EU GLOBAL STRATEGY: STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND GLOBALISM

One of the most important events of the Summit of Heads of State of the EU on Ju
ne 28th-29th was the adoption of the new EU Global Strategy. The document, entit
led "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the
European Union's Foreign And Security Policy , sets out the main principles of EU
foreign policy as well as policy in the sphere of security. Analysts have calle
d the document a major step towards EU independence from NATO. Is this really th
e case? Let's take a look.
The lack of a united foreign
ems of the EU since the post
airs and Security Policy was
reign policy strategy took 7
guided the EU in this field

policy strategy was one of the main doctrinal probl

of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff
established in 2009. The elaboration of a common fo
years. Until that time, the only one document which
was the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003.

Between the two documents, there is much continuity, but the new one is much bro
ader and reflects the changes in the EU s approach to the world affairs.
Towards more independence from NATO
In the document from 2003, NATO was mentioned 4 times, while in the new one - 17
. While the rhetoric of the old document did not insist so much on the importanc
e of NATO for Europe, it did postulate the framework for EU-NATO cooperation, Be
rlin Plus :
The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the opera
tional capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partners
hip between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our common
determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.
The agreement signed in 2002 allowed the EU to draw on some of NATO's military a
ssets in its own peacekeeping operations. At the end of the 1990 s, plans for crea
ting an independent EU military body were prevented because of American reluctan
ce to this. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, insisted on putting f
orth the three famous D s" in EU defense policy: no duplication of what is done und
er NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-E
U members. Thus, the process of creating an independent EU army was halted. Sinc
e that day, all EU military initiatives, including the EU Military Staff, EUFOR,
Eurocorps, the European Gendarmerie Force, European Maritime Force and EU Battl
egroups, are subjugated to NATO's control and cannot operate effectively without
NATO's intelligence and material and coordination assistance.
The new document on the EU s global strategy postulates as a goal a return to the
idea of establishing an autonomous EU military structure which could act indepen
dently from NATO:
As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be re
ady and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threat
s. While NATO exists to defend its members - most of which are European - from e
xternal attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to cont
ribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if
and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is i
mportant for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and
beyond its borders.
Thus, the EU is returning to the aims of the St. Malo Declaration of 1998, when
French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in
St. Malo that:
"The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible m

ilitary forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in or
der to respond to international crises".
To fulfill this ambitious mission, the EU needs to allocate more funds to securi
ty matters and create a united military structure which can overcome contradicti
ons between the EU countries. The new EU global security strategy states:
Member States remain sovereign in their defense decisions: nevertheless, to acqu
ire and maintain many of these capabilities, defense cooperation must become the
norm. The EU will systematically encourage defense cooperation and strive to cr
eate a solid European defense industry, which is critical for Europe's autonomy
of decision and action.
2. Strategic autonomy in the framework of Transatlantic partnership
A new important term employed in the new European Global Strategy is strategic au
tonomy. By this is meant independence from the United States and other actors in
the field of decision-making and the implementation of decisions. Therefore, the
achievement of strategic autonomy is linked to the creation of an effective mil
itary component of the EU (a de facto European Army).
Thus, the EU is moving towards strategic independence from the Atlanticist pole.
The peculiarity of the moment lies in that, despite Continentalist trends, the
existing European elite still consists of devoted Atlanticists. This is reflecte
d in how much attention the new document gives to pro-NATO rhetoric as well as i
ts commitment to the joint Transatlantic cause.
The strategy states:
With the US, the EU will strive for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner
ship (TTIP). Like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Can
ada, TTIP demonstrates the transatlantic commitment to shared values ??and signa
ls our willingness to pursue an ambitious rules-based trade agenda. On the broad
er security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will dee
pen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism,
cyber, migration, energy and climate action.
3. Yet another distinctive feature of the Global Strategy for the European Union
's foreign And security policy is the abandonment of promoting the so-called cau
se of good governance. In 2003 the EU stated:
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human
rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.
"Good governance" is a specifically EU term, which means that the EU sees itself
as exemplary of how the process of management should be organized. Its promotio
n means reduplicating and extending EU norms and rules to non-EU countries. Thus
, the traditional realist political dichotomy of "Friend-Foe" is replaced by the
"Order-Chaos" opposition, in which any space where EU norms are not adopted is
seen as barbaric and chaotic that can only be well-governed in the case of the e
stablishment of EU rules. Today we see that instead of this concept, the EU spea
ks more generally on the promotion of democracy and human rights than the US doe
s.
Thus, while remaining within the framework of liberal globalism, the EU occupies
a more moderate stance. At the same time, it mentions distinctive European valu
es when it speaks against "intolerance", but fails to name such or explain how t
hey differ from the global ones.

4. The EU has affirmed that it adheres to the globalist agenda, albeit preferrin
g to use the term multilateralism instead of multipolarity. While a multipolar world
presumes the creation of world order based on the balance of distinctive civili
zational poles and regional unions, multilateralism strives for a united world w
here decisions are made jointly by major players on the base of a single system
of shared values.
The EU stated the following on this matter in 2003:
An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In
doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a f
airer, safer and more united world.
Today, it has opted to explain the nature of multilateralism more openly:
This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as ou
r principles and values. Yet we know that such priorities are best served when w
e are not alone. And they are best served in an international system based on ru
les and on multilateralism. This is no time for global policemen and lone warrio
rs.
The document mentions Russia and China as powers which should not be ignored, wh
ile it declares that the EU will continue to combine pressure against Russia on
the Ukrainian and Crimean issues with a selective engagement of issues in which
Europe and Russia are interdependent.
In fact, this is a version of soft globalism opposed to the imperial ambitions o
f the neocons as well as the sovereigntist and realist intentions within and out
side the EU, mixed with soft realism. The aim of this strategic autonomy and, at
the same time, the continued embracing of the Atlanticist and globalist agenda,
looks quite contradictory, but this in fact resembles strategic changes associa
ted with the decline of US hegemony. The US cannot be the world s policeman and th
e European globalist elite is aiming to take some responsibility for its securit
y, and therefore act more delicately in its neighborhood. At the same time, libe
ral ideology remains dominant, which prevents the EU from assuming the role of a
totally independent pole and engaging in multipolar rhetoric. Instead, it conti
nues to promote multilateralism as a tool to salvage globalism in a time in whic
h US dominance is crumbling.