Rule 71

CONTEMPT
RULE 71
CONTEMPT
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013Page
322
CONTEMPT
HEIRS
OF
TRINIDAD
DE
LEON
VDA.
DE
ROXAS
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138660; February 5, 2004
CARPIO, J.:
323
CONTEMPT
Digested By: John Joseph S. Tolentino
Facts
Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas filed a case to set aside the decree of registration over
two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the Regional Trial Court on the ground of actual
fraud. The trial court dismissed the petition to set aside the decree of registration. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court
reversed the appellate court's decision.On 22 May 1997, Meycauayan filed a Petition for
Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. Meycauayan alleged that on 14 May 1992, it purchased three
parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the property awarded to the heirs of Trinidad de
Leon Vda. De Roxas ("Roxas heirs"). Meycauayan contended that since it is a purchaser in good
faith and for value, the Court should afford it the opportunity to be heard. Meycauayan contends
that the adverse decision in G.R. No. 118436 cannot impair its rights as a purchaser in good faith
and for value.
On 25 June 1997, this Court denied the Petition for Intervention. This Court also denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Maguesun. Thus, on 21 August 1997, the Decision dated 21
March 1997 in G.R. No. 118436 became final and executory.
On 20 April 1999, Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title
with the trial court entitled "Meycauayan Central Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, Maguesun Management and Development Corp., Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City, City Assessor of Tagaytay City and Land Registration Authority." 4 The
Complaint is almost an exact reproduction of the Petition for Intervention filed by Meycauayan
before this Court. Meanwhile, the Roxas heirs filed on 2 June 1999 this petition to cite for indirect
contempt the officers of Meycauayan.
Issue
Whether Meycauayan's act of filing with the trial court a complaint for reconveyance, damages and
quieting of title involving parcels of land, which were the subject of this Court's Decision and
Resolution in G.R. No. 118436, constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure
Held
324
CONTEMPT
The Court ruled that Meycauayan's obstinate refusal to abide by the Court's Decision in G.R. No.
118436 has no basis in view of this Court's clear pronouncement to the contrary. The fact that this
Court specifically ordered the cancelation of Meycauayan's titles to the disputed parcels of land in
the Resolution dated 29 July 1998 should have laid to rest the issue of whether the Decision and
Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 is binding on Meycauayan. Clearly, Meycauayan's defiance of this
Court's Decision and Resolution by filing an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
involving the same parcels of land which this Court already decided with finality constitutes indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(d) of Rule 71
reads:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
CAROLINA QUINIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TOYOTA BEL-AIR, INC., ROBERT L.
YUPANGCO, LEONARDO BAHIA AND ATTY. RUDY B. CANAL,
[G.R. No. 113867. July 13, 2000]
PURISIMA, J.:
Digested by: John Joseph S. Tolentino
Facts
Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. (TOYOTA) commenced Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Metro Manila for recovery of damages with prayer for replevin of three (3) Toyota cars
purchased by Manila Construction Development of the Philippines or John Doe, Austria Fil-Homes,
Inc. or Roger Doe and Atty. Honor P. Moslares or Peter Doe. As prayed for, the lower court issued
a Writ of Replevin for the seizure of the three vehicles involved. Pursuant to the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin, the trial court judge, in an Order dated June 28,1991, allowed the
seizure of the three vehicles. Said writ resulted in the seizure of two (2) units, one of which was
that of Carolina Quinio (Quinio), herein petitioner.
Petitioner Carolina Quinio, identifying herself as one of the John Does in the Complaint of
TOYOTA, presented a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action but in its Order of
July 12, 1991 the trial court deferred resolution of subject motion until trial on the merits pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
On October 31, 1991, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of petitioner Quinio by annulling the
challenged Writ of Replevin. With Toyota failing to appeal from the aforesaid decision, the same
became final.TOYOTA, thru its President Leonardo Bahia and General Manager Robert L.
Yupangco, failed to comply with the said Order such that petitioner resorted to a Motion to cite
Bahia, Yupangco and their counsel, Atty. Rudy Canal, in contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court for failing to comply with the said Order of July 1, 1992.
After the private respondents had filed their Comment, the trial court issued the assailed Order of
October 5, 1995, holding private respondents guilty of indirect contempt pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the private respondents, after having been declared guilty of indirect contempt
325
CONTEMPT
under Section 3, Rule 71, should have been indefinitely incarcerated pursuant to Section 7, Rule
71 until the act ordered by the court has been obeyed, and not merely fined Five Hundred
(P500.00) Pesos each under Section 6, Rule 71.
Held
The Court ruled that the petition is meritorious. There is no question that private
respondents are guilty of indirect contempt pursuant to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. What petitioner assails is the imposition of a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos and the
non-application of Section 7, Rule 71 on indefinite incarceration. Section 7 of the same rule
provides for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with
the order of the court. This may be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that,
the non-compliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which has
then no other recourse but to use its coercive power.
The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, in proper cases, is
that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the benefit of
complainant or a party to a suit who has been injured. Its object is to compel performance of the
orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey although able to do so.
Imprisonment for civil contempt proceeding relates to something to be obeyed by the contemnor by
the compliance with which he may discharge himself. Thus, in civil contempt it is aptly said that the
contemnor carries the key of his prison in his pocket.
Applying the foregoing principles in the present case, the Court believes, and so finds, that
private respondents did show a clear and contumacious behavior warranting their indefinite
incarceration, as prescribed by Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Not only did they
unlawfully deprive petitioner QUINIO of her vehicle, they blatantly disregarded the orders of the trial
court to return the same despite their ability to comply with said orders.
326
CONTEMPT
327
CONTEMPT
MEMORIA
G.
ENCINAS
vs.
NATIONAL BOOKSTORE, INC.,
and
ADOLFO
A.
BALBOA,
G.R. No. 162704 July 28, 2005
Tinga, J.:
Facts
In the Resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T. Calimag, counsel
for Roberto P. Madrigal-Acopiado and his attorney-in-fact Datu Mohaldin R.B. Sulaiman, to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for his participation in the submission of a
fake judicial decision to this Court. T Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with
Leave of Court and Petition-In-Intervention (to which was appended a copy of the fake decision) on
behalf of his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will prevail. He reasons that he was misled
in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the forged judicial decision) made available to him
at the time of submission of the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. At the same time, he asserts
that there was an honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that there was never
any malice intended in the submission of the questioned documents. In fact, he even welcomes the
referral of the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation so as to identify the mastermind of
the production of the fake decision.
Issue
Whether or not the counsel should be cited for direct contempt
328
CONTEMPT
Held
The Court ruled that Counsels explanation is insufficient and unsatisfactory. The Court
cites counsel in direct contempt of court. Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be punished
summarily without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the
court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act.
Counsels act of filing the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention based on a spurious judicial
decision constitutes direct contempt of court. A person found guilty of direct contempt may be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10)
days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank. Under the
circumstances, a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) would be appropriate.
329
CONTEMPT
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED, ALMA PEALOSA,
KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID
vs.
JORGE VALDEZ,
G.R. No. 150107; January 28, 2008
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED and TERESITA H.
QUIAMBAO,
vs.
JORGE VALDEZ,
G.R. No. 150108; January 28, 2008
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts
On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, complaint for
damages against petitioners. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms of the Unit
Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his "commissions," and bonuses. On
May 24, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated
January 20, 1999 denying their motions to dismiss. On October 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial
court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the pendency of CAG.R. SP No. 52914.
Then on December 7, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent Notice
of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes
of the Above-Captioned Pending Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted
By Existing Law and Jurisprudence." It appears that respondent was already 75 years old and
sickly. On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to cite
respondent in contempt of court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. Petitioners alleged therein
that in filing with the appellate court an urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent violated
the preliminary injunction issued by the said court.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the respondent is guilty of contempt
of court.
330
CONTEMPT
Held
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition.
Contempt of court is "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation." Succinctly, it is the despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court.
Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following
requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by
counsel. Records show that these requirements were complied with.
In the case at bar, it should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of private
respondent's deposition last December 14, 1999 was the use by the petitioners of the June 09 and
28, 1999 depositions when at that time no orders were issued by Us enjoining any proceedings
below. The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously objected to
by the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created when the private
respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to
clarify such misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14, 1999 deposition was
taken. Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CAG.R
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
DANNY GODOY,
JUDGE
EUSTAQUIO
Z.
GACOTT,
vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON,
JR.
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
REGALADO, J.:
Facts
The herein complainant filed a petition to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.,
a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively,
of the Palawan Times based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On
331
CONTEMPT
the Beat," The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and
degrade the administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful,
discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the
integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively
and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him;
and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment that his article does not intend to
impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after
complainant had promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or
influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan
Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the
comments made therein were made in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression
and of the press; that while the article may contain unfavorable comments about complainant, it
cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the administration of justice;
and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously
filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Issues
(1) Whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or
publications; and
(2) Which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is
pending on appeal.
Held
As to the first issue, the Court ruled that although Cabansag involved a contempt
committed during the pendency of a case, no compelling reason exists why the doctrines
enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative publications made after the
termination of the case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is the constant and ever growing
need to protect the courts from a substantive evil, such as invective conduct or utterances which
tend to impede or degrade the administration of justice, or which calumniate the courts and their
judges. At any rate, in the case of In re Bozorth, it was there expressly and categorically ruled that
the clear and present danger rule equally applies to publications made after the determination of a
case, with the court declaring that a curtailment of criticism of the conduct of finally concluded
litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of some serious substantive evil which it is designed to
avert.
As to the second issue, the Court ruled that The rationale that is usually advanced for the
general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt
proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt
are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel
due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and
processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to
inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.
332
CONTEMPT
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general
rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire
case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to
affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly,
this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.
333
CONTEMPT
334
CONTEMPT
YASAY V. RECTO
Gr. No. 129521 ; Sept. 7 1999
PARDO, J.:
Facts:
On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport
Resources Corporation, directed respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders
and to set a definite time and place for the validation of proxies and nominations for directors of the
firm. On the same date, June 28, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual
meeting of the stockholders. Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the
meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay.
On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources
Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC
on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them or why they should not be cited in contempt. SEC declared defendants et al. guilty of
contempt for disobeying a TRO that SEC issued. The CA set aside the order of the SEC, finding
defendants et al. not guilty of contempt. SEC appealed the CAs reversal.
Issue
Whether the SEC can validly appeal the CAs decision
Held
The Court ruled in the negative. Whether civil or criminal, contempt is still a criminal proceeding
and an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of
contempt. Moreover, the SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. There
was no willful disobedience of the SECs order since it was shown that the CA previously nullified
the TRO.
335
CONTEMPT
COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ vs. JUDGE RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch

151, Pasig City
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Digested by John Joseph S. Tolentino
Facts
For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding
No. 10931 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing, respondent was
charged in a verified complaint i with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An
Unjust Judgment relative to the above-mentioned case.Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the
petitioner is not really an undocumented alien as she has a valid PROC passport No. 1437777 and
Visa No. 1201 issued by the Philippine Embassy on March 18, 1999.
Judge Bonifacio ordered Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents to immediately release Ma
Jing in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents guilty of
indirect contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the Pasig City jail until they have
complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following disquisition:
Issue
Whether or not Judge Bonifacio violated the rules on contempt proceedings
Held
The Court ruled that the respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of
the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or
not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and
justice.
336
CONTEMPT
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt proceedings may be commenced as
follows:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein,
and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned.
Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for contempt
under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, - filing a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned
was in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent ERRED in
giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt.
ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III

vs.
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-08-2126;
January
20,
2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts
337
CONTEMPT
The complainant Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III, charged the herein respondent Judge Fatima
Gonzales-Asdala, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with gross ignorance
of the law and procedure, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
graft and corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and culpable violation of the Constitution.
During the hearing on May 25, 2006 of the habeas corpus case, on complainants information that
there were two pending case, presided by Judge Bay, directed the consolidation of said habeas
corpus case with the other cases pending. After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus
case, Branch 86 Presiding Judge Bay issued on May 31, 2006 an order consolidating the three
casesOn the same date (May 31, 2006) of the issuance by Judge Bay of the above-quoted Order,
complainants wife filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of
Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31,
2006). The motion contained no notice of hearing and no copy was furnished herein complainant,
albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via registered mail. Also on May 31, 2006, respondent
Presiding Judge, after Judge Bay who had filed a Leave of Absence effective the following day
acted on the motion of complainants wife and amended Judge Bays May 31, 2006 order by
advancing the production of the parties child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006. On June 1, 2006,
complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled date (by respondent) for him to produce the
minor child, declared him in contempt
Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when respondent issued
her May 31, 2006 Order, Judge Bay was not yet on official leave as it was yet to start the following
day, June 1, 2006; that as a judge of a co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, respondent could not
amend, revise, modify or disturb the orders of the other courts; and that respondent violated Rule
15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on litigated motions which Rule calls for the setting of such
motions for hearing and the service of copy thereof upon the opposing party at least three days
before the scheduled hearing. Complainant adds that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was
issued after the opposing counsel personally met and conferred with respondent in her chambers
without the presence of his (complainants) counsel; and that after issuing the Order, respondent
personally summoned via telephone complainants counsel to her chambers where she personally
furnished him a copy of the Order in the presence of opposing counsel.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law and procedure amounting to
contempt
Held
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law and procedure. As
found by the CA, respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she acted on the Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent
Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006). That Judge Bay
may have left the court premises in the afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her acting on even
date on motion of complainants wife, asher authority as pairing judge commenced only the
following day, June1 ,
2006,
when
Judge
Bays
leave
of
338
CONTEMPT
a b s e n c e s t a r t e d ; N o r d i d respondents opinion on the urgency of the case
justify her sacrificing law and settled jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.
Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of
indirect contempt. Indirect or constructive contempt is c o m m i t t e d o u t s i d e o f
t h e s i t t i n g o f t h e c o u r t a n d m a y i n c l u d e misbehavior of an officer of the
court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or
resistance to a l a w f u l w r i t , p r o c e s s , o r d e r , j u d g m e n t , o r c o m m a n d o f a
c o u r t , o r injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any
u n l a w f u l interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt,
or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.F o r n o t a f f o r d i n g c o m p l a i n a n t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x p l a i n
w h y h e should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of t h e
R u l e s o f C o ur t . I n Li m v. D o m a g a s w h er e t h e t h er e i n j u dg e
declared the therein complainant guilty of contempt and ordered his a r r e s t f o r
f a i l u r e t o b r i n g t h r e e m i n o r s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t w i t h o u t t h e benefit of a
hearing, the Court faulted the therein judge not only for grave abuse of discretion but also
for gross ignorance of the law
339
CONTEMPT
LUZVIMINDA V. LIPATA,vs. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Court of First Instance of Rizal,

Quezon City Branch V (Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 84),
[G.R. No. L-61643. September 29, 1983.]
AQUINO, J p:
Facts
In an unverified motion dated June 7, 1982, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda
and her stepmother be cited or declared in contempt of court and committed to prison until they
complied with the decision because, according to the deputy sheriff's return of the alias writ of
execution, they failed to obey the decision of Judge Tutaan. The contempt order against
Luzviminda V. Lipata is a result of not obeying an alias writ of execution. Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan
in his decision of September 24, 1981 ordered Luzviminda (married to Leonardo G. Lipata) and her
stepmother to deliver to the alleged vendees, the spouses Jocelyn O. Agcaoili and Jose L. Agcaoili,
the two-storey house of strong materials, eight by nine meters, located at 1884 Obisis Street,
Pandacan, Manila She was arrested but released allegedly upon her oral request for an extension.
She was re-arrested on September 1, 1982 and confined in jail. On September 8, 1982,
Luzviminda filed her petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court.
Issue
Whether or not failure of judgment debtor to comply with writ of execution is contumacious even if
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court because the order is not addressed or directed to the
judgment debtor
Held
The Court ruled that a contempt order which it not sanctioned by the Rules of Court is void.
It is not contempt of court for a judgment debtor to disobey the writ of execution for it is the sheriff's
duty to enforce the writ. He did not perform, his duty as ordained in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which requires him to deliver the property to the party entitled thereto. Thus, "a person cannot be
punished for contempt because of his alleged disobedience of an order of court not addressed to
him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place
the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the
defendant." The delivery of the real property pertains to the sheriff alone to whom the law entrusts
the execution of judgments.
Moreover, "Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their orders.
Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power he exercised." The
power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (Gamboa vs. Teodoro, 91
Phil. 270; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265.)
340
CONTEMPT
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF FELIX M. SULIT. FELIX M.
SULIT
vs.
HONORABLE JOEL P. TIANGCO, Judge, Circuit Criminal Court of Batangas, and JOSE
AQUINO, Chief of Police of Batangas City,
GR No.35333; July 20,1982
FERNANDO, CJ.:
Facts
The use of language characterized as "insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous,"
resulting in respondent Judge, now deceased, being compelled to suspend the session, but not
deterring, so the order for contempt recited, petitioner Felix M. Sulit, a member of the bar and
private prosecutor in the case, from continuing to address the people present in Court "in a very
loud voice," charging the presiding judge with proceeding in utter disregard "of the rules and law,"
was the basis for petitioner being "summarily adjudged in contempt of court." The penalty imposed
was imprisonment of ten (10) days." Hence this application for the writ of habeas corpus, the
principal allegation being that such order of incarceration was without legal basis.
Issue
Whether the facts alleging the contempt, justify the punishment of imprisonment for 10 days
Held
The punishment, however, of ten days, is impressed with a rather severe character. Power
to punish for contempt,' as was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 'should
be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindicative principle. Only occasionally should the
341
CONTEMPT
Court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail.' The lower court, it clearly appears, failed to meet such a rigid but
commendable test." 17 It does appear, therefore, that the incarceration of petitioner Sulit by virtue of
the order for direct contempt lasted until this Court issued its resolution granting him liberty upon
the posting of P200.00 bail, such resolution having been issued the day after this petition was filed.
This detention ceased on the fifth day, the bail having been filed. That was more than enough
punishment for such direct contempt.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
342
CONTEMPT
PEDRO GAMBOA,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR., JOSE AZCONA, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental GERONIMO R. FLORES, as receiver, respondents.
G.R. No. L-4893
May 13, 1952
BENGZON, J.:
Facts
For having allegedly interfered with property in the hands of a receiver, Pedro Gamboa
was sentenced to jail for contempt of court by Judge Jose Teodoro of Negros Occidental.
Wherefore Gamboa instituted this case for "certiorari with injunction with habeas corpus," during
the pendency of which this Court authorized the release upon the filing of a bond of P500 and
enjoined the execution of the contempt order.On May 31, 1951 the receiver filed a motion in the
civil case alleging that "Pedro Gamboa, who claims to be a lessee of Manuel Uytiepo cut or caused
to be cut the standing sugarcane" on the land the under receivership. On June 1, 1951, Pedro
Gamboa filed an urgent petition for postponement asserting that he had to attend the meeting of
the association that his attendance was necessary because he was a member of the committee
designated to distribute cars to the planters adhered to the sugar Central etc.
On June 2, 1951 the respondent judge, "considering that the non-appearance of Pedro
Gamboa constituted contempt," issued an order for his arrest "for contempt of court."On June 7,
1951, Pedro Gamboa submitted an urgent motion, calling the attention of the court that he was not
a party to the litigation, and could not have committed contempt. On June 27, 1951, Pedro
Gamboa filed a notice of appeal from said order to the Court of Appeals.On June 28, 1951, the
receiver filed an urgent motion asserting that Gamboa had not complied with the order of the court
on June 25, 1951 and requesting that Gamboa be again booked for contempt.
Gamboa appeared and reasoned that having appealed from the order of June 25, 1951 he
thought he was excused from complying with it. As to the portion of the order requiring him
(Gamboa) to deliver to the receiver the quantity of sugar therein mentioned, Gamboa expostulated
arguing he could not comply with it because the sugar had previously been mortgaged to the
Central Azucarera del Danao "for financiation of said sugar crop," and, without the latter's consent
he (Gamboa) could not dispose of the harvest. Hence this petition.
Issue
343
CONTEMPT
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of contempt
Held
The Court ruled in the negative. The petitioner should have been given a reasonable time,
after his appeal had been denied, to comply with such portion of the order. In sentencing Gamboa
for contempt even as his appeal from that part was turned down, without giving him a chance to
make amends for his erroneous belief, the respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion.
The man believed he was not duty bound to comply because he had appealed. The Court declares
that his appeal affected only the first part of the order but not the second part; and in the same
breath punishes him for contempt for not having complied with such second part, without giving
him an opportunity to rectify his error. Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance
with their orders. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised. A bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of the order of the procedural rules should
not immediately cause the institution of contempt proceedings.
Wherefore, the two orders of July 3, 1951, are hereby set aside and the injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent. Cost against respondent Geronimo R. Flores.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL

ENBANC
G.R. No. L-14639; March 25, 1919
J. MALCOLM
FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25, 1918 beyond the womens consent
and knowledge. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in
the district of Sampaloc, Manila. Thereafter the women were shipped to Mindanao specifically in
Davao where they were signed as laborers.
The purpose of sending this women to davao is to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district
for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years.That when the women, its
relative and lawyers filed for habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor and police moved to dismiss
the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed
344
CONTEMPT
in the city of Davao instead. As to the first order, the respondents did not produce the bodies of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and
they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. The court, at
the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court. However, the respondents have substantially complied
with the second order.
Issue
Whether the order of contempt should be imposed against all of the respondents.
Held
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to
be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100)
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain
that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a
court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in
obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the
face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
345
CONTEMPT
MAXIMO
GALVEZ,
vs.
REPUBLIC SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant-appellee. ATTORNEYS RAQUIZA,
SUPNET, DE GRACIA and ASUNCION,
G.R. No. L-12581 May 29, 1959
LABRADOR, J.:
Facts
The attorneys of Galvez, filed with the Clerk of Court of Manila a bill of costs, in the total
amount of P502.35 Thereupon counsel for appellant moved to reconsider the order, saying that the
petition for clarification was filed on February 7 in the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, however,
the writ of execution issued on January 25 had been carried out and funds of the appellant in the
Philippine Bank of Commerce were garnished to the amount of P472.67. Thereupon counsel for
appellant asked for the issuance of a writ of execution against the properties of counsel for
appellee, to enforce payment of the amount of P473. On June 7, 1957, appellant's counsel moved
the court to declared appellee's counsel in contempt, and the court issued an order requiring said
counsel to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt. On June 26, after hearing the
explanations given by appellee's counsel, the court issued the order in question.
The ground stated in the order why the action of appellee's counsel is contemptuous was
their knowledge that the motion for clarification was filed on February 7, in the Court of Appeals, to
which they had filed an opposition on February 11, but that notwithstanding this fact they still filed
an urgent ex-parte motion for execution, knowing that the Court of Appeals had not yet resolved
the motion for clarification.On this appeal, it is claimed that the action of appellee's counsel is not
contemptuous, for the reason that it was appellant Republic Surety itself that had delayed
presentation of motion for clarification because it did so only on February 7, the last day.
Issue
Whether or not the order of the court constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of a questionable
debt.
Held
The Court did not find merit in this contention. Appellant does not claim that he no longer
has possession of the disputed amount of money. It is only by a threat of imprisonment that a court
346
CONTEMPT
can compel respect for it and obedience to its orders. The order is expressly in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the omission
to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by
order of a superior court until he performs it.
In Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 748, the Court explained the nature of the abovequoted provisions, thus:
As stated in a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147, "to order that
one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a remedial measure.
Its purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an act within his or her power to perform.
ATTY.
FABIAN
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE ANDRES MA. DELGADO,
A.M.
No.
120-MJ;
GARDONES,
July
23,
1974
Makasiar, J.:
Facts
347
CONTEMPT
Atty. Gardones charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
official authority in that the respondent municipal judge caused his arrest for an alleged direct
contempt without hearing, by reason of which he was confined in the municipal jail. It appears that
complainant Atty. Gardones failed to obey the subpoena issued by the respondent requiring him to
appear as a witness in the preliminary examination of a criminal case of homicide through reckless
imprudence, which subpoena was duly received by complainantIn his order, respondent judge
found complainant Gardones guilty of direct contempt for: (1) having failed to obey the subpoena
directing him to appear in court; and (2) having driven his jeep to and from along the highway
fronting the municipal building which tended directly to impede, obstruct and delay the
administration of justice (Exh. D attached to complaint).
Issue
Whether or not respondent judge erred in so ordering the arrest of the complainant for such indirect
contempt without giving him his day in court
Held
The failure to obey subpoena constitutes indirect, not direct, contempt, for which the
complainant could not be adjudged guilty without hearing him or without due process of law. The
respondent judge therefore gravely erred in so ordering the arrest of the complainant for such
indirect contempt without giving him his day in court, which is grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. While it is true that the complainant committed direct contempt for having
disturbed the preliminary examination then being conducted by the respondent judge by repeatedly
driving his jeep and honking its horn in the vicinity of the court session hall, for which the
complainant was ordered arrested and confined in jail, the respondent should have issued a
separate order for such direct contempt, and another order requiring complainant to show cause
why he should not be punished for disobedience to its process, to give the complainant a chance to
explain his failure to appear as witness.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT ANDRES MA. DELGADO, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF DON

CARLOS, BUKIDNON, IS HEREBY SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE FOR SIX MONTHS.
348
CONTEMPT
LAUSAN
AYOG,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR.,
G.R.
No.
ET
L-46729;
November
AL.,
19,
1982
AQUINO, J.:
Facts
During the pendency of this case, employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery
Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was
occupied by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was leased
by Bian Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five thousand
pesos consisting of coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time
the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that Emberador
was not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the
trial court's decision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case. The
petitioners in their motion, asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia, the manager of
Bian Development Co., Inc., be declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the
restraining order issued by this Court, enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the
provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit.
349
CONTEMPT
Issue
Whether or not contempt was indeed committed
Held
The Court ruled tha no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining order was not
directed to Bian Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named
specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by reason of the
destruction of his improvements, his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some
appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements.
WHEREFORE, The contempt proceeding is dismissed. No costs.
350
CONTEMPT
DESA
ENTERPRISES,
INC.,
and
LUIS
N.
LOPEZ,
vs.
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and EMILIO PANTOJA, G.R. No. L-45644
September 30, l982
CONCEPCION JR., J.:p

Facts
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, will preliminary injunction, to annul and set
aside the orders of the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, dated July 23, and
December 29, 1976, and to restrain the said respondent from interfering with, or inquiring into the
contract of lease executed by and between the petitioners Desa Enterprises, Inc. and Luis N.
Lopez for lack of jurisdiction; while
The record shows that in a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC for short, dated
April 30, 1973, Emilio Pantoja asked for the revocation of the certificate of registration of the Desa
Enterprises, Inc., upon the ground that his signature, as well as that of his wife, in the articles of
incorporation of said corporation, was obtained by Dionisio Chua Kang Hay, one of the
incorporators of said corporation, by means of fraud and false representation
While the aforestated SEC Case No. 1201 was pending adjudication, or on August 10,
1976, the Desa Enterprises, Inc., filed an action against Emilio Pantoja, Benjamin Vergara, and
Eleuterio Lagrisola, with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, for the recovery of corporate funds
in the amount of P25,000,00, admittedly held by Emilio Pantoja, and damages, for having caused
the closure of the Lian Ice Plant in 1975. The petitioners, Desa Enterprises, Inc. and Luis Lopez
further contend that they are not parties in the case before the SEC, the parties being Emilio
Pantoja and Dionisio Chua Kang Hay, and were not furnished copies of the orders, violation, of
which they charged so that the SEC cannot cite them for contempt.
Issue
351
CONTEMPT
Whether or not the fact that the petitioners may not be parties in SEC Case precludes the SEC
from citing them for contempt
Held
The Court ruled that the contention is without merit. The fact that the petitioners may not
be parties in SEC Case does not preclude the SEC from citing them for contempt. The rule is
settled that "persons who are not parties in a proceeding may he declared guilty of contempt for
wilful violation of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the
parties in violating the court's order."
Besides, under Section l(b) of Republic Act No. 1143, the SEC has power to penalize any violation
of or non-compliance with any terms or conditions of any certificate, license, or permit issued by
the Commission, or of any order, decision, ruling or regulation thereof.
The petition filed in case G.R. No. L-45439 is dismissed for lack of merit and the temporary
restraining order heretofore issued is lifted. Costs against the petitioners; and
LIM
SE
and
BENITO
LIM,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan
City Branch
G.R. No. L-42800 July 30, 1979
352
CONTEMPT
AQUINO, J.:
Facts
The antecedents of this case are set forth in the resolution of April 7, 1976 in the contempt
incident, In re Adaza, 70 SCRA 378, wherein respondents' counsel was found guilty of contempt in
facie curiae and was severely censured for having used vicious, abusive and disrespectful
language in his motion for the lifting of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
On May 13, 1975, Genaro Bulotano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance at
Bulotano prayed that defendants be ordered to deliver to him the possession of Door No. 72,
including its mezzanine and the entire basement of the Venancia Building. No reason was adduced
in that complaint as to why an action to recover possession of realty located in Baguio City was
filed in Caloocan City. After the filing of the instant petition assailing the summary judgment and
the writ of possession, this Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring Lim Se
and Benito Lim to the possession of the disputed premises. The private respondents contend that
since the Caloocan court had jurisdiction over the main action, it had also jurisdiction over the thirdparty complaint. They cite the ruling that "where a court has jurisdiction of a claim and the parties in
the principal action, it generally has jurisdiction also of a suit or proceeding which is a continuation
of or incidental and ancillary to the principal action, even though it might not have jurisdiction of the
ancillary proceeding if it were an independent and original action or proceeding"
Issue
Whether or not Unwarranted and unfounded allegations that a court resolution is unjust a
miscarriage of justices amounts to contempt
Held
The Court ruled that unwarranted and unfounded allegations that a court resolution is
unjust a miscarriage of justice is contempt. In the case at bar, It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's
characterization of the mandatory injunction as "unjust and a miscarriage of justice" and as devoid
of factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution of this Court as if
it were a pleading of an adversary which he could assail in unrestrained and abrasive language.
His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious derogatory implications or
innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or contempt facie curiae.
WHEREFORE, the partial summary judgment and the writ of possession issued by the lower court
against the petitioners are set aside. The lower court is directed to dismiss, on the grounds of
improper venue and litis pendentia, the third-party complaint against the petitioners. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is made final and permanent. Costs against the private
respondents.
353
CONTEMPT
ARMANDO
ANG,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON. JUDGE
JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, G.R. No. L-66371 May
15, 1985
RELOVA, J.:
Facts
Armando Ang seeks to set aside the order, of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the
Regional Trial Court, denying his appeal from an order holding him in contempt of court. In
November 1983, petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, lodged
with this Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross
inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave
misconduct, rendering unjust decision in a Civil Case and dereliction of duties in not resolving his
motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case.
On December 23, 1983, upon learning of the administrative case filed against him by
petitioner, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him on December 29, 1983 at 8:30
in the morning, and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for
malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and
354
CONTEMPT
towards him. On January 9, 1984, respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court,
sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite
notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him.
Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of petitioner to appear, despite
notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his
two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and to this Court in
an administrative complaint against him, constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded,
embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice. On February 3, 1984, petitioner
filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the contempt charge but the same was
denied by the respondent judge
Issue
Whether or not the use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in
pleadings presented in another court or proceeding amounts to a direct contempt
Held
The Court ruled that the use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a
particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the
aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and, if found guilty
he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. which reads:
SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of appeals or Supreme Court;
bond for stay. The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a
case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order
shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an
amount fixed by the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be
decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The
appeal may be taken as in criminal cases.
EDILBERTO
vs.
DELIMA,
NENITA
DACILLO,
and
ATTY.
QUIRINO
N.
ORIEL,
355
CONTEMPT
HONORABLE PEDRO P. GALLARDO, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court
of 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City,.
G.R. No. L-41281-82; May 31, 1977
MARTIN, J.:
Facts
The Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against the
Madriaga couple and against petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo. During the pendency
of the criminal complaint and the administrative complaint against respondent Judge, he called for
hearing Criminal Cases with respect to petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo, whose
charge for malversation of funds remained pending. It was during said hearing when petitioners
Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo, thru their counsel, petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel, filed a
motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing the two criminal cases against them on the
ground that the accused Edilberto Delima being principal witness of a complaint of Jesus Near in a
criminal case now pending for appropriate action by the City Fiscal of Tacloban against the
Honorable Presiding Judge of this Honorable Court, and having executed supporting affidavit in the
same case, it is honestly believed that prejudice against him has already been developed in the
mind of the Honorable Presiding Judge and hence he cannot be expected to decide this case with
strictest objectivity and with dispassion.
After reading the verified motion for inhibition, the respondent Judge issued in open court an order
denying the same and ordering petitioner, Atty,. Quirino N. Oriel to submit a written explanation
within a period of three days, why he should not be dealt with for direct contempt of court. On
August 11, 1975, petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel filed a manifestation stating that the contents of
his motion for inhibition are not contumacious and therefore he cannot be held liable for direct
contempt but respondentJudge, in his order declared Atty. Quirino N. Oriel guilty of direct contempt.
Hence this petition
Issue
Whether the motion to inhibit respondent Judge filed by petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel is
contumacious as to make him liable for direct contempt.
Held
356
CONTEMPT
The Court ruled that here is nothing in the motion for inhibition of the respondent Judge
that will cast disrepute, disrespect or contempt against the respondent Judge.
In the case of Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536, August 31, 1967, the Supreme Court ruled
that when a person impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a
judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, is not guilty of contempt. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N.
Oriel is similarly situated. What is stated in the motion is simply a motion of the petitioner for the
judge to inhibit himself from further trying the aforementioned criminal cases because he believed
that the judge could no longer decide the case with impartiality because of a criminal complaint
Jesus Near filed against respondent Judge.
The order of respondent Judge finding petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel guilty of direct contempt and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P200.00 and to imprisonment of ten (10) days, is hereby set aside.
CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO ET AL., vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, [G.R.

No. 65416. October 26, 1999]
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Facts
Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They were blessed with eight (8) children,
namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel, Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed
Crucillo.On March 28, 1969, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo executed and entered into a
Patuluyang Bilihan Ng Isang Lagay Na Lupa ii[6] with the co-respondents, spouses Felix Noceda
and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, whereby Rafael A. Crucillo, for the price of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, sold and conveyed to the spouses Noceda a parcel of land more particularly
described:
On April 15, 1969, the petitioner, Conrado Crucillo, wrote the Register of Deeds of Cavite
requesting the latter to hold in abeyance the registration of the said land transaction for the reason
that the same was done without the knowledge, consent and authority of the co-owners of subject
property and consequently, null and void. In connection therewith, petitioner Carlomagno Crucillo
and Anita Perena (daughter of petitioner Adelaida Crucillo) returned to respondents Noceda the
amount of P4,000.00 which the latter had partially paid to their co-respondent, Rafael
Crucillo.Sometime in February 1971, respondent Rafael Crucillo presented to the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, Cavite, a Kasulatan Sa Partihang Labas sa
Hukuman dividing the estate into five (5) equal parts with the named beneficiaries.
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, theorizing that:
Issues
1. Whether or not the Oral Partition executed is valid
2. Whether or not there is a valid conveyance
357
CONTEMPT
3. Whether the spouses acquired true and lawful ownership over the said property
Held
As to the first issue, the Court ruled that the oral agreement for the partition of the property
owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties.
On the issue as to whether an oral partition, effected by the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo of his
estate, has been sufficiently established, the Court rules in the affirmative. It has been shown that
upon the death of Juana Aure, the petitioners and the respondent Rafael Crucillo partitioned the
estate among themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective shares and
exercising acts of ownership.
Anent the second and third issues -- whether there was a valid conveyance by Rafael Crucillo of
the lot subject matter of the Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan to the spouses Felix Noceda and
Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, and whether the latter spouses acquired true and lawful ownership
thereof, including the ancestral house standing thereon, the Court also rules in the affirmative. As
the existence of the oral partition of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has been well
established, it stands to reason and conclude that Rafael Crucillo could validly convey his share
therein to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda who then became the true and
lawful owners thereof, including the ancestral house existing thereon. Petitioners have, therefore,
no right to redeem the same property from the spouses Noceda because when the sale was made
they were no longer co-owners thereof, the same having become the sole property of respondent
Rafael Crucillo.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated October 7, 1983 of the former Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) is AFFIRMED.
LEE YICK HON

vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
G.R. No. L-16779; March 30, 1921
STREET, J.:
Facts
This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the action of the CFI of Manila
in imposing upon him a fine of P50 for an alleged contempt of court. On July 23, 1920, a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the CFI of Manila by one Lee Yick Hon.
358
CONTEMPT
He alleged that he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to
entering the Philippine Islands, but was prevented from so doing by the Insular Collector of
Customs, who was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited
the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be
issued as prayed. Citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had already
been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for
Hongkong at noon on the same day;
Insular Collector failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. Lee Yick Hon was
deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to
show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Contempt proceedings were instituted against the
Insular Collector. CFI of Manila imposed upon him a fine of P50.
Issue
Whether or not any lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below
was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant amounting to contempt
Held
The Court ruled in the negative. that It is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for
contempt in the violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless the act which is
forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt
or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. A party cannot be punished
for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the order.
In this case, the deportation of the petitioner Lee was not forbidden by any order of the court, and
hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court
Alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge, for there was none of any
character made in the case, "and there was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in
existence, forbidding him form doing just what he did".
Moreover, Jurisdiction over the party will not confer power to punish for contempt unless some
order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of the nature of
malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the reasonable rules of the court.
359
CONTEMPT
In re AMZI B. KELLY
G.R. No. 11715 December 21, 1916
JOHNSON, J.:
Facts
On the 22nd of March, Ramon Avancea, Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands,
presented a petition in the Supreme Court and prayed that an order against the said Amzi B. Kelly
be issued requiring him to appear before the court, and show cause, if any he have, why he should
not be punished for a contempt of the court, in respect of a publication of a certain letter or
communication published in "The Independent," on the 24th of February, 1916. Said petition
alleged:
The respondent contends that there are no provisions of law in force in the Philippine Islands
authorizing the Supreme Court to punish him for the alleged contempt committed.
The alleged libelous publication relates, according to the petition of the Attorney-General,
to a sentence rendered by the Supreme Court on the 17th of February, 1916, in which the
respondent was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six
months and to pay a fine of P1,000.
The respondent attacks the jurisdiction of this court to punish him for the alleged contempt charged
in the petition of the Attorney-General. He alleges that the statutes in force in the Philippine Islands
contain no provisions authorizing the Supreme Court to punish him.
Issue
Whether or not there respondents contention is correct in asserting that the Supreme Court does
not have the power to punish for contempt
Held
The Court ruled that the respondents contention is untenable. The power to fine for
contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the observance of order, are powers which cannot be
dispensed with in the courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. The
existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential to the observance of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts,
and consequently to the due administration of justice. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting
upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the
suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
(Hollingsworth vs. Duane, 12 Fed. Rep., 458.)
Amzi B. Kelly is hereby found guilty of contempt of this court, by virtue of said publication,
and he is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six months, and that he pay a fine of
P1,000,.
360
CONTEMPT
In re HERACLIO ABISTADO, Editor of the "Union".
December 10, 1932
VICKERS, J.:
Facts
On October 27th Ramon Sotelo called the attention of the court to the fact that there had
been published in the weekly newspaper, the "Union', on October 24th, a statement as to the filing
of the charges, with the notice that in subsequent issues the complete charges and the exhibits
attached thereto would be published. Notwithstanding the resolution of this court and the fact that
Sotelo had brought the matter personally to the attention of the respondent, who is also an
attorney, the respondent published in the issue of October 31st the charges under the heading.
November 8th the Attorney-General filed a petition in this court setting forth the above-mentioned
publications of October 24th and 31st, and prayed that the respondent be cited to show cause, it
361
CONTEMPT
any have, why he should not be punished for contempt. The order prayed for was granted on
November 9th.
On November 18th the respondent filed as "explanation", wherein he stated that he
assumed the duties of editor of the "Union" on November 1st, and had nothing to do with the
articles in question published prior to that date; that the publication of the new referred to does not
constitute contempt against this court, if freedom of the press, as provided for in our Constitution, is
to be recognized; that he never intended to commit contempt against this court
Issue
Whether or not the respondents answer is tenable in asserting his constitutional right of the
freedom of the press
Held
The Court ruled that there is no merit in the respondent's answer to the petitions of the
Attorney-General and the orders to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.The
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be protected in its fullest extent, but
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its
true sense.; In the decision of the case of In re Lozano and Quevedo (54 Phil., 801), it was held
that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the cause is ended;
The evidence shows that the resolution of this court of January 26, 1922, providing that all
proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the
suspension or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the
final disposition of the matter .
Heraclio Abistado guilty of contempt of court in both cases,
362
CONTEMPT
PEOPLE
DANNY GODOY,
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
REGALADO, J.:
Facts
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before
the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the
Revised Penal CodeHis defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by
the complainant to the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused, Godoy be convicted of rape?
Held:
The Court ruled in the Negative. They were in fact lovers.It is basic that for kidnapping to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been
established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from
pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable
inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of
appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted
to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal
her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she
had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
363
CONTEMPT
FRED
M.
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
HARDEN,
G.R. No. L-2349; October 22, 1948
TUASON,J.,
364
CONTEMPT
Facts
Fred Harden is being confined in prison for contempt of court. This arose when the plaintiff
was restrained from transferring moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets
involving the administration of conjugal partnership that he had with Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden,
however, transferred cash to various banks in Hongkong and California, as well as to an unknown
person. He was ordered by the court to redeposit the money and the BalatocMining Co. shares
belonging to the conjugal partnership, which he had in Hongkong to the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China (Manila Branch). He was not able to fulfill these orders, and so was put to jail.
Issues
1. Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas corpus
2. Whether or not penalty imposed on the petitioner for contempt is excessive
Held
The Court ruled in the Negative. The petition is denied with costs.
The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental or
constitutional rights (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence or (3) excessive
penalty. It was held that the court has jurisdiction to impose the sentence simply because the
person charged is in the state and he is still within the jurisdiction of its courts.
As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not
excessive because under Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, when the contempt consists in
the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it. This justifies the penalty imposed on
Fred Harden, thereby not making it excessive. Moreover, the courts findings are supported by
sufficient evidence and it is a matter of fact which cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. The writ
of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.
365
CONTEMPT
ATTY. ROMEO B. IGOT, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO),
G.R. No. 150794. August 17, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts
On February 24, 1983, the petitioner and the respondent executed a service contract
under which the latter would provide electricity to the petitioners house Santolan, Pasig City.
Suspicious of the unusual figure, the petitioner inspected the electric meter which the respondent
installed near his house and discovered that the Meralco seal was still intact but that the meter had
stopped rotating. He sent a letter to the respondent requesting that his electric meter be checked
at the soonest possible time and if found to be defective, demanded that it be replaced. The
petitioner did not receive any reply from the respondent. On February 1, 1999, he was surprised to
receive his Meralco electric bill showing his estimated electrical consumption for the period of
December 23, 1998 to January 25, 1999, as amounting to P12,100.30. On February 11, 1999, the
petitioner received a notice of disconnection from the respondent, which the latter threatened to
implement should he fail to pay the amount of P123,282.35 within the day. On February 12, 1999,
the petitioner filed a complaint for damages with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO).
However, aggrieved, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals for the nullification of the trial courts order dismissing his complaint, alleging that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On
September 27, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution granting the petitioners motion with a warning to
the respondent that it may be impelled to take a more drastic action. In a manifestation, the
respondent alleged that the decision of the CA had not yet become final and executory; hence, it
could not be compelled to restore the electric supply to the petitioners residence. The petitioner
366
CONTEMPT
filed an Omnibus Motion alleging the reiterated motion to cite private respondent meralcos officers
and lawyers in contempt of court
Issue
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the omnibus motion of the petitioner filed with the CA to cite
the officers and lawyers of the respondent in contempt of the CA.
Held
The Court ruled that the petitioners plea for the Court to cite respondent Meralco and its
officers and lawyers for indirect contempt for resisting to comply with the CA Decision and the
Resolutions dated August 31, 2001 and September 27, 2001 has no merit. The petitioner, being a
lawyer himself, ought to know that the charge must be filed before the court against which the
indirect contempt was committed. The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, which read:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been
committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place
in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court
subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in
section 11 of this Rule.
The petitioners omnibus motion to cite the officers and lawyers of the respondent is DENIED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR.,
G.R. No. 152611
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts
367
CONTEMPT
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. inSorsogon
to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused
to sell at that price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an
administrative proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and
ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was
issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for
Contempt was filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion
for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the
Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon
enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner
LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether PARAD or the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent
Held
The Court ruled that neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the
power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from
respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000
and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
368
i
ii

Rule 71

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rule 71

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONTEMPT

G.R. No. 162704 July 28, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ vs. JUDGE RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch

ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

LUZVIMINDA V. LIPATA,vs. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Court of First Instance of Rizal,

May 13, 1952

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT ANDRES MA. DELGADO, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF DON

CONCEPCION JR., J.:p

CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO ET AL., vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, [G.R.

LEE YICK HON

In re HERACLIO ABISTADO, Editor of the "Union".

December 10, 1932

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

G.R. No. L-2349; October 22, 1948

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

You might also like