EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002.]

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa
City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa
City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID
HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN
JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Ocer Punong Bgy. EARL
S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
ABALLA, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002.]
VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002.]
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO
OLLAVE, SR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.

Stephen V. Jaromay for petitioners.

George Erwin M. Garcia, Dela Cruz Albano & Associates and M.M. Lazaro & Associates
for E.S. Hagedorn.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Edwin B. Gastanes for petitioner in G.R. No. 154512.
Aristotle Q. Sarmiento for petitioner in G.R. No. 154683.
SYNOPSIS
Out of the 528 members of the then incumbent barangay ocials of Puerto
Princesa, 312 convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to
initiate the recall of then Puerto Princesa Mayor Victorino Dennis Socrates. The PRA
passed Resolution No. 01-02, which declared their loss of condence in Socrates and
called for his recall. Thereafter, the COMELEC scheduled the campaign period and
the recall election. Mr. Edward M. Hagedorn led his certicate of candidacy and

eventually won the recall election. The issues involved in these consolidated
petitions are: (1) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the recall resolution and in scheduling the recall election for
mayor in Puerto Princesa; and (2) whether Hagedorn was qualied to run for mayor
despite serving three consecutive full terms immediately prior to recall election.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is bound by the ndings of fact of the COMELEC on
matters within its competence and expertise unless the ndings were patently
erroneous, which was not present in the case at bar. Therefore, there was no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the
Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election. The Court lifted the
temporary restraining order enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for
mayor in the recall election in Puerto Princesa. According to the Court, what the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. A recall election mid-way in a term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after
the third term.
SYLLABUS
1.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS;
THREE-TERM LIMIT; CONSTRUED. The three-term limit rule for elective local
ocials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This three-term limit rule
is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts.
The rst part provides that an elective local ocial cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of oce for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from oce for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local ocial cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same oce following the end of the third consecutive term.
A n y subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service. Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit
one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent
election involving the same term of oce. What the Constitution prohibits is a

consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently

show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is
the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
DHTECc

2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF SERVICE MUST BE
INVOLUNTARY; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the
Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner: ".
. . The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected."
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent
the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of oce and at the same time
respect the people's choice and grant their elected ocial full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from oce for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. . . . ." In Hagedorn's case, the
nearly 15-month period he was out of oce, although short of a full term of three
years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The
Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three
years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the
cause is involuntary, is sucient to break an elective local ocial's continuity of
service.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECALL ELECTION; WINNER THEREOF COULD NOT BE
CREDITED WITH FULL TERM FOR THE PURPOSE OF COUNTING CONSECUTIVENESS
OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIAL'S TERM OF OFFICE. We held in Adormeo that the
period an elective local ocial is out of oce interrupts the continuity of his service
and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless
continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise
hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of oce interrupted his
continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only dierence
between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo,
the interruption occurred after the rst two consecutive terms. In the instant case,
the interruption happened after the rst three consecutive terms. In both cases, the
respondents were seeking election for a fourth term. In Adormeo, the recall term of
Talaga began only from the date he assumed oce after winning the recall election.
Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in oce of his
predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have
been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served
three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a
recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired
term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds
oce, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo
established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the

consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.

4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE UNEXPIRED TERM IS IN ITSELF ONE TERM FOR
PURPOSE OF THREE-TERM LIMIT. The concept of term limits is in derogation of
the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term
limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible eect to the sovereign
will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec : "Thus, a
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals
that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine
years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative ocials. Instead,
they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
ocials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned
against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of
the proposed, absolute disqualication, considering that the draft constitution
contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'" A necessary consequence of the
interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the
interruption. An ocial elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the
recalled ocial. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting
the three-term limit.

PUNO, J., concurring opinion:

1.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS;
THREE-TERM LIMIT; CONDITIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT THEREOF.
In the recent case of Adormeo vs. COMELEC, et al., we ruled that a mayor who
assumed oce via a recall election and served the unexpired portion of the
mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full term for purposes of applying
the three-term limit. . . . Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that
Talaga, Jr. was not disqualied as the two conditions for disqualications, namely
(1) the elective ocial concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the
same post and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms, were not met. We
did not consider Talaga Jr.'s service of the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as
service of a full term for purposes of the three term limit. We also ruled that he did
not serve for three consecutive terms as there was a break in his service when he
lost to Tagarao in the 1998 elections.
EHTISC

2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE ENACTMENT THEREOF,
CONSTRUED. The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja,
Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there are two principal reasons for the three
term limit for elective local ocials: (1) to prevent political dynasties perpetuated
by the undue advantage of the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the
people by allowing candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people.

Likewise evident in the deliberations is the eort to balance between two interests,
namely, the prevention of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the
people on the one hand, and respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the
people, on the other; thus, the calibration between perpetual disqualication after
three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner Garcia, and setting a limit on
immediate reelection and providing for a hibernation period. In all three cases
Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three
term limit is service of a full term of three years for elective local ocials. This
ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to prevent political dynasties as it is the
service of consecutive full terms that makes service continuous and which opens the
gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of leaders. In the words of
Commissioner Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent reelections, ocials from the President down to the
municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or
to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think
that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or unbroken service of
all of these ocials." Thus, ConCom set the limit on consecutive full terms to no
more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is
prohibited.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS PROHIBITED IS THE SERVICE OF A FOURTH
CONSECUTIVE FULL TERM AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. Even a textual analysis
of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of
a fourth consecutive full term. Petitioners are correct in foisting the view that
"term" is a xed and denite period of time prescribed by law or the Constitution
during which the public ocer may claim to hold oce as a right. It is a xed and
denite period of time to hold oce, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges
and emoluments until the expiration of the period. In ascertaining what "term"
means for elective local ocials, the Constitution itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8
that it means a xed, denite, and full period of three, years, viz: "Sec. 8. The term
of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay ocials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years. . . " Although one or more persons may
discharge the duties of the oce during this xed three-year period, the term is not
divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who may ll the oce. It is
one and indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles of three years each. If
the incumbent or the one elected to the oce lls a higher vacant oce, refuses to
assume oce, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from oce, voluntary resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his oce,
thereby creating a permanent vacancy, the term would remain unbroken until the
recurring election for the oce. The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art.
X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster the interpretation that for
purposes of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years is
contemplated. Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a xed, denite, and
full-period, the Constitution, in Art. VI, Sec. 9, uses the qualier "unexpired term" to
refer to only a portion of a term. Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to mean the remainder of the term. Thus,
when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that ". . . no such (local elective)

ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms," it consistently means
that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive full terms and prohibits
service of a minimum fourth consecutive full term.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE THROUGH A RECALL ELECTION IS
NOT IN REALITY A SERVICE OF FULL TERM; RATIONALE. It is my respectful
submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe
a local ocial who has been thrice consecutively elected in regular elections and has
served three full terms in the same position, from running in the regular election
succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that is prohibited because
it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full terms,
i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this
continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the gates to the two evils
sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage to put up a
political dynasty and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It is in this context of
regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners
harp on, should be understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s nally voted upon,
it was agreed that an elective local government ocial should be barred from
running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least
one term, he may again run for the same oce." Indeed, insofar as regular local
elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case, there
should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years. On the other hand, in the
case of a local ocial who assumes oce through a recall election whether after
his rst, second, or third consecutive term there is a break in his service caused
by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even in the case of a local
ocial who initially assumes oce via recall election, then wins the two succeeding
regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited
from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his
service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality
and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding full terms. Local
officials who assume office via recall election serve only the unexpired portion of the
incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the
Constitutional mandate that the term of oce of elective local ocials is three
years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the Constitution also
prescribe synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the
second Monday of May 1992, which is accomplished if the local ocial who assumes
oce through recall election serves only the incumbent's unexpired term. As we
ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered service of a
full term only with respect to Representatives (and Senators) because unlike local
government ocials, Representatives cannot be recalled. It is continuous prolonged
stay in oce that breeds political dynasties. Understandable therefore, insofar as
Representatives who cannot be recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired term
is strictly counted as service of a full term because the purpose of the ConCom was
to limit the right to run and be elected in Congress.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
1.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS;

THREE-TERM LIMIT; TERM DURING WHICH A RECALL ELECTION WAS HELD

SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED IN THE COMPUTATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. I
submit with respect that the term during which a recall election is held should not
be counted in computing the three-term limit not only when the recall election
occurs within three consecutive terms, as this Court has already held, but also when
such election is held during the fourth term immediately following three
consecutive terms. The reason for this is that the elective local ocial cannot be
said to have served "for more than three consecutive terms" because of the break in
his service. What prevents the fourth term from being counted in determining the
three-term limit is the lack of continuity, or the break, in the "service of the full
term." I must stress that the Constitution does not say "service for more than three
terms" but "service for more than three consecutive terms."
acCTIS

2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF. As the discussion of the
Constitutional Commission on Art. X. Sec. 8 shows, the three-term limit is aimed at
preventing the monopolization or aggrandizement of political power and the
perpetration of the incumbent in oce. This abuse is likely to arise from a prolonged
stay in power. It is not likely to arise if the service is broken, albeit it is for more
than three terms.

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS; CONSTRUED. Hence, the application of
the constitutional ban on the holding of elective local oce for three consecutive
terms requires in my view (1) election in a regular election for three consecutive
terms and (2) service for the full terms, each consisting of three years, for which the
ocial is elected. The rst requirement is intended to give the electorate the
freedom to reelect a candidate for a local elective position as part of their sovereign
right (the right of suffrage) to choose those whom they believe can best serve them.
This is the reason the framers of our Constitution rejected Scheme No. 1, which was
to ban reelection after three successive terms, and adopted Scheme No. 2, which is
about "no immediate reelection after three successive terms." On the other hand,
the second requirement is intended to prevent the accumulation of power resulting
from too long a stay in office.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS;
THREE-TERM LIMIT; FOURTH TERM PROHIBITION COVERS THE PERIOD
PERTAINING TO IT; CASE AT BAR. The ponencia is then correct when it holds that
the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree
when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection
for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001
election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May
2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVOLUNTARY SEVERANCE FROM OFFICE; NOT APPLICABLE
IN CASE AT BAR. The aw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion
between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish

"voluntary renunciation" of oce from "involuntary severance" from oce and the
term to which it relates. . . . The dichotomy made in the ponencia between
"voluntary renunciation of the oce" as used in Section 8 of Article V of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from
oce" is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the
latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately
following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot have
suered "involuntary severance from oce" because there was nothing to be
severed; he was not a holder of an oce either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He
knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is,
denitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that
involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for
purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC (311 SCRA 609 [1999]), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is not applicable
in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one
that took place during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it
occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such
involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his
election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
ITcCaS

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION, NOT CONSIDERED AS AN
INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF SERVICE; PURPOSE THEREOF. More
importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 its one that takes place at any time
during either the rst, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is
very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent
an elective local ocial from voluntary resigning from oce for the purpose of
circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would
be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded
is intended to impose a penalty on one who outs the rule or make a mockery of it
by the simple act of resigning.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THREE-TERM LIMIT CANNOT BE SUBVERTED IN A RECALL
ELECTION; CASE AT BAR. A declaration that Hagedorn is qualied to seek
reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for
which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualied to be reelected to
or to hold is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make a
mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound
governance. An elective local ocial who is disqualied to seek a fourth term
because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the
rst year of the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the
second year of said term. This would not be a problem if the disqualied ocial has
a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as
stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Puerto Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was
designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as Interim Chairman.

DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p

The Case
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari 1 seeking the reversal of the
resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in
relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay ocials
of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall 2 of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed oce as Puerto Princesa's mayor on
June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for
brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The
PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30
days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates led with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No.
02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc 3 promulgated a resolution dismissing
for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673
prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in
connection with the recall election. The COMELEC xed the campaign period from
August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) led his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo
("Gilo" for brevity) led a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certicate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
("Ollave" for brevity) led a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking
to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay led another
petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the
same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the

ground that "Hagedorn is disqualied from running for a fourth consecutive term,
having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division 4
dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared
Hagedorn qualied to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall
election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC armed the
resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

G.R. No. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August
14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal inrmities
attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not
all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the
proof of service of notice was palpably and legally decient; (3) the members of the
PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of
authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the public's constitutional right to information.

G.R. No. 154683

Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673
dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it xed the recall election on September 7, 2002,
giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC
be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new
date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
AEDcIH

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it xed the date of the recall
election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the
candidates an additional fteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to
campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within

which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24,
2002.

G.R. Nos. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated
September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539
declaring Hagedorn qualied to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation
of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding
Hagedorn's qualication to run for mayor in the recall election despite the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for
elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist
from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders
from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates led a motion for leave to le an attached
petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and
Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes.
Hagedorn led motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming
the winning candidate and to allow him to assume oce to give eect to the will of
the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to le a petition
for intervention.

The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1.

In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

2.

In G.R. Nos. 155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualied to run for

mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24,
2002.

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in xing a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our
Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an

additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA
members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC,
however, found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall
of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the
convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the
Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II
entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said
notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II
and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the
Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition
and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast
mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the
following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective ocials, print and
broadcast media practitioners, PNP ocials, COMELEC city, regional and
national officials, and DILG officials].
xxx xxx xxx
The City Election Ocer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certication dated 10
July 2002 certied that upon a 'thorough and careful verication of the
signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, . . . the majority of all
members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise
certied 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or
objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper review, all documents
submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted
the following recommendations:
'This Oce, after evaluating the documents led, nds the instant
Petition sucient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly
constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved
Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates.'
xxx xxx xxx

This Court is bound by the ndings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the ndings are patently
erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC, 5 which also dealt with alleged defective service
of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA
members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore
a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the ndings, the Court should not disturb the same. The
factual ndings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in
the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."

In the instant case, we do not nd any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's
findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall
Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new
electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This
argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members
adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of oce had not yet expired. They were
a l l de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualication to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA
proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even
sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA
proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall
Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly,
attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of
barangay ocials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all
these public records in the ocial custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does
not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in
Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election
on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor

in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local ocials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states:
EHaCTA

"Section 8.
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such

ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43.

Term of Office. (a) . . .

(b)
No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the oce
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective ocial was
elected."

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The rst part provides
that an elective local ocial cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.
The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of oce for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from oce for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local ocial cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same oce following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
ocials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after
three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three
terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT:
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO: 6
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the
blackboard, and these are Alternative No. 1 where there is no further
election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there

is no immediate reelection after three successive terms ." 7

The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation

on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would
proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives
and local ocials , namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a
total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after
three successive terms )." 8

The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection"
question in voting for the term limits of Senators 9 and Representatives of the
House. 10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of oce.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to
by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local ocials is applied to any election within the
three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be
prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their
two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded
exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected." 11

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the
Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON: 12
I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second
term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?

DAVIDE: 13
That is correct.
GASCON:
And the question that we left behind before if the Gentleman will
remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one
election which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE:
If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the
view that during the election following the expiration of the rst 12
years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year
thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not
really a period of hibernation for six years . That was the Committee's
stand.
GASCON:

So, eectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least . " 14
(Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution thus claried that a Senator can run after only
three years 15 following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly
acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate
reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period
following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the
period of rest" of an elective ocial who has reached his term limit to be the full
extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002
is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June
30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection
in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998
elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa.
Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer
run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code disqualied Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from
running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for
mayor in the 2001 elections. 16 Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in
the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he
won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of

Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a
private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001.
Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
I n Lonzanida v. Comelec, 17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of
continuity of service in this manner:
". . . The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, "Voluntary renunciation of oce for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of oce and at the same time respect the people's choice and
grant their elected ocial full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
oce for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service. . . " (Emphasis supplied)

In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of oce, although
short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of
his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus
to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any
length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sucient to break an
elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga , 18 a unanimous Court
reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of oce
breaks the continuity of service of an elective local ocial. In Adormeo, Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his
third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However,
in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in
the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned
for Talaga's disqualication on the ground that Talaga had already served three
consecutive terms as mayor.
TAaEIc

Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of
his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three
consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualied to run in the
2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when
Talaga was out of oce interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's

recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this
interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time
Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local ocial is out of oce
interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms.
In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out
of oce interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive
terms. The only dierence between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the
interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the rst two consecutive
terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the rst three
consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth
term.

I n Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed oce
after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the
tenure in oce of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact,
then he would have been disqualied to run in the 2001 elections because he would
already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who
wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but
only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another
elective ocial holds oce, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service.
Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot
be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure
in oce of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualied to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only
then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to
ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of oce
which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal
ction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders
through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the
sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits
must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible eect to the sovereign will of
the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission
were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the

people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.

Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F.
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should
be no further reelection for local and legislative ocials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such ocials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.
Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people
will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute disqualication, considering
that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's
power.''' 19 (Emphasis supplied)

A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a

new term following the interruption. An ocial elected in recall election serves the
unexpired term of the recalled ocial. This unexpired term is in itself one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion
in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ: 20
For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator
newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator
concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE:
Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will
serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of
the Lower House." 21

Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and

Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election of local
ocials. Otherwise, an elective local ocial who serves a recall term can serve for
more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular
three full terms. A local ocial who serves a recall term should know that the recall
term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent
limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualied to run in the September 24, 2002
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1.

Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his

three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30,
2001;
HCITDc

2.

Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily

interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during
which time he was a private citizen;

3.

Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30,

2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a
fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a
fourth consecutive term; and

4.

Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest

possible eect to the right of the electorate to choose their
leaders.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 24,
2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto
Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, CarpioMorales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J ., in the result, without prejudice to the filing of separate opinion.
Azcuna, J., I join the Chief Justice in his separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part, prior consultation.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No.
154512 and G.R. No. 154683. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed
no grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal
then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still hold on to my
dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511 ( Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA
100, 121 [1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section
70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional.

Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining
the COMELEC from implementing its Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it xed the
recall election on 7 September 2002, and the subsequent Resolution of the
COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fteen days from
7 September 2002 rendered moot and academic the principal issue in G.R. No.
154683. The dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R.
Nos. 155083-84. I respectfully submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn
is disqualied from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the
recall election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8.
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates
this constitutional restriction, thus:
SEC. 43.

Term of office.
xxx xxx xxx

(b)
No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the oce
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective ocial was
elected.

Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the
Committee on Local Governments of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was
introduced at the plenary session by Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
Commenting thereon in his book entitled "The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers"
(1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as
an amendment proposed by Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted
without much discussion and formally approved.

Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local
officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution, and Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No.
6636, the rst local election, that is, the election for the rst term under the

Constitution for elective local ocials, was on 18 January 1988. By express

provision of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The second election, i.e.,
the election for the second term of elective local ocials which expired at noon of
30 June 1995, for elective local ocials, was on the second Monday of May 1992
pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e., for the third term which
expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which
expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the second Monday of May 1998. The fth
election, i.e., for the fth term which would expire at noon of 30 June 2004, was on
the second Monday of May 2001.

Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of

R.A. No. 7160, a local ocial elected in the rst local election of 18 January 1988
may be reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in May 1995. He
could not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would
have been his fourth term. Similarly, a local ocial who was elected in the May
1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was rst elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City
in the May 1992 election. He was reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998
elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May 1998 election, expired
on 30 June 2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from
seeking reelection in the May 2001 election, which would have been his fourth
term.

The term of oce covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section
8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in
what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the
wordings thereof: "the term of oce of elective local ocials . . . shall be three
years and no such ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." In
short, an elective local ocial who has served three consecutive terms, like
Hagedorn, is disqualied from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term.
The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
T h e ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an
immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case
of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he
was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what
would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the
period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The aw in the ruling results from an
apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the
attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of oce from "involuntary
severance" from office and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me rst discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did

approve the rule of "no immediate reelection after three consecutive terms." In
support of its armative conclusion the ponencia quotes the Manifestation of
Commissioner Romulo as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission,
thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would
proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives
and local ocials , namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a
total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after
three successive terms ).

This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for
elective national and local ocials. However, the Commission decided to consider
rst the term of the members of Congress; and to defer the discussion on the term
of elective local ocials until the Commission would consider the report of the
Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the pertinent portions of
Volume Two, pages 238-245 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its
proceedings on 25 July 1986:
THE PRESIDENT.
Maybe it will be of help we just remind ourselves that what we have
before us now is the report of the Committee on the Legislative.
Therefore, maybe we should conne ourselves rst to what is covered
by the report which is the term of oce of the Senators and the
Representatives.
And with respect to the local ocials, let us await the report of the
Committee on Local Governments as to its recommendation on this
matter.
MR. RODRIGO.
As a matter of fact, I will go further than that. It is my belief, as regards
local officials, that we should leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT.
So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the
Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO.
I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we
rst talk about the term of oce of the Representatives because we
are now discussing the legislative department.
MR DAVIDE.
Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of oce
of the Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT.
But are we agreed on these two proposals the one of Commissioner
Garcia where there is no further election after a total of three terms
and the other where there is no immediate reelection after three
successive terms?
TaCDIc

MR. OPLE.
Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided
to consider the synchronization of elections. And from that original
commitment, we proceeded to x the terms and decided related
questions within the context of synchronization. Are we now
abandoning the original task of synchronization which could only be
fully settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms of the
President and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the
local ocials, or do we want to postpone the synchronization task to
a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local Governments
and the other concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of
Commissioner Ople?
MR. ROMULO.
In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task,
because we have decided on the ocials' absolute terms. All we are
really talking about now is whether or not they are eligible for
reelection, and I think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE.
If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization
task, then I think that is something to be thankful about. But
considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the
Acting Floor Leader that the election of the local ocials should be
eliminated from the consideration of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO.
Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the

Members of the House of Representatives.

MR. OPLE.
And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod
still stand after the elimination of the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO.
Yes, I think so.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, as worded, it is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO.
We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT.
We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots.
Anyway the voting would take only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.

It was 3:40 p.m.

At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners
wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT.
The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON.
Madam President, may I have a clarication before we count the ballots.
The voting now is just for Representatives. We are not speaking of the
term of office of the Senators yet. Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT.

The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.

This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON.
I think the issue of whether the Senators could run again for election
after their two consecutive terms or 12 years after a lapse of a period
of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT.
I beg the Commissioner's pardon.
MR. GASCON.
Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT.
Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the
counting.
Alternative No. 1 no further election after a total of three terms: //////////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 no immediate reelection after three successive
terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT.
The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for
Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR. ROMULO.
Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some
doubts as to the term of oce of the Senators, so I propose that we
similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my understanding this
morning that when we voted for the term of oce of the Senators,
they would not be perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT.

From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22

votes went to Scheme No. II; that is, with one reelection. This is
already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader propose that we
vote again?
MR. ROMULO.
The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President,
or after resting for six years they can run again. That is the question
that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT.
This morning, Scheme No. 1, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme
No. II, with one reelection 22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on
reelection 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO.
Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO.
The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with
one reelection, the Senator is perpetually disqualied, so that is a
similar question to what we had posed with regard to the House of
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT.
In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is
perpetually disqualified after serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO.
Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO.
Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualied or he can
hibernate the very word used for six years and then run again
for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other words, he
is entitled to one immediate reelection.

REV. RIGOS.
Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.
And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he
can run for the same office.
REV. RIGOS.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS.
In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a
period of hibernation; we have to clarify how long that should be. It
could be three years, because in the proposed scheme, every three
years we can elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO.
Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT.
I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare
with the Acting Floor Leader so that we will know what we are going to
vote on.
The session is suspended

It was 3:58 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDENT.
The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO.
Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the
Senators, and the schemes are as follows: The rst scheme is, no
further election after two terms; the second scheme is, no immediate
reelection after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the
same as those for the House of Representatives, I move that we go
directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT.
Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to
count.
THE PRESIDENT.
Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT.
The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme
No. II; Scheme No. II is approved.
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in
preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?

The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local ocials

without immediate reelection was taken up by the Constitutional Commission

much later or specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the pertinent portions of
Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional Commission, read as
follows:
MR. RAMA.
Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to insert a new section to be denominated
later as Section 5. It provides as follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH
SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO
SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. This is in accordance with the mandate of
the Commission when we voted on the terms of ocials up to local
ocials, excluding the term of barangay ocials which was a very
specific exception.
MR. NOLLEDO.
One claricatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of
the office of barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE.
As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO.
As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO.
We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT.
May we have the reaction of the Committee?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam
President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Is there any other comment?
MR. OPLE.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE.
May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO.
May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE.
THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT
BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW,
SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR
MORE
THAN
THREE
CONSECUTIVE
TERMS.
VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL
NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF
HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT.
Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.
Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner
Davide which has been read to the body? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the proposed section is approved.

I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no
immediate reelection" after three consecutive terms for members of Congress
clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection" after the 3-term limit would
equally apply to the elective local ocials. This accounted for the immediate

acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned

Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution. These debates clearly showed the intent of the Commission that the
ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the
fourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive terms, to be
lled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again
after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediately succeeding
fourth term. On the next fth term he can run again to start a new series of three
consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent portions of the debates, recorded in
Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. ROMULO.
Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:
Scheme No. I is without reelection; Scheme No. II is with one reelection;
and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is for the Senators.

At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners

wrote down their votes .
THE PRESIDENT.
The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please
consolidate the results of the voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
Madam President, we are ready.
THE PRESIDENT.
The Secretary-General will please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I ///
Scheme No. II /////-/////-/////-/////-//
Scheme No. III /////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT.
The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II;
and 17 votes for Scheme No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO.
Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives,

the Congressmen. I would assume we can use the same choices.

Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.
For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some
questions.
MR. ROMULO.
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO.
Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President with one reelection."
THE PRESIDENT.
No, that is for Senators.
MR. GUINGONA.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Yes, Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA.
May I suggest one more scheme with two reelections for the
Members of the House of Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT.
So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO.
While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four
propositions for Congressmen:
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.

Scheme No. III, with two reelections.

Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection.
MR. DE LOS REYES.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES.
The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three
years, according to the rst voting; the term of the Senators, if they
are entitled to one reelection, will be 12 years. So, in order for a
Member of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he
must be entitled to three reelections. I propose another scheme with
three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO.
Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I
lled up my ballot already and if I erase, this might be disqualied as a
marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO.
The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently
covered by Scheme No. II which we agreed upon earlier. The situation
will not happen, because both the Senators and the Congressmen will
have ve (5) years on the rst election. So, the possibility that the
Senators will have a longer term than the Congressmen is remote.
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not
really mutually exclusive. Can we have only these three: without
reelection, with reelection and with unlimited reelection? We are asking
here for plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT.
In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators;
without reelection, with one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS.
Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD.
I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA.
Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the
highest votes be voted upon to get the key majority. For example, if
the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election get the
highest number of votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT.
We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT.
The Secretary-General will please proceed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I 0
Scheme No. II //
Scheme No. III /////-/////-/////-/////-/
Scheme No. IV /////-/////-////

Scheme No. V /////-/

THE PRESIDENT.
The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II;
21 votes for Scheme No. III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes
for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.
I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT.
Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO.
If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this
mean two immediate reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years?
Let us say that a Member of the Lower House has been reelected
twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years
elapse and then run again?
IaDcTC

THE PRESIDENT.
We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer
the question.
MR. DAVIDE.
That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two
successive reelections. So he cannot serve beyond nine consecutive
years.
MR. RODRIGO.
Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE.
Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO.

But after nine years he can let one . . .

MR. DAVIDE.

He can rest. He can hibernate for three years .

MR. RODRIGO.

And run again.

MR. DAVIDE.

He can run again.

MR. RODRIGO.
And again have nine years as a maximum.
MR. DAVIDE.
I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is
the main proponent of this proposal on two reelections. I would seek
the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the record. (italics supplied for
emphasis.)
xxx xxx xxx

The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the oce"
as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 and "involuntary severance from oce" is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From
the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e.,
the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of
Hagedorn, he cannot have suered "involuntary severance from oce" because
there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an oce either in a de jure
or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualied from seeking a third reelection to
o ce. Disqualification is, denitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance.
Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the
continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid
down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609 [1999]), cited in the ponencia,
page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance
referred to in that case was one that took place during any of the three terms;
hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In
the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his
three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and
1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any
time during either the rst, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms.
This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his

service for the full term for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to
prevent an elective local ocial from voluntarily resigning from oce for the
purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he
resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the
provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who outs the rule or
make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of
Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred
from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not win in his second
reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall
election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive
terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between
Commissioner Suarez and Commissioner Davide found on page 592, Vol. II of the
Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19-20 of the
ponencia:
SUAREZ:
For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator
newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator
concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE:
Yes, because we speak of "term." And if there is a special election, he
will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus
one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members
of the Lower House.

On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that
the term of oce of one who is elected in a special election is considered one term
for purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualied to seek reelection in a recall election to
remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which Hagedorn was
constitutionally and statutorily disqualied to be reelected to or to hold is to subvert
the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it
abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local
ocial who is disqualied to seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but
obsessed to hold on to power would spend the rst year of the fourth term
campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This
would not be a problem if the disqualied ocial has a solid following and a strong

political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia,

the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto Princesa City is one
Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly
as Interim Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the
resolution of the COMELEC holding private respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualied
candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election, and
to declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or from
being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in question.
PUNO, J., concurring:
The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself.
Nonetheless, the complex constitutional dimensions of the issue for resolution
compels this humble concurring opinion. The issue is whether private respondent
Hagedorn is disqualied from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa City and from serving the unexpired portion of the 20012004 mayoralty term considering that he has thrice been consecutively elected and
has served three full terms as Puerto Princesa City mayor from 1992-1998. In
illuminating the gray interstices of this election case, prudence dictates that ". . .
where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right
but also politically correct." 1
Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in
1992, 1995 and 1998 and served three full terms. In the May 14, 2001 national and
local elections, he ran for governor for the Province of Palawan and lost. Petitionerintervenor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City.
On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of five hundred twenty-eight (528)
members of the Barangay Ocials of Puerto Princesa City convened themselves
into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Mayor Socrates. On
August 21, 2002, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing a
calendar of activities for the recall election. Two days after, Hagedorn led his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in said election.
On August 27, 2002, petitioners Adovo and Gilo sought for Hagedorn's immediate
disqualication on the ground that he had served three consecutive full terms as
mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately prior to the recall election and was thus
proscribed by the Constitution from running in said election. On August 30, 2002,
petitioner Ollave, Sr. intervened to disqualify Hagedorn on the same ground.
The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. On September 20, 2002, public
respondent COMELEC's First Division denied the petitions for Hagedorn's
disqualication. The following day, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. led a
motion for reconsideration imploring the COMELEC en banc to reverse the
September 20 resolution. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc armed
the resolution of the First Division holding Hagedorn qualied to run in the recall
election.

On September 24, 2002, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in
this Court with a Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. On the same
date, Mayor Socrates led a petition-in-intervention to nullify the September 23
resolution of the COMELEC.
The petitions before us raise the following issues:
"I
THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE
POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY IN THE SCHEDULED
RECALL ELECTION, THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM FOR
LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.

II.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO DIVIDE A SINGLE TERM OF OFFICE
INTO TWO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND VIOLATED THE INTENT AND PURPOSE FOR HOLDING THE SCHEDULED
RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA
CITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR AGAINST A FOURTH
CONSECUTIVE TERM.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM
RUNNING IN THE UPCOMING RECALL ELECTIONS AS HIS INELIGIBILITY IS
NOT APPARENT UNDER SECTIONS 65 AND 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION
CODE, SECTIONS 39 AND 40 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE),
AND RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS QUALIFIED TO RUN IN
THE RECALL ELECTION EVEN IF HE STANDS DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING
UNDER A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM AS SUCH IS ALLEGEDLY NOT THE
PROVINCE OF THE INSTANT DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
VI.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT ISSUED A DEFECTIVE AND CLEARLY VOID RESOLUTION." 2

The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular issue of whether or not private
respondent Hagedorn is disqualied from running in the September 24, 2002 recall
election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa City considering that he has been
thrice consecutively elected and has served three full terms in that position from
1992 to 2001.
I find the petitions devoid of merit.
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."

This constitutional provision is restated in the Local Government Code of 1991, to

wit:
HcSDIE

"Sec. 43.
Term of Office. . . . (b) No local elective ocial shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected."

We have not interpreted Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in the recall election
context of the cases at bar. It is imperative to distill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the people who ratied it. 3 Mere reliance on the surface meaning
of the words of the above provision, however, will not suce to capture this elusive
intent. Thus, we turn to the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) as an extrinsic aid to interpretation. 4 The Record of the
Constitutional Commission shows that Art. X, Sec. 8 was readily accepted by the
Commissioners without much discussion; 5 nonetheless, their debates on setting
the term limit for Representatives show that the rationale for the limit applies to
both Representatives and elective local ocials. We quote at length the relevant
portions of the debates, to wit:
"MR. GARCIA.
I would like to advocate the proposition that no further
election for local and legislative ocials be allowed after a total of three
terms or nine years. I have four reasons why I would like to advocate this
proposal, which are as follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political power;
(2) to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so that no one is indispensable
in running the aairs of the country; (4) to create a reserve of statesmen
both in the national and local levels . May I explain briefly these four reasons.

First: To prevent monopoly of political power Our history has shown that

prolonged stay in public oce can lead to the creation of entrenched

preserves of political dynasties. In this regard, I would also like to advocate
that immediate members of the families of public ocials be barred from
occupying the same position being vacated.
Second: To broaden the choice of the people Although individuals have
the right to present themselves for public oce, our times demand that we
create structures that will enable more aspirants to oer to serve and to
provide the people a broader choice so that more and more people can be
enlisted to the cause of public service, not just limited only to those who may
have the reason or the advantage due to their position.
Third: No one is indispensable in running the aairs of the country After
the ocial's more than a decade or nearly a decade of occupying the same
public oce, I think we should try to encourage a more team-oriented
consensual approach to governance favored by a proposal that will limit
public servants to occupy the same oce for three terms. And this would
also favor not relying on personalities no matter how heroic, some of whom,
in fact, are now in our midst.
Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three terms would also
favor the creation of a reserve of statesmen both in the national and local
levels.
Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and new
approaches will be welcome. Public oce will no longer be a preserve of
conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we will create a reserve of
statesmen, both in the national and local levels, since we will not deprive the
community of the wealth of experience and advice that could come from
those who have served for nine years in public office.
Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty symbolized by
prolonged stay in particular public oces is barred, will have fuller meaning.
It will not be limited only to those who directly hold public oce, but also to
consultative bodies organized by the people, among whom could be counted
those who have served in public oce with accomplishment and distinction,
for public service must no longer be limited only to public office.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and
I asked to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing
people power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind
of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are
prescreening candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that
this 48-member Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who
have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the same
position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some
people who are very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a

national stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly

competent and with integrity. They get voted into oce at the age of 25,
which is the age we provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put
them to pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are
talking here only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden
the people's choice but we are making a prejudgment today because we
exclude a certain number of people. We are, in eect, putting an additional
qualication for oce that the ocials must not have served a total of
more than a number of years in their lifetime.

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a

reserve of statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is
limited. Their skills may only be in some areas, but we are saying that they
are going to be barred from running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on
the day-to-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in
concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is
going to be barred from the same kind of public service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and
momentous decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future
who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their
country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up
structures that will perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of
three years or whatever it is . Maybe during that time, we would even agree
that their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not
run. But let us not bar them for life after serving the public for a number of
years.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall
impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualication on those who have
served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as
decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about the
Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify
those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating
themselves in oce. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in
establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. We do put a gap on consecutive service in
the case of the President, six years; in the case of the Vice-President,
unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the
Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party
list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on
the policy concerning local ocials will be taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to

prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and

frequent reelections, ocials from the President down to the municipal
mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on
indenitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on
the continuity or unbroken service of all of these ocials. But were we now
(to) decide to put these prospective servants of the people or politicians, if
we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualication, I have a
feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we
should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own
freedom of choice.

I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here
will say that simply getting nominated on a party ticket is a very poor
assurance that the people will return them to the Senate or to the House of
Representatives. There are many casualties along the way of those who
want to return to their oce, and it is the people's decision that matters.
They judge whether or not a Soc Rodrigo, a Sumulong, a Padilla, an Alonto
and a Rosales, after a rst and second term, should go back to the Senate.
That is a prerogative of the people that we should not take away from them
the right to judge those who have served. In any case, we already take
away from the people the freedom to vote for the third termers because we
say that a Senator, say, Mr. Rodrigo, is only good for twelve years. But if he
wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called back by his people to serve again,
let us say for a period of six years which Commissioner Davide called a
period of hibernation which is spent at his shpond in Bulacan, Bulacan
because there is a new situation in the country that fairly impels the people
to summon him back, like Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer
be any Cincinnatus.
That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think we already have
succeeded in striking a balance of policies, so that the structures, about
which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern, could
henceforth develop to redistribute opportunities, both in terms of political
and economic power, to the great majority of the people, because very
soon, we will also discuss the multiparty system. We have unshackled the
Philippine politics from the two-party system, which really was the most
critical support for the perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines.
That is quite a victory, but at the same time, let us not despise the role of
political parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how strong
our democratic parties are, and a splintering of all these parties so that we
fall back on, let us say, nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss
to the vitality and resiliency of our democracy . . .
xxx xxx xxx
BISHOP BACANI . . . I think when we voted on the provision that the illiterate
be allowed to vote and when we proposed in this Constitutional Commission

for initiative as a way also of empowering our people to engage in the

legislative exercise; we are really presupposing the political maturity of our
people. Why is it that that political maturity seems now to be denied by
asking that we should put a constitutional bar to a further election of any
Representative after a term of three years? Why should we not leave that to
the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are
politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient
for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people
and for politicians who may aspire to serve longer?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GARCIA.
I would like to answer Commissioner Bacani. We put a
constitutional bar to reelection of any Representative basically because of
the undue advantage of the incumbent. It is not because of lack of trust in
the people. We realize from history that Mexico fought a revolution simply
because of the issue of reelection. No reeleccion, sufragio universal.
Basically, it is because of the undue advantage of the incumbent that he
accumulates power, money, party machine or patronage. As regards what
Commissioner Aquino has said, politics is not won by ideals alone; it is won
by solid organizing work by organizations that have the capacity to do so;
and normally the incumbent has all the advantages. . .
xxx xxx xxx
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
Madam President, we have here 43 ballots
cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative No. 1 no further election after a total of three terms: /////-//////////-//
Alternative No. 2 no immediate reelection after three successive terms:
/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/" 6 (emphasis supplied)

In several cases, this Court was guided by the proceedings of the ConCom in
construing Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in relation to Section 43 (b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Dierent from the issue presented by the cases at bar,
however, the question in those cases was what constitutes a "term" for purposes of
counting the three consecutive terms allowed under Art. X, Sec. 8. It is apropos to
revisit these cases to aid us in extracting the intent behind said Constitutional
provision and properly apply it to the unique case of private respondent Hagedorn.
The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco 7
which involved the 1998 mayoralty election in Pateros. In 1989, private respondent
Capco became mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. In 1992, he was elected mayor for a term ending in 1995. In 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending in June 1998. In March
1998, he led his certicate of candidacy for the May 1998 mayoralty election of
Pateros. Petitioner Borja, Jr., another candidate for mayor, sought Capco's
disqualication on the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco would have already

served as mayor for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to
serve for another term. The COMELEC en banc declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor, thus Borja, Jr. sought recourse in this Court. In dismissing the petition, we
considered the historical background of Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, viz:
" . . . a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission
were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the
people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.
Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F.
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should
be no further reelection for local and legislative ocials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such ocials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term (2
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 236-243 [Session of July
25, 1986] . . . ). Monsod warned against `prescreening candidates [from]
whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualication, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions
`recognizing people's power.'
xxx xxx xxx
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The rst is the notion of service of term, derived
from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in oce. The second is the idea of election, derived from the
concern that the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them be preserved. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local ocials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local oce, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualication can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following cases or situations:

Case No. 1.
Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason
of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he
resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the
next election?
Yes, because although he has already rst served as mayor by succession
and subsequently resigned from oce before the full term expired, he has
not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the
term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the oce is not
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing

the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A
cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation
constitutes an interruption of the full term.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for
the application of the disqualication provisions have not concurred, namely,
that the local ocial concerned has been elected three consecutive times
and that he has fully served three consecutive terms . In the rst case, even
if the local ocial is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the rst term, the fact
remains that he has not been elected three times. . .

Case No. 3.
The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by
succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the
purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term,
is he qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the oce of mayor in the rst term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served
the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the rst term in full and
therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to
falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad
mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for
another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor,
there will be no way the people can return him to oce (even if it is just the
third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the rst term is
counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the

understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring
about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed." 8 (emphasis supplied)

We reiterated the Borja ruling in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, et al. 9

which involved the election for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Prior to the May 8,
1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he ran for
mayor, was proclaimed winner, and assumed oce. His proclamation was, however,
contested by his opponent Juan Alvez in an election protest led before the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales which rendered a decision declaring a failure of elections.
Upon appeal of the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio. In February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution

ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, and Alvez served the remainder of the term.
Lonzanida led his certicate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election for mayor
of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli led with the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had already served three consecutive
terms in the same oce and was thus prohibited from running in the upcoming
election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. COMELEC ruled that
Lonzanida was disqualied as his assumption to oce in 1995, although he was
unseated before the expiration of the term, was considered one full term for
purposes of counting the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:
"It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed oce and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio.
Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First,
the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post
in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of voluntary relinquishment of oce.
After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by nal judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of oce as mayor cannot be deemed
to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. . .

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualication, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms .
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and he did not hold
oce for the full term; hence, his assumption of oce from May 1995 to
March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit." 10 (emphasis supplied)

Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al ., 11 we ruled that a mayor

who assumed oce via a recall election and served the unexpired portion of the

mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full term for purposes of applying
the three term limit. In this case, therein private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr. was
elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full term. In 1995, he was reelected and
again served the full term. In 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. About two years
later, a recall election was held where Talaga, Jr. ran against Tagarao. He (Talaga,
Jr.) won and served the remainder of Tagarao's term.
In view of the upcoming May 2001 mayoralty election, Talaga, Jr. led his certicate
of candidacy. On March 2, 2001, therein petitioner Adormeo sought the cancellation
of Talaga, Jr.'s certicate of candidacy and/or his disqualication on the ground that
he had been thrice elected and had served three consecutive terms as city mayor.
Talaga, Jr., however, was declared qualied for the position of city mayor. Adormeo
thus sought recourse before this Court.
Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that Talaga, Jr. was not disqualied
as the two conditions for disqualication, namely (1) the elective ocial concerned
was elected for three consecutive terms in the same post and (2) he has fully served
three consecutive terms, were not met. We did not consider Talaga, Jr.'s service of
the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as service of a full term for purposes of the
three term limit. We also ruled that he did not serve for three consecutive terms as
there was a break in his service when he lost to Tagarao in the 1998 elections. We
held, viz:
"COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years, he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections .
Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing
respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X,
Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (footnote omitted) To bolster his case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional
Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that 'if one is
elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.'
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent
only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government
ocials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.
(Rollo, pp. 83-84)" 12 (emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja, Lonzanida and
Adormeo show that there are two principal reasons for the three term limit for
elective local ocials: (1) to prevent political dynasties perpetuated by the undue
advantage of the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the people by allowing
candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people. Likewise evident in the
deliberations is the eort to balance between two interests, namely, the prevention
of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the people on the one hand, and

respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the other; thus, the
calibration between perpetual disqualication after three consecutive terms as
proposed by Commissioner Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate reelection and
providing for a hibernation period.
In all three cases Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo we ruled that the "term"
referred to in the three term limit is service of a full term of three years for elective
local ocials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to prevent political
dynasties as it is the service of consecutive full terms that makes service continuous
and which opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of
leaders. In the words of Commissioner Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future
situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, ocials
from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary
interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that
permit them to stay on indenitely or to transfer these posts to members of their
families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap
on the continuity or unbroken service of all of these ocials. (emphasis supplied)"
Thus, ConCom set the limit on consecutive full terms to no more than three.
Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is prohibited.
In the cases at bar, however, private respondent Hagedorn will not serve a
prohibited fourth consecutive full term as he will be serving only the unexpired
portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term. Similar to Talaga, Jr. in the Adormeo
case, Hagedorn's service as mayor will not be continuous from the third to a fourth
consecutive full term as it was broken when Socrates was elected in the 2001
regular mayoralty election and served for one year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr.
was elected into oce by recall election and his service of the unexpired portion of
the incumbent's term was not considered a consecutive full term for purposes of
applying the three term limit, Hagedorn's service of the unexpired portion of
Socrates' term should not also be counted as a prohibited fourth consecutive full
term. It should not make a dierence whether the recall election came after the
second consecutive full term as in the Adormeo case or after the third consecutive
term as in the cases at bar because the intent to create a hiatus in service is
satisfied in both instances.
Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is
prohibited is the service of a fourth consecutive full term. Petitioners are correct in
foisting the view that "term" is a xed and denite period of time prescribed by law
or the Constitution during which the public ocer may claim to hold the oce as a
right. It is a xed and denite period of time to hold oce, perform its functions,
and enjoy its privileges and emoluments until the expiration of the period. 13 In
ascertaining what "term" means for elective local ocials, the Constitution itself
provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a xed, denite, and full period of three
years, viz: "Sec. 8. The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years . . . " Although one
or more persons may discharge the duties of the oce during this xed three-year
period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who
may ll the oce. It is one and indivisible, and term follows term in successive

cycles of three years each. If the incumbent or the one elected to the oce lls a
higher vacant oce, refuses to assume oce, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his oce, thereby creating a permanent vacancy, 14 the term would
remain unbroken until the recurring election for the office. 15

The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of
the Constitution bolster the interpretation that for purposes of applying the three
term limit, service of a full term of three years is contemplated, viz:
"Art. X, Sec. 8.
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except
barangay ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he
was elected."
"Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the oce for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice-President shall serve more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected." (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in Sec. 43 (b), viz:
"Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the oce
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective ocial concerned
was elected." (emphasis supplied)

Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a xed, denite, and full period, the
Constitution, in Art. VI, Sec. 9, uses the qualier "unexpired term" to refer to only a
portion of a term, viz:
"Art. VI, Sec. 9.

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of

Representatives, a special election may be called to ll such vacancy in the

manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term."
(emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase
"unexpired term" to mean the remainder of the term, viz:
"Sec. 44(d).
The successors as dened herein shall serve only the
unexpired terms of his predecessors. . ." (emphasis supplied)

Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that ". . . no such (local elective)
ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms," it consistently means
that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive full terms and prohibits
service of a minimum fourth consecutive full term.
In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full terms an elective local ocial can
serve, the ConCom sought to curb the undue advantage of the incumbent over
other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier to found a political dynasty. At the
time of the September 24, 2002 recall election, however, Hagedorn was not the
incumbent favored with this feared "undue advantage of the incumbent." On the
contrary, he ran against the incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could be the
subject of recall election and who, by law, was automatically a candidate in the
election. 16 Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election of Puerto
Princesa City which Socrates won, precisely because he was aware of the three term
limit.
It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 proscribe a local official who has been thrice consecutively elected in regular
elections and has served three full terms in the same position, from running in the
regular election succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that is
prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and
continuous full terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot
overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the
gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue
advantage to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It
is in this context of regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case,
which petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s
nally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government ocial should be
barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus
of at least one term, he may again run for the same oce." 17 Indeed, insofar as
regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case,
there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local ocial who assumes oce through a recall
election whether after his rst, second, or third consecutive term there is a
break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even
in the case of a local ocial who initially assumes oce via recall election, then
wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same

post, he is not prohibited from seeking another reelection and serving another full
term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via
recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three
succeeding full terms. Local ocials who assume oce via recall election serve only
the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a
full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the term of oce of elective local
ocials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the
Constitution also prescribe synchronization of regular national and local elections
beginning on the second Monday of May 1992, 18 which is accomplished if the local
ocial who assumes oce through recall election serves only the incumbent's
unexpired term.
It is only in the case of Representatives (and Senators) that "if one is elected
Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term will be
considered one term for purposes of computing the number of successive terms
allow ed." 19 The election herein contemplated is a special election thus this
Constitutional intent does not apply to a recall election which involves only elective
local officials. The Record bear this out, viz:
"MR. SUAREZ.
. . . May we ask a claricatory question regarding the interpretation of
the provisions in Sections 3 and 6 in relation to Section 9 regarding
the disqualication on the part of the Senator to run for two
consecutive terms, and in the case of the Members of the House of
Representatives, for three consecutive terms. For example, a special
election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would
have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean
that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered
one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement,
plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running?
Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualication, Madam
President?
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes, because we speak of "term" and if there is a special election, he will
serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two terms for the Members of the
Lower House." 20

As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered

service of a full term only with respect to Representatives (and Senators)
because unlike local government ocials, Representatives cannot be recalled. It
is continuous prolonged stay in oce that breeds political dynasties.
Understandably therefore, insofar as Representatives who cannot be recalled are
concerned, service of an unexpired term is strictly counted as service of a full
term because the purpose of the ConCom was to limit the right to run and be
elected in Congress. 21

In allowing Hagedorn to participate in the September 24 recall election, we are not

unmindful of the intent of the ConCom to broaden the people's choice of leaders.
The three term limit was adopted to allow the electorate to choose from other
candidates in the regular election succeeding the incumbent's third consecutive
term. This is clear in the Commissioners' alternatives for voting on the term limit
for Representatives and the outcome of their voting where 17 voted for "no further
election after a total of three terms" and 26 voted for "no immediate reelection
after three successive terms." A reelection is immediate if a local ocial wins in the
election succeeding the third consecutive term. 22 This is not the case with
Hagedorn who did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election and left that
political arena to other contenders, thereby upholding the intent of the ConCom to
broaden the choice of the electorate.
TIcEDC

The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the service of elective local ocials
after three consecutive full terms cannot be undermined through abuse of the
power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991 provides limitations on recall in
Section 74, viz:
"Section 74.
Limitations on Recall. (a) any elective local ocial may be
the subject of a recall election only once during his term of oce for loss of
confidence.
(b)
No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
ocial's assumption to oce or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election." (emphasis supplied)

Thus, an elective local ocial cannot perpetually hold on to his oce through the
mechanism of recall as at the very least, there will be a hiatus of one year after
an unbroken service of three terms. He could not simply create, in the words of
Commissioner Monsod, "structures that will perpetuate him (them)" in power
with the assurance that they will not be exposed because after serving three
consecutive full terms, he will certainly be replaced. Within the one-year period
under Sec. 74, his successor could discover and begin to dismantle these
manipulative structures. This one year period also provides a reasonable basis for
the electorate to judge the performance of the incumbent successor, thus
obviating fear of political maneuvering through initiation of recall proceedings by
a Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated by minions of the previous local official.
23 In Claudio v. COMELEC, et al., 24 we held, viz:
"In the Bower case (In re Bower 41 Ill. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 [1968]) cited by
this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC (269 SCRA 245, 256 [1997]), it was
held that 'The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the
electors to wait one year before petitioning for recall election is to prevent
premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected ocial
before having had sucient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies
and decisions."' 25

If, after one year in oce, the incumbent proves himself to be worthy of his
position, then his constituents will conrm this should a recall election be called,
as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. If, on the other hand,
the incumbent turns out to be an ineective leader, there is no reason why the
electorate should not be allowed to make a Cincinnatus of their past leader.
The imagined fear of abuse of the power of recall does not suce to disqualify
private respondent Hagedorn and should not prevail over the resounding voice of
the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have spoken and there is no mistaking that
Hagedorn is their overwhelming choice. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners'
position and allow an overly literal reading of the law to mute the electorate's cry
and curtail their freedom to choose their leaders. This freedom was as much a
concern of the ConCom as was the prevention of political dynasties and broadening
the choice of the people. This Court has not just once admonished against a too
literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulll its purpose and
defeat the intention of the authors. 26
In sum, private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualied from running in the
September 24, 2002 recall election as the disqualication under Art. X, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty election succeeding the third
consecutive term served. Nor is he precluded from serving the unexpired portion of
the 2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is not service of a prohibited fourth
consecutive full term.
I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration to the tenet of representative
democracy that the people should be allowed to choose whom they wish to govern
them. 27 In the end, ". . . more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the
tribunal of the people is nal for 'sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. '" 28
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
There is no dispute in this case that respondent Edward S. Hagedorn had served for
three consecutive terms as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City prior to his election to the
same position in the recall election held on September 24, 2002. The question is
whether his election was for a fourth consecutive term in violation of Art. X, 8 of
the Constitution, which bars elective local ocials, with the exception of barangay
officers, from "serv[ing] for more than three consecutive terms." 1
The majority hold that it does not because "what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms." (p. 15)
They argue that
. . . Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in oce
of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualied to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001,
for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But
to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting
to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last

September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as

consecutive or successive terms of oce which historically and factually are
not. (p. 22)

On the other hand, the dissenters argue that "what is prohibited is [a] fourth term"
(p. 4) and that the only way an elective local ocial, who has served for three
consecutive terms, may again be elected to the same position is for him to allow the
fourth term to expire before doing so.
Both the majority and the dissenters are thus agreed that the term following the
three consecutive terms must be counted. Their disagreement is in considering
whether or not to count the term during which a recall election is held as part of the
three consecutive terms preceding it. The majority consider the term as a
consecutive term of the term following but not of the third term preceding
which has just ended because of the interruption between the beginning of the
fourth term and the date of the recall election. Thus, the majority state:
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the
start of a new term following the interruption. An ocial elected in recall
election serves the unexpired term of the recalled ocial. This unexpired
term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. (p.
23)

In contending that the unexpired term served by the winner in a recall election "is
in itself one term for purposes of counting the three term limit," the majority take
contradictory positions because they also argue that "Hagedorn's recall term does
not retroact" to the beginning of that term and that "to consider Hagedorn's recall
term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that
he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality." The
majority are thus riding two unruly horses contending on the one hand in holding
that the term during which a recall election takes place is a fourth term, and on the
other that it is not a fourth term for purposes of determining whether an elective
local official has served for more than three consecutive terms.
On the other hand, the dissenters say that the only way an elective local ocial can
run again for the same position after serving three consecutive terms is for him to
allow the succeeding full term of three years to pass before doing so. They contend:
. . . For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to
rest for the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next fth
term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. (p.
11)

Hagedorn may not have "rested" for one full term before running in the recall
election on September 24, 2002, but neither will he be serving a fourth term
because a term consists of three years. Not to have "rested" for one full term
requires that he should also serve for one full term. This is not, however, possible
because, under Art. X, 8 of the Constitution, "the term of oce of elective ocials .
. . shall be three years." Less than three years is not a term.

The aw in the theories of both the majority and the dissenters is that both agree
that if there is an interruption in the continuity of service of an elective local ocial
during the three consecutive terms, not caused by the voluntary renunciation of
oce, the term during which the interruption occurs should not be counted in
determining the three-term limit. This is in accordance with the ruling in Lonzanida
v. COMELEC 2 that if the election of a mayor for the third consecutive term is
annulled, he can run again in the next election because the term during which his
election was invalidated is not to be counted. Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, 3 it
was held that if after serving for two consecutive terms, a mayor loses in his bid for
reelection but, in a recall election subsequently held during that term, he wins he
can still run in the next regular election because the term during which he lost is
not to be counted for applying the three-term limit. However, the majority and the
dissenters also say that if the interruption takes place in the term following three
consecutive terms, the term should be counted in applying the three-term limit. For
the majority, such term should be included in determining the next consecutive
terms, while the dissenters say it should be considered in determining the
consecutive terms preceding it. Both majority and the dissenters are thus
inconsistent.
Moreover, both erroneously assume that the election in a recall election is a
reelection. Both cite the records of the Constitutional Commission that what is
prohibited after a service for more than three consecutive terms is not reelection
per se but "immediate reelection." They note that the three-term limit, originally
adopted for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, was later
applied to elective local ocials as well. 4 Hence, they focus their discussion on
whether a reelection is "immediate."
To the majority a recall election is a reelection but it is not an "immediate" one
because a recall election does not immediately follow the end of the third term. On
the other hand, to the dissenters, such election is "immediate" because it takes
place during the fourth term which "immediately follows" three consecutive terms.
Consequently, the election during that term of a local elective ocial is prohibited if
he has served in the previous three consecutive terms. To quote the minority:

These debates [in the Constitutional Commission] clearly show the intent of
the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms applies to the fourth term, i.e., the term immediately
following the three consecutive terms, to be lled up by the regular election
for such term. (p. 11)

The question is not whether an election during a recall is an "immediate reelection."

The question is whether it is a reelection at all. The dictionary meaning of "reelect"
is "to elect for another term." 5 On the other hand, as already pointed out, the
Constitution provides that the term of an elective local ocial is three years.
Therefore, the period during which one serves by virtue of a recall election is not a
term because it cannot be for three years. It is only a tenure.

I submit with respect that the term during which a recall election is held should not
be counted in computing the three-term limit not only when the recall election
occurs within three consecutive terms, as this Court has already held, 6 but also
when such election is held during the fourth term immediately following three
consecutive terms. The reason for this is that the elective local ocial cannot be
said to have served "for more than three consecutive terms" because of the break in
his service. What prevents the fourth term from being counted in determining the
three-term limit is the lack of continuity, or the break, in the "service of the full
term." I must stress that the Constitution does not say "service for more than three
terms" but "service for more than three consecutive terms."
As the discussion of the Constitutional Commission on Art. X, 8 shows, the threeterm limit is aimed at preventing the monopolization or aggrandizement of political
power and the perpetration of the incumbent in oce. This abuse is likely to arise
from a prolonged stay in power. It is not likely to arise if the service is broken, albeit
it is for more than three terms. Hence, the application of the constitutional ban on
the holding of elective local oce for three consecutive terms requires in my view
(1) election in a regular election for three consecutive terms and (2) service for the
full terms, each consisting of three years, for which the ocial is elected. The rst
requirement is intended to give the electorate the freedom to reelect a candidate
for a local elective position as part of their sovereign right (the right of surage) to
choose those whom they believe can best serve them. This is the reason the
framers of our Constitution rejected Scheme No. 1, which was to ban reelection
after three successive terms, and adopted Scheme No. 2, which is about "no
immediate reelection after three successive terms." On the other hand, the second
requirement is intended to prevent the accumulation of power resulting from too
long a stay in office. 7
To repeat, the term during which a recall election is held is not a fourth term in
relation to the three consecutive terms preceding it. Nor is the unexpired portion of
such term a new one. Much less is the election a reelection. This can be made clear
by the following example: If A is thrice elected mayor of a municipality for three
consecutive terms and, during his third term, is made to face a recall election in an
o-year election and is elected over his rivals, it would be absurd to contend that he
cannot continue in oce because his election will actually be his fourth election and
the service of the remainder of the third term will actually be service for the fourth
consecutive term. In this case, for lack of the second element, i.e., service for more
than three consecutive terms, the three-term limit rule cannot be applied to the
election of Hagedorn in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
HaAISC

Finally, the dissenters argue that, unless the three-term limit is applied to a recall
election taking place after three consecutive terms, a popular elective local ocial,
unable to run for a fourth term, may be tempted to plot the recall of his successor so
that he can return to power in the ensuing election. I appreciate the point of the
dissenters. But the danger is equally great for a vice-mayor plotting against the
mayor and by succession ascending into power and from thence forward seeking
three more successive terms. And yet we have held that service for the unexpired
term, by reason of succession, is not to be counted. 8 In any event, it is familiar

learning that "the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of
power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse." 9
Thus, while I do not subscribe to the majority reasoning by which the decision in
this case is justied, I reach the same result as they do in holding that Hagedorn
was not disqualied because of prior service for more than three consecutive terms
to run for Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election held on September 24,
2002. The result reached upholds the right of a candidate to seek a popular
mandate and vindicates the sovereign judgment of the electorate of Puerto Princesa
City.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to dismiss the petition in G.R. Nos. 15508384 as well as those in G.R. Nos. 154512 and 154683 and to declare respondent
Edward S. Hagedorn qualied to run in the last recall election for Mayor of Puerto
Princesa City.

Footnotes

1.

Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with
prayers for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders.

2.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991, Chapter 5, Section 69 to 75.

3.

Composed of Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as Chairman with Commissioners

Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Runo S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.

4.

With Mehol K. Sadain as Presiding Commissioner and Luzviminda G. Tancangco

and Resurreccion Z. Borra as Commissioners.

5.

269 SCRA 380 (1997).

6.

Ricardo J. Romulo, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Convention.

7.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 236.

8.

Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 420.

9.

"MR. ROMULO:
Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of
the Senators, and the schemes are as follows: The rst scheme is, no further
election after two terms; the second scheme is, no immediate reelection after two
successive terms . Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are
the same as those for the House of Representatives, I move that we go directly to
the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT:
Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for
Senators. Are we ready now? The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.

COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT:

We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall

Please proceed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT:
The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. 1 and 32 votes for
Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II is approved." (Emphasis supplied) Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 244-245.
10.

MR. GASCON:
THE PRESIDENT:

Is this voting just for Congressmen?

Yes.

The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.

COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
will now start the counting.

Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We

Alternative No. 1 no further election after a total of three tern: /////-/////-/////-//

Alternative No. 2 no immediate reelection after three successive terms : /////-//////////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT:
The result show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for
Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is approved." (Emphasis supplied) Record of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 243-244.
11.

Second paragraph of Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution.

12.

Jose Luis
Commission.

Martin C. Gascon Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional

13.

Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and

now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

14.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 590.

15.

Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitutional Writers , p. 341 (1995).

16.

Hagedorn instead ran for Governor of Palawan in the 2001 elections but lost.

17.

311 SCRA 602 (1999).

18.

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.

19.

295 SCRA 157 (1998).

20.

Jose E. Suarez, Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

21.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 592.

Puno, J., concurring:

1.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).

2.

Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (Petition), pp. 9-10. The Petition-inIntervention of Mayor Socrates raises similar issues.

3.

1 L. Taada and F. Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 95-96 (1961).

4.

R. Martin, Philippine Political Law 27 (New ed. 1998).

5.

J. Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 699 (1995); Record of the
Constitutional Commission ("Record"), Vol. III, pp. 406-408, 451.

6.

Record, Vol. II, pp. 236-237, 239-240, 243.

7.

295 SCRA 157 (1998).

8.

Id., pp. 163, 165.

9.

311 SCRA 602 (1999).

10.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC, et al., 311 SCRA 602 (1999), pp. 612-613.

11.

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.

12.

Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 6.

13.

Petition, p. 23, citing Martin and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Ocers
and Election Law, Revised Edition, p. 173.

14.

Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 44(d).

15.

See Schardein v. Harrison, et al., 18 S. W. 2d 316 (1929).

16.

Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in relevant part, viz :
"Section 71. . . . The ocial or ocials sought to be recalled shall automatically
be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon."

17.

Petition, p. 18, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, supra, p. 609.

18.
19.

Osmena, et al. v. Del Mar, et al., 199 SCRA 750 (1991).

II J. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 96
(First ed. 1988).

20.

Record, Vol. II, p. 592.

21.

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., supra. p. 167.

22.

Id., p. 163.

23.

Section 70 of the Local Government Code provides, viz :

"Section 70.
Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a
preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government
unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b)
There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1)
Provincial level. All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of
the municipalities and component cities;
(2)
the city;

City level. All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in

(3)
Legislative district level. In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan
members are elected by district, all elective municipal ocials in the district; and in
cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district, all
elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4)
Municipal level. All punong barangay
members in the municipality.

and sangguniang barangay

(c)
A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in
session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective ocial
in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal
ocials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the
members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called
for the purpose."
24.

331 SCRA 388 (2000).

25.

Claudio v. COMELEC, et al., supra, p. 406.

26.

Paras v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 491 (1996).

27.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995).

28.

Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

Mendoza, J., concurring in the judgment:

1.

CONST., ART. X, 8: "The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such ocial
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
oce for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."

2.

311 SCRA 602 (1999).

3.

G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.

4.

2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 243-245 (Session of July 25,

1986) (hereafter referred to as RECORD); 3 RECORD 406-408 (Session of August
16, 1986).

5.

WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(Unabridged) p. 731 (1993).

6.

Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.

7.

See Borja v. COMELEC , 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC (res.), G.R. No.
133639, Oct. 6, 1998.

8.

Borja v. COMELEC, supra; Arcos v. COMELEC, supra.

9.

Angara v. Electoral Commission , 63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936); Nava v. Gatmaitan , 90

Phil. 172, 200 (1951); Vera v. Avelino , 77 Phil. 192 (1946); Aquino v. Enrile, Jr. , 59
SCRA 183, 417 (1974).