Political Science and Political Philosophy: Return to the Classics. No, Not ‘Those! John P. McCormick PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Tun., 2000), 194-197. Stable URL: bhutp:flinks,jstor-org/sici?stci= 1049-0965 %28200006%2933%63A2%3C 1943 APS APPR%3E2.0,CO*IB2-6 PS: Political Science and Politics is currently published by American Political Science Association ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding aay futher use ofthis work, Publisher contact information ray he abained at fpr jstoronpournal-apsa tt. 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They dared political scientists to be more morally comsci- entious, to focus on matters of real importance, and to develop @ more refined historical sensibility, These authors suggested that the factWvalue distinction at the center of the social scientific enterprise. was indicative of a moral decay at the center af Western civilization. This decay paved the way for Nazism in the twenties and thities, and possi- bly would contribute to Soviet vie- tory in the Cold War if changes ‘were not made. Less Cassandta-like wwas theit charge that politcal scien- tists were primarily interested in re fining the study of the insignificant. What they could measure through their dominant methods—public ‘opinion, voting patterns, ete.—vas, trivial in comparison to the classical analysis of regime types, or the na- tuce of man, or the purpose of the ‘common lif. ‘As a result, these. philosophers “offered history, unabashedly Western history, as a resource for studying these timeless questions of political inquizy. To their minds, questioning the nature of tyranny, or the status ‘of authority, vas sill worthwhiles fundamental, in fact. They encour- aged other political scientists to in- corporate these themes into their John P. McCormick is asitan profes Ser of politcal scence, Yale University. His publications include Cad Schmit’s Crigue Liberalism ( 16 University Pres, 1997) and ariles inthe American Polical Science Review ond Poliiel Theary. He 8 the edtr ofan o contributor to Confront ing Mass Democracy and Mots Technol aay: sayin Tench Conary Geren Poltical ond Socie| Thought (Duke Univer sity Press, foetheoring). practice, Indeed, Steven Smith's contribution to this colloquy repre- sents a renewed effort in this vein. is a call for the application of in- sights derived from traditional politi- cal philosophy to contemporary de- bates concerning civil society, cultural confict, and democratic peace. T wouldn't know precisely how to measure Strauss's, Arendt’, or Vo- gelin’s impact on the general prac- tice of political science, or that of colleagues like Sheldon Wolin and Judith Shklar (See Gunnell 1993}. 1 do know that they successfully estab, lished political philosophy as a legit mate, if sometimes stunned, mem- ber of the family of political science subdisciplincs (see Kateb 1968). These scholars certainly made it possible for someone like me to earn a living, at least partially, by teaching, talking about, and writing ‘on “old books.” But witat about today? Now that the shiadow of fascism has suppos- edly receded, and state socialism has withered away, does political philos phy still offer anything to political scientists? While I reject much of the substance of what members of that first generation offered f© main- stream political science, I sympa- thize with their spicit. This is still a powerful resource for the profession. leave aside the question of impor- tance: It should be taken for granted hat the apprehension of social real- ity in its most minute specificities is crucial and indispensable, as is the axeempt fo draw the most general conclusions about polities on hat basis. Pm heartened that David Mayhew attributes to political phi- losophy a significant and productive role in setting out, constructing, and choosing objects of analysis. I that’s the case, then political cheory has made peace with political science on the issue of importance. ‘That question aside then, I will focus an the moral, or what [ would PSQnline wav opsanet org etm the normative, imperative and the historical imperative, which T understand in relationship to social science methodology. I would not be a quick as Professor Mayhew to ‘question the potential or influence ‘of normative illumination, Political philosophy has (and can) encourage political scientists to take the nor- mative dimensions of theie work more seriously. A basic familiarity with Rawhs’s 4 Theory of Justice (1971), for instance, has enabled political scientists studying cases dealing with issues of redistribution, civil rights, and gender equity to think clearly about their awn works! relationship to justice. They have sense of hetter or worse, eifective or ineffective, and right or wrong, be: cause general intuitions about jus- tice—if not the formal pcinciples of it—derived from Rawls and a kind of constant hum of Rawls-speak echo throughout the professional literature. In less mainstream parts of the profession, books like Fou cault's Disciplze and Punish (1987) or Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1989), (0 choose just two examples, have setved something of the same function. Note, however, that all three of the books named have a somewhat distant connection with the history of political thought, tra ditionally conceived. ‘This brings me to the issue of his tory. The history of political thought is invaluable to political scientists, if only because it demonsirates how politics was studied at different times and because it allows political scientists to figure out haw they got to where they are, Until the science ‘of politics is perfected, there isi sight to be gained by observing tow those who came before analyzed political phenomena—on both the merits of the efforts themselves and the way these efforts reflect and in teract with their age. Asking what is ‘generalizable and what is contextual about the work of carlier political 195Opening “new” old books. John McCormick argues that political science graduate students should spend more time studying tum-of-the-century social science. He believes early exposure to the “canon” wiould provide political scientists a. cammon language and encourage them to link the empirical analyses of Machiavelli (right} and Hobbes with those of Neustadt and Keynes by tracing common themes os developed in Nietzsche lleft| and Marx. Photos courtesy of the library of Congress 194 PS June 2000scientists such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, ar Mantesquiew leads to asking the same questions about contemporary and personal work, ‘Bat [ think that studying history is, even more directly helpful to political scientists than that. respectfully dis- agree with Steven Smith's characteriza- tion of political sei- ‘ence’s superior sense ‘of its own history, Ia particular, the iano- ance of earlier methodological de- bates among contem- porary political sei- entists is, £0 my mind, unconsciona- ble. This neglect is detrimental to cohe- siveness within the profession and inhibitive of better informed and theorized empirical work. An inattcation to earlier methodological controversies is, ia fact, less characteristic of practitia. ners of disciplines like sociology and anthropology. By the end of thei first year, sociology graduate stu- dents will have read a thousand pages of Marx, a thousand pages of Durkheim, and a thousand pages of Weber. Political science graduate students do aot undergo the same immersion in recent classics. Exposure to this kind of “canton” gives members of other disciplines a common language, no matter what methodology individual scholars eventually adopt or what field they eventually pursue. Moreover, it gives researchers a sense of the real dif culty of accurately apprehending social reality. As a result, the almost arrogant “T just invented the wheel” disposition that serves as @ license for all kinds of bad behavior in po- litical science seems not nearly s0 prevalent in its sister disciplines “This may be a “grass is greener” observation. Nevertheless, itis not uncommon to hear political scien- ists trained at the best departments in the country proudly pronounce that they have aever read Weber. If they do admit having done so, they they are, 196 ‘The history of polit- ical thought is in- valuable to political scientists, if only because it demon- strates how politics was studied at dif- ferent times and because it allows political scientists to figure out how they got to where will quickly note that Weber did a poor job of framing rigorous eause- andheffect arguments. Onfy rarely will one hear an appreciation of how Weber's career ex- ‘emplified that of someone devoted to the social scientific mission oF of how his empitical work reflects his grappling ‘with basic abserver/ ‘object dynamics. If all political sei entists were trained more extensively in tumm-of the-century social science, both political philoso- phers and empirical researchers would benefit. Students of political philosophy could link the kind ‘of empirical analy- ses that, say, Machiavelli and Hobbes conducted with those of, say, Neustadt and Keynes, by tracing common themes as developed in Nietesche and Marx. Because the common ground for exchange and interaction will be significantly broadened, students of political the- ory will not be so marginalized— either as a result of their own be- havior of through dismissal by others. On the other hand, empicicists would be reminded that the history of the social sciences is not identical to the history of the natural sci- ences, The history of the natural sciences is stil, even post-Kuha, the history of mistakes corrected. The, history of the social sciences, om the contrary, seems ta be the history of mistakes repeated. If, for instance, rational choice scholars were to explore the prob- lems of preference formation and preference change through the enscs of Weber or Trocltsch, they ‘might be inspired to think about their awa methodological apparatus and objects of investigation in new and productive ways. But doing so would require the admission that they did not spring newly and fully formed and informed from the god- head of social science—at least not in the sense of having decisively overcome the problem of reconciling formal models and conerete objects of inquiry. Likewise, a better grounding in the classic debates of social scientific: ‘methodology might encourage so- called constructivists (aka, “inter- pretivists,” “poststructuralists”) ‘within the profession to interact ‘more intimately with the generalists and formalists. Iis dificult for me to criticize constructivists because, in my experience, they are more ac- commodating to theory and more willing to interact and exchange ideas with students of polivicat phi losophy than are formalists. But this is why I put the respansibility on ‘members of the former group to ‘engage, for example, rational choice research in a way that permits ther to do more than rejoice in the lat- ter’s obvious deficiencies and timita- tions. Too often, the response 10 exaggerated claims of universal ex- planatory power isa listing of what is not explainable. Approaching col- legial critique in this way sometimes ‘makes contemporary students of politics look more like theologians than scientists, So-called constructiv- ists must contribute to setting the terms of the debates over subjective and objective, particular and univer- sal, historically specific and tempo- tally general, and so forth, In short, they need to respond in the way ent pirically oriented positivists have; they need to produce their own ver- sion of Green and Shapiro's Pathol- ‘gies of Rational Choice Theory (1996). etter familiarity with late-nine- teenth and early twentieth century social science is one key to increas- ing interaction among political phi- losophers and political scientists, rational choice theorists and 0% structuralists, and normativists and positivists, Large doses of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim may be. deemed (0 be indigestible as @ com- ‘mon curriculum in graduate political science training. In that instance, L ‘would suggest that Weber's “Science 5.a Vocation” ({1919] 1958a) and “Politics as a Vocation" ({1919] 19580) become the oceastons of an- PS Syne 2000nual debate and discussion in politi- cal science departments, especially large research-oriented departments. Department chairs might go so far as to organize yearly lectures on one or both of these essays by different members of the department chosen from among all subfields and meth- ‘odological camps, This would pro- mote understanding of different per- speetives on and generate public discussion about fundamental ques- tions like “What is politics?” “Why do we study i?” and “What are the pitfalls and rewards of devoting References Foucault, Miche. 1987, Discictce ant Push The Bt ofthe Peson. Tans. Alaa Sher: ddan. New Yark: Vintage, Giga, Col 1989. a Diferone Voice Prsctigicl Theory and Women’s Devel pment. Cantoriége, Ma: Haciard Univer Sy Pres Greed, Donald P, znd fan Shapico. 1996. Pe ‘halogen of Rana Chace Thoory. A Cr fique of Applicetions i Potten! Sconce ‘New Hier: Yale University Prese. one’s fife to studying it?” Such an anual event would not serve t0 “eanonize” Weber. On the contrary, his answers to the questions listed above may, under such close seru- tiny, be found woefully inadequate. But Weber invoked bath Plato and contemporary state-of-the-art stien- tific research in his discussions of scholarship and polities. Conse- quently, his essays may provide the best cataiyst for interaction, dia- logue, and debate aver what consti- tutes and who comprises “political Gunn, Fohn, 1983. The Descent of Patient "Theoy The Genealogy of x American Vo canon. Chica Unaersty 2 Caieago Press Kate, George, 1968, Potuial Theor: fis Na lve and res. New Yark: St. Martin's Press Rawls, John, 1971.4 Theory of ustce, Cae= brie, MA: Harvare University Press ener, Max [1919] 1958, “Seienee as a Vo PSOnline wow apscnet org Postwar political philosophers adopted as a starting point the fai ure of classical social science in pre- dicting and preventing the collapse ‘of Burope. (The unforeseen demise ‘of the Soviet Union gives more re- cent, if also more felicitous, evie dence of this kind of predictive shortcoming.) Since neither contem- porary political philasophy nor eni- pirical research seem to encourage any better forecasting or engage ment with the real world, I submit that past mistakes are worth revisit ing, ation Prom Mex Weber isan Stet and ane 4. coth ane Eh Ne Overt Ov Uva T1615) 198, "Politics 2s « Voation* tn hom har Weber Eso Sasa o fans BI Gash sad © Wag Mik Onto onoed Ura Pre 197