Professional Documents
Culture Documents
authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him.
The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of
P570,000.00 as actual damages, P250,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the
suit.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the
RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and
her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.
CitingNutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23 it declared
that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party
if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to
warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted
that the interval between the date of the collision and the
date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of
her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised
doubts on whether Joels reckless driving and the resulting
collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llanas injury.
It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that
Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check
if she sustained internal injuries after the accident.
Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal
to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical
certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and
why the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court
that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether
Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llanas whiplash injury.
Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition
for review on certiorari when the findings of fact by the lower
courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court
is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CAs findings of
fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review
them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to
examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We
can only review the presented evidence, by way of
exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and
the CA.27 We see this exceptional situation here and thus
accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before
the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance
of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that [w]hoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict. Under this
provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict
case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
Atty. Yusingco:
You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued
a medical certificate. What relation does this medical
certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that
certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness:
This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for
me.
Atty. Yusingco:
Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco:
What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela
Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain that you felt in
your left arm?
Witness:
Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a reevaluation of my condition after three months indicated that
I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco:
Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness:
So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my
spine.
Atty. Yusingco:
September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal
of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that
the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death
of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability
including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the
civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of
his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Law 20
b)
Contracts
c)
Quasi-contracts
d)
...
e)
Quasi-delicts
3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 22
ROMERO, J.:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then
Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him
acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. He did this on several occasions in August
1968 through (a) a speech before the Lion's Club of
Malasiqui, Pangasinan on August 10; (b) public statements in
Manila on August 13 and in Davao on August 17, which was
coupled with a radio-TV interview; and (c) a public statement
shortly prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee
on Public Works (the Committee) on August 20 to formally
submit a letter-complaint implicating Raquiza, among other
government officials.
The Committee, however, observed that all the allegations in
the complaint were based mainly on the uncorroborated
testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility
turned out to be highly questionable. Villegas also failed to
submit the original copies of his documentary evidence.
c)
Forty-nine Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P49,800,00000) as exemplary damages and
d)
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
1
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directlyarising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2
Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a)
Law
b)
Contracts
c)
Quasi-contracts
d)
xxx
e)
Quasi-delicts
xxx
xxx
3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended 8 This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator o(f) the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
Sec. 1.
Actions which may and which may not be
brought against or executor or administrator. No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal may be
commenced against him.
Accordingly, the Court sees no more necessity in resolving
the other issues used by both parties in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and
the petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED. The decisions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 82186 dated March
15, 1988, and of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
dated March 7, 1985, as amended, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the right of the private
offended party Antonio V Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil
action for damages against the executor or administrator of
the estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J Villegas in
accordance with the foregoing procedure.
SO ORDERED.
the following day because the bank did not have enough
dollars;23 that on February 6, 2003, respondent Rosales
accompanied an unidentified impostor of Liu Chiu Fang to
the bank;24 that the impostor was able to withdraw Liu Chiu
Fangs dollar deposit in the amount of US$75,000.00;25 that
on March 3, 2003, respondents opened a dollar account with
petitioner; and that the bank later discovered that the serial
numbers of the dollar notes deposited by respondents in the
amount of US$11,800.00 were the same as those withdrawn
by the impostor.26
Respondent Rosales, however, denied taking part in the
fraudulent and unauthorized withdrawal from the dollar
account of Liu Chiu Fang.27 Respondent Rosales claimed
that she did not go to the bank on February 5,
2003.28Neither did she inform Gutierrez that Liu Chiu Fang
was going to close her account.29 Respondent Rosales
further claimed that after Liu Chiu Fang opened an account
with petitioner, she lost track of her.30 Respondent Rosales
version of the events that transpired thereafter is as follows:
On February 6, 2003, she received a call from Gutierrez
informing her that Liu Chiu Fang was at the bank to close her
account.31 At noon of the same day, respondent Rosales
went to the bank to make a transaction.32 While she was
transacting with the teller, she caught a glimpse of a woman
seated at the desk of the Branch Operating Officer, Melinda
Perez (Perez).33 After completing her transaction,
respondent Rosales approached Perez who informed her that
Liu Chiu Fang had closed her account and had already
left.34 Perez then gave a copy of the Withdrawal Clearance
issued by the PLRA to respondent Rosales.35 On June 16,
2003, respondent Rosales received a call from Liu Chiu Fang
inquiring about the extension of her PLRA Visa and her dollar
account.36 It was only then that Liu Chiu Fang found out that
her account had been closed without her
knowledge.37 Respondent Rosales then went to the bank to
inform Gutierrez and Perez of the unauthorized
withdrawal.38 On June 23, 2003, respondent Rosales and Liu
At the outset, the relevant issues in this case are (1) whether
petitioner breached its contract with respondents, and (2) if
so, whether it is liable for damages. The issue of whether
petitioners employees were negligent in allowing the
withdrawal of Liu Chiu Fangs dollar deposits has no bearing
in the resolution of this case. Thus, we find no need to
discuss the same.
The "Hold Out" clause does not apply
to the instant case.
Petitioner claims that it did not breach its contract with
respondents because it has a valid reason for issuing the
"Hold Out" order. Petitioner anchors its right to withhold
respondents deposits on the Application and Agreement for
Deposit Account, which reads:
Authority to Withhold, Sell and/or Set Off:
The Bank is hereby authorized to withhold as security for any
and all obligations with the Bank, all monies, properties or
securities of the Depositor now in or which may hereafter
come into the possession or under the control of the Bank,
whether left with the Bank for safekeeping or otherwise, or
coming into the hands of the Bank in any way, for so much
thereof as will be sufficient to pay any or all obligations
incurred by Depositor under the Account or by reason of any
other transactions between the same parties now existing or
hereafter contracted, to sell in any public or private sale any
of such properties or securities of Depositor, and to apply the
proceeds to the payment of any Depositors obligations
heretofore mentioned.
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JOINT ACCOUNT
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