STATUTORY CASES

Case Title:
G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as
The Postmaster General
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General EnricoPalomar,
parying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest notto be violative of
the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mailsto bring the contest to the
attention of the public.In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest?which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
eachCaltex station will dispense during a specified period.? The contest is open to all motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivres?. There is neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required
to be made. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex station andthere is also a sealed can
where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for
publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sentrepresentatives to the postal authorities for advance
clearing for the use of mails for the contest.However, the postal authorities denied their request in view of
sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law), which prohibitsthe use of mail in conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such
as lottery,gift enterprise, or similar scheme.Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was
no consideration involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their
view and even threatenedCaltex that if the contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to be
issued against it(Caltex) and all its representatives?. This leads to Caltexs filing of this petition for
declaratoryrelief.The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent
has noright to bar the public distribution or said rules by the mails?. The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief? b) Whether or not
the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? violates the Postal Law?
3) Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratoryrelief, and
that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in the rules submitted by theappellee does not
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No
costs.
4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a personinterested under a deed,
a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights areaffected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse- The
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy- The issue is ripe for judicial determination*
The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous distribution of property bychance?. It
does not qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be deemedas a lottery must
constitute a (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are notrequired to do anything or
purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in the contest.The true test for having consideration

is whether the participant pays a valuableconsideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive somethingof value in return for the distribution of the prize.?

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1
took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor andEmployment (Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification asthe sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at theLumbayao manufacturing plant of the
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17April 1982, such employees charged the firm before
the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice
of strike against the firm,alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union;
unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982,
Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers andmembers of the union, for
damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal andfor the dissolution of the restraining order, and
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of
picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor
Code, Article 217) andnot to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction andinterpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereignauthority which organizes the court;
and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed;it must be conferred by law in words that do not
admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courtsand judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes
of the forum, the issue should beresolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1)
the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree
1691reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arisingfrom
employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferredsuch
jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change withrespect to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claimsof workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only
mean, that a court of first instance judge then, aregional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied astrike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified
and set aside the 20 July1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and
enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned,
from takingany further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of
dismissingit. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused
admits to possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of
Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower courtrendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime
and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a
question of law, it was elevated tothe Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein possession of such public
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and
ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards
of provincial prisoners and jails.It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction
and interpretationcome only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.Reliance in
the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speakswith authority to the
extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the
category of a peace officer equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore, the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed
the appealed judgment.

Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Facts:
On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of Environmentand Natural
Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan fromSan Jose, Baggao, Cagayan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for theforest products found concealed in
the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENROs Jovito Layuganissued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its
owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the requiredexplanation within the reglementary period set by
Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR RegionalExecutive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao
CENROs action of confiscation andordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.The
case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case
4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan andBaggayan with the RTC Cagayan
(Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized toconfiscate and forfeit conveyances used
in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to thesecond paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman
further contended that the seizure is illegal, as shedid not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of
qualified theft under Article 309 and 310of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as
allegedly admitted by the RegionalExecutive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court
thereafter issued a writordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari withthe Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial courts order ruling that the
questioninvolved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.
Issues:

Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the
courts

Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705,
as amended by Executive Order 277
Held:
The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively(pursuant to
Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitablyreduces the other
provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentionednor included in the former
provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a wayas to give effect to the purpose
projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the lightof the object to be achieved and the evil

or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be givensuch construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefitsintended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the
same is broad enough to cover the actof forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only
limitation is that it should bemade in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
courtratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when it
eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authorityconstitutes a distinct offense independent now
from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be
imposed is that provided for under Article 309and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.The Supreme Court
granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14July 1992 resolution of the CA,
made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27September 1993, and directed the DENR
secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with theMunicipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonillaand Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed
an opposition to the said adoption. Theycontended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter namedEstrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore
said spouses weredisqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who
havelegitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
Issue:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of
Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot
adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted,it changed the word
descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Codewas patterned, to children.
The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in lawand do not include grandchildren. Well
known is the rule of statutory construction to the effectthat a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that onlystatutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subjects of statutory construction. Inthe present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of
Antero Agonoy andAmanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos bythe Agonoys.The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)

GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring
Facts:
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who wonduring the 1994
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by theregistered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing wasscheduled on 14 October 1995, where
at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,well above the 25% requirement provided by
law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16
December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition.To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner
filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF),
with the trial court issuing arestraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted
the restraining order,dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they
should not becited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
Comelecapproval.In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recallelection on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding aregular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May1996. He cited
Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Courtin which case considered
the SK election as a regular local election.
Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local electionin a recall
proceeding
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted withreference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with theother parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,rather than the letter of a law
determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read accordingto its spirit and intent. The too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Courtcannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the
law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose anddefeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in the letter that killeth butin the spirit that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of
Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local

official may be subjectof a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a
regular election,as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be
morein keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election asone
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to berecalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for
having become moot and academic,as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned
were seven months away.Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the
recall election,was made permanent.

Floresca v. Philex Mining

GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part,
others dissenting
Facts:
Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations mine sites.The heirs of the
miners were able to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA).Thereafter, a special
committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the minerswith adequate safety
protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before theCourt of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that theaction was based on an industrial accident
which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, theCFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that
the work connected injuries arecompensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the
WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A
imposesa 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs,
however,contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on theCivil
Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaintfor lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.Amici curiae submitted their
respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether
the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirsin case of his death under the Workmens
Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or
his heirs action is exclusivelyrestricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmens CompensationAct, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act
and suingin the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or
exemplary)from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other
employees,or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of
bothactions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and suein
addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.The Court in this
same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that theinjured worker or his heirs
have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both coursesof action simultaneously and

balance the relative advantage of recourse under the WorkmensCompensation Act as against an ordinary
action. It further held that the petitioners who hadreceived the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the
choice of the first remedy was based onignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice, butthat upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments made
under theWorkmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed
intheir favor.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judiciallegislation.
Held:
The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does notlegislate but merely
applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice thensecured by Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, andlater by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II
of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the1973 Constitution, as amended, and as
implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of
1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court
assume the same authority as the statuteitself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which decrees that judicialdecisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdictionslegal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a
law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts application
or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant toArticle 9 of
the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Thus, even thelegislator himself recognizes that in
certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill inthe gaps in the law; because the mind of the
legislator, like all human beings, is finite andtherefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law
may apply.

Republic v. CA and Molina

GR 108763, 13 February 1997En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year
after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on theearly stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends andsquandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty onmatters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved
of his job in 1986, Roridel became thesole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple
areseparated-in-fact for more than three years.On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage toReynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own
testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center.Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals andaffirmed in toto the RTCs
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:

Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychologicalincapacity

Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended toliberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of onespouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationshipwith the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tendsto cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, warrants thedissolution of the marriage.The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v.
Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacityshould refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity, existing at the time the marriage iscelebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confinethe meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to themarriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, andincurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defectspoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal
or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilabledifferences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.The Court, in this case,
promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing
any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to
the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint,sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essentialmarital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husbandand wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children;
(7)interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and(8) the
trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.The Supreme Court
granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;concluding that the marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,sufficiently proven by expert,
and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of
the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5)
such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essentialmarital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code as regards husbandand wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards
parents and their children; (7)interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church, and(8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels
for the State.The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision;concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts:
Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Companiade Seguros,
through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with thebeneficiary designated as
Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.Mapalad Aisporna participated actively
with the aforementioned policy.For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfos wife, with theCity Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21
November 1970, oracting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of
authority from theoffice of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true
agent, Rodolfo,she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and

was issuedbecause Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was
absentand so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court
foundMapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision
wasaffirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22October
1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals,
submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of theInsurance Act.
Issue:
Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the InsuranceAct
Held:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. Theparticular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, butthe whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its partsand in order to produce
harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189prohibits a person from acting as
agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the InsuranceCommissioner; while the second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of thesection; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellatecourts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not
under the second paragraph of Section 189 butunder its first paragraph is a reversible error, as
the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is
any person who for compensation shall bean insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without
proof of compensation, directly orindirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad
Aisporna may not be held to haveviolated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.The Supreme Court reversed
the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged,with costs de oficio.

China Bank v. Ortega (J)

GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part
Facts:
On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest DevelopmentCorporation
and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared thedefendants in default
for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decisionon 20 January 1970.To
satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B ForestDevelopment
Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the banks cashier,disallowed the same invoking

the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of anyinformation relative to bank
deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform theCourt if there is a deposit by B & B
Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold thesame intact and not allow any withdrawal
until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved toreconsider but was turned down. In the
same order he was directed to comply with the order of theCourt, otherwise his arrest and confinement will
be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bankand Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners
argue that the disclosure of the informationrequired by the court does not fall within any of the four (4)
exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1]upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of
impeachment, [3] or upon order of acompetent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, [4] or in cases where themoney deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation), and that if the questioned ordersare complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable
under Section 5 and the bank exposed to apossible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.
Specifically referring to the case, theposition of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B
and B Forest DevelopmentCorporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against
it in view of theaforementioned provisions of law.
Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processgarnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.
Held:
From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that theprohibition
against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does notpreclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry insuch a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to theexecution process.
Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank depositsbeyond the reach of execution
to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did notorder an examination of or inquiry into
the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, ascontemplated in the law. It merely required Tan
Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B ForestDevelopment Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of thegarnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawaluntil further order.The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the
lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costsagainst the petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista

GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring
Facts:

Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took activeparticipation in
the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he wasrendered disabled. The
Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board,(now Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office) is an agency of the Government charged with theadministration of different laws giving various
benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/orwidows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a
claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging
that he was suffering from PulmonaryTuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilaos
failure to complete hissupporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness,
his claim wasdisapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to
complete hissupporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators
found outthat his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act
65.Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the
basicpension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children.
Gasilaosmonthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the
increasesprovided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for
thepurpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15January
1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment infull of the
benefits thereunder from said date.In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the
pension, which he claims he isentitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension,
up to 1968 when his pensionwas finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of
Republic Act 65, thatsince the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved
by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of
pension benefitsshould commence from the date of approval of the application.
Issue:
Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
Held:
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensatea class of
men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers theyencountered, and
more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness,disease or injuries
sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmentalexpression of gratitude
to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especiallyduring times of war or
revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is thegeneral rule that a liberal
construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled topension. Courts tend to favor the
pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be consideredwith other guides to interpretation, and
a construction of pension laws must depend on its ownparticular language. In the present case, Republic
Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must beaccorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to
favor those entitled to rights, privileges,and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to
resume old positions in government,educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a
life pension for the incapacited,pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits.
Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this
would be dependentupon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction
extending for 12years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with
the spirit andintent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.The Supreme Court modified the judgment of
the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaospension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of
P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for eachof his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the
former amount increased to P100.00 from 22June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in
pension to which said Gasilao, his wifeand his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the
period from 22 June 1969 to 14January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of
Government fundsappropriated for the purpose.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts:

There are no antecedent facts available for this case.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus. The
courtdetermined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of
theemployees debt from the latters salary and turn this over to the employees credit union; but
whichdoes not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority credit.
Issue:
Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to theobligations of
employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held:
Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except toapply it. The
law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The expressprovisions of the New
Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent onpreference of credits. In the present
case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks foritself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be
applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligationsof employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the
law would have so expressly declared. There isnothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides
that obligation of laborers and employeespayable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction
from the employees wages andsalaries.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.

David v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 8
5
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 10
5
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangayelections should be held and
questions the COMELECs schedule of holding suchelections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The
COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or theLocal Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3
years.Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed.R.A. 6679
provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He alsocontends that there is a violation of
Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of
the Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the laterlegislative enactment
prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the
next barangay election should be when itstated that the next regular election involving the barangay
office is barely 7months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997 .2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution provides that, The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law,shall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of
officefor barangay officials.

In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. SSC [ GR L-1

5
04
5
, 20 January 1961]
En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 reserves vote
Facts:
On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with theSocial Security
Commission a request that Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutionsand/or
organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the RomanCatholic
Archbishop of Manila, be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended (SocialSecurity
Law of 1954). Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social SecurityCommission in its
Resolution 572 (s. 1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its
arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The
request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958);hence, this appeal taken
in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended.The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767,
s. 1958 of the Social Security Commission, withcosts against appellant.
1. Definition of employer, employee, and employment (as defined in law)
The term employer as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic
orforeign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any
kindand uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except
theGovernment and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including
corporationsowned or controlled by the Government (par. [c], sec. 8), while an employee refers to
any personwho performs services for an `employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts
are usedand who receives compensation for such services (par. [d] sec. 8). Employment , according
toparagraph [j] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those
expresslyenumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political
subdivisions,branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the
Government,domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
plainpurpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, it
isapparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds
exceptthose expressly excluded. The definition of the term employer is, thus, sufficiently
comprehensive asto include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within
its meaning. Hadthe Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for

profit or gain, itwould not have defined an employer in such a way as to include the Government and
yet make anexpress exception of it.
3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law
When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious
orcharitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par.
[j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of RA1792,
which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to includecharitable and
religious institutions within the scope of the law.
4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries
The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems
of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily
explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law arecorporations
and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
5
. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice
The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power, pursuant to the policy of
theRepublic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system
whichshall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection
toemployees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It affords protection to
labor,especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on
thepromotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people.
6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public
funds forthe benefit of a priest; does not violate right to disseminate religious information
The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to
themembers which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming that said funds
areimpressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement, death or disability
benefitswould not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution, since such payment
shall bemade to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. Further, the
contributionsare not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with the contributions imposed upon
theemployees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against
thehazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to
promotesocial justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

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