Professional Documents
Culture Documents
25years active practice at the bar of this state. I urge the Court
26to take a look at that statute and give each of the words meaning
3the requirements of the trial court, the trial court opinion and
4its analysis failed to give each word a meaning in the statute and
8practice, the trial court has converted the purpose of the statute
17to someone who qualifies here as a policeman who might have gone
18to law school and has a license to practice law but, nonetheless,
23their functions on the field, they, too, are using their skills
5example, there were a number of trial court exhibits and there was
6her testimony that indicated that she had indicated -- that she
7had not complied with the basic rules of our practice book in
9practiced law.
19will become important once takes -- when one takes a good look at
20the opinion.
24the appellate level and went through very clearly that this
6standards.
8state performed, and she is the plaintiff here, is such that she’s
11language in the CBT case, and I’m presuming this Court’s familiar
12with it now, but at that point what you said in 1956 is that
18it your argument that her clients are just the institution?
22at all.
24her office and I think the evidence at trial, Judge Norcott, made
25it pretty clear that she receives advice from third parties, as
27would be that she has no client and in terms of -- and the trial
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11of the things that -- that’s one reason why this trial court did
14carve out, as far as a client, would be, you have to have someone
24She has none, as the trial court found -- none of the earmarks of
8issue the way the trial court did the analysis, is that in
11practicing law. And the problem that exists there is that the
13quantitative analysis.
15far to do that, that the trial court completely ignored and paid
16no attention to the standards that could have been applied here
17very easily and those standards that have been pronounced through
21law.
23who admits that’s not what she does. She did that on five
1She never held herself out as an attorney during the entire time
2period. She was quite clear on the witness stand, I don’t tell
7of effort went into it, but in a way that is so nuanced that it
19And I’d ask you to scour the record and what you’ll see there is a
25voting machines.
3She had no idea what we were talking about and she admitted that
4she’s never looked at it, didn’t know what it was, a very basic
7who not only doesn’t hold herself out as a lawyer when she’s doing
8these things that the trial court found, but she didn’t even know
11years, we would submit to the Court that the -- that’s the reason
15to being, basically, a little bit pregnant. That gets you all the
16way there. And that’s exactly what this trial court ruling holds.
21state’s office and it was created, and when the attorney general’s
23practiced law came in and that’s who the lawyer is for the State
24of Connecticut. That statute left the mound of the work to the
11law, was legislatively neutered. I’d ask that you also take a
16was created to avoid having a political hat put into position and
19little that this plaintiff put on and I would say to you, frankly,
20in light of the fact that this plaintiff brought this action and
21this plaintiff knew this was her claim that she wanted to prove to
22everybody and say, I’m a real lawyer, all the evidence that she
1the bar of the state, out of the statute. If one takes a look at
2the 1897 statute and takes a look at the dictionaries that were in
3place at that time, one would see that at the bar meant being a
7statute.
9knew their way around the court system to represent the interests
1381 Connecticut Bar and we also have the judicial history and civil
18reliance on the belief that the statute, like the statute issue
22when the trial court used the words liberal construction that it
24that are used in that statute and each word that’s used in that
25statute, you have to give each one meaning. And I think that when
5the statute gets where Judge Sheldon got, but do you dispute the
11eligibility-to-run statute.
18of the issues that have been raised by the Court on its own motion
21cases that the judge cites, in every other -- all the cases that
25individual who has testified and, frankly, put all the evidence on
27want to do.
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9statute, as well, but if it turns out that she doesn’t comply with
10the statute, she will not be able to run for that office and why
11doesn’t -- why is that alone not reason to -- and the fact that
13position to vote for her, why is that not reason alone to construe
17much with it. If what we’re trying to do is use each one of the
25that.
16of the statute and how do you apply it in a way that is so broad
17to encompass as many people as possible and not deviate from the
20try to say that the plaintiff’s little bit of proof that she
22her entire time span as a secretary of the state, then I would say
26take different facts -- take it the fact that the applicant has a
3ten-year requirement?
6and eliminate it. And I think that there is a reading that would
7say that that person who had the thriving estate practice, unless
9again, there are many estate lawyers who do, in fact, go to court,
10but --
21 And, so, why can’t you glean from that that back
10Justice Park -- Judge Park, who became a chief judge, had a -- and
14never have obtained a high success at the bar, and they went on to
17that what they were thinking of at that time period was someone
18who was at court, particularly the way they spoke about him in his
19obituary.
24to --
27point --
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3the time.
5you.
9these elements. And the most interesting part about this is that
10in going through this 96-page opinion, there’s all sorts of new
14except to allow that officer of the law with a law degree who
23Does that for, you know, however long -- five years, eight years,
24ten years -- and then is appointed to the bench for five or eight
25years and for some reason decides that he or she wants to run for
26attorney general.
2presume that you would say that that person is not eligible. And
3if I’m wrong, tell me that I’m wrong and, you know -- but if I’m
14demonstrated and the trial court pointed out, that’s what she’s
16that they couldn’t deal with. She said, go deal with your
17legislature.
19hypothetical, that, you know, it’s not a good idea, but we think
23 Thank you.
25May it please the Court, Gregory D’Auria for the State. We’re
1and from the briefs in this case -- no one, not even the
8that that was a historical accident, that that was the effect of
10section 10.
12law officer. You’re therefore like any other office in the state
13-- I’ll put that phrase in quotes -- ergo article sixth, section
1410, applies to you. But our state history and our constitutional
15history tell us that the AG is not like any other state officer,
12history of the attorney general and ask the question, was the
15that would be open to all the electors? And when you look at the
24requirements.
26should not be quick to presume for it’s own purposes that that was
27the intent of the framers because it’s hard to believe that the
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2is, any elector could be the attorney general with all of the
8choose who will govern them without limitation. The State has no
21that had been in effect for many years. That’s all I have.
23Horton and I have had a discussion about something that he’ll talk
24about, perhaps, footnote 17 of his brief, about the 1970 and 1980
1language that existed. We agree with Mr. Horton that -- that the
16footnote 2?
27candidates.
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7pretty sure it’s as easy to say that 3-124 is not within that
8office’s jurisdiction.
2Norcott.
4gonna say. You’ve asked to divide the time between you and Mr.
5Horton.
17Norcott.
21in a democracy, it’s for the voters to choose who they’ll want to
4the statute to the facts that he found in this case about the
6state.
10age, just being a member of the bar, paying the requisite fees,
12office?
17and he made --
25clearly erroneous.
2election officials, all of which -- and this is the sine qua non
7accountable?
14be, as any other attorney could be, sanctioned for that. That
16only interfere with her standing at the bar, which I think ties in
183-124.
3repeatedly for a month, never gets a return phone call. May that
12I apologize if I implied that. Her clients are the people of the
15specifically.
19violation in question.
24and made some statement to them about the case, she could be
6could.
17as this Court has said, even if there is some sort of gray area,
26secretary of the state does. And her office could still fulfill
27all of its functions even if, in a worst case scenario, she were
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9attorney.
18party raises in its brief, that there are not all the traditional
27that’s simply a red herring. The real question is, are you
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5individual.
7someone tried to ask during the trial and I think it was kept out,
12practice of law?
14the question is answered. And this was the point that we made to
1816-wheeler --
26the other lawyers in her office by which they sat down, analyzed a
9was the --
11given the same answer regardless of who called her, whether it was
12the principal who called her, a voter who called her, the mayor,
13Does it matter?
16would have voted, who did vote, at that polling place, who would
17have received the benefit of the correct legal advice she gave to
18Mayor Perez.
22all the time, Justice Katz, and certainly, although her office is
23high, that is no --
27advice.
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9this case.
12state that a person is practicing law when they use legal training
15that person or apply legal training and skill and judgment to the
21clearly, he was using his legal training and skills and his
22judgment --
25was closed.
10think, also --
14context of both matters, the nature of the work matters, and the
21concurrence said --
24it.
1assume that what the DCF workers were doing is a fact of law
3you look at other cases like the Payne case and like out-of-state
7Correct?
20plaintiff didn’t hope to get advice for her benefit while bringing
21this petition?
23because she wanted a ruling in her favor, but not advice. I think
15judge for juvenile, is over there a lot because there are a lot of
17So the State has to harmonize itself with these federal mandates.
18One of the ways the General Assembly finds out about this is for
26that would be a problem, then decides that was not the practice of
4The other two would still be enough to sustain the judgment that
16of any arguments she had made in public about how we needed to
17change our voting machines to comply with the Help America Vote
18Act.
23remember with those two exhibits, Justice Katz, is not just the
8and --
11picked up the phone and called the attorney general and got his
16has been some extensive citation back and forth of the attorney
21law?
1polling place?
8least that are binding, are those which deal with the
9administration of elections?
11same way because I think there is a comma that separates those two
23McLachlan.
26question.
7general.
16set out in 3-125 and they deal with all the situations in which
4for, I think, three years and what she indicated she was not
9assessing whether one’s practicing that one does or does not hold
12If you look at 2-44(a), there are separate subsections about the
16people.
20lawyer.
23a lawyer.
6functionally, what has she been doing, not what box did she check
7on a form.
11crucial to the decision in this case. I’m gonna yield the rest of
16facts of this case, the ultimate decision about who should be our
20maintain her eligibility for that office and run for that office.
6large audience if that’s all he had to say or she had to say, but
8the broadest sense, say that he or she is giving legal advice for
16like that and has this program for five or eight years, that that
19general.
3attorney?
10what active practice of law means? What is the point of ten years
11if you can only -- if you can qualify by doing relatively little
14for five years, that isn’t good enough? I can’t understand how
18You have to understand that ten years could also modify at the bar
19of this state. They very well have not wanted some -- I was gonna
22been a member of the bar of this state and practice at the bar of
25is set out very clearly in Judge Sheldon’s decision, refers to the
3Again, that’s just one possible reading of the statute that would
6practice.
11active inform what the meaning of practice is? And vice versa?
15when this Court has its choice of more than one possible,
26somebody --
3know, it’s from a phone call and the person says, never talk to
4the cops without talking with the lawyer first. Your answer to
5Justice Palmer was, that was practicing law. So I’m assuming the
7practice of law?
12co-counsel.
16to the State’s brief and the first one has to do with the word
18means the offices that existed in 1818 and the analogy they have
23trials. And it doesn’t say, did a jury trial exist at that time
26that would have been tried to a jury. That’s the Evans case, 277
27Connecticut 496.
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7office, in the state. How can that not include the attorney
8general?
11to make sure sunk in, from Mr. D’Auria. He said, so, the only
19on the other five offices. You could only have it on the attorney
20general and it’s frozen as to what the conditions are for the
7other requirements for the attorney general now, other than what’s
9unconstitutional.
11Horton.
19opposite.
22In other words, the -- I’m sorry. I read -- I read his answer
23exactly the opposite from the way it is. But that can’t possibly
24be that way. How can you possibly say, the attorney -- that goes
2possibly be right.
5office the people elect for? I don’t see how he can make that
7actually said was you could have all sorts of statutory constrict
8-- restrictions on the attorney general now, that doesn’t make any
101818.
271818.
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3widely distributed well before that time and surely, our founding
4fathers had to have known about the federalist papers and the
6in some detail in not only Justin -- Judge Blue’s opinion, but
10clause, not to the middle clause, he’s making all the history from
15that: one is it’s not ambiguous when you have eligible along with
16the exception clause because it’s saying every elector who has
25Virginia provision like this that was construed in the case that
26all sides have cited in which they have another implied exception
8bunch of other cases for the proposition -- not just the one Mr.
12discussion, you know, for statutes. You can say something’s the
26for office.
5statutes.
7wall and then there’s another one that says exactly the opposite.
8You know, at the end of the day, you’ve gotta decide clashing
16just want to ask Attorney D’Auria, did you want to have a minute
20mean, I --
23now?
2never were between 1818 and 1965. The question we ask, I think,
3is the proper way to address the question, which is, in 1970 when
8well, the analogy’s not perfect but the jury trial cases in the
10doesn’t project the future. You need to look to the future and
24One point that we differed on with the State -- and we’re relying
6We argued it below and at that time, Mr. Horton said it’s
7ridiculous.
10With respect to the claims made that -- I would ask you to take a
13done for any purposes, the common sense is that when the
18foot level about some generalities that she does and when it gets
21Katz pointed out. And that points out the fact that there’s a
22very slim read here for this plaintiff to marshal all her evidence
24And if you take her facts and apply it a few steps out, almost
2anybody if they give bad advice? And under the plaintiff’s theory
11 Thank you.
14this case, and in that regard, I would ask counsel to just remain
20the plaintiff has standing and the issues before the court were
24124 is constitutional.
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13 C E R T I F I C A T I O N
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15 I, Kimberly Silverman, do hereby certify that the
16 foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription, to the
17 best of my ability, of the audio recording and notes of the
18 above-referenced case heard before the aforementioned Honorable
19 Supreme Court Justices of Connecticut, on the 18th day of May,
20 2010.
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25 ____________________________________
26 Kimberly Silverman
27 Court Recording Monitor
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