Crim Pro Cases

People vs. Sandiganbayan, Sept. 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 489

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 169004

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,* and
ABAD, JJ.

-versus-

SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
September 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is a petition [1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution [2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated
July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando
Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at
the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation
of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his
failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three
Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by
law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite
demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order [4] dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit
its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] onJuly 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act
[R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and
above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in
relation to office.Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's
decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606,

as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to
cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
In his Comment [8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section
4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first,
while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the
following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases
where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that
a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged
with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante[9] is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case,
Victoria

Amante

and

herein

respondent

Plaza

were

both

members

of

the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent
Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while
respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose
salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court
cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people.[11]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in
the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the
Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.[13] The exception
contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is
not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said
provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25,
2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other
offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. [15]

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the
law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an
offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in
its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the
application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses
or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public
officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in
the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those
that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit
the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,
the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
[18]
Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where the crime involved was
murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the
crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official
functions.
Thus,
under
said
paragraph
b,
what
determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public official was charged
with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations
that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege
speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such allegations,
the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners
official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April
25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official
duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing and that
accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the
latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to
his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered
by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech.
Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumedjurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed
against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the
said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law
had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the
Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish
between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading

because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not
disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while
in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses
and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this
Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated
on the scope and reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an
accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out
in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in
relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such
that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts
in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accuseds] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
[the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention
any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a wellsettled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, [22] unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. [23] The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,[25] the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is herebyNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let
the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Jose Catral Mendoza, who are on official leave
per Special Order Nos. 883 and 886, respectively, both dated September 1, 2010.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-55.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, ret. (Chairperson), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez
(members), (concurring), id. at 13-25.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 74-76.
[4]
Id. at 78.
[5]
Id. at 80-85.
[6]
Id. at 13-25.
[7]
478 Phil. 506 (2004).
[8]
Rollo, pp. 91-98.
[9]
G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 49.
[10]
G. R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 238-240.
[11]
Id., citing Presidential Decree No. 1486.
[12]
Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision
correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be
convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered
and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its
exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction;
Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil
action is first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular
courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active
service.

[13]

People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, citing Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379. (1996).
Emphasis supplied.
[15]
People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 59-60. (Emphasis supplied.)
[16]
Supra note 7.
[17]
Supra note 9.
[18]
Rodriguez, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).
[19]
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298.
[20]
G.R. No. 136806, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 498.
[21]
Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88.
[22]
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
[23]
PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 94374, August 27, 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
[24]
People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 62-65, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 22, citing Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 443 (2001).
[25]
Supra note 9.
[14]

------------------------------------------------xxx
People vs. Sandiganbayan & Amante, Aug. 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 49

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167304

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,**
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

-versus-

SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD
DIVISION) and VICTORIA AMANTE,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) datedFebruary 28, 2005 dismissing
Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria

Amante

was

member

of

the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she
was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she
headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within
seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas),
with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate
charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'

Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent
Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information [3] with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the
period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency,
despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with
the

said

court

MOTION

TO

DEFER

ARRAIGNMENT

AND

MOTION

FOR

[4]

REINVESTIGATION dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so
far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash
advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still
in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who
was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition[5] dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim
of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during
the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at
the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the

language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary
grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution[6] dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against
Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the
proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE
INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME
CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION
OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II,
SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes
the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According to
petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where
the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment [8] dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the
law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the
exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section

4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has
original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and
higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those
mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense
involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned
statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in
order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent
proceeded to cite a decision[9] of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it
conferred by acquiescence of the court.
In its Reply[10] dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials
in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b)
of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[11] wherein this Court ruled
that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background,
this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[12] thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people.[13]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[14]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended onFebruary 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19,
1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
the offense.[15] The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable
in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at
the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this
present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall
govern.Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director

and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions
thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vicegovernors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to
her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following
ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of
specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, obviously intended cases mentioned
in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by
the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the
Sandiganbayan. Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they
are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they
are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the
enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed
however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized
that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so
that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to
(g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with
violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must

involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of
those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of
an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a
public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26,
then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion
of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan[16] where this Court ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did
not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public
official involved was a member of theSangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged
with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public
official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and
felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office. [17] Thus, in the
case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[18] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a
of Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[19] where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner
herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when
he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public
hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration.
Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality,
during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office.
If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippinesreveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to
extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert
jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other
offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the
other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in
Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves,
while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and
felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which
was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out inMontilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if the

offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x
x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public
office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may
show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds]
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused]
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[20]

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27
and above, except those specifically enumerated.It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
[21]

unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

[22]

The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to

use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. [23]

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of
the

Sandiganbayan

(Third

Division)

dated February

28,

2005 isNULLIFIED and SET

ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 679 dated August 3, 2009.
Per Special Order No. 678 dated August 3, 2009.
[1]
Dated April 20, 2005, rollo, pp. 30-58.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi (now retired), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez,
concurring, rollo, pp. 59-75.
[3]
Sandiganbayan rollo, pp. 1-3.
[4]
Id. at 34-35.
[5]
Id. at 45-48.
[6]
Id. at 54-70.
[7]
G..R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 388.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 96-102.
[9]
Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-38204, September 24, 1991, 201 SCRA 632.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 106-110.
[11]
G.R. Nos. 146646-49, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 236, 242, citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).
[12]
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 224.
[13]
Id. at 238-239, citing Presidential Decree No. 1486
[14]
Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No.
1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision
correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be
convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered
and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its
exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction;
Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil
action is first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular
courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active
service.
[15]
Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 379.
[16]
Supra note 7.
[17]
Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, supra note 11, at 622.
[18]
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 318.
[19]
393 Phil. 143, 157-158 (2000).
[20]
Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88, 96.
[21]
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
[22]
Id., citing PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., 213 SCRA 16, 26 (1992).
[23] Id., citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 347-348.
**

------------------------------------------------xxx

Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, Jan. 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 224

THIRD DIVISION
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a
state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada
on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending
on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). [3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. [4] President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of
student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6]
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her
brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. [7] The
Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE
D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from
the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation
gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian
D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to
do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the
crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. [8]It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
[9]

It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public

Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was
not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with
the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions
or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13]
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems
definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted
to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. [15] It
ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is
no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in
relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such
sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own
government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation
of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant
to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall
have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or
board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the
governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of
public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that
she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from
former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. [16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [17] The motion was denied with
finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT

QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. [19]
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is
the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for
petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.
[20]

Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often

dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. [22]
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule
and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be
subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the
court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse
of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court
from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was
set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section
4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section
4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.[25]She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of
authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. [28]
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos onJune 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. [29]

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.
No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. [30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order
of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed
with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family
or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the
spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation

shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all
giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their
penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. [33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens
et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawatawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. [34] The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. [35] In other words, petitioners interpretation
lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. [36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of
P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin

requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government
instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee
on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC)
on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to
the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained
under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency
under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru
falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply
cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a
UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public
officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts
are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or
its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition feepaying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan

also has jurisdiction

[43]

officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,

over

other

We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)

covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she
is placed there by express provision of law.[44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. [45] By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. [46] At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office. [47]
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one
a public officer.[48]

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. [49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government
and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50]
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds
there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that
her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. [51] More than that, jurisdiction is
not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a
motion to quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.[53]
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student
regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions,committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land
Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense
that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case. [54]
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote
or misrepresent.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used
the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to
deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos
and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before
the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. [57]The administration of justice would gravely suffer if
lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Vice Associate Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, per Raffle dated January 14, 2008. Justice Chico-Nazario penned the assailed Sandiganbayan decision, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos.
**
As it is funded partly by the Philippine government and private donations, the UP student shoulders a minimal tuition fee while being provided a wide range of
courses and programs.
UP also has a Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP, otherwise known as the Iskolar ng Bayan Program), which enables students to avail of
discounted tuition fees to full tuition fee waivers and cash subsidies determined according to their income brackets. (www.up.edu.ph.)
[1]
Rollo, pp. 58-64.
[2]
Id. at 5.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id. at 29.

[7]

Id. at 36-40.
Id. at 7-10.
Id. at 43.
[10]
Id. at 44.
[11]
Id. at 45, citing G.R. Nos. 144261-62, May 9, 2001, 357 SCRA 677.
[12]
Id. at 47.
[13]
Id. at 50.
[14]
Id. at 54.
[15]
Id. at 58.
[16]
Id. at 61-64.
[17]
Id. at 65.
[18]
Id. at 74.
[19]
Id. at 6.
[20]
De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 294; Lee v. People, G.R. No. 137914, December 4, 2002, 393 SCRA 398; Yap v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 245, 253, citing Acharon v. Purisima, G.R. No. 23731, June 27, 1965, 13 SCRA
309; Bulaong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78555, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 618.
[21]
Marcelo v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657.
[22]
Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128954, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 575.
[23]
G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 171.
[24]
Id. at 177-179.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[26]
Id. at 8-10.
[27]
Id. at 182.
[28]
Id. at 62.
[29]
Presidential Decree No. 1486.
[30]
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent,
except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and
sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized;
Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court
but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its
exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in
cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the
corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active service.
[31]
Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 1.
[32]
Id., Sec. 10.
[33]
People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236 (1933).
[34]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, G.R. No. 83736, January 15, 1992, 205 SCRA 184.
[35]
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. L-14526, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 449; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249 (1925); Chartered Bank
v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921).
[36]
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, August 7, 1997, 276 SCRA 681.
[37]
G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 57.
[38]
G.R. Nos. 71163-65, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 252.
[39]
G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 452, 458-459.
[40]
G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231, 237-238.
[41]
430 Phil. 658 (2002).
[42]
Laurel v. Desierto, id. at 672-673, citing F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 1.
[43]
G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 187.
[44]
Presidential Decree No. 1606, Sec. 4(A)(1)(g).
[45]
Rollo, p. 63.
[46]
Laurel v. Desierto, supra note 41, at 679-680.
[47]
Id.
[48]
Id.
[49]
University of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations, 107 Phil. 848 (1960).
[50]
Id.
[51]
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298; Lim v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. L-76974, November 18, 1988, 167 SCRA 487.
[52]
Commart (Phils.), Inc. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 85318, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 73.
[53]
Id.
[54]
Rollo, p. 64.
[55]
Adm. Case No. 1053, September 7, 1979, 93 SCRA 87.
[56]
Rollo, p. 89.
[57]
Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 130068 & 130150, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30, 51-52; Albert v. Court of First Instance of
Manila (Br. VI), G.R. No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
[58]
Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 10.
[8]
[9]

----------------------------------------------xxx
Geduspan vs. People, Feb. 11, 2010
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the
respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a
temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions dated January 31, 2003 and
May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
[1]

On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. The information read:

That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused
MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private
individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan,
Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with
Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi,
Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale of
West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the possession, operation and
management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective January
1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West Negros
College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her official functions,
had given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by accused DR.
EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros College, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth,
Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment show that she
was appointed as Department Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary
[2]

grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned and controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as
the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the
position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA
8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioners appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her
position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contends
that the position of Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of
respondent court. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by
respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.
[3]

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the
commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary
grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of
the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense;

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Underscoring
supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the
abovequoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second
part thereof specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
charged together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within
the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
[4]

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of(a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),(d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding
any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned
and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249
and the offense for which she was charged was committed in relation to her office as department manager of
Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario and concurred in by Associate Justices Ma. Christina G. Cortez-Estrada and
Diosdado M. Peralta of the Fifth Division.

[2]

Rollo, p. 77.

[3]

381 Phil. 906 (2000).

[4]

361 Phil. 251 (1999).

Cases:
----------------------------------------------xxx
Valdespenas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871

----------------------------------------------xxx
Republic vs Sunga, 162 SCRA 191

----------------------------------------------xxx
Araula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 567

----------------------------------------------xxx
Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil 149

----------------------------------------------xxx
Fukuzume vs People, Nov. 11, 2005

----------------------------------------------xxx
Foz, Jr. & Fajardo vs People, Oct 9, 2009

----------------------------------------------xxx

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, Oct. 12, 2009

Macasaet vs. People, 452 SCRA 255
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 597 SCRA 49
People vs Rivera, 597 SCRA 49
Bonifacio et al vs RTC of Makati, et al, May 5, 2010
Magno vs People, April 6, 2011
People vs Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267
Buaya vs Polo, 169 SCRA
De Guzman vs Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171