Report On Uganda's 2016 Elections by Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda

Citizens Election Observers Network - Uganda
UGANDA
GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT
Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda

(CEON-U)
UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT
FOREWORD
This report contains 14 chapters on the conduct of the 2016 general elections as observed by the Citizens
Elections Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U). Election processes not only cover the presidential and
parliamentary elections, but also the period before elections, Election Day and the post-election period.
The report also contains a chapter on special interest group elections and the local council elections.
CEON-U was funded by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and USAID through the National Democratic
Institute (NDI). The project aimed at conducting a unified, comprehensive, and effective domestic election
observation mission for the 2016 general elections. The goal was to promote transparency, accountability
and integrity, increase citizen participation, and enhance the integrity of the electoral process by exposing
and deterring irregularities.
CEON-U was managed by a Steering Committee, which was the supreme decision making body and
comprised of 18 civil society organizations. To achieve the project goal, the Steering Committee recruited
18 staff at the coordination unit, who began operations at the Democracy House in Nsambya, on September
1, 2015.
The coordination unit was the technical arm of the project tasked with the day-to-day implementation
of the observation mission. In order to manage the project, the coordination unit recruited and trained
observers who were deployed in all 112 districts of Uganda.
The aim of deploying observers across the country was to provide accurate information about the electoral
processes in real time. CEON-Us election observation project was data driven and all reports were based
on findings submitted by field observers. The coordination unit would then put together the field reports
and release them to various stakeholders including Government, civil society, the Police, political parties,
the media and the candidates themselves.
All this would not have been possible had it not been for our partnership with DGF and NDI. I, therefore,
wish to express utmost gratitude to both partners and the Steering Committee for a job well done. I also
wish to thank the 23 sub-national partners who worked tirelessly to send in information in real time.
Lastly, I would like to thank the CEON-U secretariat and the field observers for having implemented the
project successfully.
I hope that this report will provide a basis for the critical reflection that will inspire a new commitment
to reinforce the things that went well in these elections, to accept the shortcomings and embrace the
recommended actions to correct them, and to prepare the ground for significant qualitative improvements
in future elections.
Dr Livingstone Sewanyana
Chairperson, Citizens Elections Observers Network-Uganda
ii
Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is a publication of the Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U). CEON-U is
a consortium of eighteen civil society organizations which agreed to conduct a unified, Comprehensive
and effective domestic election observation mission for the 2016 general elections. The consortiums
intervention was guided by the overarching need to: promote transparency, integrity and accountability
as well as increase citizen participation in Ugandas electoral processes. As such for the 2016 elections,
CEON-U aimed at enhancing the integrity of the election process by deterring and exposing irregularities.
CEON-U is immensely indebted to our development partners, the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)
and USAID through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) without whose support the generation and
publication of this report would not have been possible. They are, however, in no way responsible for the
accuracy or content of this report.
CEON-U acknowledges the support and partnership of the Electoral Commission (EC), political parties and
most especially the candidates at presidential, parliamentary and Local Council levels. CEON-U also thanks
the local leaders particularly RDCs, district chairpersons and district returning officers for the support
they rendered during the execution of the project.
This project would not have been a success without the enviable support of the sub-national partners,
regional coordinators as well as long and short-term observers who managed the field activities of CEON-U.
Special thanks also go to the following individuals: Ms Hellen Mealins, the DGF Head of Programmes, Mr
Nicholas de Torrente, Mr Frank Rusa Nyakana and Ms Josephine Namusisi the Programme Staff at DGF and
Mr. Simon Osborne and Ms. Mercy Njoroge of NDI for the immense support and guidance that they offered
to this initiative right from inception to conclusion.
Last but not least, CEON-U extends its sincere thanks to Dr. Livingstone Sewanyana, Chairperson CEON-U
and Ms Rita Aciro, Co-chairperson for the overall leadership of CEON-U.
Authors: Contributors:
Dr. Martin Mwondha
Mr. Henry Muguzi
Ms. Charity Kalebbo Ahimbisibwe
Mr. Mohammed Ndifuna
Ms. Claire Arinitwe
Dr. Peter Mwesige
Mr. Crispy Kaheru
Ms. Perry Aritua
Ms Faridah Lule
Ms. Rita Aciro
Mr. Ivan Mwaka
Mr. Mohles Segululigamba
Mr. John Mary Odoy
Mr Andrew Kawongo Editors:
Mr. Moses Ngorok Dr. Livingstone Sewanyana
Dr. Josephine Ndagire
Dr. George Lugalambi
iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACFIM
ACFODE
ACHPR
ACME
CA
CA
CEDAW
CCEDU
CEON U
CP
CEW-IT
DP
EC
FDC
FHRI
FP
HURINET
HRAPF
HRNJ
ICCPR
ICERD
LEGCO
LASPNET
NCASSR
NCF
NGO
NRM
NSIS
NVR
OSCE
PDP
POMA
PILAC
RRM
SPC
TDA
UDHR
UNGA
UPC
UYONET
UWONET
VPN
WDG
WDN
WLEDE
iv
Alliance For Campaign Finance Monitoring

Action for Development
African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights
African Center for Media Excellence
Convention against Corruption
Constituency Assembly
The convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda
Citizens Election Observers Network Uganda
Conservative Party
Citizens Election Watch-IT.
Democratic Party
Electoral Commission
Forum for Democratic Change
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative
Farmers Party
Human Rights Network Uganda
Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum
Human Rights Network for Journalists.
The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
International Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Legislative Council
Legal Aid Service Providers Network
National Coalition on Police Accountability and Security Sector Reform
National Consultative Forum
Non-Government Organization
National Resistance Movement
National Security Information System
National Voters Register
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Peoples Development Party
Public Order Management Act
Public Interest Law Clinic
Rapid Response Mission
Special Police Constable
The Democratic Alliance
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United Nations General Assembly
Uganda Peoples Congress
Uganda Youth Network
Uganda Womens Network
Virtual Private Network
Women Democracy Group
Women Democracy Network
Women Leadership Development
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD..........................................................................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS..........................................................................................................................................iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....................................................................................................................................ix
Chapter 1: Introduction...................................................................................................................................1
1.1
Objectives of CEON-U............................................................................................................................................ 2
1.2
Achieving the goal of CEON-U .......................................................................................................................... 2
1.3
Governance of CEON-U......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.4
Observation Methodology and Preparation................................................................................................ 7
1.4.1 Preparation................................................................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.2 Training Processes................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4.3 Accreditation............................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4.4 Deployment of Observers.................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.5 Reporting Mechanisms......................................................................................................................................... 9
1.4.6 Thematic Studies..................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.4.7 Media Engagement................................................................................................................................................. 9
1.4.8 Pre-Election Observation.................................................................................................................................... 9
1.4.9 Election Day for Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.............................................................. 10
1.4.10 Post election Observation............................................................................................................................. 11
1.4.11 Use of ICT................................................................................................................................................................ 11
1.4.12 Reporting of Observations............................................................................................................................... 11
1.5
Challenges and Lessons Learnt...................................................................................................................... 12
Chapter 2: Political Background to the 2016 General Elections.................................................... 13

2.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.2
A History of Violent Change............................................................................................................................ 14
2.3
Poor Quality of Elections.................................................................................................................................. 14
2.4
Main Players in the Elections.......................................................................................................................... 14
2.5
The Presidential Debates.................................................................................................................................. 15
2.6
Role of Political Parties...................................................................................................................................... 15
2.7
Unstable Politics, Militarisation of Elections, and Insecurity........................................................... 16
2.8
Rule of Law and Power of Incumbency...................................................................................................... 17
2.9
Demand for Electoral Reforms....................................................................................................................... 17
2.10 State of Political Parties and Internal Democracy................................................................................. 17
2.11 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................... 18
Chapter 3: The Legal and Administrative Framework for Elections............................................ 19

3.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 20
3.2
Legal Framework and Proposed Electoral Reforms............................................................................. 21
3.2.1 Restoration of Presidential Terms Limits.................................................................................................. 21
3.2.2 Independence of the Electoral Commission............................................................................................. 21
3.2.3 Funding of the Electoral Commission......................................................................................................... 22
3.2.4 Codifying the Duties and Powers of the Electoral Commission....................................................... 22
3.2.5 Improving Voter Registration......................................................................................................................... 22
3.2.6 Controls on Campaign Spending................................................................................................................... 23
3.2.7 The Role of Security Agencies in Elections............................................................................................... 23
3.2.8 Election Dispute Resolution............................................................................................................................ 23
3.2.9 Administration of Elections............................................................................................................................. 24
3.2
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................... 26
Chapter 4: The Pre-Election Environment............................................................................................. 27

4.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.2
The National Voter Registration Process and Updates........................................................................ 28
4.3
The NSIS Mass Enrolment Exercise............................................................................................................. 28
4.4
Unresolved Questions about the National Voters Register................................................................ 29
4.5
The Management of Nominations................................................................................................................ 30
4.5.1 The Right to Participate in Elections........................................................................................................... 30
4.5.2 Nomination of Candidates................................................................................................................................ 30
4.6
Implications of the Belated Amendment of Electoral Laws.............................................................. 32
4.7
Comparison of Election Nomination Fees in Africa.............................................................................. 33
4.8
Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................................................ 33
Chapter 5: The Conduct of Campaigns..................................................................................................... 35

5.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 36
5.2
Findings.................................................................................................................................................................... 36
5.2.1 Campaign Activities............................................................................................................................................ 36
5.2.2 Campaign Materials............................................................................................................................................ 37
5.2.3 Campaigns after 6 pm........................................................................................................................................ 37
5.2.4 Voter Bribery......................................................................................................................................................... 38
5.2.5 Public Servants on the Political Stage......................................................................................................... 38
5.2.6 Use of Government Resources........................................................................................................................ 39
5.2.7 Violence, Intimidation and Hate Speech.................................................................................................... 39
5.2.8 Security Agents..................................................................................................................................................... 39
5.2.9 Dispute Resolution.............................................................................................................................................. 40
5.2.10 Provision of Voter Education and Information....................................................................................... 40
5.2.11 Gaps in Voter Education and Information................................................................................................. 41
5.2.12 Conclusion and Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 42
Chapter 6: Specialised Study1: Gender and Women Participation............................................... 43

6.1
Background to the Specialised Studies....................................................................................................... 44
6.2
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 44
6.3
Legal Framework on Women Participation and Gender Equality.................................................. 45
6.4
Election Administration.................................................................................................................................... 46
6.5
Voter Registration................................................................................................................................................ 48
6.6
Voter Education.................................................................................................................................................... 48
6.7
Nomination of Candidates................................................................................................................................ 49
6.8
Campaigns............................................................................................................................................................... 51
6.9
Commercialisation of Politics......................................................................................................................... 52
6.10 Media......................................................................................................................................................................... 52
6.11 Special Considerations for Women.............................................................................................................. 53
6.11.1 Political Parties..................................................................................................................................................... 53
6.11.2 Electoral Commission........................................................................................................................................ 54
6.11.3 Voter Education.................................................................................................................................................... 54
6.11.4 Access to the complaints system................................................................................................................... 54
6.12 Polling Day.............................................................................................................................................................. 54
6.13 Specific Gender Issues for Women Candidates....................................................................................... 54
6.14 Conclusion and Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 55
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Chapter 7: Specialised Study 2: Campaign Financing and Use of State Resources................... 57

7.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 58
7.2
Scope and Methodology.................................................................................................................................... 58
7.3
Regulatory Framework for Campaign Financing................................................................................... 58
7.4
Campaign Spending............................................................................................................................................ 58
7.5
Campaign Finance Offenses............................................................................................................................. 60
7.6
Conclusion and Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 61
Chapter 8: Specialised Study 3: Human Rights and Security........................................................... 63

8.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 64
8.2
Purpose of the Study.......................................................................................................................................... 64
8.3
Research Design................................................................................................................................................... 65
8.3.1 Sampling.................................................................................................................................................................. 65
8.3.2 Data Collection...................................................................................................................................................... 65
8.4
Field Findings........................................................................................................................................................ 65
8.4.1 Perception of the Role of Security Agencies............................................................................................. 65
8.4.2 Relationship between the Police and Electoral Commission............................................................ 66
8.4.3 Race for Space by Vigilantes and Militias.................................................................................................. 66
8.4.4 Intra-Party Politics, Nominations, and Campaigns............................................................................... 67
8.5
Election Day............................................................................................................................................................ 68
8.5.1 Partisanship on Polling Day............................................................................................................................. 68
8.6
Post-Election Security Issues.......................................................................................................................... 68
8.7
Lessons Learnt...................................................................................................................................................... 69
8.8
Chapter 9: Specialised Study 4: Media Coverage of the Elections.................................................. 71

9.1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 72
9.2
Monitoring Media Coverage............................................................................................................................ 73
9.3
Research Questions............................................................................................................................................. 73
9.4
Scope......................................................................................................................................................................... 74
9.5
Sample and Sampling Methods...................................................................................................................... 74
9.5.1 Print Media............................................................................................................................................................. 74
9.5.2 Television................................................................................................................................................................ 74
9.5.3 Radio.......................................................................................................................................................................... 74
9.6
Methods of Data Collection.............................................................................................................................. 75
9.6.1 Content Analysis................................................................................................................................................... 75
9.6.2 Informant Interviews......................................................................................................................................... 75
9.7
Overview of the Results.................................................................................................................................... 75
9.7.1 Election Coverage Space and Time............................................................................................................... 76
9.7.2 Unequal coverage by public media............................................................................................................... 76
9.7.3 Sourcing of Election Stories............................................................................................................................. 78
9.7.4 Topics........................................................................................................................................................................ 78
9.7.5 Tone........................................................................................................................................................................... 79
9.7.6 Interrogation of Candidates Promises....................................................................................................... 79
9.7.7 Crowds and Pictures........................................................................................................................................... 79
9.7.8 Coverage of Elections by Radio...................................................................................................................... 80
9.8
Shutdown of Social Media................................................................................................................................ 80
9.9
9.9.1 Use of Public Media............................................................................................................................................. 80
9.9.2 Complaints, Verification and Enforcement............................................................................................... 80
Chapter 10: Election Day - Presidential and Parliamentary Polls................................................. 81

10.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 82
10.2 Election-Day Observation Process............................................................................................................... 82
10.3 Election Day Observation Findings.............................................................................................................. 82
10.3.1 Set-up and Opening............................................................................................................................................. 83
10.3.2 Conduct of Voting and Functioning of the Biometric System........................................................... 84
10.3.3 Voter Education at Polling Stations.............................................................................................................. 84
10.3.4 Presence of Party Agents.................................................................................................................................. 85
10.4 Closing and Counting......................................................................................................................................... 85
10.5 Tabulation Process.............................................................................................................................................. 85
vii
Chapter 11: Local Government Elections............................................................................................... 87

11.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 88
11.2 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................... 89
11.3 Key Findings........................................................................................................................................................... 89
11.3.1 Opening Time and Commencement of Voting......................................................................................... 89
11.3.2 Delivery and Functionality of Strategic Materials at Polling Stations........................................... 90
11.3.3 Presence of Party Agents.................................................................................................................................. 90
11.3.4 Voter Bribery......................................................................................................................................................... 90
11.3.5 Transportation of Voters................................................................................................................................... 90
11.3.6 Intimidation, Harassment and Violence..................................................................................................... 91
11.3.7 Unauthorized Persons....................................................................................................................................... 91
Chapter 12: Post-Election Environment................................................................................................. 93

12.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 94
12.2 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................... 94
12.3 Summary of Findings by the Long Term Observers.............................................................................. 94
12.3.1 Election Related Complaints to the Electoral Commission................................................................ 94
12.3.2 Parliamentary and LC Aspirants Petitioning Courts for Vote Recounts....................................... 95
12.3.3 Vote Recounting.................................................................................................................................................... 95
12.3.4 High Court Petitions to Set Aside Elections.............................................................................................. 95
12.3.5 Theft and Damage to Electoral Materials.................................................................................................. 96
12.3.6 Bribing of Candidates to Settle Post-Election Disputes....................................................................... 97
12.3.8 Candidates Inciting Violence over Election Results/Processes....................................................... 97
12.3.9 Attacks on Candidates/Supporters by Security Agents...................................................................... 97
12.3.10 Riots, Threatening Violence, Damage to Property, and Public Demonstrations...................... 97
12.3.11 Arrests for Post-Election Violence/Crimes.............................................................................................. 98
Chapter 13: Special Interest Group Elections....................................................................................... 99

13.1 Youth........................................................................................................................................................................100
13.1.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................100
13.1.2 Findings..................................................................................................................................................................100
13.1.3 Issues of Concern...............................................................................................................................................101
13.1.4 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................101
13.2 Workers..................................................................................................................................................................102
13.2.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................102
13.2.2 Issues of Concern...............................................................................................................................................103
13.3 Persons with Disabilities................................................................................................................................103
13.3.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................103
13.3.2 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................104
13.4 UPDF........................................................................................................................................................................104
13.4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................104
13.4.2 Voting......................................................................................................................................................................104
13.4.3 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................104
Chapter 14: Recommendations...............................................................................................................105
APPENDICES...................................................................................................................................................109
APPENDIX I: UGANDAS HOPE FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS DASHED.............................................110
APPENDIX II: Preliminary Statement on 2016 General Elections Issued February 19, 2016..........113
APPENDIX III: CEON-U ELECTION DAY DEPLOYMENT....................................................................................117
APPENDIX IV: CEON-U Update: Preparing for Election Day February 16, 2016....................................119
APPENDIX V: Infographics.............................................................................................................................................121
viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Objectives of the Observation Mission
The Citizens Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U) aimed at enhancing the integrity of the
election process by deterring and exposing irregularities. The objectives that guided the observation
mission were:
1.
2.
3.
To regularly and objectively document and expose issues related to or affecting the integrity of the
electoral process.
To raise awareness and engage key stakeholders on the observations made.
To mitigate the potential for election-related conflict.
CEON-U is a consortium of 18 civil society organizations:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Action for Development (ACFODE)/WDG

African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME)
Citizens Watch IT (CEW-IT)
Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE)/Women in Democracy and Governance (WDG)
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)/Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda
(CCEDU)
Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF)
Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ)
Human Rights Network-Uganda (HURINET-U)
Legal Aid Service Providers Network (LASPNET)
National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda (NUDIPU)
Public Interest Law Clinic (PILAC)
The Uganda NGO Forum (UNNGOF)/UGMP
Transparency International-Uganda (TI-U)/Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM)
Uganda Womens Network (UWONET)/WDG
Uganda Youth Network (UYONET)
Western Ankole Civil Society Forum (WACSOF)
Women in Leadership and Development (WLEDE)
Womens Democracy Network-Uganda Chapter (WDN-U)/WDG
These organisations agreed to conduct a unified, comprehensive, and effective domestic election observation
mission for the 2016 general elections. The consortiums goal was to promote transparency, accountability
and integrity, increase citizen participation, and enhance the integrity of the electoral process by exposing
and deterring irregularities.
Overview of the Observation Mission
CEON-Us election observation was based on data and information from reports submitted by field
observers who were deployed in all districts across the country. Their observations informed the reports
that were used to engage with election stakeholders all throughout the electoral process.
The observation mission included monitoring the pre-election, Election Day, and post-election activities.
The purpose of the 10-month pre-election observation mission was to set a comprehensive background
and context for Election Day observation. The Election Day observation was conducted through traditional
observation methodologies in order to provide evidence-based reports about the days electoral processes.
In addition to the general areas of the electoral process, there were some that required technical expertise
ix
for effective observation. Specialised studies on gender/women participation, campaign financing/use of

state resources, human rights/security, and media coverage were, therefore, commissioned to give the
observation context and to facilitate a deeper understanding of issues. These studies complemented the
general observation findings and together provide a holistic picture of the electoral process and outcomes.
Background to the 2016 General Elections
Uganda has had eight heads of state since independence in 1962. Following the promulgation of the 1995
constitution, general elections were held in 1996. Since then, elections have been organised regularly
every five years. While this is commendable, there are serious concerns about the quality of elections. The
credibility of the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections was questioned.
Nationwide consultations were conducted in 2014 to gather and document citizens expectations of the
2016 elections. The purpose of the consultations was to propose a new election managment system as
well as update the Citizens Manifesto which reflected the citizens agenda for the 2016 elections. The
process of consultations took a root of 16 regional meetings that culminated into a National Conference on
free and fair elections. This led to the generation of a national Citizens Compact for free and fair elections
that contained concrete proposals for reforming the election management system. The Government
and Parliament ignored the Citizens Manifesto yet it had ideas and recommendations that would have
contributed to a credible, free, and fair electoral process in 2016.
Highlights from the Observation Mission
The election context: The 18 February 2016 general elections took place against the backdrop of a tense
and unpredictable yet highly competitive political and governance context. The atmosphere preceding the
elections was characterised by deep-seated mistrust of the Electoral Commission, lack of independence
and impartiality of security agencies, and weakening rule of law.
The legal framework: The elections were conducted within a legal and institutional framework that was
highly contested by most political and electoral stakeholders. The Constitution and other laws provide for
fundamental rights and freedoms crucial to the integrity of elections. These include freedoms of expression,
association, assembly and movement.
Violence: In the pre-election period, CEON-U observed that violence related to ethnicity was the most
prevalent. Ethnic sentiments were the basis for hate speech, intimidation, and violence against candidates
in all 223 constituencies observed.
Nomination process: The nomination process was significantly affected by the late legislation on
nomination fees, which were hiked for presidential candidates from UGX8million to UGX20million and
for parliamentary candidates from UGX200,000 to UGX3million.There were no clear guidelines on the
documents a prospective contestant was required to present at nomination especially for parliamentary
and local government elections.
Role of women: Women played prominent roles in the management and administration of the electoral
process. In terms of election administration, 38 of the 111 District Registrars were women as were 65 of the
118 Assistant Registrars. There are no specific guidelines for the Electoral Commission district registrars
to ensure gender balance as they recruit sub-county and parish supervisors. However, an explicit provision
on gender balance would ensure that both women and men are given equal opportunity to participate in
the management and administration of elections.
Civic and voter education: Civic and voter education was inadequate, which partly accounted for the many
invalid ballot papers and the low voter turnout for the local council elections. To this end, civic and voter
education and information should be continued throughout the electoral cycle.
Role of security forces: The rampant deployment of security forces during the elections may have
intimidated some voters and led to electoral choices based on fear. Deployment of uniformed and armed
security personnel other than the police should be minimal to allow for unfettered freedom of participation
in the elections. The police were found to be partisan in many cases, which is against the law. They should
be neutral in their enforcement of the law.
Role of political parties: Political parties were poor at keeping records concerning their expenditure
during the electoral process. In terms of election-related spending, the NRM spent the most money on
campaigns, followed by independents, FDC, Go Forward, DP, and UPC. The Presidential Elections Act, 2005
(as amended) allows the incumbent to use government facilities and enjoy benefits that are attached to
the office of the Head of State during elections. The law should be amended to limit the privileges of an
incumbent running for office in order to ensure a level playing field.
Role of media: Some media houses were biased in their reporting. There were instances of biased reporting
and failure to meaningfully inform the electorate by contextualising the issues covered. Womens voices
were seldom included in the coverage, opposition candidates were routinely denied space and time to
advertise, and political actors especially those in government attempted to influence coverage by the stateowned media. There was a lack of serious interrogation of candidates promises and claims as well as a
high level of episodic reporting rather than issue-based coverage. The government also shut down social
media in the lead up to and following voting day, a situation that raised questions over the transparency of
the electoral process. There is a need for stronger guarantees for and protection of the right to information
and access to all forms of media prior to, during, and after elections.
Role of special interest groups: The manner in which the special interest group elections were conducted
was not inclusive. On the other hand, the relevance of special interest groups and the value they bring to
parliament are still debatable and hardly understood by many.
Voting process: Voting materials were delivered late at many polling stations in some areas considered
to be opposition strongholds, which led to delayed commencement of voting as well as frustration and
suspicion among voters. The Electoral Commission is urged to devise secure mechanisms of ensuring that
electoral materials are delivered on time.
Elections disputes: The post-election period was characterised by numerous court petitions that are still
being heard and adjudicated by the courts at the time of publishing this report. The petitions have exposed
the inconsistencies inherent in the way elections were conducted, with vote recounts ordered in a few
constituencies.
Acceptability of results: Lack of transparency in elections and transmission of results undermined the
legitimacy and acceptability of the outcomes. As such, the Electoral Commission should endeavor to give
the citizenry a chance for greater participation in counting, tallying, and tabulation of results. Observers
should be present at all levels of transmission of results with clear guidelines to follow through the process.
There should also be a transparent display of the flow of results at all tabulation centres.
Timing of elections: The Local Council (LC) elections faced a spillover effect of the malpractices witnessed
in the presidential and parliamentary elections. To avoid this spillover effect, the LC elections should be
held before the presidential and parliamentary elections.
Outline of the Report
Chapter 1 Introduces CEON-U and lays out the objectives and implementation mechanisms of the
observation mission for the 2016 elections. It outlines the work undertaken as well as the actors, roles,
methodology, and outcomes of the observation project.
xi
Chapter 2 Situates the general elections in the historical and political context in which they were conducted.
It interrogates whether the political environment provided a level playing field and fostered free and fair
elections. It highlights the political features that impacted the integrity of the electoral process and results.
Chapter 3 Provides an overview of the legislative environment in which the 2016 elections took place
and explores the details of the legal framework and standards for the conduct of elections in Uganda. It
discusses the laws under which the 2016 general elections were conducted and which guided CEON-Us
assessment.
Chapter 4 Describes the preparatory phase of the elections, including the activities, practices, and
controversies surrounding voter registration, management of candidate nominations, handling of electoral
laws, and the issue of nomination fees.
Chapter 5 Describes CEON-Us observation of the pre-election period, including its efforts in conducting
a long term observation mission to help improve the quality and integrity of the electoral process by
identifying the gaps and weaknesses in the electoral process.
Chapter 6 Analyses the results of the specialized study on gender and women participation in the 2016
general elections, focusing on the period between August 2015 and February 2016.
Chapter 7 Analyses the results of the specialized study on campaign financing, focusing on both the money
spent by candidates at the constituency level as well as the use of the national budget by the incumbent
government during campaigns.
Chapter 8 Analyses the results of the specialised study on human rights and security, focusing on
investigative monitoring and observation of the conduct of security agencies in the general elections of
2016.
Chapter 9 Analyses the results of the specialized study on media, focusing on assessmentof the nature
of media coverage of the 2016 elections and whether the coverage contributed to a free and fair election,
subverted the electoral process, or promoted professionalism in election coverage.
Chapter 10 Presents the findings from observation of the Election Day processes, focusing on the
presidential and parliamentary elections, the methods used, how the elections were managed, and the
challenges encountered.
Chapter 11 Looks at the local government elections, focusing on highlights and key findings from the
observation of LC5, municipal council, and LC3 polls.
Chapter 12 Gives an account of the Post-Election observation exercise from 19 February to 31 March 2016,
focusing on developments during this phase of the electoral cycle and their implications for the integrity
of the entire electoral process.
Chapter 13 Examines the conduct of the elections for representatives of the four special interest groups in
parliament, namely, the youth, workers, persons with disabilities, and the military.
Chapter 14 Outlines a set of recommendations in response to the many issues and concerns raised by the
observation mission issues and which require both legislative and administrative corrective measures by
different players in the electoral process.
xii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Objectives of CEON-U

This chapter introduces the Citizens Election Observers Network Uganda(CEON-U). It lays out the
objectives and implementation mechanisms of the domestic election observation mission for the 2016
elections. It outlines the structure, key actors and their roles, methodology, activities, outcomes of the
election observation project, challenges and lessons learnt.
CEON-U aimed at enhancing the integrity of the election process by deterring and exposing irregularities.
The objectives that guided the observation mission were:
1. To regularly and objectively document and expose issues related to or affecting the integrity of the
electoral process.
2. To raise awareness and engage key stakeholders on the observations made.
3. To mitigate the potential for election related conflict.
1.2 Achieving the goal of CEON-U
CEON-U was established as a consortium of 18 civil society organizations1 and 23 sub-national partners2.
These organizations agreed to conduct a unified, comprehensive, and effective domestic election observation
mission for the 2016 general elections. The need to promote transparency, integrity and accountability and
to increase the participation of citizens in Ugandas electoral process guided the consortiums work.
The observation mission included observing the pre-election, election-day, and post-election activities.
The aim of the 10 month observation mission (September 2015 June 2016) included observing the preelection period, election-day, and post-election activities. Election-day observation employed Sample Based
Observation (SBO) method to assess the quality of Election Day processes across the country through a
nationally representative sample.
The aim of the pre-election observation phase was to enhance the integrity of the election process by
deterring and exposing irregularities. The election-day observation was conducted through short term
observers (STOs), who included sample based observers (SBOs) and Hot Spot Observers (HSOs), in order
to provide evidence-based reports about the days electoral processes. To achieve its objectives, CEON-U
identified 23 sub-national partners across the country, who in turn recruited 23 Regional Coordinators
(RCs), 223 constituency based Long-term Observers (LTOs) and 1,026 Short Term Observers (STOs) who
were trained, equipped and deployed as required.
1
Action for Development (ACFODE)/WDG, African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), Citizens Watch IT (CEW-IT), Forum for Women in
Democracy (FOWODE)/WDG, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)/ CCEDU, Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF),
Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ), Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U), Legal Aid Service Providers Network (LASPNET),
National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda (NUDIPU), Public Interest Law Clinic (PILAC), The Uganda NGO Forum (UNNGOF) UGMP,
Transparency International-Uganda (TI-U)/ACFIM, Uganda Womens Network (UWONET)/WDG, Uganda Youth Network (UYONET), Western
Ankole Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), Women in Leadership and Development (WLEDE) and Womens Democracy Network-Uganda Chapter
(WDN-U)/WDG
2
Action for Cooperation Research in Development (ACORD), Bugisu Civil Society Network (BUCINET), Centre for Governance and Economic
Development(CEGED)), Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), Community Development and Child Welfare Initiative
(CODI), Facilitation for Peace and Development (FAPAD), First African Bicycle Initiative Organization (FABIO), Kalangala District NGO Forum,
Kapchorwa Civil Society Organisations Alliance (KACSOA), Kick Corruption out of Kigezi (KICK), Mid-western Center for Democracy and
Human Rights (MICOD), Mid-western Region Anti-corruption Coalition (MIRAC), Mukono District NGO Forum, Nakere Women Group (NWG),
Namutumba District NGO Forum Palisa Civil Society Organizations Network (PACONET), Public Affairs Center (PAC), RiamiRiam Civil Society
Network (RIAMIRIAM), Rwenzori Consortium for Civic Competence (RWECO), South Western Institute for Policy and Advocacy (SOWIPA),
Tororo Civil Society Network(TOCINET), Transparency International - Uganda (TI-U) and Western Ankole Civil Society Organizations Forum
(WASCOF)
CEON-U trained a team of Regional Coordinators, Long-Term Observers, Sample-Based Observers, Hot Spot
Observers, Tally Centre Observers, and Data center Clerks to prepare them to perform their tasks to the
highest attainable standards. The trainings covered roles of each category of observer, understanding the
electoral process, observer checklist, non-partisan observer code of conduct, reporting protocals including
use of ICT technologies for reporting. Each CEON-U observer was accredited by the Electoral Commission
and signed a CEON-U pledge of neutrality and non-partisanship.
Steering Committee members, releasing a CEON-U report to the media on 30th November 2015 at the Human
Rights Boardroom.
1.3 Governance of CEON-U

CEON-U structure comprised three levels, namely: the Steering Committee (SC) -Directors of the 18 Member
Organizations- (Decision Makers), the Coordination Unit (Secretariat) and the 23 Sub National Partners
(SNP) (Implementers). This structure reflects CEON-U decision making authority levels and channels of
communication.
The Steering Committee (SC), the supreme decision-making body for the project. It was responsible for all
policy decisions and public statements and reports. The SC provided oversight on budget control and quality
assurance. It issued all public statements and observation reports. The Chairperson and Co-Chairperson
presided over external relations and communication. Members of the SC are listed in the table below:
CEON-U Steering Committee Directors

No
Name
Organization
Regina Bafaki
Action for Development (ACFODE)/WDG
Dr. Peter Mwesige
James Mwirima
African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME)
Citizens Watch IT (CEW-IT)
Patricia Munabi
Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE)/WDG
Mohammed Ndifuna Secretary
Human Rights Network (HURINET)
Dr. Livingstone Sewanyana - Chairperson Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)
Peter Wandera
Richard Ssewakiryanga
10
Ritah Aciro Co Chairperson

Martin Mwesigwa
National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda (NUDIPU)
13
Jennifer B Kagugube
15
Sempala Robert
Womens Democracy Network-Uganda Chapter (WDN-U)
Women Leadership Development (WLEDE)
Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ)
Apollo Lee Kakonge
Western Ankole Civil Society Forum (WACSOF)
Ms. Sylivia Namubiru Mukasa
Legal Aid Service Providers Network (LASPNET)
16
Adrian Jjuuko
18
Dr. Christopher Mbaziira
17
Uganda Womens Network (UWONET)/WDG
Uganda Youth Network (UYONET)
Perry Aritua
14
Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF)/UGMP
Lillian Bagala
11
12
Transparency International-Uganda (TI-U)/ACFIM
Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF)
Public Interest Law Clinic (PILAC)
CEON-U Steering Committee members releasing a report to the press on election day on 18th February 2016, at
Hotel Africana.
4
The CEON-U Coordination Unit

No.
Name
Title
1.
Dr. Martin Mwondha
National Coordinator
Charity Kalebbo Ahimbisibwe
Communication Specialist
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15
16
17.
18
John Mary Odoy

Ivan Mwaka
Edwin Bwambale
Andrew Kawongo
Dorothy Kiwanuka Kawumi

Stephen Mulaabi
Peruth Nakubulwa
Kenneth Wanda
Evelyn Kabongerwa
Moses Nyanzi
Badru Walusansa
Suzan Nalukwago
Lule Faridah
Deborah Namirimu
Clare Arinitwe
Maria Kizito
LTO Manager
STO Manager
ICT Manager
Lead Trainer
Logistics Officer
Procurement Officer
Administration
Finance Officer
Finance and Administration Manager

Project Driver
Project Assistant
Project Assistant
Project Associate
Project Assistant
Monitoring and Evaluation
Finance and Administration Officer (NDI)
The Coordination Unit (CU) comprising of 18 staff was hosted by Foundation for Human Rights Initiative
(FHRI) was the technical arm of the project responsible for day-to-day implementation of the general
election observation mission plan under the leadership and guidance of the Steering Committee. As head
of the Coordination Unit, the National Coordinator facilitated the partnership between the SC and SNPs.
Staff at the CU worked closely with sub-national partners (that hosted RCs, LTOs and STOs) to ensure that
the project was implemented in a consultative and timely manner. The Coordination Unit managed the
Information and Data Centre hosted at the head offices and prepared observation reports and statements.
Due to CEON-Us non-profit status as a coalition of civic organisations committed to strengthening
democracy in Uganda, the Regional Coordinators, Long Term Observers based in constituencies, Sample
Based Observers, Hotspot Observers, District Tally Observers, and Data Centre Clerks were all volunteer
positions.
Sub-National Partners (SNPs)

In order to successfully manage the election observation activities, CEON-U divided the country into 16
regions3. The 23 SNPsimplemented the activities of CEON-U at the regional level under the leadership of
the Steering Committee with the Coordination Unit providing the day-to-day programme management and
technical support. Each of the SNPs was responsible for designated districts as shown below:
Acholi, Ankole, Buganda x 5,Bugisu, Bukedi, Bunyoro, Busoga, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Rwenzori, Sebei, Teso and WestNile.
CEON-U Sub-national partners districts of operation

Region
Districts
Partner
Acholi
Agago, Pader, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya
Agency for Cooperation and Research in

Development (ACORD)
Ntungamo
South Western Institute for Policy &

Advocacy (SOWIPA)
Ankole
Ankole
Buganda A
Buganda B
Buganda C
Buganda D
Buganda E
Bugisu
Bukedi
Bukedi
Bunyoro
Bunyoro
Busoga
Busoga
Karamoja
Karamoja
Kigezi
Lango
Rwenzori
Sebei
Teso
West Nile
Buhweju, Ibanda, IsingiroKiruhura, Mbarara,

Mitooma, Rubirizi, Sheema
Western Ankole Civil Society

Organisations Forum (WACSOF)
Kampala,Kiboga Wakiso Lyantonde, Bukomansimbi, Citizens Coalition for Electoral

Butambala, Buvuma, Kyankwanzi, Mityana ,
Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU)
Mubende, Rakai, Ssembabule, Gomba, Kalungu
Masaka, Mpigi, Lwengo
Transparency International (TI)
Mukono, Buikwe, Kayunga
Mukono NGO Forum
Nakaseke, Nakasongola, Luweero

Kalangala
Bududa, Bulambuli, Mbale, Sironko, Manafwa

Busia, Butaleja, Tororo
Pallisa, Budaka, Bukedea, Kibuku

Hoima, Kibaale,
Buliisa, Masindi, Kiryandongo
Bugiri, Iganga, Luuka, Namayingo, Namutumba,

Buyende
Jinja, Kaliro, Kamuli, Mayuge
Abim, Kaabong, Kotido,
Moroto, Nakapiripirit , Napak
Kabale, Kanungu, Kisoro, Rukungiri
Alebtong, Amolatar, Apac, Dokolo, Kole, Oyam Lira,

Otuke
Kabarole, Kamwenge, Kasese, Kyegegwa, Kyenjojo
Ntoroko, Bundibugyo
Bukwo, Kapchorwa, Kween
Amuria, Kaberamaido, Katakwi, Serere, Kumi,

Ngora, Soroti, Amuria,
Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Maracha, Moyo, Nebbi,

Yumbe, Zombo
Community Development and Child

Welfare Initiatives (CODI)
Kalangala District NGO Forum
Bugisu Civil Society Network (BUCINET)

Tororo Civil Society Network (TOCINET)
Pallisa Civil Society Network (PACONET)

Mid-Western Region Anti-Corruption
Coalition (MIRAC)
Mid-Western Region Centre for

Democracy and Human Rights (MICOD)
Namutumba NGO Forum
First African Bicycle Initiative

Organisation (FABIO)
Nakere Rural Womens Activists

(NARWOA)
Karamoja NGO Forum (Riamiriam)
Kick Corruption Out of Kigezi (KICK)
Facilitation for Peace and Development

(FAPAD)
Rwenzori Consortium of NGOs
(RWECO)
Kapchorwa Civil Society Organizations

Alliance (KACSOA)
Public Affairs Centre (PAC)
Center for Governance and Economic

Development (CEGED)
Regional Coordinators who doubled as master trainers were responsible for implementing CEON- U
activities in their respective regions with guidance from the CU. These 23 RCs were the focal point persons
between the SNP and CU. They were responsible for recruitment, training, and deployment of the Long
Term Observers and Election Day Observers in their regions. They recruited, trained and deployed LTOs
and STOs in their regions.
6
Long Term Observers (LTOs) (who also served as supervisors of the Sample Based Observers operating
within their assigned constituencies on Election Day) were deployed in 223 of the 290 constituencies,
covering all 112 districts of Uganda to observe electoral processes, before, during and after elections. In
order to serve as an LTO one had to be: resident of the Constituency of observation; educated up to a
minimum of tertiary education; non-partisan (not involved in partisan politics as agent or candidate);
computer literate and able to use the internet.
Hotspot Observers (HSOs) were recruited, trained and deployed in 10 constituencies, which were identified
as hotspots4, based on CEON-U pre-election LTO data. These were constituencies with high prevalence of
hate speech and violence at rallies. The 210 HSO, of which 10 were supervisors, were deployed in addition
to SBOs in these constituencies. HSOs were responsible for observing electoral processes at assigned
polling stations in the hotspots, with similar duties as those of SBOs.
Sample Based Observers (SBOs) were deployed to a random, representative sample of polling stations
nationwide on Election Day. The 700 SBOs were deployed to observe the opening of polls, voting procedures,
closing of polls, vote counting and results announcement, completing the observer checklist and incident
reports (where necessary) and transmitting their completed checklist to CEON-Us Information Centre
based at Hotel Africana Kampala. In order to serve as SBO, one had to be: resident of the parish hosting the
polling station to be observed; educated up to a minimum of tertiary education; non-partisan (not involved
in partisan politics as agent or candidate); in possession of a working phone; able to use a mobile phone.
District Tabulation Observers were responsible for observing the tabulation process at district tally centers
in assigned districts. Their duty was to complete the tabulation observer checklist and incident reports (if
necessary) and to send their completed checklists to the CEON-U Information Centre.
Altogether 700 Sample Based Observers, 204 Hotspot Observers and 112 District Tabulation Centre
Observers were assigned to observe the 2016 elections. The 223 Long Term Observers supervised Election
Day observers within their constituencies. The Long Term Observers and Regional Coordinators were also
deployed as roving observers on Election Day.
Data Clerks were responsible for receiving and verifying Election Day data coming from E-day observers. The
60 Data Clerks who were stationed at the CEON-U data centre, Hotel Africana, Kampala underwent a one day
data management training conducted by CEON-U in preparation for effective execution of their duties.
Having outlined the main actors, in the next section we explain the origins of CEON-U, thinking processes
behind its establishment, key steps and methods used in implementing CEON-U activities the detailed
methodology, challenges and lessons learnt.
1.4 Observation Methodology and Preparation

This section explains the origins of CEON-U, thinking processes behind its establishment, key steps and
methods used and managerial processes undertaken in implementing CEON-U activities. The section outlines
how the election observation process unfolded before, during and after the elections. The methods used
included quantitative and qualitative techniques of data collection for the 10-month observation period.
CEON-Uganda was established through a series of meetings5 during which the member CSOs discussed and
reflected upon the trajectory of human rights and democratic processes in Uganda. The CSOs recognized
the declining trend in respect to freedom of expression and association, increasingly restrictive civic and
political space, concerns about the increasing monetization of elections, as well as decline over the past
4
Rukiga County, Fortportal Municipality ,Bwamba County, Bunyole west County ,Tororo Municipality, Jinja West Municipality, Lamwo County
,Kumi County, Mukono County South, Vurra constituency.
5
On the 28/03/2014, civil society organizations and development partners met and agreed to set up a frame work for election observation. A
working group was set up to develop thematic areas for election observation. The group later made three proposals and one was chosen which
CEON-U is. On the 27th &28th October 2014 at Rico Hotel Entebbe, a second election observation workshop was held to get feedback from the
working group. A series of meetings took place from then onwards to work out modalities of how all the 18 civil society organization would work
under the umbrella of CEON-U and a memorandum of understanding was generated from these meetings. The working group also agreed that
CEON-U should be hosted at The Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI).
elections, in voter turnout. These were considered to be worrying trends that required more strategic
engagement by CSOs with citizens to encourage civic agency and participation in elections, as well as
continuous engagement with duty bearers on concerns about the status of democratic governance in
Uganda. The 18 CSOs agreed to conduct a unified election observation process and thereby CEON-U was
established with both financial and technical support from development partners, notably the Democratic
Governance Facility (DGF) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI)
1.4.1 Preparation
Executive Directors of CEON-U member organizations constituted a Steering Committee and a technical
working sub-committee, which prepared proposals, budgets and work-plans for CEON-U before 1st July 2015.
The SC established positions for the Coordination Unit, advertised, shortlisted and conducted interviews
for CU staff, who started working on 1st September 2015.
The SC organized an orientation workshop for Sub-national partners in August 2015.
The coordination unit (CU) organized the National Launch of CEON-U on 10th September in Kampala and
thereafter Regional Launches at Mbale, Jinja, Kabale, Masaka and Lira. CEON-U was officially launched by
Dr. Badru Kiggundu, Chairperson of the Electoral Commission.
SNPs recruited 223 LTOs in September 2015 and with support from the CU conducted Training of the LTOs
to enable them execute their duties effectively.
1.4.2 Training Processes
The CU organized and executed one LTO Pre election ToT. This was an Induction Training for Regional
Coordinators. 23 Regional Coordinators (RC) were trained at Esella Country Hotel from September 28 to 29
2015. This training prepared the RCs to conduct the subsequent regional training for LTOs. Subsequently
223 LTOs were trained at nine regional locations across the country in October 2015.
Refresher training for all LTOs was conducted in December 2015 in order to support observers especially
with ODK reporting. The same event also served as a preparation meeting for the recruitment of STOs.
The CU conducted a ToT for 32 Master Trainers comprising of 21 RCs and 11 Voluntary Master Trainers
were trained on E-day procedures and reporting through a training held at Esella Country Hotel from 5 to
8 February 2016 to enable them conduct subsequent training for SBOs, HSOs and DTOs.
In order to optimally prepare for the Election Day observation, CEON-Uganda staff together with the
recruited master trainers conducted Election Day training for 700 sample based observers, 204 hotspot
observers and 112 District tally center observers. Training was organized at regional level for effectiveness
- in Lango, Acholi, West Nile, Bunyoro, Rwenzori, Buganda, Jinja, Teso and Bugisu.
In support of observers in the field on E day, 60 Data Clerks were trained and deployed at the project data
center at Hotel Africana, Kampala.
1.4.3 Accreditation
CEON-U applied for accreditation from the EC. Members and observers of CEON-U from Kampala, Wakiso,
Mukono and surrounding areas were accredited by officials from EC headquarters, through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Up country observers and members were accredited by District based EC officials across
the country.
1.4.4 Deployment of Observers
Deployment of CEON-U SNPs, RCs and observers was executed through MoUs and voluntary service
contracts between CEON-U Chairperson and the service provider.
8
1.4.5 Reporting Mechanisms

Reporting observers to the CU was conducted through smart phones using the ODK platform as well as
SMS and email messaging. The CU reported to stakeholders through email, press statements and periodic
publications.
1.4.6 Thematic Studies
Four (4) members of the SC namely ACME, ACFIM, HURINET and WDG undertook specialized studies on 4
key thematic areas related to the integrity of the electoral processes as shown in the table below:
Organization
Thematic Area
ACME
Media Performance and Conduct in Elections
WDG
Women Participation in Elections
ACFIM
HURINET
Campaign Financing
The Role of Security Agencies in Elections
Each of these members focused on their area of expertise and released their reports under the CEON-U
brand.
1.4.7 Media Engagement
CEON-U SC and staff engaged in active collaboration with both traditional and new media to raise awareness
and engage stakeholders on key findings and recommendations from the observation process. Media
engagement included Press Releases, Press Conferences, Twitter, Facebook, Whatsapp and interactive
Website.
CEON-U organized a civil society engagement meeting at Silver Springs Hotel and a media engagement
meeting at Bugolobi Royal Suites Hotel to alert them on the strengths of using a sample based observation
method. CEON-U also held a series of meetings with various religious leaders, the Electoral Commission
and the Speaker of Parliament.
1.4.8 Pre-Election Observation
CEON-U pre-election observation was driven by data based on reports submitted by 223 constituency
based observers spread out in all districts across the country. Every week, CEON-U LTOs sent reports
based on a fixed checklist of questions to capture vital information, which included questions about
election administration preparations, voter education, campaigns, campaign financing, electoral violence
and security and the media. Weekly data was transmitted to a centralized database at the CU using smart
phones, through the open data kit platform (ODK). Long Term Observers submitted pre-election checklists
which provided information on the conduct of participants in the electoral process as well as possible
triggers of violence.
Additionally, the Regional Coordinators, together with Long Term Observers, completed critical incident
forms which they transmitted in real time using the ODK application to the Coordination Unit whenever
they witnessed or became aware of election-related violence. The conditions for completing the preelection checklist and critical incident reports were that they had to generate information which is gender
sensitive and includes assessing the participation of special interest groups (the youth, elderly, and people
with disabilities).
This real-time information was critical to providing an accurate picture of the prevailing electoral
atmosphere across the country. CEON-U observers reported on events they had personally witnessed
or heard from a credible third party. Such credible sources included media outlets or members of the
community. Where an event was heard from a third party, observers were required to assess whether
the source of that information was credible; they corroborated the information with a second and a third
source before it was reported to CEON-U.
1.4.9 Election Day for Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (With 68% voter turnout)
CEON-U adopted a three pronged strategy for observing electionday processes. This included conducting a
sample-based observation (SBO), which involved 700 sample-based observers deployed to a systematically
selected, representative random sample of 700 polling stations, out of 28, 010 total polling stations around
the country.
CEON also deployed 204 observers in hot spot constituencies namelyRukiga County, Fort Portal
Municipality, Lamwo County, Tororo Municipality, Jinja Municipality West, Vurra, Kumi County, Mukono
County South, Bwamba County and Bunyole West County. The selection of these 10 constituencies was
based on analysis of data from CEON-U long term observer data over 10 reporting periods between
October 12and December 14 2015. From the analysis, the 10 constituencies had the high percentages of
reports of election malpractices. By deploying additional observers in these constituencies, CEON aimed at
enhancing observer presence and act as deterrence for possible malpractices.
Finally, CEON also deployed observers at the 112 district Tallying Centres to observe and report on the
results tabulation process at the district level.
All the SBO, Hot Spot and Tabulation observers were trained on anelection day observation checklist and
critical incident form and reported their observation findings to the CEON database through coded text
messages throughout election day.
CEON-U Sample-Based Observation
CEON adoptedthesample-based observation method, which is an advanced, proven election observation

technique used by non-partisan citizen election monitoring groups to present an accurate and
comprehensive assessment of the Election Day process. This method has been used successfully for more
than 25 years in over 50 countries. In the Africa, SBO has been conducted in Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi,
Ghana, Cote dIvoire and Burkina Faso.
Sample-based observation relies on proven statistical methods. It enables the observers, who are deployed
to pre-selected polling stations, to comprehensively assess important aspects of the Election Day, such as
whether election officials are following proper procedures, the presence and behavior of party agents,
the secrecy of the vote, and transparency of the counting process. Itworks by observing, at a random, a
representative sample of polling stations. Information collected from the sampled polling stations is
sufficient to gain a comprehensive picture of activities on Election Day.
The findings from sample-based observation are considered representative of the entire country because
the data is derived from a randomly selected sample of polling stations. For example, if the observers find
that 25% of the polling stations it observed opened late, they can confidently conclude (within a small
margin of error) that 25% of all polling stations across the country opened late.
CEON-Us sample based observation employed a nationally representative random sample of 700 polling
stations drawn from the official list of polling stations supplied to CEON-U by the Electoral commission of
Uganda. The sample contained polling stations in all 290 constituencies in the 112 districts.
The 700 polling stations were selected by first stratifying the list of polling stations by constituencies and
districts and then selecting polling stations at random from within each strata (using the interval technique).
Tables 1 show how the distribution of the Sample as compared with the distribution of all polling stations
and registered voters. It is noteworthy from the table that the percentage of sampled polling station and
registered voters at those stations per region and district closely matches the percentage of all polling
stations and all registered voters per region and district. For example, 4.3% of all polling stations are in
Acholi region and 4.3% of the CEON SBO Observers in the National Sample are in Acholi region.
10
Table 1: Distribution of CEON-U SBO Sample by Region

The below table compares the distribution of all polling stations across political regions to that of CEONUs random sample of polling stations.
Region
No. of all Polling

Stations
% of all Polling
Stations
No. of Polling
Stations in Sample
% of Sampled
Polling Stations
ACHOLI
1209
4.3%
30
4.3%
CENTRAL
8002
28.6%
201
28.7%
1546
5.5%
39
5.6%
ACHOLI
BUNYORO
EASTERN
KARAMOJA
NORTHERN
RWENZORI
WEST NILE
WESTERN
TOTAL
1209
1528
7170
635
2192
1860
3868
28010
4.3%
5.5%
25.6%
2.3%
7.8%
6.6%
13.8%
100%
30
38
179
16
55
46
96
700
Critical factors behind the CEON-U highly successful SBO included the following:
4.3%
5.4%
25.6%
2.3%
7.9%
6.6%
13.7%
100%
Final list of polling stations from Electoral Commission from which the sample was drawn;
Each observer was deployed to a specific polling station they were assigned;
A well-trained nationwide network of observers;
Observers were well-trained and equipped to submit accurate reports; and
Reports were rapidly collected from every single observer (100% of observers) to a central data
centre.
Failing to collect a report, even from one observer would have undermined the success of this
observation.
1.4.10 Post election Observation
The post-election period began soon after the presidential and parliamentary elections from 19th February
2016 to 31st March 2016. During this period, the 223 LTOs continued to operate within their constituencies,
using a new checklist specifically designed for post-election observation and sending data to the CU using
the ODK platform, just like in the pre-election period. They used the checklist to track post-election issues
such as complaints filed at the EC, court petitions, vote recounts, damage to electoral materials, election
disputes, violence, role of security agents, riots, arrests and media performance.
1.4.11 Use of ICT
Essential ICT and office hardware, software, and supplies were either procured or leased to cater for the
information and data centre. This was in addition to equipment already acquired by CEON-U partners
such as CCEDU, CEW-IT, and ACFIM during their participation in previous observation work. For instance,
CCEDUs existing short code (6162) was used as a data reception platform.
1.4.12 Reporting of Observations
Observers reported the information generated during Pre-Election and Post-election periods with the aid
of Open Data Kit software installed on android phones. Each Long Term Observer was required to report
11
once a week to CEON-U. Checklists and incident forms that were developed were used to report through
the Open Data Kit. This enabled to write periodical reports and issue media briefings in real time.
All CEON-Us 1,270 observers reported the information they collected on Election Day periodically to the
CEON-U database through coded text messages. This enabled CEON-U to process the information and
produce reports in real time and to issue timely statements on the opening, set-up, and closing of polls as
well as on the tabulation and announcement of results.
The CU received the first data of the Pre-Election observation phase on 19 October 2015. Thereafter,
CEON-U observed the NRM primaries and released our report to the press on 2 November 2015. On 5
November 2015, CEON-U launched the first Pre-election report in various regions to engage stakeholders
on the issues it raised.
CEON-U released the second Pre-Election report on 3 December 2015 followed by an interim statement on
electoral irregularities on 15 December 2015. The third report was released on 12 January 2016. We then
released a Pre-Election statement on 16 February 2016. CEON-U also issued a statement on the opening
and set-up of polls on Election Day 18, February 12016. We issued the Election Day process statement on
19 February 2016 followed by the tabulation and results statement on 20 February 20166.
1.5 Challenges and Lessons Learnt
The complexity of the technology (Open Data Kit) used in reporting required the Coordination Unit to
constantly support the observers. The on and off mobile phone network made it difficult to transmit the
Long Term Observers reports and often led to delays in releasing the reports. Other delays resulted from
inability by Long Term Observers who were located in remote constituencies to charge their phones when
batteries ran out. They could therefore not send data until they got to places where they could charge their
phones.
Delayed accreditation of Short Term Observers across districts caused uncertainty about their deployment
to observe the elections. CEON-U managers visited the affected districts to reach out to the Electoral
Commission officials to facilitate and help expedite the accreditation process. CEON-U will in future engage
the Electoral Commission early enough to ensure that accreditation is done in time.
The Supreme Court rejected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) application to be amicus curie (friends of
court) during its hearing and adjudication on the Amama Mbabazis petition against the EC and President
Museveni. This blocked CEON-U from presenting vital evidence on many questions in this petition. However
alongside its ruling, the court recognized the importance of recommendations in CEON-U observation
reports and urged the executive to take them seriously.
In the next chapters, we will discuss the political background and context in which the elections took place,
the legal and administrative framework, nominations and a detailed account of how the campaigns and
elections unfolded, including the post-election observations.
12
Website: www.ceonu.org.ug
CHAPTER 2
Political Background to the

2016 General Elections
2.1 Introduction
This chapter situates the general elections in the historical and political context in which they were
conducted. It investigates whether the political environment provided a level playing field and fostered
free and fair elections. It highlights the political features that impacted on the integrity of the electoral
process and results.
2.2 A History of Violent Change
Uganda has had eight heads of state since independence. At the height of instability, four presidents (Yusuf
Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Paulo Muwanga, and Milton Obote II) ruled the country in less than two years
between April 1979 and December 1980. President Yusuf Lule served for 68 days - the shortest stay in
power - while the incumbent and longest serving President Yoweri Museveni has been in power for 30
years. Since 1966 when Obote attacked the Buganda monarch Kabaka Edward Mutesas palace at Mengo
and declared himself president, Uganda has over the last 50 years not experienced a peaceful transfer of
power. Instead, change of leadership has been characterised by use of force including military coups and
civil war.
2.3 Poor Quality of Elections
In 1958 the colonial government organised an election of representatives to the Legislative Council
(LEGCO). This was followed by another election in 1961 in which Ben Kiwanuka was elected as Chief
Minister. In 1962 leaders that took over government from the colonial governors were elected. In 1964
a referendum was conducted to resolve the Buganda-Bunyoro impasse over the lost counties of Buyaga
and Bugangaizi1. The next elections held in December 1980 were disputed and led to a five-year guerilla
war by the National Resistance Army. There were no direct national elections for almost 14 years after the
controversial ballot of 1980.
Delegates to the Constituency Assembly were elected in 1993 and promulgated a new constitution in 1995.
The country held the first general elections under the new constitution in 1996 and since then, elections
have been organised regularly every five years.
While the regularity of elections is commendable, there are serious concerns about their credibility. The
credibility of the 2001, 2006, and 2011 general elections was widely questioned. According to various
observation reports by DEMGroup2 and other observer missions such as the European Union3, the
three elections were marred by serious malpractices, absence of a level playing field, intimidation and
harassment of candidates and voters, manipulation of laws to favour some candidates, brutalisation of the
opposition by state functionaries, and falsification of results. The government has ignored constructive
recommendations aimed at improving the conduct of elections, including those made by the Supreme Court
in 2001 and 2006. Ugandas courts of law have not helped matters by their insistence on the substantiality
of electoral malpractices as measured by their impact on the outcome, as opposed to the credibility of
electoral processes.
2.4 Main Players in the Elections
Over 46 Ugandans expressed interest in the presidency. At the time of picking nomination forms, presidential
candidates were required to pay UGX 8,000,000 as nomination fees. The figure was later increased to UGX
20,000,000 following several amendments to electoral laws that Parliament passed late in the process. This
abrupt increase of nomination fees was widely criticised as partly responsible for the high dropout rate of
presidential aspirants. The Electoral Commission eventually nominated eight candidates who fulfilled all
the requirements. One was eventually rejected for delayed payment.
Four political parties that fronted candidates for president: Gen. Yoweri Museveni for National Resistance
Movement (NRM); Dr. Kiiza Besigye for Forum for Democratic Change (FDC); Benon Biraro for Farmers
1
2
3
14
The History of Bunyoro, 1976/www.britannica.com/place/Bunyoro.

DEMGroup Final Observation Reports of 2006 and 2011.
The European Union final Observation Reports of 2006 and 2011.
Party (FP); and Dr. Abed Bwanika for Peoples Development Party(PDP). The other four candidates run
as independents: Joseph Mabirizi, Maureen Kyalya, Prof. Venansius Baryamureba, and Rt. Hon. Amama
Mbabazi.
2.5 The Presidential Debates
Whereas presidential debates were not a new development having been previously organised in 2011,
2006, and 1996 general elections, in 2016, the incumbent President Museveni participated in the second
of two debates. The Elders Forum of Uganda, the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda, and the National
Consultative Forum organized the debates on 15 January and 10 February 2016, respectively. The objective
of the debates was to demonstrate collaborative efforts for an equal, tolerant, and harmonious society
necessary for a peaceful election in Uganda. According to Justice James Ogoola:4
The debate will provide the public with a platform to engage their leaders on their political
manifestos and vision for Uganda, thereby enhancing accountability in leadership. It is our
belief that tolerance for diverse views, exemplified through this debate, is an indicator of
political maturity, which is a cornerstone for the sustainable development of Uganda.
The expected outcomes of the debates were: (a) Increased clarity on manifestos and vision as presented
by the presidential candidates; (b) Increased sense of national unity and peaceful coexistence; (c) A
more informed electorate that focuses on key issues; and (d) Increased sense of tolerance and deepened
democratic governance in Uganda.
The first debate focused on the economy, social service delivery, governance, peace and security while
the second focused on trade and investment, foreign policy, regional integration, foreign currency and
foreign reserves, population, and demographic issues. The live televised debates were watched by a large
number of people in Uganda and overseas. The debates provided citizens an opportunity to listen to their
prospective leaders articulate their plans for the nation.
2.6 Role of Political Parties
The elections of 1962, 1980, 2006, 2011 and 2016 were held under a multi-party dispensation, while
the elections of 1996 and 2001 were held under the Movement or no party system which emphasized
individual merit.
From 1986 to 2005, political parties were prohibited from carrying out activities beyond operating their
head offices. This not only denied citizens the right to freely associate politically; it also affected the growth
of political parties and eroded their capacity to organise and compete effectively since the restoration of the
multi-party system. This has stunted the development of a democratic culture and undermined citizens
confidence in multi-party politics.
In an effort to foster dialogue and promote mutual understanding among political parties, the National
Consultative Forum was established under the Political Parties and Organisations Act 2005. The Act
provides for government support and funding to political parties as approved by Parliament. However, the
full benefits of the forum are yet to be realised.
Moreover, ruling parties have since the 1980s gained a reputation for treating the opposition as enemies
rather than legitimate competitors or even partners. Today as in the past, opposition parties generally
operate under severe constraints. With limited space to thrive, few opportunities for dialogue with the
government, and feeble efforts at mutual accommodation between the ruling and opposition parties, the
survival of multi-partyism is under existential threat.
4
Justice Ogola was Chairperson of the organising committee that included the Elders Forum of Uganda (TEFU), National Consultative Council
and the Inter-religious Council of Uganda (IRCU).
15
Uganda riot policemen pass by an injured protester during clashes in Kampala on February 16th, 2016.
Photo by Reuters
2.7 Unstable Politics, Militarisation of Elections, and Insecurity

Ugandas winner takes it all electoral system creates a situation where opposition votes are regarded
as wasted. Proportional representation in key government positions would go a long way to reduce
polarisation as well as post-election tension and conflict. Notwithstanding the return to a multi-party
system following the referendum of 2005, the legacy of individual merit which was the basis of political
contestation during the Movement system remains strong. Many politicians participate in the political
process as independents but with leanings to particular political parties. Many would have broken away
from their original parties due to internal disagreements. Independents do often run for political office
in competition with candidates standing on tickets of the very parties they are aligned to. Apart from
undermining intra-party unity, party-oriented independents pose a threat both to party flag bearers by
splitting votes and to multi-partyism as a whole.
Uganda was in political turmoil for long spells since independence from Britain in 1962 because leaders
relied more on militarism rather than the will of the people. Examples include the 1966 attack on Mengo
palace by Obote, the 1971 coup by Idi Amin, the 1979 liberation war by the Uganda National Liberation
Army, and the 1980-1986 bush war by the National Resistance Army. Militarism in Ugandas politics has
created a belief that it is useless to elect a leader who does not command military might. Elections have
in turn been militarised with the police, army, and different security agencies assuming an elevated role.
Many in the electorate perceive the army and security forces as instruments of coercion available to those
in power and their allies.
The removal of presidential term limits bred fears that some might resort to unconstitutional means
to change government. This fear has led to the enactment of repressive laws such as the Public Order
Management Act 2013 and the Political Parties and Organisations Act that have curtailed basic rights
and freedoms to associate, assemble, demonstrate, seek financial support for political activities,5 and to
participate in initiatives that promote democracy and good governance.
5
Political Parties and Organisations Act 2005. The Act provides for regulating and financing of political parties, their formation, registration,
membership and organization under articles 71,72 and 73 of the constitution
16
The framers of the 1995 constitution were cognisant of the negative aspects associated with leaders
overstaying in power and provided for a limit of two terms of five years for occupants of the office of
the president. This was in accordance with the will of the people who had been widely consulted on this
matter. The legal and parliamentary committee of the seventh Parliament presented a report to Parliament
recommending the removal of presidential term limits, thereby paving the way for a sitting president to
seek re-election until the age of 75.
2.8 Rule of Law and Power of Incumbency
The 1995 Constitution provides for and gives effect to fundamental rights and freedoms that are crucial
to the integrity of elections. These include freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and movement.
A legitimate constitutional order requires that all laws are consistent with these fundamental rights and
responsibilities. On the contrary, there has been a raft of laws that have negated these fundamental rights
and promoted short-term benefits for those who hold power.6
Ugandas Constitution generally vests a disproportionate amount of power in the president who combines
roles as head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and appointing authority for members
of the judiciary, Electoral Commission and several other public offices. Some argue that this erodes the
independence of the holders of these offices and tends to skew the playing field in favour of the incumbent.
Ugandas governance system allows a sitting president to use national resources and to control and direct
public finances and security forces for electioneering. This accords incumbents excessive advantage over
their competitors and is believed to have an influence on the outcome of elections.
2.9 Demand for Electoral Reforms
Civil society organisations conducted nationwide consultations in 2014 and compiled the Citizens
Compact which contained peoples views on and preferences for the 2016 elections. The compact followed
the Citizens Manifesto of 2011 which also emerged from a civil society-led campaign to bring the peoples
priorities to the fore in the 2011 elections. The Citizens Compact outlined a number of reforms that
needed to be addressed to ensure genuine democracy in Uganda. Several of the issues raised focused on
electoral reforms. However, the compact was disregarded by the government and MPs, thereby blocking
the path to meaningful reform of the countrys electoral system and democratic culture.
2.10 State of Political Parties and Internal Democracy
Political parties in Uganda are still very weak. Policy positions are not clear and it is difficult to distinguish
one party from another based on policy. Inter-party competition is therefore based on personalities rather
than ideology. Value systems are weak with no clear disciplinary measures against errant behavior among
members, which breeds vices such as bribery, violence and intimidation. When it comes to the ruling
party, there is a fusion of party and state structures leading to abuse of the latter for political motives.
Financial accountability during elections is rudimentary or non-existent as some parties do not have books
of accounts. Since strong political parties form an important pillar of a functional democracy, there is a dire
need to build the capacities of political parties across the board with special emphasis on identity, values,
ethics, gender equity, inter-party relations, structures and systems, and leadership, among other things.
Uganda has 29 registered political parties but only a handful managed to field presidential candidates.
Political parties that presented candidates for president went through an internal selection process. For the
NRM, Musevenis positioning as a sole candidate was crafted during a party parliamentary caucus retreat
in Kyankwanzi in 2015. Party legislators signed a document as confirmation of approval of Musevenis
sole candidature though it is claimed that some did so against their will. The NRM also conducted primary
elections for the rest of the elective positions for MPs and Local Council leaders. The elections of flag
bearers for parliament and local government positions were marred by serious malpractices such as voter
bribery, violence, and intimidation.
6
The Presidential Elections Amendment Act 2015, The Public Order Management Act, Political Parties and Organisations Act 2005 as Amended,
The Public Finance Management Act 2015as Amended.
17
FDC conducted elections for the presidential flag bearer in a contest between Gen. (rtd) Mugisha Muntu
and Col. (rtd) Dr. Kiiza Besigye. The two campaigned country-wide in a contest that was characterized
by mudslinging and bad blood between Hon. Nandala Mafabi and Gen. Muntu who were competing to be
party president. On 9 September 2015 the election for the FDCs 2016 presidential flag bearer took place
at Mandela National Stadium. Dr. Kiiza Besigye won the hotly contested race. Internal party primaries for
MPs and other leaders at local government leaders were also conducted in the respective constituencies
all over the country.
Compared to the process that its major rival, the FDC, went through in selecting its presidential flag bearer,
the NRM closed off the space for internal competition, hence falling short of the required principles of
internal democracy in political parties and other standards of electoral democracy. Other minor political
parties notably Farmers Party which fronted Maj. (rtd) Benon Biraro and Peoples Progressive Party which
fronted Dr. Abed Bwanika conducted low-key delegates conferences that passed without controversy.
Candidates Maureen Kyalya, Prof. Venancious Baryamureba, and Joseph Mabirizi fulfilled the conditions
for nomination as independent presidential candidates. They campaigned in various parts of the country
amidst monumental logistical and organizational challenges.
In the run up to the elections, a pressure group called The Democratic Alliance (TDA) sprung up. TDA was
a mechanism for opposition parties to field a single presidential candidate. The parties, however, failed to
reach a compromise on key issues, thus leading to the collapse of the alliance, a failure that some would
argue helped strengthen the NRMs position.
Although parties have made significant strides towards internal democracy, they remain riddled with
factionalism. A few months to nomination of presidential candidates, former Prime Minister John Patrick
Amama Mbabazi declared that he would challenge the presumptive NRM flag bearer. He eventually opted
against competing on the NRM ticket and set up his own platform known as Go Forward.
Within Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), the struggle for the partys leadership between the incumbent
Olara Otunnu and Hon. Jimmy Akena caused a deep rift within the party. The party was so weakened that it
failed to field a presidential candidate, which caused some party members to rally behind Mbabazi.
The Democratic Party (DP) also faced internal challenges. During the elections for the partys president
general, several members wanted the current president, Norbert Mao, out of the partys leadership. Maos
leaning towards Mbabazi in the TDA also led to divisions among party members, some of whom wanted to
see the party field its own presidential candidate. Those who disagreed with the party position decided to
compete for the other political posts as independent candidates.
2.11 Conclusion
The 2016 elections took place against the backdrop of a tense yet unpredictable environment that was
characterised by deep-seated mistrust of the Electoral Commission, impartial security agencies, and
weakening rule of law. Until mechanisms are established that provide for a truly free and transparent
process for choosing leaders, citizens will take longer to enjoy the fruits of genuine democracy.
18
CHAPTER 3
The Legal and Administrative

Framework for Elections
19
3.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with an overview of the legislative environment in which the 2016 elections took place
and then explores the details of the legal framework and standards for the conduct of elections in Uganda.
It discusses the laws under which the 2016 general elections were conducted and which guided CEONUs assessment. There are a number of areas suggested for reform in Ugandas electoral laws. Some entail
amendment of certain laws and others outright abolishment of some of the laws.
A constant issue of concern prior to the 2016 general elections was the enactment of laws widely regarded
as restrictive of the enjoyment of fundamental human rights such as those of association and expression as
well as the right to media and information. These restrictions arise from the Public Order and Management
Act (POMA) 2013. This law, considered draconian in as far as it limits the freedom of association, requires
that a meeting of three or more people must be approved by an authorized police officer or the Inspector
General of Police. Pre-election observer reports whose findings are herein contained show that public
order law was extensively used to curtail opposition party activities in a way that disadvantaged the
oppositions political objectives.
Other laws that came into place prior to the elections and are restrictive of the enjoyment of basic human
rights are the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Act, 2015. This law curtails the operations of civil
society organizations (CSOs) in as far as it accords the Minister of Internal Affairs considerable powers to
license and de-license NGOs. It is argued that the government is suspicious of NGO activities some of which
are considered to run parallel to governments objectives. For example, in November 26, 2015 the Electoral
Commission threatened to ban a voter education campaign by a national coalition Citizens Coalition for
Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU).The electoral commission had banned what it termed as a biased
voter education TOPOWA Campaign. A letter dated November 26 2015 addressed to the government argued
that some of the voter education messages being disseminated were anti-NRM and, therefore, partisan. The
Topowa Campaign was a voter mobilization campaign that was meant to encourage Ugandans to turn-out
in large numbers and vote. The campaign encouraged Ugandans not to accept bribes and to vote for leaders
who would deliver better services. Fears abound that the NGO Act will be used to restrict the operations of
NGOs especially CSOs which carry out civic and voter education initiatives around the country.
The Computer Use Act, 2011 was meant to regulate computer usage by citizens. However, it has been
castigated for granting the government power to determine what citizens can post online especially on
social media platforms. Robert Shaka was with charged, among other offences, posting information, which
according to the police, undermined national security. This law is viewed as yet as another tool available to
the government to control civic action.
Towards the end of 2015, Parliament hurriedly enacted a couple of new laws and amendments in preparation
for the 2016 general elections. Primary among the laws enacted were the changes in the presidential and
parliamentary elections Acts which were respectively amended to increase presidential nomination fees
from UGX 8,000,000 to UGX 20,000,000 and parliamentary nomination fees from UGX 200,000 to UGX
3,000,000. This hiking of nomination fees was condemned by some as being out of tune with the economic
circumstances of most Ugandans who would be denied the right to contest for leadership positions because
of the exorbitant fees.
20
The Presidential Elections Act 2005, was also amended to limit the geographical scope that presidential
candidates had to cover during campaigns. Previously, candidates were required to campaign in all districts.
However, the amendment reduced that requirement to a minimum of two-thirds of all districts. This was a
progressive development in view of the fact that there has been a steep rise in the number of districts from
72 to 112 when the law was enacted to 112 by the end of 2015. Having to traverse all these districts would
have imposed an unrealistic burden on candidates. The other significant reform was the alteration of the
time of closure of polling stations from 5:00 pm to 4:00 pm. The decision to shorten the voting time was
criticized because of the potential to disenfranchise some citizens given past experiences of late delivery
of polling materials.
3.2 Legal Framework and Proposed Electoral Reforms

Uganda has ratified and/or signed and is bound by a number of international and regional instruments on
elections.1 The election- related obligations arising from the aforementioned instruments have in several
instances been codified and are now reflected in national law and the Constitution.2An assessment of
Ugandas electoral laws portrays an overall compliance with international standards, at least on paper.
Nevertheless, concerns about the misapplication of these laws have been made.3
In the months prior to the 2016 general elections, building on past initiatives, stakeholders in the electoral
process came up with several proposed electoral reforms which were tabled before Parliament for
consideration. The hope was that they would be adopted into law in a bid to strengthen electoral legislation
to guarantee free and fair elections. These wide-ranging proposals came from civil society and political
parties, but Parliament adopted almost none of the suggested electoral reforms.4
Key proposals for electoral reforms included:
3.2.1 Restoration of Presidential Terms Limits

In the run-up to the 2016 general elections, several voices called for the restoration of the two five-year
term limits which was abolished by an amendment to the 1995 Constitution in 2005.5 Proponents of the
presidential term limits see it as a means to prevent possibilities of life presidency, which undermines
key democratic principles. Presidential term limits are therefore seen as a basic tenet of democracy.
The restoration of presidential term limits calls for an amendment of article 105 (2) of the Constitution.
Electoral reform advocacy towards this objective has so far been unsuccessful. At present the only bar to
life presidency is the constitutional provision setting the age limit for a presidential candidate at 75 years.6
3.2.2 Independence of the Electoral Commission
There are serious doubts and relentless questions about the independence and overall integrity of the
Electoral Commission. As such, for years, there has been a recurring call for reform of the laws establishing
and governing the operations of the Electoral Commission. Calls for reform include instituting a more
transparent and participatory process of appointment of members of the Electoral Commission.
It has been recommended, for instance, that the president appoint the chairperson and the commissioners
from nominations by the Judicial Service Commission. The current position in regard to this concern as
enunciated in article 60 (1) of the Constitution empowers the president to appoint the chairperson and
commissioners with the approval of Parliament. Proponents of the reform have suggested that the current
appointment procedure makes the office bearers vulnerable to patronage by the president. To this end,
the chairperson and commissioners of the Electoral Commission are perceived as being susceptible to
manipulation by the appointing authority.
1
Uganda has ratified the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) 10th May 1986; including the Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa, 22nd July 2010; The African Union Convention on preventing and Combating Corruption, 31st May 2004; The African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance, which entered into force in 2012 was signed but has not yet been ratified. Uganda has also committed to the Declaration
on the principles Governing democratic elections in Africa (Durban Declaration).Uganda has ratified the African Charter for Human and Peoples
Rights (ACHPR) 10th May 1986; including the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, 22nd July 2010; The African Union Convention on preventing and Combating Corruption, 31st May 2004; The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which entered into force in 2012
was signed but has not yet been ratified. Uganda has also committed to the Declaration on the principles Governing democratic elections in Africa
(Durban Declaration).
2
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda is the primary law in Uganda; it has provisions in governing elections. The constitutional provisions on
elections are buttressed by statute law contained in: The Presidential Elections Act No.16 of 2005 as amended, The Parliamentary Elections Act No.17
of 2005 as amended, The Local Governments Act 1997 as amended, The Electoral Commission Act Cap. 243, The Political parties and Organizations
Act No. 18 of 2005, The National Women Council Act cap 318, the National Youth Council Act Cap 319 and the regulations under these laws.
Margaret SekaggyaUganda management of elections A study by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa at p. 3.
The push for electoral reforms was prominent in the period leading to the 2016 general elections. Prominent among the advocacy initiatives
undertaken was a campaign termed the Free and fair elections campaign which was a joint initiative by Political parties and civil society aimed at
pushing for electoral reforms before the 2016 general elections. The outcome of the campaign is a document called The Citizens compact on free
and fair elections which contains electoral reform proposals arising from consultations with over 5000 citizens.
5
The abolition of term limits in Uganda is alleged to have been effected by Parliamentarians with an inducement of Uganda Shillings Five Million
having been given to the Parliamentarians by President Museveni.
6
Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda as amended
3
4
21
Appointment of commissioners after vetting by the Judicial Service Commission is seen as a more guaranteed
way of cushioning the Commission from interference and influence. This is considered the surest way to
guarantee the independence and integrity of the Electoral Commission. Additional suggestions to enhance
the integrity of the Electoral Commission include increasing the security of tenure of the commissioners
and staff to shield them from corruption and other unethical practices.
The Electoral Commission Chairman, Eng. Dr. Badru Kigundu (centre) and his commissioners at a press conference on
20th February 2016 to explain delayed delivery of voting materials in Kampala and Wakiso.
3.2.3 Funding of the Electoral Commission

It is recommended that the Electoral Commission be funded directly from the governments Consolidated
Fund rather than having its funds channeled through the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development as it is presently. It is believed that independent funding will expedite funding of the
Electoral Commissions work and tame the recurrent problem of receiving funds late resulting in delayed
implementation of activities. It is also believed that independent funding will give the Electoral Commission
the leverage it needs to solicit proportionate funding for its programmes. Inadequate funding has forced
the Electoral Commission to delegate some of its core roles like that of voter education.
3.2.4 Codifying the Duties and Powers of the Electoral Commission
It has been recommended that the roles, duties, and powers of the Electoral Commission should be better
defined by the law through enactment of relevant regulations or by amending existing legislation. As it
stands, the very generic nature of the laws in which the powers and duties of the Electoral Commission are
enshrined are a source of confusion in the administration of elections. For example, it was evident in the
just concluded elections that because of the lack of clearly defined roles, there were incidents where state
organs such as the police and the army appeared to overstep their mandate. This arose largely because the
laws in place do not go a step farther to describe in sufficient detail the duties of the Electoral Commission.
The Electoral Commission, therefore, finds itself legally unable to restrain other state agencies from
assuming its roles and duties leading to potential abuses of power by these agencies.
3.2.5 Improving Voter Registration
22
The issue of voter registration remains contentious to date. In the months preceding the 2016 general
elections, there were pleas for reforms in the method of compiling the national voter register whose
authenticity is key for the conduct of free and fair elections. According to article 61 (1) (e) of the Constitution,
the Electoral Commission is responsible for the compilation, maintenance, revision, and update of the
voter register. Some proposals on how to ensure the authenticity of the voter register advised the Electoral
Commission to retire the old and generate a new one from existing information databases possessed by
government institutions like the Uganda National Bureau of statistics.7Government adopted the suggestion
albeit with the modification that the register would be compiled from citizens details that had been
collected from 2014 to 2015 for national identification cards. The extraction of the national voter register
from the National Security Information System (NSIS) data had its own challenges. There were questions
about the legality of using NSIS data as there was no enabling law allowing the Electoral Commission to
extract this data for voting purposes.
Whereas this issue was resolved with the enactment of the Registration of Persons Act (2015) and the
National Registrations Act (2015), it raised additional concerns about the authenticity of the NSIS data.
For example, there were reports that foreign nationals had been erroneously registered as Ugandan
citizens.8 As such, the use of NSIS data as the basis for the national voter register was unacceptable to
some stakeholders. Election observation by CEON-U as will be subsequently detailed in this report shows
incidents of disenfranchisement of voters arising from errors made during the NSIS process being carried
forward to the national voter register.
The case of a prominent politician, Norbert Mao, is only one example. Maos name did not appear on
the national voter register because he had not registered for the national ID under the NSIS process.
Consequently he could not be nominated to contest as a candidate for the Gulu Municipality seat on the
Democratic Party ticket.
3.2.6 Controls on Campaign Spending
There is a growing demand to introduce campaign spending caps for all elective positions. Proponents of
this proposal believe that it will contain the commercialization of politics which refers to the use of money
by candidates to win over voters. This tends to tilt the political playing field in favour of candidates who
have the most money to spend on campaigns. There is presently no legislation in place to control campaign
expenses by political parties and candidates. The enactment of campaign financing laws is expected to help
in taming a practice that is increasingly blamed for watering down the quality of elections in Uganda.
3.2.7 The Role of Security Agencies in Elections
There needs to be a clear definition of the role of security agencies in elections, particularly that of the
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), the national army.9 Section 42 of the UPDF Act 2005 mandates the
military to assist a civil power such as the police whenever the circumstances necessitate its involvement.
This is a provision of the law that has seemingly been misused leading to accusations of the intrusion
of the UPDF into matters that do not require their intervention such as elections. To narrow down the
current overly expansive interpretation of the UPDFs powers under this provision, it has been proposed
that section 42 of the UPDF Act be amended to include clear and specific benchmarks and principles that
define the extent to which the UPDF is to be involved in managing election-related security.
3.2.8 Election Dispute Resolution
The Presidential Elections Act, 2005 and its attendant regulations govern the process of disputing the
results of a presidential election. A controversy underlying presidential election petitions is the standard
of proof required of a petitioner under the law.
Section 59 of the Presidential Elections Act 2005, provides the grounds that an aggrieved petitioner must
prove to convince the Supreme Court to nullify the results of a presidential election. These grounds are that:
Citizens Coalition For Electoral Democracy in Uganda Citizens Electoral Reform agenda Handbook p.3.
Citizens Coalition For Electoral Democracy in Uganda Does the Mass ID Enrollment Exercise Guarantee an accurate Voters register?: a report
from the observation survey of the National ID registration Exercise August 2014 from pages 36- 39.
9
The Uganda National NGO forum The citizens compact for free and fair elections at p.16 bullet point 15.5.
7
8
23
(i) a presidential candidate was at the time of his or her nomination not qualified by law to be nominated
as a presidential candidate; (ii) a presidential candidate has personally or by authorized agent been guilty
of committing an electoral offence; and (iii) there has been non-compliance by the Electoral Commission
in the management of the elections.
In regard to the third ground, the most contentious aspect is the standard of proof required. A petitioner is
required to prove not only the fact that there was non-compliance with the law in the management of the
elections but that the non-compliance affected the election result in a substantial manner. Per the dictum
of then Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki who presided over the first ever presidential election petition in
2006, an attempt was made to elaborate as to what the court would deem as elections being substantially
affected.
Justice Odoki observed that the court needed to employ two tests: qualitative and quantitative. That is, if
there is evidence of non-compliance, it implies that the qualitative aspect of the election has, in the first
plcae, been compromised. However, the qualitative damage must of necessity also be gauged by the extent to
which it quantitatively affects
the outcome of the elections
in terms of number of votes
obtained by the petitioner
versus
those
garnered
by the respondent.10 All
presidential
election
petitions so far witnessed
in Uganda, including the
recently concluded one
by John Patrick Amama
Mbabazi vs. Yoweri Kaguta
have
been
Museveni,11
dismissed on account that
the petitioners did not
produce evidence to prove
that the non-compliance in
managing the elections by
the Electoral Commission
affected the elections in a Interparty Liaison Committees were meant to spearhead dispute resolution within
communities
substantial manner.
Critics of the substantiality test argue that what the court ought to consider is not whether there is
substantiality in the illegality but merely whether there was an illegality in the management of the elections.
It is argued that gauging the extent to which the illegality affected the extent of the election is wrong as it
sets the legal bar of proof too high for the petitioner. On the other hand, supporters of this measure of proof
as well as jurisprudence in other countries point to the fact that the courts are in favor of the substantiality
test because they are mindful that there will never be a perfect election. Nevertheless, stakeholders seem
to agree that there is a need for dialogue about the substantiality test and the general legal reforms to
figure out the way forward.
3.2.9 Administration of Elections
The Electoral Commission is set up by article 60 of the Constitution which authorizes it to conduct and
supervise all elections and referenda in Uganda. The powers and duties of the commission are better spelt
out in the Electoral Commission Act of 1997.
10
11
24
Col (RTD) Dr. Kizza Besigye vs Museveni Yoweri Kaguta and the Electoral Commission Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2001.
John Patrick Amama Mbabazi vs Museveni Yoweri Kaguta and the Electoral Commission Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2016.
In preparation for the 2016 general elections, the Electoral Commission developed a strategic plan
three years in advance. Key amongst its plans was to limit the logistical failures that marred previous
elections by ensuring early procurement of election materials. Other important targets in the plan were
the adoption of the use of a biometric voter register for the 2016 general elections, the development of
clear guidelines and procedure for all election processes, as well as the implementation of timely civic and
voter education.
The management of the 2016 general elections involved 112 Districts Returning Officers, 112 Assistant
Returning Officers, and 12 Regional Election Officers responsible for coordinating between the headquarters
in Kampala and the officers in charge of electoral affairs in the districts. All these are permanent staff of the
Commission. The Commission appointed 1,403 and 7,431 sub-county and parish supervisors, respectively,
on short-term contracts to support the management team in running the 2016 general elections.
The Electoral Commission shared its strategic plan early enough and sought to engage stakeholders.
Although there were positive aspects, the commission still encountered many challenges in preparing for
the elections.
On the positive side, election materials were generally procured in time. Stakeholders were also invited
to witness some of these procurement processes such as the printing of ballot papers. The Electoral
Commission funded the trips of civil society representatives who witnessed first-hand the printing of
ballot papers in South Africa. The late introduction of the Biometric Voter Verification System and Voter
Location Slips (only weeks to the election) had prompted concerns about potential failures especially of
the biometric system as witnessed in other countries. Yet, apart from a few reported failures on Election
Day, the biometric technology the Commission employed to identify voters on the voter register generally
functioned well - a resounding success story of use of such technology in Africa.
Despite the aforementioned successes, the Electoral Commission continued to grapple with other challenges
before, during, and after the polls. Save for a few critical aspects such as the printing of ballots which the
commission allowed key stakeholders to witness, the commission was generally not transparent in the
conduct of its processes throughout the electoral period. For example, the process of election observation
accreditation proved a huge challenge for many observers.
For a change, the accreditation of observers was decentralized to all districts except for Kampala, Mukono,
and Wakiso which was done centrally in Kampala. Whereas the decentralisation seemed a good idea as it
brought the process close to the people and therefore made it cheaper and more expedient, coordination
between the district offices and the headquarters was poor. There was no clear information on where the
accreditation was to take place. Some observers seeking accreditation were forced to travel back and forth
between Kampala and their districts. Besides, the security screening conducted prior to accreditation was
in some instances biased and used as a cover to weed out observers perceived as unfavourable to some
candidates or parties.
The Electoral Commission performed poorly too in voter education. Most of the voter education work was
led by CSOs that the Commission accredited for that purpose. The Commission also failed to issue clear
guidelines on election processes despite this having been set as a target in its strategic plan for the 2016
general elections. Various candidates were confused about the procedures to follow such as with regard to
campaigns schedules.
The creation of new counties by Parliament necessitated adding more constituencies that brought
the number from 238 to 290. This resulted in wide discrepancies in population size among open-seat
constituencies, which violated the principle of equality of the vote as recommended by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR).
25
The average size of a constituency in Uganda is 52,680 voters. However, constituencies vary massively in size
ranging from Ik County (about 2,000 voters) to Nakawa Division (more than 208,000 voters).12International
principles of one person, one vote mean that the weight of each persons vote should be essentially the
same.
According to article 25 of ICCPR: The principle of one person, one vote, must apply, and within the framework
of each States electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another.Moreover,
according to the Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters13, the deviation in number
of voters in each constituency compared to the average sized constituency should seldom exceed 10
percent and never 15 percent, except in very exceptional circumstances.
In Uganda, only a fraction of the constituencies fall within the range stipulated by the Venice Commission.14
For instance, only 78 constituencies (27%) are within 15% of the average sized constituency; and only 56
constituencies (19%) are within 10% of the average sized constituency. Comparison by political region
gives a sense of what political/electoral impact these discrepancies could have. Karamoja is the strongest
region in terms of voting power, and Central region (including Kampala) is the weakest. Interesting
highlights from CEON-Us analysis reveal that:
The strongest 26% (77) of constituencies have as much combined voting power as the rest of
the 74% (213);
Top 10 strongest constituencies have as much voter power as the weakest 101 constituencies
combined;
A voter in the smallest constituency (Ik County) has 25 times more voting power than the
average sized constituency and 101 times the voting power of a voter in the largest constituency
(Nakawa Division);and
Ik County has more voting power than the weakest 45 constituencies combined.
Finally, whereas the adoption of a new voter register for the 2016 general elections was in tune with
prior demands by stakeholders, as earlier above reported, the lack of consultations with political parties,
candidates, civil society, and the media over the change in voter registration system and especially the
method used to develop the register led to widespread criticism and doubts over its authenticity. Also,
the time allowed for update and display of the register was limited, a situation that was compounded by
insufficient voter information about the update and display.
3.2 Conclusion
Although the electoral legal framework that was in place for the 2016 general elections largely complied
with international norms, weaknesses and failures in implementation watered it down significantly. The
government is largely to blame for the failure to enact the requisite electoral reforms that would have
substantially improved the qualitative outcomes of the elections.
The Electoral Commission has a lot to do to redeem its image and to restore public confidence in its ability
to deliver free and fair elections. While the Commission can go a long way to rehabilitate its reputation
by improving the administration of elections, the onus is on the government to initiate and implement
the fundamental electoral reforms that have been presented for its consideration, including legislation
that governs the very composition of the Electoral Commission. As earlier mentioned, existing gaps in the
legal framework setting up the Commission have undermined its independence - from the appointment
process of the members and commissioners to funding. Legal reform is necessary to cure these problems
so as to ensure the ability of the Electoral Commission to efficiently administer elections and referenda
in Uganda.
The smaller the number of registered voters in a constituency, the more relative voting power that constituency has in electing its parliamentary representative.
13
Venice, The Commissions guidance only applies to Europe and Eurasia, but it offers useful benchmarks for global application, p. 7: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx.
14
12
26
CHAPTER 4
The Pre-Election Environment
27
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The National Voter Registration Process and Updates
Article 61 (e) of the 1995 Constitution mandates the Electoral Commission to compile, maintain, revise, and
update the voter register. However, since the 1996 general elections, scrutiny of the register has revealed
a host of flaws ranging from illegitimate voters on the roll to legitimate ones missing.
In 2001, the National Voters Register emerged as one of
the most contentious components of that election. The
concerns about the register then largely revolved around
its integrity, comprehensiveness, and cleanliness. On one
hand, the register was found to contain ghost voters while,
on the other, eligible voters who had duly registered found
their names omitted from the final register.1
Going into the 2006 elections, the Electoral Commission
took steps to create a photographic voter register and by
the 2011 elections the aim was to build a fully biometric
register. In the run-up to the 2011 general elections, the
commission undertook an extensive exercise to clean up
the register by entering new voters onto the voter database
as well updating the information on existing voters through
a procedure that included capturing their biometric
features such as fingerprints. A total of 3.8 million voters
were added to the register through this exercise; but it
did not entirely eliminate the problem of so-called ghost
voters the underage and non-citizens as was later
discovered during the 2011 general elections.
Denis Tuape shows off his National Identity Card at

Kololo East Primary School at a function to roll out
the project on15/7/2013. Photo by Matthias Mugisha
After the 2011 elections, CSOs together with political parties called for the amendment of the Constitution
and other related laws to provide for synchronisation and extraction of voter information from the NSIS
database. This was because the then proposed national ID system had an integrated secure central
information repository with citizens data on birth, marriage, adoption, and death. This was seen as
a more reliable and inclusive database from which the Electoral Commission would constantly and
effectively update the voter register. It was also clear that the new voter register extracted from the
national ID database would provide for the availability of more comprehensive voter information such
as contact address, family line, and a unique identification number, among others. The intention was to
create a platform for a more transparent voter register with a wide range of checks built-in to guarantee
its authenticity and credibility.
4.3 The NSIS Mass Enrolment Exercise
The multi-agency National Security Information Systems (NSIS) was established in 2013 to serve a dual
role of registering Ugandans for issuance of national identity cards and creating a broad database for use
by the different agencies seeking comprehensive data on Ugandans. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was
mandated as the lead agency for the data collection. The NSIS targeted Ugandans of 16 years and above.
The Electoral Commission was a central player in the NSIS process. Clause 65 (2) of the Registration of
Persons Act, 2015 allows the commission to use the information contained in the national ID register to
compile, maintain, revise, and update the voter register.
1
28
See ruling in the Kizza Besigye vs Yoweri Museveni and the Electoral Commission, Constitutional Petition No.1 2001.
The NSIS mass enrollment exercise took place between April and August 2014 at each of the 8,000 parishes
in Uganda. The residual registration continued till January 2015 at the sub-county level.
The exercise was in its initial stages beset by poorly trained staff, malfunctioning equipment, and low
enthusiasm from Ugandans. It also faced intense criticism over its independence and the integrity of the
data. Of particular concern was the leadership role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was headed then
by the late Gen. Aronda Nyakairima, former Chief of Defense Forces.
CCEDU, a member of CEON-U, observed the NSIS registration, looking out particularly to those areas of the
project the Electoral Commission would use to develop the national voters register. CCEDU deployed 360
observers equipped with GPS systems and Outdoor Data Kits in 30 districts across the country to observe
the registration.
Findings from the observation pointed out the following key concerns:
Lack of a clear legal framework under which the NSIS mass enrollment exercise was undertaken
undermined the credibility of the process. Efforts to explain the legal framework were inadequate. The
guiding law, the Registration of Persons Act, 2015 was not in place by the time the exercise started.
The exercise was beset by poor turn up in the initial days. Inadequate and often times malfunctioning
equipment was a major drawback. At the beginning, staff was also inadequately prepared both
technically and professionally, though significant improvements had been registered by the end of the
first phase.
Government targeted to capture data for 16 million Ugandans of 16 years and above. At the end of
the exercise, the Minister for Internal Affairs announced that the target had been achieved, thereby
justifying the decision not to extend the registration period. However, CCEDUs observation of the
NSIS process indicates a lower figure of citizens registered during the process. CCEDUs statistical
analysis during its observation of the process which took into consideration the time frame provided
by the government for the registration of citizens presented that working at its maximum without any
glitches, the government could statistically have registered up to only 14,018,800. CCEDU, however,
observed that the government faced challenges in conducting the registration exercise specifically that
the NSIS registration machines were fully functional in only 64.32% of the registration centres. Having
this statistic considered, CCEDU observed that the actual number of citizens registered would be no
more than 9,016, 892.
4.4 Unresolved Questions about the National Voters Register
The Electoral Commission began updating the National Voters Register (NVR) in April/May 2015. The
target was to capture information on Ugandans who had missed out on the NSIS mass enrollment, confirm
and correct individuals details, remove those who are ineligible for enrollment (the underage, noncitizens, and the dead).
In June 2015 the Electoral Commission displayed the register to give the public an opportunity to identify
for removal any illegitimate voters. In December 2015 the Commission released the updated register with
15.3 million Ugandans. The updated register came against the backdrop of complaints by the President
General of the Democratic Party, Hon. Norbert Mao, that he had been prevented from being nominated to
contest for a parliamentary seat because his name was not on the register. This incident raised questions
about on the validity of the register.
The national population census figures estimated the national population at 34.9 million in 2015. An
estimated 70 percent of the population is below 35 years and half of these are estimated to be below 15.
Many found it questionable that more than 15 million Ugandans could be qualified to vote or 18 years and
above.
29
The transfer of data from the NSIS database to compile the NVR was guided by the Registration of Persons
Act, 2015. This Act was passed in February 2015 long after the data had been collected. Given that the
Electoral Commission Act and the Constitution mandate the Commission to compile the voter register,
critics noted that it had illegally delegated its mandate to another government agency. In so doing it
compromised its independence, thereby going against the principle of performing its functions without
the influence of any individual or institution.
4.5 The Management of Nominations
4.5.1 The Right to Participate in Elections

In addition to Ugandas Constitution, there are a number of international and regional covenants that
undergird the right of citizens to participate in elections. These include: The Universal Declaration on
Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR),
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the African Charter. The participation of citizens in the
electoral process can take many forms: Citizens may participate as voters, candidates, election observers
and in any other capacity. This section assesses the participation of citizens as candidates. It specifically
reviews the process of nominating parliamentary and presidential candidates. Of particular interest are
issues of compliance of Ugandas electoral management with national and international legislation as it
applies to the nomination of parliamentary and presidential candidates during the 2016 general elections.
4.5.2 Nomination of Candidates
Presidential candidates were nominated on 3-4 November, 2015 while the nomination of parliamentary,
municipality, and Local Council candidates took place in December 2015.
The relevant laws, that is, the Presidential Elections, Parliamentary Elections Act, and Electoral Commission
Acts were amended to guide the nomination process. The Electoral Commission revised and extended its
nomination timetable in order to accommodate changes occasioned by the amendments. Yet, some critics
interpreted the extension of nomination dates as designed to favour President Museveni who had not yet
gone through his own partys nomination procedure as the law requires.
In fact, one of the grounds of appeal that Mbabazi included in his Supreme Court petition that challenged
President Musevenis re-election was that the incumbent had violated the law governing nominations. In
Petition No. 1 of 2016, the petitioner alleged that contrary to section 11 of the Presidential Elections Act,
the Electoral Commission had failed to declare candidate Musevenis nomination papers null and void
and instead acted improperly when it extended the deadline to give him more time. This was after all
other candidates had submitted their respective documents. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Commission acted within the law. The Commission had argued that the extension was not meant to benefit
any of the presidential candidates as alleged by the petitioner.
The Electoral Commission argued in its defense that the extension of the nomination dates from 5-6 October,
2015 to 3-4 November, 2015 was intended to allow the Commission and the prospective presidential
candidates to fully comply with the newly amended provisions in the electoral laws. These amendments
included: change of voting time from 5:00pm to 4:00pm; change of nomination fees from UGX 8 million to
UGX20 million; and a new rule that required presidential candidates to campaign in a minimum of twothirds as opposed to all districts.
The Presidential Elections Act requires the Electoral Commission to issue a notice in the Uganda Gazette
appointing two days during which the nominations of candidates are to take place2. Under a multi-party
political system, candidates may be nominated by a registered political organisation or political party
sponsoring the candidate, or by a contestant standing for election as an independent candidate. Each
2
30
Section 8 of the Presidential Elections Act 2005 as amended.
candidate must attach to his nomination papers a list of names of registered voters supporting his/her
candidature; and each of those registered voters must append to that list his or her name, signature,
physical address and voter registration number as specified in the third schedule.
The Electoral Commission revised its timetable for political parties to nominate their presidential
candidates by setting aside 3 4 November 2015 in line with section 8 of the Presidential Elections Act,
2005. Immediately after the announcement, the opposition unveiled their new coalition - The Democratic
Alliance - which included various parties including Forum for Democratic Change, Democratic Party, Justice
Forum, Conservative Party, a faction of Uganda Peoples Congress, and Uganda Federal Alliance.
Opposition groups under TDA convened several meetings in which they attempted to select from amongst
them one opposition candidate who would have been fronted as the joint TDA alliance presidential
candidate for the 2016 general elections. However squabbles with TDA emerged which resulted in the
alliance members failing to agree on whether to front a single candidate or front two candidates. The
alliance was torn over which candidate to select between Dr. Warren Kizza Besigye and Go- forwards
John Patrick Amama Mbabazi. UPCs Olara Otunnu, Democratic Party, Peoples Progressive Party, Justice
Forum, and Uganda Federal Alliance endorsed Mbabazi while CP headed by Ken Lukyamuzi endorsed
FDCs Besigye. This disagreements resulted in the disintegration of the alliance and further disagreements
arose within the UPC party resulting from Olara Otunnus support for Mbabazi which UPCs then elected
new leader Jimmy Akena was against.
At the national level, the Electoral Commission registered eight presidential candidates out of nine who
sought nomination. In total, 1,343 candidates were registered at the district level for the 209 directly
elected open parliamentary seats and 406 women candidates for the 112 directly elected women district
seats.
The nomination process for parliamentary candidates happened at district level and was handled by District
Returning Officers. The Electoral Commission set aside 2- 3 December 2015 as the dates for nominating
aspirants for directly elected MPs (representing constituencies), district woman representatives, MPs for
persons with disabilities. All these nominations happened as scheduled.
The Electoral Commission deferred nominations for other special interest groups to Parliament because of
a Constitutional Court ruling3. Nomination for this group was put on hold until Parliament addressed the
concerns raised by the commission. The groups affected by the courts decision were the workers, youth,
and army representatives in Parliament.
3
In a joint ruling on Constitutional petitions: No. 378 of 2010, Kasozi Robinson vs Attorney General, No. 40 of 2010, Legal Action for Persons with
disability V Attorney general and Electoral Commission and No. 48 of 2010 Moses Mauku and Catherine Aneno, the constitutional court ruled inter
alia that the voting procedure by the different special interest groups save for the voting procedure for persons with disability were unconstitutionally developed.
31
A graph representing women who were nominated for elections by party affiliation
Requirements for nomination of MPs stipulate that an aspiring candidate shall be a citizen of Uganda and
a registered voter. The nomination shall be made by two registered voters from the constituency, who
shall appear in person before the Returning Officer and present a nomination paper filled out in duplicate
with the following: the names, age, address, and occupation of the aspiring candidate; names and address
of a person appointed as the official agent; a list of names and signatures of a minimum of 10 persons
supporting the aspirants nomination, who must be registered voters in the constituency where the
candidate is seeking nomination.
4.6 Implications of the Belated Amendment of Electoral Laws
A bill that sought to amend the presidential and parliamentary elections laws of 2005 by revising the
nomination fees payable to contest for these offices was presented to Parliament in October 2015.
Such an impromptu amendment had serious implications for the countrys democratic culture.The
introduction of new nomination fees in one month to the presidential nominations and two months to the
parliamentary nominations forced some aspiring candidates to drop out of the race. Over 40 candidates
had picked forms for the presidential race. While there is no guarantee that all were serious or intended to
follow through, it is plausible that the exorbitant fees could have discouraged some from contesting.
While every Ugandan has the right to vote and be voted into any office, the cost of participation favoured
the rich while excluding those with modest means. The 250% increment in presidential nomination fees
and 1,500% hike in for parliamentary candidates was unrealistic especially coming at such short notice.
Various stakeholders including civil society, political parties, and the judiciary expressed concern over the
late enactment of laws and its potential to undermine to the development of a truly democratic culture.
Political parties that had prepared to front candidates for all elective positions could no longer afford to do
so as a result of the change in the law. Although the Political Parties Act mandates the government to fund
parties, such funding is insufficient to facilitate their election-related activities.
4.7 Comparison of Election Nomination Fees in Africa

32
The nomination process for all elective positions in the 2016 elections was not inclusive and was a source
of concern over the manner in which the fees were hurriedly increased. In view of this, listed below are
some comparisons of nomination fees across countries:
Presidential
Ghana (2012): 10,000 Ghana Cedis (USD 5,000)
Guinea (2010) 400,000 Guinean Francs (USD 55,000)

Sierra Leone (2012): 1 million Leones (USD 225)
Benin: 15,000,000 CFA Francs, refundable if the candidate obtains at least 10% of the votes cast in
the first round (USD 25419)
Burundi: 15,000,000 Burundian Francs, refunded if the candidate earns a minimum of 5% of the
vote in the first round..(USD 25419)
Kenya: 200,000 Kenyan Shillings (USD 2,325) for men; 100,000 Kenya Shillings (USD1,160) for
women.
Cote dIvoire: Candidates pay a deposit 20 million francs that is reimbursed if candidates or lists
earn at least 10% of the national votes cast.(USD 33893)
Democratic Republic of Congo: Candidates pay a deposit of 5 million CFA that is refunded if the
candidate receives 15% of the vote (USD 8473)
Zimbabwe: USD 500
Parliamentary
Ghana (2012): 500 Ghana Cedis (USD 250)
Benin: 100,000 CFA Francs (USD 170)
Ghana (2012): 500 Cedis (USD 260)
Sierra Leone (2012): 100,000 Leones (USD 25)
South Africa4 (2009): 180,000 Rand (USD 20,000)
Burundi: 500,000 Burundian Francs per list or party list, refunded if the list earns at least 2% of
votes at the national level.(USD 847)
Kenya: 20,000 Kenyan Shillings (USD 230) for men; 15,000 Kenyan Shillings (USD 174) for women,
persons with disabilities, and youth.
Cote dIvoire: Candidates make a deposit 100,000 francs that is reimbursed if candidates or lists
earn at least 10% of the national votes cast(USD 170)
Democratic Republic of Congo: Candidates pay a deposit of 100,000 CFA that is refunded if the
candidate receives 15% of the vote.
Zimbabwe: USD 10
Senegal: Political parties and candidates participating in legislative elections pay a deposit of 20
million CFA that is refundable if the candidate or list receives 5% of votes in the first round. (USD
33893)
4.8 Conclusions and Recommendations
The nomination process for all elective positions in the 2016 elections was not inclusive and was a source
of concern over the manner in which the nomination fees were hurriedly increased. Furthermore, the
views of critical stakeholders like the National Consultative Forum which represents all registered political
parties were not taken on board. The extension of dates for the nomination of presidential candidates raised
questions about the independence of the Electoral Commission as it was widely perceived as designed to
favour the incumbent.
4
According to the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of South Africa, parties contesting for the National Assembly (lower house of parliament)
must pay a deposit of 180,000 Rand (USD 18,000). However, for the 2014 elections, this figure was increased to 200, 000 Rand (USD 20,000).
33
The new amendments that Parliament passed at the last minute negatively affected the elections. The
new laws created a great deal of confusion as they were formulated in haste and in a manner that gave the
Electoral Commission no time to internalize, publicise, and explain the implementation and its implications
on the electoral process.
The following recommendations are therefore intended to ensure that future elections are free, fair and
transparent:
1. Laws should be enacted or amended in time, at least a year to Election Day, to enable the Electoral
Commission organise the elections efficiently.
2. The ballot papers for the election of workers representatives to parliament should be printed on
serialised ballot papers to safeguard the credibility of the voting exercise.
3. The Electoral Commission should have a gazetted place where stakeholders participating in the
voting exercise can witness the tallying. This will boost the credibility of the exercise.
4. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development should undertake a due diligence of the
trade unions to allay fears that some candidates dominate the unions and it has become practically
impossible for new candidates to compete.
5. Trade unions should submit names of delegates promptly to allow Commission ample time to
update and display the register.
34
CHAPTER 5
The Conduct of Campaigns
35
5.1 Introduction
The pre-election period is a critical phase in the electoral cycle. CEON-U invested heavily in conducting a
long-term observation missions, including pre-election, to help improve the quality and integrity of the
electoral process. By engaging stakeholders on key findings from pre-election observation, CEON-U helped
in bringing the emerging concerns to the attention of stakeholders so they could plan better following the
Electoral Commissions roadmap.
Observation of the pre-election phase helped in identifying the gaps and weaknesses in the electoral
process. This formed the basis for engaging the relevant authorities that are mandated to fix those gaps
and weaknesses. CEON-U findings provided credible information for the country, which could be used
with high predictive value, to foreseeemerging challenges related to elections and to initiate corrective
measures.
For example, CEON-U observers reported significant ethnic tensions in the Rwenzori region before
elections, which eventually led to the outbreak of violent clashes between the Bakonjo, Basongora, and
Bamba after the elections. Using CEON-U findings, the Electoral Commission could have increased on voter
information in good time because reports continuously revealed the low level of voter education and urged
the Commission to address this concern.
CEON-U deployed 223 observers in 223 constituencies. The observers sent weekly reports to the
Secretariat using mobile phones from 12 October 2015 based on real time data collected from
constituencies where they resided. At the time of deployment, Uganda had 238 constituencies, leaving
only 15 outside the projects coverage. However, the number of constituencies shot up to 259 and then
290. CEON-Us pre-election reports were based on observations conducted between 12 October 2015
and 16 February 2016.
5.2 Findings
During the pre-election period, CEON-U focused on four major trends that affected the electoral process,
namely: (1) provision of voter education; (2) campaign rallies; (3) voter bribery; and (4) hate speech,
intimidation and violence especially against women.
5.2.1 Campaign Activities
The campaigns were generally peaceful throughout most parts of the country. Candidates at all levels were
enthusiastic to reach their supporters as indicated in their campaign calendars. During the pre-election
period, NRM was the most active party followed by FDC and Go Forward. Other independent candidates,
DP, UPC and other political parties were less active. Campaigns intensified as polling day drew closer and
this was the case across the board for all parties and independent candidates.
In the pre-election period, the majority (97%) of observed constituencies reported NRM parliamentary
campaigns, 26% reported NRM presidential campaigns, while 71% reported local government campaigns.
At least 84% of CEON-U observers reported independent parliamentary campaigns and 12% independent
presidential campaigns. About 72% of CEON-U observers reported FDC parliamentary campaigns, 18%
reported FDC presidential campaigns, while 57% observers reported local government campaigns by FDC
candidates. For DP, 30% of observers reported the partys parliamentary campaigns while 20% observed
DPs participation in local government campaigns. UPC had 11% reporting parliamentary and 14%
local government campaigns. Other political parties had 31% of observers reporting on parliamentary
campaigns and 13% presidential campaigns, while 23% reported Amama Mbabazi campaigns.
36
Throughout the campaigns and rallies, CEON-U observed that other political parties and independent
candidates did not operate on a level playing field given that they did not have clear structures as well
as adequate resources to facilitate vibrant campaigns. NRM candidates, on the other hand, enjoyed the
advantage of incumbency which granted them access to public resources which they used for electioneering.
Despite the candidates efforts to reach their electorate, CEON-U observed incidents involving violent
clashes1 and others where candidates were denied access2 to campaign/rally venues. Candidates for the
Farmers Party in Mbale and Go forward in Masindi and Buliisa suffered these disruptions.
5.2.2 Campaign Materials
Section 22 of the Parliamentary Elections Act grants a right to candidate to publish campaign materials
that best describe them. The relevant provision states that:
During a campaign period, any candidate, may either alone or in common with others publish campaign
materials in form of books, booklets, pamphlets, leaflets, magazines, newspapers or posters intended to
solicit votes from voters but shall in any such publication specify particulars to identify the candidate or
candidates concerned.
During the campaigning period, most candidates used posters to publicise their parties and candidature.
CEON-U observers reported that NRM presidential posters were the most prevalent at 99%, followed by Go
Forward at 94%, FDC at 93%, and independents at 57% during this period. Just like presidential posters,
NRM parliamentary posters were the most prevalent at 98%, followed by independents at 92%, FDC at
79%, DP at 34%, and UPC at 13%.
Despite efforts by different candidates to display their posters, 22% of observed constituencies reported
the defacing of Go Forward posters during this period mainly in Kigezi, Teso, and West Nile. FDC, according
to CEON-Us observers in 21% of constituencies, had its posters defaced especially in Bukedi, Teso, and
West Nile. On the other hand, 34% of observers in Bukedi, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Kigezi reported cases
of defaced NRM posters. These acts were in violation of section 82 of the Parliamentary Elections Act
that makes defacement of posters an offence. Thus, CEON-U identified a need for civic education on laws
governing campaign posters and notices.
5.2.3 Campaigns after 6 pm
The Presidential Elections Act 2005 section 23, subsection 5, grants the Electoral Commission a mandate to
develop and issue guidelines that every candidate should comply with while conducting his or her election
campaigns. These regulations prohibit campaigns after 6pm.
On 3rd December 2015 at Butembe in Jinja District, after nomination of candidates a fight broke at about 6:30pm between supporters of Kirya of
FDC and Lufafa of NRM when they met at Busedde and those of Kirya started stoning those of Lufafa. Lufafa supporters were many in number and
they left many of Kiryas supporters injured while others in a critical state. Police was then called to intervene.
1
On 2nd December 2015 at 18:42 hours in Mayuge District Bunya East constituency fight broke between supporters of Kubeketerya James (NRM
Flag bearer) and Waira Kyewalabye Majegere (independent) while in Bunya South constituency in Kityerera sub-county of the same District at
18:24 hours fight broke between supporters of independent candidate Ntedde Robert and Isabirye Iddof NRM.
On 3rd December 2015, during a campaign rally, in Kyadondo East supporters of an FDC Candidate Mr. Nkuuyinji attacked the supporters of NRM
candidate Hon Setenda Sebalu which resulted into crashing the latters car.
On 6th December 2015 in Bunyole West Butaleja District, supporters of Wangolo fought with those of Waluswaka at Budumba sub-county in Bughanga village. The fight was at around 14:45hours.
2
On 14/11/2015 at 3:00 pm Gen. Biraaro the presidential candidate and the aspirant for Mayoral position in Mbale Municipality both from the
Famers Party were sabotaged from using cricket ground which they had booked for their rally. On that day they were informed that the Electoral
Commission was going to use the same grounds to launch voter education campaign and they tried to stop the rally.
On 13th December 2015, supporters of NRM clashed withsupporters of Amaama Mbabazi after a rally of Amaama Mbabazi which was held at Kyamate Play Ground in Eastern Division Ntungamo Municipality. this happened due to the fact that the NRM supporters put on yellow t-shirts and
blocked Amaama Mbabazi supporters on stage near Jak Jex pharmacy in one of Ntungamo streets
On the 22nd December 2015 when FDC Presidential candidate, Retired Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye came to Akeket Primary School, Lalogi sub-county
where he was going to stage his rally, he found Hon. Jacob Oulanya, incumbent MP for Omoro county who decided to hold his meeting with village
chiefs and local leaders of the place at same venue
27th December 2015, in Masindi District Amama Mbabazi Organised two rallies to take place in Masindi and Buliisa. However, the rally in Masindi
did not take place because the venue where they were to meet was a stadium and was closed down by police and the RDC. The second proposed
venue was deliberately occupied by the Balokole group organized by the Masindi Municipality Mayor.
37
A graph representing campaigns of different political parties in the pre-election period.
However, CEON-U observed several candidates from FDC, Go Forward, and NRM conducting campaigns
beyond the legal deadline. FDC campaigns after 6pm were mostly observed in Teso, followed by Lango
and Kigezi. Go Forward campaigns after 6pm were mostly observed in Buganda, Kigezi, and Bukedi. NRM
campaigns conducted after 6pm were mostly observed in Acholi, Lango, Bunyoro, and Teso. In trying to
keep the campaigns in order of time, the police often exercised selective enforcement of the rule, with tough
actions taken against opposition groups while the ruling party remained untouchable. This discriminatory
treatment of candidates opened up the police to accusations of bias and rage among opposition supporters.
5.2.4 Voter Bribery
Sections 67 and 64 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005 and the Presidential Elections Act, 2005
criminalise voter bribery and buying. However, during the entire period of campaigns, candidates at
different levels were involved in this practice, thereby making it seem like the norm. As Election Day drew
closer, voter bribery increased. This manifested in the form of giving out hard cash during campaigns and
dolling out donations at fundraising functions. These practices were reported in 53% of the constituencies
that CEON-U observed and all parties were guilty of abetting them. Most incidents of voter bribery3 were
reported in the mid-western region at 78% of the total bribery caser that took place and West Nile region
followed with 62%.Rampant voter bribery among candidates of all parties conceivably skewed the 2016
elections in favor of those who spent the most. Other malpractices observed included use of government
vehicles, staff or buildings to conduct meetings, rallies, and campaigns.
5.2.5 Public Servants on the Political Stage
Some public servants especially those directly appointed by the incumbent participated in active partisan
politics. In particular, certain Resident District Commissioners in places like Kabale, Ntungamo, Kibaale,
Bukomansimbi, Nwoya, Oyam, Moyo, and Buliisa openly pledged their support for the NRM candidate,
an act that created hostility from supporters of the opposition and independent candidates as observed
mostly in Ntungamo and Kabale districts.
3
As part of the NRM campaign strategy, (1000 T-Shirts per constituency and twenty million for the flag bearers has been the normal routine for the
NRM party. In the case of Hoima Dr. Lawrence Bategeka was the NRM flag bearer)this money was given to him to mobilise and buy refreshments,
transporting the voters and t-shirts distribution.
38
5.2.6 Use of Government Resources

Section 27 of the Presidential Elections Act, 2015 (as amended) prohibits any candidate from using
government resources like vehicles, fuel cards, personnel, and offices, for election campaigning. On the
contrary, observers reported several cases of misuse of government administrative resources by the ruling
party to carry out partisan activities.
For instance, in Arua district, during the NRM grassroots elections, government vehicles belonging to the
Uganda Police and government entities - registration numbers UP 0700, UP 1396, UG 2155C, UG 2064J, and
UG 3884M were used to deliver ballot papers and other voting materials from NRM Secretariat in Arua to
various sub-counties in the district and neighboring Maracha district on 6 September 2015.
5.2.7 Violence, Intimidation and Hate Speech
The campaign environment
was generally peaceful
in the week leading up to
the elections, with only
2% of observers reporting
attacks on campaign rallies.
However, hate speech based
on ethnicity, gender, and
religion was reported in 10%
of constituencies observed.
The electoral law is very
clear
on
defamatory
speech and intimidation by
candidates while conducting
campaigns. According to
the Presidential Elections
Act section 23(3) and the
Parliamentary Elections Act
section 21(3):
This was observed in the pre-election period.
A person shall not, while campaigning, use any language which constitutes incitement to public disorder,
insurrection or violence or which threatens war; or (b) which is defamatory or insulting or which constitutes
incitement to hatred.
However, during the pre-election period, ethnicity ranked highest as a basis for hate speech,
intimidation and violence against candidates when compared to gender and religion. Intimidation
and hate speech against women were mostly observed in Acholi, Rwenzori, Buganda, Karamoja, Teso,
and Lango regions, while intimidation and hate speech against candidates because of their religions
was rampant in Acholi, Buganda, Rwenzori, Kigezi, and West Nile. Intimidation and hate speech based
on ethnicity were mainly observed in Rwenzori, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Busoga regions. Intimidation
and hate speech created hostility among supporters of the targeted candidates, eventually erupting
into violence during rallies.
5.2.8 Security Agents
There was an increase in deployment of security agents in advance of the elections, as reported by 28% of
observers. Eight percent of CEON-U observers reported acts of violence by crime preventers, while 17%
reported harassment by other security agents.
39
This was observed in the pre-election period.
5.2.9 Dispute Resolution

From December 2015 to Election Day on 18 February 2016, 89% of observers reported that they had not
heard of or witnessed any inter-party liaison committees in their constituencies. In November 2015,CEON-U
identified the need to activate these committees at community, district, and national levels. Similarly, 80%
of observers did not witness any district election security committees. CEON-U called upon the authorities
to establish functional election security committees in all districts.
5.2.10 Provision of Voter Education and Information
Civic and voter education play a key role in enhancing citizen participation in the electoral process. The
Electoral Commission4 and Uganda Human Rights Commission5 are mandated by the Constitution to
formulate and implement voter education and civic education programmes.6 These programmes are intended
to enable citizens understand and appreciate their duties, roles, rights, obligations, and responsibilities as
citizens of Uganda. The government is expected to support the implementation of these programmes.
Article 1 of the Constitution speaks to the people of Uganda about their sovereignty and points out in
Clause 1 that all power belongs to the people.7 Clause 4 provides for the peoples free expression on who
shall govern them and how they should be governed. This right, despite being open to all, is not always fully
exercised by every Ugandan.
With the realisation that citizens needed voter education and information to make informed choices, CEON-U
observed a significant increase in voter information activities over time especially towards Election Day.
The shared campaign schedules of respective candidates provided opportunities for the citizens to actively
participate in and listen to their preferred candidates. Although the Electoral Commission is mandated
4
According to the Constitution, one of the key functions of the electoral commission is to formulate and implement civic educational programmes
relating to elections. Under this, the Commission is expected to provide voter education and voter information. The mandate of the Commission
includes the promotion and regulation of information to the citizens regarding the purpose and procedures of voting. For every electoral cycle, the
electoral commission formulates and issues voter information and voter education materials.
5
Established under the provisions of Article 51(1) of the Constitution and operationalized under the Uganda Human Rights Act of 1997, the
commission is among other functions expected to: Create and sustain within society the awareness of the provision of the Constitution of the
Republic of Uganda as well as the fundamental laws of the people of Uganda, Formulate, implement and oversee programs intended to inculcate in
the citizens of Uganda awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people.
6
7
40
Information enhancing citizens social and political responsibilities and the role they play including election of their leaders.
Article 1 of the Constitution of Uganda.
These observations were made in the pre-election period.
to provide voter information, civil society that included CCEDU, shouldered most of this responsibility
by disseminating voter information through the media and a wide range of materials. Most of CEON-Us
observers (94%) reported voter information campaigns in their constituencies.
5.2.11 Gaps in Voter Education and Information
Despite the laudable efforts of various actors to keep the citizens informed, a number of limitations were
identified. These included limited funding which restricted the efforts of voter education and information
providers such as CSOs to urban and peri-urban areas while neglecting the rural majority. Other
organisations were also limited to covering the content within their scope of work like voter mobilisation.
There was also a lack of guided voter education due to the Electoral Commissions failure to release the
authorised voter education handbook until a few weeks to Election Day. To make matters worse, the
handbook was not translated into indigenous different languages for the benefit of the majority of citizens
who do not use English. Until then, CSOs were not at liberty to carry out voter education and information
as doing so without the commissions authority could lead to unpleasant consequences for the offender.
All this contributed to the inadequacy of voter education and information which ultimately impacted the
way polling was carried out. Findings showed that barely three months to the February 2016 elections,
voter education was so low that 39% of observers did not report any voter education activities in their
constituencies. However, in the week before elections, (February 8 14), CEON-U noted an improvement
in voter information and education.
The introduction of the Biometric Voter Verification System just 14 days to the polling day added to the
avalanche of information that voters were bombarded with. This added to the confusion and pawed the
way for myths that persisted up to polling day.
According to CEON-Us Long Term Observers, there was no adequate voter education carried by the
Electoral Commission? out between September 2015 and January 2016.8 This bred a situation where
myths, misperceptions, and fears about the elections thrived. For instance, the lack of clarity about the
voter locator slips and voter cards at the polling station caused uncertainty among voters who could not
readily figure out which document to use on polling day. Similarly, some voters were duped into believing
that the biometric machine was harmful and that it would affect the voters health.
8
CEON-U weekly observer reports published and shared in January 2016.
41
To the Electoral Commissions credit, it was possible to check ones registration and voting location on
its website and through a lowcost text message service. Although these services could only be utilised
by some sections of the population, observers acknowledge that this was a commendable effort by the
Commission. CEON-U also observed that voters who had no access to the internet were poorly served by
some of the voter education initiatives including those by the Commission.
Furthermore, some voters were uncertain about the voting dates for the various political offices. Some
sections of the electorateparticularly the illiterate in Arua, Gulu and Mayuge district were provided with
wrong information and manipulated to believe that each candidate was to be voted on a separate date. In
other places the citizens did not know when the election of councilors would take place. A CEON-U staff
member appearing on a radio talk show in Kampala two days before the general elections was surprised
when a caller phoned in expressing ignorance about the date of the presidential and parliamentary
elections.9
Citizens also knew very little about the electoral offences. For example, many were not aware of the legal
implications of voter bribery and vote buying. As such, many aspiring politicians were involved in the
commercialisation of politics and other illegal practices. Likewise, the electorate routinely demanded for
money from candidates seeking their votes.
The accreditation process that was supposed to be facilitated by the Electoral Commission at different
district levels was not clear to a number of District Registrars. Different officers followed different
procedures in conducting business while others were unaware of what accreditation was all about. The
information gap among staff of the Commission was also a disservice to the public.
5.2.12 Conclusion and Recommendations
Knowing how to vote is critical in ensuring that citizens exercise the right to select leaders of their choice.
Voters who are not well informed about the voting processes are bound to make mistakes on polling day.
This is usually reflected in the number of invalid votes. In 2011, invalid votes were 334,548 which was
4.04% of total votes cast. In 2016, invalid votes increased to 477,319 representing 4.62% if all votes cast.
This is a clear sign of inadequate voter education in both election cycles.
CEON-U, therefore, recommends that:
1. The state ought to provide equal facilitation to all parties, to empower them explain their messages
and programmes to Ugandans and conduct their campaigns on a level ground.
2. Civic and voter education should be a continuous process. The Electoral Commission should clearly
set aside adequate time for voter information and education to avoid uncertainty and misinformation
among citizens.
42
Report by CEON-U staff after radio talk show on Kingdom FM on 16th February 2016.
CHAPTER 6
Specialised Study1:
Gender and Women Participation
6.1 Background to the Specialised Studies

In addition to the general areas of the electoral process, there were some that required technical expertise
for effective observation. These were: Gender, Media, Security, and Finance. CEON-U in collaboration with
selected organisations conducted specialised studies in the four areas listed. These studies complemented
the general observation findings and together provide a deeper understanding of the inclusion, participation,
and performance of special interest groups.
The following organisations carried out the specialised studies:
a. Women in Democracy and Governance (WDG) focused on women participation;
b. African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) focused on media coverage including its nature,
fairness (equity), diversity in voices, hate speech, access, and content;
c. Human Rights Network (HURINET) focused on security and human rights issues with particular
attention to incidents in which the rights of human rights defenders and other citizens were
violated;
d. Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM) focused campaign financing including income
and expenditure of political parties and candidates during the party primaries, presidential and
parliamentary campaigns, as well as compliance with campaign finance provisions in the electoral
laws and evidence of corruption in the electoral process.
6.2 Introduction
This chapter presents the findings from observations on gender and womens participation in the 2016
general elections. The focus is on the period between August 2015 and February 2016. The study proposes
recommendations for addressing critical challenges in regard to gender and womens participation in the
electoral process. CEON-U assessed gender concerns and womens participation based on key landmarks
in the electoral process, including: update of the voter register, display of the register, nominations,
campaigns, and polling day.
This study is based on international, regional, and national standards for holding elections. While not
always specifically referred to in universal or regional instruments, many of the practices highlighted can
be considered essential to a genuine and democratic electoral process.
The following are key examples of best practice for democratic elections:1
The legal framework for elections and the extent to which the rights of women to participate in the
electoral process are upheld;
There is transparency in the electoral process;
The election administration acts in an effective, impartial, independent and accountable manner and
integrates the equal participation of women and men in the administration of the electoral process;
There is equal access for male and female candidates and political parties to state resources;
There is equal access for male and female candidates and political parties to, and balanced coverage by,
any state or publicly funded media;
Political parties and Electoral Commission take steps to ensure the equal participation of women and
men in the electoral process;
Specific issues affecting women are highlighted by candidates and political parties during campaigns;
Men and women are informed of their rights through civic and voter education programmes;
There is a peaceful atmosphere free from violence, intimidation or reprisals for candidates and
parties to campaign and for the electorate to vote;
Actors can use the rule of law to settle election disputes and the decisions of the courts are respected;
and
The type of complaints and cases filed by men and women and responsiveness of the complaint system.
1
44
Handbook for EU election observation; second edition (2008)
The study acknowledges the fact that an election cannot be in compliance with international standards
unless women, as well as men, enjoy full political rights. In assessing the participation of women in the
campaigns, the study takes into account the legal, social and cultural circumstances of Uganda.
6.3 Legal Framework on Women Participation and Gender Equality
Uganda is a signatory to several international and regional conventions that promote the equal rights and
treatment of women and men in politics and decision-making. Some of these have been domesticated in
the countrys constitution.
The participation of women in political decision-making positions was recognised as a political right
after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. UDHR articles 2 and
21 guarantee equal enjoyment of political rights without discrimination on the basis of ones sex or any
other ground. In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in article 252
reaffirmed the UDHR principle of the right to participate in public and political life without discrimination.
As a practical matter in line with the ICCPR, registration procedures should not be so difficult as to inhibit
candidacy (e.g. imposing an extremely high number of supporters required for candidacy, or an excessive
deposit required from a party before a list of candidates is accepted for elections).3
Despite the principles enshrined in the UDHR and ICCPR, discrimination against women with regard to
voting and holding political office has persisted around the world. In order to address overt discrimination,
it became necessary for the United Nations to adopt a convention dedicated to protecting the political
rights of women. Hence, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women in 1952. This convention, one of the early covenants adopted in the area of
womens rights promotion and protection, affirms the right of women to vote and hold public office without
discrimination.
The Political Rights Convention was followed by the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), which the UNGA adopted in 1979. CEDAW moved the right of political participation
another step toward de facto equality by affirming the obligation of State Parties to take affirmative action
to accelerate the participation of women in politics and their representation in other public decisionmaking positions.
In addition, article 7 enjoins State Parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure equality and
that women have the right to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all
publicly elected bodies. Uganda ratified CEDAW in 1985.
At the regional level, article 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHR) in states
that: Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his/her country either
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.Article 13
(2) states that: Every person shall have the right to equal access to public service of his/her country.
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the
African Womens Rights Protocol) adopted in 2003 by the African Union (AU) further affirms the principle
of equal participation and the use of affirmative action to ensure equal and effective participation of women
in politics. Article 9 states that: state parties shall take specific positive actions to promote participative
governance and the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative
action, enabling national legislations.By June 2009, the protocol had been ratified by 27 countries including
Uganda which did so in 2010; and it had been signed by 45 African countries.
2
3
The Electoral Laws Page 123

Compendium of International Standards for Elections, second edition, page 11.
45
Important resolutions and development frameworks such as the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of
Action (BDPA) and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 also call for gender
parity in decision making. For instance, under the MDG framework, the proportion of seats held by women
in the national parliament is one of the three indicators used to measure progress toward achieving Goal 3,
that is, to promote gender equality and empower women.
The Constitution of Uganda in article 33 (4) recognises the equal treatment of women and men and equal
opportunities for participation in political, economic and social activities. Article 33 (5) further recognises
the right to affirmative action for women in order to address imbalances created by history, tradition or
custom.
Objective VI of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of Ugandas 1995 Constitution
states that: The State shall ensure gender balance and fair representation of marginalized groups on all
constitutional and other bodies.Article 59(1) of the constitution states that: Every citizen of Uganda of
eighteen years of age or above, has a right to vote. Article 59(2) states that: It is the duty of every citizen
of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above to register as a voter for public elections and referenda.
The above provisions are the basis for womens equal participation with men in politics in Uganda. Indeed,
Ugandas legal framework to a large extent enables women to participate as equals with male candidates
and largely conforms to international and regional standards on gender and womens participation in
elections.
However, the introduction of new nomination fees by Parliament through amendments to the Presidential
and Parliamentary Election Acts in October 2015, barely one month to nomination for the presidential
candidates, undermined the equal participation of men and women. For instance, a presidential candidate
was required to pay UGX 20,000,000 up from UGX 8,000,000 in 2011. A parliamentary candidate paid UGX
3,000,000 up from UGX 200,000 in 2011. According to statistics from the Uganda National Population Study
Report 2011/124 by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, women generally have less access to resources than
men in Uganda. The increment in nomination fees particularly undermined the participation of women
and youth in the 2016 elections due to their failure to raise nomination fees in the short time stipulated
for nomination under the amended electoral laws. The youth petitioned against the nomination fees, but
they lost. The increment in nomination fees for presidential and parliamentary positions was contrary to
article 32 which provides for affirmative action for groups marginalised by history and tradition. Youth and
women fall in this category.
6.4 Election Administration
The Electoral Commission is a body mandated to organise, conduct, and supervise all elections and
referenda as provided for in the constitution and the Electoral Commission Act 1997. While the Constitution
guarantees the independence of the Commission, the President with the approval of Parliament appoints
the commissioners. Due to the appointment system, the Commission neither reflects the complete political
spectrum and nor does it enjoy widespread confidence within sections of the citizenry.
In December 2015, womens organizations submitted to Parliament during the public hearings on
constitutional reforms a number of proposals to integrate gender balance in the composition of the
management of the Electoral Commission. This, however, was not done. Currently, only five of the seven
commissioners are women; 38 of the 111 District Registrars5 are female; and 65 of the 118 Assistant
4
According to the Uganda National Population Study report (2011/12) 16 percent of men are in paid employment in comparison to 7.7 percent
of women. Of these 10.6 percent females in comparison to 9.1 males earn less than 50,000 Uganda Shilling. 9.3 percent males in comparison to
2.5 percent females earn more than 500,000 Uganda shillings. More females 81.3 percent derive their livelihood from the agricultural sector
in comparison to 70.2 percent males.21.8 percent males in comparison to 17.4 females have access to credit. According to the draft national
development plan 2015, only 27 percent of women own land which is a major factor of production and can be sold to get money for use for various
purposes.
5
Kisoro district only has an assistant district registrar who doubles as both the district registrar and assistant district registrar. In the records of
the EC, her title is retained as assistant district registrar.
46
Registrars are female. Figures for Sub-County and Parish Supervisors are largely unknown. Where figures
are available, there is wide discrepancy in the numbers of men and women recruited. Coupled with that,
there are no specific policy guidelines for the Commissions District Registrars to ensure gender balance
as they recruit Sub-County and Parish Supervisors. As a result, districts like Yumbe have only one female
sub-county supervisor out of 13. Out of 99 Parish Supervisors in Yumbe district, only 16 are female.
According to section 5.1 of the Electoral Commissions Manual for the General Update: Recruitment and
functions of update officials: The Returning Officer will take into consideration the persons who have
worked as Update, Registration or Display officers before. Those whose performance was not satisfactory
will not be appointed.
Gender balance should be taken into account in line with international standards for holding elections.
This also applies to the recruitment of the Update Officers in addition to the listed conditions. A provision
on gender balance would ensure that both women and men are given equal opportunity to participate as
Update Officers.
Uganda is a signatory to CEDAW which is replicated in Objective VI of the National Objectives and Directive
Principles of State Policy. Objective VI of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy
provides for gender balance and fair representation of marginalised groups. It states that: The State
shall ensure gender balance and fair representation of marginalised groups on all constitutional and
other bodies. However, there is still a gap between the law and practice with regard to gender balance in
government institutions like the Electoral Commission, which gap must be rectified in compliance with
international and regional instruments and the national constitution.
The Electoral Commission issued its Strategic Plan 2013-2017 three years ahead of the 2016 elections. The
plan included steps meant to strengthen the commissions capacity to deliver a credible electoral process.
The most important targets were a new biometric voter register, the consolidation of all guidelines and
procedures, as well as timely and comprehensive civic and voter education. Certainty of dates for every
electoral process is critical to the credibility of an election. It creates trust in the process and enhances
participation of candidates and citizens in the electoral process.
The Electoral Commission changed the roadmap for the 2016 general elections about four times.
These frequent changes of dates on the election roadmap affected planning, resource mobilisation,
and participation of candidates and voters especially rural women who have less access to media and
political parties structures located in rural areas.The Commission successfully synchronised the campaign
schedules of candidates during the campaigns, thereby limiting clashes between candidates.
On Election Day, the Electoral Commission performed relatively well with regard to ensuring gender
balance of polling officials. CEON-Us preliminary statement on the 2016elections indicated that 40% of
polling officials were female. With regard to voters, the Commission failed to ensure that all voters were
able to cast their ballots vote especially in the districts of Wakiso and Kampala. Both female and male voters
who waited in long queues for an average of four hours6 did not vote. For the elderly, pregnant women,
men, and women with infant children, the waiting was unbearable and some voters returned home and
were ultimately disenfranchised. The Commission did not offer a clear explanation on the delays which
were experienced in Kampala and Wakiso districts. The Electoral Commission, chairperson, Eng.Dr. Badru
Kiggundu said due to logistical challenges the materials could not be delivered on time. Yet such anomalies
had not happened in these areas in previous elections.
Polling in accordance with the presidential and parliamentary elections Act was supposed to begin at 7am-4pm. CEON-U observers in Kampala
reported that some polling stations in Wakiso and Kampala received materials at 2pm.
47
6.5 Voter Registration

Section 18 (1) of the Electoral Commission Act mandates the commission to compile, maintain, and update
the voter register. Despite opposition by some sections of the citizenry and organisations particularly
opposition political parties with regard to the use of data from another source, Parliament passed the
Registration of Persons Act 2014 after the exercise had begun. This gave the commission authority to use
the data from the citizen registration exercise to compile the voter register. The newly introduced system
aimed to improve inclusiveness and accuracy of the voter register.
The Electoral Commission compiled a new voter register for the 2016 general elections by extracting
data on voting age citizens from the National Identification Register. This change was reportedly not
sufficiently communicated, leaving many stakeholders especially women who usually have limited access
to information without an understanding of the connection between the ID registry and the voter register,
hence affecting the turn up for the exercise.
The final voter register contained 15.277 million voters whose information was extracted from the national
ID database of about 16.46 million citizens aged 16 years and above at the time of registration in 2014.
The numbers of registered voters may have been more if people understood the exercise. The number of
male and female voters on the register has not been released by the Electoral Commission, neither has the
number of men and women who voted in the 2016 general elections. The information is also not available
for previous elections. This affects interventions that the Commission and non-state actors could take to
address the gaps in voter registration by using strategies that work best for women and men.
The creation of a new voters register extracted from the National Identification Register contravened section
18 of the Electoral Commission Act which mandates the Commission to independently compile, maintain,
revise, and update the voter register. In addition, the guidelines issued by the Electoral Commission on the
update of the national voters register for the 2016 elections did not explicitly provide for pregnant women,
the elderly, and men and women with infant children to be given priority in the exercise. As a result, these
categories of voters had to wait in long queues. Women in particular were unable to participate in the
exercise due to their other gender roles.
In an election, there are various groups of people including pregnant women, elderly men and women, men
and women with infant children, and disabled persons who may not be able to stay long in the queues. To
enhance the participation of such groups in an election, it is important for the Electoral Commission to
make a provision in all its guidelines for each electoral activity for election officials to give priority to such
groups to enable them to participate in the exercise.
The disaggregation of voter data by sex in the national voters register is a positive trend which will
enable various actors to make the relevant interventions to ensure that women and men are given
equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process. It will therefore be important for the Electoral
Commission to release information on the numbers of men and women on the national voters register and
those who voted in the 2016 general elections to inform get-out-the vote activities of political parties and
CSOs in the 2021 elections.
6.6 Voter Education
The Commission in accordance with the Electoral Commission Act is responsible for conducting voter
education, a task that it failed to perform effectively. In addition, the majority of the CSOs did not conduct
voter education due to lack of funds. As a result, voters did not know where to complain in case they had
grievances during the electoral process. In addition, the fact that 4.9 percent7 of the ballot papers cast
during the 2016 presidential elections were invalid is a sign of a general failure to properly educate voters.
7
48
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2016).
6.7 Nomination of Candidates

The nomination process for presidential elections was largely peaceful but with gender imbalances between
men and women. For the presidential election, the Electoral Commission registered eight presidential
candidates out of nine who sought nomination. Only one of the eight candidates was female.
District Returning Officers registered 1,343 candidates for the directly elected 290 open parliamentary seats
and 406 women candidates for the 112 directly elected women district seats. There was an increment in the
numbers of women nominated for the open seats at Parliamentary and Local Council levels. For instance,
86 of the 1,314 candidates nominated for open seats at parliamentary level were women in comparison to
46 of 1,460 candidates nominated for the same seat in 2011. At the level of district chairperson, seven of
the 383 candidates were women in comparison to 6women out of the 367 candidates nominated for the
same position in 2011.
The numbers of female participants may have been even higher but for the increment in nomination
fees which affected mainly women and youth candidates due to the economic construction of Ugandan
society where men are more economically empowered than women. In addition, political parties have
not developed and implemented specific strategies to recruit women, train, and provide them with the
requisite resources t to participate in elections as candidates in line with the expectations of article 7 of
CEDAW. Most women candidates struggle single-handedly to get nominated and elected into public office.
This reduces their allegiance to political parties.
Women in Ugandas Legislature (1989-2016)

Year
District
Assembly
District
Open
seat
Others
Total
Women
Total
Men
Total
MPs
%
Women
%
Men
1989
39
NRC
39
50
230
280
18
82
1996
39
Parliament
39
51
225
276
19
81
1994
2001
2006
2011
2016
39
56
79
112
112
CA
Parliament
Parliament
Parliament
Parliament
39
56
79
14
112
100
18
Source: The Ministry of Public Service
75
11
112
50
131
139
236
230
219
244
289
286
304
319
375
428
17
24
31
35
33
83
76
69
65
67
Contestants for Open Seats by Gender (2016)

Post
President
Open MP seat
District/City
chairperson
Total
No. of
candidates
1,314
376
1,698
No. females
90
100
No. males
1,224
367
1,598
% female in
the race
12.5
6.8
2.4
5.9
% male in the
race
87.5
93.2
97.6
94.1
Source: The Uganda Electoral Commission
49
Candidates in Woman MP Race by Party (2016)

Party
No. of Candidates
Independent
200
49.4
FDC
58
14.3
NRM
110
DP
27.2
18
UPC
4.4
11
CP
2.7
UFA
0.5
JEEMA
0.2
PPP
0.2
Others
Total
Source: Uganda Womens Network
0.2
0.7
405
100
Women in the MP Open Seat Race by Party (2016)

Party
No. of
candidates
No. of
females
Males
% Party
(females)
% National
(females)
NRM
290
26
264
8.9
DP
84
77
8.3
0.5
FDC
UFA
Independents
UPC
JEEMA
PPP
Others
Total
199
6
705
23
8
12
1332
45
0
86
194
3
660
23
8
12
1246
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
50
2.5
50
6.3
0
0.4
0.2
3.4
0
6.5
Source: Parliamentary Hansard March 2014
6.8 Campaigns
The legal framework on campaigns does not discriminate against women and men during elections.
However, due to the social, economic,8 and cultural construction of Ugandan society, women face some
peculiar challenges. The campaigns were largely peaceful but for specific incidents which affected the
presidential and parliamentary campaigns in the districts of Ntungamo, Jinja, Kampala, Gulu, Mbarara,
Mitooma, and Mukono. The clashes between supporters of candidates and use of excessive force by the
police, especially against the FDC presidential candidate and his supporters, affected the campaigns. In
some instances, presidential candidates of FDC and TDA were denied access to campaign venues, thereby
fuelling animosity by their supporters towards the police. These incidents restricted their freedoms to
campaign freely. For example the detention of the FDC presidential candidate during campaigns was
contrary to the right of candidates to campaign.
Women played a substantial role in candidates campaigns as heads of communication in TDA and
organisers of campaign rallies at different levels in NRM and FDC. Some women who were interested
in participating as agents were limited by gender roles in the domestic sphere. The Gender Officer in
Gulu district informed WDN-U of specific complaints that had been raised against some women by their
husbands because they took time off during the day to attend campaign rallies and perform their roles as
agents for their candidates.
Limited resources affected the campaign programmes of both men and women. However, the economic
construction of Ugandan society meant that women were more affected by the limited resources. For
instance, at presidential level, Ms. Maureen Kyalya postponed her campaigns due to lack of funds three
weeks into the campaigns for presidential candidates, which began on 9 November 2015. It is important
to note that the Presidential Elections Act was amended raising the nomination fees from UGX 8 million to
8
According to the Uganda National Population Study report (2011/12) 16 percent of men are in paid employment in comparison to 7.7 percent
of women. Of these 10.6 percent females in comparison to 9.1 males earn less than 50,000 Uganda Shilling. 9.3 percent males in comparison to 2.5
percent females earn more than 500,000 Uganda shillings. More females 81.3 percent derive their livelihood from the agricultural sector in comparison to 70.2 percent males.21.8 percent males in comparison to 17.4 females have access to credit. According to the draft national development
plan 2015, only 27 percent of women own land which is a major factor of production and can be sold to get money for use for various purposes.
51
UGX 20 million for presidential candidates. In addition the law removed the provision for a vehicle for each
presidential candidate and the contribution of UGX 20 million to the presidential candidates campaigns.
Very few women could stand for parliamentary and local council elections. This affected the visibility
of some women candidates because they failed to print posters or hold media campaigns. In addition,
some women candidates suspended their campaigns due to financial constraints as opposed to their male
counterparts and women who had resources.
6.9 Commercialisation of Politics
The commercialisation of politics has made it even harder for women.
Beyond voter bribery there is the sheer wastage in the mode of campaigning. The need for music, full
colour posters and the individual touch (voters want to see and touch the candidate) all made the
2016 campaigns an expensive venture. Ugandas laws on elections prohibit bribery. However, reports by
ACFIM9 indicated that it was widespread. The ACFIM report on the elections also indicates that the female
presidential candidate spent the least money in comparison to her seven colleagues. This underscores the
challenges women candidates face economically during the election process.
A woman waiting for her turn to go and vote as some other people are queuing to vote at Soroti Independence
Grounds in Soroti town on 18.2.2016. Photo by Simon Naulele
6.10 Media
ACME released its media monitoring report for November 2015 on 22 January 2016. According to the
report, the presidential candidates continued to be the major source of information on elections. Television
gave the widest coverage to presidential candidates at 85.5% and parliamentary candidates at 7.4%;
newspapers at 72.1% for presidential candidates and 17.2% for parliamentary candidates; radio at 67.6%
for presidential candidates and 21.4% for parliamentary candidates. WDG was concerned that radio
accorded presidential candidates the least coverage yet 74% of females and 86% of males listen to radio
9
52
www.acfimuganda.org
at least once a week.10Television which provided the most coverage is accessible to only 20% of women
and 30% of men.11 Since there is limited community voter education, media remains the major source
of information on elections. There is need to intensify coverage of elections using radio to enable more
females, in particular, gain access to election related information.
WDG was concerned that at 17.8%, female as ACME indicated in its November 2015 report continued
to lag behind males as sources of information in newspapers on elections. Elections can provide the best
possible opportunity to ensure womens voices are heard, their concerns are addressed, and their potential
contributions to peace and democracy are maximised. Without this happening, no country can attain its
goals of peace, democracy, and development.
6.11 Special Considerations for Women
Despite the disadvantages women candidates face as a result of Ugandas social, economic, political, and
cultural construction, the legal framework at the national level makes no special provision for women
candidates as evidenced by the following:
Female and male candidates at all levels from presidential to Local Council candidates have to pay the
same nomination fees.
There are no special provisions in the Parliamentary and Local Elections Act that increase the period of
campaigns for women even when women on the affirmative action seat have a wider area of coverage.
For instance, candidates contesting for the seat of district women Member of Parliament represent a
district while their counterparts on open seats represent a constituency. The district woman MP of
Arua, for instance, has five counties which comprise the district. Her counterparts on the other hand
have only one county. In terms of campaign resources she is overstretched and yet in most cases she
has to raise funds on her own with limited or no support from her political party.
6.11.1 Political Parties
Some political parties like FDC provided nomination fees to women candidates standing for MP who
were not incumbents.
FDC did not charge any nomination fees
for all its candidates standing for elective
office at various levels. NRM on the other
hand did not bear in mind the social
and economic construction of Ugandas
society and therefore did not give special
consideration to women standing for
any elective position both within the
party structures and in the 2016 general
election.
One of the positive trends in the 2016

election campaigns was joint campaigns
by some political parties like FDC and
NRM where both men and women
belonging to the same party held joint
campaign rallies. This cut campaign costs
particularly for women candidates who
may not have had the opportunity to
campaign due to the costs involved.
10
11
NRM nomination fees
Ibid 6
Ibid 6
53
6.11.2 Electoral Commission

All candidates (male and female) who were nominated by Electoral Commission were given the
opportunity to campaign as per the Commissions schedule the candidates collectively agreed upon.
TheCommission did not give any special consideration to either female or male candidates during the
campaigns.
6.11.3 Voter Education
The Electoral Commission in accordance with the Electoral Commission Act is mandated to
undertakevoter education. There were some changes in the electoral laws which had a bearing on
whether one had a chance to vote in the 2016 election or not. For example, voting began at 7am and
ended at 4pm. The basis for voting, according to the Electoral Commission, was the voter register. A
biometric system was introduced to prevent multiple voting. The previous voter register that was used
in the 2011 elections was retired and new one generated from the national identification process. The
polling dates for various elective offices were announced through electronic media.
Despite these major changes which had a bearing on whether one would vote or not, there was limited
voter education. Most voter education was done using electronic media. Most women, particularly in
rural areas where the majority of the population lives, do not have access to a radio. Where they do,
the timing of the radio spots or talk shows may not have been conducive for them to listen in due to
gender roles. As a result, more women were affected by the changes in the electoral laws on voting day
as evidenced by the lack of information on how to cast a ballot.
6.11.4 Access to the complaints system
Both men and women, in accordance with the laws of Uganda, can file complaints at any police station
during an election. The final figures on election-related complaints that were filed by men and women
in the entire country are not available.
6.12 Polling Day
On polling day, women participated as voters, party agents, polling officials and candidates.
As voters, 15,772,000 million citizens were registered to vote in the 2016 elections. The numbers of men
and women who voted is not yet known since the EC has not released its final report. In previous elections,
the numbers of men and women who voted remain unknown. Just like men, in districts of Kampala and
Wakiso, where voting in some polling stations began at 2:00pm some men and women were disenfranchised.
The shutdown of social media by the Uganda Communications Communication upon instruction from the
State affected communication and tracking of the events that unfolded on polling day. Citing security as
the main justification for this action, the government acted in total disregard of other social and economic
systems that depend on IT to survive. It remains unknown how many patients could have died due to
failure to access finances for urgent medical treatment through mobile money. How many Ugandans went
hungry for the same reason?
Women participated as party agents for various candidates. The numbers of men and women who
participated as party agents in various political parties is not known.
Women participated as polling officials. According to CEON-U-U preliminary statement on the 2016
elections, at least 40 percent of the polling stations observed had women serving as polling officials.
6.13 Specific Gender Issues for Women Candidates
The large geographical size of some constituencies and the lack of resources limited the campaigns of
female candidates. One of the critical bottlenecks is the patriarchal interpretation of womens political
contest whether by men or women contestants. The phenomenon of powerful male politicians (muzeeyi,
54
powerful businessmen) endorsing who should stand as a woman MP is fast becoming the norm thereby
accentuating patronage and male privilege all these have long term impacts on how and/or what
an individual woman leader will deliver. The open seat has now been named in no uncertain terms as
ekifokyabasajja (mens seat). Women who contest for the open seat are now seen as intruders. Though
this perception has been growing over successive elections, it has now acquired the status of a semi-official
position.
Attrition Rates for Women MPs (2011-2016)

Election
Year
No. of Women in the

Previous (9th ) Parliament
No. of Women who

Retained their Seats
No. of Women who

Lost
Percentage Loss of
Women
2011
133
103
30
22.5
2016
133
58
75
56.4
Women Contestants for Open Seats in the Districts Studied

Name
Position
District
Constituency
Status
Kyalya Maureen
President
N/A
National
Lost
Joyce Matuka Kidulu
Mayor
Mbale
Municipality
Lost
Florence Namayanja
Jackline Kyatuheire
Josephine Kasya
Joyce Sebugwawo
Betty Olive Kamya

Janet Avako
MP
MP
LCV Chairperson
Mayor
MP
MP
Source: UWONET/WDN Report 2016
Masaka
Kanungu
Kanungu
Kampala
Kampala
Yumbe
Bukoto East
Kinkizi West
District
Lubaga Division
Lubaga North
Aringa South
Won
Lost
Won
Won
Lost
Lost
6.14 Conclusion and Recommendations

1 Conduct wide consultations with key stakeholders in electoral processes.
2 Identify strategic actions for engendering Electoral process.
3 Train and build capacities of election managers on approaches to integrate gender in electoral processes.
4 Design a Gender aware Civic Education Programme and Sensitize the public on rationale for womenspecific political representation.
5 Carry out regular civic education to raise womens awareness and ambition to engage in electoral
processes and political leadership.
6 Promote womens rights as citizens, voters and candidates. Women need to know that their participation
in political leadership is by a right rather than a privilege.
7 Partner with civil society organizations to develop gender sensitive campaign materials.
8 Integrate civic and rights education programmes in education system.
9 Track political party activities with regard to promoting gender equity (in manifestos, party leadership,
sponsoring women candidates for political leadership).
10 Enforce the regulations pertaining the involvement of women in electoral processes (provide specific
quotas for womens participations as electoral managers and candidates).
11 Indicate the inclusion of gender as one of the mandatory requirements for political party registration
and qualification to participate in elections.
12 Develop a gender sensitive binding code of conduct governing legally recognized political parties,
government and other political actors prior, during and after elections on the involvement of women
in electoral processes. The code of conduct should commit political parties to involve women as actors
at all levels of leadership.
55
Political parties
1 Align political party laws with national laws (Constitution) and regional and internationals laws,
protocols that state parties have assented to, pertaining to womens political participation.
2 Develop party gender policies.
3 Review and incorporate gender sensitiveprovisions into party constitutions (e.g. ensuring specific
quotas for women in party leadership, approval of female candidates as official political flag-bearers in
national elections).
4 Identify, mentor and support women into political leadership e.g. finance radio programmes, posters &
mobilization for their campaigns.
Parliament
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Regularly review and update provisions on women-specific political representation to ensure that
there is no perpetuation of inequality on the basis of sex.
Provide for gender parity (50:50) political representation in the Constitution.
Reform the electoral system towards Proportional Representation (PR) from the current FPTP.
Enact a law that requires the appointing authority to ensure equal representation of men & women in
Electoral Commission.
Social movement building through nurturing local mobilization capacities.
Devise incentives to constituencies that vote women on direct seats.
Organize multiple off the radar spaces to increase womens leverage across the spectrum- economic,
social & political
Devise strategies to socially criminalize sexual pacification.
Social institutions (religious, cultural)

Strongly condemn commercialized politics and mobilize people against the vice through debates and
dialogue.
Help to advocate the enforcement of legal provisions that favour gender equality.
General citizenry

56
Shun candidates that promote malpractices by denying them votes.
CHAPTER 7
Specialised Study 2:
Campaign Financing and Use of State
Resources
57
7.1 Introduction
Money dominates Ugandas politics and, as a result, the gap between elected politicians and their voters
has widened substantially. This has created an environment where the principles of political accountability
are grossly undermined. In November 2014 the Governor of Bank of Uganda, Prof. Emmanuel TumusiimeMutebile, reportedly confessed to being misled by the government into indirectly financing election
activities in 2011, an action which plunged the countrys economy into a crisis. He promised not to repeat
the same mistake in 2016. ACFIM observed that during the campaign period of 2015/2016, government
spending was kept within sector ceilings, so there were no extreme surges and no visible shocks in the
economy. This, however, is not the whole story. This chapter summarises the findings of a 10-month study
on the financing of campaigns for the Presidential and parliamentary elections of 2016.
7.2 Scope and Methodology
The study was conducted in 16 districts across Uganda and focused on both the money spent by candidates
at the constituency level as well as the use of the national budget by the incumbent government during
campaigns. Primary data was collected at both constituency level and national level in the different
districts and entered into a centralised database where it was then analysed. All expenditures reported
are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
7.3 Regulatory Framework for Campaign Financing
The regulatory framework for campaign financing in Uganda is very weak. The electoral laws have a few
provisions on party financing, voter bribery, and misuse of government resources but they are neither
followed nor enforced.
7.4 Campaign Spending
ACFIMs study found that the total expenditure incurred by all political parties and independent candidates
that contested in the presidential and parliament races in the 16 districts combined was a minimum of
UGX 435 billion (US$ 128 million). If this figure is extrapolated in view of all the 112 districts of Uganda,
it can be estimated that at least UGX 2.4 trillion (US$ 716 million) was spent by political parties and
candidates on the election campaigns of 2015/2016.
The bulk of the recorded campaign spending in the 16 districts (76.6%) was done by the incumbent
NRM party to the tune of at least UGX 333 billion (US$ 98 million), followed by independent candidates.
A combined minimum of UGX 122.5 billion (US$ 36 million) is estimated to have been spent by all the
other presidential candidates combined during the campaign period of 3 November 2015 to 16 February
2016.
Incumbent Yoweri Museveni out spent the other candidates by 91.5%. The second biggest spender was
Amama Mbabazi (6.3%) followed by Kizza Besigye (1.8%). The lowest spender amongst the presidential
candidates was Maureen Kyalya representing 0.01% of the observed combined expenditure by presidential
candidates. All other candidates combined spending was below 2%: Venasius Baryamureeba (0.18%);
Benon Biraaro (0.1%); Abed Bwanika (0.1%); and Joseph Mabirizi (0.05%).
Kampala district recorded the highest campaign spending at constituency level with a share of 27.3%,
followed by Luweero (16%), Masaka (9.4%), Iganga (7.5%), and Jinja (7.2%). The districts in which
presidential candidates spent the least were Nwoya (1.1%), Hoima (1.6%), Kanungu (2.1%), Kabalore
(2.3%), and Apac (2.6%).
58
Table 1: Amount Spent by All Parties & Candidates per Month (Nov-Dec)
Month
AMOUNT SPENT
November
December
% OF TOTAL
49,625,169,000
36.0
137,688,203,700
100.0
88,063,034,700
TOTAL
Source: ACFIM, November 2015
% CHANGE
64.0
177
Table 2: Minimum Expenditure by Party & Party Members (November & December 2015)
PARTY
NRM
INDEPENDENTS
FDC
GO FORWARD
DP
UPC
OTHERS
TOTAL
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
% of TOTAL
44,413,292,000
76,589,135,000
87.9
849,120,000
649,785,700
1.1
229,827,000
0.3
2,327,800,000
8,529,394,000
1,293,965,000
1,612,253,000
429,480,000
224,383,000
184,342,000
228,257,000
127,170,000
49,625,169,000
88,063,034,700
% Change
+72
7.9
+266
0.5
-48
2.1
0.3
100.0
+25
-23
+24
+81
+77
Table 3: Amount Spent by Presidential Candidates in November & December 2015

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
% of Total
% CHANGE
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
4,897,716,000
22,252,640,000
91.61
+354
Baryamureba Venansius
31,402,000
64,330,000
0.32
+105
Amama Mbabazi
KiizaBesigye
Abed Bwanika
Mabirizi Joseph
Maureen Faith Kyalya

TOTAL
849,123,000
129,556,500
14,532,000
11,571,000
3,709,500
5,937,610,000
Source: Ministry of Finance, November 2015
498,237,000
847,103,000
19,779,000
14,915,000
1,983,000
23,698,987,000
4.55
3.30
0.12
0.09
0.02
100.00
-41
+554
+36
+29
-47
+299
Figure 1: % Change in Expenditure by Presidential Candidates in November & December 2015

59
Figure 3: Comparison between FY 2010/11 & 2015/16 Election Period Allocations for Selected MDAs
Source: Ministry of Finance, November 2015

7.5 Campaign Finance Offenses
Voter bribery and misuse of government resources for campaigns were prevalent throughout the
entire campaign period. The amendment of section 25 and scrapping of section 26 of the Public
Finance Management Act, 2015 relaxed the principles governing the supplementary budgets. This
potentially created a loophole that enabled the manipulation of inflows and outflows of budget funds
and expenditure. By December 2015, votes like State House, Office of the President, and Ministry of
Defence had used up over 80% of their budgets thus requiring supplementary financing. The Ministry
of Defence received the highest budget allocation of over UGX 1 trillion in the FY 2015/16. On top of
this, it was also the biggest beneficiary of supplementary financing accounting for about 73% of the
supplementary budget.
The graph below shows occurence of vote buying and voter bribery by region as reported from polling stations
visited by CEON-U observers
60
The graphic below shows all 3: violence, voter bribery and voter turn away juxtaposed together by region.
Busoga, Bugisu and Kigezi appear to have registered high incidence rates for all 3 malpractices:

Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and Parliament
1) Enact tougher laws and institutions to regulate campaign financing. Legislation on political
financing is needed to regulate the power of money in political and electoral processes.
2) Redefine what constitutes voter bribery with a view of enforcing legislation in respect to vote
buying.
3) More stringent and explicit regulations limiting the use of state resources for campaign purposes
are critical.
4) Prohibit government from undertaking large procurements in less than half a year before the
election period.
5) Create institutions that will enforce laws on campaign financing.
6) Re-amend the Public Finance Management (PFM) Act, 2015 to, among other things, restrict
supplementary financing to cases that are unavoidable and unforeseeable.
7) Amend relevant laws and where possible develop new legislation to prevent private interests from
subverting the democratic process through purchase of control and favours.
1) Enforce the Political Parties and Organisations Act, 2010 (as amended).
2) Designate an office or officer to handle matters of campaign and political party/ organisation
financing.
61
Inspectorate of Government
1) Take keen interest in cases of corruption in campaign financing.
Office of the Auditor General
1) Review financial reports on budget utilisation and supplementary financing for key government
ministries, departments and agencies
2) Audit utilisation of government funding of UGX 10 billion to political parties which was on the basis
of numerical strength in parliament was shared between NRM, FDC, DP, UPC, CP and JEEMA.
Political Party Leaders
1) Revitaliseadvocacy for electoral reforms particularly inareas highlighted by internationaland

domestic election observers.
2) Advocate for restoration in the Public Financial Management (PFM) Act, 2015, of appropriation of
supplementary funding to be approved by Parliament with a two thirds majority vote.
3) Organise grassroots based awareness interventions targeting voter attitudes towards vote buying
and levying unlimited financial demands on Members of the 10th Parliament.
4) Build capacity of civil society monitors to track and document campaign spending by political
parties and candidates at constituency level.
62
CHAPTER 8
Human Rights and Security
63
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role of security agencies in Ugandan elections. How security
agencies affected the electoral process in the 2016 elections. Although Uganda has invested great efforts to
build a state based on democracy, respect for human rights and observance of the rule of law, this endeavor
remains a myth.
This study was conducted under the auspices of the National Coalition on Police Accountability and Security
Sector Reform (NCASSR). Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U), established a framework for
investigative monitoring and observing the conduct of security agencies in the general elections of 2016,
basing on lessons learnt in 2011 and years past. HURINET-U deployed throughout the country especially
in areas considered as hotspots.
One of the features of sovereignty in a modern state is the ability to guarantee the security of its citizens and
territory.1 HURINET-U documented developments around the role of security agencies in the pre-election
period t. The main purpose was to establish the extent to which security agencies displayed the highest level
of integrity, neutrality, professionalism and sense of duty during this process. This study investigated and
analysed the problems and challenges encountered by the Uganda Police Force in its function of delivering
effective policing services for the general elections as required by law and expected by the public.
The report provides an account of the conduct of security agencies (mainstream security agencies, militia
and auxiliary forces) on the eve of polling day, on polling day, and in the days following the declaration of
results. The report spells out various emerging issues observed with a particular focus on their impact on
voting patterns. The report also proffers recommendations for better election management by security
agencies based on the gaps identified.
Remains of the burnt houses in Mivule cell, Namatala ward Mbale town
8.2 Purpose of the Study

The overall objective of the study was to advocate for professional and accountable security agencies to
administer and oversee the 2016 general elections.
The specific objectives of the study were:
a) To monitor and document the readiness of the state of security agencies to police the 2016 general
elections and its impact on the electoral process;
b) To investigate, monitor, and document electoral security coping mechanisms/strategies of non-state

actors-mainly the political party organisations and their impact on the electoral process;
1
64
Susanne, D. Mueller, The Political Economy of Kenyas Crisis, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2 no. 2 (2008):185-210.
c) To monitor and document the adherence of security agencies to the required principles and guidelines
of electoral security as a way of facilitating free and fair elections including, but not limited to, conduct
during party nominations, primaries, registration, update of voter registers and campaigns;
d) To engage relevant stakeholders with the aim of devising measures, mechanisms, and processes that
can be employed to address security related matters in the course of the electoral process.
8.3 Research Design
The study design was cross-sectional and descriptive using both qualitative and quantitative methods of
data collection. A mixed method research approach2 was used which enabled the researchers to enhance
the integrity of findings while allowing the team to offset the weakness of individual methods.3
8.3.1 Sampling
The study employed purposive sampling4 for key political party politicians, media analysts, civil society
activists, Uganda Police Force and the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF). The sample population was
proportionately stratified from the traditional regions of Uganda (North, West, East and Central) as defined
by the project including emerging hotspots after the elections.
8.3.2 Data Collection
The survey was complimented by face-to-face interviews which were held with key stakeholders including
randomly selected members of the police, political party politicians, militia groups, crime preventers, media
analysts, individual voters, and the UPDF. Field visits and Rapid Response Mission (RRM) to incidents of
violation of the law or human rights and incidents relating to elections were also done. This was further
buttressed with desk review and analysis of laws, media and Electoral Commission reports, policies and
court decisions relating to elections in Uganda.
8.4 Field Findings
Pre-Election Period
In the pre-election, one of the major objectives of the security agencies was to foster cooperation among all
the role-players. Other focus areas included: the provision of manpower, training the police in accordance
with the relevant electoral laws, combating intimidation, information and communication, and logistical
support to the police.
8.4.1 Perception of the Role of Security Agencies
During the pre-election phase, there was an atmosphere of mistrust

between citizens and the security agencies. This mutual suspicion
seriously complicated the involvement of the security agencies in the
electoral process. Whilst they were perceived by all key stakeholders in the
process, except perhaps those associated with the NRM party, as biased
in favor of those in power, security agencies saw the suspicion from the
others as unfair, unjustified, and sometimes too harsh. This atmosphere
led to tensions between the security agencies and other stakeholders.
In other instances, security agencies cast themselves in a negative light by

taking sides with one camp. The illegal and/or unwarranted repression of
opposition politicians and activists under the guise of POMA undermined
the relationship between security agencies and citizens.
Mr. Salary, who was allegedly

beaten up by Hon. Kyamadidi,
Mwizi Sub-county
Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions, Sage Publications, London.
Kombo, D. K. and Tromp, D. L. A. (2009). Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction. Kenya: Paulines Publications Africa
65
The police, which is the body mandated with the primary responsibility of keeping law and order, procured
high-tech anti-riot equipment and took on an unprecedented recruitment of some 150,000 new officers
ahead of the elections.
Armoured police cars that Uganda Pimported ahead of its 2016 general election at the Port of Mombasa,
Photo/ELKANA JACOB
There were concerns over the recruitment of crime preventers, in some cases commissioning them adorned
in NRM colours, in addition to the emergence of militia and vigilante groups such as Kalangala Action
Plan, Tough Murder, Red Berret, TJ Solida, Goodlife, B13, Kifeesi, among many pseudo military outfits were
spread around the country.
There were some incidents of violence, although these were isolated and in some cases not connected
to elections. These included tribal clashes in the Rwenzori region between the Bakonjo and Bamba in
2015and several clashes between landlords and squatters in Buganda. There were also land disputes
between citizens and the state as was the case in Amuru and Kyenjojo (Rwizi forest reserve) and in Kampala
suburbs.
8.4.2 Relationship between the Police and Electoral Commission
The police worked closely with the Electoral Commission in all preparations for the general elections (e.g.
in voter registration, updating of the voter register, party primaries, and nomination of parliamentary
and presidential candidates). The police became part of the entire planning process by the Commission
including issuance of media reports and press briefings. This close working relationship nevertheless
continued to attract criticism from some stakeholders, both political parties and civil society, who alleged
that the leadership of the police was interfering with the independence of the Commission. A case in
point is when the police blocked candidate Amama Mbabazi from undertaking consultations prior to his
nomination yet the Commission had cleared him.
8.4.3 Race for Space by Vigilantes and Militias
The pre-election period witnessed the formation of vigilante and militia groups. Surprisingly, some of these
groups were affiliated to renowned political parties while others were affiliated to individual politicians.
However, most of the documented militias were mainly concentrated in Kampala while others sprang up
in remote areas of the country.
66
Table 1: A list of Documented Militia Groups

Name of Militia
District
Sponsor
Membership
NRM High Command
Across the country
NRM
Unknown
TJ Solida
Rubaga
Platform For Truth and Justice
Over 70 youths
B13
NRM 24/7 Youth Group

The Unemployed Youth
Kalangala Action Plan
The Red Belts
The Poor Youth
Forty Five and Funguwa

Barabara
Name unknown but led by

Nkonge & Bitamanya Jorum
Buikwe North NRM Brigade

Youth No Sleep
44 U
Good Life
Akol-Museveni-IkojoOlemkan (AMIO)
Kireka
Kampala
Power 10
Esyomango
Source: HURINET
Munyagwa
Kampala
Iganga- Kigulu South

Kabarole
Buikwe
Col. Tom Butiime
Hon. Mathias Mpuga
Ntungamo
Hon. Yona Musinguzi
Bukedea district
Hon. Akol Rose
Mbarara-Rwampara
Kyenjojo and Fort
Portal Municipality
(Kabarole)
Across the country
Bundibugyo
Hon. Muwuma Milton
Hon. Kangwangye
Masaka
Jinja and Kampala
Amama Mbabazi
NRM
Isingiro
Rubanda West,
Kabale
Mamba
NRM
Kawempe
Tough Murder
Security 1980
FDC
Luwero
Bukedea
Kiboko Squad
NRM
Kampala
Wash & Will
Ssemujju Nganda
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
500
Unknown
Unknown
Over 80
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
About 150
Not known
Anita Among (Woman MP Bukedea

District) and Hon. Tukei Wilberforce 70
(LC5 Chairman Bukedea)
Ngabirano the NRM flag bearer
20
Hon. Alex Ruhumda
65
FDC
60001
Hon. Henry Banyenzaki
FDC
Bakonzo militia group
50
250
8.4.4 Intra-Party Politics, Nominations, and Campaigns

A key element of a democratic system is the capability of political players to accomplish their functions and
ensure effective performance.5 On the road to the 2016 general elections, major political parties spelt out
party activities including registration of their members, delegates conferences, election of flag bearers,
and development of rules and regulations, among other initiatives.
There was party in-fighting that led to factions such Norbert Maos faction versus Lukwagos Platform
for Truth and Justice in Democratic Party (DP), Musevenis faction versus Amamas Go Forward in NRM,
and Olara Otunnus faction versus Jimmy Akenas faction in UPC. Consequently, several violent incidents
erupted between rival camps, including use of machetes and other weapons as well as destruction and
burning of property as it happened when the Sembabule District NRM offices were set ablaze.
5
Yusuf Kiranda (2010), Reality Check: The State of Multiparty Democracy in Uganda, p. 104.
67
After party primaries, it was observed that most losers particularly in NRM chose to contest as independent
candidates given the manner in which the primaries were conducted. This further intensified the rivalry
hence leading to the electoral irregularities that were reported in the general elections.
In the run-up to the elections, the controversial large scale nationwide recruitment of crime preventers
and subsequent emergence of militias and vigilantes, acting outside a clear legal framework, was broadly
perceived as adding fuel to an already explosive pre-election atmosphere.
8.5 Election Day
Officers of the Commission were in control of the polling stations. The tally centres and polling stations
were equipped with emergency power supply to provide lighting through the ballot counting process
where it continued in the night.
The police escorted the ballot boxes and secured the areas where the boxes were kept after the first and
second days of voting. At polling stations voters were searched for explosives and other dangerous objects.
They guarded the polling stations during the night and secured the premises when the votes were being
counted. This is also a crucial stage because tampering with ballot boxes would almost certainly lead to
violence.
Security on polling day especially at polling stations was largely manned by polling constables who were
dressed in police uniforms without names. They confessed to having been recruited as crime preventers.
Nevertheless, some were Special Police Constables (SPCs) filling the position of the polling constable as
required by the Electoral Commission. Other polling stations were manned by Prison Officers such as in
Budadiri East.
8.5.1 Partisanship on Polling Day
Most of the security personnel at the polling stations were largely neutral and did not engage in any form
of partisan politics apart from a few cases where a Commissioner of Police (CP) and polling constable were
assisting the elderly to vote. This was contrary to the principle that guides should be neutral participants.
Cases of this nature were cited at Bugusege polling station and Buteza Primary School, all of which were in
Budadiri West Constituency.
Senior members of the police and UPDF made political statements that questioned their constitutional
responsibility of being impartial and compromised the legitimacy of the opposition to contest for the
presidency. A case in point was Brig. Charles Otema who openly campaigned in Gulu district; Maj. Gen.
Oketa in Kilak, Amuru district; Brig. Fred Tolit in Pader district;and Capt. Labol in Kitgum district.
8.6 Post-Election Security Issues
The post-election period was characterised by sporadic violence in different parts of the country. In
response, the police and UPDF deployed heavily in the districts considered to be hotspots. However,
HURINET-U observed clashes in Bundibugyo, especially following the declaration of the NRM party
candidate Ronald Mutegeki as the winner of a hotly contested LCV chairmanship race between him and
independent candidate Jolly Tibamanya.
The tribal clashes between Bamba and Bakonzo left numerous casualties. The clashes took place in the
sub-counties of Kirumya, Bundimulegya and Bukonzo. The clashes adversely affected the livelihoods of the
two communities in the following ways:
a) At least 10 people died including two children and a pregnant woman. One was shot while the other
nine were hacked using machetes, pangas, and spears.
b) About 32 were hospitalized in Fort Portal referral hospital and in different dispensaries.
c) More than 32 houses were burnt in the parishes of Bundikeki and Katumba.
68
Some of the plantations destroyed during the post-election violence in Kasese and some of the 32 houses burnt in
Bundikeki and Katumba parishes, Kasese District
In Mbale, attackers burned huts believed to belong to NRM supporters in Muvuule, Shiduda Cell and
Bubilabi cell in Namatala Ward in Industrial division, Mbale Municipality. A total of 21 grass-thatched
houses were set on fire in Mivule Cell (13), Bubirabi Cell (2), and Shiduda Cell (6).
It was suspected that the attacks were masterminded by P10 [election mobilization militia group of FDC]
against NRM supporters and/or mobilisers.There were clashes in the Rwenzori region, Kasese district, after
the 24 February 2016 LC V elections. These clashes resulted from dissatisfaction by some candidates and
their supporters. The violence started in Busengerwa village of Busaru sub-county where one person was
shot dead by a former UPDF guide called Museveni Bonifance, alias Bhangi.This led to retaliatory attacks in
Busaru, Ngamba, and Kirumya sub-counties.The clashes left 15 civilians dead and four injured. Damaged
property included 139 houses that were set ablaze. Following these incidents, 80 suspects were charged
with murder in the High Court in Fort Portal on 11March 2016. Bhangi, the alleged killer who started it
all, was arrested in Busaru sub-county in Bundibugyo district. Police continued with investigations and the
hunt for other suspects.
8.7 Lessons Learnt
Issues concerning security during the electoral period must be addressed in order to improve the quality
of the electoral process. Security agencies can either cause insecurity or foster peace by the nature of their
involvement in the electoral process. In fact, observations of the 2016 general elections revealed that there
were instances where security agencies deliberately interfered in elections in one way or the other. In
other cases their performance fell below expectations leading to the loss of public confidence.
69

1. An election is a period of heightened tensions. Conflict and violence are becoming embedded in the
Ugandan electoral process because of a range of security, political, economic, and social factors. These
factors create susceptibilities to and incentivize the use of violence to destabilise and discredit the electoral
process as well as to achieve political gain.
2. The 2016 electoral process was blemished by preventable organisationaland logistical failures that led
to an unacceptable number of voters being disenfranchised. From the onset, the Electoral Commission
did not have the publics confidence to deliver a free, fair, and credible election. The Commission did
not provide timely information and space within which the citizenry and stakeholders could discuss
electoral programmes. The late introduction of the biometric voting system, voter location slips, and the
new modalities in the voter registry were not preceded by thorough civic education and debate among
stakeholders, a situation that reinforced peoples suspicion of the efficiency of the commission.
3. The police, on the other hand, is yet to internalise its constitutional role as an impartial enforcer of
electoral laws. It would be easier for citizens to comply with electoral laws if they had confidence that
the police were impartial. The security forces therefore ought to desist from the use of excessive force in
their engagement with citizens during the election period as it only contributes to heightened tensions.
The level of political intolerance as well as limitations placed on the freedom of movement and assembly
undermined the openness of the electoral process. An open, democratic society should embrace differences
in opinion, creed, and foster access to information.
As already observed, the pre-electoral process was generally peaceful until a few days to the polling day.
The shortcomings of the security agencies either individually or collectively were inconsistent with the
requirements of the legal framework for elections in Uganda and with international and continental
principles and obligations for democratic elections. These shortcomings in turn undermined the integrity
of the elections.
70
CHAPTER 9
Media Coverage of the Elections
71
9.1 Introduction
As the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)Office for has rightly noted, given
the key role the media play in elections, any observation effort should pay significant attention to the
activities of the media and their coverage of elections.1 Media monitoring can document whether coverage
contributed to a free and fair election or subverted the process. But it can also be a process of constructive
intervention whereby gaps in and concerns about coverage are addressed before the elections.
The purpose of the media monitoring project was to assess the nature of media coverage of the 2016
general elections, document whether media coverage contributes to a free and fair election or subverts the
electoral process, and promote professionalism in media coverage.
The goal of media monitoring was to contribute to accurate, fair, impartial and balanced coverage of the
2016 elections. The specific objectives included the following:
1. To monitor, document and share trends in media coverage of the 2016 general elections;
2. To monitor media compliance with election reporting guidelines and regulations;
3. To influence journalists, editors and media owners to provide information that is more accurate,
impartial and fair; and
4. To empower civil society and the public to demand adherence to professional standards in media
coverage of elections.
The media (can) play five essential roles in elections:
1. Provision of information to enable voters make informed decisions;
2. Provision of platforms for debate through allowing exchange of opinions amongst the different
contending groups and citizens;
3. Acting as a watchdog for fairness during election campaigning and polling; educating the public about
election processes; and
4. Providing voice to the voters.2
Previous media monitoring reports on Ugandan elections indicate that the media often fall short of these
roles. In particular, the following gaps have been observed, among others, in media coverage of past
elections in Uganda.
Bias;
Inaccurate reporting;
Self-censorship;
Poor portrayal of female candidates;
Denial of space or time for political advertising to opposition candidates;
Attempts by political actors, especially those in government, to influence visuals in newspapers and on
television;
Disproportionate attention to candidates and political parties at the expense of voters;
No serious interrogation of candidate promises and claims; and
Predominance of episodic reporting and dearth of issue-based coverage.
1
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2012). Handbook on Media Monitoring for Election Observation Missions. Warsaw,
Poland.
2
72
Marie-Soleil Frre (2010). The Media and Elections in Post-Conflict Central African Countries. Brussels: University of Brussels.
9.2 Monitoring Media Coverage

The media monitoring was anchored around the ethical and professional standards that are expected
to help the media perform the essential roles identified above. These include, but are not limited to, the
following:

Accurate reporting
Distinguishing between news and opinion
Use of and reliance on multiple sources
Corrections and the right of reply
Focus on a diversity of issues
Equitable coverage of the candidates
Balance and fairness in reporting
A good mix of both episodic reporting and issue-based coverage
Interrogation of candidate promises and claims
Provision of adequate background and context
Balance of attention paid to candidates/political parties and the voters
Rejection of bribery of journalists
Independence of media houses and journalists
ACME captured most of these standards in a publication called Guidelines for Media Coverage of Elections
in Uganda against which media monitoring was benchmarked3. Based on international standards and
best practices but sensitive to the Ugandan context, these guidelines highlight the responsibilities and
obligations of the media regarding election coverage and reporting. They were developed through a
participatory process, and most media houses signed on to them.
In August and September ACME engaged media owners and managers in order to generate consensus on
the use of the guidelines as the yardstick for media monitoring.
9.3 Research Questions
The following questions guided the monitoring of media coverage of the elections.
1. What topics do the media focus on in their coverage of the elections?

2. What type of reports do the media produce [News, commentary/opinion, features/special reports,
etc]?
3. What is the nature of the reporting [Conventional, interpretative, investigative]?
4. Who are the sources in media coverage [Ordinary people, party officials, candidates, regulators, civil
society, diplomats, religious leaders, central government officials, local leaders, police/security, etc]?
5. What is the number and gender of the sources?
6. Which political parties are focused on in media coverage?
7. Which presidential candidates are focused on in media coverage?
8. How much time or space is dedicated to each party?
9. How much time or space is dedicated to each presidential candidate?
10. What is the tone of coverage?
11. What is the frequency of personal attacks in media coverage?
12. Do media houses offer the right of reply?
13. How often do news stories interrogate candidate or party promises?
14. How often do news stories include background and context?
3
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2012). Handbook on Media Monitoring for Election Observation Missions. Warsaw,
Poland.
73
9.4 Scope
ACME monitored a purposive sample of print, electronic, and online media. The monitoring focused on
coverage related to the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2016 during the pre- and post-electoral
periods from 1 September 2015 to 31 March 2016. The election-related content being monitored across
the media landscape was defined in terms of, and broadly classified under, three genres: news, current
affairs, and commentary.
9.5 Sample and Sampling Methods
The sample of channels selected for monitoring represented print, electronic, and social media platforms
and is composed of nine newspapers, five televisions channels, 33 radio stations, and Twitter. This choice
of channels constituted a purposive sample designed to capture all facets of the election coverage that the
electorate in its diversity was exposed to.
9.5.1 Print Media
All the major national and regional publications (eight newspapers and one magazine) were included to
ensure a balanced representation, to the extent possible, of every major language group. There were five
English publications and one each in Luganda, Atesot, Luo, and Runyakitara. Five of the newspapers in
this sample (New Vision, Bukedde, Etop, Rupiny, and Orumuri) are published by the Vision Group, a listed
company whose ownership is split more or less equally between the government and private shareholders.
The nine titles together account for nearly all mainstream print media circulation in Uganda. The Vision
Group publications arguably control about three-quarters of the national readership or market.
The titles that make up the newspaper sample, with their publication cycles, are:
1. New Vision (daily)
2. Daily Monitor (daily)
3. The Observer (tri-weekly)
4. The Independent (weekly)
5. Red Pepper (daily)
6. Bukedde (daily)
7. Etop (weekly)
8. Rupiny (weekly)
9. Orumuri (weekly)
9.5.2 Television
The five TV channels included in the sample collectively cover the whole country. All but one broadcast
primarily in English. Bukedde broadcasts in Luganda and is one of the platforms owned by the Vision Group.
Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) is the public broadcaster. The rest of the stations are privatelyowned. The channels included in the TV sample are:
1. Bukedde
2. NBS
3. NTV
4. UBC
5. WBS
9.5.3 Radio
The radio stations selected for monitoring collectively cover the entire country and represent Ugandas seven
major regions: Kampala, Central, Eastern, Western, South-Western, Northern, and North-Western/West Nile.
This sample constitutes about 13% of the 250 or so stations in operation across the country. The selected radio
stations generally accommodate all audience profiles as defined by social class, language, religion, ethnicity,
and geography/geo-politics. Except UBC the public broadcaster, all the other channels are either private,
faith-based, or community radio stations. The stations that make up the radio sample included the following:
74
Public: UBC, Bukedde, Arua One, Radio West while Private: Baba FM, Buddu FM, BushenyiFM, Capital Radio,
Central Broadcasting Services, Dokolo, KagadiBroadcasting Services, Kasese Guide, KFM, Kioga Veritus FM,
Mighty FM, Nenah, Nile, Open Gate FM, Radio Amani, Radio Pacis, Radio Rhino, Radio Sapientia, Rock FM,
Rukungiri FM, Signal FM, Simba, Spice FM, Sun, Top Radio, Voice of Africa FM, Voice of Kigezi, Voice of Life,
Voice of Teso and Voice of Toro.
9.6 Methods of Data Collection
The monitoring mainly relied on quantitative content analysis, although where appropriate informant
interviews were conducted to provide context for the findings.
9.6.1 Content Analysis
Content analysis provided a detailed and multi-faceted picture of the nature and extent of election coverage
in the media as measured on various journalistic and content dimensions of quantity and quality. The
universe of interest consisted of election-related articles that fall under any three of the primary content
genres news, current affairs, and commentary. A standard coding scheme, which outlined the categories
or aspects on which monitoring information was needed and how that information was to be captured,
was employed.
The census method of sampling was employed in selecting the newspaper content included in the
monitoring of print media coverage of the presidential and parliamentary elections. This implies that all
content that fell within the universe of interest is tracked and analyzed. For news content, the story as
represented by its headline was the unit of analysis.
For radio news/current affairs, the monitoring focused on the two most important daily news bulletins
broadcast around the top of the hour during the morning and evening prime listening times between
7:00am 9:00am and 7:00pm 9:00pm.
For TV news/current affairs, the monitoring focused on the two most important daily news bulletins
broadcast at the top of the hour during the morning and evening prime viewing times between 7:00am 9:00am and 7:00pm - 10:00pm.
With regard to radio and TV talk shows, a systematic random sampling approach was used to select the
shows to monitor for those stations that run daily talk shows.
9.6.2 Informant Interviews
Key informant interviews will be conducted to provide insights on the patterns in coverage that the
monitoring findings revealed. These were informed by the issues, observations, and insights generated by
the content analysis. The interviews provided an opportunity to interrogate and illuminate the pertinent
issues with the perspectives of individuals who are familiar with the election-related issues under
investigation.
9.7 Overview of the Results
The election period saw a marked increase in political news, with major media houses dedicating new online
platforms to election news e.g. New Visions http://www.elections.co.ug/ and the Monitors http://www.
monitor.co.ug/elections. Additionally, the major newspapers created more space for election reporting
including innovations such as Monitors Fact-Checker and Truthometre and The New Visions Todays
Agenda Peoples Manifesto, in which reporter asked what issues the public wanted addressed just ahead
of candidates campaign rallies. The period also saw an increase in the number of reports that interrogated
candidate claims, reports that compared candidate positions on major issues, as well as growth in the use
of ordinary people as sources.
75
These positives were negated by the continued disproportionate attention to President Museveni once the
campaigns started, the dominance of male sources, and the predominance of the conventional reporting
approach (he said-she said),and the dearth of investigation, explanation, and analysis.
At the (media content) producer level, journalists reported pressure from government, security and ruling
party officials, which sometimes saw the cancellation of critical radio programmes as well as suspension of
presenters and talk show hosts for entertaining opposition candidates, especially Besigye. There were also
increased cases of assaults and intimidation of journalists, self-censorship, and bribery.
This media monitoring report is time-zoned into the pre-nomination, campaigns and post-election
reporting by the media.
9.7.1 Election Coverage Space and Time
During the pre-nomination period, 582,111.9cm was dedicated to election reporting by the newspapers.
Of this, 308,436cm was occupied by presidential candidates, with Go Forwards Amama Mbabazi leading
with 40.4% of the space. During the campaigns, newspaper space grew nearly eight times to 2,423,503cm
of which 1,752,907cm was dedicated to presidential candidates. President Yoweri Museveni gained in
print coverage reaching 41.3% while Mbabazi lost went down to 27.1%.Forum for Democratic Changes
Kizza Besigye followed in third place at 19.5%.
Throughout the campaign period incumbent Museveni dominated the space in the Vision Group stable
with 53.9% of the coverage in New Vision, 51.3% in Etop, 50.1% in Orumuri, 45.8% in Bukedde and 38.9%
in Rupiny.
Before nominations, 948 stories were reported with the Daily Monitor leading at 27.7% followed by New
Vision at 19.6% and the Red Pepper at 18.3%. The campaigns saw an upward trend of election coverage
with 3,168 stories reported. Again, the Monitor led the dailies with 26.3%, New Visionstood at 21.7% and
Red Pepper at 20%.Bukedde trailed with just 12.4% of the election coverage.
Most of the election reporting (55.5%) was dominated by the presidential election, with the parliamentary
election taking up 31% of the space while 13.1% was taken up by mixed reporting about the two elections.
During the campaigns, newspaper coverage rose by 12.2% to 67.7% for the presidential election.Television
coverage of the presidential coverage was 70.8% while radio coverage was the lowest at 53.8%.
9.7.2 Unequal coverage by public media
By 16 February 2016, results of the total newspaper coverage of the presidential candidates showed that
Vision Group had accorded incumbent Museveni dominant coverage in all its newspapers Etop(52.1%);
New Vision (51.3%); Bukedde (44%); Orumuri(43.4%); andRupiny (41.2%).By contrast the highest coverage
Museveni had received in the private newspapers was 37.6% in the Red Pepper followed by 34.5% in the
Observer, 30.9% in the Monitor and 23.8 in The Independent.
UBC Television also accorded 72.6% of its entire news and commentary on elections to President Museveni4
with the second in the line, Mbabazi, receiving only 12.3% of the coverage. Besigye, the eventual runner-up
in the election, received only 4.5% of UBC coverage. It was also observed that UBC Blue Channel (3.4%)
not only underserved the public with less election reporting, it also offered most of its air time (67.5%) to
the incumbent in contravention of section 24 of Presidential Elections Act, which provides for equitable
coverage of all candidates on public media.
4
The assessment should be based on the cumulative total space accorded to the presidential candidates by the time of the election on 18 February
2016.
76
Senior editors at UBC TV acknowledged that their coverage was tilted towards the incumbent and blamed
it on lack of resources, saying only a quarter of their budget for the coverage of all presidential candidates
was funded. They argued that unlike other candidates, incumbent Museveni still enjoyed the services of the
Presidential Press Unit, which supplied many of the presidents campaign-related stories. But Musevenis
opponents dismissed this as a lame excuse.
Graph 1 on the cumulative space accorded to the presidential candidates by the newspapers from
September to 16 February 2016
Graph 2 showing UBC Radio coverage of the presidential candidates by 16 February 2016
77
Graph 3 on Television reportage of the presidential election by 16 February 2016
9.7.3 Sourcing of Election Stories

Before the nominations, most newspaper stories were single sourced (58.8%); 18.2% were double sourced
and 12.5% were multiple sourced. The Independent (22.2%) had the highest frequency of multiple sourcing
in its stories.
During the campaigns, single sourced stories continued in prevalence although newspapers (56.8%)
performed better compared to TV (62%) and radio (75%).It was observed that single sourcing denied
voters the opportunity to hear diverse perspectives that multiple sourcing tends to generate.
Although candidates and politicians remained the go-to sources during both pre-nomination andthe
campaign period, ordinary people the voterswere a major source category, especially in newspapers.
In terms of gender of sources, women informed only 14% percent of election stories. It was mainly the
weekly newspapers of Rupiny, Etop and Orumuri that made an effort to have more than 30% of their
sources as women.
9.7.4 Topics
In the newspapers, politics was the most dominant topic (58.5%); human rights (7.6%) and security (6.8%)
before nominations. During the campaigns, politics remained dominant although its frequency dropped to
31.6% while the economy (10.8%) and infrastructure (8.9%) gained coverage.
On television, politics took up 30.8% of coverage during the campaigns followed by the economy (10.4%)
and infrastructure (10%).
Politics (44.4%) dominated the campaign period on radio followed by security (10.1%) and the economy
(7.7%).
78
9.7.5 Tone
The tone of the print media coverage in the pre-nomination period was largely neutral (60%), with 22.1%
negative and17.9% deemed positive. Etop (83.3%) had the highest frequency of coverage with a negative
tone while Bukedde reported with the most positive tone (37.8%). Orumuri and Rupiny scored the highest
on neutral tone (100%).5
After nominations, the tone of newspaper coverage remained largely neutral. Mbabazi received the most
negative coverage (17.3%) followed by Besigye (15.4%) and Museveni (14.2%). Maj. Gen. Benon Biraaro
attracted the most positive election coverage (45%) while Mabirizi had the highest frequency of neutral
coverage (77.8%). On television, Kyalya (37.9%) was reported most positively while Mbabazi (15.4%) was
covered most negatively. On radio, Mabirizi attracted the highest frequency of positive coverage (47.9%)
while Mbabazi had the most negative (12.6%).
9.7.6 Interrogation of Candidates Promises
During the campaign period, media houses across all platforms by and large maintained the poor practice
of not questioning claims or promises by candidates. Television did particularly poorly, followed by radio.
Newspapers performed better, but still fell short of what is desirable.
9.7.7 Crowds and Pictures
It is said a picture is worth a thousand words and the election pictorials added impetus to the need by
media for innovation in technology and creative camera angles to report the biggest crowds in panorama.
At the zenith of his campaign Kizza Besigye seemed to have larger crowds at FDC rallies across the country
to the frustration of the NRM strategists who complained about the unfair camera angles by some media
houses.
Overall, Museveni (59.3%) won the front-page picture contest in the presidential election; followed by
Kizza Besigye (33.3%) and Amama Mbabazi (7.4%).The New Vision devoted 80% of its cover page to the
incumbent with a paltry 10% for the main contenders of the opposition who got 10% each. Interestingly,
Red Pepper gave 100% front page pictorial coverage to Besigye. Monitor and Observer both split their
pictorial coverage between Kizza Besigye (50%) and Museveni (50%).
The graph below represents the share of pictures by the top three presidential candidates in 2016
In terms of volume, Orumuri, Etop and Rupiny are regional weeklies which report fewer stories than the dailies.
79
The following table shows the overall picture space devoted to presidential candidates in 2016 by
the English dailies.
Candidate
New Vision
Monitor
Red Pepper
The Observer
Total
Museveni
41.6
29.4
42.1
22.2
33.9
Bwanika
2.6
3.5
2.6
4.4
3.3
Besigye
Mbabazi
Baryamureeba
Kyalya
Biraro
Mabirizi
Total
26.0
23.4
2.6
1.3
1.3
1.3
100.0
9.7.8 Coverage of Elections by Radio
38.8
18.8
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
100.0
23.7
21.1
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
100.0
26.7
22.2
6.7
6.7
4.4
6.7
100.0
30.2
21.2
3.3
2.9
2.4
2.9
100.0
Monitoring results from the campaign period showed that radio, which a majority of Ugandans rely on for
news, continued to lag behind other media forms on both quantity of election stories (in proportionate
terms) as well as on most measures of quality.
In terms of volume of stories, upcountry radio stations, which serve most Ugandans, carried far less election
stories compared to their counterparts in Kampala. This was blamed on the prevailing environment,
which included ownership influences, self-censorship, and intimidation from ruling party and government
officials, as well as low human and financial resources at most upcountry stations.
It was also observed that most of the election coverage on radio fell below the standards required for the
electorate to get quality information. For instance, in January 2016 more than half of the election news
on radio (59%) did not contain background and context, 71% of the stories did not interrogate claims or
promises by candidates, and 78% of the reports relied on single sources. This denies voters the perspective
required to make informed decisions.
9.8 Shutdown of Social Media
The unprecedented blockade of Facebook, Twitter and mobile money ordered by the Uganda
Communications Commission undoubtedly affected the flow of information not only to citizens but also to
media houses. Although many citizens later made an estimated 1.5 million downloads of Virtual Private
Network (VPN) software to reroute their internet connections to return to social media, the damage had
been done.

9.9.1 Use of Public Media
The Uganda Communications Commission and the Electoral Commission should have an acceptable
mechanism steeped within the law and the Constitution that can be relied upon to reign in errant media
houses that violate provisions such as the one requiring equitable access to public media by all presidential
candidates.
9.9.2 Complaints, Verification and Enforcement
As the electoral administrator, the EC should ensure that a proper complaints, verification, adjudication and
enforcement mechanism is in place to respond to complaints about media coverage filed by any aggrieved
party during elections. This authority should not be ceded to other agencies but rather, require of them
to facilitate the delivery of free and fair media coverage of the elections as provided for within the legal
framework.
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CHAPTER 10
Election Day Presidential and Parliamentary Polls
81
10.1 Introduction
The Electoral Commission gazetted 18 February 2016 as the Election Day for the presidential and
parliamentary elections. Accordingly, arrangements were made for the 15,277,198 registered voters to go
to the polls that day. This is in line with article 21, section 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) which states that: everyone has a right to take part in the governance of his country by electing
representatives and the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority to govern and the constitution
of the republic of Uganda which also spells out clearly that every citizen of Uganda of 18 years of age and
above has a right to vote. In light of this, 10.6 million citizens went to the polls.
CEON-U plus international, regional and other domestic observer missions deployed persons to observe
the Election Day processes. Observers were spread all over the districts and constituencies in the country.
10.2 Election-Day Observation Process
CEON-U recruited and deployed 1,270 Short Term Observers who observed the Election Day processes.
There were three categories of Short Term Observers namely: Sample Based Observers, Hot Spot Observers,
District Tally Centre Observers, and Election Day Supervisors.
The Sample Based Observers were carefully selected to ensure that they observe at polling stations which
were randomly selected using the internationally acceptable Sample Based Observation techniques. Of the
28,010 polling stations, 700 were identified using the sample-based observation techniques with technical
assistance from the National Democratic Institute. The sample-based observation methodology provides
the most accurate, timely, data-driven, and comprehensive election observation process. The Short Term
Observers were permanently stationed at a polling station and reported their observations on a timely
basis using special skills and techniques through the Open Data Kit system. They reported using a guided
tool through their personal mobile phones at specific times as prescribed in the guidelines.
The Hot Spot Observers were also permanently stationed at a specific polling station. They were based in
the 10 districts identified earlier from the Long Term Observer reports as districts which were problematic
and needed an additional team to observe the processes. The Hot Spot Observers used the same techniques
as the Short Term Observers to report their observations.
The District Tally Centre Observers observed the tally and tabulation processes which were based at each
of the 112 district tally centres. They too observed and reported the processes using the Open Data Kit
system.
The Election Day Supervisors who were CEON-Us Long Term Observers supervised the Short Term
Election Day Observers. They were not stationed at a polling station as their task was to report on the
electoral environment and critical incidents.
CEON-U established a National Information Center (or data centre) at Hotel Africana. The centre was run
by 50 Data Clerks and eight managers plus a technical team from the National Democratic Institute who
managed the data processing and information dissemination process. The data centre was a collection
point for all reports sent by the Election Day Observers.
10.3 Election Day Observation Findings
During the sample based observation for the 2016 elections, observers watched the opening, voting, and
counting processes as well as the conduct of stakeholders such as Election Commission officials, political
party agents, and security officials. The observers recorded this information on standardised checklists
and reported their findings to the data center. This information was used to evaluate the overall quality of
Election-Day processes.
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The observers sent in six reports via coded text messages at various intervals on polling day, which allowed
CEON-U to rapidly collate and analyse the data in real time as the Election Day unfolded.
According to the reports received from 99% of the Election Day Observers, the polling day was relatively
peaceful as voters freely cast their votes at most polling stations. It was also observed that most polling
officials were well-versed with the polling day procedures and generally followed the legal provisions on
opening of the polling station, set up, voting, closing, and counting.
However, the Electoral Commission fell short of administering its logistical functions in certain districts
especially in Kampala, Wakiso, and Mukono.
10.3.1 Set-up and Opening
The presidential and parliamentary elections acts as amended provide for polling to begin at 7am and
close at 4pm. Forty-one percent of polling stations countrywide opened after 8am, while 4% had not
opened as of 8:30am.1 Some of the polling stations that opened late were in the districts of Iganga, Ibanda,
Isingiro, Jinja, Kampala, Kamwenge, Kibuku, Kisoro, Kyenjonjo, Nakapiripirit, and Wakiso. Some locations
in Kampala were reported to have commenced polling after 2pm.
Although 95% of polling stations had all strategic materials, 5% did not have at least one of the following:
ballot boxes, voter register, ballot papers, indelible ink, Biometric Voter Verification System (BVVS) or
Declaration of Results Form.2
CEON-U noted serious delays in dispatching critical voting materials to various districts such as Kampala,
Wakiso, Jinja, and Kaliro, which led to polling commencing as late as 3pm at some polling stations. In others,
voting did not take place at all. As a result, the Electoral Commission gazetted 19 February 2016 as polling
day for the affected polling stations in Makindye division and Kyebando in Wakiso district. It also extended
voting at some polling stations in Kampala to 7pm. Despite the actions taken by the Electoral Commission
to ensure that voters affected at the mentioned polling stations voted, CEON noted with grave concern that
some voters were disenfranchised due to failure to receive the information about the extended voting time
on February 18, 2016 as they had already given up, in many cases due to fatigue.
In line with Objective VI of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, which provides
for gender balance in all government institutions, 40% of polling officials were women. It was an average
of two females out of five polling officials per polling station.
CEON-U observed that at most of the polling stations, Presiding Officers sealed ballot boxes before
commencement of voting. However, this was not the practice in some polling stations where these officers
did not seal the ballot boxes before commencement of voting.
1
In Kamwenge, the photographs of the parliamentary candidates of Kibale Constituency were mixed up with those of the candidate from Kitagwenda County constituency. This caused a delay in opening of the affected polling stations. Therefore, most of the polling stations affected were
set up after 10:00am.
In Kisoro at Rukonji polling station in Nyarusiza parish, polling assistants did not turn up and the presiding officer had to source from among the
voters those who knew how to read and write to come and assist the opening and set up as well as the rest of the polling process. Polling station
set up commenced at 10:00am.
Lastly in Kyenjojo, at Kaisamba polling station, Kyarusozi sub-county, the polling constables that were supposed to escort the presiding officer
delayed, which caused opening of this polling station at 11:00am
2
For instance, Osukuru polling station A-M in Tororo District, less ballot papers were delivered than required. Instead of delivering 576 ballot
papers, 500 ballot papers were delivered. This caused commotion amongst voters because they worried that some of them would miss voting.
At 3:00PM, ballot papers at Hansanju L to Z polling station for the position of Mwenge North Constituency MP ran out, however voting for other
categories continued. More ballot papers for this position were brought after one hour.
At Kalungu town council N-Z, Kalungu West County in Kalungu district there were no chairs to place the basins and ballot papers which made
voters uncomfortable and worried of who was looking at them while casting their vote.
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People voting at Posta Bulange polling station on 24th March 2016
10.3.2 Conduct of Voting and Functioning of the Biometric System

During the voting process, polling officials at most polling stations followed procedures. In 90% of polling
stations, voters were checked for ink before receiving a ballot, while in many instances, such as in Kampala,
Mukono, Wakiso, Gulu, Arua, Tororo, Butaleja, Kanungu, Lamwo, Kibaale, Kibuku, and Lwengo districts,
voters were not checked for indelible ink before voting.
To a large extent, the biometric system functioned well. The system functioned as expected at 89% of
polling stations. Among the 10% that malfunctioned, 65% were fixed and 13% were replaced. In 1% of
polling stations, there were no biometric devices. Polling stations that voted without these devices were
in Kampala (Kawempe Mbogo Muslim S.S.S and Konge Parents School [A-M], and in Kaliro (Buvurunguti
Primary School). In some polling stations the biometric equipment that malfunctioned were not replaced.3
Polling officials were sufficiently able to use the biometric machines in 91% of polling stations. However,
some polling officials at a number of polling stations failed to operate the machines, for example, in Lamwo,
Bulambuli, Kampala, Wakiso, Namayingo, Mukono, Nebbi, Masindi, Kasese, Kapchorwa, Kween, Jinja, and
Arua.
10.3.3 Voter Education at Polling Stations
At 87% of polling stations, polling officials instructed voters on voting procedures and voters were able
to vote in secret at 80% of polling stations. Seventy-three percent of locations did not have unauthorized
personnel present inside the polling station. However, crime preventers were present at 13% of polling
stations. Ninety-one percent of polling stations did not experience incidents of intimidation, harassment or
violence during the voting. Among the 9% of polling stations that suffered such incidents, election officials
were the targets in 34% of cases, party agents in 24%, observers in 6%, and voters in 39%.
Arua (Opia Primary School polling station), Kabarole (Burungupolling station), Kampala (Migaddes Place (NAN-Z) and Agattis Place(A-M)polling
stations), Kapchorwa (Namukimba polling station), Kasese (Nyangorongo P/School polling station), Masindi (Kihara health center Kyamugwera
Air Field polling stations), Mbarara (Kyonyo Catholic Church polling station), Nebbi (Ther-oyelu Coop Society polling station), Wakiso (Kisozi
A-Kisozi P/SCH polling station), Butaleja (Kusaba Sub/County HQRTS (A-M) polling station), Bududa (Bunamuwenje C.O.U), Lyantonde (Kooki 3C
(o-z) St Francis Nursery SCH), Buikwe (Kavule-Sentamus compound polling station), Bulambuli (Jewa S.D.A P/S polling station) and Namayingo
(Singila Health Center polling station).
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Voters were assisted to voteat 69% of polling stations. Party agents assisted voters in 13% of those polling
stations, which is contrary to the law. This practice was noted in many instances.4
10.3.4 Presence of Party Agents
During voting, party agents of Mbabazi were present at 41% of polling stations and Musevenis agents at
95% of polling stations. Party agents of Besigye were present at 84% of polling stations. All voters who
were in queue by 4pm were able to vote at 87% of polling stations where voting took place.
10.4 Closing and Counting
Polling officials sorted ballots in full view of the candidates agents at 99% of polling stations. There were
no unauthorized personnel present during counting at 69% of polling stations. However, 15% of polling
stations had crime preventers present, who were not authorised persons at polling stations.
In Kasese, counting was disrupted in some polling stations, for instance Nyakakindo Primary School polling
station. At around 7pm when the Presiding Officer started reading the votes, NRM agents blocked FDC
party agents from listening in and obstructed FDC agents so that they could not even come closer to the
place where the announcing of votes was happening. The FDC party agents were denied access to polling
stations and some of them were clubbed and stoned while the NRM agents remained.
The presence of party agents at polling stations is critical for transparency of the electoral process. Party
agents are essential in an election because they can deter fraud, especially if they are vigilant and loyal to
their candidate/party. During counting, party agents of Mbabazi were present at 45% of polling stations,
Musevenis 98%, and Besigyes 93%.
Where party agents of Mbabazi were present, they signed the Declaration of Results forms at 76% of
polling stations while they refused to sign at 4% of the polling stations. Comparative figures for Museveni
are that 97% signed while 3% refused; for Besigye 93% signed while 2% refused. Presidential election
results were posted publicly at 91% of polling stations.
10.5 Tabulation Process
As Election Day concluded, CEON deployed 112 observers to district tallying centres and four observed
the National Tally Centre. Several tally centres experienced long delays in transmitting results, lack of
transparency, as well as disruptions and violence.
Whereas CEON observed that results were posted at 91% of polling stations on Election Day, at the National
Tally Centre results were only released in an aggregated manner. This denied the public the opportunity
to verify the results at the primary level. This lack of transparency created uncertainty which undermined
public confidence in the results. This was compounded by the Electoral Commissions restriction on
observers who were prohibited to declare any quantitative results information. Therefore we recommend
that;
The tabulation process was disrupted in 17% of district tally centres, including Kasese, Mbale, Bulambuli,
Bugiri, Kabaale, Iganga, Buikwe, Jinja, and Bukwo. These disruptions were due to several reasons such
delay to declare results. Military Police were present in 41% of district tallying centres, the army was
present in 15%, and crime preventers in 10%. In Kasese, a 13-year-old boy was shot dead by the military
following the build-up tensions created by the delayed announcement of results.
4
At 10:00am at Bulyangada polling station, Nakigo sub-county in Iganga District, agents of parliamentary candidate named Kyapa were helping
persons to vote, which caused chaos among supporters of Kulubya and voting was disrupted for a while.
At Kiburara primary school polling station in Kagambe parish Kisinga sub-county in Kasese district, a polling constable Namukose called the NRM
presidential candidates agent to assist voters to cast their votes. Observers witnessed that he assisted at least 4 old women.
At Tabiti trading Centre pooling station in Moyo district polling agents were helping voters to tick on ballots during the whole process from
7:00am - 4:00pm. They gave a lame excuse that they were helping to avoid invalid ballot papers.
85
At the district level, party agents of Mbabazi were present at 48% of district tallying centres; Musevenis
93%; and Besigyes 88%. Mbabazis agents disagreed with the presidential results tally from 4% of tally
centres where they were present including in Butambala and Luuka. Musevenis agents disagreed with
the presidential results tally in 4% of centres where they were present, including in Kiboga, Butambala,
Butaleja, Luuka, and Lira. Besigyes agents disagreed with the presidential results tally in 3% of centres,
including in Butambala, Butaleja, and Luuka.
Across district tally centres, CEON observers noted that candidates agents requested a total of six recounts
for presidential election results, which included Moyo, Luuka, and Mbarara. In Jinja and Kabale, the
Declaration of Results forms were not delivered to the district tallying centres. In 20% of district tally
centres, returning officers did not make a copy of sub-county and polling station results available to party
agents and observers.
1. The manner in which the results were released caused disatisfaction among voters. Therefore,
announce the presidential and parliamentary results in a disaggregated manner to build public
confidence in the election outcome and enable independent verification by observers and interested
parties.
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CHAPTER 11
Local Government Elections
87
11.1 Introduction
The Local Government system in Uganda is based on the district as a unit under which there are lower local
governments and administrative unit councils. These include Local Council 5 at district level, Local Council
4 at municipality level, and Local Council 3 at sub-county and municipal division level. These elected local
government councils are accountable to the people and are made up of persons directly elected to represent
electoral areas. The local government council is the highest political authority in its area of jurisdiction.
The councils are corporate bodies having both legislative and executive powers. They have powers to make
local laws and enforce implementation.
Section 101 of the Local Government Act mandates the Electoral Commission to organise, conduct, and
supervise the election of Local Councils (LC). Accordingly, the Electoral Commission organised LC elections
on 24February 2016 for LC5/district level, 2 March 2016 for municipal council, and 9 March 2016 for LC3/
sub-counties.
88
CEON-Us observed these elections focusing on the preparedness of the Electoral Commission, handling of
the voting process, and citizens participation. CEON-Us observation looked at the following aspects:
Polling station opening time
Time of commencement of voting
Presence of relevant polling materials
Functionality of the biometric machines
Presence of political party agents
Voter bribery and campaigning at polling stations
Competence of the polling station election officials
Presence of unauthorized persons at the polling stations
Transportation of voters
Intimidation and harassment of voters, agents, observers and polling station officials
This chapter highlights the key findings from our observation of LC5, municipal council and LC3 elections.
The analysis is based on the polling stations observed.
11.2 Methodology
CEON deployed 223 Long Term Observers in 223 constituencies in all 112 districts for the LC5 and LC3
elections. CEON-U deployed observers to polling stations for municipal council elections in 43 municipalities.
The observers were equipped with tools and equipment to enable them to carry out observations and
produce their reports. They were tasked to observe at least five polling stations. The choice of polling
stations to be observed depended on accessibility or any unique features of the polling area being observed.
On 24 February 2016, LC5 elections were held with only 198 out of the 233 observers actually reporting.
Most of the observers visited between three and five polling stations each. Our observers visited 936
polling stations.
For LC3 elections held on 9 March 2016, CEON deployed 223 Long Term Observers in all 112 districts. We
received reports from 218 observers from 933 polling stations.
Regarding the municipal council elections held on 2 March 2016, CEON observed polling in 43 municipalities
country-wide at 175 polling stations.
11.3 Key Findings
11.3.1 Opening Time and Commencement of Voting

The Electoral Commission guidelines for conduct of elections provide for commencement of voting at 7am.
Opening polling stations on time allows voters ample time to vote. Out of 936 polling stations observed
for the LC5 elections, 712 (78%) opened late. During the municipality polls, out of 175 polling stations
observed, 121 (69%) opened late. During the LC3 polls, out of 933 polling stations observed, 741 (79%)
opened late.
With regard to commencement of voting during the LC and municipality elections, voting at most polling
stations started late. It was observed that out of 936 polling stations observed during the LC5 elections,
784 (84%) did not commence voting in time. During the municipality elections, 156 (84%) polling stations
out of 175 commenced voting late. It was the same trend for the LC3 elections whereby 774 (83%) of
polling stations out of 933 started late to vote.
For the LC5 and LC3 elections, most of the polling stations that began voting after 8am were located in
Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Busoga regions while for the municipal council elections, several polling
stations visited in Mityana, Kampala, Masaka, Wakiso Gulu, Mbarara, Hoima Mbale, and Jinja begun voting
after 8am.
89
11.3.2 Delivery and Functionality of Strategic Materials at Polling Stations

A smooth conduct of an election requires that all materials are present at the polling station in good time.
However, during the LC5 and LC3 elections key items such as ballot boxes, voter register, indelible ink,
biometric voter verification system, declaration of results forms, and metallic black boxes were missing in
some polling stations.
For instance during LC5 election, 11 polling stations were missing ballot boxes and 32 had no Declaration
of Results forms. For LC3 elections, seven polling stations missed ballot boxes, seven were without voter
registers, 52 missed indelible ink, 49 had no biometric devices, and 14 were without declaration forms. For
municipality elections, two polling stations missed voter registers while five had no indelible ink.
Although over 88% of the biometric machines worked very well during the conduct of the LC elections,
failure and absence at some polling stations defeated the very purpose why biometric verification of voters
was introduced.
11.3.3 Presence of Party Agents
The law allows political party or candidates agents to be present at a polling station to represent the
interests of their candidate. Most polling stations that CEON-U observers were at during the three LC
elections had agents. However, some parties/candidates were not represented at some polling stations.
11.3.4 Voter Bribery
Voter bribery is an offence. According to section 147 of the Local Government Act, a person who with
intent, either before or during an election, either directly or indirectly, influences another person to vote
or refrain from voting any candidate, or gives, provides or causes to be given or provided any money or
materials to influence a persons voting, commits an illegal practice or offence of bribery. It is also an
offence for someone to receive a bribe. Voter bribery deprives voters of the opportunity to freely decide
who to vote for. Yet, due to ignorance of the law and impunity, voter bribery was rampant during these
elections as shown in the table below.
Voter Bribery in Local Government Elections

Local Government Level
No. of Polling Stations
LC5
113 (13%)
LC3
Municipalities
11.3.5 Transportation of Voters
1 21(13%)
20 (11.4%)
According to the various legal instruments on elections in Uganda and in particular section 155 of the Local
Government Act (2005), no person shall on any polling day and in relation to elections, canvas for votes.
CEON-U observers witnessed people being transported to polling stations.For Instance at Namabwera 2
polling station in Nandala where an NRM candidate called Kyakulaga was transporting people from their
homes to the polling station using boda boda to come and vote for him. This happened at around 11:00am
and this was because people were lazy to walk the long distances. However people were okay with this and
they responded to the voting using the boda boda paid by Kyakulaga1.
This could have been used as a means of campaigning or canvassing for votes on Election Day, which is
an act of bribery. Reports from CEON-U indicate that NRM candidates transported the highest number
of voters followed by Independents and FDC flag bearers as shown in the table below. This happended
in Iganga/Kigulu North at Nabwera Polling station were a one Kyakulagaan NRM candidate was cited
transporting voters who were lazy to walk to their polling stations.
1
90
CEON-U Election Day Incidents Log.
Transportation of Voters by Parties/Candidates during LC Elections

PARTY/CANDIDATE
FDC
ELECTION
LC 5
(No. of Polling Stations
of 936 Observed)
MUNICIPALITY
of 175 Observed)
LC III
of 933 Observed)
192
39
197
21
NRM
DP
18
16
JEEMA
UPC
11
INDEPENDENTS
31
103
NO TRANSPORTATION
37
32
27
592
127
80
11.3.6 Intimidation, Harassment and Violence
505
Violence, intimidation, and harassment are common occurrences during elections in Uganda. These often
take place before, on, and after Election Day. According to section 154 of the Local Government Act (2005),
it is an offence if a person directly or indirectly through another person, makes use of or threatens to make
use of any force or violence, inflicts or threatens to inflict physical or spiritual injury, harm or damage.
Cases of intimidation, violence, and harassment were observed during LC5, LC3, and municipality elections
as shown in the table below.
Incidence of Intimidation, Violence, and Harassment during LC5, LC3, and MunicipalityElections
Local Government Level
No. of Polling Stations Affected
LC5
28
LC3
23
Municipalities
13
11.3.7 Unauthorized Persons
According to the law, the only persons authorised to be at polling stations are the election officials,
candidates and political party agents, observers, security officials assigned to be at a particular polling
station, voters, and candidates. CEON-U observers sighted unauthorised persons including police, crime
preventers, and army personnel at various polling stations as shown in the table below.
Presence of Unauthorized Persons at Polling Stations during LC Elections
UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS
IN POLLING STATIONS
POLICE
ARMY
CRIME PREVENTORS
NO UNAUTHORIZED
PERSONS
ELECTION
LC5
MUNICIPALITY
(No. of Polling Stations of (No. of Polling Stations
936 Observed)
of 175 P Observed)
219
61
163
21
17
537
90
LC3
of 933 Observed)
194
9
90
293
91

1. In the LC5 elections, CEON-U observers reported voting problems at 123 polling stations. Election
officials made mistakes at 73 polling stations. Mistakes like not painting voters fingers with indelible
ink. In Arua Municipality, a register was delivered to Padyere A-Z polling station at 2:00pm and polls
were started at 2:30pm. However, the electoral officials closed the station at 4:00pm. This denied
many voters who had assumed voting time had been extended a chance to cast their vote. CEON-U
observers cited boxes not being sealed prior to commencement of polling, issuing of pre ticked ballot
papers, chasing away voters during counting and tabulation. At 28 polling stations procedures were not
systematically followed, while voting was marred by incidents of violence, intimidation, harassment,
and vote buying at 22 polling stations.
2. For municipal elections, observers registered 29 problematic polling stations. Electoral Commission
officials made mistakes at 17 polling stations. Voting procedures were not systematically followed at
five polling stations, while voting was marred by incidents of violence, intimidation, harassment, and
vote buying at seven polling stations.
92
CHAPTER 12
Post-Election Environment
12.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an account of the post-election observation exercise from 19 February to 31 March 2016.
CEON-U had a mandatetoobserve the electoral processesbefore,during,andafterElection Day,recognising
that elections are part of a larger election cycle. According to CEON-Us election observation roadmap,
post-election observation was one of the key planned activities. Developments during this phase of the
electoral cycle are critical to the integrity of the entireelectoral process.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon CEON-U observers toremainfocusedand vigilantthroughthe days that
followed the general elections. Post-election activities began soon after the presidential and parliamentary
elections and after each of the LC elections. The Post-election observation was aimed to follow up on claims
made during the pre-election and Election Day processes, to verify the issues raised, and to gauge peoples
perceptions and recommendations about the electoral process. Long Term Observers in the field continued
to operate within their assigned electoral areas and were complemented by teams at the secretariat.
The areas of interest in Post-Election observation included:
a. Transparency during results declaration at polling stations
b. Results tabulation and announcement
c. Records of Election Day activities
d. Observers access to Post-Election processes and information
e. Post-election political environment
12.2 Methodology
During the Post-Election period, CEON-U deployed 223 Long Term Observers in 223 constituencies
distributed in all the 112 districts of Uganda. The Long Term Observers reported on a weekly basis after
elections for four weeks till the end of March 2016. A high response rate was recorded in the first week; out
of the 223 observers deployed, 190 (85%) submitted reports during the reporting period while 33 (15%)
did not submit any reports. In the second and third weeks, the response rate increased to 98% with 218
Long Term Observers submitting their reports while five (2%) failed to submit. There was a decline in the
response rate in the fourth and final reporting week as only 188 (84%) observers submitted reports; while
35 (16%) did not submit reports.
12.3 Summary of Findings by the Long Term Observers
12.3.1 Election Related Complaints to the Electoral Commission

In the first week, 23 Long Term Observers (12%) reported being witness to election-related complaints
filed at their local Electoral Commission offices. In 54 constituencies (28%), observers reported that
they heard about election-related disputes reported to the Commissions offices within their area. In 113
constituencies (59%), observers were not aware of any election-related disputes in their constituencies.
In the second week of reporting, there was a reduction in the number of election-related disputes filed at
local Electoral Commission offices. In 11 constituencies (5%), CEON-U observers reported witnessing the
filing of election-related disputes at local offices of the Commission. In 17 constituencies (36%), Long Term
Observers reported hearing about election-related complaints filed at the district Electoral Commission
offices while 171 (78%) neither witnessed nor heard of election-related disputes being filed at local offices
of the Commission.
More reduction was recorded in the third reporting week. Eleven Long Term Observers (5%) reported
witnessing election-related disputes being filed. In 24 constituencies (11%), the observers reported hearing
about election-related complaints while in 183 constituencies (84%) no activity related to complaints was
registered.
94
A more drastic reduction was observed in the fourth week with only eight Long Term Observers in eight
constituencies (4%) reporting that they witnessed election-related complaints. Fourteen observers
(7%) reported hearing about election-related disputes being filed in their constituencies while in 166
constituencies (88%), no activity related to filing election-related disputes was observed.
12.3.2 Parliamentary and LC Aspirants Petitioning Courts for Vote Recounts

During the first post-election week, aspiring parliamentary and LC candidates in 32 constituencies (17%)
petitioned magistrates courts for vote recounts. No petitions were reported in 153 constituencies (81%).
In five constituencies (3%) the courts refused to share information with our observers.
Table: Election Related Complaints to the Electoral Commission
Election Related Complaints to the Electoral Commission
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
LTOs who witnessed

complaints being reported
Constituencies where
complaints were reported
Constituencies where no
complaints were reported
23 (12%)
54 (28%)
113 (59%)
11 (5%)
11 (5%)
8 (4%)
12.3.3 Vote Recounting
17 (36%)
171 (78%)
24 (11%)
183 (84%)
14 (7%)
166 (88%)
During the first week, parliamentary votes were recounted in 10 constituencies (5%); LC 5 votes in two
constituencies (1%), and none for LC4 and LC2 elections. In five constituencies (3%) of Kampala Central
Division, Lwemiyaga County, Bukoto County South, Budadiri County West Hoima Municipality, Kole North
County, Erute County South the courts refused to share information with our observers.
In Butambala, for example, the post-election period resulted in one court petition over election-related
irregularities in Budde constituency where the woman MP aspirant, Aisha Kabanda, disputed the vote
tallying that, in her view, favoured Lydia Mirembe who emerged winner. Kabandas pleas for vote recounting
in Mpigi were ignored. Her appeal was equally fruitless when on the 29 March 2016 the Nakawa High
Court threw out her application since the Electoral Commission had already gazetted Mirembes as the
duly elected MP.
Mayuge District registered three petitions for vote recounts. One for the woman councillor for LC3 was
granted; but the one for MP was denied for lack of evidence to warrant a recount.
12.3.4 High Court Petitions to Set Aside Elections
Table: Parliamentary and LC Aspirants Petitioning Courts for Vote Recounts

Parliamentary and LC Aspirants Petitioning Courts for Vote Recounts
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Constituencies where aspirants filed

petitions
Constituencies where no aspirants filed

petitions
19 (9%)
182 (83%)
32 (17%)
17 (8%)
11 (6%)
153 (81%)
194 (8%)
174 (3%)
High Court Petitions to Set Aside Elections (no. of constituencies)
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Parliament
21 (11%)
15 (7%)
11 (5%)
13 (7%)
LC5
4 (2%)
5 (2%)
3 (1%)
3 (2%)
LC4
2 (1%)
3 (1%)
LC2
3 (1%)
95
No.
Region
District
Constituency
Acholi
Gulu
Omoro County
Buganda
Butambala
Butambala County
Acholi
Agago
Buganda
Rakai
Buganda
Rukungiri Municipality
Kisoro
Lango
28
Kabale Municipality
Rukungiri
Kigezi
27
Chekwii County (Kadam)
Kabale
Kigezi
26
Pian County
Nakapiripirit
Kigezi
25
Jinja Municipality East
Nakapiripirit
Karamoja
24
Luuka North County
Jinja
Karamoja
23
Bunya County East
Luuka
Busoga
22
Bulamogi County
Mayuge
Busoga
21
Kigulu County North
Kaliro
Busoga
20
Iganga Municipality
Iganga
Busoga
19
Kibuku County
Iganga
Busoga
18
Pallisa County
Kibuku
Busoga
17
Samia Bugwe County North
Pallisa
Bukedi
16
Bulambuli
Busia
Bukedi
15
Budadiri County East
Bulambuli
Bukedi
14
Bungokho County North
Sironko
Bugisu
13
Bukomansimbi
Mbale
Bugisu
12
Mukono South
Bukomansimbi
Bugisu
11
Butambala County
Mukono
Buganda
10
Mukono Municipality
Butambala
Buganda
Lwemiyaga County
Mukono
Buganda
Kooki County
Ssembabule
Buganda
Agago North County
Bufumbira County East
Alebtong
Rwenzori
Moroto
Kyenjojo
Mwenge County North
12.3.5 Theft and Damage to Electoral Materials

Theft and Damage to Electoral Materials (no. of constituencies)
Actual reports
Unconfirmed reports
No reports
Week 1
5 (3%)
29 (15%)
156 (82%)
Week 4
183 (97%)
Week 2
Week 3
96
4 (2%)
3 (1%)
16 (7%)
8 (4%)
198 (91%)
207 (95%)
12.3.6 Bribing of Candidates to Settle Post-Election Disputes

Bribing of Candidates to Settle Post-Election Disputes (no. of constituencies)
Actual incidents
Unconfirmed incidents
No incidents
Week 1
2 (1%)
7 (4%)
181 (95%)
Week 4
7 (4%)
181 (96%)
Week 2
Week 3
7 (4%)
3
210 (96%)
212 (97%)
During post-election period, CEON observed instances where candidates were bribed to settle postelection disputes. These includes Butambala, Manafwa, Kisoro, Kampala and Budibugyo districts, in
the constituencies of Butambala county, Bubulo County West, Bufumbira County East, Kampala Central
Division and Bughendera County respectively.
12.3.8 Candidates Inciting Violence over Election Results/Processes
Candidates Inciting Violence over Election Results/Processes (no. of constituencies)

Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Actual incidents
No incidents
6 (3%)
11 (5%)
201 (92%)
8 (4%)
1
1
14 (7%)
3 (1%)
3 (2%)
168 (88%)
214 (98%)
184 (98%)
In the districts of Kiruhura, Rakai, Kaabong, Kisoro, Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Yumbe, Masaka, inthe
constituencies of Kazo County,Kooki County,Dodoth West County,Bufumbira County East,Bwamba
County,Fort Portal Municipality,Aringa County,Bukoto County East respectively candidates were observed
inciting supporters over election results.
12.3.9 Attacks on Candidates/Supporters by Security Agents
Attacks on Candidates/Supporters by Security Agents (no. of constituencies)

Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Actual incidents
No incidents
2 (1%)
9 (4%)
207 (95%)
4 (2%)
2 (1%)
2 (1%)
13 (7%)
3 (7%)
2 (7%)
173 (91%)
213 (98%)
184 (98%)
12.3.10 Riots, Threatening Violence, Damage to Property, and Public Demonstrations

Riots, Threatening Violence, Damage to Property, and Public Demonstrations (no. of constituencies)
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Actual incidents
No incidents
5 (2%)
16 (7%)
197 (90%0
12 (6%)
3 (1%)
4 (2%)
11
7 (3%)
6 (3%)
167
208 (95%)
178 (95%)
In Rakai, Bundibugyo and Kasese in the constituencies of Kooki County, Bughendera, Bwanba and
Busongora North repspectively there was threatened violence and damage to property.
97
12.3.11 Arrests for Post-Election Violence/Crimes

Arrests for Post-Election Violence/Crimes (no. of constituencies)
Week 1
Actual incidents
No incidents
10 (5%)
208 (93%)
31 (16%)
Week 2
24 (11%)
Week 3
Week 4
13 (7%)
159 (84%)
194 (89%)
175 (93%)
The table below shows some of the locations where post- election violence took place
Region
Constituency
Ankole
Uganda
Isingiro
Isingiro County North
Buganda
Uganda
Lwengo
Bukoto Countysouth
Ankole
Buganda
Buganda
Buganda
Buganda
Buganda
Buganda
Buganda
Bukedi
Bunyoro
Busoga
Busoga
Busoga
Busoga
Karamoja
Karamoja
Kigezi
Lango
Rwenzori
Rwenzori
Rwenzori
West Nile
West Nile
West Nile
Bukedi
Bugisu
Bugisu
West Nile
Acholi
98
District
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Ntungamo
Kampala
Luweero
Nakaseke
Nakasongola
Buikwe
Buikwe
Mukono
Kibuku
Hoima
Bugiri
Jinja
Kamuli
Mayuge
Kaabong
Kaabong
Kabale
Kole
Bundibugyo
Kabarole
Kasese
Moyo
Nebbi
Yumbe
Bukedea
Bulambuli
Manafwa
Adjumani
Amuru
Ntungamo Municipality
Kampala Central Division

Katikamu County North
Nakaseke North County
Budyebo County
Buikwe South
Buikwe County North

Mukono Municipality
Kibuku County
Hoima Municipality
Bukooli North
Kagoma County
Kamuli Municipality
Bunya County East
Dodoth East County
Dodoth West County

Rukiga County
Kole North County

Bwamba County
Fort Portal Municipality

Kasese Municipality
West Moyo County
Padyere County
Aringa County
Bukedea
Bulambuli
Bubulo County West
Adjumani East County

Kilak South County
CHAPTER 13
Special Interest Group Elections
99
13.1 Youth
13.1.1 Introduction
The law provides for election of youth representatives to Parliament and other administrative structures.
The Electoral Commission is responsible for organising and conducting youth elections. The Constitution
provides that youth are to be represented in parliament by five MPs. Article 78(1) of the Constitution
provides for the composition of parliament. It includes, among others, youth, workers, and persons with
disabilities.
The Parliamentary Elections Act states that the representative of the youth shall be elected in a manner
prescribed by regulations made by the minster. Under section 100Parliamentary Elections Act district
youth councils within the region of representation are constituted into an electoral college. The women
youth representative is elected by a national youth conference - one for each of the regions,that is, North,
Eastern, Central, and Western.
The election of youth MPs is conducted by an electoral college which is made up of regional youth committees.
The youth committees are composed of nine persons each elected through a process which begins at village
level. There are 57,364 villages in Uganda and each elects a nine-member youth committee which proceeds
to elect another nine-member committee at parish level. The successful members elected at parish level
proceed to electing nine members who form a sub-county committee. Those that are elected at the subcounty level then proceed to elect the nine-member district committees. The district committees are then
collapsed into four regional youth committees. Each of the four regional youth committees converges at a
given place and elects one youth representative for that region to parliament. The fifth youth MP, who must
be a female, is then elected by a national youth council which is composed of three members from each
District Youth Committee.
13.1.2 Findings
On 28 February 2016, the Youth Electoral College converged in the districts of Masaka, Kabarole, and Gulu
to vote for their M Ps. On 7 March 2016 they headed to Hoima to elect the youth female representative. On
24 March 2016 they were in Jinja to vote for the Eastern youth parliamentarian.
100
Region
Youth MP
elected
Party
Affiliation
Northern
Mr Oscar
OmonyOtema,
Western
MwineMpaka
NRM
Central
Ms. Sarah
Babirye
NRM
Eastern
Mafabi
Ismail
Independent
Remarks
A total of 983 youth delegates from 30 districts within northern

Uganda participated in the election. Mr Omony received 533 votes
while his closest rival Mr Abdul got 449 votes and FDCs Innocent
Ayo garnered only one vote.
Mr MwineMpaka (NRM) won with 660 votes against Amanyas

(Independent) 463 while Fortunate Nuwasasira (Independent)
polled 10. The total number of valid votes cast was 1,135. Mr
Mpaka was declared winner at 3am by Mr VallyKanzira, the district
returning officer Kabarole.
Ms Babirye (NRM) was elected with 323 votes to become youth
MP for central region against Arthur Katongole, an independent
candidate who garnered 298 votes. Thomas Kayanja, third
candidate only got four votes. The regional Electoral Commission
officer Nambutu Leticia at 1.30 am in the morning amid tight
security from both the Uganda Police Force and the Army
announced Babirye as winner
Mr. Mafabi polled 752 while the runner up Okware Dorothy of the
NRM polled 428. The total number of valid votes cast was 1396.
The elections were held under varying circumstances. In Gulu, the elections were fairly peaceful and the
laws guiding the youth election process were followed. On the contrary, in Kabarole where the western
region youth MP election took place, violence and bribery were evident. The election in Kabarole revealed
the involvement and interference of key government officials whose relatives were contesting in the
election. The former head of the Internal Security Organisation, Lt. Gen. (Rtd) Henry Tumukunde is father
of AmanyaTumukunde while the Minister of State for Agriculture, Lt. Col. (Rtd) Bright Rwamirama, is the
father of MwineMpaka. The Inspector General of Police, Gen. Kale Kayihura, was also dragged into the tug
of war that the Kabarole youth polls were.
13.1.3 Issues of Concern
CEON-U in collaboration with Uganda Youth Network (UYONET) noted a number of important issues that
have a bearing on the youth election processes and outcomes. These issues need to be addressed in future to
ensure that youth elections are conducted in a manner that will enhance credibility of the election process.
Some of the issues are highlighted below:
a. Voting began late. In some cases it started at 4pm and went on up to 12.30am. The counting and tallying
of votes stretched to 3am. This is not in tandem with the provisions of the law.
b. The youth parliamentary elections were conducted like an emergency. The Electoral Commission
seems not to have been ready to conduct the elections even though they were clearly provided for in
the road map.
c. The interference of certain senior security officialsand political leaders in the electoral process made
it appear like a contest among military generals and powerful families. This was the case in Kabarole
and Gulu.
d. The heavy deployment of security forces at the voting venues did not serve a clear purpose and was
uncalled for.
e. Young people voted mostly under a block vote basing on ethnicity.
A number of legal provisions were flouted during the youth MP elections. For instance, voting in secrecy
was not observed and voter bribery was at play in some cases. Delegates were asked to take photos as they
voted for which they were rewarded with UGX 50,000.1 Polling time was disregarded in contravention of
current laws.2 In Kabarole non-delegates carried firearms in the polling stationin contravention of the law.3
Failure to follow nomination procedures was the case for candidate RonahKemirembe whose nomination
was blocked on the ground that she was outside the legal time limit. But a critical analysis revealed that
there was no communication on nomination time, neither was the time adequate to complete all the
procedures such as paying of nomination fees. The Electoral Commission needs to improve in this area and
to assure the public that is impartial.4
13.1.4 Conclusion
Youth are an interest group whose inclusion in Parliament has been contested. Nevertheless, the youth are
a significant factor that cannot be ignored as far the economic, social, and political development of Uganda
is concerned. They are a large percentage of the population and must be accommodated in the countrys
governance structures. Therefore, a process of selecting their representatives is critical and must be wellorganised and managed.
A key observation made by UYONET is that young people are not apathetic or unwilling to participate, but
rather feel that the political system is neither sufficiently listening nor sufficiently adapting to their hopes
and needs.5 This calls for ensuring that the youth are given the space that will facilitate their participation
in the governance of their country.
1
2
3
4
5
Report by observers from Uganda Youth Network.

Section 29 Parliamentary Election Act (2005).
Section 42 Parliamentary Elections Act (2005).
Report by observers from Uganda Youth Network.
Election Observation report by UYONET.
101
13.2 Workers
13.2.1 Introduction
According to article 40 of the Constitution, workers have the right to form and join trade unions of their
choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Towards the 2016 general elections, the Attorney General
presented new amendments suggesting that 40 delegates, a third of whom should be women, shall be
nominated by the non-unionised workers from Northern, Eastern, Central, and Western Uganda. Each
region was expected to hold a non-unionised workers conference during which 40 delegates from the
electoral college would be elected under the supervision of the Electoral Commission.The delegates would
join the National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), the Central Organization of Free Trade Unions
(COFTU), and seven others directly nominated by every labour union to form the electoral college.
An electoral college is a set of people who are selected to elect a candidate to a particular office. Often these
represent different organisations, political parties, or entities. Each is represented by a particular number
of electors or votes weighted in a particular way. Many times, though, the electors are simply important
people whose wisdom would ideally provide a better choice than a larger body. NOTU was established
by Decree No. 29 of 1973and is currently the most representative labourorganisation in Uganda with 20
affiliates. It is a non-profit organisation that represents millions of Ugandan workers. Uganda has about
20 unions affiliated to COFTU and NOTU. The Electoral Commission approved the programme to conduct
elections for MPs representing workers on 5 March 2016.
Following the Commissions approval, the minister responsible for workers convened all willing nonunionised6 workers at every sub-county in Uganda to nominate delegates. The Electoral Commission
organised and conducted the elections.
The sub-county Delegates Conference was held on 5 March 2016. Ten delegates were elected at each subcounty headquarters. Delegates from each district included three women. The district non-unionised
workers Delegates Conference was held on 7 March 2016 at each district headquarters from 7am to
4pm.The Conference elected 10 delegates, at least three of whom were women, to the regional nonunionised workers Delegates Conference.
The regional Delegates Conference was held on 9 March 2016 in the following four traditional regions of
Uganda: North, South, East, and West. Ten delegates for each of the four regions, who formed part of the
subsequent Electoral College for the election of workers parliamentary representatives, were elected.
The 10 delegates represented their respective regions at the National Delegates Conference that elected
five workers M Ps from 10 to 11 March 2016. An electoral college constituted by the Electoral Commission
elected the five representatives. The composition of the college included 10 delegates each from NOTU, at
least two of whom were women; 10 COFTU, two of whom were women; as well as the chairperson, general
secretary, and treasurer of every registered labour union. There were seven delegates nominated directly by
every registered labour union. Again, three of these were women. There were also 10 delegates nominated
by the non-unionised workers in each of these regions - Central, Eastern, Northern, and Western.
Regional Delegates Conference Locations
No.
Region
Host District
1.
Northern Region
Arua
2.
3.
4.
Eastern Region
Central Region
Western Region
Mbale
Luwero
Mbarara
A non-unionized worker is a worker who performs services in exchange for remunerations, with a valid employment identity card, but is not a
member of a labour union.
102
At these delegates conferences, there was a set of registration criteria to be followedwhich included
being: a Ugandan citizen of 18 years and above, a registered voter, a worker who performs services in
exchange for remuneration, a valid employment identity card, a member of a labour union, and a minimum
formal education of Advanced (A) Level or its equivalent as provided for under Section 4 (1)(c) of the
Parliamentary Elections Act, 2015 (as amended).
13.2.2 Issues of Concern
Voter education: Delegates were concerned that the Electoral Commission did not educate them on the
new amendments passed by Parliament.
Voter register: The voter register was available on Election Day and the officials were strict in ensuring that
those on the register voted. However, delegates questioned the process especially the display exercise which
did not happen. The registration of voters continued up to the nomination date, which was an anomaly.
Commencement of voting: Voting started at 9am instead of 7am as stipulated in the amended Parliamentary
Elections Act (2015) Section 30.27. However, the polls closed on time at 4pm when all voters had voted.
Ballot papers: The Commission released ballot papers without serial numbers and they were printed on
normal A4 white sheets. Non printed/serialized ballots were used for this election.as amendments came
late yet the Commission had to organize the election as per the road map. Electoral Commission claims that
there was no time to print serialized ballots for this election.
Tallying of results: The Presiding Officer started the tallying on time after closing the poling and counting.
When he started arranging ballots on the table, he ordered everyone out of the room except Electoral
Commission officials, journalists, candidates agents, and observers.
In breach of the procedures, as stipulated in Presidential Elections Act (2005) s.48.7voters were not
allowed to observe the counting and tallying process as they were locked outside the counting venue.
13.3 Persons with Disabilities

13.3.1 Introduction
The Electoral Commission appointed and gazetted 22 February 2016 as the polling day for elections of
representatives of Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) in Parliament. The elections took place during the
delegates conference in Mukono.
The elections were conducted by secret ballot under the National Electoral College comprising the following
five delegates drawn from each district PWD electoral structure: Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, General
Secretary, Publicity Secretary, and Treasurer.
The criteria is spelt out under sec 8(4)(e) of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005 which states that: The
representatives of PWDs shall be elected by an electoral college of representatives of such persons from
each district in a manner prescribed by regulations by the Minister under section 100.
The election attracted 544 out of the 560 expected delegates from each of the 112 districts Uganda. The
election was conducted through secret ballot and the Electoral Commission used the national voter register
and national identification cards to authenticate the voting status of the delegates. No biometric voter
verification machines were used.
All five incumbent MPs who represented PWDs in the ninth Parliament retained their seats. These were:
Alex Ndeezi (Central), Hood Katuramu Karibedda (Western), Wilson Nokrach (Northern), Helen Grace
Asamo (Eastern), and Safia Nalule (National).
7
Presidential Elections Act 2015 Section 30.2 as amended.
103
13.3.2 Conclusion
Elections should be taken seriously and inclusive for all. In a democratic society, people have the right to
choose who should govern them. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that: The
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be through universal and equal suffrage.
13.4 UPDF
13.4.1 Introduction
Article 78(4) of the Constitution states that Parliament shall by law prescribe the procedure for elections of
special interest representatives such as women, army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities and other
groups as it may determine. For each of the special interest group representatives, 20% must be women.
The representation of the army and its procedure of selection were contested by different stakeholders
in 2010 given that instead of Parliament making the legislation, it delegated its authority to the minister
responsible for justice, who delegated these powers to the Army Council to make its own rules. This was
coupled with an argument that the army is also a service agency just like the police prisons; yet the latter
are not directly represented in Parliament. The court then granted an injunction against the government,
restraining it from conducting elections for special interest groups of the army, youth, and workers under
a law that it had declared unconstitutional.
On 18 November 2015 the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee of Parliament scrutinised all issues
raised by the Constitutional Court when considering the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment Bill) (No
2) Bill 2015 which included consideration of the UPDFs representation in Parliament. The Parliament
approved the amendments and the president assented to the new law, the parliamentary Elections
(Amendment) Act 2015 assented to by the president on October 01 2015, this guided the Electoral
Commission to hold the UPDF elections.
13.4.2 Voting
Election of 10 army representatives to Parliament is provided for in the Parliamentary Elections Act 2005
and the Constitution.
The army currently has 10 designated positions in Parliament, chosen by the Army Council which includes
members of the High Command, directors of military services, commanding officers of brigades, battalions,
and officers commanding equivalent military units. The president, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, chairs this Council.
The Electoral Commission assigned 3 March 2016 as the date for the election of the UPDFs representatives in
Parliament. The exercise was conducted by the Army Council in conjunction with the Electoral Commission
at the military headquarters in Bombo. The president presided over the council meeting that selected the
candidates.
The following were elected as UPDF MPs: Gen. Katumba Wamala, Capt. Flavia Byekwaso Maj. Gen. Pecos
Kutesa, Lt. Gen. Ivan Koreta, Col. Felix Kulayigye, , Col. Francis Takirwa, Capt. Evelyn Asiimwe, Brig. Innocent
Oula, Capt. Susan Lakot, and Gen. Elly Tumwine, the longest-serving army MP.
13.4.3 Conclusion
Army representation in Parliament is still under contention since there are other security agencies that are
not represented such as the the Uganda Police Force and Uganda Prisons Service. Some see these elections
as a mere formality since the general army constituency is not involved in the process. They are simply
represented. It could be argued that even those whoparticipate have their right to vote without undue
external pressure invaded by the requirement to list the people they intend to vote for.
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CHAPTER 14
Recommendations
105
This report has raised several issues which require both legislative and administrative measures to correct.
In light of these concerns, we make the following recommendations for the attention of various authorities
and stakeholders.
To the Government:
a) Amend laws such as the Public Order Management Act, 2013 (POMA) to provide a level playing
field and fair competition for all participants in the electoral process.
b) Restrain security agencies from using the POMA to interfere with the legitimate activities of political
candidates and their supporters.
c) Ensure fair treatment of opposition leaders and candidates. The police and security organs, in
particular, should treat all candidates equally before the law.
d) Enforce the laws that limit the misuse of state resources during campaigns especially by the
incumbent.
e) Ensure that electoral laws are enacted in time to save the integrity of the electoral process.
f) Guarantee fair access to information without undue interruption to access of all media channels
and forms.
g) Enact clear regulations and limits on the use of money by participants in the electoral process
including candidates and their agents, supporters and donors, and political parties.
h) Facilitate the Electoral Commission with sufficient funds and logistics to enable it conduct timely
voter education.
i) To provide a level playing field the Presidential Elections Act 2005, should be clear on the use of
government resources by an incumbent president. The law on incumbency should be enacted and
enforced to prohibit the incumbent President from personally giving gifts or donations during or
in the run-up to elections.
j) Facilitate the process of appointing an independent electoral management body to ensure credibility
and integrity of the electoral process.
To the Electoral Commission:
a) Ensure that electoral officials are well facilitated so that they are not compromised by bribes and
inducements during the electoral process.
b) Strengthen the supervision arm to ensure that all electoral officials perform their work as assigned
and replace those who are incompetent.
c) Select, appoint and deploy Election Day officials especially the Presiding Officers and Polling
Assistants on merit and without interference from the government or individuals/entities with
vested political interests.
d) Clean, produce, and display the Voter Register in time to ensure efficiency in the electoral process.
All changes requested by the affected voters should be reflected in the final register.
e) Provide comprehensive and thorough training for all electoral personnel including emphasis
on critical values such as integrity, impartiality, and non-partisanship in the management and
administration of the election process.
f) Ensure that election officials who commit election offences are prosecuted in their individual
capacities and not as the Electoral Commission.
g) Ensure that the introduction of new technologies like the BVVS and new initiatives for effective
and efficient conduct of elections is done early to allow adequate time for testing and independent
audit before fully rolling them out.
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h) Develop and disseminate civic education and voter education programmes and materials that
target communities with high levels of illiteracy.
i) Ensure that voter information on key voting aspects such identification, polling dates, and other
key voter requirements is clear and available in all languages of Uganda.
j) Ensure that materials are delivered in time at the polling stations and impose strict sanctions for
failure to perform assigned tasks and for practices that disenfranchise citizens.
k) Provide checks and balances to ensure that the correct results are tallied and declared.
l) Announce the presidential and parliamentary results in a disaggregated manner to build public
confidence in the outcome and to enable independent verification by observers and interested
parties.
m) Secure the authority to reprimand and sanction those involved in election malpractices.
n) Issue an electoral roadmap early and avoid unjustified changes that may be perceived as intended
to favour particular candidates or players.
o) Consider affirmative action in the recruitment of electoral officials at all levels.
p) Maintain the highest standards of election management for elections at all levels. National and
local elections should be treated to the same standards.
q) Take full charge of the process of accreditation of election observers without undue interference by
security agencies as it infringes the rights of citizens to participate in poll observation.
r) Facilitate the work of observers by ensuring that they have timely access to information like the list
of polling stations and declaration forms recorded at polling stations.
s) Follow the right procedures in demarcating constituencies and re-organising polling stations. This
should take place at least three years before the next elections.
t) Refund the nomination fees for all candidates who fail to secure nominations on account of the
Electoral Commissions failures.
u) Adhere to the prescribed 48-hour timeframe for delivery of materials as provided for in the Electoral
Act when distributing election materials to polling stations. Timely delivery of polling materials to
all polling stations will tackle the problem of disenfranchisement.
v) Formulate clear regulations to guide the conduct of civic and voter education.
To Political Parties and Civic Organisations:
a) In order to realise increased peoples participation in all electoral activities, political parties have
a significant contribution to make given the influence they have over their members. Therefore,
political parties should mobilise people to participate in the update of the voter register including
checking their names and other electoral processes.
b) Some political parties conduct similar activities to those of the EC like update of their members
register and issuance of party IDs in preparation for their party primary elections. This confuses
people. Political parties therefore should refrain from conducting simultaneous registration of
political party supporters during the general update of the voter register or close to that time.
Political parties should display their own voters register at least three months in advance.
c) Political parties should follow the legal guidelines and party candidates found in breach of legal
procedures should be barred from participating in elective politics for at least two terms.
d) In order to boost women participation in politics, political parties and organizations should
take special measures to encourage women candidates to contest for parliamentary and local
government council seats for directly elected Members of Parliament and other elective political
posts in all elections or by-elections.
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e) Parties should reorganise and work on their internal democracy right from the grassroots to the
top.
f) Political parties should avoid using inflammatory language and inciting supporters during
campaigns.
g) Political parties should put in place measures to limit election malpractice at party level.
h) Political parties should complement the Electoral Commission and Uganda Human Rights
Commission to conduct ongoing civic and voter education.
To Citizens:
a.
b.
In order to create a competitive and democratic arena, citizens should be more active by
participating in electoral processes at all levels.
Ugandans should play a proactive role in stopping electoral malpractices like bribery and stand
firm against being manipulated with money and other inducements during elections.
To the International Community/Donors:

a.
Support the democratisation process in Uganda through financial and political means and
diplomatic channels.
To Parliament:
a) Take up all pending reform proposals suggested by citizens and get them approved at least three
years before the next elections.
b) Enact any new electoral laws or amendments at least six months to the start of the election period.
c)
Set affordable nomination fees and in a timely manner with due consideration for maximum
participation by women, youth, and PWDs.
Media:
a) Encourage the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation and other state-owned media to provide equitable
coverage to all candidates.
b) Endeavor to advance policy-related agendas and discourse in programming.
c) Accord balanced coverage to all candidates in order to have a level playing field for all participants.
d) The government should not interfere with media operations.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
Preliminary Statement on the 2016 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
Issued February 20, 2016
UGANDAS HOPE FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS DASHED

The Citizens Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U) is a consortium of 18 (eighteen) national
and 23 sub national civil society organisations that aims to enhance the integrity of the election process
by providing evidence-based, impartial assessments, deterring and exposing irregularities, and increasing
citizen participation in Ugandas electoral process.
This statement draws on CEON-Us tabulation process observation, which involved deploying observers to
all 112 district tally centres and four at the National Tally Centre. It also reflects on CEON-Us six-month,
nationwide observation of the pre-electoral process. CEON-U deployed 223 long term observers (LTOs) in
all 112 districts of Uganda. To complement LTO findings, several organizations under CEON-U also observed
specific aspects of the election including media, campaign financing, security and gender and womens
participation. CEON-U deployed more than 1250 observers for Election Day to all 290 constituencies across
all 112 districts. This included conducting a sample-based observation (SBO), which involved deploying
700 sample-based observers to a random, representative sample of polling stations.
While Election Day processes and tabulation at the district level were conducted relatively well, with
the exception of certain locations, the credibility of the overall election process was undermined by
fundamental and structural flaws. The context in which Uganda holds its elections cannot allow for free,
fair and credible elections.
CONTEXT
Ugandas legal framework limits the foundation for conducting credible elections. These limitations
prompted civil society to produce the Uganda Citizens Compact on Free and Fair Elections, which includes
recommendations for legal reform: overhauling the Electoral Commission to ensure independence and
impartiality; reforming the demarcation of electoral boundaries; ensuring recruitment of polling officials
is done in a transparently, competitively and based on merit; and the establishment of an independent
judiciary to adjudicate on electoral disputes impartially. These recommendations were not taken up for
the 2016 elections.
Beyond the legal framework, the concentration of power in the presidency and the use of the security
agencies beyond their constitutional mandate sends a message to voters that the playing field is not level
and undermines confidence in the electoral process. Throughout the electoral process, there have been
several troubling incidents that continue to illustrate the trend of indiscriminate use of the Public Order
Management Act (POMA) and Police Act as Amended (2006) against opposition candidates and parties. This
is evidenced by the arrest of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye at least three times during the week of elections, as
well as the disproportionate use of force, including tear gas and live ammunition, on opposition supporters
and other Ugandans.
As previously reported in the CEON-U long-term observation reports over the past six months, we have
observed widespread abuse of state resources, such as using government vehicles, staff or buildings to
conduct meetings, rallies and campaigns.1 Most candidates have spent money on bribing voters and
election officials. CEON-Us 223 LTOs observed a consistently higher number of these abuses by NRM
presidential and parliamentary candidate agents compared to other candidates.
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1 www.ceonu.or.ug
2 www.acfimuganda.org
3 www.wdnuganda.org, www.uwonet.org
4 www.acme-ug.org
5 http://j.mp/ceonelection
The election campaigns were generally peaceful and candidates were largely free to traverse the country
and seek for votes. We congratulate Ugandans for the active participation during the campaign process.
However, they were also characterized by excessive expenditures by all candidates. Campaign expenditures
for the ruling party have been exceedingly high. The Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM)
reported that between May and December 2015, the minimum campaign expenditures for NRM and its
candidates was nearly 70 times more than that of the nearest party (FDC).2
Despite the constitutional provisions on gender equality and womens equal participation in politics,
the number of women as candidates has barely increased. This is in part due to the failure of parties to
nominate women for open seats, the exorbitant amount of resources required to get nominated and to run
in elections, and discrimination against women. The Womens Democracy Group February 2, 2016 report3
outlines these challenges that women in politics continue to face.
Freedom of the media and freedom of speech is a precondition for holding meaningful elections. CEON-U
applauds the media for providing dedicated space for elections in their various publications and the
internet. Social media has played a role in informing Ugandans despite its misuse in some instances.
However, in these elections, media rights were curtailed, as evidenced by self-censorship, harassment,
assault, and destruction of equipment. The Human Rights Network for Journalists - Uganda (HRNJ-U) has
documented 50 election-related cases reported by journalists and media houses. Media monitoring reports
by the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) showed that the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation
(UBC) devoted more airtime to the incumbent candidate.4 Most recently, the Uganda Communication
Corporations (UCC) decision to restrict social media use on and after Election Day limited citizens
meaningful access to electoral information.
It is worth noting that these are many of the same problems that have plagued Ugandas elections many
years in 2006 and 2011 credible citizen and international observer reports raised these concerns.
TABULATION PROCESS
CEON-U reported its preliminary Election Day findings in its February 19 statement.5
As Election Day concluded, CEON-U deployed 112 observers to district tallying centres and four observed
the National Tally Centre. Several tally centres experienced long delays in transmitting results, lack of
transparency, as well as disruptions and even violence in some cases, were noted.
Whereas CEON-U observed that results were posted at 91% of polling stations on Election Day, at the
National Tally Centre results are only released in an aggregated manner, which does not give the opportunity
to the public to verify the results at the primary level. This lack of transparency creates uncertainty, which
undermines public confidence in the results. This is compounded by the Electoral Commissions restriction
on observers from stating any quantitative results information.6
6 Electoral Commissions General Elections Handbook for Observers Article 6.1(j)
The tabulation process was disrupted in 17% of district tally centres, including in Kasese, Mbale, Bulambuli,
Bujiri, Buikwe, Jinja, and Bukwo. These disruptions were due to several reasons, including delays in
declaring results. Police were present in 41% of district tallying centres, the army was present in 15%, and
crime preventers in 10%.
At the district level, party agents of Amama Mbabazi were present in 48% of tallying centres. Party agents
of Yoweri Museveni were present in 93% of polling stations. Party agents of Kizza Besigye were present in
88% of polling stations.
Agents of Amama Mbabazi disagreed with the presidential results tally in 4% of tally centres where
they were present, including in Butambala and Luuka.
Agents of Yoweri Museveni disagreed with the presidential results tally in 4% of centres where they
were present, including in Kiboga, Butambala, Butaleja, Luuka, and Lira.
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Agents of Kizza Besigye disagreed with the presidential results tally in 3% of centres, including in
Butambala, Butaleja, and Luuka.
Across district tally centres, CEON-U observers noted that candidate agents requested a total of six recounts
for presidential election results, which included Moyo, Luuka, and Mbarara.
In Jinja and Kabale, the Declaration of Results forms were not delivered to the district tallying centres.
In 20% of district tally centres, returning officers did not make a copy of sub-country results available to
party agents and observers.
CEON-U will continue to observer the local council elections and will issue a final report on the entire
election in the coming weeks.
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APPENDIX II
Preliminary Statement on 2016 General Elections Issued February 19, 2016
The Citizens Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U) is a consortium of 18 (eighteen) national
and 23 sub national civil society organizations which have agreed to conduct a unified, comprehensive
and effective citizen election observation mission for the 2016 general elections. The consortium aims
to enhance the integrity of the election process by providing evidence-based, impartial assessments,
deterring and exposing irregularities, and increasing citizen participation in Ugandas electoral process.
SUMMARY
CEON-U deployed more than 1250 observers for Election Day to all 290 constituencies across all 112 districts.
This included conducting a sample-based observation (SBO), which involved deploying 700 sample-based
observers deployed to a random, representative sample of polling stations. The SBO methodology provides
the most accurate, timely, data driven, and comprehensive picture of Election Day conduct.
From September 2015-January 30, 2016, CEON-U also deployed 223 long term observers in 112 districts
of Uganda. The LTOs were responsible for observing the pre-election process. In addition, some of the
organizations under CEON-U also observed specific aspects of the election including: media, campaign
financing, security and gender and womens participation.
CEON-U finds that the Election Day process was relatively peaceful. However, the Electoral Commission
fell short of administering its logistical functions in certain districts. Polling officials knew polling day
procedures and generally followed the legal provisions on opening of the polling station, set up, voting,
closing and counting.
However, significant shortcomings in the pre-election process undermined the credibility of the overall
election process.
CEON-U recognizes that voting will continue today in certain polling stations in will continue to monitor
tabulation and post-election processes. We anticipate issuing a statement on the remaining processes,
including the conduct of the tabulation process following the Electoral Commissions official announcement
of results. CEON-U will not announce any results projections. We will also issue a final report in the coming
weeks.
PRELIMINARY ELECTION DAY FINDINGS
The conduct of the presidential and parliamentary elections was guided by the 1995 Constitution of
Uganda, the Presidential Elections Act, Parliamentary Elections Act and the Electoral Commission Act. The
Electoral Commission also issued Guidelines at various stages of the electoral process to guide the conduct
of the elections.
With 99% of CEON-Us sample-based observers reporting, CEON-U has summarized its preliminary
findings below.
Set-up and Opening
CEON-U reported its preliminary assessment of the set-up and opening process on the morning of Election
Day. We present below updated findings, based on additional observer reports received since then.
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The presidential and parliamentary elections Acts as amended provide for polling to begin at 7:00am and
end at 4:00pm Forty one (41)% of polling stations countrywide opened after 8am. Four (4)% of polling
stations had not opened as of 8:30am. Although 95% of polling stations had all strategic materials, the
other polling stations were missing at least one of the following: ballot boxes, voter register, ballot papers,
indelible ink, Biometric Voter Verification System (BVVS) or Declaration of Results Form. CEON-U notes
verified incidents of delays in dispatching critical voting materials in districts such as Kampala, Wakiso,
Jinja, and Kaliro, which led to polling commencing as late as 3:00pm in some stations. In others, voting
did not take place. As a result, the Electoral Commission gazetted polling day for affected polling stations
in Makindye division and Kyebando in Wakiso district for 19 February 2016 and extended voting in some
polling stations in Kampala to 7:00pm. Despite the actions taken by the Electoral Commission to ensure
that voters affected in the mentioned polling stations vote, CEON-U is concerned that some voters may be
disenfranchised due to failure to receive the information and fatigue experienced on the 18 February 2016.
In line with Objective VI of the national objectives and directive principles of state policy, which provides
for gender balance in all government institutions. Forty (40% of polling officials were women. Ninetynine (99)% of poll officials sealed ballot boxes before voting commenced. However in 10 polling stations
poll officials did not seal the ballot boxes.
Voting
During the voting process, polling officials at most polling stations followed procedures, Biometric Voter
Verification System (BVVS) functioned well, with some problems. However, there were some problems
with voters, including a high percentage of voters assisted by unauthorized persons. In 90% of polling
stations, voters were checked for ink before receiving a ballot.
In 89% of polling stations the BVVS functioned properly. Among the 10% that malfunctioned, 65% were
fixed and 13% were replaced. In 1% of polling stations, there were no BVVS. Polling officials were sufficiently
able to use the BVVS machines in 91% of polling stations. In 87%, polling officials instructed voters on
voting procedures. In 80% of polling stations, voters were able to vote in secret. 73% of locations did not
have unauthorized personnel present inside the polling station. However, crime preventers were present
in 13% of polling stations. 91% of polling stations did not have incidents of intimidation, harassment or
violence during the voting. Among the 9% of polling stations that had such incidents, election officials
were the targets in 34%, party agents in 24%, observers in 6%, and voters in 39%. In 69% of polling
stations some (1 14) voters were assisted to vote. Party agents assisted voters in 13% of those polling
stations, which is contrary to the law. During voting, party agents of AmamaMbabazi were present in 41%
of polling stations. Party agents of YoweriMuseveni were present in 95% of polling stations. Party agents of
KizzaBesigye were present in 84% of polling stations. In 87% of polling stations where voting took place,
all voters in queue by 4pm were able to vote.
Closing and Counting

In 99% of polling stations, polling officials sorted ballots in full view of the candidates agents. 69% polling
stations did not have unauthorized personnel present during counting. However, 15% of polling stations
had crime preventers present. Party agents are useful in an election because they can deter fraud especially
if they are vigilant and loyal to their candidate/party. During counting, party agents of AmamaMbabazi
were present in 45% of polling stations. Party agents of YoweriMuseveni were present in 98% of polling
stations. Party agents of KizzaBesigye were present in 93% of polling stations. Where party agents of
AmamaMbabazi were present, his agents signed the Declaration of Results form in 45% of polling stations.
Where his agents were present, 4% refused to sign. Where agents of YoweriMuseveni were present, his
agents signed the Declaration of Results form in 97% of polling stations. Where his agents were present,
3% refused to sign. Where party agents of KizzaBesigye were present, his agents signed the Declaration of
Results form in 93% of polling stations. Where his agents were present, 2% refused to sign. Presidential
election results were posted publicly at 91% of polling stations.
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ELECTORAL CONTEXT
Legal framework: Some aspects of the legal framework provided a basis for holding free and fair elections
in Uganda. However, there were some provisions within the law that should be amended to ensure that
elections are free and fair. For instance, the introduction of new nomination fees scales for presidential and
parliamentary elections within a period of one month to the presidential elections and two months to the
parliamentary elections, led to some aspiring candidates dropping out of the race.
Administration of the Elections: Article 62 of the Constitution states that the EC shall be independent. Article
61 gives the Electoral Commission powers to organize, conduct and supervise the election. The lack of trust
by the opposition and a section of the Ugandan population in the Electoral Commission as evidenced by
pre-polling opinion polls and the National Compact for Electoral Reforms indicates the need for electoral
reforms.
Voters register: Legal and procedural discrepancies in the process of compiling the national voters register
may have eroded public trust in the integrity of the register.
Voter Information and Education: The electoral process was affected by limited voter education by the
Electoral Commission. However this improved as the campaigns were coming to an end.
Campaigns: The election campaigns were generally peaceful and candidates were largely free to traverse the
country and seek for votes. However, the commercialization of Ugandan politics affected some candidates
particularly women from reaching out to voters to seek for support. Violence also marred the campaigns
in districts like Ntungamo, Gulu, Bukwo and Kampala among others. The campaigns also registered some
complaints including threatening violence, assault and tearing posters. These, however, did not have a
major impact on the campaigns.
Gender and womens participation: Overall the numbers of candidates contesting for positions at
parliamentary level increased in comparison to 2011. Despite the constitutional provisions on gender
equality and womens equal participation with men in politics, the number women as candidates has not
improved much. With regard to Members of Parliament on the direct seat, only 6% of women are contesting
for this position in comparison to 94% male. The number of men and women independent candidates for
both open MP seats and district women seats was more than those standing on party tickets.
Media: The media has played a major role in educating and informing citizens on the elections. The media
has also exposed shortcomings and positive aspects of the electoral process. CEON-U applauds the media
for providing dedicated space for elections in their various publications and the internet. Social media
has played a role in informing Ugandans despite its misuse in some instances. The decision by the Uganda
Communications Commission (UCC) to limit access to social media to Ugandans on Election Day denied
citizens freedom to report incidents and affected transparency on election day. Harassment of the media
during the electoral process led to self-censorship and denial of access to media platforms for some
candidates. This hindered the media from performing its roles during elections. Uganda Broadcasting
Corporation (UBC) has again failed to meet the standards required of it in the law.
Security in the elections: The public order management acts have been interpreted by security forces
unequally amongst the candidates and parties. During the campaigns the police exercised some restraint
but were accused of failing to conclude some crimes during the campaigns especially disappearances of
some supporters of opposition presidential candidates. The role of militia groups including Kifasi and
crime preventers among others in the election created doubts in Ugandans on whether the elections would
be peaceful.
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CONCLUSION
There are international standards for holding free and fair elections. These include: adherence to the legal
framework for an election; right of assembly and movement; democratic electoral campaigns; equal access
to the media; equal participation of men and women in the elections; rights of citizens to freely choose who
governs them. The overall findings by CEON-U indicate some serious shortcomings in adherence to these
standards.
CEON-U remains hopeful that all those voters who could not vote yesterday are able to participate today.
We call upon all electoral stakeholders to act within the law and effectively execute their legal mandate, as
well as to all Ugandans to remain calm and keep the peace.
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APPENDIX III
CEON-U ELECTION DAY DEPLOYMENT
Preliminary Findings on Opening and Set-up Process
Issued February 18, 2016
The Citizen Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U) has observed the following key issues during
the opening and set up of polling stations across the country:
41% of polling stations countrywide opened after 8am. 4% of polling stations had not opened as of 8:30am.
Although 95% of polling stations had all strategic materials with the other remaining polling stations
missing at least one of ballot boxes, voter register, ballot papers, indelible ink, Biometric Voter Verification
System (BVVS) or Declaration of Results Form.
Despite delays, we commend the voters of Uganda for actively participating up until this point.
99% of CEON-U 904 sample based and hot spot observers have reported at their arrival at polling stations.
FINDINGS ON OPENING AND SET-UP
With 91% (637 out of 700) of CEON-Us sample-based observers reporting as of 10:30am, CEON-U has
summarized its preliminary findings below.
At 55% of polling stations, polling officials arrived by 6:30am, approximately 40% of polling officials were
women. Although 95% of polling stations had all strategic materials, the other polling stations were missing
at least one of the following: ballot boxes, voter register, ballot papers, and indelible ink, Biometric Voter
Verification System (BVVS) or Declaration of Results Form. In 99% of polling stations, at least 5 registered
voters were present before the opening of the polling kit. 99% of poll officials sealed ballot boxes before
voting commenced. However in 10 polling stations poll officials did not seal the ballot boxes. 41% of polling
stations countrywide opened after 8am. 4% of polling stations had not opened as of 8:30am.
During opening and set-up, party agents of Amama Mbabazi were present in 39% of polling stations. Party
agents of Yoweri Museveni were present in 85% of polling stations. Party agents of Kizza Besigye were
present in 79% of polling stations. 4% of polling stations had no presidential candidate agents present.
CEON-U established a critical incident desk as part of its National Information Centre to receive urgent
messages from its observers. To this point in the day, the most frequent incident reports reported by CEONUs citizen observers during the opening and set up process related to materials not arriving in polling
stations in Bamunanika, Makindye and Rubaga Division.
TO EXPECT NEXT FROM CEON-U
CEON-U will continue observing throughout the day and will release some of its key findings on the voting
process to the media and on social media1 as the evening of Election Day progresses.
CEON-U will issue a preliminary statement on the conduct of the elections at 10:00am on Friday, February
19 at the National Information Centre in Africana Hotel. This statement will bring together our preliminary
findings and conclusions on Election Day conduct. This will include assessing the closing, counting and
declaration of results processes, such as the presence of party agents during the counting, whether
candidate agents sign off or refuse to sign off on results, as well as the conduct of counting procedures.
CEON-U will also observe tabulation and post-election processes. We anticipate issuing a statement on the
117
conduct of the tabulation process following the Electoral Commissions official announcement of results.
CEON-U will not announce any results projections.
CEON-U has deployed more than 1,150 observers today nationwide to all 290 constituencies across all
112 districts. This includes 700 sample-based observers to a representative, random sample of 700 polling
stations, 204 hot-spot observers, 233 mobile supervisors, and 23 regional coordinators. After voting ends,
CEON-U will also deploy an additional 112 tabulation observers at all district tabulation centers.
CEON-Us observers will remain at their assigned polling stations the entire day to observe setup and
opening, voting, counting, and the declaration of results. The whole day and night we shall receive data
from our CEON-U observers.
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APPENDIX IV
CEON-U Update: Preparing for Election Day February 16, 2016
February 16, 2016
With Election Day just two days away, the Citizen Election Observers Network Uganda (CEON-U)
is prepared to deploy its systematically-trained observers across the country to promote
participation, deter fraud and impartially assess the process. CEON-U commends the Electoral
Commission and civil society for all they have done to prepare for Election Day. However, CEON-U
has also identified several risk factors, including significant increase in voter bribery, which
demand attention from all stakeholders as the elections approach.
Reporting Accurate and Impartial Information about Election Day and Post-Election Processes
On Election Day, CEON-U will deploy more than 1250 well-trained, non-partisan citizen observers to
all 290 constituencies. CEON-U will employ sample-based and hot spot observation methodologies.
Sample-based observation (SBO) is an advanced election observation methodology that draws on
proven statistics to allow CEON-U to present an accurate and comprehensive assessment of the
Election Day processes.
CEON-U also used data from its long-term observation to identify 10 hot-spot constituencies,
where we will deploy more than 200 hot spot observers to help deter fraud and mitigate violence.
The constituencies are Rukiga County, Fort Portal Municipality, Bunyole West County, Tororo
Municipality, Jinja Municipality West, Lamwo County, Kumi County, Mukono County South,
Bwamba County and Vuura in Arua.
CEON-U observers will also immediately report critical incidents about serious problems that may
occur. Reports will be processed in real time by a sophisticated database, which will also enable
rapid communication with observers to ensure completeness and accuracy of observer reports.
CEON-U will issue statements and evidence-based findings at key points during Election Day and
the period immediately following. Below are some of the issues CEON-U aims to report on.
Set-up and Opening

A statement on the opening and set-up of polling stations on Election Day, February 18, at 11:00am
at the National Information Centre in Africana Hotel. This will include accurate information on the
percentage of polling stations that open on time, whether procedures are followed, and whether
critical materials are present.
Voting
CEON-U will be observing key aspects of voting will release some of its key findings on the voting
process to the media and on social media1 as the evening of Election Day progresses. This will
include nationally representative information on:
1 whether voters are checked for indelible ink before voting;
2 the functioning and operation of the Biometric Voter Verification System (BVVS);
3 presence of unauthorized personnel;
4 whether secrecy of the vote is ensured; and
5 extent of intimidation, harassment or violence.

119
Overall Election Day Process

CEON-U will issue a preliminary statement on the conduct of the elections at 10:00am on Friday,
February 19 at the National Information Centre in Africana Hotel. This statement will bring
together our preliminary findings and conclusions on Election Day conduct. This will include
assessing the closing, counting and declaration of results processes, such as the presence of party
agents during the counting, whether candidate agents sign off or refuse to sign off on results, as
well as the conduct of counting procedures.
Tabulation
CEON-U will issue a statement on the conduct of the tabulation process following the Electoral
Commissions official announcement of results. This assessment will draw on reports from CEONUs tabulation observers at all 112 district tabulation centres. CEON-U will report on the credibility
of the tallying process, including whether disruptions, intimidation, or violence occur. CEON-U
will not announce any results projections.
CEON-U will also issue a final, comprehensive report in the weeks following Election Day.
Long-term Observation Findings: February 8 - 14

CEON-U has been observing the pre-election period since September 2015, including 223 longterm observers (LTOs) across all 112 districts. In the past week (February 8 14), CEON-Us LTOs
noted the following issues, which could affect the conduct of Election Day.
Voter information: Voter information activities increased since previous weeks, with 94%
of observers reporting voter information campaigns in their constituencies. This increase is
encouraging, since it is critical that voters have information about where, when and how to vote,
particularly given the introduction of the Biometric Voter Verification System (BVVS).
Voter bribery: As campaigns ramped up this past week, voter bribery also increased. It was reported
in 53% of the constituencies observed. This was particularly the case among NRM parliamentary
candidate agents, with 48% of observers reporting such activities. Voter bribery was highest in
Mid Western (78% reported vote buying) and West Nile (62% reported vote buying) regions.
Security agents: There has been an increase in deployment of security agents in advance of
elections, as reported by 28% of observers. However, no intimidation or violence by security
agents was reported. We hope this continues through Election Day.
Violence: The campaign environment the past week was mainly peaceful this past week, with only
2% of observers reporting attacks on campaign rallies. However, hate speech based on ethnicity,
gender and religion continued to be reported in approximately 10% of constituencies observed.
CEON-U encourages voters to participate and all candidate and parties to behave peacefully.
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APPENDIX V: Infographics
121
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Report On Uganda's 2016 Elections by Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda

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Citizens Election Observers Network - Uganda

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Alliance For Campaign Finance Monitoring

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Chapter 2: Political Background to the 2016 General Elections.................................................... 13

Chapter 3: The Legal and Administrative Framework for Elections............................................ 19

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Chapter 4: The Pre-Election Environment............................................................................................. 27

Chapter 5: The Conduct of Campaigns..................................................................................................... 35

Chapter 6: Specialised Study1: Gender and Women Participation............................................... 43

Chapter 7: Specialised Study 2: Campaign Financing and Use of State Resources................... 57

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Chapter 8: Specialised Study 3: Human Rights and Security........................................................... 63

Chapter 9: Specialised Study 4: Media Coverage of the Elections.................................................. 71

Chapter 10: Election Day - Presidential and Parliamentary Polls................................................. 81

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Chapter 11: Local Government Elections............................................................................................... 87

Chapter 12: Post-Election Environment................................................................................................. 93

Chapter 13: Special Interest Group Elections....................................................................................... 99

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

CEON-U is a consortium of 18 civil society organizations:

Action for Development (ACFODE)/WDG

Overview of the Observation Mission

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

for effective observation. Specialised studies on gender/women participation, campaign financing/use of

Background to the 2016 General Elections

Highlights from the Observation Mission

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Outline of the Report

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

1.1 Objectives of CEON-U

1.2 Achieving the goal of CEON-U

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

1.3 Governance of CEON-U

Citizens Election Observers Network-Uganda (CEON-U)

UGANDA GENERAL ELECTIONS 2016: REVISITING THE DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCT

CEON-U Steering Committee Directors

Action for Development (ACFODE)/WDG

Dr. Peter Mwesige

African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME)

Citizens Watch IT (CEW-IT)

Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE)/WDG

Mohammed Ndifuna Secretary

Human Rights Network (HURINET)

Ritah Aciro Co Chairperson

National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda (NUDIPU)

Womens Democracy Network-Uganda Chapter (WDN-U)

Women Leadership Development (WLEDE)

Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ)