financial derivatives; the impacts on child care, schooling, and
care of the elderly.
Now, as then, the result is a crisis in multiple dimensionsnot only economic and
Moreover, our crisis seems to share a distinctive deep-structural logic with the one
Polanyi analysed. Both appear to be rooted in a common dynamic, which he called fictitious commodification. In both eras, ours and his ,
consensus exists. Political elites are explicitly or implicitly neoliberaloutside Latin America and
China, at least. Committed first and foremost to protecting investors, virtually all of them
including self-professed social democratsdemand austerity and deficit reduction, despite the
threats such policies pose to economy, society and nature. Meanwhile, popular opposition fails to
coalesce around a solidaristic alternative, despite intense but ephemeral out- bursts , such as Occupy and
the indignados, whose protests generally lack programmatic content. Progressive social movements are longer-lived and
better institutionalized, to be sure; but they suffer from fragmentation and have not united in a
coherent counter-project to neoliberalism . All told, we lack a double movement in Polanyis sense.3 The result, therefore, is
a curious disjuncture. While todays crisis appears to follow a Polanyian structural logic, grounded in the dynamics of fictitious commodification, it does not manifest a Polanyian political logic, figured by the double movement.
Thesis - Hippies
The strategy of the 1AC is that of the permitted Left the frenetic call for social
stabilization coopts any more radical movement to address the neoliberal
coordinates that make market domination inevitable.
Robinson 8
William I., Professor of Sociology at the University of Santa Barbara, Latin America
and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective)
Nevertheless, it
signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. imperial strategies . In its
regime form, it seeks to divide and co-opt radical left social movements and parties. The radical Left, on
the other hand, offers fundamental challenges to empire, neoliberalism, and capitalism . The radical
Left works to overturn capitalist class rule and capitalist states in Latin America through the
activity and struggle of the popular classes and oppressed peoples themselves . It envisions a transition toward
democratic social coordination of the economy and the construction of a development model in which human needs are prioritized above the
needs of capital. The radical Left fights for communal ownership of economic and natural resources. It
pushes for worker and community control of workplaces and neighborhoods. The radical Left sees
liberal capitalist democracy as a limited expression of popular sovereignty and seeks instead to
expand democratic rule through all political, social, economic, and private spheres of life . It is antiimperialist, seeking the regional liberation of Latin America and the Caribbean and challenging the imperial pretensions of the American empire,
as well as those of its emergent rivals active in the region. This is quite distinct from earlier versions of state capitalism or nationalist populism in
Latin American twentieth-century history, which sought merely state ownership of the means of production in strategic economic sectors and
state allocation of resources. The radical Left described here is an ideal type, a vision of society toward which increasing numbers of Latin
Americans hope to transition out of existing capitalism through processes of struggle . No new economic system drops from the
sky, Michael Lebowitz (2006: 61) points out. Rather than dropping from the sky or emerging pristine and complete from the conceptions of
intellectuals, new productive forces and relations of production emerge within and in opposition to the
existing society. One implication is that the new society can never be fully formed at the beginning. Initially, that new society must build
upon elements ofthe old society. The radical Left indigenous social movements that arose in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, and the radical
socialist flanks of the Chavista movement in Venezuela, are arguably those social forces that most closely approximate the outlook of the radical
Left described above. Perhaps the best analytical starting point for an understanding of the izquierda
permitida ideal type, the radical Left's antipode, is what Iorge Castaneda, a former leftist, describes approvingly as the
"reconstructed, formerly radical left."The reconstructed governments of Chile under Michelle Bachelet (until
her recent electoral defeat to right-wing Sebastian Piflera), Uruguay under Tabar Vazquez (and now Ios Mujica), and Brazil under Lula (and
now Rouseff), for example, stress "social policy-education, anti-poverty programs, health care,
housing- but within a more or less orthodox market framework." When the parties of the izquierda permitida
have come to office in recent years, their "economic policies have been remarkably similar to those of [their neoliberal] predecessors"
(Castafleda, 2006: 35). As we have seen, in the final years of the 1990s and the outset of the 2000s, the region entered into a steep recession that
fundamentally brought into question the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a development model and gave birth to myriad social explosions and
popular struggles. The paradigmatic political parties and regimes of the new izquierda permitida are one
expression of a reconstitution of neoliberalism in a new form. In terms of its economic program, the izquierda
permitida has been deeply influenced by the turn from classical structuralism to neostructuralism within the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Over the course of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, neostructuralism
moved from the margins to the center of political influence in the region by challenging certain assumptions of the market dogmatism
characteristic of orthodox neoliberalism while rebuking simultaneously the core presuppositions of classical structuralism. Post-Pinochet Chile
became the poster child of neostructuralism throughout the 1990s. In this way it became a prototype for the izquierda permitida. Neostructuralism
was also deeply influential in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," which came out of a Iune 1999 convention of the Socialist International and
eventually became the model of political economy for Lula's Brazil, Kirchner's Argentina, Vazquez's Uruguay, and arguably the governments
formed recently by formerly guerrilla parties in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala (for a different view, see the chapter by Hctor Perla Ir.,
Marco Mojica, and Iared Bibler in this volume). The areas of conceptual innovation at the heart of
state policies. These shifts will require a greater role for state engineering. States must fashion
institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and coordination of markets .
The institutions must be of high quality and embody "public regardedness" rather than personalistic clientelism. Whereas orthodox neoliberals
in the 1970s and 1980s saw the state's basic function as lubricating the dynamism of the market through the protection of property rights, contract
enforcement, information collection, and strictly delimited social provision for the destitute, neostructuralism "assigns the state an important
auxiliary role in the search for international competitiveness," blending economic policy on various levels "with political intervention to
construct a broad social consensus" (Leiva, 2008: 9-10). The
orientation of the new izquierda permitida is to "pragmatically strive to reconcile liber1y, equity,
and community with the demands of a market economy " (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller, and Teichman, 2006). The
restructuring of neoliberalism in the direction of an izquierda permitida may offer "an alternative that combines representative democracy with a
market economy and state initiatives to reduce inequalities and promote social citizenship" (Roberts, 2008: 87). The regimes of the izquierda
permitida introduce targeted antipoverty programs, subsidies for small- and mediumsized businesses, increases in royalty regimes for
multinational corporations operating in the natural-resource sectors, and joint private-public ventures between the state and foreign capital.
These changes do not signify any change in underlying social inequalities of the neoliberal class
system. They retain fiscal and monetary austerity, co-opt radical extra-parliamentary movements,
and pursue "social pacts" between the ruling classes and the working class and the peasantry
predicated on keeping wages down.
Links
Link Aid
Poverty assistance to displaced rural farmers is just a new means of exploiting
surplus populations. The plan is a reworking of development assistance in response
to the latest rounds of neoliberal dispossession. The aff does nothing but lubricate
the gears of capital.
Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre,
University of Bristol, 7
[Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People,
pg. 10-12
Accumulation by dispossession embodies the idea that capitalism must perpetually have something
outside of [sic] itself in order to stabilise itself (Harvey 2003: 140). One example is the continuing relevance of Marxs
notion of an industrial reserve army, that is, a floating population of cheap, unskilled labour, lacking protection and entitlements, that can be hired
and fired as business expands and contracts. For Harvey, such an outside can be either a pre-existing non-capitalist
territory, such as still existed in many regions of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, or a
sector or market within capitalism that has not been fully exploited or proletarianized . Additionally and
importantly, however, capitalism can actually manufacture it (ibid.: 141). Through a combination of
mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues to shape the violent bouts of predation on
existing dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed
accumulation. Within the underdeveloped world, many forms of primitive accumulation that would be
recognizable to Marx are still operating today: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family farming
by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of proletarianization and reproletarianization, the wholesale
privatization of common property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption and so on. At the same time,
however, and relating to the mass consumer societies of the developed world, certain aspects of primitive accumulation have been adapted and
expanded. The credit system and finance capital, for example, have opened up new zones of predation. Stock promotions, mergers and asset
stripping have accompanied the active promotion of high levels of debt peonage. Corporate fraud and dispossession through credit and stock
manipulation, including the raiding and decimation of pension funds by stock and corporate collapse are all central features of what
contemporary capitalism is about (ibid.: 147). Indeed, the reversion to private hands of public entitlements won through political struggle, such
as a state pension, social welfare and national health care has been the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of
neoliberal orthodoxy (ibid.: 148). New global mechanisms for dispossession have also opened up, for example regarding intellectual property
rights, patenting and the licensing of genetic material such as seed plasma. Biopiracy by international pharmaceutical companies and the pillaging
of the worlds genetic resources are rampant, creating means ofgovernance that can now be used against whole populations whosepractices had
played a crucial role in the development of those materials (ibid.). The wholesale commodification of life, including its many natural and cultural
forms, histories and intellectual creativity, is currently under way. When coupled with the deepening international privatization of common goods
and entitlements such as land, water and public utilities, Harvey has argued that capitalism has launched the world on a new
wave of enclosing the commons (ibid.). From political economy one could argue that accumulation by
dispossession, in continually evoking a surplus population, not only provides development with an
object, it is one that is constantly being renewed. A superfluous and potentially dangerous waste-life
is continuously thrown off as markets are relentlessly made and remade in the endless search for
progress. This concern arising from political economy is recognized by policy makers. Politicians
are fully aware, for example, that while globalization brings many benefits, if badly managed it can
exacerbate inequality and instability (Biccum 2005). This contemporary ambivalence towards
globalization returns development once more to its founding design of reconciling the need for
order with the challenges of progress. Because surplus life is continuously produced, development
also periodically reinvents itself. While the context, words and emphasis may change, the central meaning remains
the same. In terms of basic tenets this process, since 1949at least, has been well documented by William Easterly (Easterly 2002).
Following decolonization, when it vectored into an interstate relationship, development has
regularly reinvented itself within a limited set of axioms. Like penal reform, the endless rediscovery of
development has produced a a monotonous critique (Foucault [1975]: 266) which, in this case, invariably calls
for an increase in aid spending, a renewed focus on poverty reduction, the delivery of more effective
aid, the necessity of better coordination between donors, aid agencies and recipients, the
importance of recipients being receptive to policy change and, not least, debt relief. The periodic
repackaging of these aims over the past half-century has been helped by developments
organizational preference for limited agency competition, low public accountability, institutional
amnesia and a willingness to engage in obfuscation and spin control, allowing practitioners always
to describe aid efforts as new and improved (Easterly 2002: 228).
efficacy and engagement. Macroeconomic reforms shape political behavior by restructuring the
relationship between citizens and the state in ways that create pow- erful incentives or
disincentives for becoming involved in politics. In Mexico, repeated austerity programs since the
1980s, which gutted fed- eral spending programs and eliminated subsidies for basic foodstuffs; a
decline in the spending and scope of rural development programs; and a general shrinking of
state budgets made the state less relevant for the poor.10 Other free market reforms, such as the
privatization of state- owned enterprises, the deregulation of the market for coffee and other cash
crops without agricultural extension services, and attempts to pri- vatize ejidos (a form of collective
property in rural areas), have rein- forced the perception among popular groups that the state
cannot or will not provide for them. Central to this change in incentives was the governments
shift away from comprehensive welfare, poverty alleviation, and rural develop- ment programs
to more limited programs that carefully target people on the basis of individual need. Grindle
(1986) has argued that rural devel- opment projects were core elements of the states strategy to
extend its presence as deeply as possible into the Mexican countryside. In reality, it was precisely
because of state-building efforts during the 1950s and 1960s and because of comprehensive
development programs like PIDER-COMPLAMAR, SAM, and CONASUPO in the 1970s and
1980s that peasants had more and more incentives to target the state when seek- ing solutions to
their material needs (see also Fox 1993). Similarly, Craig and Cornelius argue that Recent
reforms have dismantled this welfare system, eliminating many of the incentives the poor had for
engaging in political activity. The poverty alleviation initiatives of Ernesto Zedillos
administration (19942000) particularly signaled a retreat of the state from the lives of the poor.
A central characteristic of the new era of government-spon- sored poverty alleviation programs,
such as PROGRESA; its successor, Oportunidades; and agricultural subsidy programs like
PROCAMPO is that they target individuals on a strict need basis, using formulas for calculating the level of support that individuals and households receive. This rationalization of
public spending may be good economic policy because it insulates policymakers from political
pressures; but by elim- inating much of the discretionary power that parties, corporatist organizations, and politicians had in allocating benefits to their most loyal clients, it makes political
participation irrelevant, if not irrational. Per- haps even more damaging, the selective allocation of
social assistance often divides communities between those receiving assistance and those left out of
programs. This fragmentation of interests atomizes the rural and urban poor, places them in
competition with each other, and weak- ens their capacity for collective action (Kurtz 2004). The
net effect of these changes has been to increase the cost of tar- geting the state while making it less
likely that political action will be successful. In the following interview excerpt, Norma explains
how her interactions with the CNC and government officials have changed over the past few
years. Notice that she places particular emphasis on decreasing benefits, declining access, and an
inability to use her posi- tion as a representative of the CNC to guarantee preferential treatment
for her group.
Just as there are local losers in NTAE industries, there are also winners. Local benefits include
new employment and income opportunities, access to new consumer goods, social and
productive infrastructure, and so on. But these benefits are very unevenly distributed. The NTAE
industry has benefited a class of medium-level producers and local investor groups , often -urbanbased. Many people in these groups have bought out their poorer neighbors thereby changing the
class structure. It is interesting to observe the local social groups often involved in the NTAE
industry. In the case of Central America or of Chile, for instance, local influence over the
industry is exercised largely through finances. Under the neoliberal program state banks
providing low-cost credit to peasant producers have been closed or restructured along market lines .
Most credit for NTAEs comes from private banks, from TNCs that provide commercial credits for
their contractors (or simply use their own capital for direct investment), and increasingly, from
investment houses in urban areas, known as financieras. These financieras function like
investment funds, where urban professionals and middle strata, along with capitalists, invest their
money in shares. Urban import-export groups, such as those that own foreign automobile or
computer dealerships, have entered NTAE production by organizing these fancieras, which
replace state credits that were established in the pre-globalization period of ISI and state-led
development (for these details, see Robinson, 2003).
Link - Biodiversity
Aid is primarily economicenvironmental protections are constrained by market
forces.
Corson 2010 (Catherine; Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke;
Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode
Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576602, June 2010)
In this context, articulating the economic importance of environmental issues became a critical
means of integrating environment issues into USAID's development agenda . Reports and letters
that informed the 1970s congressional amendments emphasized the need to protect the natural
resources upon which poor people in developing countries relied (Blake et al 1980; Scherr 1978).
However, as the program enlarged in the ensuing decades, the agency's environmental advocates
found that they needed to highlight environmental projects contributions to a country's overall
economic growth in order to mobilize political support. As one former senior USAID official
recounted: Articulating the rationale for environment as an economic issue was an important part
of advancing the environmental agenda. We had to devise a rationale that was consistent with the
agency's mission, and AID's primary mission was economic development. In an article in which
she described the emerging USAID environmental portfolio, influential USAID environmental
advisor Molly Kux highlights six investment rationales for foreign aid donors to invest in
environmental conservation, including maintaining ecosystem services; addressing the rural
populations economic aspirations; increasing nature-based tourism; protecting endangered
species; investigating natural economic products; building on indigenous conservation; and
promoting sustained yield harvesting (Kux 1991:298299). Her priority list reveals historical roots
of the contemporary faith in market-based conservation. These roots reflect strategic policy
designed to appeal to the constituent groups that support environmental foreign aid: politicians and
bureaucrats committed to economic development and, as I will show, congressional advocacy
organizations, who were primarily interested in species conservation. Nevertheless, the 1980s
tactic of embracing economic growth and sustainable development in order to access the
development agenda laid the groundwork for the later rise in market-based conservation
approaches and ultimately the process through which conservation became a conduit for
capitalist expansion.
governance, in particular opening up room for private actors to influence state policy. This article
explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s
underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation
funding. By focusing strictly on international biodiversity conservation this alliancedriven to a
great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their
corporate partnershipshas been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create
new spaces for capital expansion. The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic
conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within
US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are
produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities
for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008;
Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together,
these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the
growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate
linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Bscher and Whande 2007), and the
contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell
2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008). While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human
environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have
often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and
civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the interorganizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps
to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization , as called for
by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of
foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of
NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for
environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed
and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the
relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the
private sectorwhich have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and
reforms underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first
comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to NGOs
moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. The
second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect the
environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this aim .
To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the 1980s, the
Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the same time, in
an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to private
contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID funded
conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many of the
environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the 1970s
shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to protesting
World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOsnow with a
special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity fundingto take up the endeavor to promote
environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global environmental
agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the privileging of
NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from USAID funding.
In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity funding in the late
1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They consolidated this campaign
during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard for environmental issues and
massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding. In the twenty-first century,
the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political support behind USAID's
biodiversity program. Based on the analysis presented in this article, I make three broad claims
that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal conservation. First, throughout
these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized visions of themselves as
representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private interests thought to be
behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access to policy-makers and
influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships that characterize the
BINGOs twenty-first century operations. Second, the strict focus on international biodiversity
has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the BINGOs, USAID, corporate
leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental foreign aid. By defining the
environment as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away from competing economic
and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied partners have enticed US
politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid. They have created an
avenue through which they can become environmentally friendly without confronting the
environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA or the foreign
and domestic investments of US corporations. These successful political strategies, aimed at
mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by which
environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion . In fact, I contend
that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and material
spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental stewardship
for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical territories for
capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of common lands as
protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming around the
concept of biodiversity conservation.
project management to contractors and grantees. The convergence of the downsizing with
reiterated congressional backing of biodiversity meant that the agency was reducing its staff just as
Congress was requiring it to spend increasing amounts on biodiversity .17 At the same time,
Clinton Administration and congressional policies promoted the funding of NGOs to carry out
the agency's environmental agenda. With a vested interest in USAID's biodiversity program, the
conservation NGOs stepped up their congressional advocacy when its funding became threatened in
the late 1990s. In the context of the second Bush administration anti-environmentalism, they
further consolidated their collaboration. Redefining Environmentalism after 9/11 The election of
giving, expanding by roughly 40 percent between 2001 and 2005 (Lancaster 2007:91), the
environment was not a Bush priority. The MCA basically ignored environmental issues until
NGOs pushed Congress to mandate that it add an environmental indicator as one of the
economic and governance standards that recipient countries had to meet. The 2006 reform placed
environmental programs as a subcategory under economic growth, with specific prioritization on
biodiversity conservation, natural resources and reducing pollution (US Department of State
2007). The Bush administration's relegation of environment to the economic growth portfolio
meant that USAID environment officials had to articulate environmental programs in terms of
their contribution to economic growth. Moreover, through the GDA, USAID became a linchpin in
the growing NGOcorporate conservation partnerships, which included, for example the
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance, a US$23 million initiative among the Home Depot,
Metafore, the US Forest Service and WWF-US. In this context, articulating the economic benefits of
conservation and reaching out to the private sector were necessary political moves to secure
USAID funds. As in the Reagan revolution, the demotion of environmental issues catalyzed a
revived congressionalNGO partnership, which aimed to protect the environmental gains of the
previous two decades, but which focused this time primarily on biodiversity conservation. The
private sector and emphasizing the economic value of conservation became necessary political
survival strategies. Nonetheless, as the next section describes, new NGO activities on Capitol
Hill catapulted these associations to a new level. Creating the New Conservation Enterprise The
beginning of the twenty-first century also witnessed a mounting collaboration among the four
large conservation NGOs: WWF-US, TNC, CI and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). In
2003, building on the mobilization started at the end of the Clinton administration to protect
biodiversity funds, the four joined forces under an entity called the International Conservation
Partnership (ICP). The ICP aimed to build widespread congressional support for conservation
through activities such as congressional briefings and lunches, jointly endorsed letters, and
overseas congressional trips to priority biodiversity sites.19 One of the ICP's primary activities
was the annual publication of an International Conservation Budget (ICB), which recommended
appropriations levels for the major US government-funded international biodiversity
conservation programs, including USAID's. Its successful circulation to members of congress
speaks for itself in that the amount legislated in the appropriations bills each year generally
reflected those promoted in the ICB. For example, for FY 2008, it recommended US$195 million
for USAID, which was the amount that the Appropriations Committee included for USAID later
that year (US Congress 2007). The ICP also inspired the 2003 creation of a bipartisan House
International Conservation Caucus (ICC),20 which, with an eclectic membership of 150 ranging
from the far left to the far right, had become one of the largest bipartisan caucuses in the House
by the end of 2007. Representatives Hal Rogers, a Republican from Kentucky; John Tanner, a
Democrat from Tennessee; Ed Royce, a Republican from California; and Tom Udall, a Democrat
from New Mexico co-chaired the caucus (DePhillis 2007; ICC 2008). In 2005, a parallel caucus
was created in the Senate, and as of 2009, it was chaired by Senators Sam Brownback, a
Republican from Kansas; Dick Durbin, a Democrat from Illi nois; Olympia Snowe, a Republican
from Maine; and Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat from Rhode Island. The caucuses strict
focus on foreign environmental issues has underpinned their ability to bring together a bipartisan
coalition that includes a broad spectrum of political perspectives.21 First, organizing around
international biodiversity has enabled the coalition to continue to draw on reliable US public
concern about, and therefore congressional interest in, saving charismatic megafauna in other
countries. It has also allowed many congressional members to embrace environmentalism
without confronting domestic constituents. As one former USAID official said: It is easier to do
biodiversity overseas than in this country because the conflicts don't involve constituencies of
Congress. When there are problems with local communities [overseas], they don't call up their
congressman. As such, the caucuses have attracted individuals who might consider themselves
anti-environmentalist on domestic issues by providing a way, as one congressional aide told me, to
be proactive when it comes to the environment without being labeled a traditional
environmentalist. What has brought these diverse individuals together is, as an NGO
congressional liaison summarized, They [the members] all like wildlife, and they have all at one
time or another visited international park sites abroad. Here, NGO-organized trips for
congressional members and staff to biodiversity sites overseas have been important mechanisms to
mobilize congressional interest in funding international biodiversity conservation .22 Most
congressional staff I interviewed had been on overseas jaunts with one or more of the four ICP
partners. In July 2006, the ICP formed the International Conservation Caucus Foundation
(ICCF), a separate 501C(3) organization, with the mission to support the ICC, and specifically to
provide an educational forum on Capitol Hill, where we keep Members of Congress and their
staff constantly updated with information we synthesize from our base of NGO supporters on the
most pressing and timely issues in international conservation (ICCF 2007b). To this end, the
ICCF has provided congressional briefings on topics such as WalMart's commitment to
sustainability, the USAID-funded Living in a Finite Environment program in Nambia, and the
ecosystem payments program in Costa Rica. Initially funded by the BINGOs, the ICCF has since
attracted a number of corporate advisors and sponsors. The members of its advisory
conservation council have included corporate giants such as Exxon Mobil, International Paper,
and Unilever. In putting together this sponsorship, the ICCF has drawn on the corporate linkages
of some of its founding NGOs. Bailey (2006) reports that TNC's corporate associates and major
contributors at various times have included 3M, Shell Oil, General Motors, Ford Motor
Company, BP Exploration, MCI Telecommunications Company, MBNA America Bank, Enron
Corporation, Georgia-Pacific, Johnson and Johnson, Weyerhaeuser Company, Waste
Management Inc. Monsanto Company and Dow Chemical. Similarly, Chapin (2004:24) writes
that some 1,900 corporate sponsors donated a total of US$225 million to TNC in 2002, and
that CI's website lists over 250 corporations, which donated approximately US$9 million to its
operations in 2003. In 2008, these corporations included, among others, Anglo-American,
Chevron and Rio Tinto (CI 2008). Likewise, TNC has chapters at the state and country level,
many of which have powerful political and corporate ties. The ICCF'sPartners in Conservation
brochure showcases a number of publicprivate partnerships undertaken by the organization's
sponsors (ICCF 2007a). For example, it cites the Goldman Sachs and WCS partnership to protect
680,000 acres on the island of Tierra del Fuego, Chile and the American Forest & Paper
Association, Indonesia Ministry of Forestry, and CI partnership, entitled the Alliance to Combat
Illegal Logging, which uses remote sensing to monitor illegal logging. Other partnerships include
the WalMart and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation Acres for America program, which
conserves 1 acre of critical wildlife habitat for every acre of land developed for an existing
WalMart facility or new one created in the United States, and ExxonMobil's support for the Save
The Tiger Fund, which, it boasts, represents the largest single corporate commitment to saving a
species (ICCF 2007a:20). Perhaps most striking is the promotional material put out by the
ICCF, including the widely circulated invitations to the ICCF's annual galas. These galas provide
vehicles for colossal shifts of funds amongUS-basedstate, private and non-profit sectors in the
name offoreignconservation, and as such, contribute to a growing biodiversity conservation
enterprise. As colorful collages of corporate and conservation NGO logos, their invitations
provide striking symbols of the merging of conservation and capitalism. It is hard to identify
where conservation ends and capitalism begins. Attendance at such fundraising events costs, for
example in 2006, between US$1000 and 50,000. These galas have honored various celebrities,
including former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, actor Harrison Ford and Chad Holliday,
Chairman and CEO of DuPont, for their contributions to international conservation. The 2006
and 2007 invitations boasted meals prepared by Texas Cowboy Chef Tom Perini, who was the
Caterer to the President of the United States. Importantly, despite the organization's efforts to
increase government expenditures on biodiversity conservation, the ICCF invokes antigovernmental rhetoric to attract conservative and corporate members. For example, ICCF
president David Barron underscored the bipartisan nature of the foundation and its neoliberal
tenets at the ICCF's September 2006 inaugural gala. In a published letter to the gala attendees, he
stated (emphasis in original): We arenotadvocating more government. Quite the contrary, we
are advocating private sector solutions We are pro-development and pro-business. We are propeople, pro-wildlife and pro-wilderness. The ICCF's outreach to conservative and corporate
leaders reflects, like the sustainable development agenda and the framing of environmental issues in
economic terms, a successful strategy designed to raise funds and awareness for environmental
conservation. Similar to sustainable development, international biodiversity conservation has
become a nucleus around which public and private organizations can find common interests. By
defining the environment as a foreign concern, the ICCF's high-profile effort has provided an
avenue for organizations and individuals who have been heretofore considered antienvironmentalists to appear environmental. By providing this stamp of environmental approval,
however, the biodiversity conservation movement has enabled global capital expansion.
conservation NGOs with bipartisan congressional ties and corporate support, the perception of
environmental NGOs as a countering force to anti-environmental corporations continues . While
advocating against state interference, the alliance has been able to direct public funding. In this
process, as the state has turned to private organizations to implement its work, it has in turn
become dependent on these entities not just to design and implement programs, but also to
mobilize political support for their existence. Finally, the intertwining of conservation and
neoliberalism in Washington DC politics, through public/private/non-profit partnerships, has
facilitated capital accumulation in the United States, as well as created new spaces for capitalist
expansion overseas. The biodiversity conservation movement, with its expanding corporate
partnerships, has enabled capitalist expansion by not only supporting the enclosure of common
lands and exclusion of former resource users, but also by labeling otherwise exploitative
corporations as environmental stewards and by building a capitalist enterprise centered on
biodiversity conservation. In this enterprise, funds are shifted among government, private and
non-profit sectors; conservation organizations have grown into corporate-like entities; and annual
galas provide venues for exorbitant expenditures of wealth in the name of conservation. In this
manner, neoliberal conservation has reinforced the separation of environmental concerns from
their broader political economic drivers. It has allowed for the conceptualization of environmental
goals without changes in existing political institutions, or distributions of economic power or
resources flows (Adams 1995; McAfee 1999; Redclift 1987), and in fact, it has reinforced these
institutions and resource flows. While there remains a hopeful nod to environmentalism as a
potential political movement in opposition to neoliberalism (McAfee 1999; McCarthy and
Prudham 2004), it is clear that, in the twenty-first century, an environmental movement, once
organized in opposition to economic growth, has instead become its conduit.
Gupta 2002; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Jepson 2005; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Peck and
Tickell 2002). They have become, as Harvey (2005:177) writes, the Trojan horses of global
neoliberalism. Despite the recognition of these shifts, relatively little empirical work exists on
how this dispersed governance in the international development agenda has created new avenues
for the intertwining of capitalism and conservation. Through analysis of the everyday politics
among NGOs, branches of the state, and the private sector, this article uses the lens of USAID to
concurrently address this gap and respond to calls for ethnographic information about
conservation and development donors. In doing so, it links literature on the neoliberalization of
nature with critiques of conservation policy and practice, and it situates itself in three related
debates on neoliberalism, conservation and development. The first of these examines the
neoliberalism of natureseen in measures such as privatization and regulatory rollback,
commodification of nature, and new enclosures (for overviews see Castree 2008; Heynen et al
2007). For example, it analyzes the manifestation of neoliberal ideology in environmentalism,
evident in tradable emission permits, transferable fishing quotas, user fees for public goods and
utility privatization, as well as through corporations use of environmental discourses (eg
McAfee 1999; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). In biodiversity conservation specifically, hegemonic
practice now values nature based on its potential market price. The enclosure, commoditization,
and privatization of nature has resulted in an emphasis not just on ecotourism, but also on
mechanisms like direct payments and publicprivate partnerships to promote conservation , and
management of parks by private entities (Hutton, Adams and Murombedzi 2005; Igoe and
Brockington 2007; West and Brockington 2006). Adding a critical new dimension to this
literature, I explore how public and private entities, in their endeavor to mobilize funding for
environmental foreign aid, have embraced neoliberal ideology, and in turn, contributed to its
further expansion. The second body of literature explores the entwined growth of the BINGOs
and their expanding corporate linkages. As conduits of conservation's commoditization, networks
of states, foreign aid donors, philanthropists, corporations and conservation organizations have
attracted escalating financial support for international conservation since the 1980s. In particular,
the BINGOs have turned to corporations and private sponsors to finance conservation (Bailey
2006; Bscher and Whande 2007; Chapin 2004; Dowie 2005). In the process, they have created
what I term a conservation enterprise, in which funds are shifted among public, private and nonprofit entities in the name of conservation, without ever being used on-the-ground . The analysis
presented below reveals how transformations in US foreign aid politics and policies have
contributed to the emergence of this conservation enterprise. Accompanying the rise of big
conservation is a move within conservation away from engaging local actors. As protected area
networks spread across the globe, a third group of researchers continue to document new
enclosures of common lands under the guise of biodiversity conservation and the associated
displacement of local and indigenous peoples (Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Brockington,
Igoe and Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Chapin 2004). A subset of the aforementioned body of literature
looks at the relationship between neoliberal discourse, community conservation, and the
privatization and commercialization of conservation (Dressler and Buscher 2008; King 2009;
McCarthy 2005). As Igoe and Brockington (2007:446) aptly summarize: neoliberalism's emphasis
on competition, along with its rolling back of state protection and the social contract, creates spaces
in which local people are not often able to compete effectively in the face of much more powerful
transnational interests. At its extreme, the turn away from community conservation is evidenced
by the call for a return to exclusionary parks, or what critiques call fortress conservation, in
which local people are excluded, by force if necessary, from utilizing resources within park
boundaries (for an analysis, see Adams and Hutton 2007; Brechin et al 2002; Wilshusen et al
2002). Nevertheless, critiques have also contended that ecoregional and transboundary
approaches, which aim to extend conservation beyond parks to landscape scales, have
simultaneously furthered the influence of state agencies, international and national NGOs and
private companies in conservation and reduced investment in local communities (Brosius and
Russell 2003; Gezon 2000; Wolmer 2003). Ultimately, this scholarship illuminates how the
foreign aid donor politics about which I write manifest on-the-ground and in people's daily lives.
However, while these authors show the enclosures happening as a result of biodiversity
conservation, they have elided how such endeavors are embedded in and productive of powerladen relationships among financing organizationsa gap that I aim to fill. Finally, as King
(2009) points out, there have been relatively few detailed empirical studies that uncover the
internal debates and politics of the organizations behind international conservation. I would add
to his critique that few studies explore theinter-organizationalrelationships that comprise the
international biodiversity conservation agenda. In attending to this omission, I join a nascent
group of researchers who use ethnographic analysis to investigate the micro-politics of foreign
aid donors (eg Bebbington and Kothari 2006; Crewe and Harrison 1998; Goldman 2005; Lewis
et al 2003; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005). The findings presented here draw on a decade
of experience working in Washington, DC politics, particularly with USAID and the US Congress ,
as well as on specific research, carried out between 2005 and 2008. In this regard, long-term
participant observation informed my appreciation of the political dynamics and bureaucratic
cultures analyzed here and fundamentally shaped the original research design, research process
and final analysis. The focused research then entailed the analysis of 30 years of USAID policy
and program documents related to environment and natural resources issues, as well as USAID
congressional presentations, congressional appropriations and authorization bills, hearing
records, and NGO lobbying material, for example.5 It was then supplemented with 70 keyinformant interviews with current and former staff from USAID, the US Congress, NGOs, other
lobby organizations, consultant groups, research institutions and universities. Interviewees were
chosen through a combination of snowball and targeted sampling, in which individuals were
chosen for their ability to provide critical information and/or to represent a range of perspectives
and organizations. In particular, I selected individuals who were personally pivotal in shaping the
environment programsuch as those who directed lobbying efforts, wrote particular pieces of
legislation, or oversaw USAID's environment programas well as individuals who could offer
extensive historical perspectives. Many of the interviewees were current or former senior officials
in these organizations, and as is typical in Washington, many of the interviewees had worked in
more than one relevant position and/or organization. Interview data were analyzed and
triangulated using content analysis software. However, in order to protect confidentiality, all
information is reported anonymously in that sources are identified only by general position and
interview dates are not disclosed.
were only a matter of the red tape and being shunted around, all that would have to be done
would be to improve management methods, but that would not work. Where lies the root of this
disaster? It is related to a basic issue: how management in an institution is conceived of and
implemented. Do the top civil servants or cadres make the decisionsbecause they think they
are the only ones who have the expertise to do soor is trust placed in the membership and the
organized people, in their energy and creativity? It was often said in the Soviet Union, devastated
by an imperialist war and a civil war, that progress could only come about if the workers and
peasants en masse were committed to work for the countrys reconstruction. But when workers
and peasants took these remarks seriously and tried to apply them by taking the initiative
(organizing, for example, a peoples cafeteria or a daycare center), their efforts were rejected by
the central authorities. This was done on various pretexts, but the bottom line was that the
authorities could not stand the fact that people had done things outside their control.
Bureaucratism is the direct negation of peoples autonomous activity. Any independent initiative,
any new thought is considered heresy, a violation of party discipline. The center must decide and
supervise each and every thing that is done. Nothing can be done if the order didnt come from the
center.
decades, a number of political theorists have attempted to analyze the contemporary conjuncture
as post-political or postdemocratic. Reversing the terms of the end of ideology thesis offered by
neoconservative (Francis Fulcuyama) and third way (Anthony Giddens) thinkers, these
theorists critically redescribe the orientation toward consensus, ad ministration, and technocracy
lauded as benefits of the post- Cold War age. Several aspects of this redescription stand out, namely,
the primacy of the economy, the individual, and the police . The current conjecture is post-political,
the argument goes, because the spread and intensification of neoliberal economic policies have sub
jected states to the demands of corporations and the seemingly inevitable logic of the market. To
the extent that state authority is increasingly less able to constrain corporate power, politics
matters less . This inability of democratic politics to produce viable solutions to_ social and
economic problems, moreover, r esonates with the celebration of the individual in communicative
capitalism. The individualization of politics into com modifiable lifestyles and opinions
subsumes politics into consumption. That consumer choices may have, a politics-fair trade, green,
vegan, woman-owned-morphs into the sense that politics is nothing but consumer choices, that is,
individuated responses to individuated needs. Zygmunt Bauman makes the point well: being an
individual de jure means having no one to blame for ones own misery seeking causes of ones own
defeats nowhere except in ones own indolence and sloth, and looking for no other remedies other
than trying harder and harder still. With eyes focused on ones own performance and thus
diverted from the social space where the contra dictions of individual existence are collectively
produced, men and women are naturally tempted to reduce the complexity of their predicament.
Not that they find "biographic solutions onerous and cumber some: there are, simply no
biographic solutions to systemic contradictions, and so the dearth of solutions at their disposal
needs to be compensated for by imaginary ones .... There is therefore a demand for individual
pegs on which frightened individuals can collectively hang their individual fears, if only for a brief
moment. with politics seemingly reduced to consumer choice, government similarly contracts,
now concerning itself with traumatized victims. Its role is less to ensure public goods and solve
collective problems than to address the personal issues of subjects . Accordingly, pollsters assess
individual preference and satisfaction, as if the polled were the same as the politicized people.
Finally insofar as the economy alone cannot fulfill all the functions of government, one element
of the state rises to the fore-security. Thus, accompanying diminished political influence on
economic and social policy is the intensification and extension of the state as an agency of
surveillance and control. The neoliberal capitalist economy; the fragile, consuming individual,
and the surveilling, controlling state are aspects of the diagnosis of de politicization well worth
emphasizing. Yet post-politics, depoliticization, and de-democratization are inadequate to the task
of theorizing this con juncture. The claim that states are decreasing in significance and impact
because of the compulsions of the market ignores the millions of dollars regularly spent in
political campaigns. Business and market interests as well as corporate and financial elites
expend vast amounts of time and money on elections, candidates, lobbyists, and lawmakers in
order to produce and direct a political climate that suits their interests. Capitalizing on left
critiques of regulation and retreats from the state , neoliberals move right in, deploying state power
to further their interests. Similarly social conservatives in the United States persistently fight
across a broad spectrum of political fronts-including local school boards, statewide ballot
initiatives, judicial appointments, and mobilizations to amend the Constitution. The left-wing
lament regarding post-politics not only overlooks the reality of politics on the ground but it cedes in
advance key terrains of activism and struggle. Not recognizing these politicized sites as
consumers can specify the features they desire in a product: I 'll take a grande half-calf skinny latte
with extra foam: I'II design and order my own sports shoes; IIl save television shows, edit out
the commercials, and watch them when it's convenient for me. Media, ever smaller and more
integrated, are not just many-to-many as early Internet enthusiasts emphasized, but me-to someto me. The rise of the consumer as producer hyped as Web. 2.0 and signaled by Facebook,
MySpace, and YouTube designates a shift in media such that increasing numbers of people present
their own artistic work (videos, photographing music, writing), express their own views, and star
in their own shows. They want-to make themselves known and visible -not just read or hear or see
others (one example: 93 percent of U.S. teenagers use the Internet; 39 percent of them post their
own art, stories, and video online).5 At the same time, the experience of consuming media has
become progressively more isolated-from large movie theaters, to the family home, to the singular
person strolling down the street wearing tiny headphones as she listens to the soundtrack of her
life or talks in a seeming dementia into a barely visible mouthpiece. This isolation in turn repeats
the growing isolation of many American workers as companies streamline or flexibilize their
workforce, cutting or outsourcing jobs to freelance and temporary employees. lnsofar as too many
on the academic and typing left have celebrated isolation as freedom and consumption as
creativity we have failed to counter the neoliberalization of the economy Even worse-we have
failed to provide good reasons to support collective approaches to political, social, and economic
problems. Its easier to let the market decide. Rather than accepting responsibility for this failure
and for our own enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of networked, consumer-driven
entertainment and communications media, though, we continue to blame the other guys -
right is weaker than we are prepared to admit, then our retreat, our cowardice, is all the more
shameful: We gave in, gave up, before we needed to. We actually didn't lose. Its worse than that we
quit.
Link - Competitiveness
The idealization of competitiveness is the end logic of absolute labor exploitation to
be competitive, we come to desire our own domination.
RAMONET 11
(Ignacio, Spanish editor of LeMonde, "Neoliberalism's Newest Product: The
Modern Slave Trace," Global Research, Aug 3,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/neoliberalism-s-newest-product-the-modern-slavetrade/25888)
Responsibility for this expansion of human trafficking lies largely with the current dominant
economic model. In effect, the form of neoliberal globalisation than has been imposed over the last
three decades through economic shock therapy has devastated the most fragile levels of society and
imposed extremely high social costs. It has created a fierce competition between labour and capital.
In the name of free trade, the major multinationals manufacture and sell their goods around the
world, producing where labour is cheapest and selling where the cost of living is highest. The new
capitalism has made competitiveness its primary engine and brought about a commodification of
labour and labourers . Globalisation, which offers remarkable opportunities to a lucky few, imposes on the rest, in Europe, a
ruthless and unmediated competition between EU salary workers, small businesses, and small farmers and their badly-paid,
exploited counterparts on the other side of the world. The result we now see clearly before us: social dumping on a planetary
scale . For employment the result is disastrous. For example, in France in the last twenty years this phenomenon has caused the elimination of
more than two million jobs in the industrial sector alone. Certain sectors in Europe where there is a chronic shortage of labour tend to use
undocumented workers, which in turn fuels the trafficking of more workers by clandestine networks that in many cases force them into slave
labour. Numerous reports clearly evidence the sale migrant farm workers. Despite the many tools of international law
available to combat these crimes, and
condemning them,
industry and construction and major agricultural exporters exert constant pressure on
governments to turn a blind eye
to the trafficking of undocumented workers. Industry management has always supported mass
immigration because it depresses the price of labour. Reports by the European Commission and BUSINESSEUROPE (an association of European
industries and businesses) have called for more immigration for decades. But todays human traffickers are not the only
ones exploiting slave labour: now a form of legal servitude is being developed . For example, last
February in Italy Fiat served its workers with the following extortionate ultimatum: either agree to
work more, for less money, in worse conditions, or the company will shift operations to Eastern
Europe. Faced with the prospect of being fired and terrorised by the conditions in Eastern Europe, with its rock bottom
wages and no weekends off, 63 percent of the Fiat workers voted for their own exploitation. In Europe many employers,
taking advantage of the crisis and brutal fiscal adjustment policies being imposed, are trying to establish similar forms of legal servitude.
Thanks to the tools made available by neoliberal globalisation, they threaten their workers with
savage competition from cheap labour in distant countries. If we are to avoid this form of corrosive
social regression, we will have to begin to question the current workings of globalisation and begin
the process of deglobalisation.
Being competitive is the result of cheap labor and a volatile neoliberal system of
economics
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs107-108
Nontraditional exports and services are the face of global capitalism in the region. They utilize the
region's comparative advantage in cheap labor as a basis for a "competitive" reinsertion into global
markets. The social and production relations of global capitalismincluding the new capital-labor
relation based on informality, flexible and casualized labor, as discussed in Chapter i, and the
gendered nature of these relationsare evident in these new activitiesin the maquiladoras,
agro-export platforms, new offices, commercial establishments, and tourist facilities that have
spread throughout Latin America. Yet these social and production relations also spread to older
economic sectors and to areas of social life not directly connected to the global economy, so that
the social relations and the culture of global capitalism are diffused throughout society . Existing
social relations are disarticulated and replaced by new sets of relations shaped by the
commercial, productive, and cultural processes of global society. It appears that Latin America
began a new cycle of capitalist development in the 1990s, following the lost decade of the 1980s,
as a new model of globalized accumulation took hold. I will argue, however, that this new cycle
exhibits deep structural and social contradictions and is politically unstable . A key underlying
theme of this book is that the problematic nature of the global system. First, in particular, the
model is highly dependent on attracting mobile and often volatile transnational finance and
investment capital, with a large component of financial speculation characteristic of the global
casino. Second, the new export boom, based on a set of nontraditional activities that constitute
regional participation in global production and distribution chains, is fragile as a consequence of
global market competition, overproduction, and the impermanent nature of production sequences
in the global economy. Third, the development model based on neoliberal integration into the
global economy does not require domestic market expansion or an inclusionary social base and is
therefore unable to couple the new accumulation potential with social reproduction. Fourth, the
social contradictions generated by the model have led to heightened social conflict, popular class
mobilization, the political instability of fragile polyarchic regimes, a new resistance politics , and the
breakdown of neoliberal hegemony. The key argument is that the model was thrown into an
economic crisis between 1999 and 2002, and then this crisis unleashed counter-hegemonic social
and political forces that discredited neoliberalism and brought about a new period of popular
struggle and change. This sweeping scenario is unpacked in this and the following three chapters.
Let us start by looking more closely at what has been in fact an export boom in Latin America
from the 1980s and on, comparable to the export booms of earlier epochs, such as the late 1800s
and then again after World War II.
Link - Cuba
Cuba serves as an important symbol that neoliberalism isnt the only option
Gonzalez 04
(Carmen,Teachesenvironmentallawfundamental,internationalenvironmentallaw,and
internationaltradelawattheUniversityofSeattle,TradeLiberalization,FoodSecurity,andthe
Environment:TheNeoliberalThreattoSustainableRuralDevelopment,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
Cuba is symbolically important because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant
export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural
productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment .However,thetransformationof
CubanagriculturewasaresponsetothecrisisoftheSpecialPeriodandwasmadepossibleby
Cubasrelativeeconomicisolation.Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into
the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to
restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore
important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made
compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for
sustainable rural development.
Integration of neoliberalism into Cuban policy resulted in the worst inequality and
corruption since the start of the Castro regime
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs349-350
The objective limitations of projects of popular transformations at the level of the nationstate are apparent in Cuba. Despite the inevitable (and some not so inevitable) problems the
Cuban revolution has faced in its half century of existence Cuban society is perhaps the
most egalitarian in the hemisphere and certainly one of the most developed in terms of
quality of life indicators. Cuba's efforts to transition from a capitalist to a revolutionary
socialist society ran up squarely against the limitsnay, the corrosive influenceof global
capitalism in the 1990s and on. With no choice but to integrate into world capitalist markets
the Cuban government attempted to create a sort of dual economy: one capitalist, linked to
the global economy and driven by the law of value; the other socialist, internal, driven by a
social logic. Thus it promoted the tourist industry, created a parallel dollar economy where those
with access to foreign exchange could purchase scarce goods and services, relaxed controls on
private money-making undertakings, and allowed, even encouraged, an expanding informal
economy driven by local exchange values. In theory these measures were innocuous, in the
interests of popular majorities, perhaps necessary or even inevitable. The problem is that
such reforms were not enacted in the abstract but in the real world of global capitalism
and its penetration via these reforms into the structures of Cuban society and the fabric of
social and cultural life. Cuba's integration into global capitalism meant growing social
inequalities. Those who had access to the capitalist sector, whether in tourist jobs or other
forms of association with foreign capital, dollar remittances from family members abroad,
the ability to set up a small business, and so forth, inevitably acquired more resources and
social privilege over those restricted to the socialist sector. There is gravitation toward the
capitalist sector, which could only be suppressed by authoritarian means. It was not
possible to insulate the socialist from the capitalist sector. Moreover, those who acquire
such privileges form a potential social base for a political opposition to the revolution.
Expanding social inequalities combined with the increased availability of scarce goods,
luxury items, and conspicuous consumption fuel relative deprivation and social tensions.
There were other pernicious influences, such as a renewed racialization process (see
Chapter 3), the reappearance of prostitution, largely servicing tourists and other foreign
visitors, and corruption. The distorting influence of the law of value or capitalist logic over
a system organized along a nonmarket social logic generated such absurd paradoxes as
doctors working as hotel waiters, university professors driving taxis, and engineers
running family kitchens. The Cuban experience underscores the catch-22 that all efforts
to challenge global capitalism must address: in an age when "de-linking" or withdrawal
from the system is not a viable option, how is transformation from within managed in such
a way as to not reproduce the very social and political forces that reproduce global
capitalism? How to supersede a system from which one cannot yet de-link, does not control,
and cannot confront in its entirety? How to build a democratic socialism in the midst of a global
capitalist milieu from which there is no flight? If the (capitalist) state as a class relation is
becoming transnationalized then any challenge to (global) capitalist state power must
involve a major transnational component. Struggles at the nation-state level are far from
futile. They remain central to the prospects for social justice and progressive social change.
The key point is that any such struggles must be part of a more expansive transnational
counter-hegemonic project, including transnational trade unionism, transnational social
movements, transnational political organizations, and so onable to link the local to the
national, the regional, and the global. And they must strive to establish sets of
transnational institutions and practices that can place controls on global market and rein
in some of power of global capital. This is why permanent mobilization from below that
pressures the state to deepen its transformative project "at home" and its counterhegemonic transnational project "abroad" is so crucial.
hearsomereformistelementsontheleftadvocatingsuchengagement.Whattheyareactually
doingisgivingthebourgeoisadviceonhowtoremovethisthornintheirside.All this talk of
democracy is in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. NotsolongagotheFinancialTimes
wasgivingmoresoberadvice.TheyweresuggestingaChineseroadforCubaaccompaniedby
aliftingoftheUSsponsoredembargo.TheChinesemodelwouldenvisageanopeningupof
Cubatocapitalismaccompaniedbyafirmgriponstatepoweratthetop.
despite the poverty suffered by most Cubans, which has largely been explained is the result of
external factors, as noted above. Cubans do not necessarily have to believe Castro (1999) that
neo-liberal global capitalists enter third world areas with tremendous tax breaks and ... pay
not more than 5 percent of the salary they must pay in their own countries ... leaving behind
nothing more than pollution, poverty and meager wages (p. 13), all they have to do, as many
do, is look at their neighboring countries to realize that life dominated by the insatiable appetite
for profits and personal gain of neo-liberal capitalism would have far graver consequences on their
lives than the US Embargo. For example, it is widely believed by Cubans that privatization would
almost instantly lead to illiteracy and a spike in infant mortality rates (Bez, 2004).However,
Bez (2004) and other activist scholars are watching closely wondering if the pride of The
Revolution will eventually attract investment offers too good to turn down given the economic
hardships endured by the Cuban people as a result of US economic warfare/terrorism coupled
with the end of Soviet aid. Indeed, it has been noted on more than one occasion that the Cuban
people comprise the best-educated and healthiest populations in Latin America increasing their
value as a commodity on the international market. Castro (1999) takes special care to note that
even during Cubas most financially desperate times, funding for their education and health care
programs were never cut, and gains in the health of the population were even realized. However,
because the state maintains high levels of education as a basic right, and because the economy is
set up around an externally controlled global market system based on the manufacture of
scarcity, the level of education among the population tends to exceed that which is needed in
employment. It is within this context of real material desperation among Cubans, in a context of
manufactured scarcity and marked by the fall of the USSR and appropriately dubbed the Special
Period, that we can begin to understand Cubas economic reform policies that have re-privatized
certain segments of the Cuban economy, such as tourism, when Castro himself has spent the
majority of his time in office as a staunch opponent of private capitalism. For example, expressing
his indignation at the dehumanizing and destructive nature of capitalism Castro (1999) laments,
... neo-liberal globalization wants to turn all countries ... into private property ... into a huge free
trade zone (p. 13). But what role has the Cuban government and Castro himself played in
turning their country into a free trade zone in their engagements with private capitalists? After the
revolution the Cuban people, inspired by Castros moving speeches tapping into the populations
patriotism and legacy of imperial resistance, were enthusiastically energized to work in the sugar
cane fields striving to produce record breaking yields in order to support the pillars of the
revolution, such as education, for the emergence of what Ernesto Che Guevara called the new
man, which has been criticized for embracing traditional masculine values within industrialism
while ignoring feminist critiques of patriarchy. While the state has heavily relied on the
monopolization of agriculture to fund the social programs of the revolution, the state, having had
raised and guaranteed wages, found itself under increasing strain in 1968 when the world market
price for Sugar, Cubas primary export, fell to less than 2 cents per pound (Bez, 2004). The
crisis resulting from the reliance on a single export crop for national funding made it hard to
situate blame outside the country. As rations tightened and Cubans became disgruntled, footdragging and absenteeism increased in the sugar mills and factories. Cubans began more
regularly engaging in the black market, usually to satisfy food needs, which also hurt the
governments ability to accumulate capital. In an effort tocollect this money, dollar stores were
made available (discussed below). What have these changes looked like in practice?
agriculturalproduction,itislikelythatstructuraladjustmentwillresultinrenewedemphasison
sugarproductionoronthecultivationofnontraditionalagriculturalexports(suchasflowers,
fruits,andvegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food
production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies
and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets
to foreign competition.These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing
commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and
reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also
be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless
Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the
environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of
genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major
cultivator of genetically modified crops.
Lifting the embargo destroys the Cuban revolution, which is key to worldwide antineoliberal revolution.
Wenston & Woods 08
(Fred & Alan, Alan Woods is a Trotskyist political theorist and author. He is one of the leading
members of the International Marxist Tendency, as well as its British affiliate group Socialist
Appeal, Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down
http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)
If the Cuban revolution were defeated, as happened in Russia, it would have a demoralizing effect
first of all on the workers, youth and peasants of the whole of South America, and even on a world
scale. On the other hand the regeneration of the Cuban revolution and the victory of the Venezuelan
revolution would completely transform the situation on a world scale.
Now there are important capitalist elements in Cuba. There is an increasing number of small
traders, the people who hold dollars, black marketeers, who are increasingly interwoven with the
party and the state. And that is the real threat to the Cuban revolution. A while back the
leadership took measures to restrict the growth of the dollar economy. That will no doubt have an
effect for a time, but in the long run it cannot stem the tide in the direction of a market economy.
One of the main reasons for this is the increased participation of Cuba on world markets, which
they are compelled to do now with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have no alternative.
We are not against that. In and of itself it would be a progressive development. The Bolsheviks
attempted to trade with the capitalists on the world market. Lenin and Trotsky actually offered
American capitalists the possibility for them to conduct business in places like Siberia: to open
up whole parts of Russia and lease it to them as concessions rather it lease it to them to be
correct, not give it to them. And that was absolutely correct, as long as the Bolsheviks
maintained the firm control of the state. But the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet state in its
infancy was a direct threat, and therefore the American, British and French bourgeois would not
trade with them. They wanted to crush the Bolshevik revolution because it was a threat.
The Cuban revolution represents a threat to capitalism and imperialism because it gives an
example. Therefore the American imperialists at this stage they do not want to trade with Cuba,
they want to throttle Cuba; they want to destroy Cuba.
If the truth were to be told, the American ruling class are a little bit lacking in mental equipment. If
they were a bit more intelligent they would not blockade Cuba. On the contrary, they would
promote trade with Cuba . That would materially assist the bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces
inside Cuba. But because they are all a little bit thick and the big boss in the White House is
exceptionally thick they do the opposite of what is required, from their class point of view.
Link Democracy
Despite the fallacy that in democracy everyone wins, existing democracies prove
that because of neoliberalism current democracy only benefits the wealthy
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
87)
Real existing constitutional democracies privilege the Wealthy. As they install, extend, and protect
neoliberal capitalism, they exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor, all the While promising that
everybody wins. The present value of democracy relies on positing crucial determinants of our
lives and conditions outside the frame of contestation in a kind of no go zone These
suppositions regarding growth, investment, and profit are politically off -limits, so its no Wonder
that the Wealthy and privileged evoke democracy as a political ideal. It cant hurt them. The
expansion and intensification of networked communications technologies that was sup posed to
enhance democratic participation integrates and consolidates communicative capitalism.
Nevertheless, the left continues to present our political hopes as aspirations to democracy Despite
democracy's inability to represent justice in the Wake of political submission to a brutalized,
financialized, punishing global market, left political and cultural theorists appeal to arrangements
that can be filled in, substantialized, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and
conservatisms diametrically opposed to social justice and economic equality. Calling for democracy
leftists fail to emphasize the divisions necessary for politics, divisions that should lead us to organize
against the interests of corporations and their stockholders, against the values of fundamentalists
and individualists, and on behalf of collectivist arrangements designed to redistribute benefits and
opportunities more equitably. With this plea, leftists proceed as if democracy were the solution to
contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them, rather than the name of the
impasse in which we find ourselves.
Link- Development
Development is just a neoliberal phrase for creating ideal places for the investment
of transnational capital
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs107-108
Neoliberal programs in Latin America have sought to create an optimal environment for private
transnational capital to operate as the putative motor of development and social welfare . As
transnational elites in Latin America set about to integrate their countries into the global economy
they came to base "development" on the virtually exclusive criteria of achieving maximum
internal profitability as the condition sine qua non for attracting transnational capital: what
Korzeniewicz and Smith (2000) call the low road to globalization. Profitability in this regard
rested above all on the provision of cheap labor along with access (often state subsidized) to the
region's copious natural resources and fertile lands . New capital-labor relations have developed
out of a logic of accumulation based on the provision to the global economy of an abundant
supply of cheap, flexible, and disciplined labor as a "comparative advantage." In turn, the
availability of a vast reserve army of cheap labor impedes growth in productivity and reinforces
these particular conditions of profitability. For neoliberal elites, successful integration into the
global economy became predicated on the erosion of labor's income, the withdrawal of the social
wage, the transfer of the costs of social reproduction from the public sector to individual families,
a weakening of trade unions and workers movements, and the suppression of popular political
demands. Hence, in the logic of global capitalism, the cheapening of labor and its social
disenfranchisement by the neoliberal state became conditions for "development ." The very drive
by local elites to create conditions to attract transnational capital has been what thrusts Latin
American majorities into poverty and inequality . The contraction of domestic markets, the growth
of the informal economy, and austerity programs, among other components and effects of
capitalist globalization, have resulted in the informalization of the workforce, mass under- and
unemployment, a compression of real wages and a transfer of income from labor to capital.
Link- Discourse
Neoliberalism is highly creative and organized. Minor resistance doesnt stand a
chance.
Fischer and Plehwe, 2013
(Karin Fischer and Dieter Plehwe, Fischer is a senior reporter at The Chronicle of Higher
Education, Dieter Plehwe is a Senior Fellow at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin and
the co-editor with Philip Mirowski of The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the
Neoliberal Thought Collective. The Pink Tide and Neoliberal Civil Society Formation: Think
Tank Networks in Latin America, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6601)
How can we explain such resilience, or the comeback of neoliberal forces, leaders and recipes, in
spite of the dismal record with regard to human rights, economic viability and social welfare? Of
course the global division of labour and political power resulting from cross-border restructuring
has locked in legal and other constraints. The new constitutionalism for disciplinary
neoliberalism (Gill 1998) provides a certain amount of stability for the international economic
order. But without local support the quasi ultra-imperialism (Kautsky) of the present age
would implode in many countries, much like the Soviet empire in the late 1980s. Consequently
we have to look for local forces supporting neoliberal orientations, even if they do not generate a
lot of popular support in certain moments.
Neoliberalism is a comprehensive political and general ideological orientation, which has proven to
be well organized and highly creative in the past at least with regard to exploiting the
contradictions of social liberalism, populism, and mixed or planned economies. Neoliberals have
been able to combine a strong normative core and political flexibility, a well-orchestrated high level
debate and a wide range of more or less pragmatic political projects. Compared to parochial
political movements, neoliberals drew particular strength from creating and maintaining strong
links across borders and from a new style of organization that relied to a greater extent on
organizational networks than competing political forces.
Link - Economy
Neoliberalism creates the fantasy that everyone is a winner while in reality
neoliberalism is driven on the idea of competition. This illusion lures countries and
individuals into the free market system and is used to reassure the unemployed only
to the effect that many become the losers of the system
Dean 09
(Jodi Dean is a professor of political science at Columbia University, Democracy and other
Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left politics, Duke University Press, page
57)
We can see this closure at work in the slippage between ideas of competition and winning. On
the one hand, neoliberal thought emphasizes the necessity of competition. As George points out,
competition was Margaret Thatchers central value and faith in competition was the governing
precept of her destruction of the British public sector. George quotes Thatcher, It is our job to
glory in inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit
of us all. On the other hand, even as neoliberalism emphasizes competition, it holds on to the
notion that everyone is a winner, a notion clearly at odds with competition because in competition
there are winners and losers. Thus, so-called Third World or developing countries are not told,
Sorry, losers, thats the breaks in a global economy. Rather, they are promised that everyone will
win. The Global Report on Human Settlements notes: Conventional trade theories see increased
trade and a liberalized trade regime as purely beneficial; but, as in all chance, there are, in fact,
winners and losers. Those participating in the active, growing areas of the world economy or
receiving (unreliable) trickle-down effects benefit. Those who do not participate at best receive no
benefits, but, in fact, are usually losers, since capital tends to take flight from their countries or
their industries to move to more productive zones, reducing work opportunities and business
returns as currencies and wages fall or jobs disappear. just as the Washington Consensus
promised the less-well-Developed countries that they would all benefit from free trade, so in the
United States are workers advised not to worry about the decline in manufacturing and rise of
outsourcing. New jobs will be created. With education, workers can be retrained. This same
promise that no one will lose reappears at the level of the local school. Kids today are taught that
everyones a winner. Everyone gets some kind of prize or ribbon just for showing up. In some U.S.
districts, schools no longer post grades or rankings out of fear of hurting the self-esteem of those
students near the bottom. Perhaps surprisingly, the emphasis on testing inherent in George W
Bushs education policy No Child Left Behind, is not accompanied by a corresponding ranking of
students. Instead, schools and teachers are ranked and assessed-but not the students, because
everyone is a winner.
Engaging with Latin America through capitalism destroys the societies people live in
CANTERBURY 2004
(DENNIS C. Professor of Sociology at Eastern Connecticut State University, USA Development
Alternatives to Neoliberal Globalization: Or Are There No Alternatives? Department of
Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, Eastern Connecticut State University, Willimantic,
CT 06226, USA Review of Radical Political Economics, Volume 36, No. 3, Summer 2004,
391-399)
The internationalization of capital, the process of drawing people into the global economy, has
devastating effects on people. By separating consumption and production and
minimizing the states ability to provide succor, the marketplace becomes a
mechanism for enslaving people rather than liberating them. As international trade becomes
more important, policy can no longer respond to local concerns for social welfare and the
environment; sustainable development, then, becomes a popular cause around which civil society
must rally. This is crucial since it is unlikely that the neoliberal model would build sustainable
communitiesthe logic of accumulation is ecologically unsustainable and antithetical to
community development. Indeed, Barkin argues in Transcending Neoliberalism that
neoliberalism exacerbates social class divisions and sharpens the partitioning of society at all
levels. The program for international economic integration and domestic
perpetual praise of the market we are witnessing what can be described as market
fundamentalism. People believe in the market as if it was a god. There seems to be a sense that
nothing could ever happen without it. Total global maximized accumulation of money/capital as
abstract wealth becomes the sole purpose of economic activity. A free world market for
everything has to be established a world market that functions according to the interests of the
corporations and capitalist money. The installment of such a market proceeds with dazzling
speed. It creates new profit possibilities where they have not existed before, e.g. in Iraq, Eastern
Europe or China. One thing remains generally overlooked: The abstract wealth created for
accumulation implies the destruction of nature as concrete wealth. The result is a hole in the
ground (Galtung), and next to it a garbage dump with used commodities, outdated machinery,
and money without value. However, once all concrete wealth (which today consists mainly of the
last natural resources) will be gone, abstract wealth will disappear as well. It will, in Marx words,
evaporate. The fact that abstract wealth is not real wealth will become obvious, and so will the
answer to the question which wealth modern economic activity has really created. In the end it is
nothing but monetary wealth (and even this mainly exists virtually or on accounts) that
constitutes a monoculture controlled by a tiny minority. Diversity is suffocated and millions of
people are left wondering how to survive. And really: how do you survive with neither resources nor
means of production nor money?
For thirty years, global and national economies have been guided by policies of neoliberal
deregulation, often known as the Washington Consensus. Neoliberalism has been disastrous for
workers in most countries, pitting workers against each other in a race to the bottom and making it all but
impossible to protect working class interests. There is now a growing consensus that the Washington
Consensus has been a failure. There is also a growing global recognition that we are in the midst of
an unprecedented climate crisis. Ready or not, that crisis is affecting every nation, every locality, and
every worker. Its effects are already serious, and unless decisive global action is taken to counter it, they
will soon be catastrophic. Neoliberal deregulation, by dismantling the means for public steering of
society to meet social needs, has also made it nearly impossible to correct global climate crisis.
These twin realizations, the failure of neoliberalism and the climate crisis, will define the struggle for the
interests of poor and working people for the next century. At the same time, the necessity to counter
climate change may provide an opportunity to address the broader problems of neoliberal deregulation.
This article argues that it is only by rolling back neoliberalism that we can protect the rights of workers
globally and solve the crisis of climate change. In Part 1 we provide a short history of globalization. In
Part 2 we discuss the climate crisis and its effects on workers. In Part 3 describes proposals for a global
green new deal to create full employment through climate protection. Part 4 argues that a new global and
national regulatory regime is necessary both to counter both climate change and the race to the bottom.
Part 5 discussions the role of organized labor nationally and globally in bringing about such a
transformation.
over identified, overinvested free-marketer is the one who clearly delights in the
game, in the risk, the hunt, the thrill of the market . A key motif in market-porn, that is, in memoirs of life in business, the
fascinating-repulsive market predator exposes the obscene supplement of the free market fantasy the violence or violation that underpins the
system.35 His enjoyment depends on the others losing. He only Wins when others lose. According to
business memoir conventions, the predator ultimately has to lose in some domain-his business is
taken over or collapses, he loses his family, or he loses his sense of self. This loss is thus accompanied by lessons,
lessons now made available to everyone so we can avoid his mistakes and be ourselves Winners in the free market. Ive been describing free
trade as a fantasy that occludes and sustains the brutality of neoliberal capitalism. Free trade establishes possibilities through which We narrate
our relation to enjoyment. Ziiek argues that What makes desire possible in contemporary conditions is the despotic figure which stands for the
primary jouisseur, the one who appropriates all enjoyment.36 My reading of the fantasy of free trade suggests otherwise. This fantasy provides a more complex organization of enjoyment, one
that promises that everyone wins, uses losses to reconfirm the necessity of strengthening the system so everyone wins, and perpetually displaces the thieves of enjoyment throughout the system as Wamings, exceptions, and
contingencies. The fantasy of free trade is but one of the fantasies animating neoliberal ism as an ideological formation. The previous chapter considers fantasies linked to communication technologies, and there are still others
remain ing to be analyzed. But important as the level of fantasy is for under standing how neoliberalism organizes enjoyment, the category of fantasy alone cannot explain the hold of neoliberalism. Thus, in this chapter, Ive also
mentioned neoliberalisms reliance on a religious supplement (specifi callyg some practices of evangelical Christianity) as well as its investment in its differences from and opposition to competing ideologies. Neo liberalism has to
employ a variety of means to secure its dominance, as its understanding of the role of the state explicitly acknowledges. Analyzing the changed functioning of the state under neoliberalism, Paul A. Passavant develops a compelling
account of neoliberal govern mentality. A crucial element of this mode of governmentality is the consumer/ criminal doublet. In what follows, I link Passavants consumer/ criminal doublet to Zi:2eks idea of the decline of symbolic
efficiency in order to explain an additional aspect of neoliberalism as an ideological formation, namelyg how it produces the subjects it needs. Under neo liberalism, the disciplined worker and consumer-citizen of the social wel fare
state fragment into myriad, shifting, imaginary identities that con verge around the strange attractors ofthe insatiable shopper (shopaholic) and incorrigible criminal. THE DECLINE OF SYMBOLIC EFFICIENCY In his critique of
risk society theory, Zi:2ek.introduces the idea of the decline of symbolic efficiency. He draws from the later work of Lacan to describe a change in the functioning of the symbolic order. During the middle years of his teaching, Lacan
understood the symbolic order as the order of language and meaning. The symbolic is what counts as our everyday experience, our understanding of the role of names and offices, our expectations regarding references. We might say
that the symbolic here refers to what everybody knows. In his later work, Lacan introduces different modes in the operation of the symbolic. Hence, his four dis courses-those of the master, hysteric, university; and analyst-are
Different forms of the social link established through language. By Semi nar XX, rather than presuming a symbolic order held in place by a master signiiier, Lacan theorizes a symbolic space held together by fragile and contingent
knots of enjoyment (symptoms, quilting points)/" In this later version, Lacan emphasizes the ways the imaginarjg the symbolic, and the Real are entangled in one another, rupturing, filling in, and covering over their own excesses
and lacks. Zizeks notion of a decline in symbolic efficiency continues the theori zation of this idea of a symbolic space permeated by enjoyment. He highlights our perpetual uncertainty our sense that we never really know whether
what we say registers with the other as what we mean as well as our sense that we are never quite sure what everybody knows. There is no ultimate guarantor of meaning, no recognized authority that stops our questioning or
assuages our doubts. For example, if we receive distressing medical news, we can-and are encouraged to-seek a second, third, and fourth opinion. Many of us will search for information on the Internet and explore alternative
remedies. But we rarely find firm, reassuring answers, answers in which we are completely coniident. There are myriad experts all offering their own specific advice-how can we choose among them? To take another example, how
can we know the truth about global warm ing? Some scientists, politicians, and journalists have called it a hoax and a conspiracy to undermine capitalism. Other scientists, politicians, and journalists tell us that the first group
constitutes ia minority; there is clear evidence for global warming and a scientific consensus that humans are causing it. Then we might worry aren't minorities sometimes right? Hasnt mainstream scientific opinion been dead wrong
in the past? In the face of fundamental disagreement, how can one determine whom to believe especially if we are already skeptical about the media, which some remind us is owned by corporations even as others emphasize its
pervasive left bias? I return to these problems of credibility and certainty in chapter 6. For now, I simply want to tag this fundamental uncertaintjg this fact that we cannot count on something like reality as the decline of symbolic
efficiency The change in the status of realitjg of the symbolic order of language and meaning, has been noted by others besides Zizek-most directljg by the administration of George W Bush. .In an oft-cited article from the New York
Times Magazine, Ron Suskind relates a discussion he had with a FREE TRADE 65 'White House aide. The aide dismissed journalists as being part of the reality-based community. He continued, Thats not the way the world
really works anymore .... Were an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you are studying that reality-judi ciously as you will--well act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too."'2
The decline of symbolic efficiency links to Michael Hardts and An tonio Negris account of the shift from disciplinary society to the society of control.43 As Hardt and Negri explain, disciplinary logics worked pri marily within
the institutions of civil society to produce subjects. These institutions-the nuclear family union, school, neighborhood-are now in crisis. According to the zooo census, for example, less than a quarter of Americans live in families
comprised of a married couple and chjldren.4 Union membership has likewise declined such that in zoo6 only 12 percent of workers were unionized and public sector employees were five times more likely than private to belong
to a union.45 Hardts and Negris point is that the old political subject, the citizen-subject of an autonomous political sphere, the disciplined subject of civil society can no longer be said to exist. The implications of this point are
broad. For just as the disciplined subject of civil society can no longer be said to exist, so is there a fragmen tation among the identities mobilized politically in and as civil society. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century the
categories of social inclusion and exclusion were politicized and mobilized. Social movements organized along lines of race, sex, ethnicity and sexuality radically transformed everyday life as they sought to eliminate entrenched
hierarchies. As a result of the critical. work of these movements, as well as the accompanying decline of the welfare state and empowering of neo~ liberalism, racial, sexual, and ethnic identities are less fixed, less stable, less available
as determinate subject positions. The category we seems per manently to have been called into question and in its place are fluid, hybrid, and mobile imaginary identities (Hardt and Negri use the term singularities). Emerging in
the context ofthe breakdown of determining social norms, the subjects inhabiting these identities are generally undisciplined, al though subject to ever more controls. We might think here of changes in public schools away from
practices of discipline and normalization and toward searching, surveilling, and policing. Contemporary subjects in creasingly lack self-control, in part because they lack a strong sense of self that arises through discipline, and, as I
detail below, look outside them selves for some authority to impose control. Extemal control-through the direct or indirect use of force, through threats and fears, and through the mobilization and intensification of aEects and
desires-takes on more of the work previously done by internalized control." In psychoanalytic terms, we can say that symbolic identity is increasingly -fragile, uncertain, and meaningless in the society of control. Imaginary identities
sustained by the promise and provision of enjoyment replace symbolic identities. And the multiplicity and adaptability of these identities does not mean that subjects are somehow freer or more liberated than they were under the
discipline ofthe welfare state. Rather, they come under different sets of controls, diEerent organizations of enjoyment. Read together with I-Iardt and Negri, Zizeks notion of the decline of symbolic efficiency clarifies an eEect of the
The latter does not provide symbolic identities, sites from which we can see ourselves. Rather, it oEers in
their place new ways for me to imagine myself, an immense variety of lifestyles with which I can experiment. The variety of available identities
and the mutability which characterizes contemporary subjects relations to their identities, moreover, renders imaginary identity extremely
vulnerable. The frames of reference that give it meaning and value_shift and morph. Others who might challenge it can appear at any moment.
Their successes, their achievements, their capacities to enjoy can all too easily call mine into question--I could have had more; I could have been
better; I could have really enjoyed. We thus encounter under neoliberalism a situation wherein Symbolic
shift from a Keynesian to a neoliberal ideological formation.
prohibitive norms are increasingly replaced by imaginary ideals (of social success, of bodily fitness _ . .).48 These
imaginary ideals combine with ferocious superego figures who command subjects to enjoy (thereby effectively ensuring that we cannot) .49 So
neoliberal ideology does not produce its subjects by interpellating them into symbolically anchored identities (structured according to
conventions of gender, race, work, and national citizenship).5 Instead, it enjoins subjects to develop our creative potential
(CAHNDRA; President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST); Trans Pacific
Partnership is a Threat To National Sovereignty
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/the-chavez-legacy/)
The TPP also allows pharmaceutical corporations to increase the price of medicines and to limit
consumer access to cheaper generic drugs. Monopoly patents would be better protected and the
purchase of generic drugs would be made more difficult. At the same time, by designating a whole
spectrum of policies, regulations and practices as trade barriers the proposed agreement
undermines some of the people oriented measures associated with different TPP countries. For
instance, the TPP, it is alleged, upbraids the Malaysian government for requiring that slaughter
plants maintain dedicated halal facilities and ensure segregated transportation for halal and nonhalal products.
the model has been implemented it has kept the gears of the system in sync with one another.
Greased by neoliberalism, global capitalism tears down all nonmarket structures that have in the
past placed limits on, or acted as a protective layer against, the accumulation of capital.
Deregulation made available new zones to resource exploitation, privatization opened up to
profit-making public and community spheres, ranging from health care and education to police
and prison systems. Nonmarket sphere of human activity - public spheres managed by states and
private spheres linked to community and family-are broken up, commodified, and transferred to
capital. As countries in the South integrate into global capitalism through neoliberal restructuring
they become "emerging markets" that provide new market segments, pools of labor, and
opportunities for transnational investors to unload excess capital, whether in productive or
financial investment. By prying open and making accessible to transnational capital every layer of
the social fabric, neoliberalism "dis-embeds" the global economy from global society, and the state
cedes to the market as the sole organizing power in the economic and social sphere.
summit held in Venezuela. In 2008, the treaty founding this organization was approved in Brazil. Closer
suggested that the two countries should use their own currencies instead of the U.S. dollar for
trading purposes. [In two succeeding BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) conferences, plans have advanced to conduct trade among
themselves without using the U.S. dollar.] In the last few months of 2009, trade and economic relations between China and Venezuela grew
closer. Agreements have been signed in agricultural, energy, and industrial areas. An agreement has also been
reached to increase the capital of the China-Venezuela Development Fund, doubling, to $12 billion, the amount originally decided. This is the
biggest credit given by China to any country since 1949. Snchez Ancochea says that this has generated new resources and new opportunities for
Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries. However, they also create serious risks and threats, including a steep rise in the
trade deficit with China, a reinforcement of the traditional way Latin America, especially the Andean countries and those of the Southern Cone,
participate in the world economy, and a heavy blow to labor intensive sectors, such as textiles. Thus, these agreements put the survival of a large
number of small and medium-size economies at risk of being edged out by the high relative productivity and low real wages in China.7 FTAA
Turned Down; ALBA Created: The U.S. government was unable to accomplish its plan to establish
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the whole of the American continent.8 As an alternative to the FTAA, the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, better known as ALBA, was created on December 14, 2004, with an accord between Cuba and
Venezuela.9 Since then, several Latin American countries have joined: Bolivia in 2006, Nicaragua in 2007, Honduras and Dominica in 2008, and
Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Ecuador in 2009. Faced with this situation, the White House has chosen to sign
bilateral treaties with some Latin American countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and a group of Central American countries.
Link - Education
Under the neoliberal framework efforts to reduce poverty or improve education will
always be frustrated and the hegemonic neoliberal discourse will ensure failure
Davidson-Harden 8
(Adam has a PhD in Education from the University of Western Ontario and was a SSHRC
postdoctoral fellow in cultural and policy studies at the Faculty of Education. Re-branding
Neoliberalism and Systemic Dilemmas in Social Development: The Case of Education and
School Fees in Latin American HIPCs MW)
Globally, education continues to be a key source of hope and institutional potential for reducing
poverty and income inequality in poorer and wealthier nations alike. The 'big question' impugning
the BWIs in this regard concerns whether currently-ascendant neoliberal methods and strategies
for educational development and other types of social service provision adequately address this
role, or this hope, for education. The states of Latin America boast the highest regional levels of
within-country social inequality in the world. From the 'lost decade's impact to the acceleration
of structural adjustment in the 1990s, the legacy of hegemonic neoliberal policies has served to
entrench, sustain and exacerbate poverty and inequality, rather than ameliorate them. In order to
put progress (or lack of progress) toward core goals for educational development in heavily
indebted states in context, it is necessary to appreciate what I term the 'systemic dilemmas' of
neoliberal development strategies that envelop and constrain efforts to realize the goal of 'education
for all'. Once some of these central dynamics revolving around debt, aid and conditionality as
mechanisms levered by the BWIs and richer donor countries are understood as a limiting
framework for educational development, the frustration of reaching even modest goals (as those
embodied, for example, in the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs) can be better understood
as an ongoing set of tensions around the continuing pre-eminence of neoliberalism as a hegemonic
discourse in international development.
Link- Environment
The environment is being destroyed by neoliberalist practices
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 172-174)
Neoliberal state policies with respect to the environment have
therefore been geographically uneven and temporally unstable
(depending on who holds the reins of state power, with the Reagan and
George W. Bush administrations being particularly retrograde in the US). The
environmental movement, furthermore, has grown in significance since the
1970s. It has often exerted a restraining inuence, depending on time and
place. And in some instances capitalist firms have discovered that increasing
eciency and improved environmental performance can go hand in hand.
Nevertheless, the general balance sheet on the environmental
consequences of neoliberalization is almost certainly negative.
Serious though controversial eorts to create indices of human wellbeing including the costs of environmental degradations suggest an
accelerating negative trend since 1970 or so. And there are enough
specific examples of environmental losses resulting from the
unrestrained application of neoliberal principles to give sustenance
to such a general account. The accelerating destruction of tropical
rain forests since 1970 is a well-known example that has serious
implications for climate change and the loss of biodiversity. The era
of neoliberalization also happens to be the era of the fastest mass
extinction of species in the Earths recent history. If we are entering
the danger zone of so transforming the global environment,
particularly its climate, as to make the earth unfit for human
habitation, then further embrace of the neoliberal ethic and of
neoliberalizing practices will surely prove nothing short of deadly. The
Bush administrations approach to environmental issues is usually to
question the scientific evidence and do nothing (except cut back on the
resources for relevant scientific research). But his own research team reports
that the human contribution to global warming soared after 1970. The
Pentagon also argues that global warming might well in the long run be a
more serious threat to the security of the US than terrorism. 28 Interestingly,
the two main culprits in the growth of carbon dioxide emissions
these last few years have been the powerhouses of the global economy,
the US and China (which increased its emissions by 45 per cent over the
past decade). In the US, substantial progress has been made in increasing
energy eciency in industry and residential construction. The proigacy in
this case largely derives from the kind of consumerism that
continues to encourage high-energy-consuming suburban and exurban sprawl and a culture that opts to purchase gas-guzzling SUVs
rather than the more energy-ecient cars that are available. Increasing
US dependency on imported oil has obvious geopolitical ramifications. In the
case of China, the rapidity of industrialization and of the growth of car
ownership doubles the pressure on energy consumption. China has moved
from selfsuciency in oil production in the late 1980s to being the second
largest global importer after the US. Here, too, the geopolitical implications
are rife as China scrambles to gain a foothold in the Sudan, central Asia, and
the Middle East to secure its oil supplies. But China also has vast rather lowgrade coal supplies with a high sulphur content. The use of these for power
generation is creating major environmental problems, particularly those that
contribute 27 to global warming. Furthermore, given the acute power
shortages that now bedevil the Chinese economy, with brownouts and
blackouts common, there is no incentive whatsoever for local government to
follow central government mandates to close down inecient and dirty
power stations. The astonishing increase in car ownership and use, largely
replacing the bicycle in large cities like Beijing in ten years, has brought
China the negative distinction of having sixteen of the twenty worst cities in
the world with respect to air quality. 29 The cognate eects on global
warming are obvious. As usually happens in phases of rapid
industrialization, the failure to pay any mind to the environmental
consequences is having deleterious eects everywhere. The rivers are
highly polluted, water supplies are full of dangerous cancer-inducing
chemicals, public health provision is weak (as illustrated by the problems of
SARS and the avian u), and the rapid conversion of land resources to urban
uses or to create massive hydroelectric projects (as in the Yangtze valley) all
add up to a significant bundle of environmental problems that the central
government is only now beginning to address. China is not alone in this, for
the rapid burst of growth in India is also being accompanied by stressful
environmental changes deriving from the expansion of consumption as well
as the increased pressure on natural resource exploitation.
Jaffees Brewing Justice independently arrives at many of the same conclusions. Jaffee, a
sociologist, identifies an emergent fair-trade paradox, ultimately a struggle over the identity of
fair trade. Although these visions represent the extreme ends of a continuum, rather than simple
polar opposites, some advocates of fair trade see it as a movement committed to promoting
global social justice, whereas others see it as market. Like Fridell, however, Jaffee believes that
the critical change in fair-trade coffee took place when it moved into the mainstream, as fairtrade labeling allowed large coffee retailers to sell fair-trade coffee. This move, he argues, was
accompanied by a de-radicalization of fair trade. The mainstreaming of fair-trade coffee in the
past decade also coincided with one of the worst economic crises that the coffee industry has
experienced. The heart of Brewing Justice is a detailed empirical study of fair-trade and organic
coffee production by several small communities in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. Jaffee
systematically compares the fair-trade and organic growers of the Michiza cooperative
with their neighbors who produce conventional coffee. Several chapters ask the hard question:
what difference does fair trade make to producers? Jaffees answer can be summarized in the
words of one informant: mejor, pero no muy bien que digamos ([the organization members]
are a little better off, but you wouldnt say great (236). On the basis of surveys of fifty-two
families, including conventional and fair-trade farmers, Jaffee finds that during times of
crisis, everyone was losing money. The net income of fair-trade households was not much
different from that of their conventional neighbors; the higher prices they received for their
coffee were largely offset by the additional wages they had to pay to produce it. These wages,
however, did diffuse the economic benefits of fair trade throughout the community. Fair-trade
households also seemed somewhat better able to manage the problems of food security and
migration that afflicted conventional farmers. Still, only 10 percent to 20 percent of coffee farmers
have decided to produce fair-trade, certified-organic coffee. Jaffee found that many farmers perceive
this specialty production as involving a lot of additional hard work for only minimal benefits. He
concludes bleakly that these farmers remain impoverished, even if they are somewhat better off
than their conventional neighbors, and that fair trade has not brought an end to poverty: it
simply prevents further deterioration
Link- Hegemony
US hegemony is the deadliest weapon of transnational capitalist to force neoliberal
reforms in target countries
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs38-39
Interpreting the U.S. state as playing a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist interests
is a more satisfactory explanation than that of advancing "U.S." interests, as we will see when
applying the concepts of hegemony and world order to the study of Latin America. The U.S. state
has taken the lead in imposing a reorganization of world capitalism. But this does not mean that
U.S. interventionism seeks to defend "U.S." interests. As the most powerful component of the
TNS, the U.S. state apparatus defends the interests of transnational investors and the overall
system. The only military apparatus in the world capable of exercising global coercive authority
is the U.S. military. The beneficiaries of U.S. military action around the world are not "U.S." but
transnational capitalist groups. This is the underlying class relation between the TCC and the
U.S. national state. It is in this way that the United States played a key role in the globalization of
Latin America, more properly understood as U.S. tutelage of the region's restructuring and
integration into global capitalism on behalf of a transnational project than as a project of "U.S."
hegemony in rivalry with other core powers for influence in the hemisphere. If the world is not
divided into rival national economies and national capitals, do we still need a theory of
imperialism? In the post-World War II period, and drawing on the tradition established by Rosa
Luxembourg, Marxists and other critical political economists shifted the main focus in the study
of imperialism from the classical focus advanced by Lenin and Hilferding on rivalry among core
powers to the mechanisms of core capitalist penetration of Third World countries and the
appropriation of their surpluses. Imperialism in this sense referred to this exploitation and to the
use of state apparatuses by capitals emanating from the centers of the world system to facilitate this
economic relation through military, political, and cultural mechanisms . The relentless pressure for
outward expansion of capitalism and the distinct political, military, and cultural mechanisms that
facilitate that expansion and the appropriation of surpluses it generates is a structural imperative
built into capitalism. We need tools to conceptualize, analyze, and theorize how this
expansionary pressure built into the capitalist system manifests itself in the age of globalization.
The class relations of global capitalism are now so deeply internalized within every nation-state that
the classical image of imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated . Failure to
comprehend this leads to such superficial and misleading conclusions as, for instance, that the
failure of popular projects to materialize under the rule of the Workers Party in Brazil or the
African National Congress in South Africa is a result of a "sell out" by the leaders of those
parties or simply because "imperialism" undercut their programs. Today, imperialism is not about
nations but about groups exercising the social powerthrough institutionsto control value
production, to appropriate surpluses, and to reproduce these arrangements . The challenge for such
a theoretical enterprise is to ask: how, and by whom in the world capitalist system, are values
produced (organized through what institutions), how are they appropriated (through what
institutions), and how are these processes changing through capitalist globalization? During the
five hundred years since the genesis of the world capitalist system, colonialism and imperialism
coercively incorporated zones and peoples into its fold. This historical process of "primitive
accumulation" is coming to a close. The end of the extensive enlargement of capitalism is the end
of the imperialist era of world capitalism. The system still conquers space, nature, and human
beings. It is dehumanizing, genocidal, suicidal, and maniacal. But with the exception of a few
remaining spacesIraq until recently, North Korea, etc.the world has been brought into the
system over the past half millennium. The implacable logic of accumulation is now largely internal
to worldwide social relations and to the complex of fractious political institutions through which
ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We need a theory of capitalist expansion: that is,
not only of the political processes and the institutions through which such expansion takes place,
but also of the class relations and spatial dynamics it involves.
If neoliberalism was able to "peacefully" force open new areas for global capital in the 1980s and
the 1990s this was often accomplished through economic coercion alone, made possible by the
structural power of the global economy over individual countries. But this structural power
became less effective in the face of the three-pronged crisis mentioned above. Opportunities for
both intensive and extensive expansion began to dry up as privatizations ran their course, the
"socialist" countries became integrated, the consumption of high-income sectors worldwide
reached ceilings, spending through private credit expansion could not be sustained, and so on. The
space for "peaceful" expansion, both intensive and extensive, became ever more restricted.
Military aggression became an instrument for prying open new sectors and regions, for the
forcible restructuring of space in order to further accumulation. The train of neoliberalism became
latched on to military intervention and the threat of coercive sanctions as a locomotive for pulling
the moribund neoliberal program forward. The "war on terrorism" achieved a number of
objectives for a global capitalism beset by structural, political, and ideological crises. It provides
a seemingly endless military outlet for surplus capital, generated a colossal deficit that justifies the
ever-deeper dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and locks neoliberal austerity in place, and
legitimates the creation of a police state to repress political dissent in the name of security . Yet
global capitalism will continue to be unstable and crisis-ridden. Global inequalities, wherever
their social dynamics are operative, lead to new social control systems and a politics of
exclusion. The "war on terrorism" provided a convenient cover for the transnational elite to
extend its drive to consolidate and defend the project of capitalist globalization with a new and
terrifying coercive dimension. The powers that be in the global capitalist order seemed intent on
organizing and institutionalizing a global police state following the September 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center. Could we witness the rise of a global fascism, a new war order, founded on
military spending and wars to contain the downtrodden and the un-repented and to seize new
territories, resources, and labor pools ? Conflict in global society is prone to occur at multiple
levels: between transnationally oriented elites and those with a more local, national or regional
orientation; between agents of global capitalism and popular forces; among competing groups
within the globalist bloc who may foment inter-state conflicts in pursuit of their particular
interests; and so on. The picture is further complicated by the instability wrought by the
breakdown of social order and the collapse of national state authority in many regions. In
particular, challenges to the global capitalist bloc may come from subordinate groups in
transnational civil society or from specific nation-states when these states are captured by
subordinate groups, such as in the case of Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, as well
as from dominant groups who are less integrated into (or even opposed to) global capitalism,
such as, for example, the Baath Party / Iraq state elite prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, sectors
among the Russian oligarchy, or Chinese economic and political elites. The U.S. government under
the George W. Bush presidency militarized social and economic contradictions, launching a
permanent war mobilization to try to stabilize the system through direct coercion . U.S.
interventionism and militarized globalization constituted less a campaign for U.S. hegemony
than a contradictory political response to the explosive crisis of global capitalismto economic
stagnation, legitimation problems, and the rise of counter-hegemonic forces. The U.S. state has
attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist interests, to act as
guarantor of global capitalism, both materially and symbolically, by deploying force and
threatening to apply coercion and sanctions against those who would transgress property rights,
close off any territory to transnational investors, or threaten to withdraw from the system. The
U.S. state has undertaken an unprecedented role in creating profitmaking opportunities for
transnational capital and pushing forward an accumulation process that left to its own devices (the
Neoliberalistic policies are specifically political. They only serve to promote U.S.
hegemony in any given area. Refer to Malaysia as an example.
MUZAFFAR, 2013
(CAHNDRA; President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST); Trans Pacific
Partnership is a Threat To National Sovereignty
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/the-chavez-legacy/)
While some of the provisions of the TPP may be set aside at the behest of individual countries, it is
obvious that the US which is the driving force behind the pact is determined to use it as its vehicle
to strengthen its economic position in the Pacific region in the face of the rise of China. It explains
why China itself economically the most dynamic nation in the region has not been invited to
join the TPP. This is why it would be nave to view the TPP as a mere economic and trade
arrangement. Its underlying motive is clearly political. It is a critical weapon in the US arsenal for
curbing and containing the emergence of a power which has the potential of shaping the future of
the entire Pacific in the decades to come. The US will not allow this to happen. It knows that in
order to remain as the worlds sole superpower it has to ensure that it is at the helm of that one
region with the greatest economic viability and vitality. The US already has 320,000 troops in
the Pacific region. That is the military arm of Pacific Power. The TPP is designed to
secure the economic dimension of Pacific Power. As a nation committed to harmonious
relations among states, Malaysia should be extra cautious about participating in any
venture by any power, be it the United States or China, to enhance its hegemony over
the Pacific a region whose very name signifies peace.
MUELLER 11
(Julie L. "The IMF, Neoliberalism, and Hegemony," Global Society, 25:3, July, 378)
Today, one could argue that
to the detriment of developing states. While the IMF has remained true to its stated mission in promoting policies that achieve
these goals, it is important to question the underlying assumptions of this approach to global economic stability. Surprisingly, while much
research has been done questioning the effectiveness of IMF policies, little has been written in the field of political economy addressing the
Funds underlying assumptions and how these came to dominate Fund policy making. Also, although many authors have been critical of the Fund
for its promotion of elite interests, there is little analysis of the cleavages within this class and the role the Fund plays in supporting one particular
segment of the economic elite. As arguably the most powerful international economic organisation, the Fund should be examined from a more
critical perspective.
any viable economic alternative the children may be sold into prostitution instead (leaving
yet another advocacy group to pursue the eradication of that). The universality presupposed in
rights talk and the dedication of the NGOs and advocacy groups to universal principles
sits uneasily with the local particularities and daily practices of political and economic life
under the pressures of commodication and neoliberalization. But there is another reason
why this particular oppositional culture has gained so much traction in recent years.
Accumulation by dispossession entails a very dierent set of practices from accumulation
through the expansion of wage labour in industry and agriculture. The latter, which
dominated processes of capital accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise to an
oppositional culture (such as that embedded in trade unions and working-class political parties)
that produced embedded liberalism. Dispossession, on the other hand, is fragmented and
particular a privatization here, an environmental degradation there, a nancial crisis of
indebtedness somewhere else. It is hard to oppose all of this specicity and particularity
without appeal to universal principles. Dispossession entails the loss of rights. Hence the
turn to a universalistic rhetoric of human rights, dignity, sustainable ecological practices,
environmental rights, and the like, as the basis for a unied oppositional politics.
investor democracy, it has ushered in a new investment culture, one that serves to
reinforce neoliberal ideology by naturalizing and depoliticizing the processes of global
finance, and by generating consent to its preferred policies. With the vast expansion of mutual funds
and private pension plans, the norms and practices of finance capital are becoming culturally
embedded in peoples everyday lives, in a way that a downturn in the stock market cannot destroy: when
stocks crash, investors simply make a temporary switch to bonds. Significantly, this emerging culture has
helped to create the perception that material benefits are accruing to broader layers
through the structures of neoliberalism. In contrast to the postwar era, where hegemony was constructed
primarily through productive capital and the state, consensus today is increasingly shaped through the vehicle of
finance capital, as the perceived gains of mutual-fund returns and the effects of investment culture reinforce both
positive and negative aspects of neoliberal ideology.
eralist and/or democratic political systems among others, are significant, since they allow at least
for a different pace of implementation of the new policies, as well as for modifications or even
opposition to them, depending on the degree of negotiation between political sectors (Bresser
Pereira et al. 1993).
This new school of thought focused on the need for an export-oriented industrialization and a
radical departure from the ISI model of the relationship between the market and the state, i.e. EOI
became a theoretical and political response and alternative to ISI. EOI also became a significant
part of the so- called Washington Consensus (Williamson 1992) since the 1980s.
However, EOI is not external to developing countries. In addition to the crisis of ISI and of
corporatist sociopolitical structures since the late 1960s, most devel- oping nations have also
undergone significant ideological changes and experi- enced a shift in power between capital and
labor. Not only has EOI become mainstream economic theory in international trade and
development theory, but also many, if not most, government officials in Latin America have been
strongly influenced by this school of thought. Since the 1980s, most of the secretaries or ministers in
Latin America, through undergraduate or graduate studies in top- ranking US schools of
economics, have directly been inspired by EOI.
307-9
Compliance with the discipline of the capitalist market can be individual, but may be
equally effective as a collective response; if civil society organizations opt for development
models that reinforce the ideology of capitalist productive relations, they can embody and
advance the neoliberal project as collectivities and not individuals. As long as cultural
rights remain within these basic parameters, they contribute directly to the goal of neoliberal
self-governance; they reinforce its ideological tenets while meeting deeply felt needs; they
register dissent, while directing these collective political energies toward unthreatening
ends. (2006:75) As I have documented elsewhere (Robinson, 2003), the Mayan renaissance
unfolded alongside the penetration of global capitalism into the indigenous highlands and
the rapid development of the transnational model of accumulation through the establishment
of a market in land, commerce, rural and suburban maquiladora industries, nontraditional
agricultural exports, and transnational tourism. Local autonomy is not a viable alternative to
the national and transnational political system precisely because that system and the
neoliberal states that are its local brokers do not intend to allow local indigenous
communities to opt out of incorporation into global capitalism. The challenge facing the
indigenous movement became apparent to me during a June 2007 visit to El Cauca, one of the
indigenous heartlands in Colombia, invited by the Association of Indigenous Councils of North
Cauca. Colombia's indigenous struggle experienced a remarkable renaissance in recent
decades. The state was forced to approve a new constitution in 1991 that recognized not
only cultural rights but also indigenous rights to collective land and autonomous
administration of resources, and millions of acres of land have been reclaimed from
landlords. And while the indigenous are only 1 to 2 percent of the Colombian population,
they actually spearheaded the national popular mobilization against a free trade agreement
between Colombia and the United States. Indigenous identity, levels of internal
organization, and self-confidence seem to be at an all-time high. Yet more radical ideologies
and programs of struggle against neoliberalism and the neo-fascist Colombian state
competed with indigenista ideologies and projects, that is, what Hale terms neoliberal
multiculturalism. Even more importantly, the movement had reached an impasse in the face of
other burning matters, such as what types of alliances it should develop with other popular
sectors and whether it should seek to participate in national political struggle or limit itself to
protecting and extending local autonomy, and to what extend the indigenous could or should
provide leadership outside of their own communities. If the embrace by the TNS of
multiculturalism is a central component of the effort by the transnational elite to co-opt the
indigenous movement and construct a hegemonic order in the Americas, in the Gramscian
sense, it also exposes in my view the limits (if not the bankruptcy) of identity politics and the
pitfall of separating the analysis of race or ethnicity from that of class and from the critique
of (now globalized) capitalism. I agree with Hale that "as proponents of neoliberal
multiculturalism become ever more deeply invested in shaping cultural rights rather than denying
them, this shift helps explain the impasse that many indigenous rights movements now confront."
Recognition of indigenous cultural and ethnic rights from the state represented a cutting
edge of struggle so long as the state withheld those rights. But the moment when
"indigenous identity politics represented a frontal challenge to the state has passed, giving
way to a phase of much greater involvement of powerful actors in the formulation of
identity-based demands, intense negotiations from within powerful institutions, and inevitably,
greater internal dissention within the movements themselves" (2006:37). In Hale's words,
neoliberal multiculturalism has "the makings of a menacing political project, informed by
deepened knowledge of the [indigenous]. Recognition of certain [indigenous] demands,
often adopting the very 'language of contention' that indigenous activists themselves
deploy, generates a powerful capacity to punish those demands perceived as militant,
unyielding, or dangerous . . . the potential for fragmentation, cooptation, and sheer
perplexity is enormous" (2006:44-45). This is, in sum, a strategy for the hegemonic
incorporation rather than the previous coercive exclusion of indigenous populations. Slavoj
Zizek (1997) has pointed out that the Universal acquires concrete existence only when some
particular content starts to function as its stand-in, and that this link between the Universal
and the particular content which functions as its stand-in is contingent in that it is the
outcome of a political struggle for ideological hegemony. In order to be effective, "the ruling
ideology has to incorporate a series of features in which the exploited majority will be able
to recognize its authentic longings. In other words, each hegemonic universality has to
incorporate at least two particular contents, the authentic popular content as well as its
distortion by the relations of domination and exploitation" (Zizek, 1997:29). Zizek reminds
us of Etienne Balibar's reversal of Marx's classical formula: the ruling ideas are precisely
not directly the ideas of those who rule. Rather, these ideas incorporate a series of crucial
motifs and aspirations of the oppressed and rearticulate them in such a way that they
become compatible with the existing relations of domination. This is precisely what has
taken place with the transnational elite's embrace of multicultural indigenous rights; that
elite threw the ball back into the court of the indigenous. But the indigenous movement was
in the early twenty-first century part of an expansive counter-hegemony sweeping Latin America
as its fate became more than ever bound up with that of the popular majority. There is no reason
to assume that the "insurrectionary Indian" will not be able to prevail over the "authorized
Indian" and push the movement beyond its impasse.
beginnings of the modern world system in the long 16th century (Wallerstein 1979, Frank
2005, Mies 1986), when the conquering of the Americas, their exploitation and colonial
transformation allowed for the rise and development of Europe. The so-called childrens
diseases of modernity keep on haunting it, even in old age. They are, in fact, the main feature of
modernitys latest stage. They are expanding instead of disappearing. Where there is no South,
there is no North; where there is no periphery, there is no center; where there is no colony, there
is no in any case no Western civilization (Werlhof 2007a). Austria is part of the world
system too. It is increasingly becoming a corporate colony (particularly of German corporations).
This, however, does not keep it from being an active colonizer itself, especially in the East
(Hofbauer 2003, Salzburger 2006). Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are
abandoned and give way to a mentality of plundering. All global resources that we still have
natural resources, forests, water, genetic pools have turned into objects of utilization. Rapid
ecological destruction through depletion is the consequence. If one makes more profit by cutting
down trees than by planting them, then there is no reason not to cut them (Lietaer 2006). Neither
the public nor the state interferes, despite global warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of
the few remaining rain forests will irreversibly destroy the earths climate not to even speak of
the many other negative effects of such action (Raggam 2004). Climate, animal, plants, human
and general ecological rights are worth nothing compared to the interests of the corporations no
matter that the rain forest is no renewable resource and that the entire earths ecosystem depends
on it. If greed and the rationalism with which it is economically enforced really was an
inherent anthropological trait, we would have never even reached this day.
Link: IMF
Neoliberalists use the faade of a financial safety net to spread the roots of
neoliberalism into countries. So in order for countries to get help, they must
essential convert to neoliberalism.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 74)
Additionally, the IMF could act as a stand-by lender to prevent financial panics or crises. To
qualify for short-term loans, countries would have to meet four conditions. First, the countries
would have to allow free entry of foreign financial institutions. Second, borrowers would have to
publish the maturity structure of their debts. Third, commercial banks would have to be adequately
capitalized. Finally, a proper fiscal requirement, as defined by the IMF, would have to be realized
to assure that IMF resources would not be used to sustain irresponsible budget priorities (Meltzer
2000).
The Commissions majority also agreed that long-term lending for develop- ment assistance,
poverty reduction, and structural transformation would remain the purview of the World Bank and
the regional development banks. To achieve this goal, the majority argued that the banks must be
transformed from capital- intensive lending institutions to sources of technical assistance,
providers of regional and global public goods, and facilitators of an increased flow of private sector
resources to the emerging countries (Meltzer 2000). Central to this para- digm shift would be the
gradual elimination of all resource transfers to countries with capital market access or an annual
per capita income greater than $4,000 over the subsequent five years. In addition, the banks
would limit assistance to countries with an annual per capita income greater than $2,500.
Link - Integration
Greater integration into the global neoliberal market ensures the widening of
economic crisis and collapse of the global economy.
Ifediora 2009
(John O., Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, The Global
Financial System And National Economies: A Conflation of Two Economic Doctrines, May 46, 2009)
A Precise: For the first time since the great depression of the 1930s, developed nations, as a collectivity, have felt the full effect of the medicine they have been
prescribing to developing nations; and like the former recipients, they do not care much for it. The financial meltdown that began from the housing market bubble in
the US, and spread to the industrialized world in quick succession laid bare the fundamental weaknesses of free and unregulated capital market, and international
trade. Developing
nations, for now, have been spared the anguish, but for how long? But a decidedly
relevant question is why the current economic downturn is more remarkable in developed
economies, and less so for developing ones? Are we to assume that developing nations are relatively
immune from the current financial and economic crises as a result of prudent macroeconomic
policies they designed for their respective national economies or is it due to the infancy of their
financial sectors, and credit-market isolation from the industrialized world? In this paper, I intend to show that the
economic world order devised by developed nations and set in motion since the mid-1980s is based on two different economic platforms each designed to address the
respective needs of the world community of nations; one to accommodate macroeconomic policy needs of developed and donor nations, the other for developing ones,
and aid recipients. I propose to use two policy-initiatives devised by developed nations and their multinational surrogates to spur global economic integration, and
guide developing nations out of poverty to make my case. Specifically, my discussion would point to the neo-liberal policies of deregulation of capital markets, and
free international trade as advanced by rich nations, and implemented by the Unholy Trinity of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO as the source of past and
current global financial crises, and the primary reason for the abysmal economic realities extant in developing nations. Since the goals of sensible macroeconomic
policies (monetary and fiscal policies) are stability and growth, it would be shown that neo-liberal policies in this regard have been catastrophic, and need to be
modified, especially in light of current global financial and economic realities, and their impact on the economies of developing countries. At the outset, a brief review
of the current infrastructure of the global financial system is in order. The past thirty years of globalization effort by the developed world has seen incredible growth in
capital flows engendered by progressive deregulations of capital account transactions, the drive to boost global investment through a combined strategy of price
stability and high interest rate, and a strong agenda by the WTO to lift all remaining restrictions on foreign direct investment, and tariffs. On the upside, this neoliberal push for deregulation and liberalization of trade and capital flows have the capacity to enhance domestic growth in recipient countries through relatively easy
access to foreign funds that could be utilized to establish and expand the host countrys industrial capacity. But there is a catch; an
developing
countries run into financial crises, as they often do, their usual port of call is the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the Bretton Woods institutions formed by the allied powers (primarily the US and Britain) right after WWII. Then, its
primary mandate was to extend short-term financial credit and loans to a war-turn-Europe, and to countries emerging from colonial rule. Its counterpart, the World
Bank, was designed to assist in long-term infrastructure development and capacity building, and during a significant portion of the post-war years executed their
mandates reasonably well until the rise of neo-liberalism in the mid 1970s. It must be noted that before these Washington Institutions or more informally, the
Washington Consensus became fully embedded in the neo-liberal orthodoxy, there were no banking crises in the developing world between 1945 and 1971, and only
16 currency crises within the same period in contra-distinction to 17 banking crises, and 57 currency crises between 1973 and 1997 when the IMF began the hard push
for capital account liberalization (Friedman, 2000). It should not come as a surprise, even to the disinterested observer, that much
of what transpires
in the global financial system or the global economy for that matter, is determined by the activities
of rich industrialized countries. Collectively they produce on average 80% of the worlds total
production of goods and service, account for 70% of all international transactions, and control up
to 90% of all foreign direct investments (Ferguson, 2003). And since the richest ones amongst these
countries are the major contributors to the IMF and the World Bank, they also shape the rules by
which the global economy is run. Unfortunately, these rules of economic engagement are bifurcated: one set of rules that
embody keynesian activism for rich countries, and neo-liberal orthodoxy and free market for the
rest.
Yet even as they closed the economic gap with the US, postwar Europe and Japan were
becoming ever more tightly penetrated, integrated and dependent on the American empire.
Crucial here was the changing nature of international capital flows . Whereas under the British
empire these had overwhelmingly taken the form of portfolio investment (e.g. lending to
governments for infrastructural development), the dominant capital flows were now direct foreign
investment, primarily from the US. This penetration and integration, often effected by us
multinationals with the full back-up of the us state, meant that American capital now existed as a
material social force inside a good many other social formations .10 This had a more profound
impact on social relations, property rights and labor relations than purely financial flows would
have done, and involved direct links with local banks, suppliers and buyers. Moreover, as with
trade dependence, the integrated production processes that multinational corporations spawned
had the effect of restraining protectionist impulses and reinforcing pressures for free trade. Thus,
beyond the Cold War political and military ties which were already shaping the range of options
under consideration, American direct investment brought in its train American legal and
consultancy firms, business schools, investment houses and accountants. The restructuring of
domestic class forces and institutions that accompanied all this was , in turn, reinforced by military
reliance on the us, not just for protection against Soviet or Chinese expansionism, but for the
security of their capitalists investments in much of the Third World.
Panitch and Gindin- Distinguished research professor of political science@ York University and editor
of the socialist register, Research director of Canadian UAW and chief economist of CAW, September-October
2005 [Superintending Global Capital pgs. 101-123]
Finally, accommodation by other capitalist states to the American imperial project was mediated
not only through the threat of Communism and the Cold War, but also through the quasiKeynesian form of international economic management adopted in 1945, the postwar welfarestate regimes, and the decolonization process in the Third World. All these modes of
accommodation entered into crisis by the 1970s, but no fundamental challenge to the American
empire emerged from the other advanced capitalist states, and those from popular anti-colonial
forces in the Third World were either defeated, co-opted or marginalized. The neoliberal turn in
the us, and its subsequent near-universalization, entailed the restructuring and opening of the
worlds states, including ex-Communist ones, to economic competition, the free movement of capital
and the deepening of capitalist social relations. Both financial markets and international financial
institutions played a crucial role in facilitating this and in reinforcing American imperial power.
Mexico was about to go bankrupt in 1982. That was the point at which neoliberalism kicked in.
The US, via the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury, said: we'll bail you out, but we'll bail you out on condition
that you start to privatize and open up the country to foreign investment and start to adopt a neoliberal stance.
Initially the Mexicans really didn't do that very much, but by the time you get to 1988 they start to do it sort of big time. But here's the interesting
it's unreasonable to think that actually the US imposed neoliberalization on Mexico . What
happened was that the US was putting noeliberalizing pressures on Mexico and an elite inside of
Mexico seized the opportunity to say: yes, that's what we want. So it was a coalition between the
elite in Mexico and the US Treasury/IMF that put together the kind of neoliberalization package that
came to Mexico in the late 1980s. And actually if you look at the pattern, it's very rare for there to be a straight imposition
of neoliberalizing policies through the IMF or the US. It's nearly always an alliance between an
internal elite, as it had been in Chile, and US forces that put this thing together. And it's the internal elite who are as much to blame for
thing:
Link- Labor
Capitalist employers strip their workers of any power and in turn use them to
further their own interests
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 167-168)
Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in
networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identiable by
certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated
various skills (sometimes referred to as human capital) and tastes (sometime referred to as
cultural capital), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes,
doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of
production, though not an undierentiated factor since employers require labour of certain
qualities, such as physical strength, skills, exibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to certain
tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term
contracts are preferred in order to maximize exibility. Employers have historically used
dierentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then
arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or
covertly, in ways that redound to the employers advantage. Conversely, workers may use the
social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of
employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the
creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests.
In this they are merely constructing that protective covering of cultural institutions of
which Polanyi speaks. Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that
embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour
has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are
curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour
markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and
technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour
force redundant complete the domination of capital over labour in the marketplace. The
individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which
only short-term contracts are oered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a
thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A personal responsibility
system (how apt Dengs language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health
care, protections against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state.
Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual
security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the aordability of nancial
products embedded in risky nancial markets. The second prong of attack entails
transformations in the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too
much can be made of the race to the bottom to nd the cheapest and most docile labour
supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force
whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because
immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which
creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for
example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly
shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they
are exposed.
Otero, 2011
(Gerardo Otero, Dr. Gerardo Otero is Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser University (SFU).
He is an Associate Member of the Latin American Studies Program and of the School of
International Studies at SFU, and an Adjunct Professor in the Development Studies Doctoral
Program at the Universidad Autnoma de Zacatecas, in Mexico. Journal of Poverty. Page 384386)
This article explores the way in which the U.S. economy has faced the crisis of the Fordist stage
of capitalism since the 1970s by focusing on a cheap- labor strategy to restore profitability. By
endorsing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. officials ensured access to
an abundant supply of labor south of the border. For their part, Mexicos political tech- nocrats
placed their bet for economic growth on the comparative advantage of cheap labor. This has been a
losing bet for the workers of both countries: Neoliberalism and Mexicos integration into the North
American economy without free labor mobilityhave had a detrimental impact, particularly on
Mexico. The counterpart of its loss of food self-sufficiency by growing dependency on U.S.-grains
imports has been the loss of labor sovereignty. Defined as the ability of a nation to generate
employment with livable wages for the vast majority of the population, labor sovereignty has been a
casualty of Mexicos economic integration with its northern neighbors. The most vis- ible result of
this loss has been substantially increased out-migration rates, with vast numbers of displaced
Mexican workers flowing into the United States in search for work, most often unauthorized or
undocumented.
More specifically, this article explores the relation between food self- sufficiency and labor
sovereignty in the midst of Mexicos integration to its northern neighbors, especially to the U.S.
economy. It compares and contrasts food self-sufficiency in the three NAFTA countries around
produc- tion for the domestic market, per-capita calorie consumption, and overall food trade. The
main proposition is that food-self-sufficiency is a condition for a country to enjoy labor
sovereignty, as defined above. Of the three NAFTA nations, Mexico is the least self-sufficient, and
hence the one that expels the largest rate of migrants. Although Mexicos exports of fruits and
vegetables to the United States and Canada increased substantially since the late 1980s, this
sector did not generate nearly enough employment to absorb bankrupted peasants. Therefore,
Mexico has become dependent on the importation of basic-subsistence grains, which used to be
produced by smallholder peasant farmers. Many peasants became redundant in the Mexican
economy, and their only way out, literally, has been to migrate to the United States or Canada.
Although most migrants to Canada (a small minority) enter that country as part of statesponsored guest worker pro- grams (Otero & Preibisch, 2010), the vast majority of migrants to
the United States do so as undocumented or unauthorized workers.
The presence of large masses of low-skill workers in the United States, authorized or not, raises
huge issues of labor rights, discrimination, and exclusion. It has been documented that there is an
inverse relation between numbers and rights (Ruhs & Martin, 2008): the more migrant workers
there are in rich countries, the fewer their rights are, and vice versa. The fact is that employer
demand for workers is negatively sloped with respect to labor costs, which means that more
rights for migrants typically means higher costs. In North America, the United States tends to have
much higher numbers than rights, whereas Canada tries to fit the Scandinavian model of fewer
numbers and more rights. But numbers of guest workers in Canada have started to outpace the
numbers of immigrants as permanent residents or citizens as of 2006, which raises the question
whether both of NAFTAs rich countries are converging toward the numbers side of the equation
to the detriment of workers rights.
Labor protections that do not reconfigure the neoliberal project act as ideological
supports, undermining attempts at true transformation.
Pollin 06
(Robert Pollin is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Resurrection of
the rentier, Oxford University Press,
<http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/NLR28008.pdf>)
The underlying premise behind the mixed economy was straightforward. Keynes and likeminded reformers were not willing to give up on capital- ism, in particular two of its basic
features: that ownership and control of the economys means of production would remain
primarily in the hands of private capitalists; and that most economic activity would be guided by
mar- ket forces, that is, the dynamic combination of material self-seeking and competition.
More specifically, the driving force of the mixed economy, as with free-market capitalism, should
continue to be capitalists trying to make as much profit as they can. At the same time, Keynes was
clear that in main- taining a profit-driven marketplace, it was also imperative to introduce policy
interventions to counteract capitalisms inherent tendenciesdemonstrated to devastating effect
during the 1930s calamitytoward financial break- downs, depressions and mass
unemployment. Keyness framework also showed how full employment and social wel- fare
interventions could be justified not simply on grounds of social uplift, but could also promote the
stability of capitalism. Thus, if workers are employed and can bring home decent paychecks, they
and their families will consequently spend more money, which in turn will expand markets and
create more profit opportunities for business. Unemployment insur- ance and other income support
policies correspondingly establish a stable floor on the overall level of market demand in the
economy. This enables businesses to assume that their customer base is not likely to evaporate in the
event of an economic downturn, bringing them to ruin.
Propelled by a free trade agreement with the United States, apparel manufacturing is booming in
Jordan, its exports to America soaring twentyfold in the last five years. But some foreign
workers in Jordanian factories that produce garments for Target, Wal-Mart and other American
retailers are complaining of dismal conditions of 20-hour days, of not being paid for months
and of being hit by supervisors and jailed when they complain. An advocacy group for workers
contends that some apparel makers in Jordan, and some contractors that supply foreign workers
to them, have engaged in human trafficking. Workers from Bangladesh said they paid $1,000 to
$3,000 to work in Jordan, but when they arrived, their passports were confiscated, restricting their
ability to leave and tying them to jobs that often pay far less than promised and far less than the
country's minimum wage. "We used to start at 8 in the morning, and we'd work until midnight, 1
or 2 a.m., seven days a week," said Nargis Akhter, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi who, in a phone
interview from Bangladesh, said she worked last year for the Paramount Garment factory outside
Amman. "When we were in Bangladesh they promised us we would receive $120 a month, but
in the five months I was there I only got one month's salary and that was just $50." The
advocacy group, the National Labor Committee, which is based in New York, found substandard
conditions in more than 25 of Jordan's roughly 100 garment factories and is set to release a report
on its findings today. Its findings were supported in interviews with current and former workers.
Such complaints have dogged the global apparel industry for years, even as it has adopted measures
intended to improve working conditions in factories that produce clothing for American and
European consumers. But the abusive conditions that the guest workers described show how hard
it is to control sweatshops as factories spring up in new places , often without effective monitoring
in place. In recent years , Jordan has become a magnet for apparel manufacturers, helped by the
privileged trade position that the United States has given it, first because of its 1994 peace accord
with Israel and then because of a free trade agreement signed with Washington in 2001. Jordan's
apparel industry, which exported $1.2 billion to the United States last year, employs tens of thousands of guest workers, mainly
from Bangladesh and China. In interviews this week, five Bangladeshis who used to work in Jordanian apparel factories and
four who still do had similar tales of paying more than $1,000 to work in Jordan, of working 90 to 120 hours a week, of not being
paid the overtime guaranteed by Jordanian law, of sleeping 10 or 20 to a small dorm room. The National Labor Committee helped
arrange interviews with the Bangladeshi workers, who spoke through interpreters. The largest retailer in the United States, WalMart, and one of the largest clothing makers, Jones Apparel, confirmed yesterday that they had discovered serious problems with
the conditions at several major Jordanian factories. In addition, a factory monitor for a major American company confirmed that
Jordanian factories routinely confiscated their guest workers' passports, doctored wage and hour records and coached employees
to lie to government and company inspectors about working conditions. The monitor asked not to be identified because the
company had not given authorization to speak publicly. Beth Keck, a spokeswoman for Wal-Mart, said the company did not own
or manage factories, but tried to improve working conditions in Jordan and elsewhere. "It is a continuous challenge, not just for
Wal-Mart but for any company," she said, noting that the most commonly observed problems included failure to pay proper
wages, "egregious hours," and "use of false or insufficient books or documentation." Charles Kernaghan, executive director
of the National Labor Committee, which has exposed mistreatment in factories in Central America
and China, said he was shocked by what he discovered in Jordan. "These are the worst conditions
I've ever seen," he said. "You have people working 48 hours straight. You have workers who were
stripped of their passports, who don't have ID cards that allow them to go out on the street. If
they're stopped, they can be imprisoned or deported, so they're trapped, often held under
conditions of involuntary servitude." Mr. Kernaghan said Bangladeshi workers had contacted his
organization to complain about working conditions in Jordan. He then traveled to Jordan and met
quietly with dozens of workers. He said American companies, despite their monitoring efforts,
were often slow to uncover workplace abuses because workers were coached to lie to them or were
scared to speak out. Moreover, factories often send work out to substandard subcontractors without
notifying American retailers. Several factory owners in Jordan insisted that they treated their
workers properly. "Some people are always making allegations," said Karim Saifi, the owner of
United Garment Manufacturing, a factory near Amman that workers criticized for long hours and
wage violations. "As far as we know, we follow all the labor laws here. If we were not abiding by
all of the local Jordan laws, we would not be able to operate." Several foreign apparel workers
said that while their factories required them to stay until midnight, the Jordanian workers were
usually allowed to leave at 4 p.m. Two large industrial zones outside Amman are thriving,
having geared themselves to the American apparel market. They have attracted dozens of
garment manufacturers, some with 200 workers, some with 2,000, that say they produce clothes
for J. C. Penney, Sears, Wal-Mart, Gap and Target. "It would be wrong to think that problems at
a few places are representative of the 102 apparel factories in my country," said Yanal Beasha,
Jordan's trade representative in Washington. Jordan's ambassador to the United States, Karim
Kawar, said "If there are any violations of our labor laws, we certainly take it seriously." Mr.
Beasha said Jordanian government inspectors monitor the working conditions in factories. But
several guest workers said factory managers hid abuses by coaching workers to lie. Mr. Beasha
said the Jordanian government cared about the welfare of foreign guest workers, noting that it
enforced overtime laws and recently increased the minimum wage for citizens and guest
workers. But Mohammed Z., who has worked for more than a year at the Paramount Garment
Factory, said that even though he worked more than 100 hours a week normally from 7 to
midnight seven days a week the company refused to pay him overtime when he did not meet
production targets. He asked that his last name be withheld for fear of retribution. Having paid
$2,000 to work in Jordan, he said, in an interview from Amman, "I'm not earning enough to repay
my loan or to support my wife and son." Unhappy that his passport has been confiscated, he said:
"My identity has been taken by the company. I have no freedom because I have no freedom to move
to other places." Mohammed Saiful Islam, 30, a Bangladeshi who was production manager at
Western Garment, said that several times the workers had to work until 4 a.m., then sleep on the
factory's floor for a few hours, before resuming work at 8 a.m. "The workers got so exhausted
they became sick," he said. "They could hardly stay awake at their machines." Mr. Saiful, who is
in the United States to highlight poor working conditions in Jordan, pointed to a yellow and
black fleece sweatshirt that he said his factory made. It had an Athletic Works label made for
Wal-Mart, selling for $9.48. "Sometimes when companies sent in monitors, the workers were
instructed what to say," Mr. Saiful said. Mohamed Irfan, who in a telephone interview from
Jordan said he was Western's owner, said, "The workers get the minimum wage, and all times,
there is no problem in our factory." Mohamed Kasim, Paramount's owner, said his factory also
paid its workers properly. Mr. Kasim and other factory managers said workers received free
room and board and sometimes medical care. But several workers said that when they were sick
they did not receive medical care, but were instead punished and had their pay docked . Several
Bangladeshis said there were terrible conditions at factories that made clothes for Wal-Mart and
Jones Apparel, which owns brands like Gloria Vanderbilt and Jones New York. Ms. Keck, the
Wal-Mart spokeswoman, said company inspectors recently identified "serious violations" of its
labor rules at three Jordanian factories. At Honorway Apparel Jordan, for example, which
manufactures sleepwear for Wal-Mart, inspectors found employees working off the clock,
managers who refused to pay overtime and wages that "could not be verified," Ms. Keck said. At
the Ivory Garment Factory, which Wal-Mart ceased working with two years ago, inspectors
found "egregious working hours." Joele Frank, a spokeswoman for Jones Apparel, said the
company had also found "serious problems" at the Ivory Garment Factory, which produces
Gloria Vanderbilt clothing, and said it would "monitor the situation closely." A spokesman for
Sears Holding, said the company was investigating potential problems at Honorway, which
produces clothes for Kmart, a division of Sears Holding. A Kohl's spokeswoman denied workers'
accusations that clothing sold by the company was made at several Jordanian factories with poor
conditions. Target said it worked with only one factory that has come under criticism Al Safa
Garments, which Wal-Mart recently cited for labor violations. Many retailers said their policy
was, after discovering violations, to work with a factory to improve conditions, rather than
automatically withdraw their business. Wal-Mart says it gives factories a year to fix serious
problems, reinspecting them every 120 days. "Our business with the factory is the only leverage
we have to push for improvement," Ms. Keck said. After The New York Times asked about the
accusations on Monday, Wal-Mart dispatched two inspectors to Jordan. Hazrat Ali, 25, who
worked from September 2004 to March 2005 at the Al Shahaed factory, said he sometimes worked
48 hours in a row and received no pay for the six months. "If we asked for money, they hit us," he
said. Nasima Akhter, 30, said that the Western factory gave its workers a half-glass of tea for
breakfast and often rice and some rotten chicken for lunch. "In the four months I was in Jordan,
they didn't pay us a single penny," she said. "When we asked management for our money and for
better food, they were very angry at us. We were put in some sort of jail for four days without
anything to eat. And then they forced us to go back to Bangladesh."
Link - Loans
Foreign loans are used as catalyst to increase neoliberal power
Petras & Veltmeyer 02
(JamesPetrasisaretiredBartleProfessorofSociologyatBinghamtonUniversityin
Binghamton,HenryVeltmeyerisaprofessorofSociologyandInternationalDevelopment
StudiesatSaintMary'sUniversity,AgeofReverseAid:NeoliberalismasaCatalystof
Regression)
Theterm'foreignaid'isatbestambiguous,disguisingmorethanitreveals,Bilateraland
commercialloans,aswellasloansfromtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs),requirethe
paymentofprincipalandinterest.Even if interest rates on JFI loans are lower than those of the
commercial banks, the onerous repayment conditions have had a devastating impact on policy
making in developing countries, Jan Pronk's essay argues that aid is not the prime mover of
development but a catalyst.However, the fundamental question is: aid as a catalyst for what and
for whom? for an answer to this question we turn to what could be termed a politically 'realist'
approach to aid(Hayter,1971,1985;Magdofr,1969).In this approach the role of aid is examined
in its historical context, looking at how foreign aid is part of the arsenal of policy instruments used
by aspiring hegemonic states to conquer markets and promote the interests of their capitalist classes
against competitors and their nationalist and socialist opponents.The'idealist'view,incontrast,
conceivesofaidasadisinterestedpolicydivorcedfromthe'interests'ofthecapitalistclassand
guidedbyhumanitarianconcerns.Democraticvaluesandeconomicwellbeing.Moreoftenthan
not,idealistsdissociatetheirdiscussionofaidfromthehistoricalstructuralcontextinwhichitis
embeddedandargueintermsofnormativevaluesandthedegreeofcompliance\viththose
valuesbytherecipientcountry,There are two types of realist critics of the-'idealist' approach.
Market fundamentalists like Milton Friedman (1982) condemn foreign aid because it is said to
subsidize 'statism' and hinder market forces that are better-able to deal with economic and. social
problems. Some critics, on the other hand, argue that 'aid' from hegemonic countries undermines
Third World develoment by catalyzing structural changes that undermine popular sovereignty ,
facilitate vast outflows of funds and undermine locally based productive units .In the following we
adopt the realist perspective that foreign loans and grants are a catalyst of 'reverse aid' - designed
to benefit the donor countries, In the context of widespread 'implementation of a neo-liberal model
of capitalist development, aid has contributed towards what could be termed 'bad governance'
(neo-authoritarianism, large-scale chronic corruption and external subordination), extending and
deepening social inequal ities, and generating conditions of global poverty; as well as economic
stagnation and volatility in the international flows of capital
Loans from neoliberalist developments lead to unstable economic policies and the
destruction of the environment.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 78)
More importantly, if foreign direct investment is given priority over domestic development in
creating viable financial markets, the need for international capital will continue, as large sectors of
the economy will remain underserved by financial institutions.7 Thus, developing economies will
have to continue to bor- row on international capital markets, which will likely result in export-led
growth strategies to repay international debts. These strategies, in turn, will encourage
environmentally harmful and unsustainable economic policies. Developing economies should
instead focus on strengthening their own financial institutions, which would reduce the need for
more international capital.
International loans and treaties globalize Latin American economies and open them up to
neoliberalism
Babb 13
(Sarah Babb, ProfessorPh.D.,NorthwesternUniversity,AmericanJournalofSociology,The
RebirthoftheLiberalCreed:PathstoNeoliberalisminFourCountries,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/367922)
Mexican liberalization proceeded in stages. The first was a period of structural adjustment
measures, conducted under the auspices of an IMF program,beginningin1982.This period was
characterized by the imposition of fiscal and monetary austerity, and the beginnings of a gradual
and selective opening to free trade and other market mechanisms .The second period, which began
around 1985, was one of structural reformsin other words, of recognizably neoliberal
policies.This phase was marked by a much more radical opening to free trade(seefig.3),andthe
impositionofahostofotherliberalizingreformsassociatedwiththeadministrationofCarlos
Salinas(198894).The financial system was liberalized, and policy toward foreign investors was
modified such that foreign firms could acquire up to 100% ownership in publicly traded Mexican
firms(Moffett1989,p.A11).AmendmentstoArticle27oftheMexicanConstitutioneffectively
endedMexicosrevolutionaryhistoryoflandreformandopenedMexicanlandstopurchaseby
privateinvestors,bothdomesticandforeign(Crdoba1994,pp.25657).And in 1994, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was put into effect, obligating Mexico to lower tariffs
and eliminate nontariff barriers on goods imported from the United States and Canada .How did
Mexico undergo this radical turnaround from the freespending populism of the 1970s to the
freemarket capitalism of the 1990s? There is no doubt that international factors played a critical
role.In particular, the globalization of finance in the 1970s, and the consequent Third World debt
crisis, created a new set of constraints and opportunities for Mexican policy makers .Thishadtwo
outstandingconsequencesforMexicanpolicy:first,theinternationalizationand
professionalizationofMexicaneconomicpolicymakers;second,thecreationofsignificant
materialincentivestopursueneoliberalpolicies.
Link - Localism
The affirmative is too local: It plays into the hands of elites and reaffirms the
structure of neoliberalism. The Alternative alone is preferable.
HARVEY 6
(David, distinguished professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate
Center of CUNY, "On Neoliberalism: An Interview with David Harvey" Monthly
Review, June 19, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/lilley190606.html)
DH: Yes, I
object very much to that angle of left thinking these days that says, let us just simply rely upon all the local,
specific movements here, there, and everywhere, to somehow or other generate a complete change in the world
without confronting state power .
I think this
plays into the hands of the neocon use of neoliberal tactics in its own pursuit of power .
I think that
it is
disempowering for the left to take that line of approach . But again I think we also do have to recognize -- and
this is what I really am concerned about in my book and elsewhere -- a tremendous diversity of struggles which are going on out
there: struggles against dam construction in India, or the struggles of the landless peasant movements in Brazil, the struggles going in Bolivia, the
struggles going on in Venezuela, the struggles going on in Sweden, the struggles going on in Paris right now. All of these struggles are very
specific and we have to acknowledge their diversity and appreciate their diversity. I don't think it's a matter of saying to
people, forget your specific struggles and join the universal proletariat in motion ; I don't think that's what it's
about at all. What we have to do is to find a way of politically uniting those struggles, and that's why I think
something like the concept of neoliberalism and its penchant for accumulation by dispossession
provide a kind of vocabulary to start to bring together those struggles around a more general kind
of theme. So that an Iowa farmer who's just lost his farm can understand how a Mexican peasant
feels, can understand how the struggles going on in China are parallel , so we start to see a certain unity in all of
the struggles, at the same time as we acknowledge their specificity.
Link- Maquiladoras
The localization of labor violence to a question of only US-Mexico labor relations
obscures the global violence of neoliberal labor coordination.
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 169-170)
Under neoliberalization, the gure of the disposable worker emerges as prototypical upon
the world stage. 19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic
conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China,
the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short
of appalling: unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers
who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at
all. 20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a
Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows: We are regularly insulted, as a
matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which
we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work ocially from seven in the morning
until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes
especially if there is an urgent order to be delivereduntil nine. However tired we are, we
are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot
to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there
is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working
there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home
from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . . Similar tales come from
the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants
in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health hazards, the exposure to a
wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked.
In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse in which 61
workers, locked in the building, died in a re in the aftermath of the re. received a
lenient two-year suspended sentence because he had showed repentance
and cooperated in the aftermath of the re.
Link- Mexico
Now is a critical time for Leftist resistance in Mexico. Supporting parliamentary
change works in service of Rightist state interest. Movements will be pressured to
moderate
WEBBER and CARR 13
(Jeffery R., professor of politics at the University of London, and Barry, professor of
history at La Trobe University, The New Latin American Left Cracks in the Empire,
p. 23-4)
Mexico is also included in this column as an example where the Far Right maintains control over
the state apparatus, but where there are incipient signs of radical left activity form below . In
Richard Roman and Edur Velasco Arregui's chapter, we find that Mexico has been on a
significantly different political trajectory than many states in South America. Whereas in many
of the latter countries, according to Roman and Velasco Arregui, there have been national
reformist solutions to organic crises of neoliberal capitalism, in Mexico a similar set of crises has
instead led to the consolidation at the regime level of a new conservative-neoliberal power bloc . The
new bloc has triumphed in the last four presidential elections and has been able to transform
economy and society in such a way than many of the previously won social rights of citizenship have
been abolished. In a parallel transformation, the state has become ever more repressive, militarized,
and exclusionary. The general context that the radical social Left has had to confront, then, has
been one of an increasingly repressive state, democratic only insofar as it holds highly construing
elections. Neoliberalism has ravaged the lives of millions of working class and peasant Mexicans,
but emigration to the United States has provided a precarious and partial safety valve against a
potentially explosive urban and rural discontent. With the heart of the global economic crisis
centered in the Untied States, and especially in the sectors of the economy that had employed many
Mexicans, this safety valve may now be in question. While the political context facing the racial
social Left has thrown up severe obstacles, there have nonetheless been a string of popular
insurgencies in recent years. The ongoing struggles of the Zapatistas, the experience of the Oaxaca
Commune in 2006, and the mass antifraud movement of the same year are all part of this trend.
But specific explosions of extra-parliamentary resistance have not translated into sustained
victories for the popular classes, nor the formation of durable national organizations representing
left forces. At the same time, while the party Left made small inroads into the electoral process,
they have still consistently lost to the Far Right in presidential contests. While much of the
weakness of the Mexican Left can be explained by the repressive character of the neoliberal
state, there are also a set of internal weakness that cannot be sidestepped, suggest Roman and
Velasco Arregui. The Mexican political culture of patrimonial administration of government
subsided and the distinct lack of rank-and-file control over formally democratic institutions
throughout society are part of this scenario. The electoral Left is prone to co-optation and the
operation of its extra-parliamentary activity and alliances through the state subsides siphoned to
officially registered parties that play by the rules. The extra-parliamentary Left , meanwhile, has
often been subject to the same state-society pressures of clientism, as broad popular movements
attempt to make tangible gains for their members that rehire state action in return for moderation
of movement activist and compliance with wider state objectives. While this reservoir of
revolutionary tradition is a source of hope, the present situation presents formidable obstacles
standing in the way of left advance. The electoral and social Left, the Zapatista movement and
the Oaxaca Commune experience have been primarily regional. It appears that for the moment
the Left remains in a very weak position from which to mount offensive against the conservativeneoliberal bloc presently in power.
Link - NAFTA
NAFTA has uniquely displaced hundreds of thousands of Mexican peasants, and
also lead to the trans-nationalization of Mexican factories and businesses
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs107-108
In distinction to the typical pattern of EPZs, many of the maquiladora establishments along the
U.S.-Mexico border have a twin plant on the U.S. side supplying parts to be further processed
and/or receiving goods made on the Mexican side. This arrangement, in which the Mexican side
may offer lower wages, lax regulations, and other benefits, grew out of the particular way in which
the border region became a major nodal point of the global economy of the global economy on the
historical basis of the North American political economy . The twin plant on the U.S. side may be
owned or contracted by a TNC that is not headquartered in the United States, such as Sony, and
the operations on the Mexican side are often owned or run by Mexican and third country nationals
operating under outsourcing and subcontracting arrangements, so that the whole border economy
is a zone of transnational capital. NAFTA, in fact, encouraged TNCs from around the world to
attain a toehold in Mexico to enjoy privileged access to the North American Market . Far from a
case of the United States seeking to construct a western hemisphere bloc in competition with
Europe and Asia, the integration of Mexico into the North American political economy has had the
effect of accelerating not regionalization but trans-nationalization. While the majority of
maquiladoras are owned or outsourced by TNCs based in the United States, transnational capital
in the Mexican maquiladora industry originates from several dozen countries , among them Mexico
itself, Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Germany, France, Brazil, Holland, Sweden, and Dubai. In
the 1970s and 1980s, Mexican maquiladoras were concentrated along the border with the United
States, especially in the border cities of Tijuana, Ciudad Jurez, and Mexicali, connected with
twin plants across the border. But by the 1990s they were spreading south into central and even
southern Mexico- what Sklair (1993) refers to as the march to the interior- where wages are lower
and labor militancy and turnover is less. Puebla, Morelos, Guanajuato, the greater Mexico city
area, the Yucatn peninsula, and the west coast state of Jalisco, figured prominently as new
production sites. Investors took advantage of a huge new pool of peasant labor made available by
the opening of the Mexican market to U.S. agricultural surpluses and the breakup of communal
ejido lands under NAFTA and other neoliberal measures, such as the end of price supports and
state credit for small producers, all of which has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Mexican peasants . A part of these have migrated to the United States and elsewhere
outside of the country and another part has migrated to Mexican cities (Jones, 2001). By the turn
of the century, about one in every three maquiladora workers did not work in a border
municipality
Venezuela's ability to launch a transformative project while also sustaining its participation
in the global economy is clearly dependent to a significant degree on its oil wealth. Venezuela
is the world's fifth-largest producer of oil, a key global resource, with the largest reserves of
conventional oil (light and heavy crude) in the Western hemisphere and the largest reserves
of non-conventional oil (extra-heavy crude) in the world. This provided the country the
resources needed to undertake an internal revolutionary reorganization but it also gave the
Bolivarian state a significant international clout. High oil pricesthe price per barrel went
from some $10 in 1999 to over $70 briefly in 2006allowed the government to finance a
broad array of social programs and gave the revolution some breathing room, as did the
U.S. invasion and occupation against Iraq, which made it more difficult for Washington to
concentrate political, diplomatic, and material resources in destabilization efforts
elsewhere. On the other hand, the Chavistas have been able to break foreign and local elite
control over the oil industry and to democratize this source of wealth, an experience that
poses a powerful example for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexicocountries that also have an
abundance of energy resources. The struggle over oil in Venezuelaand by extension over
energy and other natural resources in Latin Americais instructive of the complexities and
contradictions that forces opposed to global capitalism face when they are able to win, or at
least influence, state policy, given the impossibility of individual withdrawal from global
capitalism. As the bourgeois order crumbled in Venezuela during the 1990s, and as it
became increasingly likely that popular classes could win state power, groups of state
bureaucrats and private investors close to the state oil company, PDVSA, began to set up
subsidiaries abroad (such as the chain of Citgo Petroleum Company and various refineries
in the United States) in conjunction with private transnational oil companies, including
Exxon, Shell, and Gulf. The bureaucrats and investors also began to transfer the country's
oil wealth out of the country and into the private sector accounts of transnational investors
(among them Venezuelan nationals) via price transfers between the company's headquarters in
Caracas and this network of worldwide subsidiaries (see, e.g., Lander 2003; Niemeyer, 2004;
Mommer, 2003). Local and transnational economic elites were able to bypass the state
wresting control over operations and policy making from the Ministry of Energy and Mines,
which became a rubber stamp for decisions made by the company managers in converting
PDVSA into a transnational conglomerate for the generation and private appropriation the
country's principal source of wealth (Mommer, 2003). PDVSA succeeded in reorienting
public policies by opening up the oil sector to direct foreign investment, increasing the
amount of oil marketed internationally in order to capture market shares at the expense of
maintaining prices, disregarding Venezuela's OPEC quota commitments, and reducing the
tax rate, among other machinations (see various entries in Lander, 2003). Such a circulation
of oil-generated capital only became possible in the globalization phase of capitalism. It was
neoliberal structural adjustment from 1989 and on including liberalization, deregulation,
the lifting of capital and currency controls, tax breaks, and privatization that facilitated this
rechanneling of the oil-generated surplus so that it would bypass local state circuits (Parker,
2005). The profits generated by the PDVSA's increasingly abundant investments abroad were
never repatriated to the parent company and thus contributed nothing to the state. In 1991,
fiscal income was equivalent to 16 percent of GNP but declined to less than 10 percent
during the course of that decade and plummeted to less than five percent by 1998. It would
seem at the time that Chavez took power in 1999 that the popular classes, even as they won a
foothold in the state, were less able to utilize that state as an institutional lever to wrest wealth
from a transnationalized bourgeoisie. However, the Chavez government pursued an
aggressive strategy of wresting control back from the PDVSA managers and their backers.
The government reestablished control over the company by the Energy and Mines Ministry.
It reinvigorated Venezuela's role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), playing a pivotal role in the successful reimposition of production quotas and
consequent rise in world market prices (this was before the U.S. Iraq war sent prices spiraling
upward). In 2001, the government passed a Hydrocarbon Law that reduced taxes and
increased royalties because the latter was easier to calculate and less susceptible to evasion,
price transfer, and other manipulations than the former. Following the December 2002
production stoppage and lockout organized by the PDVSA executives with the backing of the
country's business associations and political opposition, the government replaced the PDVSA
management. It subsequently introduced measures to favor the participation of local small
and medium firms, worker cooperatives, and community organizations in the oil industry
and introduced PDVSA-financed social programs in oil-producing regions (Lander, 2003;
Parker, 2005). Macroeconomic policy under Chavez in the first few years of his presidency
was heterodox but hardly radical. Currency controls were put in place in 2002 but the
government continued to meet its foreign debt obligations, to avoid deficit spending, and to
maintain a foreign reserve surplus. Moreover, while mandating state intervention in the
economy and directly challenging neoliberalism the new constitution ratified the rights of
private property. Yet Chavez himself declared that if his children were starving he would not
think twice about committing theft and suggested that the plight of the poor takes priority
over the protection of private property (Ellner, 2001:24). The new constitution approved by
popular referendum in 1999 prohibited the privatization of public health, education, and
utilities, ensured state ownership of all mineral and hydrocarbon deposits and prohibited
their transfer or alienation, prohibited the patenting of genome of living beings, and
declared the right of indigenous peoples to collective ownership of their lands. In late 2001
Chavez also enacted a package of forty-nine laws with a radical socioeconomic content,
including agrarian reform, state control of oil ventures, state support for worker cooperatives and
the undoing of the earlier privatization of the social security system (Ellner, 2005:167-168).
During the period between Chavez' inauguration in January 1999 and the abortive coup in April
2002 two positions were in tension within the Chavez movement, according to Ellner. A "soft
line" faction led by Luis Miquilena, a longtime businessman and politician who occupied the
number two position in the Chavista movement during the government's first few years,
advocated a strategy of establishing MVR links with "progressive" capitalists and brought in
financial support for the movement from major Venezuelan and transnational economic groups
(Ellner, 2005:181). But Miquilena and several other prominent leaders defected to the opposition
in 2002, on the eve of the abortive coup, reflecting a shifting correlation of political forces in
favor of a "hard line," or elements more inclined to facilitate a deeper transformation of the
country's property structure and reconstitution of the political system.
Link - Oil
Empirics prove, US Venezuela oil investments can only serve one purpose: To
increase the oil power of the United States.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and imagination, religious
faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture
the most fundamental values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an
ideological and political sphere where religious fundamentalism comes together with market
fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly,
American imperial ambitions are now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the
responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a civilizing process for
the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter
speaks for many such intellectuals when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State
University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States invaded Iraq in order to
seize its oil.As she put it, Why not go to war just for oil? We need oil. Of course, we consume most
of the worlds oil; we do most of the worlds production (qtd. in Colella 2004, 1). In this world-
view, power, money, and a debased appeal to pragmatism always trump social and economic
justice. Hence, it is not sur- prising for neo-conservatives to have joined hands with neoliberals
and religious fundamentalists in broadcasting to the world at large an American triumphalism in
which the United States is arrogantly defined as [t]he greatest of all great powers in world
history (Frum and Pearle qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8).
Industries also spends big money to pressure Congress, with $16.2 million on lobbying and more than $1.3 million from
its PAC (the top oil and gas spender). In total, the oil and gas industry sends 90 percent of its near $50 million in
contributions to Republicans, far eclipsing their record spending in 2008. Misinformation Campaigns, Including Over $150 Million
In Election Ads: Over $150 million has been spent on TV ads promoting fossil fuel interests, particularly oil and coal, reports the New York
Times. In addition to traditional campaign donations, the oil industry has turned to outside groups running attack ads. Earlier this year, Americans
For Prosperity founded and funded by the Koch brothers launched a bogus ad claiming that clean energy stimulus dollars went overseas.
And the
oil lobby A merican P etroleum I nstitute has its own campaign promoting myths about oil production
and gas prices. For example, API chief Jack Gerard, rumored to be on Mitt Romneys shortlist for a White House or agency appointment, claimed
that oil production on federal land is down. This is simply not true, since oil production is up 240 million barrels on federal lands and waters
under President Obama compared to the Bush administration. And oil companies hold 20 million acres of federal oil, gas leases in Gulf of
Mexico that remain unexplored or undeveloped. This is just one
Behind-The-Scenes Campaign To Defeat Clean Energy: Koch Industries and fossil fuel groups are mobilizing to defeat the extension of modest
tax incentives for wind energy, even though oil tax breaks are permanent. The American Energy Alliance, which has Koch ties, aims to make the
credit so toxic for Republicans it would be impossible for John Boehner to sit at a table with Harry Reid. The Koch-funded Americans For
Congress
and for Republican candidates. The House of Representatives is the most anti-environment in Congressional history, averaging at
least one anti-environment vote per day to eliminate or undermine pollution protections, many benefiting Big Oil. And the Romney/Ryan budget
plan would give the big five oil companies another $2.3 billion annual tax cut beyond existing loopholes.
wing intellectuals, and governments alike has found its material expression both in an all-out attack on
democratic values and in the growth of a range of social problems including: virulent and
persistent poverty, joblessness, inadequate health care, apartheid in the inner cities, and increasing
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Such problems appear to have been either removed from the inventory of public
discourse and social policy or factored into talk-show spectacles in which the public becomes merely a staging area for venting private interests
and emotions. Within the discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no way of
talking about what is fundamen tal to civic life, critical citizenship, and a substantive democracy . Neoliberalism offers
no critical vocabulary for speaking about political or social transformation as a democratic project. Nor is there a
language for either the ideal of public commitment or the notion of a social agency capa ble of challenging the basic assumptions of corporate
ideology as well as its social consequences. In its dubious appeals to universal laws, neutrality, and selective scientific research,
neoliberalism "eliminates the very possibility of critical thinking, without which democratic debate
becomes impossible" (Buck-Morss 2003, 65-66).This shift in rhetoric makes it possible for advocates of
neoliberalism to implement the most ruthless economic and political policies without having to open up such
actions to public debate and dialogue. Hence, neoliberal policies that promote the cutthroat downsizing of the workforce, the bleeding of social
services, the reduction of state governments to police precincts, the ongoing liquidation of job security, the increasing elimination of a decent
social wage, the creation of a society of low-skilled workers, and the emergence of a culture of permanent insecu rity and fear hide behind
appeals to common sense and allegedly immutable laws of nature. When and where such nakedly ideological appeals strain both reason and
imagination, religious faith is invoked to silence dissension. Society is no longer defended as a space in which to nurture the most fundamental
values and relations necessary to a democracy but has been recast as an ideological and political sphere "where religious fundamentalism comes
together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy" (Soros 2004, 10). Similarly, American imperial ambitions are
now legitimated by public relations intellectuals as part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is celebrated as either a civilizing
process for the rest of the globe or as simply a right bestowed upon the powerful. For instance, Ann Coulter speaks for many such intellectuals
when she recently argued, while giving a speech at Penn State University, that she had no trouble with the idea that the United States invaded Iraq
foundation of human freedom. This becomes clear not only in the passage of repressive laws such as the USA Patriot Act but also in the work of
prominent neoconservatives such as David Frum and Richard Pearle who, without any irony intended, insist that "[a] free society is not an unpoliced society. A free society is a self-policed society" (qtd. in Lapham 2004b, 8). In what could only be defined as an Adam Smith joins George
Orwell in a religious cult in California scenario, markets have been elevated to the status of sacrosanct temples to be worshiped by eager
consumers while citizens-turned soldiers of the-Army-of-God are urged to spy on each other and dissent is increas ingly criminalized.3 Political
culture, if not the nature of politics itself, has undergone revo lutionary changes in the last two decades, reaching its most debased expres sion
under the administration of President George W. Bush. Within this polit ical culture, not only is democracy subordinated
to the rule of the market, but corporate decisions are freed from territorial constraints and the demands of public obligations, just as
economics is disconnected from its social consequences. Power is increasingly removed from the dictates and control of nation states and politics
is largely relegated to the sphere of the local. Zygmunt Bauman captures brilliantly what is new about the relation ship among power, politics, and
the shredding of social obligations: The mobility acquired by "people who invest"?those with capital, with money which the investment requires?
means the new, indeed unprece dented ... disconnection of power from obligations: duties towards employ ees, but also towards the younger and
weaker, towards yet unborn genera tions and towards the self-reproduction of the living conditions of all; in short the freedom from the duty to
contribute to daily life and the perpet uation of the community. . . . Shedding the responsibility for the conse quences is the most coveted and
cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, locally unbound capital. (Bauman 1998, 9-10) Corporate power increasingly frees
itself from any political limitations just as it uses its power through the educational force of the dominant culture to put into place an utterly
privatized notion of agency in which it becomes difficult for young people and adults to imagine democracy as a public good, let alone the
transformative power of collective action. Once again, demo cratic politics has become ineffective, if not banal, as civic language is impoverished
and genuine spaces for democratic learning, debate, and dialogue such as schools, newspapers, popular culture, television networks, and other
public spheres are either underfunded, eliminated, privatized, or subject to corporate ownership . Under the aggressive politics and
culture of neoliberalism , society is increasingly mobilized for the production of violence against the
poor, immigrants, dissenters, and others marginalized because of their age, gender, race, ethnicity,
and color. At the center of neoliberalism is a new form of politics in the United States, a politics in which
radical exclusion is the order of the day, and in which the primary questions no longer con cern equality, justice, or freedom,
but are now about the survival of the slickest in a culture marked by fear, surveillance, and economic deprivation. This is a politics that hides its
own ideology by eliminating the traces of its power in a rhetoric of normalization, populism, and the staging of public spectacles. As Susan
George points out, the question that currently seems to define neoliberal "democracy" is "Who has a right to live or does not" (1999,para.34).
Neoliberalism is not a neutral, technical, economic discourse that can be measured with the precision of a mathematical formula or defended
through an appeal to the rules of a presumptively unassailable science that conve niently leaves its own history behind. Nor is it a paragon of
economic ration ality that offers the best "route to optimum efficiency, rapid economic growth and innovation, and rising prosperity for all who
are willing to work hard and take advantage of available opportunities" (Kotz 2003, 16). On the contrary ,
neoliberalism is an
ideology, a politics , and at times a fanaticism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market economy
that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dictates and values of a market-driven society. More important, it is an eco
nomic and implicitly cultural theory?a historical and socially constructed ideology that needs to be made visible, critically engaged, and shaken
from the stranglehold of power it currently exercises over most of the command ing institutions of national and global life. As such,
neoliberalism makes it difficult for many people either to imagine a notion of individual and social agency necessary for
reclaiming a substantive democracy or to be able to theorize the economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for
a viable global
public sphere in which public institutions, spaces, and goods become valued as part of a larger
democratic struggle for a sustainable future and the downward distribution of wealth, resources,
and power.
The affs method of disaster capitalism is under the influence of Neoliberal interests
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs38-39
It is true that military, oil, and engineering/construction companies , many of them headquartered
in the United States, managed to secure their particular sectoral interests through brazen
instrumentalization of the U.S. state under the Bush presidency. However, these companies are
themselves transnational and their interests are those not of "U.S. capital" in rivalry with other
countries but of particular transnational clusters in the global economy . Transnational capitalists
are themselves aware of the role of the U.S. state in opening up new possibilities for unloading
of surplus and created new investment opportunities. "We're looking for places to invest around
the world," explained one former executive of a Dutch-based oil exploration and engineering
company, and then "you know, along comes Iraq" (as cited in Monthly Review, 2004:64). The
"creative destruction" of war and natural and humanitarian disasters generates new cycles of
and construction constitutes one of those sectors of global capital that most benefits from the
creative destruction of crises, wars, and natural and humanitarian disasters. Klein has
characterized this new mechanism of accumulation as "disaster capitalism" (2005b), while Bello
observes that " post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction planning and implementation are
increasingly influenced by neo-liberal market economics" and that the same set of actors are
"now dominant in both arenas: the U.S. military-political command, the World Bank, corporate
contractors and humanitarian and development NGOs" (Bello, 2oo6b:28i). In 2004 the U.S.
government created the "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ." The idea
was to utilize post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction to transform "the very social fabric of
a nation" along neoliberal lines, explained one official (Klein, 2OO5b). "The rise of a predatory
form of disaster capitalism," in Klein's words, "uses the desperation and fear created by
catastrophe to engage in radical social and economic engineering" (Klein, 2OO5b). In a sense
the U.S. state became rentier insofar as the main dominant groups became increasingly
dependent on the extraction of rents through the conversion of public into private resources.
These groups aggressively turned to the state to convert public resources into private profits by
way of disaster capitalism and publicly funded but privately contracted reconstruction. But more
importantly, the U.S. state mobilized the resources through war and disaster capitalism to
generate new outlets for surplus and sustain global accumulation. The $607 billion invested by the
U.S. state in war and "reconstruction" in Iraq between 2002 and 2007 (Rosen, J., 2007) went to a
vast array of investors and subcontractors that spanned the globe (Phinney, 2005). Kuwaiti
Trading and Contracting, Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering and Saudi Trading and
Construction Company were just some of the Middle East-based companies that shared in the
bonanza, along with companies and investor groups as far away as South Africa, Bosnia, the
Philippines, and India (ibid.). The picture that emerges is one in which the U.S. state mobilizes
the resources to feed a vast transnational network of profit making that passes through countless
layers of outsourcing, subcontracting, alliances and collaborative relations, benefiting
transnationally oriented capitalists from many parts of the globe. The U.S. state is the pivotal gear
in a TNS machinery dedicated to reproducing global capitalism. Suffice it to conclude here with
the observation that the empire of global capital has barely emerged and yet already faces deep
crisis. Globalization resolved some problems for capital but the underlying laws of capitalism
remain in place and continually assert themselves. The unfolding crisis in the world economy
may turn out to be neither a recurring business cycle nor the opening salvos of a new
restructuring crisis. Hardly had the neoliberal model triumphed in the 1980s and 1990s than it
began to appear moribund. The struggle for what will take its place is now under way and is the
backdrop to the political upheavals that began to rock Latin America in the early twenty-first
century. Neoliberalism may prove to be a parenthesis between old nation-state accumulation
models and a new global social structure of accumulation whose contours are not yet clear . The
global crisis is experienced in different forms in distinct countries and regions. Let us now
examine in broad strokes how it has been manifest in Latin America.
The reliance on oil as a wealth creator is part and parcel of neoliberalist ideology.
Tapamor 7 (Edward Writer for Resource Investor, Peak Oil Passnotes: Neo-Liberalism's
Ultimate Failure Part 2, 11/16, http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2007/11/16/peak-oil-passnotesneoliberalisms-ultimate-failure)
We pointed out last week that this column does not put any faith in the
liberalism or "free markets". We have noted that despite its ideologically rigid application around the world for the last 25 years, it
has done nothing to create a supply cushion in oil markets. Instead what it has done is pass giant profits to the
most powerful organisations within the industry, privatising the profits and socialising the costs. One great
example at the moment is biofuels. The developed world, especially the U nited S tates, wants liquid fuel for transport. So a tax
has been placed on the entire world population as the transport-dependent U.S. and EU suck out available spare capacity in the agricultural
market by converting corn to ethanol. Basically land has been converted to growing corn in order to provide fuels for the states most dependent
on car travel. This has boosted food prices all around the globe, even for people who do not posses cars or have ever even travelled in one. What
is more amazing is that this event is not some kind of economic neo-liberal happening. Like much of free market thinking, it is in fact a myth.
Fifty percent of the revenues that U.S. farmers receive from growing corn for ethanol in fact do not come from anything as neo-liberal as sales
and marketing. No, 50% of the revenues come from subsidies, from the taxpayer, via the government. If you are a major industrial landowner, it
is a godsend. The
idea of investment to "create wealth" (another wacky neo-liberal idea - we can see you printing
the money supply, we are not blind) is thrown away as every taxpayer in the U.S. subsidises major industrial concerns.
Secondly comes the idea that war and global "full-spectrum dominance" can safeguard the United States. It is true that war provides liquidity for
economies as - once again -
taxpayer subsidies in the form of war budgets send wealth flooding up the chain to the
most powerful organisations and concerns on the planet. There is now little doubt that the United States, for example,
has spent around $1 trillion on the invasion and destruction of Iraq. Although we can argue over how much importance the region has in terms of
invasion-to-oil-and-gas-reserves, there is little doubt that securing the region for U.S. and EU "interests" was a prime motivator - maybe not all of
it but certainly a very important one. But if an economy was truly democratic - unlike any on the planet - then the U.S. could have spent that
money far more wisely. One trillion dollars would buy 11.77 billion barrels of oil at $85 per barrel. Of course it could also have been spent on
second generation biofuels - the ones ExxonMobil [NYSE:XOM] and Total [NYSE:TOT] are so keen on - or wind farms or solar power or
insulation for American homes. Instead the money has been part of the trickle-up, the process whereby money is passed from the weakest to the
richest, the real underlying motivation for neo-liberalism class war. As there are no democracies on the planet, only differing forms of oligarchy,
it is no surprise to see the Chinese state capitalists or the Russian state capitalists doing roughly similar versions of the same thing. Chinese per
capita consumption of oil is the same as that of the U.S. in 1904, yet we hear so often that - basically - it is the "fault" of China to create a
demand-led, geo-political peak oil. What this signals is that economies need democratising, not placing in the hands of
either private or state oligarchies. But in the developed world instead what we do have is a moment
where modern economies - neo-liberal ones - are exposed as failures. Investment signals and market economics,
such as they are, cannot satisfy what is needed, a rise in demand led by the force feeding of capitalism-for-the-rich around the world for the last
50 years. The only possible respite for this is to have a recession - where prices drop, where the weakest are hurt the most and where, once again,
the richest and most powerful benefit by cherry picking assets from the disparate, profligate and downright unlucky. When peak oil bounces the
world into recession, as many in the oil industry believe it will, remember who told you first.
Link- Patriarchy
Neoliberalization returns women to the traditional patriarchal systems of the past
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 170)
Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading,
debilitating, and dangerous toil. The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact
extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women
may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional
social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit
markets. The paths of womens liberation from traditional patriarchal controls in
developing countries lie either through degrading factory labour or through trading on
sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade
(one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is
involved). The loss of social protections in advanced capitalist countries has had
particularly negative eects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist
countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of womens rights through neoliberalization has been
nothing short of catastrophic.
systemic dilemmas affecting educational development Latin America's poorest and most heavily
indebted states, the author will argue that until neoliberalism's core conditions and normative
preference for 'marketized' modes of development are effectively challenged and alternatives are
acknowledged, progress toward the achievement of basic goals of equity of access to education
and other forms of social rights will continue to be frustrated in the Latin America's most
vulnerable states, and beyond. In the face of still-hegemonic neoliberalism, the struggle for
alternatives is a type of 'counter-hegemonic' struggle based in a discourse of human rights as well
as a strong role for states in social investment and development.
The movements of the twentieth century failed but neoliberalism is weaker now and
movements could overcome it
Petras and Veltmeyer 13
(James, Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, Henry, professor of Sociology
and International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University, Social Movements in Latin
America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance, January 17, 2013, page 221-222 MW)
The implementation of IMF and World Bank policies of neoliberal reform, and structural
adjustment to the requirements of the new (neoliberal) imperial order, were only and made
possible by means of a multipronged assault on the working class and the new semiproletariat of
rural landless workers, disarticulating the forces of resistance and demobilizing the social
movements. On the other hand, the same forces and policies that destroyed the social movements
of the l960s and 1970s in conditions of capitalist exploitation and imperial rule gave rise ro a new
wave of social movements that in the 1990s would pose a serious challenge to the neoliberal world
order. The imposition the imperial neoliberal model resulted in the productive and social
transformation (agriculture and rural society, separating millions of peasants and small farmers
from their means of direct production, not only proletarianizing and uprooting many of them but
also fueling new forms of resistance in the form of popular sector social movements. To counter
the rise of this popular resistance the World Bank , and other agents of the neoliberal imperial
order designed and implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy within the framework of a
postWashington consensus 011 the need for a more pragmatic form of neoliberalism a more
inclusive form of "development" and a new paradigm focused on the "empowerment of the
poor," self-help, micro-projects and marker-assisted land reforms .
Link - Relations
Poor relations make Latin Americans fight Neoliberalism
Vanderbush 09
(Walt,Ph.D.,NorthwesternUniversity,1993M.A.,NorthwesternUniversity,1989B.A.,College
ofWooster,1982,NewPoliticalScience,TheBushAdministrationRecordinLatinAmerica:
SinsofOmissionandCommission)
The notion that the US periodically neglects Latin America is certainly not a new one. Scholars
observing US policy toward the region have described an historic neglect-panic cycle in which the
pattern is to largely ignore Latin America until some sort of crisis situation develops. While
conceding that past periods of benign neglect in the 1950s and 1970s were not necessarily so
benign,HowardWiardaexpectedthattheendoftheColdWarwaslikelytousherinanew
periodofbenignneglect. AfterworkingintheClintonadministrationduringthe1990s,Robert
PastoroptimisticallywroteintheprefacetoasecondeditionofhisbookonUSLatin
Americanrelationsthatitmightbepossibleinthe21stcenturytoexitpermanentlyfromthat
neglectpaniccycleanddevelopamodernandrespectfulrelationshipinitsplace.Instead,
many of those commenting on US Latin American relations during the presidency of George W.
Bush have seen the time since September 11, 2001 as another period of US disengagement with the
concentratedallitsenergiesandattentiononalQaedaandIraq,andintheprocessneglected
LatinAmericaandtherestoftheworld. WithoutdenyingtheimpactofSeptember11onUS
LatinAmericanrelations,ortheresultingfocusbytheBushadministrationonotherpartsofthe
world,itisamistaketoseethecurrentsituationaslargelytheresultofUSneglect. First,thetheme
ofneglectdoesnotgivesufficientweighttotheresourcefulnessandactivismbyvarious
groupsandleaderstochallengetheUSpowerintheregion.Socialgroupshavemobilizedacross
LatinAmericatoopposeneoliberaleconomicpoliciesthathaveexacerbatedpovertyandinequality,
andinplacesledtogreaterforeigncontrolofLatinAmericanresources,andtheUSisclosely
associatedwiththosepracticesandideas. Second,IwouldarguethatthepoliciestheUSdidpursue
intheregionhadatleastasgreatanimpactonthechangesoverthesetwotermsasdidanyfailure
bytheBushadministrationtopayattentiontoLatinAmerica.ForJorgeCastan eda,observing
fromMexico,itmayhavebeenaforgottenrelationship, butinVenezuela,Bolivia,andCuba,
theexperiencehasbeenmoreadversarialthanneglectful.
Link - Resources
Link Neoliberalism destroys the planets natural commodities
Werlhof 2008
(Prof. Claudia von Werlhof is Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Innsbruck,
Austria. Global Research, February 01, The Consequences of Globalization and Neoliberal Policies. What
are the Alternatives? http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequences-of-globalization-and-neoliberalpolicies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative got half-way on its feet no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coercion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered. The earth is not the paradise it
was (at least in many places) 500 years ago, 200 years ago or even 100 years ago. The devastation
has been incredible: large parts of our drinking water are disappearing mainly due to the melting of
the glaciers and polar caps; our climate has changed dramatically, causing turbulences and
catastrophes; our atmosphere is no longer protected against ultraviolet radiation (ozone layer
problem); many species of our fauna and flora are extinguished; most cultures and their
knowledge are destroyed; most natural resources exhausted. And all this happened within what
only comes to a nanosecond of the earths history.
label left to the forces that struggle to build a society that is an alternative to the exploitative
capitalist system and its logic of profit, a society of workers organized by a humanist- and
solidarity-based logic whose aim is to satisfy human needs; a society free from material poverty and
from the spiritual poverty that capitalism engenders; and a society that does not issue decrees from
above but rather builds from below, with the people as protagonists. In other words, a socialist
society.43 These forces, therefore, will not be characterized solely by a struggle for equality that manifests
itself in a war on povertyalthough this may be one of their most distinctive features but also by their rejection of an
aberrant societal model based on exploitation and the logic of profit : the capitalist model. I should add,
nevertheless, something more. I fully agree with the Uruguayan researcher Beatriz Stolowicz who maintains: One is not left just because one
says one is, but one is left because of what one does to achieve these necessary transformations and constructions. That is how one comes to be
left.4 But why is it so necessary to use the criterion of practice to decide who is on the left? Becauseas I
wrote in 1999 in The Left on the Threshold of the Twenty First Century: Making the Impossible Possible the
right has
unscrupulously appropriated the lefts language, which is particularly obvious in the way it
formulates its programs.45 Words like reforms, structural changes, concern over poverty,
and transition are today part of the rights anti-human and oppressive language.
As Franz
Hinkelammert says, The key words of the opposition popular movements of the 1950s and 1960s have been transformed into the key words of
those who ruthlessly destroyed them.46 He goes on to say, The night, when all cats are grey, falls. Everyone is against privilege; all want
reforms and a structural change. Everyone is in favor of a preferential option for the poor.47 Todayin the midst of the crisis of
neoliberalismthis appropriation of the lefts language has reached the point where even
capitalists have adopted the lefts criticism of neoliberalism. The role of the market has begun to be challenged; there
is talk of the need for the regulatory power of the state. We have to acknowledge that, as Beatriz Stolowicz says, In the sphere of
discourse, capitalist strategies are not dogmatic, they change their arguments, they criticize what
they used to propose when the negative effects of this cannot be hidden and could generate political
problems. To win over adepts, they show solidarity with the discontent over globalization (as Joseph
Stiglitz called it). They join in the anti-globalization zeal, using the adjective neoliberal to qualify it
neoliberal globalizationbecause of the decisive weight of finance capital as it continues to cause convulsions. Thus, neoliberalism is now
simply speculation, and the latter is blamed on the irresponsibility of bad executives, thus protecting the credibility of capital . The
dominates much of the left and particularly emanates from non-governmental organizations or NGOs. I wonder if you can explain
your
critique both of the legalistic framework of universal human rights and of non-profits as the agents of change. DH:
I'm not against much of that, I think some of that is okay, but it has limited purchase because it's trying to fight
neoliberalism with neoliberalism's own tools . It's attempting to roll back a market ethic by a logic
of individual rights, when the market ethic is based on the logic of individual rights . When you start to
look at the details, what you find is that, first off, the NGOs are not democratic institutions. There are good NGOs and there
are bad NGOs, there is a vast array of NGOs doing very different things. The problem with the rights discourse is that as
soon as you get into the judicial world, you find yourself having to actually try to prove things
through the law, and the law is not exactly an unbiased institution. It has certain kinds of ways of
looking at private property and individuals and so on. For example, I think it's wonderful that in New York City, in
Rockefeller Center, there is this bronze plaque where Rockefeller writes his personal credo. And his personal credo says he believes in the
supreme worth of the individual. Well, all of us should know that legally the corporation is an individual. So maybe we should
go out there and say, do you realize that what Rockefeller means here is that he believes in the supreme worth of the corporation? And so
when I go into court and I take on a corporation, there is an asymmetry of power in this whole
system. And this even works at the world level. For instance, if the state of Chad doesn't like the fact that the United States
is disobeying WTO rules in its subsidies to the cotton farms of this country, Chad has to mount a case against the United States, but in order to do
this, it needs at least a million dollars. But the budget of Chad is very small, so a million dollars out of the budget Chad is huge, whereas a
million dollars out of the budget of the US is almost nothing. So Chad cannot afford to actually mount a campaign against the United States in
the WTO and claim its rights under the WTO. This is the sort of problem we run into at all levels: as soon as you go into the legal system there is
an asymmetry of power and the like. While I'm not against some of those things that are going on through the pursuit of human rights, what I'm
saying is that there is limited purchase to that
social and political organization, social solidarities, and we have to really reevaluate what is meant
by democracy and what is really meant by freedom.
the world is free if we have to pay immense amounts for what should be public education. I think the current questions are what is freedom, what
is democracy, how social solidarities can be built -- those are the issues we should really be concentrating upon
Link - Rights/Constitutionalism
Legal strategies to social change indefinitely postpones radical resistance to the
neoliberal order, shoring up rightist control. Only a rejection of legal methods of
change can created liberated politics.
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 43-5)
The constitutional framework significantly alters the context of leftist activity, which for decades
had been directed against military tyrannies. The battle within the current system is not simple because the current
institutionalism renews bourgeois domination in multiple disguises. This plasticity disconcerted a generation of militants
prepared to fight against a very brutal but not very devious dictatorial enemy. Some activists were demoralized by these
difficulties and ended up accepting the accusations from the right. They began to flay themselves
for their former "under-estimation of democracy," forgetting that civil liberties were an
achievement of popular resistance (and not of a bourgeois party regime complicit with authoritarianism). The constitutional
framework induced other militants to proclaim the end of "revolutionary utopia" and the beginning of a new era of
gradual advances toward a postcapitalist future. They returned to the gradualist scheme and proposed to embark on the road to
socialism through an initial consensus with the oppressors. They advocated taking this path to gaining hegemony for the workers. But the
vast trajectory of social democracy has proved the unreality of this option. The dominant classes
do not give up power. They only co-opt partners to recreate the pillars of an oppression based on
private ownership of the big banks and corporations. They will never permit this control to be
corroded by the political or cultural weight of their antagonists. For this reason, any policy that indefinitely
postpones the anticapitalist goal ends up reinforcing oppression. Socialism requires preparing and
consummating anticapitalist ruptures. If one forgets this principle, the strategy of the Left lacks a
compass. But the confrontation with constitutionalism has also generated positive effects in recent years.
It has allowed, for example, debate on the left about the form that a genuine democracy under
socialism would adopt.
This reflection introduced a significant change in the way of conceptualizing the anticapitalist perspective. In
the 1970s, democracy was a topic that the critics of the Soviet bureaucracy omitted or barely put forth. Now almost no one skirts this problem.
Socialism has ceased to be imagined as a prolongation of the tyranny that reigned in the Soviet Union and has currently begun to be perceived as
a regime of growing participation, representation, and popular control. But this future also depends on the immediate responses to
constitutionalism. Two positions prevail on the left: one focus proposes winning space within the institutional
structure, and
the other promotes parallel organs of people's power (Harnecker, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005).
The first path argues for advancing by climbing from the local to the provincial levels to subsequently
reach the national governments. It follows from the experiences of community administrations that the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores) and the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) of Uruguay pursued in the early 1990s. It recognizes the bitter concessions granted to the
establishment during these administrations (business commitments and postponement of social improvements), but it construes the final outcome
as positive. Undeniably, this "municipal socialism led to old activists turning into confidence men of capital. They debated at city halls,
exhibited hostility toward the social movement, and ended up governing on behalf of the dominant classes.
First they moderated programs, then they called for responsibility, and finally they changed sides.
The participatory budget did not counteract this regression. Discussing how to distribute a local expenditure limited by the constraints of
neoliberal policy leads to imposing a self-adjustment upon the citizenry. Participatory democracy only awakens radical
consciousness of the people when it resists and denounces the tyranny of capital. If it renounces this
goal, it turns into an instrument for preserving the established order. An opposite strategy to the
institutional path exists that encourages social mobilization and rejects electoral participation . It
the emergence of direct
options for people's power. It also questions the electoral traps that, in the Andean countries, have led to channeling resistance
denounces the corruption of the Workers' Party or the passivity of the Broad Front and advocates
through the system. This vision ignores the influence of the electoral arena and minimizes the negative consequences of abandoning it.
Citizenship, voting, and electoral rights are not just instruments of bourgeois manipulation.
achieved against dictatorships, which under certain conditions allow one to take a stand against
the Right.
democracy has not been consolidated social pressures to take democracy beyond the limits set by
the needs of capital could lead to derailment of democratic governments and a return to
authoritarian ~ rule. A new question necessarily opens up. What degree of political freedom is to
be found along side neoliberal democracy? The limits seem determined primarily by what
neoliberalism considers the needs of capital accumulation . That is, economic policy-making must
be kept out of reach of popular pressures, by legislation whenever possible, or through the
creation of artificial barriers otherwise. Legislation may guarantee an independent Central Bank,
strict observance of an exchange rate policy, the reduction of union power, the sacrosanctity of
pri vate property, a balanced budget, etc. Other barriers to popular participation may involve a
reduction in the access provided to the representatives of popular groups to the higher echelons of
policy-making, the placement of indirect forms of representative selection -such as electoral
colleges or single-member districts- the criminalization and harassment of social movements, etc.
Policy-making lies outside of politics ; in the hands of a cadre of professionals, who convinced the
superiority of their knowledge acquired by technical training are, as John Markoff (1996, p. 119)
notes "open to violating the will of electorates or disagreeing with bureaucratic superiors." In
order to keep legal and artificial barriers in place, neoliberal governments may recur to further
reductions in political freedoms: such as the imposition of rules by presidential decree, or the
curtailment of freedoms of speech, press and assembly. The degree of democracy and political
freedom then becomes a function of the needs of markets." Where pressures for redistribution are
high - representing a threat to neoliberal principles of private property, market supremacy and
capital accumulation- political freedoms will necessarily be curtailed to prevent democratic
impulses from launching at the throat of the neoliberal political order. Neoliberal democracy
exhibits a primary concern with the protection of economic freedoms, and a marked distaste for
open political participation. How do these features compare to liberal democracy? An essential
characteristic in common is the significance of private property as a basic right of individuals, and
the freedoms associated with this right. The entire rational of neoliberalisrn, both as economic and
political doctrine, evolves around this principle. However, liberal democracy requires other
elements of individual liberty and rule of law - that at times - run counter to the objectives of
neoliberalism. In the push to free society from the coercive powers of politics, neoliberalism does
not hesitate in stepping over individual rights, particularly an individual's political rights. Given
that the driving force behind neoliberalism is the reestablishment of capital accumulation on
sound grounds, and not the establishment of a regime characterized by the rule of law and
political freedoms, it should not come as a surprise that neoliberal democracies often fail the test
of liberal democracy. Regardless of an ostensible contradiction in terms, Fareed Zakaria's
concept of "illiberal" democracy applies well to several regimes that should be considered
neoliberal democracies. Zakaria (1997, p. 22) makes use of several regimes with outstanding
neoliberal credentials: such as Menem's Argentina and Fujirnoris Peru as examples of "illiberal"
democracies, defined as regimes that "routinely ignor[e] constitutional limits on their power and
depriv[e] their citizens of basic rights and freedoms." Zakaria (1997, p. 33) argues that rulers of
neoliberal democracies often justify methods more closely associated with authoritarianism than
democracy on the grounds "that they are desperately needed to enact tough economic reforms."
Does this mean that "illiberal" democracy is equivalent to neoliberal democracy? Zakaria (1997,
p. 34) would answer negatively, for he remains convinced that successful economic reforms
require constitutional liberalism to "protect individual rights and create a framework of law and
administration." Zakaria fails to recognize that although neoliberal democracy requires the
protection of particular individual rights, primarily private property and other economic freedoms
- other rights are often trampled in order to increase the possibilities of success in economic
reforms. Barro (1996, p. 7) contributes to the formulation of an alternative view. He suggests
that "[cjountries with higher standards of living tend to approach higher levels of democracy
over time." Consequently, different degrees of democracy may be adequate for different levels of
economic development in order to further the process of accumulation and foster economic
growth. Barro (1996, p. I I) adds: The advanced Western countries would contribute more to the
welfare of poor nations by exporting their economic systems, notably property rights and free
markets, rather than their political systems, which typically developed after reasonable standards
of living had been attained. In other words, it is not civil liberties at large that must be protected
in developing nations, but rather those particular civil liberties that give rise to solid capitalist
relations and markets working in the interests of a propertied class . Only once the market has
acquired sufficient dominance and exerts control over society can other individual rights, more
closely associated with political freedom, be subject to expansion. Barro suggests that most
political rights must only be granted to the population at large after the sphere of politics has been
sufficiently reduced to guarantee the absolute supremacy of market relations of production and
distribution. The significance of these ideas for neoliberal democracy cannot be overstated.
Neoliberalism may find liberal democracy acceptable under certain conditions, but democracy
must be limited and diminished -even to a level that compromises the principles of political
liberalism- when threats to neoliberal objectives arise from democratic pressures.
Link: Sovereignty
Neoliberalist loans led to the loss of sovereignty of poorer countries.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 78-79)
There is an important subtext to the Commissions proposed development stra- tegies, which
principally rely on the private sector to ameliorate the situation of the worlds poor. In particular,
the proposed development framework would lead to the further erosion of the national sovereignty
of poorer countries, a profound lack of confidence in the ability of a government to efficiently
provide basic goods and services for its people, and the subsidization of privatization of national
goods and services.Though the loss of sovereignty has been briefly touched upon above, it war-
[t]ransformation of the IMF into a source of long-term conditional loans has made poorer nations
increasingly dependent on the IMF and has given the IMF a degree of influence over member
countries policymaking that is unprecedented for a multilateral institution. Some agreements
between the IMF and its members specify scores of required policies as conditions for continued
funding. These programs have not ensured economic progress. They have undermined national
sovereignty and often hindered the devel- opment of responsible, democratic institutions that
correct their own mis- takes and respond to changes in external conditions.
Despite the fact that the Commissions first of six guiding principles of IMF reform is
sovereignty the desire to ensure that democratic processes and sovereign authority are
respected in both borrowing and lending countries (Meltzer 2000), the Commission did not
explain how its policy recommendations would improve the status quo. In lieu of eliminating the
source of the loss of national sovereignty the forced implementation of predetermined neoliberal
policies, regardless of the country or situation it appeared that the Commission had merely
masked it by requiring countries to pre-qualify for loans, in lieu of the current practice of
conditioning loans on specific criteria. Indeed, this policy change could potentially exacerbate the
loss of national sovereignty as countries would be forced to implement policies before they could
qualify for loans, rather than merely agree to implement policies as a condition of the loan.
In addition, the Commissions World Bank restructuring program would facil- itate, and
functionally subsidize, the privatization of public goods and services in developing economies by
two principal means, thereby effectively overriding national development policies. First, the
Commission would have required countries with capital market access to seek funding for
development projects from these private sources rather than from a multinational entity, such as
the World Bank or IMF. Thus, countries would be forced to either borrow large sums of capital at
high interest rates, or to allow private corporations to enter the country and assume responsibility
for various functions previously under the governments purview. Second, for countries that are
both poor enough and lack access to international capital markets, the World Bank would
essentially auction off the rights to certain goods and services to the lowest bidder guaranteeing
payment by directly delivering the funds to the service provider. Furthermore, user fees would be
subsidized for the poorest countries, thereby assuring multinational corporations a certain return
on their investments, as long as the country remains poor.
Link Terrorism
The war on terror is caused by neoliberal interests
Lafer06
(GordonLafer,GordonLaferisapoliticaleconomistandisanAssociateProfessoratthe
UniversityofOregonsLaborEducationandResearchCenter,Neoliberalismbyothermeans:
thewaronterrorathomeandabroad,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0739314042000251306)
The takeover of Iraq is clearly driven by a mixture of motives: the presidents reelection strategy,
the lust for oil, the profits of contractors, the neoconservative ideology of administrators and the
neoliberal agenda described here.Attimesthesemotivesconverge,andattimestheypull
againsteachother.Yetthetaskofpoliticalscientistsmustbetolookatthosecrosscurrentsof
motivesandwithoutminimizingthecomplexityofthethingdoourbesttoanswerthe
question:sowhatreallyisgoingonhere?One broad strain of thought is that the war is essentially
the project of a neoconservative policy elite within the administration .AstheCarnegieEndow
mentsJosephCirincioneputsit,thewarsuggestsatextbookcaseofhowasmall,organized
groupcandeterminepolicyinalargenation,evenwhenthemajorityofofficialsandexperts
originallyscornedtheirviews. There is no question that the neocons have been the most vocal
proponents of the war, and that they vigorously championed an invasion of Iraq for years before
9/11. Their zeal for this project has been relentless and unabashed .Their reasons for war were
never limited to weapons of mass destruction, but focused on the much grander goals of restoring
American virtue,ignitinganIslamicReformation,and establishing the US as the sole power
over the entire planet, foreverinstitutingwhatthegovernmentcallsitssinglesustainable
modelfornationalsuccessthatisrightandtrueforeveryperson,ineverysociety. Giventhe
depthofthisconviction,andthebreadthofinfluentialpositionsoccupiedbyneocons,thismakes
itseemthatthewarwaswagedprimarilyforideologicalratherthaninterestedreasons.
westerncivilization,buthavealsoatthesametimegivenatasteofthesortofconflictsthatare
generatedbyeconomicglobalization.Intheworldofglobalrisksthemarkofneoliberalism
rapidlylosesitscredibilitytosubstitutethestateandpoliticsthrougheconomics.The
privatizationofairlinesecurityintheU.S.isparticularlyemblematicoftheabovepoint.Until
nowtherehasbeenquiteabitofreluctancetodiscussthisbecausethetragedyofSeptember11
washomemade,inpart.Moreover,the U.S.s vulnerability certainly has something to do with its
political philosophy. America is a neoliberal nation through and through and is thus unwilling to
pay the price for public safety.When it is said and done it was long known that the U.S. was a
target for terrorist attacks. But in contrast to Europe, flight security was privatized and taken over
by miracle-working, highly flexible part-time workers whose wages are lower than those of fastfood workers, meaning approximately six dollars an hour.Personsthatgothroughveryfewhours
oftrainingandpracticethisprofessionfornomorethansixmonthsoccupytheseimportant
securitypositions.Before restricting the basic rights of all citizens to ward against terrorism and
endangering democracy and an under rule of law state, efforts should be made toward making
flight security government run and more professional.Thisisjustoneexampleofthemanyother
improvementsthatcouldbemade.It is Americas neoliberal concept of itselfits government
penny-pinching on the one hand, and the triad of deregulation, liberalization and privatization on
the otherthat contributes to Americas vulnerability to terrorism. Themeasuretowhichthis
realizationcatchesonwillbreakthehegemonicpowerthatneoliberalismhasgainedinshaping
itsphilosophyandactionsinthepast.In this sense the horrific pictures of New York contain a
message that has yet to be deciphered: a state, a country can become neoliberal to the point of
death.
Beck 02
(UlrichBeck,ProfessorofSociologyattheLudwigMaximiliansUniversityMunichandholdsa
professorshipatMunichUniversityandattheLondonSchoolofEconomics,TheSilenceof
WordsandPoliticalDynamicsintheWorldRiskSociety,
http://logosonline.home.igc.org/beck.pdf)
In times of crisis neoliberalism is left standing without a single political response. The approach of
increasing the dosage of bitter economic medicine even more radically when a breakdown is
pending or comes full-circle in order to rectify the problematic consequences of globalization is an
illusionary theory that only now begins to pay the price.On the contrary, terrorist threats make the
simple truths that the neoliberal triumph had suppressed knownagain:Thattheseparationofthe
worldeconomyfrompoliticsisillusionary.Thereisnosecuritywithoutthestateandpublic
service.Withouttaxationthereisnogovernment.Withouttaxationthereisnoeducation,no
affordablehealthcare,nosocialsecurity.Withouttaxationthereisnodemocracy.Withoutthe
public,democracyandcivilsocietyhavenolegitimacy.Andwithoutlegitimacythereisalsono
security.Thusitfollowsthatwithouttheshapeandformofalegallyregulated(meaning
recognizedandnotviolent)nationalsettlementofconflictinthefutureandaboveallonthe
globallevel,therewillalsobenoworldeconomyinanyform.
the rising pink tide, Alejandro Chafuen wrote his article Hope Amid Turmoil in Latin
America? for Atlas Highlights (Chafuen 2006). Chvez, Morales and Castro are invoked to
express the frustration of the neoliberal right with the contemporary challenges. But in what
amounts to nothing less than a Gramscian analysis of social power relations from a right wing
perspective, Chafuen points to the comparable weakness of the neoliberal forces in Latin America
back in the 1970s: seven neoliberal think tanks only in 1975 compared to the number of 35 for
2005; only ten universities with neoliberal professors compared to his count of 40 today; five freemarket journals and magazines instead of twelve these days; plus seven radio and TV channels
supporting the neoliberal cause compared to none in 1975. Chafuens message to the adherents of
the Atlas network: Do not worry too much about the neo-socialist challenge, because you can
rely on a wide range of neoliberal capacities which will be very difficult to destroy.
The think tank model of politics becomes particularly relevant in times of crisis. Think tanks
provide a framework for debates on future strategies. Political leaders and intellectuals currently
out of favour in the electorate find shelter in think tanks after having lost public positions, and they
serve to recruit and train new personnel for the future. As Zibechi (2008) argues, representatives
of the traditional Right have been replaced by figures from civil society as a consequence of the
resurgence of the left. Transnational private organizations with links to local right-wing or
neoliberal think tanks and parties are carrying out a continent wide ideological (counter)
offensive. The hegemonic contest of the different Rights in Latin America consequently has to be
analyzed within the wider context of a war of position (Gramsci).
Link Treaties
EconomictreatieswiththeUSareusedtoforceneoliberalismintoaforeigncountry
Shadlen00
(KennethShadlen,AssociateFellowatInstituteofLatinAmericanStudies,Universityof
London,LatinAmericanResearchReview,Neoliberalism,Corporatism,AndSmallBusiness
PoliticalActivismInContemporaryMexico,
http://lasa2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=35&Num=2&Start=73)
Smallindustrialists have faced a new economic and political environmentsincetheearly1980s,
when economic crisis and intense pressure from the international financial community obliged the
Mexican government to open the economy.16 Economic liberalization began in the wake of the 1982
debt crisis and continued throughout the decade (Lustig1992).Mexico entered the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the following year unilaterally accelerated the
pace of trade liberalization by eliminating most quantitative import restrictions and lowering the
maximum tariff from 100 to 20 percent.By the early 1990s, import barriers had been reduced,
foreign investment deregulated, most state enterprises privatized, and Mexico was negotiating the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada .Themajor
changesineconomicpolicywereaccompaniedbytheemergenceofanewalliancebetweenthe
stateandbusiness,inwhichacohesivegroupoftechnocraticpolicymakerscollaboratedclosely
withthetopstrataoftheMexicanbusinesscommunity.Within the state, a closely knit group of
officials with extensive links to the international financial community came to control key aspects of
economic policy making(Maxfield1991;CentenoandMaxfield1992;Centeno1994).In the
private sector, the peak representatives of the business community came under the control of the
most internationalized segment of Mexican capital, which was anxious to consolidate business
support for the new development strategy(TiradoandLuna1995;Schneider1997;Garridoand
Puga1990).Each feature of the new alliance diminished CANACINTRA's capacity to affect policy
making, as the increasingly technocratic nature of policy making and big business's monopoly of
the main channels of interest articulation devalued small industry's traditional points of access to
the state.These tendencies were evident in the two most important events of the period under
study: a series of tripartite economic pacts that served as the principal mechanism of economic
policy making after 1987, and NAFTA. Both featured intense collaboration between the state and
elite private-sector proponents of the neoliberal model. For example, when the economic pacts
were being formulated, business was chiefly represented by the peak-level Consejo Coordinador
Empresarial (CCE).17 Similarly, during the NAFTA consultations, business representation was
monopolized by the Coordinadora de Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior
(COECE), a related organization created by the CCE to represent business on trade issues.18
consent, which make it possible to shepherd the bewildered herd. According to Chomsky, propaganda is as necessary to bourgeois
democracy as repression is to the totalitarian state.51 Therefore, bourgeois political parties can even accept a defeat at the polls as long as they
continue to control most of the mass media. The media, from the moment of such a defeat, work to win back the hearts and minds of those who
made the mistake of electing a leftist head of government. That is the reason why visceral reactions, such as those we have seen in a number of
countries, follow any measure taken by left governments to censure the medias disinformation campaigns and efforts to incite violence, or to
create legal instruments that protect the people's right to receive accurate information. The powerful international media echo these reactions. For
todays political battles are not won with atomic bombs but with media bombs. An example of
these media bombs is the campaign to make people think that Venezuela is engaged in an arms race
that threatens the region. Allusion to Venezuelas recent weapons purchase from Russia buttresses
the allegation. However, if CIA data are consulted, it is clear that the situation is completely
different . Using these data, Belgian economist Eric Toussaint reports: Venezuelan military spending is the sixth highest in the region behind
that of Brazil, Argentina, Chile (a country with a much smaller population than Venezuelas and considered to be a model country), Colombia,
and Mexico. In relative terms, comparing military spending to GDP, the Venezuelan military budget is
the ninth largest in Latin America. Have people been able to read this in the most important
international papers? Absolutely not. What was reported in August 2009 is that Sweden had asked Venezuelan officials to
respond to a Colombian allegation that Venezuela was supplying arms to the FARC, and that Sweden had in effect told Colombia that SAAB
missiles found in a FARC camp had been supplied by Sweden to Venezuela. However, was anyone able to find an article reporting the detailed
and concise reply given by Hugo Chvez? The missiles in question had been stolen from a Venezuelan port in 1995, four years before Chvez
took over the presidency.52 It would seem that today the election of left candidates is better tolerated because these have fewer and fewer real
possibilities of modifying the existing situation.
itsUSsuppliedweaponry,VenezuelaturnedtoChinaandRussia.
leftists are not really leftists. For example, the Chilean Socialists are committed to neo-liberal economics.
Although Mexican President Enrique Pena Nietos Institutional Revolutionary Party is called a socialist party, it is doubtful
that Mexico will dramatically change its politics and policies aside from cosmetic changes . Even in
Venezuela questionable business deals are made with foreign companies, like the selling of the Deltana Platform
to Chevron-Texaco. Moreover, if leftists are protecting the status quo in their respective societies then they
are actually right-wing under the operationalized definition of right that was outlined earlier. Groups and individuals that have
actually present themselves as socialists or communists have been major supporters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example,
before he even became Brazils president, the Marxist sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso was appointed as finance minister by President
Itamar Franco with the IMF becoming Cardosos most enthusiastic supporter after it had three different Brazilian finance ministers consecutively
fired. Cardoso pushed for neo-liberal de-regulation and the privatization of Brazils public sector. Like many other revolutionaries a lot of the
Marxist guerrillas in Brazil who fought against the military junta in their country have put away their fatigues and copies of Das Kapital for IMF
and World Bank economic manuals. This is why union boss Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Brazilian Workers Party was renounced as traitor and
a lackey of the IMF and World Bank by the workers of the Occupied Factories Movement of Brazil after he became president. President Dilma
Rousseff, Lulas successor and a former Marxist guerrilla, is continuing his policies. This is why there are those that pessimistically say that you
never know what to expect when you vote for the leftists in Latin America.
our social and physical sciences capture aspects of it, the violence in our world is far too
overwhelming to contain. No study can capture it in its entirety and no report can present us with
a complete set of data on it. For many, the violence that surrounds and engulfs us is an
abomination and a threat, something to be fought and eliminated; though for many more,
violence serves a social and economic endand is as American as apple pie. Rooted in
everyday institutional structures, writes Henry Giroux, violence has become the toxic glue that
bonds Americans together while simultaneously preventing them from expanding and building a
multiracial and multicultural democracy (2002, 231). The toxic glue of violence is a threat to
individual and social well-being as well as to democracy itself. One of the imperatives of critical
pedagogy must be to reveal its manifestationsanother must be to work toward its elimination.
And progressive intellectuals must continue to utilize the public sphere through print and social
media to bring about a better understanding of the dangers of an increasingly violent world and to
work toward eliminating the toxic glue of violence. Violence is nowhere. While violence is
everywhere more apparent, it is also everywhere ignored and hidden . The violence that is unseen
and unknown must be engaged just as much as the violence that is seen and known. While violent
video games and movies premised on the spectacle of violence are not difficult to discern, they
often have the unintended consequence of closing off consideration and understanding of other
forms of violence, in particular the myriad types of violence that cannot be staged . Much of the
violence that is unseen and unheard happens on a temporal scale that is beyond the capacities of
our senses. Termed by Rob Nixon, slow violence, it has been described by him as a violence
that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across
time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all (Nixon 2). The
slow violence of mass droughts in China, flooding in Australia, food crises, super twisters,
earthquakes linked to geo-engineering, arctic melt-off and so on (Cohen 2012, i); [C]limate
change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnifications, deforestation, the radioactive
aftermath of war, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental
catastrophes (Nixon 2). This was not the violence addressed by the theorists and critics of the
twentieth-century. Much of this violence unfolds over spans of time better described as
geological rather than human. Or, better yet, over spans of time from which the human is
viewed as but a passing moment. The theoretical work here that is just beginning to take shape
promises to reframe the very ways we think about history, time, and change.1 However, if the
exanthropic violence of climate change is the future of theory, what of the anthropic violence
that has been the focus of much attention, particularly since the rise of womens studies, gender
studies, and ethnic studies in the sixties and seventies? How are we doing here with forms of
violence that are visible and seen and felt by women, children, and the disenfranchised across the
globe? Unfortunately, not well. In todays media-saturated world, violence is always visible but
rarely felt. The prevalence of media violence is especially high in U.S. culture. Our
entertainment industry is adept at aestheticizing violence and transforming the most violent and
morally extreme members of our society into culture products suitable for mass consumption
and celebration. Take for example, the serial killer Aileen Wournos, who paradoxically became
the object of revulsion and attraction when presented to us by the American entertainment
industry. Many marveled at how the angelic Hollywood actor Charlize Theron had been
transformed into the monster Wournos, and found themselves comparing the real Theron to
the image of Wournos presented by her in the film, Monster (2003). She is my favorite of the
night, said a fashion editor from Glamour magazine commenting on Therons appearance at the
Golden Globes that year, [e]specially because you have the contrast of her in that movie and the
way she looks tonight.2 This entirely commonplace comment reveals a semiotic process
wherein serial killing and its aesthetic image become hopelessly intertwined, and ultimately
confused. In the translation of serial killing to its performance and promotion, a complex
semiotic process creates multiple layers of signification concerning the event and its perpetrator.
The result is both a greater understanding (albeit a superficial one) of the killers and the horrific
events in which they participated, and a growing sense of confusion between the real and the
image. Carefully packaged, promoted and sanitized by the culture industry, American psychos
such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Aileen Wournos and John Wayne Gacy increasingly become less
despicable objects of moral revulsion, and more objects of fascination and entertainment. Their
final entry into the sign system of celebrity entertainment is signaled by becoming household
names as readily recognizable as our sports, movie and television icons. For the average
culturally literate American, naming three contemporary serial killers is about as challenging as
naming three talk show hosts. However, the realness of these killers and their violent crimes gets
buried under multiple layers of signification. A hyperrealand hypermoralimage soon
displaces any remaining fragments of the reality of the horrific events perpetrated by them. The
cultural celebration of violence though does not end with the remediation of increasingly
macabre, sadistic, and cruel behavior. Rather, it creates a culture where violence has become a
if not thestandard form of entertainment, and where our children are targeted as major
consumers of this violence. From the hyper-real violence of many of the video games played by
children to the scenes of fighting, killing, and torture found in many of the movies our children
watch, there is no escaping the toxic glue of violence. Even the G rated Pixar family movie,
Cars 2 (2011), featured two deaths and one torture scene (a crime syndicate tortures a car until it
blows up). How else can this be explained except as a primer on violence for children? It is not
going to be a surprise to anyone familiar with the American film industry that violence is one of
its main commoditiesand one that is internationally consumed. However, there is some reason
to believe that more people are beginning to understand the negative impact of repeated cultural
consumption of violence. If nothing else, the tragic events surrounding the shooting of
moviegoers in Aurora, Colorado this past summer facilitated this discussion. However, the
solution is not to be found in say banning The Dark Knight Rises (2012) from theaters because
of its alleged connection to an act of violence. This would be about as effective as taking Sweet
Tarts away from children in an effort to stop tooth decay. Rather, the solution is to be found in
understanding how making violence into a commodity connects with a broader and more
pernicious neoliberal social and economic agenda. Once this is understood, then just as with
eating candy, you can consume violence at your own risk. Neoliberal economic practices have
increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of neoliberalism have been well documented.
Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux, everything either is for sale or is plundered for
profit (2004, xii). He continues: Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate
ranchers; politicians willingly hand the publics airwaves over to broadcasters and large
corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a
new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks
the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profitmaking just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public
services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly
resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to raise revenue for classroom materials,
increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties
that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation . Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfranchised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world. Moreover, the celebration of violence in
the American entertainment industry must be seen as an extension of the neoliberal militaristic
transformation of the country. Arguably, the state of permanent war of the United States has
benefited an entertainment industry which views increased militarization as a marketing dream.
Toys, games, videos, movies and clothing associated with the military and its values increase in
times of war. The permanent state of war in the United States thus provides increasing
opportunities for corporations endlessly to exploit nationalistic jingoism and the glorification of
violence. In light of neoliberalism and its economic Darwinism, the recent resurrection of
Captain Americathe defender of American idealsis less a nostalgic nod to comic historys
past, than a market-driven embrace of our increasingly militarized, violent, and jingoistic
culture.
Impact - Extinction
Empirically, neoliberalism is a disaster and will only accelerate the drive to
environmental extinction.
MACLEOD 2013 (ALAN, Thatcher and Chavez A Tale of Two Deaths; counterpunch
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/12/a-tale-of-two-deaths/)
Hugo Chavez and Margaret Thatcher, two iconic statespeople of our age, representing
fundamentally opposing world views, have died. Their deaths have sparked passionate feelings,
for and against. Doubtless, history will remember them as two great figureheads in world
politics. Just as contrasting as their ideologies was the reaction to their deaths, from both the
media and the public. In a New York Times Obituary, Simon Romero described Chavez as
astute and manipulative, and accused him of strutting about like a strongman. In the UK, the
Guardian went on the offensive, claiming the debate continued as to whether Chavez could
fairly be described as a dictator, but a democrat he most certainly was not, seeing as he
assidously fomented class hatred. The Times reaction to Thatchers death could hardly have
been more different; The world has lost one of the great champions of freedom and liberty.
Praise was more muted in Britain, going down the great and controversial figure line. A
collection of front pages can be seen here. This contrasted with the reactions from the public
themselves. Across Venezuela there were mass public scenes of grief, with few openly revelling
in the death of the President. There was even a candlelight vigil for Chavez in London. A month
later, long-planned street parties erupted in towns and cities that residents claimed Thatcher had
destroyed. The two represent the two primary ideologies of the age: neoliberalism and 21st
century socialism. Thatchers neoliberalism, known by many names: free-market economics,
Reaganomics, the Washington Consensus, Neoconservatism, traces its philosophical roots to the
work of objectivist philosopher, Ayn Rand. In a 1959 interview Rand gave a summary of her
position. Mans highest moral purpose is the achievement of his own happinessI challenge
the moral code of altruism, the precept that mans moral duty is to live for others. Going further,
she stated to a shocked interviewer that, I consider helping others evil and that love should be
treated as a business deal. Her ambitious goal was to revolutionize human relations. Shunned by
academia, she found an audience in the business community, where her central messages struck a
chord. Thatcher echoed Rands vision when she insisted that there is no such thing as society, only
individuals.Their philosophy was summed up in the three words by the movie, Wall Street: greed
is good. Rands effect on the business community was explored in Adam Curtis excellent
documentary trilogy, All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace. Neoliberalisms economic
basis is in the work of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Friedman was close to both
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Often discussed but rarely defined, for World Bank economist
John Williamson, its key features are: * Fiscal discipline * A redirection of public expenditure
priorities toward fields offering both high * economic returns and the potential to improve
income distribution, such as * primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure * Tax
reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) * Interest rate liberalization * A
competitive exchange rate * Trade liberalization * Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct
investment * Privatization * Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) * Secure property
rights. Critics argue that these policies have the effect of transferring control of the economy from
institutions which, in theory at least, have the well-being of society as their primary goal to entities
only concerned with profits. Under neoliberalism, humans have no inalienable rights, only what
they achieve on the markets. Thus, rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter, such as the
right to water, to healthcare and an adequate standard of living, are outdated, a letter to Santa
Claus, in the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN. While Rand is
scornful of religion and established morality, many socialists see it as a crucial part of their
beliefs. Tony Benn, former candidate for leader of the British Labour Party, Thatchers bte noir,
and vocal supporter of Chavez, states that his socialism comes from the book of Genesis: When
Cain killed Abel and the Lord had a word with him about it, Cain said : Am I my Brothers
keeper?. He was talking about equality. The idea that I have an equal responsibility for my
neighbour or my brother has reappeared in a whole range of different forms over the years an
injury to one is an injury to all, united we stand, divided we fair, love thy neighbour as
thyself. Similarly, Chavez affirmed that I am a Christian, I believe that Christ and the authentic
Christian tendencies have much to contribute to the 21st century socialist project. Chavez
defined his 21st century socialism at the World Social Forum in 2006: There is hardly any time
left: socialism or death, but real death of the entire human species and of life on planet earth,
because capitalism is destroying the planet, capitalism is destroying life on earth, capitalism is
destroying the ecological equilibrium of the planet. The poles are melting, the seas are heating up,
the continents are sinking, forests and jungles are being destroyed, rivers and lakes are drying up;
the destructive development of the capitalist model is putting an end to life on earth. I believe its
now or never.
Impact: Extinction
Neoliebralism results in economic destruction that ends in extinction
LOO 13
(Dennis, professor of sociology at California State Polytechnic, "Courting
Catastrophe: Neoliberalism's Threat" Invited Lecture at UC Riverside, posted May
3 on The Leftist Review, http://www.leftistreview.com/2013/05/03/courtingcatastrophe-neoliberalisms-threat/dennisloo/)
What is most problematic about globalization isnt that it widens the gap between those with wealth
and those with far less, leaving people in want and creating unnecessary suffering and deaths, or
that it rips up the social fabric, or that it is precipitating and accelerating environmental
degradation and disasters, endangering the very planet that we live on, or any of the other profound troubles
that my book chronicles and analyzes. These problems are catastrophic on an epic scale the demolition of
society. But to get a handle on what has been happening to us collectively, we have to first be clear about why it is
happening and what it is in its totality because if we dont, we wont be able to change course. We need to know where we are, how we got
here, and why it continues to be so difficult to change course, before we can have a chance to actually change course.
Impact- Extinction
Neoliberalization, if left unchecked, will lead to total societal breakdown
Harvey 7
(David, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press,
2007. Pg. 166-168)
Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodication and
greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of
postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contractmarriage, for example, is
understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and
unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reects a
dierence as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame liberals,
Hollywood, or even postmodernists for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of
the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do
most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the
world and who continually aunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term
commitments in their endless pursuit of prot. But there are far more serious issues here
than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner
of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal
and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour,
and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, are obviously not commodities . . . the
commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely ctitious. While capitalism
cannot function without such ctions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the
complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in
the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity labour power cannot be shoved
about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without aecting also the human individual
who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of mans labour
power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral
entity man attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions,
human beings would perish from the eects of social exposure; they would die as victims of
acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be
reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes deled, rivers polluted, military
safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the
market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business
enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as
oods and droughts in primitive society. 18 The damage wrought through the oods and
droughts of ctitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina,
Mexico, or even within the US, testies all too well to Polanyis nal point. But his theses on
labour and land deserve further elaboration.
now dominates policies that define public spheres such as schools, allowing them to stripped of a
civic and democratic project and handed over to the logic of the market. Regrettably, it is not
democracy, but authoritarianism, that remains on the rise in the United States as we move further
into the 21st century.
The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election exists at a pivotal moment in this transformation away from
democracy, a moment in which formative cultural and political realms and forces including the
rhetoric used by election candidates appear saturated with celebrations of war and Social
Darwinism. Accordingly, the possibility of an even more authoritarian and ethically
dysfunctional leadership in the White House in 2013 has certainly caught the attention of a
number of liberals and other progressives in the United States. American politics in general and
the 2012 election in particular present a challenge to progressives, whose voices in recent years
have been increasingly excluded from both the mainstream media and the corridors of political
power. Instead, the media have played up the apocalyptic view of the Republican Partys
fundamentalist warriors, who seem fixated on translating issues previously seen as non-religious
such as sexual orientation, education, identity, and participation in public lifeinto the
language of a religious revival and militant crusade against evil.
How else to explain Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Paul Ryans claim that the struggle
for the future is a fight of individualism versus collectivism, with its nod to the McCarthyism
and cold war rhetoric of the 1950s. Or Rick Santorums assertion that President Obama is
getting America hooked on The narcotic of government dependency, promoting the view that
government has no responsibility to provide safety nets for the poor, disabled, sick, and elderly.
There is more at work here than simply a ramped up version of social Darwinism with its
savagely cruel ethic of reward the rich, penalize the poor, [and] let everyone fend for
themselves, [ii] there is also a full scale attack on the social contract, the welfare state,
economic equality, and any viable vestige of moral and social responsibility. The Romney-Ryan
appropriation of Ayn Rands ode to selfishness and self-interest is of particular importance
because it offers a glimpse of a ruthless form of extreme capitalism in which the poor are
considered moochers, viewed with contempt, and singled out to be punished. But this
theocratic economic fundamentalist ideology does more. It destroys any viable notion of the and
civic virtue in which the social contract and common good provide the basis for creating
meaningful social bonds and instilling in citizens a sense of social and civic responsibility. The
idea of public service is viewed with disdain just as the work of individuals, social groups, and
institutions that benefit the citizenry at large are held in contempt. As George Lakoff and Glenn
W. Smith point out, casino capitalism creates a culture of cruelty: its horrific effects on
individuals-death, illness, suffering, greater poverty, and loss of opportunity, productive lives, and
money.[iii] But it does more by crushing any viable notion of the common good and public life by
destroying the bonds that hold us together.[iv] Under casino capitalism, the spaces,
institutions, and values that constitute the public are now surrendered to powerful financial
forces and viewed simply as another market to be commodified, privatized and surrendered to
the demands of capital. With religious and market-driven zealots in charge, politics becomes an
extension of war; greed and self-interest trump any concern for the well-being of others; reason is
trumped by emotions rooted in absolutist certainty and militaristic aggression; and skepticism and
dissent are viewed as the work of Satan.
If the Republican candidacy race of 2012 is any indication, then political discourse in the United
States has not only moved to the rightit has been introducing totalitarian values and ideals into
the mainstream of public life. Religious fanaticism, consumer culture, and the warfare state
work in tandem with neoliberal economic forces to encourage privatization, corporate tax breaks,
growing income and wealth inequality, and the further merging of the financial and military
spheres in ways that diminish the authority and power of democratic governance.[v] Neoliberal
interests in freeing markets from social constraints, fueling competitiveness, destroying
education systems, producing atomized subjects, and loosening individuals from any sense of
social responsibility prepare the populace for a slow embrace of social Darwinism, state
terrorism, and the mentality of warnot least of all by destroying communal bonds,
dehumanizing the other, and pitting individuals against the communities they inhabit.
Will there be a predatory degeneration of civilization if neither forces from above nor those from
below are able to bring about a resolution of crises and conflicts? Are we already seeing this?
There are many historical precedents in which a civilization collapses when it is unable to
resolve its internal contradictions. Chew has written extensively on recurrent "dark ages"
in human history: that is, periods when particular civilizations have reached ecological
exhaustion as a result of or resulting in chronic social and military conflict that makes
impossible systemic change that could avert collapse. Such periods have been
characterized by the collapse of centralized authority, a sharp regression in social
organization and the forces of production, the death of many, and a drastic reduction in
population levels (see, inter alia, Chew 2007). What makes such a prospect in our particular
historical times most frightening is that a civilizational collapse would now be global,
encompassing all of humanity, and the level of ecological destruction involved suggests
there may be no easy recovery, if indeed, any would be possible. Images of Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath, of a global Blade Runner society, to evoke the dystopian
imagery of the 1982 Ridley Scott film, or more recently of the 2006 film Children of Men,
written and directed by Alfonso Cuaron, come to mind The possibility of such an outcome is
terrifying. But we would be foolish to dismiss it as a possibility rather than to take such
prospects as a dire warning for collective action against those social, political, and ideological
forces that prevent a change, to use William Greider's phrase (1997), in the "manic logic of
global capitalism." I am reminded of Zizek's chilling observation that "the true horror [of
global capitalism] does not reside in the particular content hidden beneath the universality
of global Capital, but rather in the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global
machine blindly running its course, that there is effectively no particular Secret Agent who
animates it" (1997:45)- This implies, however, that even if their command over resources
allows them to exercise a disproportionate influence over outcomes, ruling groups and the
powerful do not actually control their ownor collective outcomes. The future is not
predetermined; we are all its collective agents. As frightening as the current course of
events may seem, we should also recall that the crisis opens up tremendous new
possibilities for progressive change. It is at times of crisis rather than stability and equilibrium
in a system that the power of collective agencies to influence history is most felt. Whatever
humanity's future, we should keep our eyes on Latin America, as it will surely play a vital
role in what is to come.
wealth (capital gains, dividends, and estate taxes) to a tax on work, principally in the form of a
regressive payroll tax (Collins, Hartman, Kraut, and Mota 2004). During the 2002-2004 fiscal
years, tax cuts delivered $197.3 billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest 1% of Americans (i.e.,
house- holds making more than $337,000 a year) while state governments increased taxes to fill
a $200 billion budget deficit (Gonsalves 2004). Equally alarm- ing, a recent Congressional study
revealed that 63% of all corporations in 2000 paid no taxes while [s]ix in ten corporations
reported no tax liabili- ty for the five years from 1996 through 2000, even though corporate profits were growing at record-breaking levels during that period (Woodard 2004, para.11).
Turns Case
progressing from the status of relatively limited, disappointing democracies (with a small number
clearly regressing). The economic reform process has also yielded disappointing results, performing well below the promises and
expectations of its early advocates. Although economic reforms made some important contributions, particularly the virtual elimination of
inflation throughout the region, economic performance has weakened dramatically in recent years. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the political base for continued economic reforms also appears to be shrinking in a
number of countries in the region. In many respects, this disappointing set of results does not come as a shock. While many were
optimistic about democratization and economic reforms early on, skeptics and cautionary analyses abounded regarding both processes.
Poverty, inequality, corruption, weak rule of law, weak institutions, clientelism, risk aversion
among domestic capitalists, inadequate financial markets (especially for small business), external
constraints, as well as undemocratic attitudes and behaviors all figure among the underlying
problems that undermine efforts to promote democracy or economic development . These problems are well
known and have been thoroughly discussed. As a result, the literature on Latin America abounds with excellent studies and diagnoses of a wide
array of aspects of the democratization and economic development process. But, we still do not seem to have a strong explanation for why this
complex of problems persistsand has persisted for so long in Latin America. We dont have a consensus on what has
gone wrong in recent years (or even agreement on the extent to which things have gone wrong) and we certainly have little
agreement as to where Latin American governments can or should go from here.
institutionbuildingbytheChvezadministration;therelianceoninformal,parallelmechanisms
for policy and service delivery; partisanship in staffing state institutions and the failure to
developeffectivechecksandbalances,thelatterowingmuchtotheheavycentralizationaround
theexecutiveandthehighlypersonalizednatureoftheChvezpresidency.Intheabsenceof
effective, functioning institutions based on principles of meritocracy and accountability, the
Chvezgovernmentstruggledtodeliveritssocialpolicyagendaandtoshiftserviceprovision
from an emphasis on quantity of provision to the more complex challenge of quality of
provision.Waste,inefficiencyandcorruptionwereseriousproblemsbythetimethegovernment
wasenteringintothethirdphaseandthisinturntranslatedintomountingpopulardisaffection
withthegovernmentanddiminishingfaithinitscapacitytodeliveronpolicypledges. A second
element of continuity was that of oil dependence and the pre-1990s model of oil financed state led
development. Although the Chvez government aimed to break with the Punto Fijo regimes
debilitating reliance on the oil sector, by the third phase oil export revenues had actually increased
as a percentage of central government income and trade with the US had increased, despite
Chvezs aims of diversifying commercial ties. More problematically, the same structural and
macroeconomic distortions that had been present during the Punto Fijo period continued into and
were arguably reinforced during the Bolivarian period. This was particularly problematic for the
Chavistas as it threatened to undermine the goals of the Bolivarian revolution. For example, the
overvaluation of the exchange rate undercut efforts to boost food sovereignty as the country
continued to suck in cheap imports .Craftingsocialisminanoilboomwasacomplexeconomic
policy challenge, one that rising inflation and production shortages indicated the Chvez
governmenthadnotdevisedadequatetoolsfor.However,onanoteofdifference,whileboom
andbustconditionswereasevereproblemduringthePuntoFijophase,theprognosisforthe
internationaloilpricewasoneofsustainablepricehighsduringtheBolivarianperiod.However,
thebenefitstotheChavistasherewasoffsetbyseriousconcernsrelatingtounderinvestmentin
oildrillingandproductioncapacitiesowingtodiversionofoilprofitsintosocialspending. A
final element of continuity related to foreign policy. A much neglected aspect of the Punto Fijo
period was the consistent policy emphasis on Bolivarian principles of multipolarism, of supporting
progressive revolutionary movements (for example the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) ,ofbuildingajust
internationalorder,promotingregionalsolutionstotheconflictinColombiaandofbuildingties
withotheroilproducingnations.ThesewereallcentraltenetsoftheChvezadministration,but
inthemanifestlydifferentconditionsoftheWaronTerroranddiminishedUStoleranceof
ideologicaldevianceinitsbackyard.ThedangerChvezfacedgoingintotheThirdPhasewasof
amajorshiftintheregionalorder;theendingofthepresidencyofhisnemesisGeorgeBushand
theweakeningofcentreleftregionaladministrationsthathelpedtoinsulateChvezandwhich
gavehisBolivarianexperimenthemispherictraction. And while Chvez went further than his
predecessors in realizing the long-held vision of a multipolar world, basic inefficiencies in the
Bolivarian government, in delivering on commitments and following rhetoric through with actual
policy on the ground was a severe impediment to the consolidation of the changes the Bolivarian
government introduced through initiatives such as ALBA and Banco del Sur.Alongsidecontinuity
betweenPuntofijismoandBolivarianismtherewasalsosignificantchange.Attheelitelevel,the
politicalleftthatwasexcludedfromthefoundingPactassumedcontrolofthecountryandinturn
broughtintopoliticsthosethatfelloutofthePuntofijoframework.Therewasaredistributionof
political and also economic power through the protagonistic democracy model and the
governmentssocialspendinganddevelopmentstrategy.Accordingtogovernmentfigures, by
the end of 2007, unemployment was down to 6.3 per cent; the infant mortality rate had fallen from
25.6 per 100,000 births in 1990 to 13.9; enrollment and completion in basic, secondary, higher and
further education all showed strong improvements over the decade of the Bolivarian process and
the number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 24 per cent in 1990 to 9.4 per cent. The
external debt to GDP ratio was down to just 11.3 per cent and Venezuela experienced double digit
growth and a strengthening of its international reserve position. This was also a period of
strengtheningpoliticallegitimacy.PollsurveysshowedthatVenezuelanshadahighlevelof
confidenceandtrustintheirparticipatorydemocracy,presidentandelectoralsystemmarkinga
strongchangefromthe1980sand1990s(Escobar2007;Latinbarometro2006).Furthertothis,
therewasagrowingbodyofevidencethattheMissiones,theMTAs,theCUTsandcommunity
councilshadatransformativeimpactontraditionallymarginalizedandexcludedgroups(Bravo
Escobar2007;Encuentros2005;GarciaGuadilla2007;Hellinger2007;LacabanaandCariola
2005),withparticipationintheseorganizationsimprovingperceptionsofindividualefficacy,
levels of interpersonal trust, connections to government, access to welfare and social
development.Ultimately the challenge facing the Bolivarian alternative lay in institutionalizing
these progressive and democratic changes introduced by the revolutionary process and ensuring
their survival beyond the presidency of the authoritative figure of Chvez. This was a complex
proposition in a period of conflict, evolution and transformation; persistent shifts in the power
bases around the government; eclecticism in policy direction; the high turnover of personnel and ad
hoc policy initiatives all of which were key features, and weaknesses of the Bolivarian alternative.
of refugees recorded by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has
grown disproportionately from 2 million in 1975 to more than 27 million in 1995. Bauman
describes the lives of Palestinians who are born and die in camps, who never know anything
other than camp life (143). He calls attention to the way that this social fragmentation dismantles
the social commitment to togetherness, to seeing ourselves as linked to others. Instead, these
camps become the basis for the construction of wasted lives that offer nothing more than a
security threat (143).
Impact Classism
Neoliberalism leads to classism as it creates the ideology that the impoverished are
criminals who knife each other between welfare checks
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Withinthediscourseofneoliberalism,democracy becomes synonymous with free markets, while
issues of equality, racial justice, and freedom are stripped of any substantive meaning and used to
disparage those who suffer systemic deprivation and chronic punishment. Individual misfortune,
like democracy itself, is now viewed as either excessive or in need of radical containment. The
media, largely consolidated through corporate power, routine- ly provide a platform forhigh
profilerightwingpunditsandpoliticiansto remind us either of how degenerate the poor have
become or to reinforce the central neoliberal tenet that all problems are private rather than social
in nature.ConservativecolumnistAnnCoulter captures the lattersentimentwith her comment
that [i]nstead of poor people with hope and possibility, we now have a permanent underclass of
aspiring criminals knifing one another between having illegitimate children and collecting welfare
checks(qtd.inBean2003,para.3).RadiotalkshowhostMichaelSavage,too,exemplifiesthe
unabashedracismandfanaticismthatemergeunderaneoliberalregimeinwhichethicsand
justiceappearbesidethepoint.Forinstance,Savageroutinelyreferstononwhitecountriesas
turdworldnations,homosexualityasaperversionandyoungchildrenwhoarevictimsof
gunfireasghettoslime(qtd.inFairnessandAccuracyinReporting2003,para.2,6,5).
care, education, and laws establishing labor standards (Aronowitz and Gautney 2003,xvi).For
example,therestrictions that the IMF and World Bank imposeoncountriesasaconditionfor
grantingloanseuphemisticallyreferredtoasaprogramofstructuraladjustmentnot only
subject them to capitalist values and dire economic restrictions, but also undermine the very
possibility of an inclusive and substantive democracy. The results have been disastrous as evidenced
by theeconomiccollapseofcountriessuchasArgentinaandNigeriaaswellasbythe fact that
onethirdoftheworldslaborforcemore than a billion peopleare unemployed or
underemployed (Aronowitz2003,30).Trackingtwentysixcountriesthatreceivedloansfrom
theWorldBankandtheIMF,theMultinationalMonitorspelledouttheconditionsthataccom
paniedsuchloans:[c]ivilservicedownsizing,privatizationofgovernmentownedenterprises
withlayoffsrequiredinadvanceofprivatizationandfrequentlyfollowingprivatization;
[p]romotionoflaborflexibilityregulatorychangestoremoverestrictionsontheabilityof
governmentandprivateemployerstofireorlayoffworkers;[m]andatedwagereductions,
minimumwagereductionsofcontainment,andspreadingthewagegapbetweengovernment
employeesandmanagers;and[p]ensionreforms,includingprivatization,thatcutsocialsecurity
benefitsforworkers.(Gray2001,78)In the UnitedStates,neoliberal policies have created a huge
deficit projected at $5 trillion over the next decade due in part to President George Bushs
exorbitant tax cuts for the wealthy(tothetuneofanestimated$3trillioniftheyaremade
permanent).While the rich get tax cuts, 8.2 million people are out of work and 2.3 million have lost
their jobs since 2000;somehavesimplygivenuptheunpromisingtaskoflookingforjobs.
Massive subsidies for the rich, coupled with the corporate frenzy for short-term profits at the
expense of any social considerations, translate into retrograde economic and social policies
celebrated by the advocates of neoliberalism, just as they refuse to address an income gap between
rich and poor that is not only the widest it has been since 1929, but also represents the most unequal
among all developed nations (Woodard2004,para.42).
Impact- Environment
Neoliberalism justifies the destruction of all ecology in the name of profit
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
It becomes obvious that neoliberalism marks not the end of colonialism but, to the contrary, the
colonization of the North. This new colonization of the world30 points back to the beginnings
of the modern world system in the long 16th century,31 when the conquering of the
Americas, their exploitation and colonial transformation allowed for the rise and development
of Europe.
Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are abandoned and give way to a
mentality of plundering. All global resources that we still have*natural resources, forests, water,
genetic pools*have turned into objects of utilization. Rapid ecological destruction through
depletion is the consequence. If one makes more profit by cutting down trees than by planting
them, then under the prevailing economic logic, there is no reason not to cut them.32 Neither the
public nor the state interferes, despite global warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of
the few remaining rainforests will irreversibly destroy the earths climate, because the entire
earths ecosystem depends on them. Yet, the impact on global climate is only one of many
negative effects of deforestation.33 And as we move ever closer to the precipice of ecological
collapse, we would do well to acknowledge and defend the intrinsic value and rights of the
climate, animals, plants, humanity and the general ecology over and above the interests of the
corporations. But for that to happen, we have to turn the allegiance to the market on its head.
Neoliberalism allows for the use of violence and the destruction of the
environment if it allows the accumulation of profits or the prevention of
potential losses.
Di Leo and McClennen, 2012
(Jeffrey R. Di Leo and Sophia A. McCleennen, Di Leo is the Dean of the School of Arts and
Sciences and Professor of English and Philosophy at the University of Houston. McCleennen is
Professor of International Affairs and Comparative Literature at the Pennsylvania State
University. Postscript on Violence, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 244 (Article))
Neoliberal economic practices have increased biopolitical violence. The devastating effects of
neoliberalism have been well documented. Under neoliberalism, writes Henry Giroux,
everything either is for sale or is plun- dered for profit (2004, xii). He continues:
Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranch- ers; politicians willingly hand
the publics airwaves over to broad- casters and large corporate interests without a dime going
into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate
contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the
environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes
legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower
the taxes of major corporations; schools increasingly resemble malls or jails, and teachers, forced to
raise revenue for classroom materials, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything
from hamburgers to pizza partiesthat is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to get
higher test scores. (2004, xii-xiv)
When extreme free-market capitalism becomes the source of values, violence is given a reprieve
from moral indignation. Democratic values as well as basic notions of human rights and economic
justice are overlooked when the market reveals profits to be hador losses to be avoided. As
neoliberalism widens the gulf between the rich and the poor, and the enfran- chised and the
disenfranchised, it also places at risk of violence the poor and the disenfranchised. Therefore, it
should be no surprise that the devastation of the environment and the violation of human rights is
often more extreme in less affluent parts of the world.
The propensity of capitalism toward crisis is manifest not only at the level of finance and
production but also in the ecological foundation of the system. The process of capitalist
development unleashed by policies of neoliberal globalization over the past several decades , and the
current global crisis, have not only exacerbated widespread conditions of poverty and hunger,
pushing millions more into poverty, and jeopardized the livelihoods of millions of workers,
peasants, and small-scale producers, but also led to a serious degradation of the environment and
the ecosystem at the base of these livelihoods and economic activities. The same process, however,
has also led to wide spread and growing movements of resistance to the latest incursions of capital
and neoliberal policies. All over Latin America, particularly in countries with significant
populations and communities of indigenous people-Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Mexicothere have emerged movements of local resistance. And, at the same time, there is a trend toward
the organization of this resistance and forming connections among these . Organizations across the
region. One of these connections, bringing together indigenous organizations in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina, is the Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones
lndigenas (CAOl), which in March 2010 announced a major congress of Andean indigenous
organizations to consider and concert collective response to the challenge of neoliberalism and
corporate capitalism to their way of life and to mother earth.
Impact- Equality
Neoliberalism causes inequality in classes around the world. People are even poorer
than in 1990.
Hursh & Henderson 08
(David W. Hursh and Joseph A. Henderson; Warner Graduate School of Education and Human
Development, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA; Contesting Global Neoliberalism
and Creating Alternative Futures; http://www.informaworld.com)
While the primary aim of neoliberalism is to restore corporate profitability over the welfare of its
citizens, proponents claim that giving free reign to corporations and unleashing individuals to
pursue their own economic self-interests is the best way to ensure economic growth and, therefore,
to provide for an improved standard of living for those in developed and developing countries and
for the poor worldwide. However, as Jomo (2007) and Berry and Serieux (2007) write, since the
rise of globalization and neoliberalism in the 1970s, economic growth has slowed and the income
inequality has worsened in most countries in the world in recent decades (Jomo, 2007, p. xix).
Even in the USA, long held up as the exemplar of capitalist development, under neoliberalism
household income has grown only because of the rise of two-worker households, men earn less
than their fathers did, and, as measured by the Gini coefficient, income inequality has grown (The
Economist, 2010). We need to remember that countries and regions differ, and that the
population of many countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are poorer. James
Ferguson, in Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (2006), writes that: many of
the poorest African countries have put in place IMF-sponsored reforms (chiefly, opening markets
and privatizing state assets) that were intended to produce a flood of capital investment. But the
result for most has not been a boom in foreign investment. More often, it has been a collapse in
basic institutions (including major industries as well as social infrastructure such as schools and
health care) and an explosion of official illegality. (p. 35) Jomo and von Arnim (2008) write that
neoliberal globalization has had an especially negative impact on Sub-Saharan Africa, as these
countries were not able to compete in the newly opened markets. Further, multinational
corporations invested in minerals, such as oil, which meant importing employees from outside
Africa, or in agriculture, which undermined local farming (Ferguson, 2006). Consequently, per
capita income declined during the last two decades of the previous century, rebounded slightly at
the beginning of this century, only to decline again. Likewise, Davis (2006), in Planet of Slums,
describes that while some cities and countries, such as Russia and Moscow, have created a very
wealthy oligarchy, overall poverty and inequality has increased. He cites the United Nations
Human Development Report 2004 (United Nations Development Programme, 2004), that in 46
countries people are poorer than in 1990. In 25 countries more people are hungry than a decade
ago (Davis, 2006, p. 162). Jeff Faux (2006), in The Global Class War, exposes the increasing
disparity within the USA, between the USA and other countries, and within other countries. For
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) precipitated a crisis in the value of
Mexicos peso, leading to its devaluation, fewer jobs, and higher living costs, and an increase in the
poverty rate from 45.6% in 1994 to 50.3% in 2000.
the hollowing out of the state, and the lack of adequate funding for education and other social
services such as health care. For example, in Uganda, as in several other Sub-Saharan countries,
the global recession has contributed to drug shortages, making it impossible to treat the growing
number of AIDS patients (McNeil, 2010). Yet, under more social democratic policies the state
would play a larger role in providing health care. Furthermore, education is increasingly
contested, as the plutocracy promotes education as a means of producing productive, rather than
critical, employees. Schools are more often places where teachers and students learn what will be
on the test rather than seeking answers to questions that cry out for answers, such as how to
develop a healthy, sustainable environment or communities where people are actually valued for
who they are rather than what they contribute to the economy. Instead, we must ask what kinds of
relations do we want to nurture, what kinds of social relations, what kind of work do we want to
do, and what kinds of culture and technologies do we want to create. These questions require that
we rethink schools so that teachers and students can engage in real questions for which the answer
will make a difference in the quality of our lives. These questions also require that we rethink our
relationship to a specific kind of free marketplace that is not, in fact, inevitable. By
problematizing the idea of neoliberal marketization, we can begin to construct new markets that
actually value commonly held resources and local communities.
riots(knownasIMFriots)innumerousdevelopingcountries,includingMorocco,Madagascar,
theDominicanRepublic,Venezuela,Zambia,and,mostrecently,Argentina.Indeed,structural
adjustmentinflictedsuchintensesuffering,stirredsuchpassionateopposition,andgeneratedso
muchadversepublicitythattheWorldBankandtheIMFhaverecentlyrenamedtheprogram
developmentpolicysupportlending.Second,the lowering of tariff barriers and the elimination
of non-tariff barriers in developing countries increased rural poverty and depressed domestic food
production by exposing developing country farmers to ruinous competition from industrialized
country producers.When the influx of cheap, subsidized food from the United States and the EU
depressed domestic food prices,wealthyfarmersshiftedfromfoodproductiontothecultivationof
morelucrativeexportcrops.However,poor farmers found their livelihoods threatened as
declining agricultural prices coincided with the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies, the reduction
of extension services, and the elimination of subsidized credit. Many farmers abandoned the land,
resulting in a concentration of land ownership in the hands of wealthier farmers .Domestic food
production on both large and small farms declined, and dependence on imported food increased.
Third,the emphasis on export production increased rural inequality by reinforcing the privileged
status of large farmers at the expense of smallholders. Largefarmersgenerallyhadbetteraccessto
capitalandcreditwithwhichtofinancecashcropproductionandwereprovidedwithtaxbreaks,
subsidizedcredit,andotherincentivestoconverttoexportproduction.As cash crop production
increased land values, landowners raised rents, revoked peasant tenancy and sharecropping rights,
or simply evicted tenants in order to rent the land to more affluent farmers who could grow highvalue crops.Thesewealthylandownersalsoexpandedtheirholdingsbypurchasingtheplotsof
smallholderswholackedthecapitaltoproducefortheexportmarketandwhofoundit
increasinglydifficulttoliveofftraditionalfoodcropproduction. The net result was increasing
economic polarization in rural areas, with an ever-growing poor majority and an ever- wealthier
elite. Finally,the neoliberal reforms exacerbated food insecurity by depressing developing country
export earnings. Structural adjustment shifted investment to the export sector in order to generate
the revenue with which to service the foreign debt. However, as competing developing country
exports simultaneously glutted the market, the benefits of export expansion were almost completely
nullified by declining prices.Inaddition,the neoliberal reforms harmed developing countries by
requiring them to open their markets while permitting developed countries to maintain tradedistorting subsidies and import-restrictive tariffs. According to a study released in 2003 by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), industrialized country subsidies and
protectionism displaced about $40 billion in net agricultural exports per year from developing
countries and cost developing countries approximately $24 billion per year in foregone agricultural
and agro-industrial income.Thisforegoneincomereverberatedthroughouttheeconomy,aslost
agriculturalrevenuesresultedinthedepressionofemploymentinfarmingandfarmingrelated
activitiesandinreducedinvestmentintheagriculturalsector.
national debt was restructured and public spending was sharply reduced. The government laid
the legal framework for private welfare and pension provision and the trading of shares in
privately held companies on the Caracas stock exchange, the Bolsa de Valores de Caracas (Naim
1993). In foreign policy, the government sought to lock in these changes and ride the free market
and regionalist tide of the early 1990s by taking Venezuela into regional free trade agreements
and commercial associations. However the neoliberal experience was limited in comparison to
the orthodox shift in neighboring countries and El Paquete was not applied in a comprehensive
manner. There was no rationalization of the bloated, party dominated state or reform of the
income taxation structure. The privatization process was limited and not accompanied by the
introduction of adequate regulatory mechanisms. Moreover Andrs Prez was not averse to
expansionary approaches when the oil price temporarily increased, a policy flux that led some
critics to argue that the problem was not neoliberalism, but its half-baked implementation (Naim
1993). The social consequences of the neoliberal shift were disastrous and particularly given the
collapse of the Punto Fijo welfare safety net. Falling real wages, which declined 53 per cent between
1982 and 1995, and volatile inflation (which soared to 89 per cent in 1989) exacerbated an existing
trend of rising poverty. There was no rapid or effective trickle-down and government efforts to
target its limited anti-poverty initiatives were ineffectively administered by the sclerotic national
bureaucracy. By 1991, 69.8 per cent of households lived in general poverty - up from 58.9 per cent
in 1989. Of this figure 35.8 per cent were in critical poverty an increase on the 26.9 per cent
recorded in 1989. Aside from rising poverty, orthodox policy approaches presaged a trend of
deepening inequality with the share of national income accruing to the richest 10 per cent of the
population rising from 30 per cent to 43 per cent between 1988 and 1991, while the share of the
poorest 10 per cent declined from 2.3 per cent to 1.8 per cent (Baptista 1991 cited in Coker 1999 p.
83). Food costs were particularly difficult for poorer sectors to cover, specifically after devaluation
in 1989, owing to Venezuelas historical lack of food sovereignty and gross inequalities in land
distribution (with 70 per cent of agricultural holdings in the hands of just 3 per cent of
producers). Underscoring this, malnutrition related infant mortality rates doubled over the brief
two-year period of the initial economic adjustment, increasing from 29.7 deaths per 100,000 in 1988
to 60.2 deaths in 1990 (Coker 1999).
access provided to the representatives of popular groups to the higher echelons of policymaking, the placement of indirect forms of representative selection -such as electoral colleges or
single-member districts- the criminalization and harassment of social movements, etc. Policymaking lies outside of politics; in the hands of a cadre of professionals, who convinced the
superiority of their knowledge acquired by technical training are, as John Markoff (1996, p. 119)
notes "open to violating the will of electorates or disagreeing with bureaucratic superiors." In
order to keep legal and artificial barriers in place, neoliberal governments may recur to further
reductions in political freedoms: such as the imposition of rules by presidential decree, or the
curtailment of freedoms of speech, press and assembly. The degree of democracy and political
freedom then becomes a function of the needs of markets." Where pressures for redistribution are
high - representing a threat to neoliberal principles of private property, market supremacy and
capital accumulation- political freedoms will necessarily be curtailed to prevent democratic
impulses from launching at the throat of the neoliberal political order.
Impact Imperialism
Neoliberalism fuels US modern imperialism
Panitch and Gindin- Distinguished research professor of political science@ York University and editor
of the socialist register, Research director of Canadian UAW and chief economist of CAW, September-October
2005 [Superintending Global Capital pgs. 101-123]
It is in the context of this integration that the Federal Reserve began to emerge as what the
Economist could call in effect, the worlds central bank, in terms of providing liquidity and
setting the baseline for global interest-rate changes.12 The origins of this development lay in the
growth of international finance during the Bretton Woods era itself, especially once Wall Street
had come to dominate the new Eurodollar market in London. It was on this basis that the first big
bang of financial deregulation occurred in New York in the mid-70s, followed by the explosion of
both domestic and international financial markets when the Volcker Shock inaugurated the
neoliberal era proper. The response of the us as a capitalist state (representing finance to the end of
strengthening American capitalism) and as an imperial state (looking to imbricate finance in
meeting us global responsibilities) led to a painful restructuring of manufacturing in the American
economy. This restructuring, together with Wall Streets increasingly deep financial markets,
brought the worlds savings to the us. At the same time, the growing international role of
American investment banks mediated corporate mergers throughout Europe and much of Asia,
further influencing their industrial and financial re-orientation. In short, the mutual
embeddedness of Wall Street and the American state reinforced imperial capacities . The
development of the American empire has thus seen the extension, at the international level, of the
three dimensions of the capitalist state discussed earliereconomic, political, territorialwithin
a specific historical form. As the domestic separation of the economic and political is extended
into the international domain, it becomes possible to think in terms of an informal empire. As
other states, for the most part, take on liberal-democratic forms, and the us comes to oversee global
capitalism through these states, a unique type of imperial political rule emerges.
2002).
Neoliberalglobalpoliciesalsofurtherthebroaderculturalprojectofprivatizingsocialservices
throughappealstopersonalresponsibilityastheproperfunctionsofthestatearenarrowed,tax
andwagecostsintheeconomyarecut,andmoresocialcostsareabsorbedbycivilsocietyand
thefamily(Duggan2003,16).AsIhavementioned,thoughitisworthrepeating,the hard
currency of human suffering permeates the social order as health-care costs rise, one out of five
children fall beneath the poverty line, and 43 million Americans bear the burden of lacking any
health insurance. As part of this larger cultural project fashioned under the sovereignty of
neoliberalism, human misery is largely defined as a function of personal choices and human
misfortune is viewed as the basis for criminalizing social problems. Misbehaving children are now
put in handcuffs and taken to police stations for violating dress codes. Motherswhotestpositive
fordrugsinhospitalsruntheriskofhavingtheirchildrentakenawaybythepolice.Young, poor,
black men who lack employment are targeted by the criminal justice system and, instead of being
educated or trained for a job, often end up in jail.Infact,areportbyUnitedforaFairEconomy
statesthatOneofoutthreeBlackmalesbornin2001willbeimprisonedatsomepointintheir
lifetimeifcurrenttrendscontinue[andthat]in2000,therewereatleast13statesinwhichthere
weremoreAfricanAmericanmeninprisonthanincollege(Muhammad,et.al.2004,2021).
Once released from prison, these young people are consigned to a civic purgatory in which they are
denied the right to vote, parental rights, drivers licenses, student loans, and residency in public
housingthe only housing that marginal, jobless people can afford (Staples2004,7).As
stipulatedintheWelfareReformActof1996,ifconvictedonasingledrugfelony,theseyouth
whenreleasedarefurtherpunishedbyalifetimebanonfoodstampsandwelfareeligibility.Such
policies are not only unjust and morally reprehensible, they are symptomatic of a society that has
relegated matters of equality and racial justice to the back burner of social concerns. In a market
society caught up in the greed cycle (Cassidy2002),addressing persistent injustices gets in the
way of accumulating capital and the neoliberal and neoconservative revolution aimed at transforming democracy into a one party, corporate state.
Impact Racism/Sexism
Neoliberalism exploits racism and sexism in order to minimize the backlash it
receives from trying to widen the gap between the elites and the rest of the country.
Michaels, 08
(Walter Benn Michaels, He is an American literary theorist, known as the author of Our
America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (1995) and The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the
End of History (2004). New Left Review 52, page 34)
Why? Because it is exploitation, not discrimination, that is the primary producer of inequality
today. It is neoliberalism, not racism or sexism (or homophobia or ageism) that creates the
inequalities that matter most in American society; racism and sexism are just sorting devices . In
fact, one of the great discoveries of neoliberalism is that they are not very efficient sorting
devices, economically speaking. If, for example, you are looking to promote someone as Head of
Sales in your company and you are choosing between a straight white male and a black lesbian,
and the latter is in fact a better salesperson than the former, racism, sexism and homophobia may
tell you to choose the straight white male but capitalism tells you to go with the black lesbian.
Which is to say that, even though some capitalists may be racist, sexist and homophobic,
capitalism itself is not.
This is also why the real (albeit very partial) victories over racism and sexism represented by the
Clinton and Obama campaigns are not victories over neoliberalism but victories for neoliberalism:
victories for a commitment to justice that has no argument with inequality as long as its
beneficiaries are as racially and sexually diverse as its victims. That is the meaning of phrases like
the glass ceiling and of every statistic showing how women make less than men or AfricanAmericans less than whites. It is not that the statistics are false; it is that making these markers
the privileged object of grievance entails thinking that, if only more women could crash through
the glass ceiling and earn the kind of money rich men make, or if only blacks were as well paid
as whites, America would be closer to a just society.
tenuous stability under which the powerful negotiate political compromises with diverse
interests to maintain social control, then rising violence and growing insecurity suggest a new
social disequilibrium and a progressive loss of control throughout Latin America. In the
regions largest cities, disorder and violence become part of daily life. This situation has created a
self-feeding cycle whereby neoliberal policies generate high rates of inequality, exclusion, poverty,
and alienation, which yield a rising tide of both radical and criminal violence, which triggers more
state coercion, which, in turn, encourages more violent resistance from below. The end result is a
militarized elite facing a mobilized and hostile population made up not just of the urban poor and
unemployed but also disaffected technical, managerial, and professional classes who have found
their living standards eroded by the devaluation of wages and the accompanying decrease in
purchasing power. Under these conditions of generalized discontent and instability, the
institutions of democracy lose flexibility, and the paternalistic state of old reemerges to offer
models of authoritarian repression and militarized violence to establish order. Thus, a situation
marked by poverty and exclusion leads increasingly to urgent circumstances and radicalized
responses, causing people and classes to interconnect and integrate in multiple ways to oppose
the structural violence of the state. Neoliberalism thus ends up producing more polarization and
less democracy than the state-centered development models prominent in Latin America during
earlier periods (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Understanding popular violence as a consequence of
structural violence focuses attention away from the repercussions of violence toward its social
and economic causes. Rather than demanding harsher and more repressive measures to restore
law and order and punish lawbreakers, a structural perspective views the reform of the state
itself as the best means to reduce violence and restore social stability; but it requires policy
makers to abandon journalist dichotomies such as formality-informality, legality-illegality,
victim-attacker, and criminal-citizen (Galtung 1998; Hernndez 2002).
Impact Authoritarianism
Impact Youth
Neoliberalism has its most proximate impact on us: our own life chances will be
degraded absent a unified challenge to the logic of the unrestrained market.
Giroux 2005
(Henry Giroux professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, West Chester
University, College Literature, 32.1, Winter 2005, pp. 1-19)
Neoliberalism has been particularly hard on young people. The incarceration rates have soared for
black and brown youth, who have become the targeted population in Americas ongoing and
intensified war on crime. By almost all measures ranging from health care to job opportunities to
getting a decent education, youth of color fare considerably worse than white youth. But all youth,
except those who are privileged by class and birth, are feeling the weight of an economic and
political system that no longer sees them as a social investment for the future.Forexample,as
Anya Kamenetz points out: Americans between the ages of 19 and 29 are now twice as likely to be
uninsured as either children or older adults. The unemployment rate for people aged 16 to 24 was
16.1 percentasofFebruary2004,versus6percentforthegeneralpopulation.Anestimated
900,000peopleinthisagegroupgaveupandlefttheworkforcebetween2000and2002,
meaningatotal of 6 million peopleinthatrangeare dropouts, neither in school, working, nor in the
military. By some accounts the age groups jobless rate is more than 80 percent. (Kamenetz 2004,
para.11)Forthosestudents whocannotfindworkordecidetogo directly on to college, massive
tuition increases over the past decadeover47percentatpublicfouryearcollegesprevent
many working and middle-class youth from attending higher education, and those that do are often
saddled with enormous debt once they graduate.Inaddition,aspiraling national debt will place a
terrible burden on this generation of young people, and this debt will leave little money for critical
needssuchaseducation, health care, the environment, and other crucial public provisions.
Moreover,aspartofanongoingefforttodestroypublicentitlements,theBushadministration
hasreducedgovernmentservices,income,andhealthcare;implementedcutsinMedicareand
veteransbenefitsandtrimmedbackoreliminatedfundsforprogramsforchildrenandforpublic
housing.All of these policies have had and continue to have a crippling affect on youth, disabling
any hopes not only for a better future, but also for a life that can rise above the hardships driven by
the constant pressure to simply survive. Youth are now viewed as a national burden, more despised
and feared than cherished and protected.
Alternatives
the market still exists, it can be contested and new alternatives developed (Harris, 2007). Unlike
MarxismLeninism, then, twenty-rst-century socialism does not completely reject capitalism;
instead, this new model rejects market policies imposed by any foreign source, seeking instead to
incorporate capitalism within a humanitarian rubric. To that end, the state also assumes control
over critical natural resources, and redistributes the revenue .
We must align ourselves with the socialist alternative in every instance only
mobilization at every opportunity will spur the transformation forward.
FOSTER, 10
(John Bellamy, "Forward to Latin America and Twenty-First Century Socialism,"
MONTHLY REVEIW 62:3, July-August)
Harnecker argues strenuously against a narrow workerist view of revolution, and against all kinds of revolutionary isms: vanguardism,
verticalism, authoritarianism, excessive centralism, etc. Socialism for the twenty-first century, in her vision, is a revolution defined by its
commitment to protagonist democracy. In Venezuela the revolution has taken the form of a peaceful armed transition, i.e., peaceful but not
defenseless, as in the case of Allendes Chile. It
revolution forward by continually transferring ever more power to the people . The Bolivarian Revolution,
This is a real
struggle, one that can be won or lost, she tells us. It is rife with contradictions and impossible
obstacles that nonetheless need to be surmounted. The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela exists in the context of a
capitalist economy. It does not control the state as a whole, but simply part of the government. Its life, its very existence, thus
depends on the continual mobilization and the developing capacities of the population, the
multitude, the poor. Above all, Harnecker attunes us to the distinctiveness of this revolution, which is unlike any other, and yet which is
putting forth new principles and modalities of revolutionary change that may aid in the formation of similar struggles worldwide. Its
strength is its historical specificity, and it is out of this that its real universality arises . She tells us: Chvez
she explains, adamantly rejects representative democracy, choosing instead participatory or protagonist democracy.32
influenced by Jos Carlos Mariteguithinks that twenty-first century socialism cannot be a carbon copy of anything but has to be a heroic
creation. That is why he talks of a Bolivarian, Christian, Robinsonian [referring to Simn Rodrguez], Indoamerican socialism , a new
collective existence, equality, liberty, and real, complete democracy. If the transition away from
capitalism is now an organic tendency of world history in our time, it also follows: to each country,
its own transition. In the end, what is needed, she concludes, is a left that understands that, more important than what we have done in
the past, is what we will do together in the future to win our sovereigntyto build a society that makes possible the full development of all
human beings: the socialist society of the twenty-first century.
Alt - Collectivities
Small collectivities are ideal to solving neoliberalism because it forms an acceptable
limit to interdependence of individuals
Wagner and Moreira 03- Writers on Latin American politics and society, Toward a Quixotic Pragmatism:
The Case of the Zapatista Insurgence 2003, pg. 8
This understanding of power may well stem from the political experience and organization of
relatively small collectivities, in which not only is the individuals dependence on the fate of the
group undeniably clear but so is the groups dependence on the participation of its members . As
Marx has sufficiently stressed, however, capitalist economies survive on the same basic principle
of interdependence, although it is not immediately apparent and is in fact actively hidden by the
promotion of the illusion of individuals independence from each other. In this sense, the
experience of small collectivities foregrounds what is not accessible to experience in capitalist
societies, and the principle of ordering with obedience formulates the fundamental social and
economic interdependence of individuals for social contexts in which the collective itself has
become an abstraction. It also formulates the limits that this interdependence effectively sets to the
exercise of power, because, as it is clearer, again, in relatively small collectivities, a groups
capacity to function as a group and to accomplish its aims cannot be guaranteed by forcethe
power to do cannot systematically rely on the power to subjugate or repress . This differentiated
experience of power foregrounds a distinction that can fruitfully inform all political contexts,
namely, the distinction between the prescriptive and pragmatic senses of orders, rules, and
instructions. Not only can these two orders be dissociated ordering is not necessarily
commandingbut the prescriptive instance of ordering, on which the mere organizational
instance may be thought to depend, is in fact subordinated to the latter. 8. The personal
endorsement of a collectivitys decisions does not imply that each individuals will or desire must
coincide with that of the others but rather that it must be exercised positively in the process of
deciding what there is to decide. As long as all participate in the elaboration of the terms of the
decision, the options that are posited can, by definition, be envisaged, if not preferred, by all.
There will doubtless be a moment of subordinationas opposed to subjugation, which implies
prescription, the use of forceof the individual to the collective will at the time of the final
decision, when decisions are actually taken, and after the options have been elaborated. But at
this point, once the dice have been thrown, the decision becomes one of the aspects of the future of
the collectivity, and as such it is up to the collectivity
was quick to distance the movement from previous failed attempts and from dogmatic
ideologies of the past: We are not talking about copying models, I believe that copying models was one of the great errors of the
socialist attempts of the 20th century, following the handbook. No, with this autonomy, with this diversity, with this force originating from every
community, from our people. Today, more than 360 million Latin Americans live under left-wing
governments dubbed the Pink Tide by Western intellectuals (perhaps because they couldnt
stomach the word red). They are not homogeneous, they range from the eco-socialism of Morales in Bolivia, to
Ecuadors radical young economist, Correa to the Workers Party and Lula in Brazil, but basic principles of equality and
integration unite them. Critics claim a reliance on state leads to corruption and inefficiency, and that enforced collective action is an
attack on the pure liberty of the individual. It is not by chance that an anti-neoliberal agenda has developed in
Latin America. It was in the Empires Workshop where Thatcher and Friedmans ideas were
first implemented. After overthrowing President Allende, a democratic Marxist who stood for many of the same things Chavez did,
dictator General Pinochet invited protgs of Friedman and Hayek to Chile. There, they had free reign to carry out their ideas, thanks to the
Generals brutal suppression of the population. The result was not dissimilar to the West today: soaring unemployment and poverty, falling
industrial production and purchasing power falling to just 40% of what it had been in 1970, coupled with a rise in wealth and power of a small
section at the top of society. Hayek recommended Chile as a model for Thatcher to follow. She agreed Chile to be an economic miracle, but
lamented that Britains democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent made some of the measures taken quite
unacceptable. Likewise in Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez, on instruction from Friedmans students, imposed a sweeping austerity
packet on Venezuela, privatizing state-owned assets and removing price controls on oil, plunging the population into poverty, to the point where
ordinary Caracas residents spent more than 25% of their income on bus fares (Jones, p116). This despite running on an anti neoliberal ticket,
calling the bankers and economists genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism during his election campaign. Desperate
Venezuelans began rioting for food, but their protest soon became one against the system itself. The government acted quickly. The military was
called in, surrounded the poor quarters of the city, and commenced three days of war against its inhabitants. The L.A. Times Bart Jones speaks of
Red Cross workers being gunned down in the street, mass graves being filled with mutilated corpses, tied up corpses with bullets in the
back of their heads and children being gunned down as the armies fired indiscriminately into shanty towns (Jones, Hugo! pp. 121-124). Perhaps
3,000 were killed, a similar number to the Tienanmen Square crackdown, in a country with a population more than 40 times smaller. So it was
not in Seattle, but in Caracas where the first direct protest against neoliberalism occurred. And it
was the outrage at the brutal suppression of the people which spurred Chavez onto the political
stage . Latin America is ten to twenty years ahead of the West, in economic terms . After decades of
brutal neoliberal austerity, an alternative has emerged and fought back. Similar ideas have begun
to appear in the West, thanks to the Occupy Movement, which swept America and Europe last year.
Those in the West has much to learn from the region, even if it is what not to do. The Guardian released a
piece on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. It showed a 65% increase in British poverty , from 13 to 22% of
the population. Inequality, as measured by the GINI index, rose from .253 to .339. The planned destruction of the manufacturing industry led to
record high unemployment. The irony of Thatcherism is that her policies have left far more people dependent on the welfare state than previously.
In contrast, even Thatchers allies at the World Bank admit that Chavez managed a 50% decrease in
poverty, and a 65% decrease in extreme poverty. Their figures show too that unemployment fell from 14.5% in 1999 to
7.6% in 2009. Venezuelas inequality has dropped from .487 in 1998 to .392 in 2009. Today, it is the most admired country in Latin America. A
similar story is being played out in other Latin American countries. For all this, Thatcher was remarkably successful in
shifting the political discourse to the right. Her policies of privileging business led to record
corporate profits and increased concentration of media ownership. Socialists like Tony Benn were
pushed to one side and Tony Blair became leader of a New Labour, largely indistinguishable from the
Conservatives. When asked what she thought was her greatest achievement was, Thatcher responded Tony Blair and New Labour. Benn
agreed, ruefully. The concentration of money has led to the rightward shift of the media, too. The free-
market has led to independent media bought up or swamped by massive conglomerates. Media outlets
are increasingly beholden to corporations for advertising. Today, questioning neoliberalism is heresy , leading to even
supposedly left-of-centre newspapers wondering if we should be worried by the rise of the populist
left in Latin America. It is becoming increasingly hard to hide the successes of countries of Latin
America in solving age old problems by bucking the supposed iron rules of neoliberal economics.
But the media continues to try. The New York Times bemoans Chavezs irresponsible handouts, while the Washington Post
insists he remains in power only by showering the poor with gifts. What are these gifts? The Telegraph finally enlightens us: lavishing state
funds on projects like operations to restore sight to the blind and soup kitchens. Such is the aversion to the state in Western intellectual culture
that providing even basic food and medicine, in accordance with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, are serious transgressions on freedom.
This has been lampooned by FAIR, in their article Chavez Wasted his Money on Healthcare When He Could Have Built Gigantic Skyscrapers.
Despite Thatcher insisting that there is no alternative, Latin America is providing a model for a
different future. A silent battle for heaven and Earth is being waged. And we all must choose sides.
Which one are you on? Choose wisely, because the fate of the 21st century will be decided on which
one of these ideologies prevails.
The decisive condition for the emergence of a new economic order and way of life is the
struggle for the democratisation of democracy. Today, democracy, this great achievement of
the 20th century, has been debased to a mere facade of imperial claims to power, of the
implementation of the imperative of an unleashed capital valorisation and of the protection
of egotistical property claims. It has been transformed into an oligarchy of globally acting
elites. The alternative to this is participatory democracy, in particular as it is developed in the
context of the World Social Forum. The main features of a new participatory democracy are
above all four directions of development: first, it involves the production of a universal public
sphere, the assurance that all decisions are accessible to those who are affected by them, that
there is the obligation to listen to them, to confront their criteria and their critiques.
Second, democracy is only possible if it contributes to the development of the other in a way
based on solidarity. This is the case above all for those who today have been touched by war,
environmental destruction, failure of the state and lack of fundamental conditions for a
self-determined life. Third, democracy requires immediately communal, regional and firmbased codetermination with a right to veto if ones own essential needs are at stake. Fourth,
democracy is only possible when people are not threatened by a lack of jobs, poverty in old
age, lack of basic goods for a self-determined life, or war. Only when these four conditions
are met is the delegation of power to others in any way responsible, for it is only then that it
is not transformed into ones own lack of power. Many elements of this new solidarity
development have emerged in the existing society dominated by capital. The old welfare state
and all the other attempts to control capitalism since the latter half of the 19th century have
already contributed to this. These kinds of post-neoliberalism approaches based on solidarity
have also emerged in confrontation with neoliberalism. The social and political struggles
against capitalist globalisation on the local as well as the global level have also helped the
nuclei of a participatory democracy to emerge. People have begun once again to engage
politically; against all forms of resistance, they have developed elements for a mode of life
based on solidarity.
Alt - Rejection
Total rejection is key the only way to produce real alternatives to neoliberalism is
to refuse the allure of half measures.
Werlhof 8
(Claudia von Werlhof. Werlhof is a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences at the
University of Innsbruck. The Globalization of Neoliberalism, its Consequences and Some of its
Basic Alternatives. 27 August 2008. Capitalism Nature Socialism. BA)
Still, euphoria would be out of place. An alternative to neoliberalism is not created through
analysis and protest alone but must be practiced. Opinions on how to do this differ. Some discuss
alternatives that are none: a reform of the WTO; control of globalization through NGOs; a
return to Keynesianism; a restoration of social market economy; or even a revival of
socialism. Such ideas ignore reality and trivialize the problem. Neoliberalism shows every day
that much more is at stake.
Neoliberalism is an apocalypse, a revelation, because the reality it creates makes it impossible
for neoliberalism to justify itself. Nor can we consider the corporations harmless players.
There is no ambiguity. As a consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about
what is happening. The only good thing about neoliberalism is that it reveals the truth about
Western civilization and European values. This means that people now have the chance to
draw the right conclusions about what is really needed.
What is really needed, of course, is nothing less than a different civilization. A different economy
alone, or a different society or culture will not suffice. We need a civilization that is the exact
opposite of neoliberalism and the patriarchal capitalist world system it is rooted in. The logic of
our alternative must be one that completely undermines the logic of neoliberalism.113
Neoliberalism has turned everything that would ensure a good life for all beings on this planet
upside down. Many people still have a hard time understanding that the horror we are
experiencing is indeed a reality*a reality willingly produced, maintained and justified by our
politicians. But even if the alternative was half implemented*no more plundering, exploitation,
destruction, violence, war, coer- cion, mercilessness, accumulation, greed, corruption*we would
still be left with all the damage that the earth has already suffered.
Alt - Socialism
Socialism is the only alternative that can resolve the contradictions of capitalism and
the violence of imperialism
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 34)
But since globalization is not in reality the end of history, every alternative remains open. What
we are witnessing is merely a new period of accumulation, sustained by recovery of the rate of
yield that the oppressed of every country pay. This regressive flow makes socialism an
immediate necessity as the sole popular response to the new stage. Only socialism can correct the
disorders created by the global expansion of capital in the current framework of financial
speculation and imperialist polarization.
As we saw, the indigenous and other social movements in Latin America, in distinction to
the old vertical models, have spearheaded a new model of horizontal networking and
organizational relations in a grassroots democratic processes from the bottom up. But at
some point popular movements must work out how the vertical and horizontal intersect. A "long
march" through civil society may be essential to transform social relations, construct
counter-hegemony from the ground up and assure popular control from below. Yet no
emancipation is possible without an alternative project, and no such project is possible
without addressing the matter of the power of dominant groups, the organization of that
power in the state (including coercive power), and the concomitant need to disempower
dominant groups by seizing the state from them, dismantling it, and constructing
alternative institutions. The current round of social and political struggle in Latin America
highlights the changing relation between social movements of the Left, political parties,
the state, and global capitalism. This in turn raises the issue of political organizations that can
mediate vertical links between political and civil society, that is, interface between the popular
forces on the one hand and state structures on the other? How can internally democratic political
instruments be developed to operate at the level of political society and dispute state power
without diluting the autonomous mobilization of social movements? The potential for
transformation will depend on the combination of independent pressure of mass social
movements from below on the state and also on the representatives and allies of those
movements taking over the state. The issue is how to assure that political organizations are
internally democratic. How can they serve as instruments of social movements and popular class
mobilization and not the reverse? The limitations of strict horizontalism have become
evident in Mexico in recent years with regard to the Zapatistas, for whom horizontalism
becomes a rigid principle rather than a general emancipatory practice, or in Argentina with
regard to the autonomist movement. The Zapatista model generated hope and inspiration for
millions throughout Latin America and the world in the 1990s. The January 1, 1994,
uprising was an urgent and refreshing response to the capitulation by many on the Left to
the "TINA" ("there is no alternative") syndrome: the assertion that there was simply no
alternative to the new global capitalist order. The Zapatistas insisted on a new of set nonhierarchal practices within their revolutionary movement and within the communities
under their influence, including absolute equality between men and women, collective
leadership, and taking directives from, rather than giving them to, the grassroots base,
leading by following and listening, and so on. Such non-hierarchal practices must be at the
very core of any emancipatory project. Yet they also hold strong appeal to the anarchist
currents that have spread among radical forces worldwide in the wake of the collapse of
"actually existing socialism" and the old statist-vanguardist Left, and that are unwilling to
deal with the wider political system and the state. These currents have a strong influence in
the global justice movement and the World Social Forum, as well as among radicalized
youth and middle classes in Mexico who provide a base for the Zapatistas beyond Chiapas.
But Zapatismo has not been able to draw in a mass working-class base, and as a result it has
experienced a declining political influence in Mexican society. It was still in 2007 a force of
counter-hegemony or even of hegemony in some communities inside Chiapas, but the fact is
that global capitalism made major headway within Chiapas itself between 1994 and 2007 as the
Zapatista movement has stagnated. This conundrum came to a head with the Zapatistas' refusal
as a matter of principle to engage with the campaign that the PRD and Manuel Lopez Obrador
waged for the presidency in the 2006 elections. As a result the Zapatistas were ill prepared to
throw their weight behind the mass struggles against the fraud perpetrated by the Mexican state
and its two ruling parties, the PRI and the PAN. If it is true, as the Zapatistas observe, that there
is no blueprint for revolution, then it is also true that revolutionaries need to be able to shift
strategies and tactics as history actually unfolds.
If the neoliberal national state is not a space for engaging in politics it is necessary to open new
political spaces that allow popular forces to challenge elites in that state? What is the possibility
of reconstituting national states? How can the popular classes assure the continued accumulation
of their autonomous power and at the same time seek to capture local state machineries and
transform them into instruments responsive to their interests? How can they undermine the
neoliberal national states and challenge the TNS without falling into a resistance grounded in
mere rebellion rather than in a coherent and viable alternative project? This means creating
imageries and projects that take the popular classes beyond their disruptive powers. Greater
webs of interdependence mean greater disruptive powers. Popular forces need to develop
constructive power as well, to go beyond the restraining influence of rules in activating
both disruptive and constructive powers. The objective potential for popular power has
actually increased in the globalization epoch. There is a new wider basis for intersubjectivities that have been fragmented at the national level by globalization and for a reterritorialization of space in new ways. New spaces are not necessarily transnational spaces.
However, popular forces that operate in these new local, national, and regional spaces must
link with transnational chains and networks, and moreover, are increasingly empowered to
do so by the very nature and dynamics of capitalist globalization. The challenge, hence, is
how to convert a reactive global resistance into a proactive global program. For poor
majorities a resolution to the crisis requires a
radical redistribution of wealth and
power, predicated on the construction of more authentic democratic structures that allow
for popular control over local and TNS institutions. The transformative possibilities that have
opened up in Latin America cannot be realized without an organized Left and a
democratic socialist program. Yet such possibilities will only end up frustrated by the old
vanguardist model of top-down change by command and the military fetishism of the
1960s and 1970s that converted armed struggle from the means to an end into an end
itself. No where is this more evident than in the "military hypertrophy" of the Colombian
Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC), which sees independent political mobilization as a
threat to its own efforts to hegemonize resistance (Hylton, 2006). The transformative
moment of the early twenty-first century in Latin America will depend on the Left's ability
to learn the lessons of the previous era of revolution, especially the need to relinquish
vanguardism of party and state and to encourage, respect, and subordinate itself to the
autonomous mobilization from below of the popular classes and subordinate sectors.
Popular and progressive resistance competes with the spread of reactionary resistance to
global capitalism, ranging from religious fundamentalisms to racist and xenophobic rightwing populisms, which may well gain influence if a popular project is unable to cohere.
Moreover, we must not conflate neoliberalism with global capitalism. Precisely because the
neoliberal phase of global capitalism is coming to a close, resistance must move beyond the
critique of neoliberalism. The problem of the particular neoliberal model is in the end
symptomatic of the systemic problem of global capitalism. If it can be said that the "Washington
consensus" had cracked by the turn-of-century then what may replace neoliberalism in Latin
America and in global society depends not only on the struggle to oppose the neoliberal order
but also on the struggle to develop a viable alternative and to impose that alternative.
corporate swindlers, international political institutions, and those government politicians who
willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and rapacious profits. From
Seattle to Genoa, people engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up the challenge of
neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it takes place.
Political culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers,
schoolteachers with parents, and intellectuals with artists. Groups protesting the attack on
farmers in India whose land is being destroyed by the government in order to build dams now find
themselves in alliance with young people resisting sweatshop labor in New York City.
Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of organized labor as well as groups
protesting Third World debt. The collapse of the neoliberal showcase, Argentina, along with
numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including Enron), reveals the cracks in
neoliberal hegemony and domination. In addition, the multiple forms of resistance against
neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused exclusively on
particularized rights and interests. On the contrary, identity politics is affirmed within a broader
crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with the
collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties. Central to these new movements is
the notion that neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning,
education, and political agency. Democracy in this view is not limited to the struggle over economic
resources and power; indeed, it also includes the creation of public spheres where individuals can
be educated as political agents equipped with the skills, capacities, and knowledge they need to
perform as autonomous political agents. I want to expand the reach- es of this debate by arguing
that any struggle against neoliberalism must address the discourse of political agency, civic
education, and cultural politics as part of a broader struggle over the relationship between
democratization(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy) and the global
public sphere.
Latin America proves it doesnt want Neoliberalism by shifting ideas and policies
towards the left.
Kaltwasser, 2011
(Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser holds a PhD from the Humboldt University of
Berlin (2008), has worked for the Chilean Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and was
a post-doctoral fellow at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB). Latin American Research Review
consolidated paradigm of social policy, we are witnessing the emergence of gradual and tentative
alternative ap- proaches to neoliberalism (52).
havecometoknow(andfromwhichmanyhavebenefitedgreatly)hasencompassedfasterand
morefrequenttransnationalinteractionsintrade,finance,technology,andideas,andithas
widenedtherangeofglobalplayersfromdiplomaticrepresentativesandfirmstoindividuals,
civilsocietygroups,midlevelgovernmentofficials,andterroristorganizations.These actors
have had a deepening influence on the conditions of life in communities around the world, and on
the policies and structures of states.Theconventionalwisdomviewstheeffectsofthesestructural
changesasstronglypositive:moreopenpoliticalandeconomicsystems,increasedprosperity,
andmitigationofconflict.Whileitacknowledgesnegativeeffectsincomeinequality,financial
volatility,economicandphysicalinsecuritytheseareconsideredsurmountablewithimproved
nationalandglobalgovernance,andthecontinuedspreadofmarkets.But the idea that liberal
globalization is the only form of globalization is erroneous. Many aspects of globalizationthe
rapid advance and diffusion of technology, the proliferation of private transnational actors, the
centrality of economic growth, and the importance of the global economy in the aping of national
economic policyare well established and probably irreversible. But that form of globalization
of progressively open markets, non-discrimination in trade and investment, strong rule-based
global in- stitutions, and the spread of democratic politicsis in steep decline. And this decline
will imperil the economic and political benefits of growth, poverty alleviation, and relative peace
among great powers, which have characterized the post-World War II system. That decline is
already underway, but the shape of globalization that emerges after U.S. hegemony is less clear. The
new globalization will beinevitablymore heterogeneous. Hopefully, it also still will be open and
multilateral, and still delivering robust growth and alleviating poverty. U.S. encouragement will be
essential but not sufficient for this vision, given the emerging multi- polar distribution of power. But
if America continues an anachronistic pursuit of primacy over this new order it will invite resistance, and will accelerate a trend towards a mercantilist scramble for markets, capital, and
resources among powerful states and non-state actors.
everything will have been a waste of time. (2007^2-3) In late 2006 Chavez called for the
formation of a United Venezuelan Socialist Party, or PUSV in its Spanish acronym. The MVR
was by 2006 a mass party, with over a million members (Jorquera, 2005:84), and it was the main
political force in the pro-revolutionary camp, which involved an alliance of several Left political
organizations, including the Venezuelan Communist Party, Podemos, and Patria Para Todos
(PPT, or Homeland for All). Yet neither the MVR nor its allied parties were a statist party: that is,
parties fused with state structures. Such a fusion seemed impossible since the state in Venezuela
remained a battleground of contending social and political forces, even if under the hegemony of
Chavez and the Chavistas, especially after the abortive 2002 coup.
The space of student centered debate is the crucial nexus point for creating
alternatives to neoliberalism.
Giroux 5 (Henry A. Global Television Network Chair, Professor at McMaster University,
The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics, Winter 2005,
JSTOR)
Just as
the world has seen a more virulent and brutal form of market capitalism, generally referred to as
neoliberalism, develop over the last thir ty years, it has also seen "a new wave of political activism [which] has
coalesced around the simple idea that capitalism has gone too far " (Harding 2001, para.28). Wedded to the belief
that the market should be the organiz ing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an
incessant attack on democracy, public goods, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism everything
either is for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranch ers; politicians
willingly hand the public's airwaves over to powerful broad casters and large corporate interests without a dime
going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted cor porate contracts without any competitive bidding
and then bills the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-
making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order
to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers, forced to get
revenue for their school by adopting mar ket values, increasingly function as circus barkers hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza
parties?that is, when they are not reduced to prepping students to take standardized tests. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday
life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and
corporations rather than in governments (except for their sup port for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship
has increasingly become a function of consumerism and politics has been restructured as
"corporations have been increasingly freed from social control through deregulation, privatization, and other
neoliberal measures" (Tabb 2003, 153). Corporations more and more design not only the economic sphere but also shape legislation and policy
affecting all levels of government, and with limited opposition. As corporate power lays siege to the political process, the benefits flow to the rich
and the powerful. Included in such benefits are reform policies that shift the burden of taxes from the rich to the middle class, the working poor,
and state governments as can be seen in the shift from taxes on wealth (capital gains, dividends, and estate taxes) to a tax on work, principally in
the form of a regressive payroll tax (Collins, Hartman, Kraut, and Mota 2004). During the 2002-2004 fiscal years, tax cuts delivered $197.3
billion in tax breaks to the wealthiest 1% of Americans (i.e., house Thisholds making more than $337,000 a year) while state governments
increased taxes to fill a $200 billion budget deficit (Gonsalves 2004). Equally alarm ing, a recent Congressional study revealed that 63% of all
corporations in 2000 paid no taxes while "[s]ix in ten corporations reported no tax liabili ty for the five years from 1996 through 2000, even
though corporate prof its were growing at record-breaking levels during that period" (Woodard 2004, para. 11). Fortunately, the
corporate capitalist fairytale of neoliberalism has been challenged all over the globe by students ,
intellectuals, com munity activists , and a host of individuals and groups unwilling to
allow democracy to be bought and sold by multinational corporations, corporate swindlers, international political
labor organizers,
institutions, and those government politicians who willingly align themselves with multinational, corporate interests and rapacious profits. From
Seattle to Genoa, people engaged in popular resistance are collectively taking up the challenge of
neoliberalism and reviving both the meaning of resistance and the sites where it takes place . Political
culture is now global and resistance is amorphous, connecting students with workers,
schoolteachers with parents, and intellectuals with artists . Groups protesting the attack on farmers in India whose land
is being destroyed by the government in order to build dams now find themselves in alliance with young people resisting sweatshop labor in New
York City. Environmental activists are joining up with key sections of organized labor as well as groups protesting Third World debt. The
collapse of the neoliberal showcase, Argentina, along with numerous corporate bankruptcies and scandals (notably including
Enron), reveals the cracks in neoliberal hegemony and domination . In addition, the multiple forms of
resistance against neoliberal capitalism are not limited by a version of identity politics focused
exclusively on particularized rights and interests. On the contrary, identity politics is affirmed within a
broader crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarization of public life with
the collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties . Central to these new movements is the notion that
neoliberalism has to be understood within a larger crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Democracy in this view is
not limited to the struggle over economic resources and power ; indeed, it also includes the creation of
public spheres where individuals can be educated as political agents equipped with the skills,
capacities, and knowledge they need to perform as autonomous political agents . I want to expand the
reaches of this debate by arguing that any struggle against neoliberalism must address the discourse of political
agency, civic education, and cultural politics(the ongoing struggle for a substantive and inclusive democracy) and the global public
sphere . We live at a time when the conflation of private interests, empire build ing, and evangelical fundamentalism brings
into question the very nature, if not the existence, of the democratic process. Under the reign of
neoliberalism, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic virtue has been
undermined by a slavish celebration of the free market as the model for organizing all facets of everyday life (Henwood 2003). Political culture has been increasingly depoliticized as
collective life is organized around the modalities of privatization, deregulation, and commercialization. When the alleged champions of neoliberalism invoke politics, they substitute "ideological
certainty for reasonable doubt," and deplete "the national reserves of political intelligence" just as they endorse "the illusion that the future can be bought instead of earned" (Lapham 2004a,
9,11). Under attack is the social contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social provisions?such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public
transportation, and education? which provided both a safety net and a set of conditions upon which democracy could be experi enced and critical citizenship engaged. Politics has been further
depoliticized by a policy of anti-terrorism practiced by the Bush administration that mim ics the very terrorism it wishes to eliminate. Not only does a policy of all embracing anti-terrorism
exhausts itself in a discourse of moral absolutes and public acts of denunciation that remove politics from the realm of state power, it also strips community of democratic values by defining it
almost exclusively through attempts to stamp out what Michael Leeden, a former counter-terror expert in the Reagan administration, calls "corrupt habits of mind that are still lingering around,
somewhere"(qtd. in Valentine 2001, para.33). The appeal to moral absolutes and the constant mobilization of emergency time coded as a culture of fear configures politics in religious terms,
hiding its entanglement with particular ideologies and diverse rela tions of power. Politics becomes empty as it is reduced to following orders, shaming those who make power accountable, and
shutting down legitimate modes of dissent (Giroux 2004).
gives education its most valued purpose and meaning, which in part is "to encourage human agency,
not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion" (Aronowitz 1998, 10?11). It is also a position that threatens right-wing private advocacy groups,
neoconservative politicians, and conservative extremists because they recognize that such a pedagogical commitment
goes to the very heart of what it means to address real inequalities of power at the social level and to
conceive of education as a project for democracy and critical citizenship while at the same time foregrounding a series of important and often
ignored questions such as: "Why do we [as edu cators] do what we do the way we do it"?W hose interests does higher edu cation serve? How
might it be possible to understand and engage the diverse contexts in which education takes place? In spite of the right-wing view that equates
indoctrination with any suggestion of politics, critical pedagogy is not concerned simply with offering students
new ways to think critically and act with authority as agents in the classroom; it is also concerned to provide
students with the skills and knowledge necessary for them to expand their capacities to both
question deep-seated assumptions and myths that legitimate the most archaic and disempowering
social practices that structure every aspect of society and to take responsibility for intervening in
the world they inhabit. Education is not neutral, but that does not mean it is merely a form of indoctrination. On the contrary, as a
practice that attempts to expand the capacities necessary for human agency and hence the possibilities for democracy itself, the university must
nourish those pedagogical practices that promote "a concern with keeping the forever unexhausted and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting
back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unravelling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and
preventing that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished" (Bauman and Tester 2001, 4). In other words, critical pedagogy
forges both critique and agency through a language of scepticism and possibility and a culture of openness, debate,
and engagement , all elements that are now at risk in the latest and most dangerous attack on
higher education.
financial crisis in the core of the world system was channeled to Latin America through slumping
external trade and export prices and declines in remittances (ECLAC, 2009). The fallout from the crisis has been
uneven in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Mexico and Central America being hardest hit due to the unique depth of their integration into
the US economy. However, if the world slump extends into protracted crisis, as some expect, South American economies will increasingly feel its
effects. Venezuela, for example, is already weathering the contradictions thrown up by ongoing rentier
capitalism in a context of fluctuating international oil prices . Center-left regimes will come under
increasing pressure to shift back toward orthodox neoliberal austerity in an effort to displace the
costs of the crisis onto the popular and working classes. Whether this leads to the delegitimization of center-left
politics followed by a sharper turn to the left, will depend less on economics than on the politics of struggle
between left resistance from below and right-wing restoration from above, and the shifting balance
of class forces underlying these developments.
(JuliaBuxton, B.Sc.(Economics),M.Sc.(ComparativeGovernment),Ph.D.'TheCrisisofthe
VenezuelanPartySystem'allattheLondonSchoolofEconomics,TheBolivarianRevolutionAs
VenezuelasPostCrisisAlternative)
Venezuela has produced the most well-known and controversial neoliberal alternative in South
America.NotsincetheCubanrevolutionof1959hasthetenetsofthehemispherespolitical
economy been so fundamentally challenged as under Hugo Chvezs Bolivarian Revolution.
Bolivarianism is a complete repudiation of the free trade, free market principles and policies that
shaped South America in the 1980s and 1990s; of the philosophical underpinnings of the neoliberal
model; and of the agents of its adoption and institutionalization across the region the United
States government, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the political
and governance realm, Bolivarianism eschews liberal democracy and formal institutions, in favor of
routizined popular participation (termed protagonistic democracy) and informal, partisan and
personalized modes of state management.TheendgoaloftheChvezadministrationistocreate
TwentyFirstCenturySocialisminVenezuela,whichistoberealizedthroughthetransformation
ofthestatesroleinthenationalandglobaleconomy,andoftherelationshipbetweenthestate,
governmentand Venezuelan citizens. This chapterexplores what appears to beadramatic
changeinparadigmsofdevelopmentandgovernanceinVenezuela. It discusses the shift away
from orthodox economic policies that were pursued in the 1990s to the heterodox course of the
2000s and considers the accompanying changes in the political realm, outlining how the move away
from liberal democracy that had prevailed since 1958 to protagonistic democracy impacted on
modes of political representation and institutional structures. The chapter adjudges
Bolivarianism to be a truly transformative model, one that has the potential to represent a viable
neo-liberal alternative on account of two Venezuela-specific factors; the countrys unique status as a
major oil exporter and the pre-Chvez political and institutional legacy.These provide the financial
resources and created a political culture conducive to a radical reshaping of Venezuelas political
economy and the embedding of Twenty First Century Socialism . However there are serious
obstaclestothedeliveryofBolivarianpoliciesandcommitments,andthiscallsintoquestionthe
viability of the Revolution and prospects for its consolidation. These Venezuela specific
characteristics: oil wealth and popular antipathy to the pre-Chvez party and political system, are
also used to explain one of the great ironies of political developments in South America that
Venezuela, a long standing democracy with a history of centrist government, should have produced
the most stridently anti-neoliberal administration on the Continent in the 2000s. Venezuelahad
onlyfleetingexposuretoeconomicorthodoxy,andeventhen(datedcrudelyfrom19891992
during the Presidency of Carlos Andrs Prez and 19941996 during the Rafael Caldera
administration)stabilizationandstructuraladjustmentmeasureswerehaphazardlyapplied(Naim
1993).Andyetthisappearstohavegeneratedapowerfulbacklashthatwasmanifestinsupport
forChvezandthesubsequentdirectionof,andpopularsupportfor,hisgovernment. In order to
understand the popular appeal of Chvez and his Bolivarian model, the chapter approaches
Bolivarianism as a response to Puntofijismo, Venezuelas limited model of democracy that prevailed
from 1958 until Chvezs election in 1998,andnotneoliberalism.Venezuelaexperiencedavery
ChvezpresidencyprovedtobeadecisiveinfluenceoverthedirectiontakenbytheChvez
government. In respect of the latter point, attempts by the Puntofijista opposition to remove
Chvez from power forced a radicalization of the government, with the strong rise in the
international oil price financing a more expansive and revolutionary Bolivarian project than was
envisaged in 1998. As such, Venezuelas Bolivarian post-crisis alternative emerged very much by
default and not design , and was premised on anti-Puntofijismo not anti-neoliberalism.
has in the past led to social breakdown, authoritarianism, and fascism). A popular or
revolutionary outcome to an organic crisis also requires that there be a viable alternative that is
in hegemonic ascendance: that is, an alternative to the existing order that is viable and that is
seen as viable and preferable by a majority of society. Global capitalism was not experiencing
an organic crisis in the early twenty-first century. Nonetheless, I believe the prospects that
such a crisis could develop were more palpably on the horizon at the turn of the century
than at any time since perhaps 1968. Seen from the viewpoint of capital, neoliberalism
resolved a series of problems in the accumulation process that had built up in the epoch of
Keynesian capitalism but fueled new crises of over-accumulation and legitimacy. The
model is not sustainable socially or politically. Its coming demise may well turn out to be
the end of Act I and the opening of Act II in the restructuring crisis that began in the
1970s. As in all historic processes, this act is unscripted.
Alternatives - Solvency
The crisis, wrote Antonio Gramsci in his prison notebooks, consists precisely in the fact
that the old is dying and the new cannot be born. The first half of Gramscis famous
formulation is every moment more apparent. Very few dare any longer to believe that the
current order of things is permanent or even stable. The second half, however, is more
complex. Why is it that the new cannot be born? There are many answers to this question,
and some of them involve vast economic and ecological developments on a global scale that
are beyond the control or comprehension of anyone*including the ruling classes. But there
is another reason why the new cannot be born: because we are not ready to create it. While
anticapitalist organizations all over the world have a more or less clear understanding of the
current world order and its systemic crises, they are far less prepared to explain in the necessary
detail the organization of a future world system, or, of equal importance, the prerogatives and
contours of an organized process of transition. It is in this sense that we can understand Georg
Lukacs injunction that [i]t is an ideological crisis which must be solved before a practical
solution to the worlds economic crisis can be found (1968, 79). For these reasons, the
debates about the theory and practice of 21st century socialism, particularly in Latin
America, have taken on immense relevancy for the world at large. Thus far, however, these
revolutionary processes in the global South have no serious partners in the global North.
There is an urgent need for these processes to develop in the centers of the world economy.
If material conditions are not yet ripe, the subjective work that lays the foundation for every
revolutionary process is long overdue. Toward this end, I have undertaken here a review of
Hannah Sells book Socialism in the 21st Century. Her work is doubly significant in that she is
the national secretary of a socialist party, and in that this party is, in my considered opinion, one
of the more ideologically and organizationally reliable international socialist parties in the world
today. Her work can thus be used as a reference point to understand the state of current socialist
thinking on this subject in the global North. The purpose of this review is to mobilize her book as
a point of departure for more engaged, strategic thinking about how a new alternative system
can actually be conceived, planned, and built, particularly in the United States. The
majority of Hannah Sells book is devoted to the critique of capitalism and the justification of the
idea of socialism. Her intended audience seems to be people who are on the fence about the
reformability of capitalism and the suitability of socialism as a replacement. There is a need for
this kind of work, and there is no fault in her devotion of time and energy to it. But there is a
definite need to move beyond it. This is my first and perhaps most important point: Those of us
who are already sympathetic to socialism do not need to read any more critiques of capitalism!
As Immanuel Wallerstein wrote in 2009, [t]he crucial battle . . . in the middle run (next 15-25
years) . . . is a battle not about capitalism, but about what will replace it as an historical
system (Wallerstein 2009). We need to move forward; we need to devote our intellectual
production towards the creation of alternatives! Time is really running out! With this in
mind, I focus on the parts of Sells book that deal specifically with the construction of socialism.
These are mostly from the chapter How Could Socialism Work? She outlines socialist ideas
and demands with considerable clarity and persuasiveness, but her work leaves us with many
important and unavoidable questions. My purpose is not to engage in a debate over Sells book,
or to fuel the scourge of sectarianism on the Left*there is no time for that! The purpose is to
provoke revolutionaries to move beyond the critique of capitalism and to begin the real work of
building the alternative.
compatible with the promotion of people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a
complementary function since social struggle is not self-sufficient and partisan organization is
necessary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to include immediate improvements
as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all socialist strategy.
Brand, 06
(Ulrish Brand, Brand has a PhD in Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt/M, The
World Wide Web of Anti- Neoliberalism, page 236-237)
The brave new world of neoliberalism has been battered by the crises of South East Asia and
other countries, and by the protests in Seattle, Genoa and else- where, even in the public opinion
of Western countries. Hardly a politician or corporate executive can mount a public podium
without speaking of the pro- blems and dangers of capitalist globalization, although as a rule they
append the corollary that nevertheless there is no alternative. This much is clear, however: while
the critique of neoliberal globalization in general, and of certain actors in particular, is enjoying
increasing attention in the media, and networks like Attac use it quite cleverly, there are few
changes to the general structural transforma- tions in train or in neoliberal power relations. It
would, of course, be nonsensical to lay this at the feet of a new, and still developing movement.
It is nevertheless necessary to register the dangers and dead-ends which may lie ahead.
One of the chief dangers facing anti-neoliberal movements is surely that they may share the fate
of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which were so celebrated in the 1990s. They
launched themselves into the political fray with enormous effort and became cosmopolitan
ghosts (Drainville 2001: 15), focus- ing on a consensus with dominant forces. In doing this,
however, they increas- ingly became an alternative resource for neoliberals in government as
well as in international politics to be selectively resorted to as actors with experience and
profound knowledge of complicated political and socio-economic processes. Moreover, as civil
society actors they provided legitimacy for the prevailing developments particularly as, at least
on the soft issues of environment, devel- opment, human rights and womens politics, civil
society sat at the table. The handling of hard military or economic matters would, on the other
hand, con- tinue to be shielded from possibly critical eyes.2 The relative failure of NGO
involvement lay crucially in the lack of far-reaching critical understanding of the upheavals of
neoliberal globalization among activists. This was to be especially clear in the debates and politics
with regard to sustainable development which were conducted more or less in isolation from the
neoliberal transformation of society (Brand and Go rg 2005). In the medium term it became
possible that the new protest movements (or parts thereof) would become a sort of institutionalized bad conscience, with whom the powerful would meet amid high publicity, and which would
always remind them to be conscious of the losers and losses
of globalization and to take (usually merely symbolic) action on these now and again.
Renaissance 2010, they have destroyed working-class neighbourhoods and replaced them with
upscale housing and boutique schools (Lipman, in press). In New York City, the mayor has
gained control over the citys schools by secretly and unilaterally choosing Cathleen Black, CEO
of a major media corporation, as the next Chancellor, completely disempowering and
disenfranchising the public (Chen & Barbaro, 2010). In response to events in Chicago and New
York, parents, community youth groups, and teachers are working, separately and together, to
resist school privatization and the destruction of neighbourhoods. Possibilities for real
communitybased reform have increased with the election of the Caucus of Rank and File
Educators (CORE) to the Chicago Teachers Union on a platform of democratic unionism and
opposition to privatization and Renaissance 2010. In New York City parents and community
groups are organizing against the Cathleen Blacks appointment as school Chancellor. Third,
schools must engage students in raising the essential questions of our time, whether these be about
climate change, environmental sustainability, or rebuilding communities in a socially just way. We
need to develop a social democratic approach to government, governance, and education that
promotes critical analysis and active participation in creating an alternative to neoliberalism.
We must recognize the many pluralisms of society and reject the necessitarian approach
taken by defenders of neoliberalism in order to find a true alternative
Munck 3
(Ronaldo, Department of Sociology at Univerity of Liverpool, Neoliberalism,
Necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative?, Third World
Quarterly, 2003. Pg. 497-498)
There is much in Roberto Mangabeira Unger's wide-ranging political philosophy that could
help us to develop a more nuanced perspective on economic liberalism than the rather
'necessitarian' approach which I believe prevails. Against what he calls the 'mythical history' of
democracy, for example, Unger asks us to recognise how many of the economic and political
institutional arrangements of democracy are accidental or at least socially constructed. Against the
'deep-structure' theorists who find hidden causes for all political phenomena, he shows the
limitations of a 'structure fetishism' which denies that we can change our formative contexts.
Against all kinds of necessitarian assumptions lying behind much social and political analysis
(especially that influenced by traditional forms of Marxism) Unger aims 'to break loose from a
style of social understanding that allows us to explain ourselves and our societies only to the
extent we imagine ourselves helpless puppets of the social worlds we build and inhabit or of
the lawlike forces that have supposedly brought these worlds into being' (Unger, 1997: 7). But
history can be surprising and social (re)invention can occur even in the most unlikely of
circumstances. In an earlier debate around the 'impasse' in development theory there was also a
sense that much of the progressive or alternative development theorising was 'necessitarian'
and lacked the fluidity to pose real alternatives to the status quo (see Booth, 1985). Radical
development theory, like much radical analysis of neoliberal globalisation today, suffered
from what Unger calls the symptom of 'false necessity', with its heavy dose of determinism and
belief in law-like forces governing society. For Unger, on the contrary, 'the institutional
arrangements of contemporary society are the outcomes of many loosely connected sequences
of social and ideological conflict rather than of irreversible and determinate functional
imperatives, driving forward a succession of indivisible institutional systems' (Unger, 1998:
24). In a spirit of democratic experimentalism, taking us beyond the reform/revolution
dichotomy of the traditional left, we can explore the alternative pluralisms that always exist
within society and in the political arena. Applied to the struggle for a future beyond
neoliberalism, this range of ideas and theories may assist in a more productive set of
debates than those engaged in by the traditional 'critique' school.
They are likely to turn with more frequency to violent methods in defense of their interests.
These groups' resistance to change is likely to take increasingly extra-institutional forms
especially in those cases where the threat they face, beyond redistributive reform, involves
property relations. Recent anti-terrorism laws have been passed in most Latin American
countries that criminalize social protest, such as in El Salvador, where terrorism is defined by
such legislation as "any pressure on authorities to make certain decisions" (COMPA, 2007). In
the Venezuelan countryside and in Bolivia's eastern region landlords have already
organized armed paramilitary squads that have clashed with peasants demanding
agrarian reform. We cannot rule out military intervention and new coup d'etats in countries
such as Bolivia and Ecuador. In Colombia, upwards of four million people have been violently
uprooted from the countryside by state security forces and right-wing paramilitary armies to
make way for transnational agribusiness and mining concerns, while it has been disclosed that
such TNCs as Coca-Cola, Chiquita Brands International, and several U.S.-based mining
companies have regularly hired the paramilitary armies to block unionization and eliminate
dissent among their workers (Hylton, 2006). 3. GLOBAL ANTI-CAPITALIST ALTERNATIVE
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PROJECT What configuration of social and political forces
could bring about a postcapitalist global order? It is an irony that the crisis of global
capitalism has followed in the wake of the crisis and collapse of the Left in most countries
around the world and the discrediting, until recently, of socialist ideology. In Latin America a
twenty-first-century neofascist project is taking place in Colombia while right next door, in
Venezuela, a twenty-first-century socialist project is under way. A socialist alternative is
not at odds with a struggle for global reformism, and in fact such an alternative would
most likely snowball out of efforts to bring about a reform of the system, such as we may
be seeing in Venezuela, and perhaps even in Bolivia and Ecuador. What is crucial is for
popular, radical, and socialist-oriented forces in the global justice movement to put
forward an alternative vision that goes beyond reformism and to have such a vision
achieve hegemony within any counter-hegemonic bloc to global capitalism. Redistributive
reform, it is worth reiterating, is not viable without structural changes that move a counterhegemonic bloc from challenging the "fairness" of the market to replacing the logic of the
market with a social logic. A democratic socialist alternative would require a renewal of
critical and radical thinking along with a capacity to operate as much on the cultural and
ideological as on the political terrain. More than ever before, political and economic
processes are globalized, as Levine (2005) observes, to the extent that they are
"culturized." Global accumulation is increasingly reliant on symbolic and cultural
exchanges that make possible the rapid circulation of commodities. But that alternative also
requires renovated political vehicles that provide the popular classes in civil society with
instruments for invading state structures. Moreover, no matter how unpopular with postmodernists, a global transformative project requires, as Boswell and Chase-Dunn argue, a new
universalism. The axis of an anti-capitalist and universalist struggle must be the new global
working class, with its rainbow and heavily female face, one that is transnationally
state that seeks to protect ordinary people from financial speculators. Something similar is true in
Europe as well, where the left is anemic and right-wing populist parties are on the move.
There are several reasons for this lack of left-wing mobilization, but chief among them is a failure
in the realm of ideas . For the past generation, the ideological high ground on economic issues has
been held by a libertarian right. The left has not been able to make a plausible case for an agenda
other than a return to an unaffordable form of old-fashioned social democracy . This absence of a
configured around 1970 before the neoliberal surge and consider how they look
now, and you will see they have all changed in ways that re-define the operative
characteristics of capitalism viewed as a non-Hegelian totality.
An anti-capitalist political movement can start anywhere (in labor processes,
around mental conceptions, in the relation to nature, in social relations, in the
design of revolutionary technologies and organizational forms, out of daily life,
or through attempts to reform institutional and administrative structures
including the reconfiguration of state powers). The trick is to keep the political
movement moving from one moment to another in mutually reinforcing ways.
This was how capitalism arose out of feudalism and this is how something
radically different called communism, socialism, or whatever must arise out of
capitalism. Previous attempts to create a communist or socialist alternative
fatally failed to keep the dialectic between the different moments in motion and
failed to embrace the unpredictabilities and uncertainties in the dialectical
movement between them. Capitalism has survived precisely by keeping the
dialectical movement between the moments going and constructively embracing
the inevitable tensions, including crises.
Some have seen the newfound emphasis on indigenousas distinct from class (such as peasant)
identity as a new identity politics and even as a "postmodern" turn among the indigenous and
other Fourth World peoples. There is indeed a newfound indigenous identity and struggles
around such cultural rights as bilingual education and recognition of "pluricultural nationality,"
or the right to maintain ethnonational identities distinct from, although formative of,
multinational states. Indigenous struggles have forced discussion on constitutional amendments
in Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and elsewhere to recognize the
multiethnic and pluricultural makeup of each country as a new view of the nation and the state
emerges. These assessments of a postmodern turn, however, are misleading, insofar as alongside
cultural rights the resurgent indigenous struggles have revolved around militant sets of social,
material, and political demands that go well beyond multiculturalism and challenge the very logic
of global capitalism. By the twenty-first century it had become clear to a new generation of
indigenous leaders that indigenous discourse and organization proved to be a powerful way to
advance political and material struggles than other forms of class-based organizing . All of the
major indigenous struggles in Latin America, including those in Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Guatemala, have emphasized the links their between resurgent struggle and broader resistance to
neoliberalism and capitalist globalization. Central to the new indigenous struggles are demands
for political autonomy from the neoliberal state and for land and territory . Crucially, this demand
is not just for land but for territory; the right to continue collective forms of land ownership
and in this way challenging head-on the capitalist form of property and the neoliberal logic of the
spread of markets in land. They have also demanded as part of political autonomy and territorial
control, control over resources, such as land, lumber, and mining (as in the case of the Mapuche
in Chile), oil and natural gas, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, and so forth. In putting forward these
demands they have clashed head-on with capitalist globalization and its agents, including
transnational energy, mining, and agribusiness corporations and constitute a frontal challenge to
transnational corporate plunder in Latin America.1 Indigenous struggles spearhead popular class
demands; these are struggles against (transnational) capital and for a transformation of property
relations. Ethnicity and class have fused in the new round of indigenous resistance, which has
become aperhaps theleading edge of popular class mobilization. 2 The indigenous movement
represents a threat to transnational capital because indigenous communities block access to
land and natural resources under indigenous custodianship. Collective ownership of land and
intrinsic in being indigenousas an historical cultural identity and collective social experience
that makes the indigenous a threat in this way to global capitalism and leads indigenous
communities to spearhead twenty-first-century resistance struggles. Rather, the very exclusion
and total social control by oppressive colonial and post-colonial states that the indigenous have
experienced has forced them to sustain and reproduce a collective community existence in order to
survive the past 500 years and that now stands smack in the way of global capitalist expansion in
Latin America. If local paramilitary squads and oligarchs in Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere
respond to this indigenous threat with coercive terror, how has transnational capital responded?
The very success of the indigenous movement has led it into a set of quandaries. Its
achievements to date in cultural and ethnic rights, in forcing the dominant groups and society at
large to recognize those rights, indicate both the advances and the limitations of the multicultural
agenda and underscore the limits of what Charles Hale, in his excellent study, Mas Que Un India
(2006), terms the India permitido. "The rise of a multicultural ethic among Latin American
states and political-economic elites has been explained as the outcome of three powerful forces
of change," according to Hale: "grassroots and national mobilization from below, with ample
support from 'global' allies; neoliberal economic reforms, which eliminated corporate constraints
on indigenous politics while accentuating inequality and economic distress; and, finally,
democratization, which widened spaces of protest, and necessitated substantive responses from
above" (2006:219). If at first multiculturalism was a threat to the dominant order the
transnational elite was able in the 19905 to accommodate itself to the cultural and ethnic
demands of indigenous (and Afro-descendant) groups, such as bilingualism, so long as these
demands were not part of a more expansive struggle against neoliberalism and capitalist
globalization. Indeed, transnational elites and TNS agencies such as the World Bank sought to
neutralize such a struggle by raising as its own the banner of multiculturalism and by providing
ample funding and other forms of assistance to indigenous organizations and NGOs focusing on
multiculturalism and its more limited set of proposals. In this way, the transnational elite
appeared as a progressive, pro-indigenous force often at odds with local elites and states that were
resisting any change in the racial/ethnic status quo, while multiculturalism becomes the cultural
counterpart to neoliberalism in the socioeconomic sphere and polyarchy in the political. Hale
refers to the type of indigenous that the transnational elite sought to support and promote as "el
indio permitido," or the permitted/allowed Indian, whereas those challenging the neoliberal
socioeconomic order is the unauthorized or "insurrectionary" Indian. "The Maya movement
stands at an impasse," he observes, focusing on Guatemala, where 60 percent or more of the
population is Mayan. "Powerful institutions well beyond Guatemala are finding ways to contain
cultural rights activism through appropriation rather than suppression," or what he terms
neoliberal multiculturalism, a project "located at higher, more powerful levels of the global
system." The World Bank, along with its Latin American counterpart, the Inter-American
Development Bank, has championed the notion of "development with identity," and devoted
significant resources to indigenous organization, participation, and cultural rights. As Hale
observes: The shift away from national ideologies that promoted assimilation, toward
endorsement of cultural rights and intercultural equality, has occurred with striking uniformity
across the region [Latin America], beginning in the mid-igSos. This shift has coincided with the
ascendancy of economic policies and political practices grouped together by the omnibus term
"neoliberalism.". . . Proponents of neoliberal governance reshape the terrain of political struggle
to their advantage, not be denying indigenous rights, but by the selective recognition of them . Far
from being exempt from the process of [neoliberal] "subject formation," indigenous peoples
(and other protagonists of cultural rights) are their principal targets. While indigenous people
engage in widespread and at times intense resistance to the neoliberal establishment, this flow of
political activity does not stand outside or immune to processes of neoliberal subject formation. .
. . In important respects, indigenous cultural rights activism and neoliberal economics are neatly
compatible. (Hale 2006:34-35, my emphasis) It is no wonder, therefore, as Hale observes, that
global institutions such as the World Bank support indigenous rights at the same time as they
promote policies that deepen indigenous structural poverty, material deprivation, and racialethnic inequalities. Indigenous forms of collective land ownership, such as the comunas in
Ecuador, the aullus in Bolivia, the resguardos in Colombia, or the ejidos in Mexico, are a threat to
global capitalism and have become the target expanding support toindigenous cultural and
ethnic struggles and demands for political representation. Globalization breaks up non-capitalist
forms of land tenure and local community structures and organizations. The 1991 agrarian
counter-reform in Mexico, which modified Article 27 of the constitution and eroded communal
agrarian ejidos (collective lands), was coupled with reforms to Article 4 of the same constitution
that for the first time recognized the multiethnic character of the Mexican nation. In that same
year, the Agrarian Law approved in Ecuador eliminated from the constitution the definition of
the social function of land and water and opened the door to the disappearance of communal
lands. A year later in Peru, the Land Law privatized the land market by reversing the
constitutional inviolability of community-held lands. Similarly, in Amazonia the penetration by
local and transnational investorsloggers, cattle ranchers, agribusiness, oil companies, etc.
facilitated by neoliberal reform threatened indigenous territorial autonomy. Male's case study of
Mayan struggle in Guatemalan is revealing. Starting in the late 19805, as the "Mayan
effervescence" was taking off, an array of international organizations, from small NGOs to the
World Bank, the governments of Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United States made
large-scale funding available and pressured the Guatemalan state to recognize indigenous
cultural rights as multiculturalism became the buzzword. In this way transnational forces were
able to penetrate and influence the direction of Mayan civil society just as the latter was
experiencing a renaissance in the wake of decades of severe repression and civil war, and when
the post-bellicose Maya political project was not yet defined. The 1995 peace accord signed
between the government and the URNG insurgent umbrella organization included an Accord on
Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples; declared Guatemala a "multicultural, pluri-ethnic,
multi-lingual" nation; condemned the country's history of racial discrimination; and granted full
language, culture-specific religious, clothing, educational, and other cultural and ethnic rights to
the indigenous majority. Yet the very same peace plan also included an Accord on Agrarian and
Socio- Economic Affairs that ratified the neoliberal program for the country and proposed
solutions to land and other pressing socioeconomic problems within the logic of market forces. In
this way, argues Hale, "Maya cultural rights and economic neoliberal restructuring converge to
constitute a single political project" (2006:75). It is important to note that the peace accord
granted Mayan demands for collective self-administration of their internal affairs and collective
holdings.
cannot be overemphasized. The dynamics of these alliances are critical to an understanding the
nature and scope of political responses to neoliberal capitalist development in the region, and for
gauging the forces unleashed in the process of popular struggle against these conditions. For one thing,
horizontal links and alliances among organizations in the popular movement provide conditions for
coordinating and directing the accumulated and mobilized forces for change - for moving beyond
resistance and opposition to constructive revolutionary change and development. The agency for
this cannot be found in the state and certainly not the market, whether regulated or free or in
business associations. They have to be sought within the popular movement itself as well as civil
society. The question is whether alliances should be sought and constructed with the associational type of NCO in the middle-class sector of
this society or with class-based organizations-with a reconstituted labor movement. To this extent, the strategic turn of the popular movement
toward civil society is not necessarily misplaced. The problem consists in the fact that for the NGOs this turn
toward strategic partnerships with civil society" conforms to a strategy pursued by the guardians
of the neoliberal world order, anxious to control and limit any dissent from its policy prescriptions,
to preserve capitalism from its opponents and enemies. A turn to class society for allies relates to
conditions that are real enough, the identification of a possible agency for change, and an
assessment of the social forces that can be mobilized for resistance and a democratic socialist
transformation.
neoliberalism to justify itself by the reality it creates. No one can be fooled anymore by calling the
corporations harmless players either. Things have become serious. There is no ambiguity. As a
consequence, the perpetrators of neoliberal politics simply lie about what is happening.
Latin America, the post-modernist perspective on the "new social movements" has proven to be
irrelevant. The most consequential and dynamic of the social movements at all directly or indirectly
engaged in the struggle for state power. As for the political dynamics of the struggle the issues are diverse, but the most
critical one turns on the relationship of the social movements to the state. This is the central theme of chapter 5,
which elaborates on the dynamics of resistance by the social movements mounted by the rural landless workers, the proletarianized and semiproletarianized peasants, and the indigenous communities of Chiapas, Ecuador, and Bolivia.:' Chapter 6 reviews the development project
advanced by the World Bank, the operational agencies of the United Nations, and other inter- national organizations. The strategic albeit unstated
aim of this project, implemented with the support and agency of NGOs formed and contracted to mediate between the donor (aid-giving)
organizations and the "aid" recipients among the poor, is to divert the poor from taking action in the form of social movements. The
primary concern of the social movements is to bring about social change by challenging economic
and political power in the form of direct collective action . In this connection, the concern of the
organizations that share this project is to offer the poor another option to adopt a less
confrontationist approach to social change; to seek an improvement in their social condition within
the local spaces of the power structure rather than challenging the holders of this power . The agency of
"development" in this context is to empower the poor-to capacitate them to act and take advantage of the opportunities provided by the system for
improving their lot. The context for the analysis' and discussion of the social movement matrix presented in chapters 3-5 was provided by the
"structural adjustment program," with reference to the imperialist policy of neoliberal globalization. In chapter 6 we turn to political
developments-and the strategic response of the social movements to neoliberalism-in the new, and somewhat changed if not entirely different
context of the new millennium; a generalized disenchantment with neoliberalism, the dominant target of the social movements; and, at the level
of the economy, the emergence of a primary commodities boom, a period of economic growth preceded and followed by the outbreak and
conditions of a systemic crisis. Under these conditions the most significant development was a turn in the political tide with the ascent of the
political class on the Left co state power-the emergence of a stream of center-left political regimes. The key questions posed by this developmentand taken up in chapter 6-are the significance and meaning of this phenomenon (the turn toward the Left in state power) and the relation of the
center-left to the social movements in the fight against neoliberalism and imperialism. The concern of chapter 7 is with the form taken by the
resistance co neoliberalism under conditions of a global crisis as they hit Latin America in 2008, and the form assumed by the social movements
under these conditions. Our argument in this respect is made in three parts: first, an examination of the social movements under conditions of the
1999-2002 crisis; second, a perspective on the social movements under conditions of the primary commodities boom from 2003 to 2008; and
third, an analysis of the social movements under conditions of the global crisis that hit Latin America in 2008, putting an end to a short-lived
primary commodities boom. As for the strategic responses made to the global crisis, we distinguish between the following: (1) the response of the
organizations and individuals that represent the class interests of global capital, the guardians of the neoliberal world order and capitalist system;
the strategic response of most governments in Latin America, which has been to insulate the economy from the ravages of global capitalism and
the financialization of production, and (2) the response of the social movements in the popular sector, which has been to question, oppose and
reject the neoliberal model and imperialist policies used to guide and inform the policy "Of most governments in the region. The book concludes
with an appraisal of the correlation of forces ranged in support and opposition to capitalism, neoliberalism, and imperialism. As we see it, the
turn to the political left in the new millennium has dampened, if not extinguished, the revolutionary
spirit awakened by the popular movements in the 1990s. At the level of state power, apart from
Cuba, the only regime that can be regarded as on the "Left" is that of President Chavez in
Venezuela. But revolutionary forces are building in a number of countries in the region. However,
they do have to contest the political space with emerging movements on the right.
incumbent on the intellectual and political Left to assess the situation and to provide support to the
forces of progressive change, particularly those on the revolutionary Left. They are the best hope
for genuine progress - a world beyond neoliberalism, beyond capitalism, beyond class exploitation,
and beyond imperialism.
corporations over the U.S. government especially that of Big Oil is impenetrable. If history is a
guide, this simply is not true . One hundred years ago, mass movements of people across the U nited
S tates joined together to fundamentally rewrite the relationship between corporations, the government,
and the public. It was one of the most radical and transformative periods in U.S. history and a period to which our own time bears much
resemblance. Corporate executives were working hand in glove with elected officials to advance interests widely held to be contrary to the overall
economic health of the people and the nation, including waging wars for corporate profit and imperial expansion. In response, people
Progressive Era. Ultimately, this era did not yield the more radical changes desired by some, but it did bring about regulation: specifically, the
first federal laws in the United States to protect labor and regulate corporate activity, and the financing of political campaigns. The Sherman
Antitrust Act was among these new regulatory tools to rein in the nation's "epidemic" of megacorpo-rations. Then, as now, oil lay at
the heart of much of the struggle, while John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil, like its largest descendant today
ExxonMobilreigned as the most formidable corporate power. Standard Oil's rise was part of a mass consolidation of
economic and political power into the hands of a few mega-corporations in the decades following the Civil War. In 1865 these
companies emerged from the war heavily supported by the U.S. government with tax breaks, subsidies , and
protection from both foreign and domestic competition. They were also free from government regulationincluding the
absence of just about any worker rights and consumer protections. These policy choices were justified, their supporters contended, because the
companies needed unimpeded growth to match the expansion of the American economy. Unregulated, the corporation did what it does naturally:
whatever it could to enrich the bottom line. In describing the tactics and practices used by Standard Oil, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the first regulatory commission in U.S. history, did not mince words: " unjust
discrimination ," " intentional disregard of rights ," "unexcused," "illegal," "excessive," "extraordinary," "forbidden," so
obvious and palpable a discrimination that no discussion of it is necessary," "wholly indefensible," "patent and provoking discrimination for
which no rational excuse is suggested, "obnoxious," "absurd and inexcusable," " gross
" the most unjust and injurious discrimination ." Rockefeller built Standard Oil into the first major industrial monopoly in the
United States and established the model that all others would seek to follow. Ida Tarbell writes in the introduction to her 1904 book The History
of the Standard Oil Company that Standard Oil "was the first in the field, and it has furnished the methods, the charter, and the traditions for its
followers. It is the most perfectly developed trust in existence; that is, it satisfies most nearly the trust ideal of entire control of the commodity in
which it deals."5 The New York State Senate concluded after its hallmark investigation of Standard Oil in 1888, "Its success has been the
incentive to the formation of all other trusts or combinations. It is the type of a system which has spread like a disease through the commercial
system of this country.'* Following Standard Oil's lead, the nation's largest companies merged and consolidated their own efforts by forming
trusts. A "trust" is a combination of corporations where a board of trustees holds the stock of each individual company and manages the business
of all. At the time, the word trust quickly became synonymous with any large corporation. The trusts gobbled up their smaller competitors and
forced out of business those that they could not buy. The companies then used their size and economic clout to
influence political decision-making on their behalf. Again Rockefeller set the standard, perfecting the art of the political
contribution. As power was consolidated in the hands of a few great companies , the rights of workers,
farmers, consumers, and smaller businesses shrank accordingly . All across the country, people responded
with resistance , rebellion, and a demand for fundamental change, including new legal structures to support not only
their rights but also the nation's flagging democracy. Farmers, women and children factory workers, African-American railway workers,
longshoremen, suffragists, Anarchists, Communists, Socialists, Wobblies, and many other groups organized for change. On May 1, 1886, 350,000
workers at over 11,500 establishments all across the United States went on strike. In the course of that year, there were more than 1,400 strikes
involving some half a million workers. By 1904, there were on average more than 4,000 strikes per year.7 The objectives of the strikers sound
almost trite today, as they are rights that most American citizens now take largely for granted: the eight-hour workday, the forty-hour workweek, a
minimum wage, worker safety, the right to form unions, compensation when injured on the job, and the right to work under legal contracts
enforcing mutual commitments between employers and workers. The 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act was designed to protect small businessesand
thereby support the overall economy; to keep business within the realm of government regulationand thereby protect workers and consumers;
and to keep businesses small enough so that economic clout did not become political clout and thereby protect democracy. The law would
ultimately be used to bring down Standard Oil, and it remains the foundation of all U.S. antitrust policy today. However, from the 1980s until
today, the original intent of the law has been all but forgotten, and the mergers of megacorporations, including the descendants of Standard Oil,
have been allowed to proceed virtually without restriction. At the center of the Progressive and Populist Movements were
the "muckrakers," journalists who dug up the dirt and brought sunlight to shine on the crimes
committed by corporations and the politicians who supported them. While she hated the nomenclature, Ida Tarbell, author, historian,
and journalist, was one of the most influential muckrakers of her day. Her blistering sixteen-part, two-year-long expose of John D. Rockefeller
and his Standard Oil Company ran in McClure's Magazine from 1902 to 1904. When the series was released as a book in 1904, one journal
described it as "the most remarkable book of its kind ever written in this country." Daniel Yergin, in his landmark book The Prize: The Epic Quest
for Oil, Money and Power, describes TarbelPs book, saying "Arguably, it was the single most influential book on business ever published in the
United States."8 It was the nail in the coffin for the nation's most hated trust and its premier robber baron. As for Rockefeller, Yergin describes
him as "the single most important figure in shaping the oil industry."9 It is a common characterization and is undoubtedly true. However,
Rockefeller earned this and even greater acclaim despite the fact that neither he nor his company contributed to the discovery of oil. He did not
develop the technology to drill for oil, pump it out of the earth, turn crude into kerosene for lamps or gasoline for cars, or move it through
pipelines around the earth. On the contrary, Rockefeller did more than just about any other individual in history to undercut the efforts of those
who made these discoveries and to push them out of the oil business altogether. Nor did Rockefeller found the first oil company, introduce the
ideas of vertical or horizontal integration to the oil industry, or invent the concept of the corporate trust. Yet Rockefeller unquestionably deserves
Yergin's title, because he mastered the fine art of mass consolidation and achieving unprecedented profit with little regard for the human, social,
or broader economic costs of his actions. In Rockefeller's words, "The growth of a large business is merely a
survival of the fittest."10 For more than a century, the direct descendants of Standard Oil, including
ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Conoco-Phillips, have dutifully followed Rockefeller's business model .
Yet all of Standard Oil's descendants should pay heed , for John D. Rockefeller personally sowed the seeds of his
own demise: a peoples' movement committed to, and ultimately successful in, breaking up the
Standard Oil Company.
2NC AT:
AT: Framework
The here and now is key: our pedagogical practices must be in line with the work of
social movements and activists.
GIROUX 2012
(HENRY, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University; Neoliberalism's
Culture of Cruelty Authoritarian Politics in the Age of Casino Capitalism, Counterpunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/27/authoritarian-politics-in-the-age-of-casino-capitalism/)
Yet, the current historical moment seems at an utter loss to create a massive social movement
capable of addressing the totalitarian nature and social costs of a religious and political
fundamentalism that is merging with an extreme market-fundamentalism. In this case, a
fundamentalism whose idea of freedom extends no further than personal financial gain and
endless consumption. Under such circumstances, progressives should focus their energies on
working with the Occupy movement and other social movements to develop a new language of
radical reform and to create new public spheres that will make possible the modes of critical
thought and engaged agency that are the very foundations of a truly participatory and radical
democracy. Such a project must work to develop vigorous educational programs, modes of public
communication, and communities that promote a culture of deliberation, public debate, and critical
exchange across a wide variety of cultural and institutional sites. Ultimately, it must focus on the
end goal of generating those formative cultures and public spheres that are the preconditions for
political engagement and vital for energizing democratic movements for social change
movements willing to think beyond the limits of a savage global capitalism. Pedagogy in this
sense becomes central to any substantive notion of politics and must be viewed as a crucial element
of organized resistance and collective struggles . The deep regressive elements of neoliberalism
constitute both a pedagogical practice and a legitimating function for a deeply oppressive social
order. Pedagogical relations that make the power relations of casino capitalism disappear must be
uncovered and challenged. Under such circumstances, politics becomes transformative rather than
accommodating and aims at abolishing a capitalist system marked by massive economic, social, and
cultural inequalities. A politics that uncovers the harsh realities imposed by casino capitalism
should also work towards establishing a society in which matters of justice, equality, and
freedom are understood as the crucial foundation of a substantive democracy.
Rather than invest in electoral politics, it would be more worthwhile for progressives to develop
formative conditions that make a real democracy possible. As Angela Davis has suggested, this
means engaging in difficult coalition-building processes, negotiating the recognition for which
communities and issues inevitably strive [and coming] together in a unity that is not simplistic and
oppressive, but complex and emancipatory, recognising, in June Jordans words that we are the
ones we have been waiting for.[vi] Developing a broad-based social movement means finding a
common ground upon which challenging diverse forms of oppression, exploitation, and
exclusion can become part of a wider effort to create a radical democracy.
In part, this means reclaiming a discourse of ethics and morality, elaborating a new model of
democratic politics, and developing fresh analytical concepts for understanding and engaging the
concept of the social. One avenue for developing a critical and transformative politics might take
a cue from youth protesters the world over and develop new ways to challenge the corporate
values that shape American, and increasingly global, politics. It is especially crucial to provide
alternative values that challenge market-driven ideologies that equate freedom with radical
American public needs to do more than talk. It also needs to bring together educators, students,
workers, and anyone else interested in real democracy in order to create a social movementa
well-organized movement capable of changing the power relations and vast economic
inequalities that have created the conditions for symbolic and systemic violence in American
society.
Addressing such challenges suggests that progressives will invariably need to take on the role of
educational activists. One option would be to create micro-spheres of public education that
further modes of critical learning and civic agency, and thus enable young people and others to
learn how to govern rather than be governed. This could be accomplished through a network of
free educational spaces developed among diverse faith communities and public schools, as well
as in secular and religious organizations affiliated with higher educational institutions. These new
educational spaces focused on cultivating both dialogue and action in the public interest can look to
past models in those institutions developed by socialists, labor unions, and civil rights activists in
the early twentieth century and later in the 1950s and 60s. Such schools represented oppositional
public spheres and functioned a democratic public spheres in the best educational sense and
ranged from the early networks of radical Sunday schools to the later Brookwood Labor College
and Highlander Folk School in Tennessee. Stanley Aronowitz rightly insists that the current
system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political
opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a
large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy; less secure private sector
corporate jobs, and centrist and center-left media institutions.[vii] At a time when critical
thought has been flattened, it becomes imperative to develop a discourse of critique and possibility
one that recognizes that without an informed citizenry, collective struggle, and dynamic social
movements, hope for a viable democratic future will slip out of reach .
We must refuse their calls for accommodation only reconfiguring the terms of
debate can challenge the neoliberal death drive.
GIROUX 2012
(HENRY, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University; Neoliberalism's
Culture of Cruelty Authoritarian Politics in the Age of Casino Capitalism, Counterpunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/27/authoritarian-politics-in-the-age-of-casino-capitalism/)
Totalitarian temptations now saturate the media and larger culture in the language of austerity as
political and economic orthodoxy. What we are witnessing in the United States is the normalization
of a politics that exterminates not only the welfare state, and the truth, but all those others who
bear the sins of the Enlightenmentthat is, those who refuse a life free from doubt. Reason and
freedom have become enemies not merely to be mocked, but to be destroyed. And this is a war
whose totalitarian tendencies are evident in the assault on science, immigrants, women, the elderly,
the poor, people of color, and youth. What too often goes unsaid, particularly with the medias focus
on inflammatory rhetoric, is that those who dominate politics and policymaking, whether
Democrats or Republicans, do so largely because of their disproportionate control of the nations
income and wealth. Increasingly, it appears these political elite choose to act in ways that sustain
their dominance through the systemic reproduction of an iniquitous social order. In other words,
big money and corporate power rule while electoral politics are rigged. The secrecy of the voting
booth becomes the ultimate expression of democracy, reducing politics to an individualized
purchasea crude form of economic action. Any form of politics willing to invest in such
ritualistic pageantry only adds to the current dysfunctional nature of our social order, while
reinforcing a profound failure of political imagination. The issue should no longer be how to work
within the current electoral system, but how to dismantle it and construct a new political
landscape that is capable of making a claim on equity, justice, and democracy for all of its
inhabitants. Obamas once inspiring call for hope has degenerated into a flight from
responsibility. The Obama administration has worked to extend the policies of the George W.
Bush administration by legitimating a range of foreign and domestic policies that have shredded
civil liberties, expanded the permanent warfare state, and increased the domestic reach of the
punitive surveillance state. And if Romney and his ideological cohorts, now viewed as the most
extremists faction of the Republican Party, come to power, surely the existing totalitarian and
anti-democratic tendencies at work in the United States will be dangerously intensified.
A catalogue of indicting evidence reveals the depth and breadth of the war being waged against
the social state, and particularly against young people. Beyond exposing the moral depravity of a
nation that fails to protect its young, such a war speaks to nothing less than a perverse death-wish, a
barely masked desire for self-annihilationas the wilful destruction of an entire generation not
only transforms U.S. politics into pathology, but is sure to signal the death-knell for Americas
future. How much longer will the American public have to wait before the nightmare comes to
an end?
An awareness of the material and cultural elements that have produced these deeply antidemocratic conditions is important; however it is simply not enough. The collective response here
must include a refusal to enter the current political discourse of compromise and accommodation
to think well beyond the discourse of facile concessions and to conduct struggles on the mutually
informed terrains of civic literacy, education, and power . A rejection of traditional forms of
political mobilization must be accompanied by a new political discourse, one that uncovers the
hidden practices of neoliberal domination while developing rigorous models for critical reflection
and fresh forms of intellectual and social engagement.
Discourse and education are key to a global alliance against the exploitation of
neoliberalism.
Cooper 11
(Charlie. University of Hull, England Review Essay: Neoliberalism, education and
strategies of resistance)
It is clear from the assessments set out in these books that neoliberal education systems have been
a source of great social harm. In particular, the analyses presented bear witness to the profoundly
harmful effects of neoliberalism on societal wellbeing evidenced by widening inequalities; an
increasingly oppressed labour force; the erosion of democracy and critical thought; the breakdown
of social solidarities; the increasing surveillance and criminalisation of specific dangerous subcultures; and the increasing alienation of teachers and students from the learning process (leading
to rising health problems). At the same time, the public realm for critical dialogue has been
increasingly closed off by the actions of nation states particularly through interventions aimed at
intensifying central-state control over education - compliant to the tightening grip of neoliberal
global organising. The consensus view expressed in these books is that resistance to the
neoliberal agenda will require a network of alliances comprising a range of issue-based social
movements and strategies, organised (as has been described) locally, nationally, regionally and
globally, and aided by ICT. There is also a consensus position on the basis of this resistance i.e.
that a radical critical pedagogy rooted in Marxist analysis, applied to teaching, research and social
action, is the only viable option for arriving at a more just society . Alternative ways of seeing and
understanding the world, founded on postmodernist analyses, are discounted here as distractions
- sidetracking the masses from the real task which is discovering how the material basis of modern
life is rooted in the exploitation of labours use value and that the only solution to this is the
construction of an alternative socialist future.
my caseand I imagine also in yourswith the aim of reaching a public outside the circle of
intellectuals. I wanted to make some sort of breach in this wall of silencefor it is more than just
a wall of money but here television is very ambiguous: it is at once the instrument that allows
us to speak, and the one that silences us. We are perpetually invaded and besieged by the
dominant discourse. The great majority of journalists are often unknowing accomplices of this
discourse; breaking out of its unanimity is very difficult. In France, anyone who is not a highly
established name has virtually no access to the public realm. Only consecrated figures can break
the circle, but alas they are typically consecrated just because they are satisfied and silent, and to
ensure they remain so. Very few use the symbolic capital their reputation affords them to speak
out, and to make heard the voices of those who cannot speak for themselves.
Framework - Epistemology DA
The knowledge production of the 1ac is based on neoliberal expertism and denies
ethical agency
Lander 2
[Edgardo Lander is professor of social sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in
Caracas. Nepantla: Views from South p 245-248 Project Muse
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.2lander.html MW]
The naturalization of these processes of free circulation of investment and
trade, as criteria that dictate the terms under which all societies on the planet necessarily must be
organized, is explicitly supported by the expertise of those who speak in the name of specialized
knowledges, in this case of economic science (a knowledge in the singular): It is widely
recognized by economists and trade experts that the WTO system contributes to development.
(WTO 1999b, 7) The economic case for an open trading system based upon multilaterally
agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on commercial common sense. But it is also
supported by evidence: the experience of world trade and economic growth since the
SecondWorldWar. (8) Economists agree that the greatest gains go to the country that slashes its
own trade barriers. Readiness to open up to foreign suppliers of consumer goods and of inputs to
production improves choices as well as competition in price and services offered. Protection that
gives special favours to one sector or another of the economy distorts the way a country uses its
productive resources. Removal or reduction of distortions allows resources to be used more
efficiently. (WTO 1999a, 5) Another manifestation of the naturalization/depoliticization of the
issues at stake in international economic relations is the tendency to turn disagreements into
technical issues that can be resolved in an objective and impartial manner by the relevant
specialists. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment establishes that regulations (including
environmental or health-related regulations) that can be considered polemical from the point of
view of their scientific justification may be submitted to a body of scientific experts for
consideration (OECD 1998, 66). Similar practices are established in WTO agreements. A
separate agreement on food safety and animal and plant health standards (sanitary and
phytosanitary measures) sets out the basic rules. It allows countries to set their own standards.
(WTO 1999b, 19) Member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines
and recommendations where they exist. However, members may use measures which result in
higher standards if there is scientific justification. (ibid.) What in these texts appears to be the
simple application of objective scientific criteria in reality relates to extremely complex and
controversial matters. This is the type of situation that arises when, whether on the basis of
scientific evidence (on which consensus may or may not exist) or based on specific preferences
on the part of the population, standards are established that regulate, limit, or block the use of a
certain product or technological process. This can be seen in the heated debate surrounding foods
derived from genetically modified plants and animals. One well-known case illustrating the
application of WTO standards is the U.S. lawsuit involving the European Unions ban on the sale
in E.U. territoryof beef treated with growth hormones. The WTO ruled in favor of the
United States, categorizing this ban as an unfair, protectionist practice that went against free
trade, forcing the European Union to either allow the importation of these products or face
severe sanctions, in spite of the opposition of a great majority of the continents population. The
opinion of a few experts, chosen by the WTO authorities dealing with conflict resolution, thus
overruled the democratically expressed wishes of the people of the European Union. In this case
it was determined that the fear of consuming beef treated with growth hormones lacked scientific
basis; inside the new world order defined by the WTO, this preference was not one for which
people could legitimately opt. The majority of the ethical and political confrontations having to
do with techno-scientific matters do not have a univocal scientific solution, and differences of
opinion and interpretation can continue indefinitely (Nelkin 1977, 1984). Generally, the issues at
stake cannot be resolved solely on the basis of experts opinions. People are being denied the
sovereign right to found their decisions on ethical choices or on particular cultural contexts. This is
an example of the growing authoritarianism of the global capitalist order, exposing the population
to the potentially harmful effects of certain techno-scientific processes against its expressed will,
merely because specialists consider that their opposition is based on nothing more than
prejudice. These are not issues that depend on the existence or absence of consensus in the scientific
community. In any case, as Hans Jonas (1984, 118) argues, human capacity to wield power over
nature is always greater than the predictability of this powers long-range effects, which, in case of
doubt, calls for an ethics of responsibility.7 This ethical choice is denied when it is assumed that, to
make this type of decision it suffices to take into account the opinions of experts and the rights of
investors (Lander 1994). Beyond the internal controversies within Western, techno-scientific
communities lies the fact that in the thousands of conflicts occurring in the world today between
the interests of transnational capital and those of rural or indigenous people concerning the use of
the environment, there is generally also a conflict in the parties views of the cosmos, an
antagonism between different knowledge systems and different ways of conceiving the
relationships between culture and nature. Neverthelessand this is a perfect expression of the
continual functioning of colonial mechanismsin the new global capital order only one form of
knowledge is recognized: Western scientific knowledge. From this discourse of knowledge the
criteria and procedures are established by which all controversies are decided.
The unbiased evidence that the aff portrays is actually a ruse. Neoliberalists control
the flow of economic research and can manipulate it to further their own agendas.
Weller and Singleton, 06
(Christian E. Weller and Laura Singleton, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American
Progress and a professor of public policy at the McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Laura Singleton: Behavioral Sciences
Collegium, BS, Mathematics, Davidson College, MBA, Harvard University, MS, PhD,
Management, Boston College. Peddling reform: the role of think tanks in shaping the neoliberal
policy agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Page 72-73)
A more academic research network that has aided the neoliberal cause to some degree, in particular
with respect to international economic issues, is the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). The NBER was founded in 1920 to promote economic research. Theoretically, the
NBER is committed to undertaking and disseminating unbiased economic research among public
pol- icymakers, business professionals, and the academic community. The NBER publishes
research faster than academic journals do, thereby largely determining what research will receive
wide attention. Although the NBER is nominally independent, it has received almost $10 million
from staunchly conservative foundations over the years (Media Transparency 2002).
Moreover, the NBER has played an important role in promoting neoliberal policies with respect to
international economic issues due to its president since 1977, Professor Martin Feldstein, an MPS
member who served as chairman of President Reagans Council of Economic Advisors. His writings
include strong criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF (for example: Feldstein 1999, 2002). As if
to eliminate any notions of impartiality, one of Feldsteins prote ge s, Richard Clarida, reported
that [n]obody gets very involved in the Bureau without Marty wanting it to happen (Media
Transparency 2002). Moreover, Feldsteins influ- ence extends easily into the political realm. Much
of President George W. Bushs economic team studied under, or was recommended by, Professor
Feldstein. Among these are Lawrence Lindsey, R. Glen Hubbard, Richard Clarida, Assis- tant
Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy, and Paul ONeill, former Secretary of the
Treasury. Indeed, Feldstein is generally credited as the father of supply-side economics and
helped to create President George W. Bushs 2001 tax cut plan (Leonhardt 2002).
Aside from the use of think tanks and the media to advance the neoliberal policy agenda, several
well-endowed foundations enabled these institutions to conduct and promote their research . One of
the reasons the neoliberal network has been so successful is that it understands government policy
is based upon, and has subsequently developed, a conveyer belt of thinkers, academics, and
activists (People for the American Way 2002: 4) to promote their agenda. Thus, foundations give
money to a variety of sources to promote its neoliberal philoso- phies. Among the various
recipients of conservative foundation funds are think tanks, which serve to package and
repackage conservative policy ideas, academics, who push the intellectual boundaries on various
issues, and graduate students, who form the next generation of conservative researchers . An
analysis of conservative foundations and American politics done by the People for the American
Way (2002) a progressive advocacy and research group emphasized the role of think tanks,
funded by conservative foundations, in conservative policy forma- tion. One journalist noted that
[W]ith increasing frequency, legislation, proposed and enacted, can be traced directly to thinktank position papers on such con- servative agenda items as welfare cuts, privatization of public
services, private options and parental choice in schools, deregulation of workplace safety, tax
limitations and other reductions in government, even selling of the national parks (People for the
American Way 2002).
At Permutation - Rejection
SAY NO TO THE PERMUTATION THIS MOMENT REQUIRE A
COMMITMENT TO REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION NOT MILD
REFORM
WEBBER and CARR 13
(Jeffery R., professor of politics at the University of London, and Barry, professor of
history at La Trobe University, The New Latin American Left Cracks in the
Empire, p. 4)
The ultimate trajectory of the pink tide depends on the Left's capacities to counter right-wing
propositions and ongoing imperialist meddling in the sovereign affairs of Latin American nations;
just as crucial, though, will be the course of the battle between different currents within the Left
seeking to gain hegemony over the anti-neoliberal bloc. Latin America "has moved into an
historic conjuncture in which the struggle among social and political forces could push the new
resistance politics into mildly social democratic and populist outcomes ," William I. Robinson
points out, "or into more fundamental, potentially revolutionary ones." Results "will depend
considerably on the configuration of class and social forces in each country and the extent to
which regional and global configurations of these forces open up new space and push such
governments in distinct directions" (2007: 148).
once it showed itself to be incapable of solving the most pressing problems facing our countries . The
era of neoliberalisms heyday on our subcontinent has been left behind. Although the end of history heralded by Francis Fukuyama is not yet
here, what does seem to have arrived is the end of neoliberalism. The current global economic crisis is one of the factors
dealing it the coup de grce. According to Brazilian sociologist Emir Sader, there is a hegemonic crisis in Latin America, in which
the neoliberal model and the power bloc which leads it are worn down, weakened, and only manage to survive by implementing the model in a
toned-down formfor example Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.19 Given this situation, there are only two paths: either
capitalism undergoes retrofitting or we move toward an alternative project not based on the logic of
profit but on a humanist, solidarity-based logic that works to satisfy human needs and makes
possible a kind of economic development in our region that will benefit not the elites, but the
overwhelming majority of our people. The inability of the neoliberal economic model to obtain positive economic results for our
peoples has also negatively affected the credibility of bourgeois democracy. People no longer have confidence in this form
of government, and they are less and less willing to accept the enormous gap between those who elect and
those who get elected.
emerges a more radically individuated sense of personhood, of a subject built up of traits set
against a universal backdrop of likeness and difference. In its place, to invert the old
Durkheimean telos, arise collectivities erected on a form of mechanical solidarity in which me is
generalized into we. In this vocabulary, it is not just that the personal is political. The personal is
the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional valence . By
extension, interpersonal relationsabove all, sexuality, from the peccadillos of presidents to the
global specter of AIDScome to stand, metonymically, for the inchoate forces that threaten the
world as we know it. It is in these privatized terms that action is organized, that the experience of
inequity and antagonism takes meaningful shape. In this sense, Jameson (1999: 47) is correct.
There is no autonomous discourse of class. Certainly not now, if ever. Oppositions of gender and
race, even if not in themselves explicit vehicles for that discourse, are frequently reinvested in
its practical dynamics and express its stark antagonisms. This is inevitable. Reigning
hegemonies, both popular and academic, may separate the construction of identity from the
antinomies of class. But the market has always made capital out of human dif- ference and
difference out of capital, cultivating exploitable categories of workers and consumers, identifying
pariahs, and seeking to silence enemies of established enterprise. As lived reality, then, social
class is a multiply refracted gestalt. Its contrasts are mobilized in a host of displaced registers, its
distinc- tions carried in a myriad of charged, locally modulated signs and objects from the
canons of taste and desire to the niceties of language use, the subtle discriminations of
advertising to the carnal conflict of sport. In short, as neoliberal conditions render ever more
obscure the rooting of inequality in structures of production, as work gives way to the mechanical
soli- darities of identity in constructing selfhood and social being, class comes to be understood, in
both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice . Which is
why it, like citizenship, is measured increasingly by the capacity to transact and consume; why
politics is treated as a matter of indi- vidual or group entitlement; why social wrongs are
transposed into an issue of rights; why diffuse concerns about cultural integrity and communal
survival are vested in private anxieties about sexuality, procreation, or family values; why the
fetus, neoliberal subject par excellence, becomes the focus of a macabre nativity play, in which,
vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, moral antago- nists lock in mortal battle over the right
to life (Jean Comaroff 1997a; Berlant 1997). Analytically, of course, it is imperative for us not to
take these things at face value. The problem, rather, is to explain why, in the millennial age, class
has become displaced and refracted in the way that it has. Which is why, finally, its reduction, to the
mere experience of inferiority, as Jameson (1999: 47) would have it, is insufficient. The concept
of class so reduced captures neither the com- plex construction of contemporary experience nor the
crises of social reproduc- tion in which much of the world appears to be caught.
Globalization of capitalism cant happen because to the inherent limited capacity of the nationstate.
Comaroff 2k
(Jean, John L. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. Public
Culture, Volume 12, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 291-343. Duke University Press)
This antithetical position has a nontrivial political dimension for its advocates, especially those
on the left. To the degree that globalization dissolves the sover- eign nation-state into a sea of
planetary economic forces and legal jurisdictions, it would appear to negate any real prospect of
progressive or proletarian politics be they international or intranationalas they would have no
terrain on which to occur, no concrete object in terms of which to frame itself, no obvious target
against which to act (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1; Ahmad 1992: 317).40 We share the concern.
As it is, there is a strong argument to be made that neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment,
portends the death of politics by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of
economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, in the inexorable, expanding needs of
business, in the imperatives of science and technology. Or, if it does not conduce to the death of
politics, it tends to reduce them to the pursuit of pure interest, individual or collectiveor to
struggles over issues (the environment, abortion, health care, child welfare, human rights) that,
important though they may be, are often, pace Jameson (1999: 47), dissociated from anything
beyond themselves. It is here that the analytic case for the sustained salience of the modernist
polity merges into the normative case for its desirability. A parenthetic comment here. There are
those who would muddy the argument by pointing out that the notion of a strong nation-state has
always been some- thing of a fantasy. This on three grounds: the state, the nation, and the
hyphen. Recall, in respect of the first, Philip Abrams (1988: 7577), for whom the state was
always the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies: an essentially
imaginative construction, it was, at once, a triumph of conceal- ment and an ongoing
ideological project. Even more extreme is Ralph Milibands (1969: 49) famous claim that the
state . . . does not, as such, exist. Shades here of things written long ago. Philip Corrigan and
Derek Sayer (1985: 7) remind us that Marx (1967) believed the state to be in an important sense
an illusion . . . : [it] is at most a message of dominationan ideological artifact attributing unity,
structure and independence to the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice
of government. For Weber (1946: 78), too, it was a claim to legitimacy, a means by which
politically organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed, and it is constituted
in large part by the activities of institutions of government themselves (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985:
7). A truly curious force of history, this: at once an illusion, a potent claim to authority, a cultural
artifact, a present absence and an absent presence, a prin- ciple of unity masking institutional
disarticulation. But nothing like the kind of essentialized thing that much of the current debate
treats either as alive or dead. Likewise the nation: the enormous literature on the topic both
before and after Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983)makes it abundantly clear that neither
at its dawn nor in its high modernist phase was this polity homogeneous , that even its European
exemplars were as different as they were alike. What is more, their capacity to regulate
boundaries and to control flowsof capital and cultural property, communications and currencies,
persons and information was invariably incomplete in the face of transnational pressures and
incentives. So, too, was their hold over the loyalty of their citizens and subjects. Indeed, the
nation-state has always and everywhere been a work in progress, nowhere a fully realized
accomplishment. The same may be said, by extension, of its hyphen- nation: of the articulation of
state to nation. Polities across the planet vary hugely in both the extent to which, and the manner
in which, nation and state are con- joined in them, of which more shortly.
2000s have been two radically opposite decades. During the 90s, the neoliberal model was
imposed to varying degrees in virtually every country on the continentwith the exception of
Cuba. Clinton, who did not even cross the Rio Grande to sign the first North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was forced not long after to approve a super-loan from Washington
when the first crisis of the new model broke out in Mexico. The US went on to press for a
hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), presenting this as the natural
outcome of the seamless extension of free-trade policies.
At an Americas summit meeting in Canada in 2000, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez was the only
leader to vote against Clintons proposal for an FTAA, while Cardoso, Menem, Fujimori and
their colleagues fell meekly into line. On the occasion of his first Ibero-American Summit,
Chvez reported, Castro passed him a piece of paper on which he had written: At last Im not
the only devil around here. It was thus with some relief, too, that Chvezhimself elected
president of Venezuela in 1998attended the investiture of Lula in Brasilia and Nstor Kirchner
in Buenos Aires in 2003, before moving on to that of Tabar Vzquez in Montevideo in 2004,
that of Evo Morales in La Paz in 2006, and in 2007 those of Daniel Ortega in Managua and
Rafael Correa in Quito; followed in 2008 by Fernando Lugo in Asuncin. Meanwhile the US
free-trade proposal that had been almost unanimously approved in 2000 was dead and buried by
2004. Since that date, Chvez himself has been re-elected, as was Lula in 2006; in April of this
year, Kirchner was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernndez, and Lugo triumphed in Paraguay,
putting an end to more than sixty years of rule by the Colorado Party.
What is the meaning of this radical reversal, faster than any the continent has experienced before,
to give the largest number of progressive governments, whether left or centre-left, that it has seen
in its entire history? It is true that the continent displays the highest levels of inequality in the
world, an income gap aggravated by the neoliberal decade; and yet the hard blows that punished
past popular struggles, along with the solidity of the neoliberal establishment, made such a rapid
turn quite unexpected. In what follows we shall attempt to understand the conditions that
transformed Latin America into the weakest link in the neoliberal chain.
Imposing the model
A precondition for the privatization programmes imposed across successive Latin American
countries in the 1980s and 90s was the defeat and disarming of earlier movements of the left and
organized labour . During the decades of development the emphasis was on import-substitute
industrializationin particular in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, but also to a lesser extent in
Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica. These developments were underwritten by
broad politico-ideological projects that encouraged the strengthening of the working class and its
trade unions, backed by local party formations and democratic-national blocs, in a context of
nationalistic ideologies and identities. The potential this built up burst onto the political scene in
the 1960s as a radical force, when the long cycle of growth petered out in conflicts over workers
rights, at a time when the Cuban example was pointing towards alternatives that transcended the
limits of capitalism and US imperial domination. The response to these struggles was an era of
military coups, first in Brazil and Bolivia in 1964, in Argentina in 1966 and 1976, and finally in
Uruguay and Chile in 1973.
The combined and closely related processes of military dictatorship and the application of
neoliberal models acted together to yield an extreme regression in the balance of power between
social classes. It would have been impossible to implement the wholesale sell-offs of national
industrial resources that unfolded most drastically in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina without first
crushing the peoples ability to defend their interests. These three countries had been remarkable
for their achievements, possessing advanced systems of social protection under states that
assumed a regulatory capacity and a role in expanding the domestic market, guaranteeing the
social welfare of the population, and providing public services. The most brutal repression they
had ever known was needed to clear the way for neoliberal policies that privatized state functions
in the case of Argentina, transferring virtually all public resources into the hands of private
capitaland abolished hard-won social rights. In short, three of the most enlightened states on
the continent found themselves completely dismantled.
In the course of the 1990s, neoliberalism penetrated Latin America right across the political
spectrum. The programme was originally implemented by the far right, in Pinochets Chile. It
found other right-wing adeptssuch as Alberto Fujimori in Perubut also absorbed forces that
had historically been associated with nationalism: the PRI in Mexico; Peronism in Argentina
under Carlos Menem; in Bolivia, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movementthe party that had
headed the nationalist revolution of 1952 under Vctor Paz Estenssoro. After this, neoliberalism
moved on to social democracy, gaining the adherence of the Chilean Socialist Party, Venezuelas
Accin Democrtica, and the Brazilian Social-Democratic Party. It became a hegemonic system
across almost the entire territory of Latin America.
Nevertheless, the neoliberal model failed to consolidate the social forces necessary for its
stabilization, resulting in the early onset of crises that would check its course . The three largest
Latin American economies were the theatre for the most dramatic crises: Mexico in 1994, Brazil
in 1999 and Argentina in 2002; the programme crumbled without delivering on its promises. The
ravages of hyper-inflation were checked, but this was only achieved at tremendous cost. For a
decade or more, economic development was paralysed, the concentration of wealth grew greater
than ever before, public deficits spiralled and the mass of the population had their rights
expropriated, most notably in the domain of employment and labour relations. On top of this,
national debt expanded exponentially and regional economies became highly vulnerable,
helplessly exposed to attack from speculators, as these three countries each discovered to their
cost.
It was neoliberalisms poor economic performance in Latin America that in many instances led to
the defeats of the governments that pioneered it . These include Alberto Fujimori in Peru,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Menem in Argentina, Carlos Andrs Prez in Venezuela
and Gonzalo Snchez de Lozada in Bolivia; also gone are the PRI in Mexico, the alternation of
the two traditional parties in Uruguay, and the politicians who tried to perpetuate neoliberalism
even beyond its collapse, including Fernando De la Ra in Argentina, Lucio Gutirrez in
Ecuador and Snchez de Lozada in Bolivia. It is also important to note the isolation of those
leaders who struggle to keep it going, such as Felipe Caldern in Mexico, Michelle Bachelet in
Chile, Alan Garca in Peru, or Alfonso Uribe in Colombia. (Uribe, incidentally, lost recent local
elections revolving around issues of governance; his prestige derives from the uncompromising
deployment of democratic security policies against terrorism, a position which earns him a
steady 80 per cent domestic support.) A growing number of presidents have been elected, or in
some cases re-elected, in response to the failure of the neoliberal economic model.
the limits of parliamentary changes in the era of global capitalism as much as it also symbolizes
the end of the reigning neoliberal order. It is important not to paint the distinct pink tide experiences with a single brush.
The new leftist leaders all in one way or another came to power on the heels of mass popular
resistance to neoliberalism, but there is more that differentiates than unifies the distinct cases. On the one hand, the case of Brazil
was most indicative of mildly reformist thrust of many of the new Leftist government- and the most tragic for the popular
classes. Lula, denied the presidency in three previous electoral contests but victorious in 2002, took the vote only after his wing of the PT moved
sharply toward the political center. He forged a social base among middle-class voters and won over centrist and even conservative political
forces that did not endorse a left-wing program yet were unwilling to tolerate further neoliberal fallout. Lula promised not to default on the
countrys foreign debt and to maintain the previous governments adjustment policies, thereby indicating that the real power was that of
transnational financial capital. Portending what was to come, almost as soon as he took office in 2003 he slashed the budgets for health and
educational in order to comply with dictates of the international monetary fund (IMF) that the government maintain a fiscal surplus. Other
pink tide governments attempted to expropriate popular power from below and undercut its
transformative potential along the lines of what Gramsci (borrowing from Croce) called transfromismo (Gramsci, 1971:58-59),
whereby actual and potential leaders and sectors from the subordinate groups are incorporated
into the dominant project in an effort to prevent the formation of counter-hegemony. This was the case with the presidency of
Luco Gutirrez, brought to power in Ecuador by a coalition of indigenous and popular movements, or under the presidency in
Argentina of Nstor Kirchner. Gutirrez, a former army colonel, won the 2002 election with the support of that countrys powerful
indigenous and social movements after he promised to reverse the neoliberal program of his predecessors and implement popular reforms. But
from the start Gutirrez was subject to pressure from transnational capital and the Ecuadorian elite to push him in the opposite direction. Upon
taking office he appointed several indigenous cabinet ministers as well as representatives of the local and transnational corporate community.
Within months, Gutirrez capitulated to these conservative political forces in the tenuous governing coalition and reverted to an open neoliberal
program. In Argentina, Kirchner strongly criticized the neoliberal policies of his predecessors, yet his own program was limited to minor policy
modifications to favor domestic producers and consumers- among them, low interest rates, capital controls, price controls on public services, and
the restoration of some social welfare programs, alongside a clientalist co-optation of a portion of the piqueteros and other popular movements
(see below). In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega and what remained of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) dressed with a Leftist
discourse what in the pre-neoliberal era would have been characterized as a routine attempt to establish a populist multi-class political alliance
under the hegemony of capital and state elites. In the years since the 1990 electoral defeat new Sandinista economic groups developed close
business and personal ties with transnationally oriented capitalist groups while the political leadership negotiated a heavily criticized pact to
divide up government power with the Liberals, one of the two historically dominant bourgeois oligarchic parties. While the FSLN retained a
mass, if dwindling, base among the countrys peasantry and urban poor, many leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega had become successful
businessmen heavily invested in the new transnational model of accumulation, including in tourism, agro-industry, finances, importing-exporting,
and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Their class interests impeded them from challenging transnational capital or organizing a transformative
project yet their legitimacy depended on sustaining a revolutionary discourse and undertaking redistributive reforms (Robinson, 2003). In a
policy document released shortly after taking office in 2007 the FSLN declared that its project rested on two planks, one political and the other
economic. The first, citizen power councils, were to incorporate local communities into the struggle against drugs, narco-trafficking, gangs,
diseases, ignorance, degradation of the environment, and the denial of human rights (FSLN, 2007:5). Absent was any reference to these councils
as politicized forums or vehicles for popular self-mobilization; they seemed to be conceived as instruments for a controlled incorporation from
above of grassroots communities into the states social control and administrative programs. The second plank, economic associations for small
and medium producers, called for reorienting economic policies toward these sectors so as to link them up to the large-scale private sector
(ibid): that is to incorporate these small-scale rural and urban producers via credits and technical assistance into the dominant transnational
circuits of accumulation through subcontracting and other ancillary activities. The document called for respect for all forms of property,
attracting transnational corporate investment, and an agro-industrial model of development. At the same time, however, the Sandinista program
included a re-nationalization of health and educational systems, greater social spending, progressive tax policies, and a literacy campaign, among
other popular welfare measures. Hence
region committed to mild redistributive programs respectful of prevailing property relations and
unwilling or simply unable to challenge the global capitalist order. This was not very different from what had
informed the social democratic thinking that defined the Buenos Aires consensus. These new governments were progressive
insofar as they introduced limited redistribution and restored a minimal role for the state, less in
regulation accumulation than in administering its expansion in somewhat more inclusionary ways.
When we cut through the rhetoric, a number of these governments -such as the Socialists in Chile or Kirchner and
Lula- were able to push forward a new wave of capitalist globalization with greater credibility than
their orthodox neoliberal predecessors . Many Leftist parties, even when they sustained an antineoliberal discourse, such as the PT in Brazil, the frente Amplio (Broad Front) government of Tabar Vsquez in Uruguay, and the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, abdicated earlier programs of fundamental structural change in the social order
itself. What stood out about a number of the pink tide governments is that (I) there has been no significant redistribution of
income or wealth, and indeed, inequality may still actually be increasing; and (2) there has been no shift in basic property
and class relations despite changes in political blocs, discourse in favor of the popular classes, and mildly reformist or social welfare
measures. In Argentina, for instance, the percentage of national income going to labor (through wages) and to unemployed and pensioners
(through social welfare subsidies and pensions) dropped from 32.5 in 2001, before the crisis exploded to 26.7 in 205. In Brazil the wealthy grew
in number by 11.3 percent in 2005 as inequality deepened (Zibechi, 2006). Moreover, programs to subsidize the consumption of the poor and the
unemployed, such as Zero Fome (Zero Hunger) and Bolsa Familia (Family Basket) programs in Brazil or social welfare payments plans in
Argentina and Uruguay, were financed by taxing not capital but formal sector workers and middle classes. It was increasingly dubious whether
viable redistributive strategies were possible without more fundamental changes in property relations. Would this new social democratic tide
amount to better local mangers of global capitalism than their orthodox neoliberal predecessors? How long could low levels of redistribution hold
back the tide of rebellion?
Shanghai and the shaken but by no means destroyed financial centers of New
York and London, so all manner of experiments in social change in different
places and at different geographical scales are both likely and potentially
illuminating as ways to make (or not make) another world possible . And in each
instance it may seem as if one or other aspect of the existing situation holds the
key to a different political future. But the first rule for a global anti-capitalist
movement must be: never rely on the unfolding dynamics of one moment
without carefully calibrating how relations with all the others are adapting and
reverberating.
Feasible future possibilities arise out of the existing state of relations between
the different moments. Strategic political interventions within and across the
spheres can gradually move the social order onto a different developmental
path. This is what wise leaders and forward-looking institutions do all the time
abandon the workerist approach, which is only concerned with the working class, the left came to understand that the new
political instrument must respect the plurality of the new subject and take on the defense of all discriminated social
sectors: women, indigenous peoples, black people, young people, children, pensioners, people of diverse sexual orientations, people with
disabilities, and others. The left realized that the point is not to recruit for ones political organization. Rather
than clasping to its bosom all the legitimate representatives of those who struggle for emancipation, the organization should be a body that
coordinates all their different lives into a single project. Finally, the left understood that democracy is one of the most beloved banners of the
people, and that the struggle for democracy cannot be separated from the struggle for socialism because
it is only under socialism that democracy can develop fully.2 If we keep this history in mind, I think we can better
comprehend what has happened in Latin America in recent decades. Part one serves as an introduction to our discussion of twenty-first century
socialism.
AT :Pragmatism
Pragmatism destroys political agency
Santos and Garavito 2005
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of
Coimbra (Portugal); and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito Associate Professor of Law and founding
Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights at the University of the Andes
(Bogota, Colombia). He is a founding member of the Center for Law, Justice, and Society
(Dejusticia) and an Affiliate Professor of the Law, Societies and Justice Program at the
University of Washington., Law Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic
Globalization in Law and Globalization from Below, edited Boaventura de Sousa Santos and
Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, pg 7-8)
However, the
kind of political action envisaged by the governance approach is a far cry from that of
counter-hegemonic globalization. Given its conception of power and its focus on problem solving,
the governance approach tends to bracket deep power asymmetries among actors (for instance, those
between capital and labor in global code of conduct systems) and to view the public sphere as a rather depoliticized
arena of collaboration among generic "stakeholders" (see RodrlguezGaravito 2005). In contrast to critical
theories of law that view contentious collective action by the excluded as a political requisite for the
attainment of meaningful legal transfonnations, "the Pragmatist ... relies on 'bootstrapping' - the
bracketing of self-interest and distributive claims in order to focus attention on common interests
and values," thus explicitly rejecting the "victim's perspective" (Simon 2003:26) that is central to
subaltern cosmopolitan politics and legality. As a result, the governance perspective's telling call for
participatory exercises in institutional imagination lacks a theory of political agency suited to the
task. By default or by design, those doing the imagining are the elites or members of the middle-class with
the economic and cultural capital to count as "stakeholder s." Either way, the process is a top,down one
in which those at the bottom are either incorporated only once the institutional blueprint has been
fully laid out or are not incorporated at alL The post hoc inclusion of the excluded is illustrated by Unger's
otherwise powerful theory of democratic experimentalism: "if social alliances need institutional innovations to be sustained, institutional
innovations do not require preexisting social alliances. All they demand are party-political agents and institutional programs, having those class or
group alliances as a project - as a project rather than as a premise" (1996:137). The exclusion of those at the bottom from governance schemes is
candidly acknowledged by Simon: "pragmatist initiatives are likely to by-pass the most desperate and the most deviant. Pragmatism supposes
a measure of mutual accountability and engagement that may not be attractive to or possible for
everyone" (2003:23).
As it turns out, in the context of neoliberal globalization, the most desperate and marginalized those
living in poverty and excluded from the benefits of social citizenship due to class, gender, racial, or
ethnic oppression - account for the immense majority of the world population . The challenge of
institutional imagination, therefore, cannot be met but by privileging the excluded as actors and
beneficiaries of new forms of global politics and legality. This is the strategy of counterhegemonic
globalization and its legal counterpart, subaltern cosmopolitan legality.
The alt doesnt lack organization- it rejects the state-like organization your
pragmatism calls for under pragmatic approaches the movement fails
Graeber 2
(David is an American anthropologist and anarchist who is a Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Graeber has
been involved in social and political activism, including Occupy Wall Street, The New Anarchists New Left Review p 70 MW)
A constant complaint about the globalization movement in the progressive press is that, while
tactically brilliant, it lacks any central theme or coherent ideology. (This seems to be the left
equivalent of the corporate medias claims that we are a bunch of dumb kids touting a bundle of
completely unrelated causesfree Mumia, dump the debt, save the oldgrowth forests.) Another
line of attack is that the movement is plagued by a generic opposition to all forms of structure or
organization. Its distressing that, two years after Seattle, I should have to write this, but
someone obviously should: in North America especially, this is a movement about reinventing
democracy. It is not opposed to organization. It is about creating new forms of organization. It is
not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization are its ideology. It is about creating and
enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations;
networks based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy . Ultimately,
it aspires to be much more than that, because ultimately it aspires to reinvent daily life as whole.
But unlike many other forms of radicalism, it has first organized itself in the political sphere
mainly because this was a territory that the powers that be (who have shifted all their heavy
artillery into the economic) have largely abandoned.
The world of the alt doesnt need to be explicitly stated that demand for specificity is
neoliberalist at its core
Graeber 2
(David is an American anthropologist and anarchist who is a Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Graeber has
been involved in social and political activism, including Occupy Wall Street, The New Anarchists New Left Review p 72 MW)
This is very much a work in progress, and creating a culture of democracy among people who
have little experience of such things is necessarily a painful and uneven business, full of all sorts
of stumblings and false starts, butas almost any police chief who has faced us on the streets
can attestdirect democracy of this sort can be astoundingly effective . And it is difficult to find
anyone who has fully participated in such an action whose sense of human possibilities has not
been profoundly transformed as a result. Its one thing to say, Another world is possible. Its
another to experience it, however momentarily. Perhaps the best way to start thinking about these
organizationsthe Direct Action Network, for exampleis to see them as the diametrical opposite
of the sectarian Marxist groups; or, for that matter, of the sectarian Anarchist groups.6 Where
the democratic-centralist party puts its emphasis on achieving a complete and correct theoretical
analysis, demands ideological uniformity and tends to juxtapose the vision of an egalitarian
future with extremely authoritarian forms of organization in the present, these openly seek
diversity. Debate always focuses on particular courses of action; its taken for granted that no one
will ever convert anyone else entirely to their point of view . The motto might be, If you are
willing to act like an anarchist now, your long-term vision is pretty much your own business.
Which seems only sensible: none of us know how far these principles can actually take us, or
what a complex society based on them would end up looking like. Their ideology, then, is
immanent in the anti-authoritarian principles that underlie their practice, and one of their more
explicit principles is that things should stay this way.
Drawing a plan here and now is not necessary; the only necessary course of action is
to de-deify profit
Quincy Saul 2011
Studied political economy, history and music at Hampshire College, graduating in 2010 Holds a graduate
certificate in labor studies from the City University of New York, If Not Now, When?
Reflections on Socialism in the 21st Century
Sell writes: It would be necessary to draw up a plan, involving the whole of society, on
what industry needed to produce. She insists, moreover, that everybody in society would be
able to participate in this decision-making process. Good. But many questions immediately arise:
How will the decision-making apparatus work? Who will administer it? Will we try to reform
touch-screen voting, move beyond electronic voting machines into deeper levels of technodemocracy, or go back to town meetings and paper ballots? Will socialists use the current
political architecture (capitol buildings, etc.)? Will pre-revolutionary politicians be allowed to
participate? Will the Congress and Senate be preserved? The White House? The Pentagon? And
what should the plan be? When will it be necessary to lay it out? How much time do we have?
How will antagonisms between different needs and desires be reconciled? Consensus on a
continental and inter-continental scale is impossible. What will the decision-making process be,
and how will it be conceived, created, and enforced? These are severe technical questions with
no easy answers. (How will we meet electricity needs after eliminating nuclear energy and
curtailing coal mining?) Who will write this plan? When will it begin? As the saying goes, if not
now, when? If not you, who? Anticipating this question, Sell writes: It is not possible or
necessary here and now*amid a society where profit is god and humanity is bent and
distorted under its endless dictates*to draw up a full or accurate picture of a socialist
society. Future generations, who will be more informed and knowledgeable than us [sic],
will do that.
This was as true for the social as for the national movements.What happened historically in
these debatesand this is the fourth similaritywas that those holding the state-oriented
position won out. The decisive argument in each case was that the immediate source of real
power was located in the state apparatus and that any attempt to ignore its political centrality was
doomed to failure, since the state would successfully suppress any thrust towards anarchism or
cultural nationalism. In the late nineteenth century, these groups enunciated a so-called two-step
strategy: first gain power within the state structure; then transform the world. This was as true for
the social as for the national movements.
The fifth common feature is less obvious, but no less real. Socialist movements often included
nationalist rhetoric in their arguments, while nationalist discourse often had a social component.
The result was a greater blurring of the two positions than their proponents ever acknowledged.
It has frequently been remarked that socialist movements in Europe often functioned more
effectively as a force for national integration than either conservatives or the state itself; while
the Communist parties that came to power in China, Vietnam and Cuba were clearly serving as
movements of national liberation. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the process of
mobilization forced both groups to try to draw increasingly broad sectors of the population into
their camps, and widening the scope of their rhetoric was helpful in this regard. But secondly, the
leaders of both movements often recognized subconsciously that they had a shared enemy in the
existing systemand that they therefore had more in common with each other than their public
pronouncements allowed.
The processes of popular mobilization deployed by the two kinds of movement were basically
quite similar. Both types started out, in most countries, as small groups, often composed of a
handful of intellectuals plus a few militants drawn from other strata. Those that succeeded did so
because they were able, by dint of long campaigns of education and organization, to secure
popular bases in concentric circles of militants, sympathizers and passive supporters. When the
outer circle of supporters grew large enough for the militants to operate, in Mao Zedongs phrase,
like fish swimming in water, the movements became serious contenders for political power. We
should, of course, note too that groups calling themselves social democratic tended to be strong
primarily in states located in the core zones of the world-economy, while those that described
themselves as movements of national liberation generally flourished in the semi- peripheral and
peripheral zones. The latter was largely true of Com- munist parties as well. The reason seems
obvious. Those in weaker zones saw that the struggle for equality hinged on their ability to wrest
control of the state structures from imperial powers, whether these exercised direct or indirect
rule. Those in the core zones were already in strong states. To make progress in their struggle for
equality, they needed to wrest power from their own dominant strata. But precisely because these
states were strong and wealthy, insurrection was an implausible tactic, and these parties used the
electoral route.
The seventh common feature is that both these movements struggled with the tension between
revolution and reform as prime modes of transformation. Endless discourse has revolved
around this debate in both movementsbut for both, in the end, it turned out to be based on a
misreading of reality. Revolutionaries were not in practice very revolutionary, and reformists not
always reformist. Certainly, the difference between the two approaches became more and more
unclear as the movements pursued their political trajectories. Revo- lutionaries had to make
many concessions in order to survive. Refor- mists learned that hypothetical legal paths to
change were often firmly blocked in practice and that it required force, or at least the threat of
force, to break through the barriers. So-called revolutionary movements usually came to power
as a consequence of the wartime destruction of the existing authorities rather than through their
own insurrectionary capacities. As the Bolsheviks were reported to have said in Russia, in 1917,
power was lying about in the streets. Once installed, the movements sought to stay in power,
regardless of how they had got there; this often required sacrificing militancy, as well as
solidarity with their counterparts in other countries. The popular support for these movements
was initially just as great whether they won by the bullet or by the ballotthe same dancing in
the streets greeted their accession to power after a long period of struggle.
Finally, both movements had the problem of implementing the two- step strategy. Once stage one
was completed, and they had come to power, their followers expected them to fulfill the promise of
stage two: transforming the world. What they discovered, if they did not know it before, was that
state power was more limited than they had thought. Each state was constrained by being part of
an interstate system, in which no one nations sovereignty was absolute. The longer they stayed
in office, the more they seemed to postpone the realization of their promises; the cadres of a
militant mobilizing movement became the functionaries of a party in power. Their social positions
were transformed and so, inevitably, were their individual psychologies. What was known in the
Soviet Union as the Nomenklatura seemed to emerge, in some form, in every state in which a
movement took controlthat is, a privileged caste of higher officials, with more power and more
real wealth than the rest of the population. At the same time, the ordinary workers were enjoined to
toil even harder and sacrifice ever more in the name of national development . The militant,
syndicalist tactics that had been the bread of the social movement became counterrevolutionary, highly discouraged and usually repressed, once it was in office.
Sell writes that a genuine socialist government would not be dictatorial, and emphasizes
that socialism is defined by its democratic content. Both sides of the Cold War poisoned the
word socialism in the hearts and minds of millions, and it is important and essential to
tirelessly re-articulate that socialism must be thoroughly and profoundly democratic if it is
to be genuine. But while this is important when trying to convert non-socialists to the cause,
it can also be disingenuous. What about the inevitability of conflict? Especially in First
World countries*where the bourgeoisie is large, entrenched and highly entitled, and where
capitalist life-worlds and false consciousness and consumerism have elevated insane,
unsustainable privileges to the status of real needs*a socialist revolution could not be
purely democratic in the strict sense of the term. Certain things must be non-negotiable
for socialists, like the reduction of consumerism and ecologically destructive industries.
There will be plenty of resistance, for instance, to the forced curtailment of mountaintop
removal, the dismantling of the prison industrial complex, and the opening of the U.S.Mexico border, and this resistance will have to be dealt with. How? What will the limits to
democracy be, who will define the criteria, and how will this be implemented? And as the saying
goes, with whose army? Though the 19th and 20th century idea of a dictatorship of the
proletariat, of a period of emergency rule, when the expropriators are expropriated,
must be revised for the 21st century, it cannot be dismissed or glossed over. There is no way
around answering these questions one way or another. If we are serious about democracy, we
must answer them collectively and transparently. If we dont answer these questions,
someone else will answer them for us.
AT: No Alt
No alternative is capitalist propaganda
KATZ 13
(Claudio, professor of economic history at the University of Buenos Aires, trans.
Leonard Morin, "Socialist Strategies in Latin America," The New Latin American
Left, 39)
The difference of approach is instructive. While the dominant classes exhibit enormous flexibility
in confronting adversaries with different remedies (for example, increased state intervention), the
response of some socialists is timid. They only see obstacles to the popular project, while their
opponents attempt one model after another of capitalism. With idealized conceptions of the
industrial working class-as the sole architects of socialism- there will always be obstacles to
conceptualizing an anticapitalist agenda in the periphery. But if one abandons the narrow notion,
there is no reason to question the viability of this project on the basis of class definitions. The
assimilation of traditions of struggle is more important for an anticaptialist process than is the
hierarchy of the participating subjects. If the experiences of resistance are shared, the potential for
a revolutionary change increases. An example of such sharing was the conversion of Argentine
sexworkers into militants of a great movement of the unemployed. Another case was the
transformation fo the ex-miners in Bolivia into organizers of informal workers. The great
difference between the current period and that of 1960-1980 lie more on this plane of political
consciousness than in the realm of relationships of force or in the change of the popular subjects.
It is not the intensity of the social conflicts, the willingness of the oppressed to struggle, or the
capacity of the oppressors to control that has substantially changed, but the visibility of - and the
confidence in - a socialist model.
AT Alt is Utopian
Utopian alts good?
(Pierre was a French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher. Gunter won the Nobel Prize
for Literature as a leftist novelist. The Progressive Restoration: A Franco-German Dialogue
New Left Review p 64-65 MW)
Bourdieu: I feel you are a little too optimistic. Im not sure, unfortunately, that the problem can
be posed in these terms, since I think the economic and political forces that currently weigh
down on Europe are such that the legacy of the Enlightenment is in real danger. The French
historian Daniel Roche has just written a book in which he demonstrates that the Enlightenment
tradition has very different meanings in France and Germany: that Aufklrung doesnt mean the
same as Lumires, even though this would seem to have been one thing the two countries shared
to the full. But the difference is there, and its a significant obstacle which we must overcome if
we are to resist the destruction of what we associate more generally with the Enlightenment
scientific and technological progress, and control over that progress. We need to invent a new
utopianism, rooted in contemporary social forces, for whichat the risk of seeming to encourage a
return to antiquated political visionsit will be necessary to create new kinds of movement.
Unions, as they exist today, are archaic organizational forms; they must reform, transform,
redefine themselves, internationalize and rationalize themselves, base themselves on the findings
of the social sciences, if they are to fulfil their purposes. Grass: What you are proposing is a
utopia. It would amount to a fundamental reform of the union movement, and we know how
difficult it is to shift that apparatus. grassbourdieu: Dialogue 77 Bourdieu: But a utopia in
which we have a part to play. For example, social movements in France are a good deal less potent
now than they were a few years ago. Traditionally, our movements have had a strongly
ouvririste outlook, very hostile to intellectuals, in part with good reason. Today, since it is in
crisis, the social movement as a whole is more open, more responsive to criticism, and becoming
much more thoughtful. Suddenly, it is much readier to welcome new kinds of critique of our
society that encompass it as well. These critical, reflective social movements are, in my opinion, the
future.
conditions in the new millennium have shifted the tide of national politics, bringing to power the
political class of the Left, and a demobilization of the social movements and their retreat from
the political arena. NGOs-not all of them by any means (some are aligned with. and supportive
of the popular movement in their struggle for substantial social change)-turned out to be a major
instrument of this demobilization, the handmaiden of neoliberal globalization (from global
capital to local development). The propensity of capitalism toward crisis, reflected in the
contemporary outbreak of systemic crisis of global proportions, has generated movements to the
Right as well as the Left, each seeking to mobilize the forces of change released by the crisis .
twenty-three U.S. military bases across our subcontinent, and multilateral military exercises are
still held every year for the purpose of training troops in the region.21 The Fourth Fleet
[operating in the Caribbean and Central and South America] has been reactivated, and U.S.
intelligence networks have been extended in an effort to keep watch on and control the dynamics
of popular movements in the region.22 The empire is trying to prevent the emergence of national
forces that could clash with U.S. policies of domination and imposed servitude . There has been,
therefore, a huge increase in military aid to Colombia, its faithful ally and beach-head in the
region. And, to weaken any government that it does not directly control, the United States has
supported separatist movements in Bolivia (in the resourcerich eastern Half Moon states),
Ecuador, and Venezuela (in the oil-rich state of Zulia).23 Faced with the unstoppable advance of
left forces in Latin America, especially in the last two years, the Pentagon has decided to
implement a plan to recolonize and discipline the whole cont inent.24 It aims to stop and, as far
as possible, reverse the process of building a free and sovereign Latin America, set in motion by
Chvez. The Empire cannot accept thatin spite of the enormous economic, political, military, and
media power deployed in the regionLatin American countries are forging their own independent
agenda that runs counter to its designs
AT Chav. A dictator
Chavez was not a dictator- he was popular amongst all classes in Latin America
Robinson 08-American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008, Latin
America and Global Capitalism, pgs333-4
The UNT was able to mobilize over a million workers to its May Day 2005 rally while the CTV
was barely able to muster a few thousand to its own activity, a sign of the radicalization of the
working class and the decline of the old business unionism that had emerged during the Punto
Fijo regimes. In late 2005 a law drafted by the UNT was put before the National Assembly on
worker co-management in enterprises. Popular sectors also organized into numerous local and
regional organizations, including community associations, students, women's, cultural, Christian
base groups, new trade unions, peasant associations, and so forth. As many visitors to Venezuela
have observedI myself made four visits between 2004 and 2007there has been a rapid
process of politicization and self-organization among the poor majority. The anti-neoliberal
discourse of the leadership is outpaced by the increasingly revolutionary discourse of
popular grassroots sectors that are developing an expanding class consciousness. Popular
sectors, while they may support Chavez and his government, are by no means blindly
subservient to the president and have often come out against Chavista leaders and state
officials. The image of an omnipotent Chavez crafting policy is misleading because it denies
the remarkable agency of the poor majority, who are well organized. It is their belligerence
that buoys Chavez at the helm of the state and their protagonism that has pushed the
process forward. The flourishing grassroots social movements, moreover, predate the Chavez
era, with genealogies in the diverse mass, trade union, and guerrilla struggles of the Punto Fijo
era. Rural and urban activists, indigenous and Afro-descendant groups, environmentalists, trade
unionists and others have taken the initiative repeatedly in protesting against aspects of
government policies that go against their interests. Most would agree that, at least up until 2006,
the Bolivarian revolution had managed to avoid state authoritarianism, thanks, in large
part, to the ongoing, autonomous mobilization of popular sectors, but also, I would suggest,
as a result of the disputed nature of the state and of the Chavez presidency's own efforts to
avoid bureaucratism and forge direct ties with popular sectors. Chavismo has opened up a
remarkable space for mobilization from below. Despite claims by Chavez' opponents it does
not seem to be the case that there is an authoritarian one-man rule. Personalistic accounts of
the Venezuelan revolution are simplistic (see, e.g., Ramirez, 2005). Chavez is genuinely
popular among the poor majority and some sectors of the middle classes, and is as well
immensely popular throughout Latin America. Historical processes of social change are the
product not of individuals but of collective social forces. These forces throw up individuals
whose personal attributescharisma, brilliance, and foresightare activated by historical
conjunctures. Moreover, as I will discuss in the next section, the discourse critical of Chavez is
somewhat contradictory.
AT: Gibson-Graham
Gibson-Graham is a neg author: only the hope of the alternative can break out of
the skepticism of the inevitability of neoliberalism.
DeMartino 13
(George,ProfessorandCoDirector,MAinGlobal,Finance,TradeandEconomicIntegration,
EthicalEngagementinaWorldbeyondControl;UnderReview,RethinkingMarxism)
Notably,thebook(andotherGibsonGrahamworkofthepastdecade)turnedacarefuleyetothe
questionofhowtocultivateaneconomicsubjectthatcouldopenuptothepossibilities
associatedwitheconomicdifference.Gibson-Graham explored abstractly in their theoretical
work and concretely in their community work the stubborn resistance to imaging and welcoming
opportunities to live differently. Even those harboring anger and resentment toward a capitalist
system that exploited and then discarded them for instance, workers rendered unemployed by
capital flight often refused to engage the idea of creating alternative enterprises under worker
control (Gibson-Graham 2003). Instead, they aspired to return to employment in the capitalist
sector that, they felt, had abused them.Whatisitaboutthehumanpsyche,GibsonGrahamasked,
thatsooftenpreventsactorsfromrecognizing,imaginingandwelcomingopportunitiestolive
differently?What bodily processes interrupt the capacity to grab hold of the chance to break free
from practices that are recognized as oppressive? And how in practice do we overcome the fear,
resignation, anger and resentment that block the exploration of alternative economic identities? In
APostcapitalistPolitics(2003)andotherworkGibson- Graham explore the power of language
and theory, but also interpersonal encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming
these obstacles. What they would came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for pursuing projects
of economic emancipation.The collective joins university and community-based researchers with
othercommunitymembersinjointprojectstoinventoryalreadyexistingalternativeeconomic
practicesandindigenousresourcesandcapacities,andtoimagine and pursue economic practices
and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just what economic forms are
and are not achievable and sustainable.Acentralgoalistoproliferateeconomicformstogenerate
avibranteconomicecosystempopulatedbyallsortsofeconomicspeciesratherthantopursuea
predefinedsetofmodelsofeconomicengagement.Implicit in the project is the need to inquire
into economic alternatives without judgment; to silence the reflexive skepticism that haunts the
Gibson-Graham 1996) of new and as-of-yet unimagined progeny .Ofequalimportanceisthetask
ofpromotingsafespaceswithinwhicheconomicagentswhoaremarginalizedandemptiedof
aspirationregeneratethemselvesasvibranteconomicsubjectswhorecognizethepotencyoftheir
agencyinmakingtheworldanew.
has nothing to do with state-owned enterprise in itself; as Bob Rowthorn and Ha-Joon Chang
observe: it is not only agents in the public sector who can block structural change but also
private-sector agents, because what matters here is political influence and not ownership per
se.9 These theoretical weaknesses in the case for privatization should be borne in mind when
assessing the actual processes by which state divestitures were carried out worldwide. For in
practice, as we will see, the paths taken varied more widely than privatization theory would
generally be willing to acknowledge.
supranational development agencies have joined academics and the policy-oriented non- governmental
community in a widening new convergence of ideas that criticizes the original Washington
Consensus of the 1980s and early 1990s and calls for the development of a high road to development
that links growth with greater equity and democracy (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000).
The alternative is rational - Globalization can be prevented with new public policy
choices that combat the neoliberal market.
Hu-DeHart 3
(Evelyn. Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies, Volume 24, Number 2 & 3, 2003, pp. 244-260. University
of Nebraska Press)
Thus, it cannot be argued that globalization is natural and inevitable, and produces general
progress for all. Rather, it should be made clear that globalization and the global finance sys- tem is
a man-made artifact, in the inimitable words of critic William Grei- der, one of the most
trenchant and lucid critics of corporate globalization. It is defined as, a political regime devised
over many years by interested parties to serve their ends, and if man made it , Greider concludes,
then man can very well undo it, because nothing in nature or, for that matter, in economics requires the rest of us to accept a system that is so unjust and mindlessly de- structive. 46 In short,
globalization is not an inevitable force of history, but rather the consequence of public policy
choices.47 This is precisely what pro- testers in Chiapas and Seattle and on our campuses are
celerated globalization has produced greater world equality, far from lifting all boats, the rising
tide of globalization is only lifting yachts!43 Today, the worlds richest two hundred people
have more wealth than 41 percent of the worlds humanity.44 Increasing the worlds productive
capacities may be a good thing for all, but it must be accompanied by a broader distribution of
wealth.45
in a particularly oppressive way in the garment industry worldwide, whether in Asia, Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, or the United States itself. Thus, the antisweatshop movement
on college campuses correctly focuses its pressure on the manufacturers and not primarily on the
Asian subcontractors, because they understand that U.S. manufacturers pocket the lions share of
profits and call the shots.38 The biggest losers in this global assembly line are women Latina and
Asian womencharacterized as inherently, innately, and naturally suited for the kind of low-skill
labor in light manufacturing, whether in Third World export- processing factories or U.S. electronic
assembly plants and sweatshops. This myth of nimble fingersa purely ideological construct
is nothing less than rationalization for low wages, not to mention justification for the perpet- uation
of the notion of Third World womens intellectual inferiority. It is not just the gendered quality of
the international division of labor that is so prob- lematic, but that the gendered division is inferred
and inscribed as a perma- nent hierarchy that is further reinforced by race, class, and nationality
differences, as well as denial of immigration and citizenship rights in the case of the smuggled and
undocumented.39 We are compelled to conclude that Third World women in their home countries
and after migration to the United States comprise one continuum in the same gendered,
transnational workforce that lies at the base of the ex- tremely exploitative and oppressive global
subcontracting system of produc- tion.40 Whether she works in a Nike plant subcontracted to a
covertheyearsupto1995.TheGRIhasfivecomponents:commercial,financial,capital
account,privatization,andtaxreform.The index confirms that all of the countries underwent
neoliberal re- forms in the years after the onset of the debt crisis; in fact the 1995 GRI scores for all
countries, except Jamaica (.767) and Venezuela (.667), ex- ceeded that of the most neoliberal
country of 1982, Uruguay (.776).Wefirstdividethecountriesintotwogroups,thoseabovethe
medianvalueoftheGRIin1995,andthosebelow.Inordertobettergaugethesuccessesand
failuresofradical,thatis,fastandextensive,neoliberalreformprocesses,wethenclassifythe
countriesonthebasisoftheextentofthesereformsfrom1982to1995,measuredasthe
changeinGRIscores.Wefurtherincludeameasureofthemagnitudeofanydrasticreform
episodestheirgovernmentsmayhaveimposedduringthatperiod.Wecalculatedthemagnitude
ofdrastic154LatinAmericanResearchReviewreformepisodesforeachcountryasitslargest
oneyearchangeontheGRI.Again,bothclassificationsaresimpledichotomies,aboveandbe
lowthemedianofthemeasureinquestion.Thethreeclassificationsoverlapconsiderably.Costa
Rica,theDominicanRepublic,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Peru,andParaguayareabovethe
medianinallthreeclassifications;Colombia,Honduras,Mexico,andVenezuelaare
consistentlybelowthemedian.Despitethesesimilarities,thethreeclassificationsyielddifferent
resultsthatareusefulforevaluatingtheclaimsmadeonbehalfofneoliberalreformagainstits
actualrecordinLatinAmerica.Resultsforourfirsttwoindicators,growthandvolatility,are
shownintable2.Wedividetheperiodintotwosubperiods,198289and199098.Wedothis
inordertodealwiththeargumentthatananalysisofthewholeperiodwouldlumptogetherthe
economiccrisesthatprecededthereformswiththereformperioditselfanditsaftermath.Itcould
bethecasethatthecountriesthatsufferedtheworstcrisesthenengagedinthemostradical
reforms,andabadeconomicperformanceovertheentireperiodcouldbeinterpretedasacause
ratherthananeffectofradicalneoliberalreforms.Table2showsthatcountries that had more
liberalized economies in 1995 suffered a somewhat bigger decline in GDP per capita between 1982
and 1989 but experienced clearly higher aver- age annual growth in GDP per capita between 1990
and 1998 (in con- stant dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity).However,justasclearly,
countriesthatpursuedmoreradicalreformapproachessufferedactuallyasomewhatlower
declinebetween1982and1989butthen ex- perienced six times lower average annual growth
rates between 1990 and 1998 than countries that proceeded more cautiously. Countries that
imposed drastic reform episodes suffered a steeper decline in between 1982 and 1989, and between
1990 and 1998 grew by less than a quarter of the rate of countries that avoided them. Thislast
resultcouldpotentiallybeinterpretedaslendingsomesupporttothealternativeinterpretation
thatdeepereconomiccriseswerethecausesofmoreradicalreforms.However,onecanjustas
wellarguethatthe drastic reform episodes aggravated the economic recessions. An examination of
growth rates in the period between 1973 and 1981 does not support the argu- ment that economies
with historically lower growth rates were forced into more radical reforms in the 1980s. Radical
reformers grew at an average of 1.15 percent in the period between 1973 and 1981, whereas the
more moderate reformers grew at an average annual rate of 1.51 percentnotadifferencethat
wouldleadtoriskyexperiments.Moreover,between1973and1981countriesthatimposed
radicalreformepisodesinthe1980sgrewat1.77percentperyear,whereascountriesthat
avoidedsuchepisodesgrewat0.86percentperyear.Theseresultssuggestverystronglythat
moreliberalizedeconomiesdidprovidebetterconditionsforeconomicgrowthbetween1990and
1998,butthatradical approaches to liberalization have substantial costs in the form of de- pressed
growth rates. When we turn to volatility, the picture is very consistent; more liberal- ization is
associated with greater volatility. Following the Inter-American Development Bank (1995), we
measure volatility in per capita income us- ing the standard deviation of annual growth. In
countries with more liber- alized economies as of 1995, the average standard deviation in annual
growth was 5.7 percent in the period between 1990 and 1998, compared to 3.6 percent for countries
with less liberalized economies.Themoreradicalreformershadthesamedegreeofvolatility,5.7
percent,andthemorecautiousreformers,thelowerrateof4.1percent.Finally,countriesthat
imposedradicalreformepisodesintheperiodbetween1982and1998hadavolatilityof5.5
percentbetween1990and1998,andcountriesthatavoideddrasticreformepisodes,4.2percent.
Our results, then, indicate that both the speed of neoliberal reforms and a higher achieved level of
reforms have costs in the form of higher vola- tility.Arguably,thisisaresultofthecombinationof
theliberalizationofcapitalmarketsandtrade,anargumentwewillcomebacktobelow.1.For
thisanalysis,wehadtocorrecttwodatapointsforColombia(drawnfromtheWorldBanks
WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsCDROM)thatclearlylackedfacevalidity.WethankKurt
Weylandforpointingoutthisdeficiencyinapreviousdraft.156LatinAmericanResearch
ReviewOurattempttogaugetheperformanceofmoreandlessliberalizedeconomiesandof
moreandlessradicalreformersintheareasofpovertyandinequalityissomewhathamperedby
theavailabilityofdatathatarecomparableovertimeandacrosscountries.Incomeinequality
dataforArgentina,Bolivia,Ecuador,Paraguay,andUruguayareunavailable;fortheremaining
countries,datafortheclosestavailableyearwasused.Povertydataatthenationallevelfor
BoliviaandUruguayareunavailable.Ideally,onewouldwantpovertydatafortheperiodbefore
theonsetofthereforms,tomeasurechange,butproblemsofcomparabilityareserious.
Nevertheless,evenwithrestricteddataavailability,thepictureemergingfromtable3isclearand
consistent.Higher levels of liberalization and more radical processes of liberal- ization are
associated with higher levels of inequality and poverty. The changes in inequality are impressive:
Thecountrieswiththemoreliberalizedeconomiesasof1995startedoutaround1982with
lowerlevelsofinequalitythanthecountrieswiththelessliberalizedeconomiesasof1995,but
Neoliberalists cannot even follow their own true ideologues of creating dynamic
growth and prosperity. Instead, they obstruct capital development and promote
deindustrialization.
Michl, 2011
(Thomas Michl, Director of the Colgate London Economics Study Group, and PhD New School
for Social Research, New Left Review 70, page 122)
Neoliberal ideologues promised a more efficient allocation of capi- tal that would generate dynamic
growth and prosperity. For a brief period in the 1990s, a temporary wave of investment in
information technology appeared to make this plausible; but that washed back out over a decade
ago. Contemporary capitalism suffers from a chronic shortage of invest- ment and misallocations of
capital on a global scale. The financial system, far from facilitating real growth a role that banks
did play, in previous stages of capitalismactually obstructs capital development and promotes
the deindustrialization of the advanced-capitalist core. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
run-up to the Great Recession. Along a key tectonic- plate boundary, the internal stresses
presented themselves in the abysmally low business investment rate during the 200107
recovery. During this period, Greenspan and Bernanke were desperately trying to prevent the us
from following Japan into a deflation trap. But despite their near-zero real interest rates, an
investment-led recovery eluded them, even though prof- its, relative to either income or capital,
were strong. In manufacturing, the capital stock actually shrank for the first time since the
Depression, stark evidence of deindustrialization. Instead, the Federal Reserve got an unsustainable construction-led expansion and a house-price bubble fed by capital inflows from the
Pacific rim, channelled through a shadow-banking system ensorcelled by structured finance and
securitization.
AT: Realism
Realism fails to describe the world created by neoliberal globalization.
Santos and Garavito 2005
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of
Coimbra (Portugal); and Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito Associate Professor of Law and founding
Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights at the University of the Andes
(Bogota, Colombia). He is a founding member of the Center for Law, Justice, and Society
(Dejusticia) and an Affiliate Professor of the Law, Societies and Justice Program at the
University of Washington., Law Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic
Globalization in Law and Globalization from Below, edited Boaventura de Sousa Santos and
Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, pg 9-10)
For the present purposes, what is particularly relevant about this line of work are its epistemological tenets and its conception of hegemony,
which stand in explicit contrast with those of subaltern cosmopolitan legality. Studies of global legal hegemony aim at a
"more realist understanding of the production of the new international economic and political
order" (Dezalay and Garth 2002b:315). Such a realist perspective is explicitly built on a twofold critique of
approaches such as ours that seek to expose and underscore the potential of counter-hegemonic
forms of political and legal action. On the one hand, it draws a sharp (and, as we will see,
problematic) distinction between description and prescription and confines proper scholarship to
the former. On the other hand, it is keen on highlighting the links between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors - for instance, between philanthropic foundations in the North and human rights
organizations in the South as well as tensions and contradictions within transnational activist coalitions. From this viewpoint, such
links and tensions reveal that, far from "happily coexisting in this effort to work together to produce new and emancipatory global norms"
(Dezalay and Garth 2002b:318), NGOs and other actors of counter-hegemonic globalization are part and parcel of the elites benefiting from
neoliberal globalization and thus contribute to the construction of new global orthodoxies through programs to export US legal institutions and
expertise.
We offer a response to these criticisms in laying out the epistemological and political tenets of subaltern cosmopolitan legality in
the next section. For the purposes of this section, a brief discussion of the limitations and tensions of the hegemony approach is in order. First,
despite its call for realist descriptions, the reality grasped with its analytical lenses is a highly
partial one. Since its entry point of choice into global legal processes is the world of transnational
elites, the description it offers is as revealing as it is limited . Missing from this top-down picture are the
myriad local, non-English speaking actors from grassroots organizations to community leaders who, albeit oftentimes working in alliance with transnational NGOs and progressive elites, mobilize
popular resistance to neoliberal legality while remaining as local as ever. From Bolivian peasants resisting the
privatization of water services to indigenous peoples around the world resisting corporate biopiracy, these subaltern actors are a critical part of
processes whereby global legal rules are defined, as the current contestation over the regulation of water provision and property rights on
traditional knowledge bear witness (Rajagopal 2003).
AFF
history is a long record of government policies that failed because they were
designed with a bold disregard for the laws of economics. It is impossible to understand the history of
economic thought if one does not pay attention to the fact that economics as such is a challenge
to the conceit of those in power. An economist can never be a favorite of autocrats and
demagogues. With them he is always the mischief-maker, and the more they are inwardly
convinced that his objections are well founded, the more they hate him. Ludwig von Mises Is this statement
of Mises one of ideology or science? The politically correct answer would be that this is just another example of Misess excessive ideological
commitment to laissez faire. But as with much in modern intellectual life, the
is true for the central mystery of political economy (how individuals pursuing their own interests, and only their own
interests, can within certain institutional environments generate outcomes which are socially desirable) and for the central tragedy
(how individuals can in striving to promote the public good generate unintended undesirable consequences). There are systemic
forces that are in operation in political economy and they exist independent of the wishful
thinking of participants in the political-economic nexus. Hoover doesnt appear to recognize this fundamental point in
political economy and thus his effort to understand the development of modern political economy is flawed from the start. Let me focus on my
criticism first and then I will end highlighting aspects which I think the reader can benefit from in reading his book nevertheless. First, the
selection of subjects is bizarre from the beginning if
gleaned from technical economics to make policy relevant contributions. In short, it is on the basis of
sound economic reasoning that they were able to make policy relevant arguments to their
contemporaries. But except for a paragraph here or there, the technical economics of Keynes and Hayek are passed over in this book to
focus instead on their political affiliations and political influence (Keynes with the democratic center, Hayek with the hard right - Laski is given
the hard left) and we
are treated to asserted arguments about how personal psychology impacted their
position. We are treated to these figures as political theorists or rather political icons of
movements that identified with them. This enables Hoovers choice of thinkers to have some coherence, though the reason for
both Keyness and Hayeks influence are going to get inadequate treatment as a consequence. Second, Hoover is only apparently asking a
question about the evolution of ideas and ideological influence. But a reader can sense from the second paragraph of the preface where Hoovers
sympathies personally lay on the policy questions of the day. He laments that the ideological pendulum has swung too far to the right and then he
states plainly that On a moments reflection, it is clear that governments do good things, as well as bad. And markets likewise are Janus-faced,
sometimes provident, other times the wastrel. (p. xi) In other words, Hoover has an answer to his question before he asks it. Political
economy is to serve as a means for human betterment within the context of democratic
deliberation among citizens. These deliberations must be rational and not prone to ideological
excess if they are going to generate understanding among citizens of the need for a complex
interweaving of institutions, processes, and constitutional safeguards so that the excesses of any
one institution may be limited, while its virtues are brought to the service of society. (p. 270) Who,
the reader must ask, could ever be against limiting abuse and encouraging virtue? Nobody can be against the exercising of
wisdom, courage and public spiritedness in making political decisions. But in Hoovers treatment both Laski
and Hayek are going to be found wanting in this regard because ideological theorizing in their name can be abused by politicians on the left and
right - as Hoover argues we have seen - and thus only Keynes is left to rationally mediate between the two extremes of socialism and
libertarianism. Overly
to Hoover.
Permutation
Plan is a prerequisite to the alternative- only global integration of Latin American
models of economics can disseminate challenges to neoliberalism.
Sader 2008
(Emir Sader, directs the Public Policy Laboratory (LPP) of the State University of Rio de
Janeiro, where he is a professor of sociology. The Weakest Link? New Left Review 52, JulyAugust 2008)
None of this, of course, suffices to build a political and military counterweight to the US. At best
the continent is resisting, and working on its own forms of integration, in a region whose economic
clout has been much diminished by the de-industrializing effects of the economic opening-up
enforced by neoliberalism. The founding in May 2008 of Unasur, a project for the integration of
all the countries of South America, and the proposal for a South American Defence Council
both initiatives US-freepoint toward a new space and model for continental integration; though
Colombias formal participation complicates matters, since Uribe has decided to allow the US to
establish a military base on its territory.
The importance of the region as a whole derives from its energy resources, primarily oil, and from
its exports of cash crops, soya in particular. But domestic markets are becoming more attractive as
their capacity for consumption increases, while regional integration reinforces political
negotiating muscle, as has been seen in the dealings of the G-20 with the WTO. The process of
breaking with the neoliberal model and founding alternative spaces for trade, such as ALBA, has
turned the continent into an indispensable reference in any debate around the alternatives to
neoliberalism. It is partly for these reasons that Chvezs leadership has become celebrated
beyond continental borders. Yet one of the more vulnerable aspects of post-neoliberal processes is
their global isolation ; in the absence of other allies Venezuela has been forced to cultivate any
governments that are in conflict with the US, such as those of Russia, Iran, Belarus and China. In
addition, the Latin American countries that have made concrete moves to break with the model are
not the most developed, relatively speaking; their greatest economic asset is to be able to count on
Venezuelas oil.
On the ideological plane, Latin America is better placed to table issues for debate: the plurinational, pluri-ethnic state; the notion of 21st-century socialism; alternative formulas for regional
integration such as ALBA. But there are few platforms for disseminating the new ideas, raising
them against the pense unique and its theories, incessantly propounded by the mass media. Latin
American critical thought, which can boast a long tradition of far-sighted interpretations and
theoretical innovations, is faced with fresh challenges in response to issues such as the new
nationalism, indigenous peoples, the new model of accumulation, processes of socialization and demarketization, and the historical and political future of the continent. In some countriesmost
importantly Boliviathe experiments under way are accompanied by a rich process of reflection
and theoretical elaboration. In others, there is a considerable dissociation, not to say
contradiction, between much of the intelligentsia and the process the rest of the country is
embarked on: the most striking example is Venezuela. In countries with a strong university-based
intelligentsia such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, a significant part of the educated elite will
not commit itself to participating in the principal areas of social and political struggle, even if it
maintains a high standard of intellectual elaboration. The existing theoretical potential may play
an important role in the construction of post-neoliberal models.
Placing the recent wave of market reforms in historical perspective, Santiso develops a message of great
theoretical and practical relevance. He sees Latin Americas development as a series of quests for
utopian solutions to the regions severe and longstanding problems. In his view, this search for
perfection, undertaken both by good revolutionaries from the left and free-marketeers from the right, has been a
recipe for failure. The imposition of rigid, dogmatic blueprints on a complex, messy reality has
been unsuccessful time and time again. The attempt to maximize some goals inevitably entails the neglect
of others, and the resulting imbalances and tensions make these radical experiments
unsustainable. Utopian efforts can destroy existing structures but fail at the patient
rebuilding of a solid institutional framework, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the
credibility and long-term horizon required for successful development. Therefore, Santiso
highlights and celebrates the effort of a number of Latin American countries, especially Chile and Brazil, to
enact and administer the new market model in a pragmatic, prudent fashion. In his interpretation, the Concertacin
governments in Chile and the Cardoso and Lula da Silva administrations in Brazil have pursued an eclectic
approach, combining macroeconomic stability with equity enhancing social programs. They have usefully
unleashed market forces in productive sectors by privatizing public enterprises, but have
guided the newly empowered business sector with stable institutional 201 rules and prudent regulations. By
reconstructing consensual institutions, they have created a firm domestic foundation for
their development efforts. In Santisos view, this pragmatic approach holds the greatest
promise for Latin Americas development. By stopping the pendulum swing between radical proposals
from the left and right, the region attains the stability required for balanced economic and social
progress. As Mexico, Colombia, and several other countries move in the direction traced by Chile
and Brazil, the author sees the prospects as fairly good. But resurgent neopopulism in Argentina
and especially Venezuela poses a threat. Attacking neoliberalism, at least rhetorically, it seeks to revive
elements of the state-interventionist economic nationalism that predated the market reform wave. Santiso condemns
such a return to the past as unpromising, and his book serves as a warning against these siren calls, which have
found considerable resonance in the region and among its academic observers.
hegemony, that is to say, that we have to convince instead of imposing. We need a left that
understands that, more important than what we have done in the past, is what we will do together
in the future to win our sovereigntyto build a society that makes possible the full development
of all human beings: the socialist society of the twenty-first century.
TFCLARL, for instance, is conducive to the rejection of dogmatic positions based on preconceived
blueprints. In addition , the TFCLARLs acceptance of heterogeneity in the absence of both
vanguardism and the prioritization of one social agent over others points in the direction of a
strategy that synthesizes different and at times conflicting interests and visions. Finally, the
TFCLARLs tendency of rejection of dogmatism, celebration of diversity and eclecticism are
ingredients that lend themselves to rich debate on the left as well as rewarding scholarly inquiry.
people's power which any revolutionary process requires-would be made compatible with the maturation of socialist consciousness, which to a
certain extent takes place in the constitutional arena.
governments, groups, and movements that call or consider themselves right-wing or left-wing really
fit into such categories?In this context, the terms left and right need to be operationalized before any discussion can move forward.
For purposes of discussion, the left would best be operationalized or defined as a political position that advocates reform or, in its radical form,
revolution. Its proponents describe it as a position aimed at reducing or ending social inequality whereas its critics view it as either utopian or
destabilizing. On the other hand, the right would best be operationalized or defined as a conservative and reactionary political position. Its
proponents describe it as traditional and a safeguard of stability whereas its critics and opponents say that it supports social hierarchies that
maintain societal inequality. Socio-politically, the terms left and right originate in the upheavals of the French Revolution. The French
Estates-General of the Bourbon monarchy and its revolutionary predecessor, the French National Assembly, became divided between those
groups that supported the Bourbon monarchy, clergy, and old regime and those groups that opposed them in favour of revolution and
republicanism. The supporters of the old regime would sit to the right of the legislative president or speaker in the legislative chamber whereas
those groups that supported change and a new regime would sit to the left. It is also important to note that the right emerged as a reaction to
the formation of the calls for change from the left. A Plethora of Lefts in Latin America. It should be pointed out that contrary to the
highly simplistic dualism portrayed by the US government and most leftists about the
categorization of Latin America into left or right is overly simplistic . Things are actually not clear-cut. This
means that the above operationalized definitions of right and left are essentially ideal-types. The leftist governments and movements of Latin
America are an eclectic bunch.
history and local circumstances/variables that have constructed and influenced each one.
In short, each
one has its own identity. At least at the grassroots level, they want local agency, relatively more inclusive societies, and a reduction of the
influential role of Latin Americas comprador elite oligarchs.
The two-left thesis classifies the TFCLARL as the bad left or populist left, which it contrasts with the allegedly
good left, namely moderates such as Lula. The bad left is distinguished by its
radical rhetoric, intransigence and confrontational tactics . Examples include Lpez Obrador, who created a shadow
cabinet to protest the alleged fraud of the 2006 presidential elections, and Ollanta Humala (at the time of his first presidential bid in 2006), who,
according to Castaeda, attempted to invade Chile in what was really a peaceful symbolic protest in April 2007 to draw attention to Perus
border claims (Castaeda, 2008: 232). The two-left thesis emphasizes personal ambition, style and discourse and in doing so
completely passes over the complex array of groups that form part of the twenty-first century left and the difficult
decisions that have been thrust upon it as a result of its commitment to the pacific road to power.
TFCLARL movements, due to their pronounced internal diversity and contradictions, are even more complex, as is repeatedly recognized by
Latin American leftist theoreticians (Boron, 2008: 126; Dussel, 2008: 72). Thus, for instance, they are committed (and have taken steps) to
overcoming their organizational shortcoming and promoting participatory democracy while in many cases retaining the strong executive powers
of an all-powerful lder mximo. Furthermore, while lacking the blueprints for long-term change of orthodox Marxism, twenty-first century
leftists have defined themselves as socialists and have debated different socialist options, unlike the more ideologically vague classical populism
of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, their ideological vagueness may be a logical response to the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
or in the words of Laclau a precondition to constructing relevant political meaning (Laclau, 2005: 17-18). In short the political
agenda that lies behind the two-left thesis rules out a nuanced analysis of non-Communist
transformational movements in Latin America both in the twentieth century and the present and is
at odds with rich scholarly writing that demonstrates their complex and dynamic nature.
The basic premise of neoliberalism that free markets lead to better growth, higher prosperity
and even more equality was always fiction. As Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has
repeatedly pointed out, there is no such thing as a free market. Nor is there any example of a
country that has developed by following the neoliberal tenets of privatization, liberalization and
budget cuts. Instead countries have traditionally used some mix of subsidies, tariffs, and debtfinanced investment to prop up industries and shift comparative advantage to higher-end goods.
Despite the history, neoliberals argue that markets alone should determine things like wages, and
that corporations and their owners should be able to operate however they like . Developed
countries that adopted neoliberal tenets post-1980 saw wages stagnate almost as quickly as
corporate profits skyrocketed. In the developing world it was much worse. Africa suffered two
decades of economic stagnation as a direct result of being forced to follow these policies, with
Latin Americans and Asians doing not much better. The past decade has seen some improvement,
but the global community is still well behind where it should be in terms of eradicating things
like hunger and preventable disease. But the neoliberal era may finally be nearing its long-awaited
end. Heres why. 1) The IMF has admitted that budget cuts are not always the answer . The IMF
has for over three decades forced countries to restructure their economies to be in line with
neoliberal tenets. In particular, they have forced indebted countries to cut budgets before they can
borrow from capital markets to pay off creditors. The phrases bureaucrats and politicians
invented to sell this ideology are by now clichs. Governments cant spend more than they earn,
We all need to tighten our belts, etc. etc. By cutting government spending, the story goes,
countries make room for increased private sector spending, and the economy grows. Though
earlier IMF studies had come to similar conclusions, it wasnt until January 2013 that the IMFs
chief economist published what amounts to a mea culpa. Turns out that decreasing public
investment is actually a pretty good way to hurt prospects for economic growth rather than increase
them. Oops. And theres another twist in the story. For the last few years, decision makers have
been citing a paper by Harvard economists that ostensibly highlights the dangers of countries
borrowing too much in order to finance public expenditures. The paper specifically suggested a
cutoff when the debt hits 90% of GDP beyond which economies would suffer for their
overspending ways. The paper has been cited by public officials around the globe to justify
budget cuts. But it turns out that the papers conclusions were a result of a series of errors, one of
which was forgetting to update a calculation on an Excel spreadsheet. When the correct data is
put in place, the conclusions more or less disappear. Double oops. 2) The Doha development
round is dead In November, 2001 the World Trade Organization launched its Doha development
round. Despite its name, the Doha round was about anything but development. High on the
agenda were things like removing social and environmental protections, eliminating subsidies for
poor farmers, and ensuring that big pharmaceutical companies could maintain patents on (and
greatly increase the cost of) life-saving medicines. With the help of progressive activists from
Seattle to Hong Kong, and due to the huge uprising of developing countries in the WTOs
Cancun ministerial, Doha is more-or-less dead and the WTO is at a standstill. Thats great news for
those who want to see fair trade as opposed to free trade and trade deals that put development
and human rights first. The challenge now is to come up with a framework (and maybe even a
mechanism) for multilateral regulation of global trade that prioritizes human rights over
corporate profits. 3) Countries are increasingly trading in local currencies Apart from the IMF,
one way for the U.S. to maintain its control over the global economic system is the supremacy of the
U.S. dollar. Certain transactions must be done in U.S. dollars buying petroleum for example and
the U.S. dollar is still seen as the safest global currency. The result is that the dollars value remains
artificially high, increasing the purchasing power of U.S. consumers and the desire of everyone
else to sell to the U.S. This deal benefits almost no one (not even U.S. consumers) and some
governments have begun to look for alternatives. Agreements to begin to trade in local currencies
have been negotiated between Brazil and China, Turkey and Iran, China and Japan, and the
BRICS countries. Though some of these agreements are just taking off, if implemented they
represent a significant challenge to the status quo. 4) 2007-08 proved beyond a doubt that markets
dont regulate themselves. And Iceland proved that there is another way. The financial crisis of
2007-08 is far from the first financial crisis of the neoliberal era; in fact it would also be accurate to
call the neoliberal era the era of financial crisis. From Mexico in 1982, to other countries in
Latin America soon after that, to the U.S. stock market collapse in 1987, to Japan in 1990, to the
Asian financial crisis of 1997, to Russia and Brazil in 1998-99, to Turkey and Argentina in 20002002, to the collapse of the dot com bubble, there has hardly been a moment since 1980 when
there is not a financial crisis happening somewhere. What usually happens in such times is that
governments take measures to protect the elites (usually the bankers who actually caused the
crisis) and shift the burden of paying for the costs to the general public. The current crisis is a
good case in point.
a time when neoliberalism was sharpening its assault on the state, in favour of the market; on
politics, in favour of economics; and on political parties, in favour of corporations, a certain
ambiguity crept into the distinction between movements that championed the social dimension
to the detriment of politics, parties and states, and those same neoliberal arguments. A new
tendency arose within the left or the overall resistance to neoliberalism, embodied in social
movements and NGOs, and articulated around the dichotomy of state versus civil society. The
World Social Forum reinforced this tendency by welcoming social movements and NGOs but
remaining closed to political parties, arguing that this space belonged to civil society.
There are two main problems with this position. Firstly, it blurs the boundaries with neoliberal
discourse, since as we pointed out above, the latter likewise regards the state and party politics as
its great enemies. Secondly, given that neoliberalism is characterized by the wholesale
expropriation of rights, it can only be overcome in the political sphere: through the universalization
of rights enacted by the governing authority of the state . Otherwise, the struggle against
neoliberalism would remain perpetually on the defensive, having discarded the political
instruments necessary for its own realization. Some movements have remained trapped in this
paradox, ostensibly embodying hubs of resistance yet unable to move forward into challenging
neoliberal hegemony, via a fresh articulation of the social with the political. Their critique of the
state is subordinated to the terms of the theoretical discourse of neoliberalism, structured around
the polarization of state versus private. This polarity is designed to demonize the state, take
control of the private sphere (in which market relations are embedded) and abolish the
indispensable framework for the democratization and defeat of neoliberalism: the public sphere.
The real polarization is between the public sphere and the market sphere, in that the neoliberal
project is committed to the infinite extension of market relations, whereas the state is not so much a
pole as a space of hegemonic dispute between the two spheres. The construction of an antineoliberal alternative must begin with the reorganization or recasting of the state in favour of the
public sphere, universalizing citizens rights while divorcing the state and general social
relationships from the market. To democratize means to de-marketize, to recuperate for the terrain
of peoples rights that which neoliberalism has delivered into the hands of the market. Limiting the
field of action to the social as opposed to the political, proclaiming the autonomy of social
movements as a principle, means condemning oneself to impotence, and ultimately to defeat . The
cases of Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina provide instructive examples of these alternatives.
Nicaragua, and three smaller countries from the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The power of
the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil and Lulas presence as a social democratic president there can also be seen as representing a
significant shift leftward. Meanwhile, dissent in Mexico, where millions rose up in protest of the stolen 2006 election, has been growing. Just
over twenty years after the Caracazo,
of socialism worldwide .15 So much so that the United States, as the main imperial power, has sought to
intervene again and againnot only playing a role in the failed military coup against Chvez, but also in the successful 2009 military
coup against Hondurass democratically elected president, Manuel Zelaya, who had brought Honduras into ALBA. Washington has
subsequently given its support to a normalization of the rightward shift in Honduras, and, in the face of the
fierce repression of the protesting Honduran people, has simply looked the other way. Meanwhile, the United States is constructing as
many as seven military bases in Colombia, bordering Venezuela and Ecuador
legitimacy,encouragingconsensusandenablingotherstooverlookdifferencesinvaluesand
internalpolitics.American leadership in a globalizing system, without Cold War simplicities, will
have to measure up to others rising expectations. Issues such as income inequality, race and gender,
the death penalty and the size of the American prison population, energy consumption and
environmental degradation, the electoral system, and the balancing of executive power will greatly
influence the consent others grant to America. Thescenarioalsoplacesextensivedemandson
globalmanagementintworespects.Stronginstitutionsgovernedbymultipleactorsofdiverse
interestsandinternalstructureswillbeinfinitelymorechallengingthanhegemonicstability.The
simplifying assumption that many globalization advocates make in advancing their vision, namely a
growing convergence around a neo-liberal model, would not be permitted in this scenario. Strong
states must reform the present structure and invest it with credibility, then let it work without
assurances that it will not produce unintended consequences for security or growth. Wealsomust
assumethatheterogeneousglobalizationcoexistswiththepersistenceofinsecurity,fromthreats
thatemergeorareenabledbyglobalizationitself,andfrominterstaterivalry. An effective security
architecture that secures a globalization not dominated by any one state or coalition, may be a
logical contradiction. This diminished America-centric vision may thus yield to illiberal
globalization,asecond scenario in which the United States attempts to exert domination over a
rapidly changing global system, blocking (or lacking the power to broker) reform of global
institutions, promoting a neo-liberal agenda for others, while adopting mercantilist policies in the
face of competitive threats from China, India, or the European Union .Under this scenario, China
would aggressively attempt to undermine liberal principles of conditionality, while the European
Union pushes standards of state behavior centered on the environment, human rights, and social
policy.Globalization would continue in the sense of expanded global flows across porous borders,
but these flows would face more restraints, while the global governance structure would become
less legitimate and more of an arena for interstate competition over the rules. Strong governments
would involve themselves deeply in negotiating special advantages for their competitive industries
with one hand, while protecting or subsidizing declining industries with the other .Thisisa
fundamentallydifferentsituationthanexiststoday.
governmentreleasedthe"EconomicandSocialPolicyDevelopmentProject"(Proyectode
LineamientosdelaPolticaEconmicaySocialdelPartidoylaRevolucin),athirtytwopage
bookletthatpresentsthegovernment'splans.75Theultimateaimofthesereformsis,inthe
wordsofRalCastro,topreventCubafromfalling"offacliff"duetoeconomicdisaster.76
Morespecifically,theplanintends"toboostexportsandreducerelianceonimports,andtounify
Cuba'stwincurrenciesofworthlessdomesticpesosandstronger'convertible'ones."77The
specificpointsoftheplanincludeaneconomicmanagementmodelandpoliciesfor
macroeconomics,foreignaffairs,science,technologyandinnovation,health,educationand
employment,agribusiness,industryandenergy,tourism,transportation,housingandwater
resources,andtrade.78Despite the wide range of changes to be implemented and mounting
commentary that such "bold changes . . . may herald the beginning of [Cuban communism's]
end,"79 the plan itself states that "[t]he economic policy in this new phase will follow the principle
that socialism is the only way to overcome our difficulties and [End Page 378] preserve the gains of
the Revolution, and that as we update our economic model, planning will be paramount, not the
market."80Inadditiontotheplan,theCubangovernment,thelargestemployerinthenation,
declareditsintentiontolayoffoveronemillionworkers;byApril1,2011,500,000Cubanswere
scheduledtolosetheirjobs,tobefollowedbyanother800,000workersbefore2013.81
Eventually,"uptotwoinfiveCubanswillnolongerworkforthestate."82Whencomparedto
thecurrentlevelofselfemployment,whichisatabout143,00083ofthe11.2millioncitizens,84
themagnitudeandsignificanceofthelayoffsisbetterunderstood.Inplaceofgovernment
employment,thegovernmentencouragescitizenstoseekselfemploymentorcreateco
operativeswithothers85ashockingdevelopmentforacountrythat,forthelastfortyyears,has
notallowedcitizenstoemployotherCubans,asitisconsideredexploitationbytheCuban
Constitutiontohaveanonfamily"employee."86The178governmentapprovedformsofself
employmentincludeeightythreeprofessionsinwhichnonrelativeemployeesmaybehiredand
twentyninepreviouslyunauthorizedprofessionsandconsistofawiderangeofprofessions,
includingfoodvendors,sportstrainers,stonemasons,bookkeepers,autobodyworkers,andother
varioustrades.87Inexchangeforworkingintheprivatesector,theselfemployedwillpaytaxes
rangingfromtwentyfivetofiftypercentoftheirpersonalincome.88Thechangesproposedby
Cubadiffermarkedlyfromthoseofthepast,89raisingquestionsaboutthefuturetrajectoryof
thisreform.ThisisespeciallysoifCubaeventuallybecomesahybridormarketbased[End
Page379]economy.Despite such conjecture, the Cuban government remains committed to its
Marxist-Leninist roots; in the words of Marino Murillo Jorge, the Cuban Economic and Planning
Minister, "[t]here is no reform, it is an update of the economic model. No one thinks that we are
going to turn over property: we are going to administer it in another way." 90Juan Triana, an
economist at the University of Havana, declared these economic reforms are the most important for
Cuba since 1975, because "[i]t reaffirms the revolutionary essence of our political system, but
changes the philosophy of our economic management."91Ultimately,theCubangovernment,out
ofnecessity,aimstorestructureitseconomicsystemtoincreasethenowlackingproductivity
andefficiencythatcontinuetoplaguethecountryandtocounterbalancemanyfundamental
benefitsprovidedbytheCubangovernment,includingfreehealthcareandeducation,allwithin
thecontextofitscurrentpoliticalideology.92As such, Cuba remains resolute in its resistance to
the predominant models of globalization, and due to the flexibility of globalization, it will be able to
do so.
As many have noted, the Cuban government responded in a pragmatic (and often uncoordinated)
manner to the economic and political circumstances thrust upon it.2 The actions of the Cuban
government can be divided into distinct phases. The first, from 1990-1993, can be seen as a type
of Cuban Astructural adjustment program@ (SAP). Although the policies were not adopted at the
insistence of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, they were very reminiscent of
the SAPs imposed on much of Latin America in the 1980s. In the main, the Cuban government
placed severe restrictions on domestic consumption and attempted to redirect economic ties to the
capitalist economies (save the United States, which rejected opening economic relations with the
island). From 1993 to 1994, Cuba deepened its SAP approach while adding a dash of A Cuban
perestroika.@ Thus, the government cut subsidies, raised public utility prices, began to charge
for previously free services, and engaged in price increases. Furthermore, it cut the size of the
Cuban state. All of these measures would have been applauded by the World Bank and the IMF.
At the same time, a A restructuring@A of the Cuban economy began. This Cuban perestroika
most notably allowed for official acceptance of dollarized economy through the decriminalization
of use of hard currency (the US dollar). At the same time, state farms were transformed into
cooperatives to increase food production by the introduction of monetary/market incentives.
And, the Cuban government authorized various forms of self-employment. For students of
globalization, it is the period from 1995 on that represents the most interesting phase of Cuban
economic reform. Some might argue that this marks the beginning of policies that created a
distinct Cuban approach to the globalization phenomena. A central piece is the modification of
policies and regulations governing joint ventures with foreign capital. Changes in Cuban law
allowed for: unrestricted repatriation of profits and dividends; 100% foreign ownership of
property; guarantee of the right to invest in real estate; the creation of export processing zones
(EPZ); laws offering protection against expropriation; and the opening of all sectors to foreign
investment except public health, education, and defense. Many are surprised to find that Cuba is
an original member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
ProfessorofHealthEconomics,Rosa,ReviewofRadicalPoliticalEconomics,Cubaandthe
BattleofIdeas:AJumpAhead)
During the years 19891993, Cuban reform prioritized increasing the inflow of foreign currency
and the minimization of the social impact that the external adjustment would inevitably cause.
Stateplanningwasthecentralinstrumenttoachieve,inanorderlyandcoherentmanner,aseries
ofstepswhichwouldstrengthenthecountrysproductiveapparatusandtheeconomicsystemas
awhole(Hernndez,etal.2003).Among the strategies adopted by the Cuban government, the
following stand out:a)concentration of investments in activities which could earn more foreign
currency;b)use of foreign capital as a complement for national resources in order to attain goals
related to technology, markets, and financial resources;c)development of international tourism
and biotechnology;d)flexibilization and decentralization of export activities;e)further
development of the program of improved nourishment;f)improvement of the levels of application
of science and technology in the sectors in which the highest levels had already been achieved ;g)
revaluationoftheCubanpeso,whichwouldmakeitpossibleforsalariestorecover;h)priority
for social programs, such as health and education(Borrego2006).TheCubangovernmentwas
awarethatthestepstakenwouldnotproduceimmediateresults.Thatiswhyitestablisheda
widerangingprocessofdiscussionofthestepsbyholdingnumerousassembliesofworkers,in
neighborhoodsandinvariouspopulartribunals,whichledtotheeventualapprovalinMay1994
oftheProgramofStepsforFinancialSanitationbytheNationalAssemblyofthePeoples
Power.Themainstepsincludedinthatprogramreferredtotheincreaseinthepricesofcigarettes
andalcoholicbeverages,andtoadecreaseintheconsumptionofelectricity,water,and
transportation;decreasingoreliminatingsubsidiestocompanies;chargingforsomesports
activities;aswellasthegradualintroductionofataxsystem.Between1992and1995,other
stepsweredefinedbytheParliament,bytheStateCouncil,andbytheCouncilofMinisters.
Already in 1992 the Constitution was altered, eliminating the states monopoly of foreign trade and
acknowledging the existence of new forms of property, such as mixed companies and associations.
Beginning in 1993, steps with a structural character were taken. Networks of stores were created
for the sale of products and services in foreign currency or in convertible pesos; thelatterweresold
inbureausofexchangeorgivenasastimulusfortheresultsofworkinsomesectors.Selfemployment was extended to relieve the employment situation, and in agriculture the Basic Units
for Cooperative Production were created and received the usufruct of 64 per- cent of the land
previously operated by the state.In1994,theStatesCentralAdministrationwasrestructured,
with,ontheonehand,theeliminationof15ministriesandnationalinstitutionsand,ontheother
hand,thecreationoftheMinistryofForeignInvestmentandCollaboration.Inthatsameyear
agricultural markets and markets for industrial and craftsmanship products were created in which
products are sold at unregulated prices, and a scheme was introduced for self-financing in foreign
currency for some economic activities.Furtherworkincentiveswerealsoadoptedinsome
industries,whichincludedthepaymentofapartofsalariesinforeigncurrency,thatisin
convertiblepesos.
worldmodel,norisitaboutafewtemplatesforengagement;ratheritcreates,embraces,and
elevatesdifferences,linkages,andinterplaybetweencountries.Indeed, globalization is a
powerful, transformative force that prevents any state from remaining in isolation if it hopes to
survive. It is also a force that does not require homogenization for states to integrate into the global
community. Cuba's policies, if successful, will provide it with the requisite stability to engage in the
global economy.144Cubanreformshowsthatthestate,asanactor,mayremainideologically
resolute,yetalteritseconomytoenterintoaglobalizedsociety.Certainly, globalization does not
mark the end of socialist Cuba, but instead draws all parties in the global economy to common
engagement to succeed.
The U.S. is using the embargo to take advantage of Cuba, there are still economic
opportunities being seized by capitalists
Bliss 2006
(Dr. Susan, Director Global Education NSW, SUSTAINABILITY OF MODERN CUBAS
POST
REVOLUTION GLOBALISATION PROCESS, Australian Geography Teachers Association,
in Geographical Education 2006, Vol 19)
Since 1990s with increasing information technology and globalisation the
economically isolate Cuba was nullified with $100 million from Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) and $26 million from Iran
Development Bank and in 2004, Cuba signed investment agreements with China and Venezuela in biotechnology, mining, oil, energy,
telecommunications, agriculture, education and tourism. In reality these new global links demonstrate US6 unilateral actions have little chance
of working as long as other countries are willing to supply Cuba with desperately needed financial resources (Spadoni, 2005 b). Cuba's
front door may be closed to US investors but back door is wide open (Spadoni, 2005a) in this interconnected,
interdependent globalised world. One wonders about the effectiveness of economic sanctions to achieve US
ambitious foreign policy goals and the uncanny tactical dexterity displayed by Castro.
The Embargo enables Cuba to diversify exports and maintain its economy
Gonzalez 04
(Carmen,Teachesenvironmentallawfundamental,internationalenvironmentallaw,and
internationaltradelawattheUniversityofSeattle,TradeLiberalization,FoodSecurity,andthe
Environment:TheNeoliberalThreattoSustainableRuralDevelopment,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=carmen_gonzalez)
ThesagaofCubanagricultureillustratesthewaysinwhichdevelopingcountriesarestructurally
disadvantagedintheglobaltradingsystembythecolonialandpostcolonialdivisionoflabor
thatrelegatesthemtotheproductionofprimaryagriculturalcommodities.Cubas integration into
the world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured goods and food
products so deeply constrained its development options that not even a socialist revolution could
alter these pre-existing trade and production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist
trading bloc and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by external
circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners, decentralize agricultural
production, prioritize domestic food production, and promote organic and semi-organic farming
techniques.
(ROBERT ; analyst and writer for Cuba-L Direct; A Tale of Two Summits
Obama and Latin America: No Light, All Tunnel; http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/05/13/obamaand-latin-america-no-light-all-tunnel/)
Where the Port of Spain summiteers tinker with things as they are ,
diplomats from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC. But shortly
after these talks were held, the State Department issued its annual list of
state sponsors of terrorism. Cuba is still on it. A travel rule is not a foreign policy Actions
like that are extensions of Bushs Cuba policy and beg the question, just how meaningful is Obamas relaxation of the
Bush travel restrictions, which got so much attention in Port of Prince? Answer: not very much. The new travel rules
Obama announced, which had already been legislated by Congress the previous month, are tactical details and should
not be confused with policy. The policy underlying the regulatory minutia of travel licenses, per diem travel
expenditures, cash remittances or the definition of a "relative" remains, as it was in 2004, the destruction of the
Cuban revolution. Determined to find a hint of policy change in Obamas announcement, the media generally forgot
that Bushs hardening of the rules on family travel and remittances took up only a few paragraphs in the first Report
of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (2004). The rest of the 450-page report is an overthrow manual.
The grand objectives of the report are: "Bring an end to the ruthless and brutal dictatorship; assist the Cuban people
in a transition to representative democracy; and assist the Cuban people in establishing a free market economy." The
role of the travel restrictions in that scheme is to help "reduce the regimes manipulation of family visits to generate
hard currency." Little was said about the damage to families aside from quite illogically claiming that reducing family
travel and remittances would somehow preserve and promote "legitimate family ties and humanitarian relief for the
Cuban people."[10] In 2006, the commission found more ways to get rid of the Cuban revolution and issued a
second report.[11] Obamas "reform" should be read in the context of these reports. With the Castro government gone,
the commission expects the United States to engage in neighborly acts of kindness reminiscent of the previous
interventions of 1898-1902 and 1906-1909. It would busy itself fixing roads and ports, sewers and water purification
plants, installing US models for education and healthcare, US-style multi-party elections and, of course, "business."
The commission insists that the Castro government has impoverished the Cuban people. To remedy that, it
recommends further tightening the economic blockade by such measures as setting up a Cuban Nickel Targeting Task
Force to strangle Cuban cobalt and nickel exports. Nothing coming out of the Obama administration so far appears to
deviate from the fundamental policy. The Washington Post reported that, according to White House officials, lifting
the travel and remittances restrictions would support Cuban dissidents with money. As for allowing US
telecommunications firms to do business in Cuba, the officials said that move would "flood Cuba with information
while providing new opportunities for businesses."[12] We may be forgiven for thinking Obama wanted people in the
United States to visit their relatives in Cuba, take them some cash, maybe some underwear that sort of thing. What
they would really be doing, says a White House Fact Sheet, is supporting "the Cuban peoples desire for freedom and
self-determination."[13] The next time you see Obama, ask him which of the other Bush "recommendations to
hasten the end of the Castro dictatorship" he would like to abolish next. Sanctions still preferred When you look for
signs that Obama is about to distance himself from the sanctions policy and enter the unexplored land of diplomacy
with Cuba, you find that sanctions are still the weapon of choice. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apparently thinks
the proper role of diplomacy is to get other countries to help apply crushing sanctions. In an Asia Times piece,
Shahir Shahidsaless notes that Clinton recently told Congress, "We actually believe that by following the diplomatic
path we are on, we gain credibility and influence with a number of nations who would have to participate in order to
make the sanctions regime [on Iran] as tight and as crippling as we would want it to be."[14] Assuming that
Cuba remains bound by the unshakable insistence of Fidel and Raul Castro
that it will not surrender the revolution to win approval from the United
States, it is unlikely that Obama will in the near future lift the blockade. To
do without the concessions Obama demands would, after 47 years of lowintensity warfare against the island, hand the United States a historic
defeat and force upon it a humiliating admission that a socialist
alternative to capitalism is viable and acceptable.
large and dynamic network of SMSBs [small and medium sized businesses] that are firmly rooted
in the local area (TN: 123). Finally, production processes must become locally centered or
endogenized (TN: 124). Examining the case of non-governmental
Socialism is dead. Kaput. Stick a fork in Lenin's corpse. Take the Fidel posters off the wall. Welcome to the twenty-first century. Wake
up and smell the capitalism. I have no particular hostility to socialism. But nothing can kill a good idea in America so quickly as
sticking the "socialist" label on it. The reality in America is that socialism is about as successful as Marxist footwear (and have you ever seen a
sickle and hammer on anybody's shoes?). Allow your
capitalist health care plan?), and the idea is doomed. Instead of fighting to repair the tattered remnants of socialism as a marketing
slogan, the left needs to address the core issues of social justice. You can form the word socialist from the letters in social justice, but it sounds
better if you don't. At least 90 percent of America opposes socialism, and 90 percent of America thinks "social justice" might be a good idea. Why
alienate so many people with a word? Even the true believers hawking copies of the Revolutionary Socialist Worker must realize by now that the
word socialist doesn't have a lot of drawing power. In the movie Bulworth, Warren Beatty declares: "Let me hear that dirty word: socialism!"
Socialism isn't really a dirty word, however; if it were, socialism might have a little underground appeal as a forbidden topic. Instead, socialism is
a forgotten word, part of an archaic vocabulary and a dead language that is no longer spoken in America. Even Michael Harrington, the founder
of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), didn't use the word socialism in his influential book on poverty, The Other America. The
best
reason for the left to abandon socialism is not PR but honesty. Most of the self-described
"socialists" remaining in America don't qualify as real socialists in any technical sense. If you look at
the DSA (whose prominent members include Harvard professor Cornel West and former Time columnist Barbara Ehrenreich ), most of the
policies they urge-a living wage, universal health care, environmental protection, reduced
spending on the Pentagon, and an end to corporate welfare-have nothing to do with socialism in
the specific sense of government ownership of the means of production. Rather, the DSA
program is really nothing more than what a liberal political party ought to push for, if we had one
in America. Europeans, to whom the hysteria over socialism must seem rather strange, would never consider abandoning socialism as a
legitimate political ideology. But in America, socialism simply isn't taken seriously by the mainstream.
Therefore, if socialists want to be taken seriously, they need to pursue socialist goals using
nonsocialist rhetoric. Whenever someone tries to attack an idea as "socialist" (or, better yet, "communist"), there's an easy answer:
Some people think everything done by a government, from Social Security to Medicare to public schools to public libraries, is socialism. The rest
of us just think it's a good idea. (Whenever possible, throw public libraries into an argument, whether it's about good government programs or
NEA funding. Nobody with any sense is opposed to public libraries. They are by far the most popular government institutions.) If an argument
turns into a debate over socialism, simply define socialism as the total government ownership of all factories and natural resources--which, since
we don't have it and no one is really arguing for this to happen, makes socialism a rather pointless debate. Of course, socialists will always argue
among themselves about socialism and continue their internal debates. But when it comes to influencing public policy, abstract
discussions about socialism are worse than useless, for they alienate the progressive potential of
the American people. It's only by pursuing specific progressive policies on nonsocialist terms
that socialists have any hope in the long term of convincing the public that socialism isn't (or
shouldn't be) a long-dead ideology.
positiveandrobustacrosstheregioninrecentyears,hyperinflationisafadingmemory,and
soundfiscalmanagementhasneverbeensowidespread.Theregionspeoplearericherand
livinglongerthaneverbefore.EveninequalitythatchronicbaneofLatinAmerican
societieshasfalleninBrazilandMexico.Yetoverthenextquartercentury,thisregionof33
nationsand600millionpeoplefacespowerfulforcesofchangefromoutsideandwithin.Latin
Americansocietiesareagingrapidly,anddemographicchangeisforcingthemtoconfrontnew
socialandeconomicproblems.TheriseofIndiaandChinaisgeneratingenormouslylucrative
opportunitiesforsomeLatinAmericancountriesbutcreatingseriouscompetitivedifficultiesfor
others.ClimatechangepotentiallythreatensCentralAmericanandCaribbeannationswith
destructionanddislocation.A growing middle class is chang- ing domestic political dynamics.
What will these trends mean for Latin America in the next 25 years? What will the region look like
in 2033?AfewthemeswillbecentraltoLatinAmericasstoryinthenextquartercentury.To
undertakecrystalballgazingexercisesthatproduceusefulinsights,thekeyistofocuson
variablesthatarecriticaltoasocietysfuturebutthatarerelativelyinflexibleintheshortor
mediumtermforexample,acountrysindustrialstructureandtheagedistributionofits
population.Thesecharacteristicsprovidecluesabouthowasocietysmorevolatiledimensions,
suchasitspoliticsandeconomy,mightevolve.TheGrayingofLatinAmericaAs countries get
richer, they experience de- mographic change. Over the past half-cen- tury, as the economies of
Latin America grew, life expectancy increased, infant mor- tality declined, and parents chose to
have fewer children. The number of children per woman fell from 5.9 in the 1950s to 2.5 by the
early twenty-first century. Today, the av- erage Latin American lives roughly 72 years, almost as
long as his or her European and North American counterpart. These trends are likely to continue.
According to the United Nations, Latin Americas birthratewillfallfurther,to1.9childrenper
womanby2030.Lifeexpectancyatbirthmayapproximate 78 years by then.Asaresult,the
numberofLatinAmericansaged65andolderwillrisesteadilyindeed,thatagegroupwill
increasefasterthanotheragegroups,atabout3percentperyear.By2033,Latin America will
look a lot like the advanced economies of Europe and North America today, at least in demographic terms.Cuba and Uruguay will have the most people over 60 as a percentage of their
populations, followed by Chile and Ar- gentina. In 25 years, Brazil will have a ratio of old to young
comparable to that of Canada today.ChilewillhavetheagedistributionofpresentdayAustria,
andArgentinawilllookliketodaysNorway.Tokeepthingsinperspective,overallLatin
AmericawillremainmoreyouthfulthanEuropeandJapan.In 2033, some 15 percent of Latin
Americans will be over 60, but in Europe, the number will be closer to 30 percent. Still, by the
standards of devel- oping Asia and Africa, Latin America will be at a distinctly more advanced
stage of maturity.LatinAmerica,alongwiththeUnitedStates,willcometooccupyaninter
mediatepositionbetweentherichestbutdemographicallystagnant,societiesoftheglobalNorth
andthepoor,butfastgrowing,countriesofthedevelopingSouth.(OnekeyexceptionisChina,
whichwillcometoresembleLatinAmericasmorematurecountries.)
smokestacks and water pipes. As we learned to do more and more with a given unit of resources, the waste
involved (which manifests itself in the form of pollution) shrank. This trend was magnified by the shift away from
manufacturing to service industries, which characterizes wealthy, growing economies. The latter are far less
Property
rights -- a necessary prerequisite for free market economies -- also provide
strong incentives to invest in resource health. Without them, no one cares
about future returns because no one can be sure they'll be around to reap
the gains. Property rights are also important means by which private
desires for resource conservation and preservation can be realized. When
the government, on the other hand, holds a monopoly on such decisions,
minority preferences in developing societies are overruled (see the old
Soviet block for details). Furthermore, only wealthy societies can aord the
investments necessary to secure basic environmental improvements, such
as sewage treatment and electrification. Unsanitary water and the indoor
air pollution (caused primarily by burning organic fuels in the home for
heating and cooking needs) are directly responsible for about 10 million
deaths a year in the DEVELOPING[SIC]Third World, making poverty the
number one environmental killer on the planet today. Capitalism can save
more lives threatened by environmental pollution than all the environmental
organizations combined. Finally, the technological
pollution-intensive than the former. But the former are necessary prerequisites for the latter.
advances that are part and parcel of growing economies create more
natural resources than they consume. That's because what is or is not a
"natural resource" is dependent upon our ability to harness the resource in
question for human benefit. Resources are therefore a function of human
knowledge. Because the stock of human knowledge increases faster in free
economies than it does in socialist economies, it should be no surprise that
most natural resources in the western world are more abundant today than
ever before no matter which measure one uses.
Kim 7
[Anthony B. Kim, Policy Analyst in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The
Heritage Foundation, The Link between Economic Freedom and Human Rights, September 28,
2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/wm1650.cfm]
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, President Bush urged the nations of the world to work together "to free people
considerable contributions to development economics, once noted that "Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave
economic freedom in a nation, the easier for its people to work, save, consume, and ultimately live their lives in dignity and peace.
This
relationship
published annually
by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, which measures economic freedom around the globe. The Index identifies strong synergies
among the 10 key ingredients of economic freedom, which include, among others, openness to the world, limited government intervention, and strong
The empirical findings of the Index confirm that greater economic freedom
empowers people and improves quality of life by spreading opportunities
within a country and around the world. As Chart 1 clearly demonstrates, there is a robust relationship between
economic freedom and prosperity. People in countries with either "free" or "mostly free"
economies enjoy a much higher standard of living than people in countries with "mostly unfree" or
rule of law.
"repressed" economies.[3]
Citizens in nations that are built on greater economic freedom enjoy greater access to ideas and resources, which are the forces that let "all of us
exchange, interact and participate"[4] in an increasingly interconnected world. Access, another form of freedom that has practical promise, is an
important transmitting mechanism that allows improvements in human development and fosters better democratic participation. A new cross-country
study, recently commissioned and published by the FedEx Corporation, measures the level of access that a nation's people, organizations, and
government enjoy in comparison to the world and to other countries. The study looks into trade, transport, telecommunication, news, media, and
information services in 75 countries.
Higher economic freedom also has a strong positive correlation with the United
Nation's Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, literacy, education, and standard
of living for countries worldwide.[6]By creating virtuous cycles and reinforcing mechanisms, the prosperity created by economic freedom
results in reduced illiteracy (through greater access to education) and increased life expectancy (through access to higher quality health care and food
supplies).[7]
Debate over the relationship between economic freedom and political freedom and the question of causation has been somewhat controversial due to
On the one
hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second
place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.
The cause of freedom has swept around the world over the last century. It is the compelling force of economic freedom that empowers people, unleashes
freedom's
champions must confront both the dark ideology of extremists and
those who would restore the failed socialist models of the past. Confidence
in, and commitment to, economic freedom as a liberating force must continue to serve as
the foundation of open societies and human rights.
powerful forces of choice and opportunity, and gives nourishment to other liberties. As the 21st century progresses,
when entrepreneurs say that globalization, rather than their own decisions, is forcing them to pollute the environment, cut jobs, or
raise their own salaries. And globalization doesn't usually get any credit when good things happen
when the environment improves, the economy runs at high speed and poverty diminishes. Then
there are plenty of people willing to accept full responsibility for the course of events.
Globalization does not defend itself. So if the trend toward greater globalization is to continue,
an ideological defense will be needed for freedom from borders and controls .
Apocalyptic predictions about the ills of capitalism will not motivate activismpractical
reforms are the only hope for the left.
Wilson, 2000 Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe 2000 (John K. Wilson, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence
People p. 14- 15)
Leftists also need to abandon their tendency to make apocalyptic predictions. It's always
tempting to predict that environmental destruction is imminent or the stock market is ready to
crash in the coming second Great Depression. Arguments that the U.S. economy is in terrible
shape fly in the face of reality. It's hard to claim that a middle-class American family with two cars, a big-screen TV, and a
computer is oppressed. While the poor in America fell behind during the Reagan/Gingrich/Clinton era and the middle class did not receive its
share of the wealth produced during this time, the economy itself is in excellent shape. Instead,
hyperinflation and stabilize the economy, they imposed harsh budget austerity, dismissed many
government employees, privatized public enterprises, opened their economies to foreign trade,
and removed myriad regulations and controls. These draconian measures created tremendous
short-term costs for influential, well-organized sectors of business and labor (see Haggard and
Kaufman 1995, parts 2-3; Murillo 2001; Stokes 2001a; Teichman 2001; Corrales 2002; Weyland
2002). How did these profound reforms, which revamped the development model of many
countries, affect democracy? Did they really threaten the survival of competitive civilian rule?
Did they undermine the quality of democracy, as governments used autocratic means to impose
draconian changes, restrict popular participation, and thus limit opposition and protest against
these controversial measures? In sum, how compatible have democracy and neoliberalism been
in contemporary Latin America? The available evidence suggests that the record has been
mixed, but overall more favorable than many observers feared. Neoliberalism clearly has not
destroyed competitive civilian rule in the region; it has actually helped to secure the survival of
democracy, as defined in minimal procedural terms. Drastic market reform, however, seems, on
balance, to have limited and weakened the quality of democracy in Latin America
Weisbrot and others on the intellectual left imagine or think. First, there is little difference in the
actual policies pursued by the ostensibly anti-neoliberal regimes on the center-left and those , such
As found in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru that are overtly neoliberal in their policies and aligned
with the United States. The dominant Feature of these policies is their origin in what has been
described as A post-Washington Consensus on the need to "bring the state back in" and for a more
pragmatic, more socially inclusive form of neoliberalism and development (Ocampo, 2006, 2007;
Sunkel and Infanre, 2009). Under this consensus, virtually all governments, regardless of
ideological orientation Or regime type, introduced a new poverty targeted social policy and pursued
a "pro-poor" approach in the Implementation of neoliberalism.
making of public policy to central bankers, and why do their ranks include so few committed
Keynesians, let alone socialists, willing to champion solidaristic alternatives? Why is there no
broad coalition of new-New Dealers: trade unionists, unemployed and precarious work- ers;
feminists, ecologists and anti-imperialists; social democrats and democratic socialists ? Why no
Popular Front insisting that the costs of fictitious commodification should be paid, not by
society as such, nor by nature reduced to a sink, but by those whose relentless drive to accumulate capital precipitated the crisis? Why have the creative protests of the indignados and
Occupy movements failed to find any coherent, sus- tained political expression that could mount a
credible challenge to those malefactors of wealth, as Franklin Roosevelt would have called them,
and to the governments who do their bidding?
Several explanations suggest themselves. The simplest attributes the absence of a double
movement to failures of political leadership. This hypothesis must have leapt out at anyone who
followed the us Presidential campaign. To the dismay of many, Barack Obama proved unwilling
or unable to articulate an alternative to the unabashed neo- liberalism of Romney and Ryan. In
the Presidential debate of 3 October 2012, for example, the moderator fed the incumbent a
softball question: how does your view of the role of government differ from Romneys? It would
take a psychoanalyst to plumb the full depths of the Presidents failure to offer a full-throated
answer, the hesitancy expressed in his body language and tone of voice, and the embarrassed
character of his response:
Well I definitely think there are differences. The first role of the federal government is to keep
the American people safe . . . But I also believe that government has the capacitythe federal
government has the capacityto help open up opportunity and create ladders of opportunity, and
to cre- ate frameworks where the American people can succeed . . . the genius of America is the
free-enterprise system, and freedom, and the fact that people can go out there and start a business
. . . But as Abraham Lincoln understood, there are also some things we do better together . . .
Because we want to give these gateways of opportunity to all Americans, because if all
Americans are getting opportunity, were all going to be better off.
Contrast this with Franklin Roosevelt boldly mocking his market- fundamentalist opponents as
he campaigned for re-election in 1936; here again, the transcript cannot do justice to Roosevelts
deliveryhis self-assured sarcasm and evident pleasure in mocking his opponents transparent
bad faith:
Let me warn you and let me warn the nation, against the smooth evasion that says: Of course we
believe these thingswe believe in social security, we believe in work for the unemployed, we
believe in saving homes. Cross our hearts and hope to die, we believe in all these things. But we
do not like the way the present administration is doing them. Just turn them over to us. We will
do all of them, we will do more of them, we will do them better, and most important of all, the
doing of them will not cost anybody anything.5
The comparison shows that the hypothesis of leadership failure has gen- uine force. A charismatic
individual can indeed make a difference to the course of history, and the prospects for a double
movement today would certainly improve if FDR, and not Obama, were leading the charge.
Nevertheless, this idea does not suffice to explain why there is no double movement in the present
conjuncture. It would be one thing if we were dealing here with the foibles of a single individua l.
But Obamas weak- ness is hardly unique. It is the broader patternthe across-the-board
collapse of political Keynesianism among the elitesthat must be explained. Faced with the
failure of an entire ruling stratum to make any serious attempt to stop an impending train wreck,
we cannot restrict ourselves to hypotheses centred on individual psychology.
The Political Left and the Social Movements In the 1990s and at the beginning of the new
millennium the peasant and indigenous movements were playing a major role in some countries
in Latin America. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Central America, and
Paraguay, peasant and indigenous movements were involved in either overthrowing neoliberal
regimes, building powerful regional movements with impacts on national policy , helping to elect
center-left presidents and or, in a few cases, providing mass support for guerrilla movements.
Most of these social movements were effective "veto groups" in the making of national political
agendas. As important political actors, these movements were allies much sought after by selfdeclared center-left electoral politicians and parties to counteract the patronage politics of rightwing agromineral elites. The moment of triumph of the movements, their recognition as central
actors in national politics, as potential makers and breakers of the electoral fortunes of urban-led
political parties and leaders, was also the beginning of the end of their role as representative agents
of the mass base. Peasant and indigenous leaders were divided. Some maintained their Principled
demands and remained loyal to their constituents, while Others succumbed to the blandishments
or political favors of government jobs, EU- and US-supplied NGO funds, or micro project loans
Administered by international banks. Social movement leaders, activists, and supporters witnessed
their center-left political allies turn to the right , embracing an agromineral export strategy and
abandoning promises of land reform, food security, and funding for cooperative agriculture. The
result was a visible loss of political initiative, internal divisions, and mass defections and, in
some cases, the transformation of the movements into transmission belts of official policies
leading to partial demobilization and the loss of "street power."
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Japandespite its cultural distinctiveness
embraced the basic assumptions of Western capitalism, adapting the system to the national
context. In the last two decades China, undefeated in war, has taken on the same priorities,
transforming its social habits, customs and values at a pace previously unseen in Eastern culture.
In Western Europe social democracy has become the main mouthpiece of neoliberalism. In Latin
America, traditional populist tendencies always characterized by a real or rhetorical nationalism
have played the same role, here opting for extreme variants of neoliberalism, with the PRI in
Mexico and Menem in Argentina as the prime examples. With the disappearance of socialism from
the current historical horizonand with it, all discussion of capitalism as a historically determined social systemthe Left was disarmed in face of the conservative counter-offensive launched
by Reagan and Thatcher, and continued by Clinton and Blair. It has abandoned strategic
programmes for the con- struction of a new type of society and turned to defending the rights of the
oppressed, or to creating local and sectoral sites of resistance. The proliferation of alternative
municipal governments and NGOs are the best examples of this. The project of building an
alternative to capitalism was abandoned in favour of resistance from withinopposition to
neoliberalism rather than to the overall system. Anti-totalitarianism now mutated into an
antagonism towards any overarching analysisany attempt to see historical processes as a whole.
These would inevitably result in reduc- tive programmes with the state as their monolithic agent.
Pluralist democracy demanded more complex diagnoses, irreducible to the economism
attributed to (actually existing) Marxism, and would there- fore renounce grand narratives. It
was in this context that local and sectoral forms of resistanceecologi- cal, feminist, ethnic, human
rights, municipal democracycombined to form the movement that, together with union
organizations and anti-WTO groups, would surface so explosively in Seattle in November 1999.
If they represent an advance, in creating new spaces in which opposition forces can come
together, many of them also implicitly renounce any attempt to construct an alternative society:
as if our indefi- nite confinement within the limits of capitalism and liberal democracy was
accepted as fact.
movements. With growing unemployment in Europe, unions were thrown onto the defensive,
mounting at best a partial resist- ance to flexibilization while rapidly losing members. In the
increasingly informal and heterogeneous world of labour that was emerging, tradi- tional methods
of organizing had ever less effect. Parties had to confront the universalization of neoliberal
policies. European social democracy adapted to this at the very moment when, for the first time,
the Centre- Left was in power in nearly every EU state; the Communist parties of the region
shrivelled, or vanished altogether. A similar scenario was enacted in Eastern Europe, where
former Communist parties took up a radical- ized neoliberalism or local versions of the Third
Way. The magnitude of this defeat for the Leftits depth and reachhas not been sufficiently
evaluated. Its principal component is the victory of liberalism, on both the economic and political
planes. Economically, the expansion of the financial sphere, deregulation and the market-led annulment of social benefits have dissolved the foundations of the welfare state. Commercialization has
absorbed and penetrated the field of social relations, daily practice and consciousness, becoming the
lodestone of ideological life. The corporation now plays a leading role in deter- mining economic
processes, to the detriment of social forcesunions, partiespremised on more associative forms
of life and opposed to the unlimited extension of the market. Politically, with the displacement of
the capitalism/socialism binary by that of democracy/totalitarianism, liberalism conquered
hitherto undreamt-of areas of the Left. Neoliberal economics and representative democracy were
embraced as the defin- itive form of politics by huge swathes of the traditional Left. Parallel to this,
imperialism as current historical reality disappeared from the political lexicon, enabling the US to
impose its international hegemony, as the model of both democracy and economic success its
deregu- lated Anglo-Saxon system triumphantly counterposed to the remnants of the European
welfare state. Economic progress was identified with free capital flows; levels of deregulation
became the measure of poten- tial growth. The process took globalization as its logo, to underline
its distinction from backward national models, asserting the international movement of capital as
the only possible paradigm.
The alternative is not possible: It lacks any strategy, it has poor representation, and
it lacks political strength
Sader 02
(Emir Sader is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of So Paolo and
Director of the Latin American Social Science Research Council, Beyond Civil Society: The
left after Porto Alegre, new left review, newleftreview.org/article/download_pdf?id=2411)
The movement reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the struggle against neoliberalism. Its
virtues include the high level of some of the theoretical contributions, whether global or sectoral
analyses; the social heterogeneitytrade unions, environmental, gender and ethnic groups
alongside political, intellectual and cultural figures; and the moral certainty that the great themes
confronting humankind at the beginning of the twenty-first century will be discussed here, not at
Davos. Deficiencies include the inability to convert these benefits into political strengthwhether
at the level of governments and parliaments, or as mass mobilizationsthat could effectively
exercise a veto on the reigning neoliberal policies, or take other innovative forms of political action.
There is also a weakness in the whole field of economics. The movement lacks any strategy for
transforming the growing feelings of exasperation and distrust of neoliberal dogma into an
alternative policy, or at the very least a project to curb the speculative movement of capital and
point towards new forms of international trade. Another shortcoming is the uneven participation in
the Forums, with very poor representation from some of the core countries the US, Germany,
Japan, Britainor emerging superpowers such as China and India.
rebellion are being mobilized by a broad range of class- and community-based social
movements, with the support of some progressive NGOs and the state of Venezuela. In this
context the immediate prospects for substantive social change in the direction of radical
egalitarianism and regional liberation-the socialism of the twenty-first century are dim. The
forces of resistance are resilient but the obstacles are formidable, demanding of the Left a response
for which it has nor yet demonstrated a capacity.
Not even an event as spectacular as the spontaneous meltdown of a superpower and all its client
states was enough to impart the message of economic freedom. And the truth is that it was not necessary. The
whole of our world is covered with lessons about the merit of economic liberty over central
planning. Our everyday lives are dominated by the glorious products of the market, which we all gladly take for granted. We can open up our
web browsers and tour an electronic civilization that the market created, and note that government never did anything useful at all by comparison.
We are also inundated daily by the failures of the state. We complain constantly that the educational system is broken,
that the medical sector is oddly distorted, that the post office is unaccountable, that the police abuse
their power, that the politicians have lied to us, that tax dollars are stolen, that whatever
bureaucracy we have to deal with is inhumanly unresponsive. We note all this. But far fewer are somehow able to
connect the dots and see the myriad ways in which daily life confirms that the market radicals like Mises, Hayek, Hazlitt, and Rothbard were
correct in their judgments. What's more, this is not a new phenomenon that we can observe in our lifetimes only.
We can look at any country in any period and note that every bit of wealth ever created in the
history of mankind has been generated through some kind of market activity, and never by
governments. Free people create; states destroy. It was true in the ancient world. It was true in the first millennium after Christ. It was true
in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. And with the birth of complex structures of production and the increasing division of labor in those
years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world's
population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their plight and change their own class identification. The
empirical truth has never been hard to come by. What matters are the theoretical eyes that see. This is
what dictates the lesson we draw from events. Marx and Bastiat were writing at the same time. The former said capitalism was creating a
calamity and that abolition of ownership was the solution. Bastiat saw that statism was creating a calamity and that the abolition of state plunder
was the solution. What was the difference between them? They saw the same facts, but they saw them in very different ways. They had a different
perception of cause and effect. I suggest to you that there is an important lesson here as regards the methodology of
the social sciences, as well as an agenda and strategy for the future. Concerning method, we need to recognize that
Mises was precisely right concerning the relationship between facts and economic truth. If we have a solid
theory in mind, the facts on the ground provide excellent illustrative material. They inform us
about the application of theory in the world in which we live. They provided excellent anecdotes
and revealing stories of how economic theory is confirmed in practice . But absent that theory of
economics, facts alone are nothing but facts. They do not convey any information about cause and
effect, and they do not point a way forward. Think of it this way. Let's say you have a bag of marbles that is turned upside
down on the ground. Ask two people their impressions. The first one understands what numbers mean, what shapes mean, and what colors mean.
This person can give a detailed account of what he sees: how many marbles, what kinds, how big they are, and this person can explain what he
sees in different ways potentially for hours. But now consider the second person, who, we can suppose, has absolutely no understanding of
numbers, not even that they exist as abstract ideas. This person has no comprehension of either shape or color. He sees the same scene as the
other person but cannot provide anything like an explanation of any patterns. He has very little to say. All he sees is a series of random objects.
Both these people see the same facts. But they understand them in very different ways, owing to the abstract notions of meaning that they carry in
their minds. This is why positivism as pure science, a method of assembling a potentially infinite series of
data points, is a fruitless undertaking. Data points on their own convey no theory, suggest no conclusions, and offer no truths.
To arrive at truth requires the most important step that we as human beings can ever take:
thinking. Through this thinking, and with good teaching and reading, we can put together a
coherent theoretical apparatus that helps us understand. Now, we have a hard time conjuring up in our minds the likes
of a man who has no comprehension of numbers, colors, or shapes. And yet I suggest to you that this is precisely what we are
facing when we encounter a person who has never thought about economic theory and never
studied the implications of the science at all. The facts of the world look quite random to this perso n.
He sees two societies next to each other, one free and prosperous and the other unfree and poor. He looks at this and concludes
nothing important about economic systems because he has never thought hard about the
relationship between economic systems and prosperity and freedom. He merely accepts the
existence of wealth in one place and poverty in the other as a given, the same way the socialists at a lunch table
assumed that the luxurious surroundings and food just happened to be there. Perhaps they will reach for an explanation of some sort, but absent
economic education, it is not likely to be the correct one. Equally as dangerous as having no theory is having a bad
theory that is assembled not by means of logic but by an incorrect view of cause and effect . This is the
case with notions such as the Phillips Curve, which posits a tradeoff relationship between inflation and unemployment. The idea is that you can
drive unemployment down very low if you are willing to tolerate high inflation; or it can work the other way around: you can stabilize prices
provided you are willing to put up with high unemployment. Now, of course this makes no sense on the microeconomic level. When inflation is
soaring, businesses don't suddenly say, hey, let's hire a bunch of new people! Nor do they say, you know, the prices we pay for inventory have not
gone up or have fallen. Let's fire some workers! This much is true about macroeconomics: It is commonly treated like a subject completely
devoid of any connection to microeconomics or even human decision making. It is as if we enter into a video game featuring fearsome creatures
called Aggregates that battle it out to the death. So you have one creature called Unemployment, one called Inflation, one called Capital, one
called Labor, and so on until you can construct a fun game that is sheer fantasy. Another example of this came to me just the other day. A recent
study claimed that labor unions increase the productivity of firms. How did the researchers discern this? They found that unionized companies
tend to be larger with more overall output than nonunionized companies. Well, let's think about this. Is it likely that if you close a labor pool to all
competition, give that restrictive labor pool the right to use violence to enforce its cartel, permit that cartel to extract higher-than-market wages
from the company and set its own terms concerning work rules and vacations and benefits is it likely that this will be good for the company in
the long run? You have to take leave of your senses to believe this. In fact, what we have here is a simple mix-up of cause and effect. Bigger
companies tend to be more likely to attract a kind of unpreventable unionization than smaller ones. The unions target them, with federal aid. It is
no more or less complicated than that. It is for the same reason that developed economies have larger welfare states. The parasites prefer bigger
hosts; that's all. We would be making a big mistake to assume that the welfare state causes the developed economy. That would be as much a
fallacy as to believe that wearing $2,000 suits causes people to become rich. I'm convinced that Mises was right: the most important
step economists or economic institutions can take is in the direction of public education in economic
logic. There is another important factor here. The state thrives on an economically ignorant public. This is the
only way it can get away with blaming inflation or recession on consumers, or claiming that the
government's fiscal problems are due to our paying too little in taxes. It is economic ignorance that
permits the regulatory agencies to claim that they are protecting us as versus denying us choice. It
is only by keeping us all in the dark that it can continue to start war after war violating rights
abroad and smashing liberties at home in the name of spreading freedom. There is only one force
that can put an end to the successes of the state, and that is an economically and morally informed
public. Otherwise, the state can continue to spread its malicious and destructive policies.
a powerful set of tools for the analysis of revolutionary change in bourgeois society. Yet, all too often,
these tools were converted into a mechanical science of revolution to be imposed on the most
diverse situations. At its crudest, it was tied to a unilinear view of history, in which all historical peoples were destined to pass through
the same identical stages on the same identical path. This imposed a kind of doctrinal purity on Marxism.