DNA Affirmative - MSDI 2015

About MSDI & Missouri State U..
For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent
educational experience in the middle of the high school topic. MSDI is distinct from
other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus assures that a typical 2-week debater
gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we emphasize the
largest cases on topic, with students getting both aff and neg rounds on each. Third,
our senior faculty are comparable with top lab leaders in any camp. Fourth, MSDI
students can earn highly transferable college credit in public speaking for a minimal
cost. Fifth, we respect variance in home debate circuits our goal is to improve line
by line debating in ways that will help students no matter who judges in their home
circuit. Finally, our price is below any comparable camp and far below most camps.
Our 2016 information will be available shortly at:
http://debate.missouristate.edu/camp.htm.
Missouri State University is a large comprehensive university (enrollment over 24k),
with nearly any major you might want. The university has excellent academic
scholarship support most debaters combine academic entitlement scholarships
(guaranteed based on GPA/test scores) with debate scholarships. The Spicer Debate
Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: NDT and NFA-LD. Weve
national semis or finals in both in the last decade. Our debaters have an average
GPA over 3.5, a 97% graduation rate, and 70% complete law/grad school afterward.
Our program is a high-impact academic experience with an exceptional alumni
network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more information
(EricMorris@MissouriState.edu).
http://debate.missouristate.edu/
http://www.missouristate.edu/FinancialAid/scholarships/
DNA Af
1AC
Inherency
Most states have no formal policy in place for CODIS.
Natalie Ram; May, 2015. (Assistant Professor at University of Baltimore Law School). DNA by the
Entirety. Columbia Law Review. 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873. Lexis. Accessed: 6/29/15. // JW
CODIS software may also be used to search for less than exact matches . n51 Such
searches may be necessary where a crime scene sample is incomplete or degraded. n52
But partial matches between an offender [*882] pro-file and a crime scene sample
generated by such searches may exclude the offender whose CODIS profile provides
the match. This may occur where, though matching in part, the known offender's DNA
profile also is demonstrably different from the crime scene sample. These sourceexcluding
The
partial matches may instead inculpate the offender's close genetic relatives as
possible perpetrators of a crime.
n53 Like the crime scene sample, these
relatives share
some, but not all, of the examined loci with the individual whose CODIS profile provided
the partial match. This is precisely what occurred in the investigations leading to Tyrone Holloway's arrest
and conviction in Virginia. When the Virginia state forensics laboratory identified a partial DNA match between
Kenneth Holloway's DNA and the DNA collected from as-yet-unsolved crime scenes, that match definitively
excluded Kenneth as a suspect. n54 Kenneth's DNA matched the crime scene DNA only in part, and the portions
that did not match indicated that Kenneth did not commit the crimes in question. But the match cast doubt on
someone else--Kenneth's male relatives, and ultimately, on his brother Tyrone. n55 Because DNA is inherited in
there is a strong probability that close genetic relatives will share a

significant number of STR alleles. Two unrelated, randomly selected individuals will have, on average,
established patterns,
8.59 alleles in common. n56 By contrast, children will share at least thirteen alleles with each parent. n57 Siblings
Moreover, relatedness is more likely where two

DNA samples share rare genetic markers. n59 [*883] Under an "interim policy" instituted
by the FBI in July 2006, states now may share information about partial matches
will share on average 16.5 to 17 alleles. n58
uncovered in CODIS. n60 Today , most states have no formal policy in place
regarding this practice . n61 Yet at least nineteen states permit or have permitted the
use of a partial DNA match for purposes of familial investigation . n62 At least one state
permits such use based solely on the similarity between crime scene sample and
offender CODIS profile alone, with no additional confirmatory genetic analysis required. n63 This is so
even though
partial matching methods presently have a significant rate of
false positives --supposed relatives who, upon further analysis, turn out not to be related. n64
Unregulated local databases will expand in the SQ

Stephen Mercer & Jessica Grabel 2014 Law Profs Univ DC & GSU
New York University Annual Survey of American Law SHADOW DWELLERS: THE
UNDERREGULATED WORLD OF STATE AND LOCAL DNA 69 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L.
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Proponents of DNA databases have an easy argument. DNA analysis is an effective law enforcement tool, n326 but
the analysis takes time, particularly if it has to be performed by a state-run lab that handles analyses for multiple
local jurisdictions. n327 Local communities have a vested interest in getting criminals off the
streets, a task that is better accomplished sooner rather than later. According to proponents, the tangible crimefighting benefits of
expanding DNA databases at the local level generally outweigh the intangible,
This expansion is not

likely to slow in the wake of the Supreme Court's endorsement of DNA sampling as a
type of standard booking procedure in Maryland v. King. n329
fuzzy ethical and privacy problems such an unregulated expansion brings. n328
Plan
The United States should decrease domestic surveillance in
DNA databases by imposing a warrant requirement for
arrestee searches and restricting CODIS access to all
databases not complying with CODIS requirements.
Familial Targeting Advantage

Local databases enable familial searches
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Underregulated DNA databases are also used to perform searches of familial DNA, a
practice that the FBI does not routinely permit at the federal level . n207 In fact, a handful
of states openly [*671] practice familial DNA searches, while other states are silent or explicitly prohibit such use.
n208 As of June 2011, California, Colorado, Texas, and Virginia are known to perform
these familial searches. n209 Other states like Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee have contemplated legislation pushing toward using familial DNA
searches. n210 Whereas Maryland and the District of Columbia have explicitly prohibited such usage, n211 other
jurisdictions have simply started employing familial searching based upon existing laboratory policies. n212 Local
databases are a growing phenomenon, with little to no guidance and regulations as
to search practices; local law enforcement agencies are governing themselves and creating in-house policies
regarding DNA collection and sample usage. n213
Familial searches negate the credibility of the criminal justice

system.
Richard Willing 6/7/2005
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-06-07-dna-cover_x.htm (Acc. 630-15) USA Today Suspects get snared by a relative's DNA
Beginning this year, Florida's DNA database operators have been permitted to give investigators the names of
convicted offenders who match a crime scene sample at 21 of 26 alleles. State crime lab supervisor David Coffman
says research using Florida's convicted offender database suggests that men who have 21 alleles in common
almost always are brothers. Florida also has begun searching its database for rape suspects by using the DNA of
children born to rape victims to identify their fathers. The database has helped solve at least eight rape cases that
way. The practices are drawing increasing criticism as they become more common. Dan Krane, a DNA specialist at
Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio, says familial searching "puts someone in jeopardy of investigation simply
because his brother committed a crime." "That's the sins of the father being visited on the son," Krane says.
"That's contrary to the whole idea of our criminal justice system ." Helen Wallace, deputy
director of Genewatch, a privacy rights group in Derbyshire, England, says familial searches are certain to uncover
"This has
significant implications for privacy, but it has all happened with no public
discussion," Wallace says. "It's just done, and we're presented with it ." Even DNA scientists are wary
of the technology's power. "The average Joe on the street, if he knew what could be
done (with DNA databases), he would be worried about privacy," Li says. "I think the
average Joe is right." Frederick Bieber, a geneticist at Harvard Medical School, says
privacy concerns raised by familial searching could be addressed by setting rules that
family secrets, such as revealing that supposed siblings actually are not related by blood.
determine "how far into the family tree (a genetic search) can go." He says more research is needed to help states
"We can't just open the floodgates

and unleash this (without) rules to protect the freedoms and liberties of those who
are potentially subject to intrusive searches," Bieber says. But "how could you not use (DNA)? It has
determine when near-matches invade innocent people's privacy.
tremendous potential as an investigative tool."
Courts dont check familial DNA tests which result in racial

discrimination.
Jenny Choi, 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 713 Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Familial DNA testing may have a disparate impact on certain racial groups.
n109 The African-American community has experienced a well-recognized history of
disproportionately high arrest and conviction rates, which has in turn led to its
overrepresentation in databases. n110 Familial DNA testing may " exacerbate the
actual and apparent disparities " by creating a greater probability that a partial
match exists. n111 There are similar consequences for the Hispanic community.
First, Hispanics are increasingly experiencing the same input problem. n112 Coupled
with the fact that they are the demographic group with the highest rate of natural
population growth, "a Hispanic defendant is likely, on average, to lead investigators
relying on familial testing to a higher number of genetic relatives than if the profile
had been obtained from a non-Hispanic person." n113 Interestingly, no articles have
mentioned the disparate impact on males versus females. The majority of the total
correctional population is male. n114 Thus, it would be logical to assume that partial
match searches would affect males at a greater rate than females, especially with
the additional Y-STR testing that intentionally targets male relatives. Yet these critics
are much more concerned with possible unintended consequences on racial groups.
Despite these arguments, legal analysts consistently believe that these claims will
carry little weight in court. n115 In order for an Equal Protection claim to be viable,
there must be intentional discrimination. n116 Current California and federal
standards for partial match searches show no indication of intentionally targeting
particular racial groups. In fact, the FBI has recommended protocol to implement
searches that equally target each of the four major ethnic groups.
DNA approaches lead to 4x greater surveillance for black

Americans fundamentally unfair, akin to profiling
Henry T. Greely, 2006 Stanford U Professor of Law & Genetics
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics Summer, 2006 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 248 (Lexis,
Acc. 6-29-2015)
What is only slightly troubling in the context of individual families may be much more troubling in a broader setting.
African-Americans constitute about thirteen percent of the U.S. population, or about

thirty-eight million people. In an average year, over forty percent of people convicted of
felonies in the United States are African-American. As a result, the set of individuals
in the Offender Index is not racially neutral with regard to the American population.
Although we have not been able to find confirmation of this, we assume, based on the felony conviction statistics,
that African-Americans make up at least forty percent of the CODIS Offender Index, or roughly 1.1 million people out
of 2.75 million. The problems of embedding this racial disproportion in the Offender Database have already been
ably argued by David Kaye and Michael Smith. n52 Assume that, either using the current CODIS markers or an
expansion to roughly twice as many markers, partial matches of crime scene DNA samples to [*259] the CODIS
Offender Index could generate useful leads from among an offender's first degree relatives -- parents, siblings, and
the percentage of
African-Americans who might be identified as suspects through this method would
children -- but not more distant relatives. Using some additional simplifying assumptions,
be roughly four to five times as high as the corresponding percentage of U.S.

Caucasians (the term used, along with African American, without a hyphen, in the CODIS system). (Non-AfricanAmerican Hispanics occupy a middle position between African-Americans and non-Hispanic U.S. Caucasians in
terms of their proportionate representation in the CODIS Offender Index. For the sake of simplicity, they have not
been treated separately in this analysis.) Assume first that family structures are the same for African-Americans and
for non-Hispanic U.S. Caucasians in the CODIS Offender Index. Assume further that the average person in the
database has five living first degree relatives. (Data on this point has, thus far, proven impossible to find, certainly
for offenders but even for adult males, either by race or in general.) Under these assumptions, the 1.1 million
African-Americans in the Offender Index will have 5.5 million first degree relatives, leading to a total of 6.6 million
African-Americans "findable" through the database -- the offenders and their relatives. That constitutes about
seventeen percent of all African-Americans. U.S. Caucasians (including non-African-American Hispanics) make up
about sixty percent of the Offender Index or currently about 1.65 million people. They would have 8.25 million first
degree relatives, for total coverage of 9.9 million people "findable" through the database. U.S. Caucasians, including
non-African-American Hispanics, constitute about eighty-three percent of the American population or about 247
million people. The 9.9 million U.S. Caucasians who would be either in the Offender Index, or a first degree relative
more than four

times as much of the African-American population as the U.S. Caucasian population
would be "under surveillance" as a result of family forensic DNA and the vast
majority of those people would be relatives of offenders, not offenders themselves .
of someone in the Index would make up just four percent of the white population. Thus,
(If non-African-American Hispanics were analyzed separately from non-Hispanic U.S. Caucasians, the disproportion
between African-Americans and U.S. Caucasians would be even greater.) This analysis is simplified in several
respects. For one thing, the actual "coverage" is lower because some people are double-counted. Some people are
both offenders and first degree relatives of offenders; others are first degree relatives of more than one offender. If
the family structures of African-American and U.S. Caucasians offenders are the same, however, the relative
proportion should remain the same. On the other hand, the expansion of the power of this technique to allow it to
identify second degree relatives would, of course, increase the number of people covered in both groups while
generally retaining the same disproportionate impact on the African-American community. That disparate impact
alone seems unlikely to lead a court to hold that family forensic DNA violates the Equal Protection Clause. It is not
the result of any unstated racially discriminatory purpose or intent in the use of family forensic DNA, but a
consequence of the vast disproportion, for whatever reasons, in felony convictions between African-Americans and
U.S. Caucasians. And yet,
like racial profiling, it does seem fundamentally unfair , in a way

that has systemic implications broader than those affecting random families that
include convicted felons.
Prohibiting arrestees from DNA testing protects minority

groups from discrimination.
Rachel Cox 2015 Georgetown University Law Center
American Criminal Law Review Winter, 2015 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 155 UNETHICAL
INTRUSION: THE DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DNA
SAMPLING ON MINORITY POPULATIONS (Lexis Acc 6-29-15)
The possession of genetic information may result in discrimination against both
individuals and against entire ethnic groups, and may facilitate stigma and
discrimination against those groups . n164 The broadening of DNA databases raises
particular concerns for minority populations, as such "creeping" of databases may
increase the discriminatory connection between race and criminal behavior . n165
Because there are "race, class, and geographic inequities in arrest patterns"--for example, minorities and lowerclass individuals are arrested in greater proportions than white, middle- or upper-class individuals--those inequities
will be represented [*176] in DNA databases that contain the DNA of arrestees, n166 and may reinforce stereotypes
about which types of individuals are "criminals": The potential for such skewing of the information contained in
criminal histories remains significant today, not least because of the prevalence of plea bargaining and deal making
in exchange for testimony . . . . After passing through a DNA database . . . the biased information contained in
criminal records will have essentially been 'laundered,' and it will be treated as objective information imbued with
the considerable authority of science. n167 Additionally,
minority populations who have a large

number of DNA samples in government databases may face discrimination based
on disorders that are prevalent in their particular ethnic population. For example,
African Americans may face discrimination as a population based on sickle cell trait.
Because of the potential for discrimination against large groups of racial

minorities, both for the alleged tendency to commit crime and for minority-specific
genetic traits, states should enact statutes prohibiting DNA sampling of arrestees in
order to protect minorities from discrimination.
n168
Familial searches criminalize family members

Acc. 6-29-2015)
The other discussion is from Robin Williams and Paul Johnson. n29 As one part of a wide-ranging article, Williams
and Johnson discuss the United Kingdom's experience with familial searching and point out several concerns about
it effectively
increases police scrutiny and interest in people based on their relatives' past
involvement with the criminal justice system. This use raises concerns about
fairness both in individual cases and, more broadly, in its differential effects on groups
in American society. The first set of issues is disconcerting, but does not seem to disqualify the approach.
it. They do not, however, analyze what seems most troubling about this approach -- the way
The broader issues may make the use of this approach unacceptable.
We must reject every instance of racism.

Joseph Barndt, parish pastor and an antiracism trainer and organizer, 1991
(Dismantling Racism p. 155-56)
The
prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles
the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate
To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences and limitations, ghettos and prisons.
from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential that God intends
for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman,
and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison will
But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We
Brick by
brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be
destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and
for all, the walls of racism. The danger of self-destruction seems to be drawing ever more near. The
results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonization , of military buildups and
violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be
reaching the point of no return. A small and predominantly white minority of global population
derives its power and privilege from sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of
color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.
inevitably destroy us as well.
are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom.
Medical Advances Advantage

Currently citizens are willing to participate in medical
research; however they want control and privacy of their
genetic information.
citizens manifest a desire to control what is done with their identifiable

genetic information, framed in both property and privacy terms. For instance, research on
public attitudes regarding consent to the research use of genetic material reveals that, while most potential
research participants are happy to grant broad consent for future use of their
genetic information, a large majority also believe that their consent should be
required before researchers can use clinically derived samples retaining personal
Ordinary
identifiers. n114 "Personal control over [one's genetic information] is central to

individual autonomy in making basic life decisions." n115 This notion of control--and control most basically
about excluding others from accessing one's information--invokes the framing of property, and its core right to
exclude. Similarly sounding a property theme are the medical rights to know and not to know: In the medical
context, individuals retain both a right to know what their genetic information reveals about them and the right not
citizens also express privacy-related concerns

about their genetic information. In the context of genome-wide research, one study reported that
"84% of participants chose public data release, with anonymization, prior to learning
about re-identification risks. After receiving such education, only 53% chose public
release, 33% chose restricted access in a [*894] password-protected database, and
14% opted out of data sharing." n117 These findings underscore that the
identifiability of genetic information--the possibility of attributing certain genetic
information to a particular individual--matters to a significant portion of the
population. In the language of privacy and disclosure, experts warn Page 7 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873, *890 that
to know certain genetic information. n116 Yet,
"[i]n theory, whole genome sequence information could be used to deny financial backing or loan approval,
educational opportunities, sports eligibility, military accession, or adoption eligibility. Disclosing genomic
information could affect the opportunities available to individuals, subject them to social stigma, and cause
psychological harm." n118 Policymakers across legal institutions have utilized the same two frames, property and
privacy, in attempting to operationalize this interest in controlling one's identifiable genetic information. This not
only underscores the centrality of the property and privacy frames, but also indicates that the interest in identifiable
genetic information is one society is prepared to take seriously. Most directly, a number of states have enacted
legislation declaring that genetic information is the property of the individual from whom it derives. n119 Congress,
in turn, has legislated genetic information through privacy protections. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA) demonstrates Congress's understanding of the importance of genetic information. GINA aims to protect
individuals from discrimination on the basis of genetic information in the employment and health insurance
markets. n120 Its express intent is to "protect the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the
potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies,
research, and new [*895] therapies." n121 Significantly, GINA defines "genetic information" to include not only an
individual's own genetic tests, but also the tests of genetic relatives. n122 GINA clarifies that "genetic information"
is "health information" under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). n123
Under regulated DNA databases hinder medical research

advancements.
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Local DNA databases can also hinder
the
advancement of clinical research.
Individuals may be hesitant to produce their DNA for studies or research if there is a
fear their sample could be shared with law enforcement . Individuals commonly volunteer to
share their DNA for research advancements and to be used for other purposes. For example, in 2003,
Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc. and Quest Diagnostics Inc. collected DNA samples as part of a Major League
Baseball survey to study the use of steroids by baseball players. n322 The team owners and players involved
voluntarily produced their DNA and agreed in their labor contracts that test results and players' identities would
remain confidential. n323 Upon the government's investigation into a local lab cooperative and its role in
distributing illegal steroids to players, the DNA samples were seized, leading to investigations of some of the
players whose identities were disclosed to authorities. n324 Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit initially held that the
government could do so, triggering a subsequent Ninth Circuit panel to raise concerns about the impact on players'
privacy. n325
Clinical trials key to fighting new diseases

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Participation in Clinical Trials Critical to Development of
New Medicines for Patients Inclusion of Diverse Patient Populations Necessary to Address Health Disparities By
Fischer
14
Stephanie
02.26.
| http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/participation-clinical-trials-criticaldevelopment-new-medicines-patients
Developing new medicines is a lengthy and complex process, relying heavily on

volunteer participation to evaluate potential therapies for safety and effectiveness in clinical trials.
Without the patients who volunteer to participate in clinical research , the
development of new treatments would not be possible. Challenges in Patient Recruitment The
Courier-Post is the latest to report the difficulty in recruiting patients for clinical trials, despite vigorous safeguards
Delays in recruitment can mean delays in the

approval of potential new medicines for the patients who may benefit from them.
and the opportunity to help advance science.
While the recruitment of patients for clinical trials is challenging, it is even more so among groups such as African
Americans, Asian Americans and Hispanics which have been historically underrepresented in clinical trials. The FDA
reports that even though African Americans are 12 percent of the U.S. population, they make up only 5 percent of
clinical trial participants. Hispanics represent 16 percent of the U.S. population, but only 1 percent of clinical trial
participants. Gary Puckrein, President and CEO of the National Minority Quality Forum (NMQF), included even more
chilling statistics in a blog post on health disparities and African American History Month. According to Dr. Puckrein,
One of the great challenges for those working to eliminate health disparities in minority communities is their
underrepresentation in clinical trials. Diverse Patient Population Critical in Clinical Trials As PhRMA President and
participants with
diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds in clinical trials can further research and help
find better ways to fight diseases that disproportionately impact those populations.
CEO John Castellani noted in a recent guest opinion for the National Journal, inclusion of
This sentiment was echoed in a guest editorial in the Washington Post this weekend by David Satcher, honorary
chairman of the African American Network Against Alzheimers and a former surgeon general of the U.S. In his
editorial, Dr. Satcher noted the critical importance of increasing African American enrollment in clinical trials for
potential new treatments of diseases such as Alzheimers: Without higher levels of participation among African
Americans, we will never unlock the root causes of the disparate impact of a disease such as Alzheimers. Every day
that African Americans continue to live in fear of such trials is another day that we fall further behind in the fight
against Alzheimers and other diseases Researchers believe it is possible to stop Alzheimers with investments in
research equal to the size and scope of the disease. But funding can go only so far without a corresponding increase
in patients willing to participate in innovative clinical trials. As one of the groups that has the most to gain from
Alzheimers clinical trials, African Americans should lead by example. In doing so, we just might gain meaningful
insight into the causes of the disparate impact of Alzheimers and help speed our pace to a cure.
Lack of antibiotic innovation causes extinction -- research is

key
Davies 8Professor of Microbiology and Immunology @ University of British
Columbia [Dr. Julian Davies, Resistance redux: Infectious diseases, antibiotic
resistance and the future of mankind, The European Molecular Biology
Organization Report, Jul 2008; 9(Suppl 1): S18S21]
For many years,
antibiotic-resistant pathogens have been recognized as one of the
main threats to human survival , as some experts predict a return to the preantibiotic era . So far, national efforts to exert strict control over the use of antibiotics have had limited
it is not yet possible to achieve worldwide concerted action to reduce the
growing threat of multi-resistant pathogens: there are too many parties involved .
success and
Furthermore, the problem has not yet really arrived on the radar screen of many physicians and clinicians, as
antimicrobials still work most of the timeapart from the occasional news headline that yet another nasty superbug
has emerged in the local hospital. Legislating the use of antibiotics for non-therapeutic applications and curtailing
general public access to them is conceivable, but legislating the medical profession is an entirely different matter.
In order to meet the growing problem of antibiotic resistance among pathogens, the
discovery and development of new antibiotics
and alternative treatments
for
infectious diseases, together with tools for rapid diagnosis that will ensure effective and appropriate use of
existing antibiotics,
are imperative . How the health services, pharmaceutical industry and academia
respond in the coming years will determine the future of treating infectious
diseases. This challenge is not to be underestimated : microbes are formidable
adversaries and, despite our best efforts, continues to exact a toll on the human race . Pg.
S21
Gene based biotech research solves environmental threats

including warming
Mtui 11
[Godliving Y. S. Mtui. Department of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, University of Dar es Salaam. International
Journal for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology Research Vol. 2(13), pp. 222-231, 30 December, 2011. ETB]
Climate change is a significant and lasting change in the statistical properties of the climatic system when
considered over long periods of time. It can be caused either by the Earth's natural forces, which include solar
radiation and continental drift, or human activities (Theodore, 2001). Greenhouse gases are those gaseous
constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific
wavelengths within the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earths surface, the atmosphere and
clouds (IPCC, 2007). Water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone
(O3) are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earths atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely
man-made greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine and bromine
containing substances. Beside CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol (http://kyotoprotocol.com) deals with the
greenhouse gases such as sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
An increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases leads to increased infrared opacity of the atmosphere, an
imbalance that can only be compensated for by an increase in the temperature of the surface-troposphere
system. This phenomenon is termed the greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2007). Adaptation to climate change is a
response that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems to climate change effects (IPCC,
2007). Another policy response to climate change is known as climate change mitigation. It refers to human
intervention to reduce the sources or decrease intensity of negative climate change effects. Most often, climate
change mitigation scenarios involve reductions in the concentrations of greenhouse gases, either by reducing
their sources or by increasing their sinks. Examples of mitigation measures include using fossil fuels more
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching from biomass to renewable energy, improving
the insulation of buildings, and expanding forest and other sinks to remove more carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere (IPCC, 2007; Sallema and Mtui, 2008). The decline of crops yield, heat stress and ocean acidification
are among some of the negative effects of climate change. In order to feed the ever increasing world population,
Biotechnology can contribute

positively by mitigating the impact of climate change through green house gas
reduction, crops adaptation and increase in yield using less land (Treasury, 2009). This
there is a need to
double the rate of agricultural production.
paper seeks to address the contribution of biotechnology to adaptation and mitigation of negative climatic
effects. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY Agricultural biotechnology involves the practical application of biological
organisms, or their sub-cellular components in agriculture. The techniques currently in use include tissue culture,
conventional breeding, molecular marker-assisted breeding and genetic engineering. Tissue culture is the
cultivation of plant cells or tissues on specifically formulated nutrient media. Under optimal conditions, a whole
plant can be regenerated from a single cell; a rapid and essential tool for mass propagation and production of
Advances in breeding help agriculture achieve

higher yields and meet the needs of expanding population with limited land and water
disease-free
plants (Kumar and Naidu, 2006).
resources. As a result of improved plant breeding techniques, the productivity gains in worldwide production of
primary crops, including maize, wheat, rice and oilseed has increased by 21% percent since 1995, while total
land devoted to these crops has increased by only 2% (Treasury, 2009). In molecular assisted breeding,
molecular markers (identifiable DNA sequences found at specific location of the genome) are being used. By
determining location and likely actions of genes, scientists can quickly and accurately identify plants carrying
desirable characteristics, hence conventional breeding can be conducted with greater precision (Mneney et al.,
2001; Sharma et al., 2002). Molecular markers can be used in plant breeding to increase the speed and
efficiency of the introduction of new genes (marker assisted introgression), understanding of genetic diversity,
taxonomic relationships between plant species and biological processes such as mating systems, pollen or
Biotechnology enables development of disease
diagnostic kits for use in laboratory and field. These kits are able to detect plant
diseases early, by testing for the presence of pathogens deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or proteins which
disease dispersal (Johanson and Ives, 2001).
are produced by pathogens or plants during infection (Kumar and Naidu, 2006). Conventional agricultural
biotechnologies works better when combined with modern biotechnological approaches. Modern agricultural
biotechnology refers to biotechnological techniques for the manipulation of genetic material and the fusion of
cells beyond normal breeding barriers. The most obvious example is genetic engineering to create genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) through transgenic technology involving the insertion or deletion of genes. In
genetic engineering or genetic transformation, the genetic material is modified by artificial means. It involves
isolation and cutting of a gene at a precise location by using specific enzymes. Selected DNA fragments can then
be transferred into the cells of the target organism. The common practice in genetic engineering is the use of a
bacterium Agrobacterium tumafaciens as a vector to transfer the genetic trait (Johanson and Ives, 2001). A more
recent technology is ballistic impregnation method whereby a DNA is attached to a minute gold or tungsten
particle and then fired into the plant tissue (Morris, 2011). Crops may be modified for improved flavour,
increased resistance to pests and diseases, or enhanced growth in adverse weather conditions. In recent years,
biosafety and genetic engineering projects have been initiated in Africa, with the aim of introducing genetically
modified organisms into Africas agricultural systems. Already, countries like South Africa, Egypt and Burkina
Faso have commercialized GMOs while many others have developed the capacity to conduct research and
development in modern agricultural biotechnology (Mayet, 2007). Green biotechnology is the term referring to
the use of environmentally friendly solutions in agriculture, horticulture, and animal breeding processes
(Treasury, 2009). Recombinant DNA technology has significantly augmented the conventional crop improvement,
and has the potential to assist plant breeders to meet the increased food demand predicted for the 21st century.
Dramatic progress has been made over the past two decades in manipulating genes from diverse and exotic
sources, and inserting them into microorganisms and crops to confer resistance to pests and diseases, tolerance
to herbicides, drought, soil salinity and aluminium toxicity, improve post-harvest quality, enhance nutrient
uptake and nutritional quality; increase photosynthetic rate, sugar and starch production, increase effectiveness
of bio control agents, improve understanding of gene action and metabolic pathways, and production of drugs and
vaccines in crops (Sharma et al., 2002 ; Vallad and Goodman, 2004). BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
deforestation, inorganic
fertilizer use and overgrazing currently account for about 25% of green house
gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) emission (Treasury, 2009). Various initiatives under the banner of green
biotechnology, may offer solution to decrease green house gases and mitigate
climate change by giving farmers opportunities to use less and environmentally friendly energy, carbon
MITIGATION Greenhouse gas reduction Agricultural practices such as
sequestration and reduce fertilizer usage (Treasury, 2009). Use of environmentally friendly fuels Given the
impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity and the role played by agriculture practices in global
warming, agricultural techniques must play a crucial role in the fight against climate change. Production of
biofuels, both from traditional and GMO crops such as sugarcane, oilseed, rapeseed, and jatropha will help to
reduce the adverse effects of CO2 emission by the transport sector (Sarin et al., 2007; Treasury, 2009). Energy
efficient farming will therefore adopt machines that use bioethanol and biodiesel instead of the conventional
fossil fuels. Green energy programs through plantations of perennial non edible oil-seed producing plants will
help in cleansing the atmosphere and production of biodiesel for direct use in the energy sector, or in blending
biofuels with fossil fuels in certain proportions thereby minimizing use of fossil fuels to some extent (Lua et al.,
2009; Jain and Sharma, 2010; Lybbert and Summer, 2010) Less fuel consumptions Organic farming uses less fuel
by the application of compost and mulching techniques which reduce weeds and herbicides spraying due to less
ploughing (Maeder et al., 2002). Reduced irrigation would also contribute to reduced fuel usage, thereby
reducing the amount of CO2 release into the atmosphere. Using modern biotechnology such as GMOs and other
related technologies facilitate less fuel usage by decreasing necessity and frequency of spraying and reducing
tillage or excluding the tillage practice. For example, insect resistant GM crops reduce fuel usage and CO2
production by reducing insecticides application. Reduction of fuel usage due to the application of biotechnology
amounted to savings of about 962 million kg of CO2 emitted in 2005, while the adoption of reduced tillage or no
tillage practices led to a reduction of 40.43 kg/ha or 89.44 kg/ha CO2 emissions due to less fuel usage
respectively (Brookes and Barfoot, 2006, 2008). Carbon sequestration The capture or uptake of carbon containing
substances, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2), is often called carbon sequestration. It is commonly used to
describe any increase in soil organic carbon content caused by change of land management, with implication
that the increased soil carbon storage mitigates climate change (Powlson et al., 2011).
Therefore, soil carbon sequestration is an important strategy to mitigate the increase of atmospheric CO2
concentration. Reducing the amount of conventional tillage is one way of enhancing carbon sequestration. By
leaving at least 30% of residue on the soil surface, no-till agriculture reduces loss of CO2 from agricultural systems
and may also play a role in reducing water loss through evaporation, increase soil stability and creation of cooler
Conservation practices that help prevent soil erosion, may also

sequester soil carbon and enhance methane (CH4) consumption (West and Post, 2002; Johnsona et al.,
soil microclimate.
2007). Powlson et al. (2011) have suggested that the climate change benefit of increased soil organic carbon
from enhanced crop growth (for example using industrial fertilizers) must be balanced against greenhouse gas
emissions emanating from the manufacture and use of such fertilizers. In modern agricultural practices,
genetically modified Round up Ready TM (herbicide resistant) soybean technology has accounted for up to 95%
of no-till area in the United States of America (USA) and Argentina, and led to sequestration of 63,859 million
tones of CO2 (Fawcett and Towery, 2003; Brimner et al., 2004; Kleter et al., 2008). The modified crops reduce the
need for tillage or ploughing to allow farmers to adopt no till farming practices. In terms of climate change
mitigation, this practice enhances soil quality and retails more carbon in the soil (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008).
Reduced artificial fertilizer use The dependency on agricultural chemicals to sustain productivity in marginal
landscapes has led to a global scale contamination of the environment with toxins that change the course of
biogeochemical cycles (Ogunseitan, 2003). Reduced fertilizer use also means less nitrogen pollution of ground
Artificial inorganic nitrogenous fertilizers such as ammonium sulphate,

phosphates, sodium nitrate and calcium nitrate are responsible for the
formation and release of greenhouse gases (particularly N2O) from the soil to the atmosphere
and surface waters.
ammonium chloride, ammonium
when they interact with common soil bacteria (Brookes and Barfoot, 2009). To reduce the negative effects of
artificial fertilizers, the use of environmentally friendly biotechnology-based fertilizes are being encouraged.
Biofertilizers Organic farming technologies utilizing bio-based fertilizers (composted humus and animal manure),
or crop rotation and intercropping with leguminous plants with nitrogen-fixing abilities are some of the
conventional biotechnological options for reducing artificial fertilizer use. In modern biotechnology, the use of
mutation or genetic engineering techniques to improve Rhizobium inoculants have resulted to strains with
improved nitrogen-fixing characteristics (Zahran, 2001). Biotechnological advances involving the induction of
nodular structures on the roots of cereal crops such as rice and wheat offer a bright prospect of non-leguminous
plants being enabled to fix nitrogen in the soil (Kennedy and Tchan, 1992; Paau, 2002; Saikia and Jain, 2007; Yan
et al., 2008). Another option is the cultivation of GM crops that use nitrogen more efficiently. An example of such
crops is the nitrogen-efficient GM canola which not only reduces the amount of nitrogen fertilizer that is lost into
the atmosphere or leached into soil and waterways, but it also impacts positively on the economies of farmers
through improved profitability (Treasury, 2009). Managing soil nitrogen to match crop needs can reduce N2O
emission and avoid adverse impacts on water quality. Also, manipulating animal diet and manure management
can reduce CH4 and N2O emission from animal husbandry (Johnsona et al., 2007). BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR CROP
Climate change leads in reduced crop yield due to inadequate rainfall,

emergence of potential weeds, pests and diseases caused by fungi, bacteria and
viruses (Johnsona et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2008). One way of adapting to such calamities is to
apply agricultural biotechnologies that counter the effects of such changes by
improving crop productivities per unit area of land cultivated. Biotechnology for increased yield per
ADAPTATION
unit area of land To satisfy the growing worldwide demand for food crops, two options are available: Either to
increase the area under production, or improve productivity on existing farmland (Edgerton, 2009). Given the
worlds available arable land, and the climate change dynamics, the second option is more feasible. Utilizing
organic residues as a source of nutrients for plants, good agronomical practices such as landscape management,
crop rotation or mixed farming, and use of traditional and indigenous knowledge on non-chemical pests and
diseases control are some of conventional options (Bianchi et al., 2006). Biotechnology and application of
advanced techniques in breeding can help agriculture further to achieve higher yields and meet needs of
expanding population with limited land and water resources (Treasury, 2009). Adaptation to biotic stresses The
major aim of agricultural biotechnology is to enhance productivity and maximize productive capacity of
diminishing resources. Conventional landscape management practices and breeding initiatives have contributed
significantly to crop adaptations through the development of strains that are resistant to biotic stresses such as
insects, fungi, bacteria and viruses (Valllad and Goodman, 2004; Bianchi et al., 2006). In modern biotechnology,
the ability of a soil bacterium (Baccilus thuringiensis, Bt) gene to be transformed into maize, cotton and other
crops to impart internal protection against insects (mainly of the order lepidoptera and diptera) significantly
contributes to agricultural pest control strategies. For many farmers, Bt crops are proving to be valuable tools for
integrated pest management programs by giving farmers new pest control choices (Zhe and Mithcell, 2011).
Transgenic canola (oil seed rape) and soybean have been modified to be resistant to specific herbicides (May et
al., 2005; Bonny, 2008). Also, GM cassava, potatoes, bananas and other crops that are resistant to fungi,
bacteria and viruses are in development; some have already been commercialised while others are undergoing
field trials (Mneney, 2001; Van Camp, 2005). Studies carried out between 2002 and 2005 found out that biotic
stress resistant GM crops account for increases in average yield of 11 to 12% for canola and maize compared to
conventional crops (Qaim and Zilberman, 2003; Gomez Barbero et al., 2008; Brookes and Barfoot, 2008, 2009).
Adaptation to abiotic stresses Climate change poses an enormous challenge in terms of available agricultural
land and fresh water use. Abiotic stresses including salinity, drought, extreme temperatures, chemical toxicity
and oxidative stress have negative impacts on agriculture and natural status of the environment. The
agricultural sector uses about 70% of the available fresh water and this is likely to increase as temperature rises
(Brookes and Barfoot, 2008). Moreover, about 25 million acres of land is lost each year due to salinity caused by
unsustainable irrigation techniques (Ruane et al., 2008). It is anticipated that increased salinity of arable land will
lead to 30% land loss within 25 years and up to 50% by the year 2050 (Wang et al., 2003; Valliyodan et al.,
2006). Therefore, solutions to facilitate crop adaptation to abiotic stressful conditions (drought and salinity) need
to be developed. Plant biotechnology programs should give priority to the breeding for drought and salinity
tolerance in crops and forests. Conventional approaches to mitigate the effects of drought and salinity stresses
involve selection and growing drought resistant crops that can tolerate harsh conditions on marginal lands. Such
crops include cassava, millet and sunflower (Manavalan et al., 2009). While mulching to prevent surface water
loss has been a common practice for organic farmers; tissue culture and breeding are being used to cross
drought tolerant crops with other high yielding species to create a drought tolerant, high yielding hybrids (Apse
and Blumwald, 2002; Ruane et al., 2008). However, although adaptation to stress under natural conditions has
some ecological advantages, the metabolic and energy costs may overshadow its benefit to agriculture.
Therefore, blending traditional and molecular breeding techniques would be most desirable (Wang et al, 2001;
2002). Molecular control mechanisms for abiotic stress tolerance
are based on activation and regulation of specific stress-related genes. Transgenic
Apse and Blumwald,
plants are engineered based on different stress mechanisms: metabolism, regulatory controls, ion transport,
antioxidants and detoxification, late embryogenesis abundance, heat shock processes and heat proteins (Wang
et al., 2001, 2003). It has been reported by Zhu (2001) that salt tolerant plants also often tolerate other stresses
including chilling, freezing heat and drought. Already, a number of abiotic stress tolerant, high performance GM
crop plants have been developed. These include tobacco (Hong et al., 2000); Arabinopsis thaliana and Brasicca
napus (Jaglo et al., 2001); Tomato (Hsieh et al., 2002; Zhang and Blumwald, 2002); rice (Yamanouchi et al.,
2002); maize, cotton, wheat and oilseed rape (Yamaguchi and Blumwals, 2005; Brookes and Barfoot, 2006).
Plants may also be engineered to reduce the levels of poly (ADP ribose) polymerise, a key stress related enzyme,
resulting in plants that are able to survive drought compared to their non-GM counterparts. Field trial results
have shown a 44% increase in yield in favour of such GM crop plants (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008). Another
technology involving the use of genetic switches (transcription factors and stress genes) from microbial
sources is currently under research by the United Kingdom (UK) Agricultural Biotechnology Council (ABC;
http://www.abcinformation.org). This technology has been tested and resulted in two-fold increase in productivity
for Arabidopsis and 30% yield increase for maize during severe water stress. It has been suggested that
comprehensive breeding plan for abiotic stress should include conventional breeding and germplasm selection,
elucidation of specific molecular control mechanisms in tolerant and sensitive genotypes, biotechnology-oriented
improvement of selection and breeding procedures (functional analysis, marker probes and transformation with
specific genes) and improvement and adaptation of current agricultural practices (Wang et al., 2003). With the
availability of whole genome sequences of plants, physical maps, genetics and functional genomics tools,
integrated approaches using molecular breeding and genetic engineering offer new opportunities for improving
stress resistance (Manavalan et al., 2009). Agroecology and agroforestry Consequences of global climate
change responsible for altering patterns of temperature and precipitation are threatening agriculture in many
tropical regions. Agroecological and agroforest management systems, such as shade management in crop
systems, may mitigate the effects of extreme temperature and precipitation, thereby reducing the ecological
and economic vulnerability of many rural farmers, and improving the agroecological resistance to extreme
climate events (Lin et al., 2008). Fungal applications in biotechnology, termed mycobiotechnology, are part of a
larger trend toward using living systems to solve environmental problems and restore degraded ecosystems. The
sciences of mycoforestry and mycorestoration are part of an emerging field of research and application for
regeneration of degraded forest ecosystems (Cheung and Chang, 2009). Mycorestoration attempts to use fungi
to help repair or restore ecologically harmed habitats. Whether the habitats have been damaged from human
activities or natural disasters, saprophytic and mycorrhizal fungi can help steer the course to recovery. A number
of non-legume woody plants such as casuarinas (Casuartna sp.) and alders (Alnus sp.) can fix nitrogen
symbiotically with actinomycete bacteria (Frankia sp.), a phenomenon that is beneficial to forestry and
agroforesty (Franche et al., 1998). Both endo- and ectomycorrhizal symbiotic fungi together with actinomycetes
have been used as inoculants in regeneration of degraded forests (Saikia and Jain, 2007). Therefore, both
mycorrhizal fungi and actinorhizal bacteria technologies can be applied with the aim of increasing soil fertility
Afforestation would indirectly

contribute to improved agricultural productivity and food security because forests
create microclimates that improve rainfall availability. Furthermore, forests act as
carbon sinks thereby contributing towards sequestration and concomitant greenhouse reduction
and improving water uptake
by plants (Ruane et al., 2008).
effects for climate change mitigation. Consequently, forestry and agroforestry offer the potential to develop
synergies between efforts to mitigate climate change and efforts to help vulnerable populations to adapt to
negative consequences of climate change (Verchot et al., 2007). The conventional and modern biotechnological
initiatives related to climate change adaptation and mitigation are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. CHALLENGES
AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES As the world population is expected to reach 8 billion people by 2028, the demand
for food is also expected to increase by 55%. Moreover, out of worlds total land area of 13 billion hectares (ha),
only 12% is cultivated. In the next 30 years, developing countries will need an additional 120 million hecters for
crops (Ruane et al., 2008). Therefore, science and technology should take a lead in spearheading increased
agricultural productivity. If we want to feed the world without destroying our resources, science and technology
should drive the development of modern agriculture. Genetically modified crop varieties are the most cost
effective ways to sustain farming in marginal areas and restore degraded lands to production (Treasury, 2009).
Efforts should be made to integrate local and conventional biotechnologies with modern biotechnology strategies
within national policies and legal frameworks in order to increase resilience of local crop varieties against
changes in environmental dynamics (Stinger et al., 2009). Despite the availability of promising research results,
many applications of biotechnology have not met their full potential to deliver practical solutions to end-users in
developing countries (Ruane et al., 2008). The challenges for the bioenergy sector are concerns about imminent
land, water, food and feed conflicts as a result of introduction of large scale plantations of energy crops in limited
arable land (Rubin, 2008; Mtui, 2009). In the area of increased soil fertility using biofertilizers, nitrogen fixation
research is moving towards genomic studies whereby complete sequences of nitrogen-fixing bacteria are being
elucidated (Yan et al., 2008). In forest biotechnology, there is a poor understanding of forest genomics and
complex ecosystem processes at landscape scales. It is argued that genomic approaches for monitoring soil
microbial communities could become an important tool in understanding the effects of biomass removal for
biofuels, or enhancing durable below-ground carbon sequestration (Groover, 2007). Modern biotechnology has
encountered enormous public debates related to risks and benefits of the GMOs technology in terms of health,
environment, socio economic and ethical issues (Bakshi, 2003). The attitudes and interests of various stakeholder
groups supporting or opposing modern biotechnology have led to polarized opinions (Bruinsma et al., 2003;
Aerni 2005). There have been opponent activists who dispute the safety of the technology, citing possible risks
including: creation of more rigorous pests and pathogens, exacerbating the effects of existing pests, harm to non
target species, disruption of biotic communities and loss of species and genetic diversity within species (Snow et
al., 2005). Political, socio-economic, cultural and ethical concerns about modern biotechnology are related to the
fear of technological neo-colonialism in developing countries, intellectual property rights, land ownership,
customer choices, negative cultural and religious perceptions, and fear of the unknown (Brink et al., 1998,
Makinde et al., 2009). Such public concerns have led to over-regulation of the technology, which threatens to
retard its applications (Qaim, 2009). It is suggested that the effects of GMOs should be studied case-by-case,
incorporating assessment of potential plant/ecosystem interactions, accessible and relevant indicators and tests
for unforeseen effects (Bruinsma et al., 2003). In order to overcome the challenges currently encountered in
development and application of modern biotechnology, governments ought to put in place appropriate biosafety
and biotechnology policies and legal frameworks before adopting such technologies (Stringer et al., 2009). Table
3 summarizes major challenges to climate change and agricultural biotechnology, and some proposed solutions.
CONCLUSION This review shows that safe development and application of plant biotechnology can contribute
positively towards climate change adaptation and mitigation through reduction of CO2 emissions, carbon
sequestration, reduced fuel use, adoption of environmentally friendly fuels, and reduced artificial fertilizer use,
employing biofuels for improved soil fertility and crop adaptability. These measures are meant to improve
agricultural productivity and food security, and at the same time protecting our environment from adverse
effects of climate change. There is consensus among scientific community that climate variability is a result of
applications of both
conventional and modern agricultural biotechnologies will not only contribute to
increased yield and food security, but it will also significantly contribute to climate
change adaptation and mitigation initiatives.
direct and
indirect anthropogenic activities. An integrated approach
to safe
Genetic biotechnology averts extinction from warming &

disease
Baum and Wilson 13 (Seth D. Baum* and Grant S. Wilson Global Catastrophic Risk
Institute * The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering Ethics in
Biology, Engineering and Medicine, 4(1):59-72 (2013). Pg lexis)
Note: GCR: Global Catastrophic Risk
bioengineering can also reduce the chances that other GCRs will
occur. One such GCR is climate change. Catastrophic climate change scenarios could involve sea
level rise of up to 10 meters, droughts, increased extreme weather events, loss of most threatened and
endangered species, and temperature increases of 6 degrees Celsius.37 Still worse than that would
be outcomes in which large portions of the land surface on Earth become too warm for mammals
(including humans) to survive.38 And the worst scenario could involve climate engineering backfiring to
In addition to itself being a GCR,
result in extremely rapid temperature increase.39 6 Despite the risks of climate change, the international
community has struggled to satisfactorily address the issue, for a variety of political, technological, and economical
Bioengineering may be able to help. An army of bioengineered algae that is specifically designed to
convert carbon dioxide into a biocrude fuel ready to be made into fuel for any vehicle type a
technology that Craig Venters Synthetic Genomics, Inc. is developing with a $600 million investment from
ExxonMobil could remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and provide a
plentiful, carbon-neutral fuel sour ce that does not pose many of the downsides of todays biofuel
options (although this technology has its own risks).40 Or, despite being a bizarre proposition, humans could
be genetically engineered to reduce our CO2 output, such as by engineering humans to be
intolerant to meat or to be smaller in size.41 Likewise, while a deadly bioengineered virus has the
potential to escape from a laboratory and cause a global catastrophe, such research
may be necessary to create vaccines for viruses that could cause worldwide pandemics. For example,
reasons.
the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 (the Spanish flu) killed about 50 million people worldwide.42 Would
modern bioengineering technology have been able to avoid this global catastrophe ? In
fact, researchers justified the airborne H5N1 virus, discussed above, as helping to prevent the spread of a similar strain that
could mutate naturally. Overall, there is a dynamic relationship between bioengineering and other GCRs that should be assessed
when considering how to respond to these risks.
Science leadership checks all war scenarios

Koppelman et al 10, Ben, research officer at the foreign policy center, Natalie Day,
Senior Researcher at Demos and Project Manager for The Atlas of Ideas, dr Neil
Davison, senior policy adviser (security & diplomacy) in the Science Policy Centre at
the Royal Society, Dr Tracey Elliott, Head of International, The Royal Society, Dr
James Wilsdon, Director of the Science Policy Centre at the Royal Society, Professor
Anthony Cheetham FRS, Department of Materials Science, University of Cambridge,
Professor Mohamed Hassan, President, Academy of Sciences for the Developing
World, Dr Ragunath Mashelkar FRS, President, Global Research Alliance, Dr Jim
McQuaid FREng, Former Chairman, Environmental Security Panel, NATO Science for
Peace and Security Committee, Dr Vaughan Turekian, Director, Centre for Science
Diplomacy, AAAS, USA [New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, January, the royal
society]
Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive issues may sometimes be the only way to initiate a wider
political dialogue. The soft power of science, and the universality of scientific methods, can be used to diffuse
tensions even in hard power scenarios , such as those relating to traditional military threats. For
example, technologies to verify nuclear arms control agreements were a rare focus of joint working between the US and USSR
during the Cold War. Lessons from the Cold War are once again highly pertinent. In the run-up to the May 2010 Review Conference
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear disarmament is firmly back on the international agenda. However, the
timescale for disarmament is long, as illustrated by the history of negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention. After the
Geneva Convention banned the use of chemical weapons in 1925, negotiations for a treaty banning their production and stockpiling
did not start until the 1980s, and the convention entered into force only in 1997. Even now, stockpiles of chemical weapons in the
US and Russia have yet to be destroyed. So focusing in 2010 on the challenges of the final stages of a nuclear disarmament
process may be premature. A more practical next step could be to establish the scientific requirements for the verification regime
necessary to support future stages of negotiation (Pregenzer 2008). In 2008, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested
that a high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament could be established (based on the model of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). This panel could begin by identifying the scientific and technical aspects of
disarmament, and then set out a research agenda necessary to achieve them. International cooperation would be essential, both
between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, as all would need to have confidence that reductions are taking place. The recent
initiative between the UK and Norwegian governments on disarmament verifi cation sets a precedent here, and could be expanded
security threats now extend beyond the military

domain, with environmental security attracting particular attention (Abbott C, Rogers P & Sloboda S 2007).
Essential resources, such as freshwater, cultivable land, crop yields and fish stocks, are likely to
become scarcer in many parts of the world, increasing the risk of competition over resources within and
to include additional States (VERTIC 2009). However,
between states (UNEP 2009). This could intensify as previously inaccessible regions, such as the Arctic Ocean, open up as a
consequence of climate change and ice melt. Substantial parts of the world also risk being left uninhabitable by rising sea levels,
reduced freshwater availability or declining agricultural capacity. Many of the regions that are vulnerable to the impacts of these
multiple stresses are already the locus of existing instability and conflict (see Figure 2). 5 Conclusions The main conclusions to
emerge from the discussions at the Royal Society/AAAS meeting were as follows: 5.1 The three dimensions of science diplomacy
The concept of
science diplomacy is gaining increasing currency in the US, UK, Japan and elsewhere. It is still
applied to the role of science, technology and innovation in three related areas: informing
foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international science cooperation
(diplomacy for science); using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries
(science for diplomacy). 5.2 Science and universal values Scientific values of rationality, transparency and universality are the
same the world over. They can help to underpin good governance and build trust between nations. Science
provides a non-ideological environment for the participation and free exchange of ideas between people,
regardless of cultural, national or religious backgrounds. 5.3 The soft power of science Science is a source of what Joseph
Nye terms soft power (Nye 2004). The scientific community often works beyond national boundaries on problems of common
a fluid concept, but can usefully be
interest, so is well placed to support emerging forms of diplomacy that require non-traditional alliances of nations, sectors and nongovernmental organisations. If aligned with wider foreign policy goals, these channels of
contribute to coalition building and conflict resolution.
scientific exchange can
Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive

issuessuch as nuclear nonproliferationcan sometimes provide an effective route to other forms of political dialogue. Similarly the
potential of science as an arena for building trust and understanding between countries is gaining traction, particularly in the Middle
East and wider Islamic world (see Case study 1). 5.4 Motivations for science diplomacy Science diplomacy seeks to strengthen the
symbiosis between the interests and motivations of the scientific and foreign policy communities. For the former, international
cooperation is often driven by a desire to access the best people, research facilities or new sources of funding. For the latter,
science offers useful networks and channels of communication that can be used to support wider policy goals. Foreign ministries
should place greater emphasis on science within their strategies, and draw more extensively on scientific advice in the formation
and delivery of policy objectives. In the UK, the appointment of Professor David Clary FRS as the Chief Scientific Adviser at the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office creates an important opportunity to integrate science across FCO priorities, and develop
stronger linkages with science-related policies in other government departments.
Privacy Advantage
DNA application technology creates new privacy threats.
Bartusiak, 11
(Linda; JD candidate for University of Pennsylvania. May, 2011). University of Pennsylvania

Journal of Constitutional Law. Plea Bargaining for DNA: Implications on the Right to Privacy. 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
1115. Lexis Nexis. // JW
DNA is a very important and useful tool for solving crimes and convicting criminals. DNA
technology is evolving rapidly, and scientists are constantly finding new applications for its
use by law enforcement personnel. With all these new technologies come new
threats to privacy . DNA is obtained by law enforcement from individuals, but under the Fourth
Amendment, individuals have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures of their person absent probable cause. In some situations law enforcement
officers clearly have probable cause to seize an individual's DNA . Page 1 In other situations,
despite having apparent probable cause, an individual's constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable seizures and a related reasonable expectation of privacy
may rightly prevent police from being able to collect or use that person's DNA. In
Orange County, California, the District Attorney offers a plea bargain to arrestees for misdemeanor crimes only: in
exchange for a DNA sample, the District Attorney will drop all charges against the arrestee. Police will then retain
Aside from due

process questions about the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of DNA, the
use of DNA databases for various purposes implicates significant privacy concerns .
that person's DNA sample in their database ("Orange County database") indefinitely.
The two privacy issues of greatest concern are familial searches and function creep. [*1116] This comment will
discuss these and other privacy risks of DNA databases and evaluate how the Orange County database is designed
to address these risks. Specifically, Orange County should set a time limit on the inclusion of arrestee profiles in the
database to balance the needs of law enforcement with an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Additionally, although Orange County's prohibition on familial searches is one very important privacy safeguard, the
amount of allowed and encouraged function creep remains a serious problem and needs to be addressed to ensure
the privacy interests of the program's participants are protected.
DNA is seized, kept, and searched regardless of probable

cause.
Michael J. Crook, 2012 Attorney at Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, Campbell
Law Review, Sacrificing Liberty for Security: North Carolina's Unconstitutional
Search and Seizure of Arrestee DNA 2012 34 Campbell L. Rev. 473 (Lexis, Acc. 629-2015)
The DNA Database Act of 2010 affects the arrest procedure and the order of events that occur after the arrest of an
When arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, the arrestee's DNA is seized

either at the time of arrest or at the time of fingerprinting . n64 If arrested without an
arrest warrant, the arrestee first appears before a magistrate for a Page 4 34 Campbell L.
Rev. 473, *480 probable cause hearing in order to determine whether there was
sufficient probable cause for the arrest. n65 If the magistrate determines that the
requisite probable cause existed for the arrest, the DNA sample is seized from the
arrestee. n66 It is essential to note that the probable cause hearing is to determine
whether there was sufficient probable cause to justify the arrest, not whether there
was sufficient probable cause to seize the DNA . Additionally, the crime for which the individual is
arrested does not have to be a violent crime, nor does there have to be any DNA evidence
involved with the crime at all. Instead, the individual only has to be arrested for commission of one of
the enumerated crimes in the statute. n67 As long as [*484] the individual is arrested for one of
the enumerated crimes, his DNA will be seized and searched. There is no
individual.
requirement that the seizure of the arrestee's DNA be predicated by any probable
cause or by any need for DNA evidence for the crime for which the arrestee has been arrested.
The Act mandates that the DNA sample be taken by cheek swab, unless there is a court order in place requiring that
If the arrestee refuses to provide a DNA sample, he "shall"

be incarcerated until he complies with the statute and provides his DNA. n69 The
arrestee is jailed without the possibility of bail and will only be released upon his
giving of a DNA sample. n70 When the cheek swab is performed, the technician seizing the DNA must
the sample be a blood sample. n68
record the date and time of the sample. the name of the person taking the sample, the name and address of the
arrestee, and the offense for the arrest. n71 This information stays with the sample throughout its existence. n72
After the DNA sample has been seized, it is then sent to the appropriate laboratory facility for analysis and testing.
n73 The physical DNA sample is stored in [*485] the Databank, and the DNA record is stored in the Database, as
After the arrestee's DNA sample is seized, the arrestee is then

provided a written notice of the procedures required to be taken in order to have his
DNA sample and record expunged. n75 Expunction is warranted only in certain circumstances. n76
Within thirty days of the occurrence of one of the expunction qualifying events, the
District Attorney must verify that one of the qualifying events has actually occurred
and supply that information on a form to be submitted to the SBI. n77 Within thirty
days of receipt of the form, the SBI must verify that the DNA sample and record are
not required to be in the Database and Databank based on another statute and then
must remove the record and the samples. n78 After the removal of the record and the samples, the
well as in CODIS. n74
SBI must mail the arrestee a verification form indicating that his DNA record and sample have been expunged. n79
If for whatever reason there is a denial of the expunction or a failure to act on time by either the SBI or the District
During the
entire time the arrestee's DNA is in the possession of the government, his DNA is
being checked against DNA samples from crime scenes and run in the state
Database and in the CODIS database. n81 This perpetual search continues even
while the arrestee navigates through the bureaucratic red tape of the expunction
process. During this period, even though the arrestee no longer has any reason to
be in the DNA database, and is technically an innocent, his DNA is still being
searched. n82 The arrestee has not been convicted of any of the enumerated [*486]
crimes, yet the State still allows the continual warrantless search of his DNA in
CODIS.
Attorney, the arrestee can file a motion with the court to review the denial of the expunction. n80
Privacy is key to the 4th Amendment

Loyola Law Review is the property of Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Stephanie
Beaugh
6/18/
2013 (Academic Search Complete, ac: 7/1/15) Loyola Law Review. Spring2013, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p157-209. 53p. 01929720
The United States Constitution protects people from unreasonable searches and
seizures.78 The Fourth Amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
Probable cause or a warrant are required prior to a

search or seizure in order for it to be deemed reasonable and constitutional.80
Even though the reasonableness factor has never been specifically defined, over the
years, the United States Supreme Court has delineated many of the parameters of
what constitutes reasonable searches and seizures and the very few exceptions to
warrantless searches.81 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule82 requires weightier
justifications for interference with a persons life, liberty, and freedom with less than
probable cause.83 Prior to the appointment of Earl Warren to the United States Supreme Court, the idea of a
constitutional right to privacy did not exist as enforceable law.84 The Warren Court established and
entrenched the idea that privacy was part and parcel of the Constitutions
the persons or things to be seized.79
guarantees to the people through its holdings over the years .85
The jurisprudence of the

Supreme Court in those post-Warren years focused on curtailing the powers of the government and adhered to the
ideal displayed by the language of our founding documents of freedom and individual liberties. 86
This was
nowhere more evident than in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the right to privacy
was read into the Fourth Amendment.87 Griswold created a high water mark for the rights of the
accused and the fair treatment of suspects, and it upheld the ideal that people are innocent until proven guilty and
should be treated as such.
DNA databasing is the biggest internal link to privacy

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The indefinite retention in a police database of the DNA profile of a person who has not been arrested for a serious
A person's loss of control

over his or her DNA profile in a networked database of state and local databases is
harmful because it stigmatizes an individual at the discretion of the police . The
privacy interest includes a loss of control over a person's entire DNA sample, which
crime or convicted of a felony intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy.
contains highly sensitive, intimate information . For example, there are over 6000 genetic
disorders that are severely [*684] debilitating and stigmatizing. n286 Future testing may include the rapidly
expanding field of behavioral genetics in its search to establish causal relationships between genes and a host of
adult behaviors related to criminality, such as mental illness, substance abuse, aggression, and impulsiveness.
having privacy is having control over our

bodies, our possessions, our intimate environment, and the information - whether
by watching, listening, touching, or reading - other people can gather about us. The
wish for privacy is the wish to control what is revealed about ourselves and our
intimate world... . Privacy is "the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others - either
n287 As one commentator put it: In its most basic sense,
physical access, personal information, or attention." n288 The basic notion of "privacy" generally "connotes ...
control over access to the self as well as things close to, intimately connected to, and about the self." n289
Control of one's identity must perforce include a privacy right to protect one's
genetic information since DNA is arguably " the human essence - that is, the
thing that makes individuals special and perhaps unique ." n290 These are
substantial and compelling aspects of DNA privacy interests. New technologies,
especially those that make personal information more accessible, make interaction
among individuals quicker and more convenient, but they also create a risk to
individual privacy - technology brings with it new risks as well as conveniences. Today, digital storage of
information for indefinite periods of time increases the likelihood that a person's actions, conversations, or
information intended as private may be obtained by [*685] others. n291 Such recordkeeping practices allow
information about people, in terms of both who they are and what they do, to be accessed by others for decades or
perhaps longer. n292
DNA privacy should be prioritized over other privacy concerns

Kelly Lowenberg, 2011 Fellow at the Stanford Law School Center for
Law and the Biosciences
University of Cincinnati Law Review Summer, 2011 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1289

APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN DNA COLLECTED FOR ONE PURPOSE IS
TESTED FOR ANOTHER (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
As already described, DNA contains a large amount of information about identity, genealogy, and phenotypic traits.
All this information is contained in each nucleus of every one of our bodies' cells.
As technology advances,
more meaningful information will be extractable from that genetic material. While
the size of the space being searched predictably limits the amount of information stored in a room within a house or
a container, the only practical limit on information that can be extracted from biological samples are currentlyavailable analysis techniques and our knowledge of what genetic variations mean. Additionally, a person typically
a person has no reason to know much

the information that will be revealed when her DNA is analyzed. n96 A person has
little to no discretion over what information is stored in her body and likely has not analyzed or evaluated
knows what she has brought into her house and stored there, but
of
that information herself. A person's
privacy in the contents of each microscopic bundle of DNA
should be more stringently protected because of the unpredictability and

density of the genetic information it contains
There is an ethical requirement for privacy in context to

genetic materialautonomy and liberty.
Ho Calvin, and Kaan Terry. Genetic Privacy : An Evaluation Of The Ethical And Legal Landscape [e-book].
London: Imperial College Press; 2013. Available from: eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost), Ipswich, MA.
Accessed July 3, 2015.
In this chapter, I argue that the
in Singapore
regulatory frameworks for biomedical research in the UK and also
present privacy as a norm of respect for persons. This ethical
requirement may also be understood as respect of autonomy, and to some extent

liberty, although the distinction between autonomy and liberty are not so critical for
our present discussion. In the context of genetics, there are two types of privacy that are
especially relevant: informational, relating to the collection, use and disclosure of
information or data; and decisional, primarily concerned with independent decisionmaking. There are also at least two general ways in which they can be claimed: transactional, in terms of
particular processing of information; and substantive, as a more general expectation of privacy. By evaluating legal
and regulatory (including ethical) provisions on confidentiality and privacy in genetic medicine and research, I
advance the following arguments: (1) A transactional right to informational privacy is modelled after the legal form
of (or relationality in) confidentiality, and to the extent that both claim justification in respect for persons, privacy
and confidentiality are interchangeable subjects and objects in defining the patient or the research subject; (2) A
transactional right to decisional privacy is also evident in the construct of the patient and the research subject; (3)
A substantive right to informational and decisional privacy is prescribed in the UK within the legislative framework
of the Human Rights Act 1998. Arguably, such a right has been imported into the regulatory framework of
Singapore for genetic medicine and research through the work of the Bioethics Advisory Committee (BAC). In other
words, while it cannot be said that there is a substantive right to privacy in Singapore, such a right is nevertheless
present within the fields of healthcare and biomedical research; and (4) In its importation, the BAC has also slightly
modified the character of this substantive right,
in giving the principle of autonomy that

underlies the requirement of respect for persons a more relational (as opposed to purely
individual) character. This is perhaps most evident in a familial setting where the family is taken to be an
autonomous unit. However, this does not mean that individual members are not entitled to any privacy.
Every violation of freedom must be rejected.

Petro 1974 (Sylvester- Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, Toledo Law
Review, , p. lexis)
It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once . Thus it is unacceptable to say
that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been
invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism
and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum, if one believes
in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering any society aiming to maximize
spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be empathically
identified and resisted
with an undying spirit.
Privacy is critical to democracy, eroding privacy would be

worse than any attacker could do.
Laas-Mikko Katrin, and Sutrop Margit. HOW DO VIOLATIONS OF PRIVACY AND MORAL AUTONOMY
THREATEN THE BASIS OF OUR DEMOCRACY?. TRAMES: A Journal Of The Humanities & Social Sciences [serial online].
December
2012;16(4):369-381. Available from: Academic Search Complete, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 3, 2015.
The problem is that what is being endangered is not really privacy alone; since
privacy supports a range of other values, limitations on privacy can also place
these other values at risk . As pointed out by several authors (Gavison 1980, Kupfer 1987, Solove 2007),
privacy promotes liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthers
the existence of a free society . Therefore, in a democratic state one should
continually be posing the question, what is the price of protecting security ? The main
purpose of our paper is to urge upon us the need to weigh carefully whether we are actually willing to relinquish
privacy and a host of other values in the name of security. Of course, security is a crucial matter, but the means we
use to ensure it should be proportional to the greatness of the potential threat. We should also consider whether
those values that have previously been maintained by privacy can be protected in some other way. Indeed ,
it is
paradoxical that decisions are made to limit privacy in order to protect

democratic society and ensure its security, while these same means of
protection can erode that same society ( more effectively than attackers might
have done), by undermining its basic values . This reminds us of the satirical film, Team America:
World Police, where in the name of capturing a few terrorists, the Louvre and the Eiffel Tower are blown up, along
with other landmarks essential to our culture.
Democracies prevent global nuclear conflict

Joshua Muravchik (Resident Scholar at the AEI) 2001 Democracy and Nuclear Peace
July 14,
http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf, Date Accessed 7/29/2006)

That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the
most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that
there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts
rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains
Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies

stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for
enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost
overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other
ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence
or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization . If this is so, the
greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear
arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more
remote.
powerful and clear.
Solvency
The government should be required to obtain a search warrant
before entering DNA profiles
2014 by Stephanie B. Noronha. Maryland Law Review * J.D. Candidate,
2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.S. in
Psychology and B.A. in Spanish Language and Literature, cum laude, University of
Maryland, College Park, 2009. (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
the King Court's assessment of

the DNA collection of arrestees under the reasonableness balancing test n6 is a
misguided judicial response to the [*668] immediate benefits of new technology, and it leaves
room for government abuse. n7 Unlike searches of physical places and things, a search of
someone's DNA is unique with respect to the physical intrusion necessary to
effectuate the search n8 and the amount of data rendered by the search . n9 While DNA
searches require limited physical invasion of the human body, they yield a considerable amount of
aggregated data. n10 Thus, these types of searches are complex and require special
consideration. The King Court, however, wrongly applied the reasonableness balancing
test. n11 Instead, the Court should have relied on a line of cases that involves searching
data on seized computers, which are more comparable to cases on collecting and searching DNA data. If
Although DNA technology is undoubtedly a powerful crime fighting tool, n5
the Court had done so, the Court would have found that similar to the requirement to obtain a search warrant to
search data on seized computers,
the government should be required to obtain a search

warrant before entering an arrestee's DNA profile into a DNA database to search for
a "hit."
Unregulated CODIS partners escape SQ regulation risk

undermining ALL support for DNA investigation
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Louisiana and Maryland are not the exception, but rather the norm.
laboratories that participate in
the FBI's
The more than 190 public DNA
CODIS program also maintain databases at
the state or local level n11 that may contain DNA from known persons or crime scenes that cannot be
entered into the national databank. n12 The FBI closely regulates the categories of DNA
profiles that can be entered into the national databank, but not the categories that
participating [*642] laboratories can store and search in databases at the local and
state levels, creating a gap in regulation . n13 Precisely because of this regulatory gap, police
may expand underregulated local and state CODIS databases using DNA samples from crime victims, individuals
who voluntarily provide elimination samples to aid an investigation, or samples collected from persons pursuant to
a court order or warrant. n14
Police may also expand underregulated databases using crime
scene DNA samples that do not meet the FBI's quality standards for inclusion in the
This is the next wave of DNA database expansion . Unfortunately, it is
accompanied by the perverse consequences that flow from allowing law enforcement to
national databank. n15
decide which citizens should be subjected to lifelong genetic surveillance
in
databases that are trawled for matches or partial matches to crime scene DNA samples rejected by the FBI.
These consequences could very well endanger public confidence in the core mission of
the regulated national DNA databank without any corresponding utility.
We need a consistent regulatory policy across federal &local

databases
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
local law enforcement agencies face real or perceived exigencies regarding community-wide
crime prevention, they will push for ever-expanding DNA data on those in their communities.
As more
Regulations setting the ethical parameters of the content and use of these databases must keep pace
and must cover federal, state, and local databases. It is incongruous to think that
the
policies justifying federal or state regulation don't apply equally to local databases. Effective
regulation of DNA law enforcement databases must strike the right balance between ensuring
effective law enforcement and guarding the concerns about the use of unregulated DNA
databases. n330
DNA law enforcement databases give the government a unique and
exclusive privilege to search a person's most intimately identifying data

without
that person's
approval or knowledge. With that privilege comes the need to use the power
Appropriate regulations must be crafted to

protect against government overreach. Where that institutional right goes largely
unregulated, or is regulated in minimal and ineffective ways, there is a greater likelihood for both
real and potential abuses of the genetic information stored in DNA databases. Effective regulation
appropriately and in line with an individual right of privacy.
should safeguard privacy rights

actual and potential
abuses
in genetic information
and prevent, limit, or mitigate
that result from institutional control over that information. To varying degrees,
every state regulates the genetic information it acquires, manages, and searches at the statewide level for law
enforcement purposes.
But, as previously discussed in this Article, the state statutes regulating the
management of DNA databases
are anything but uniform
and most local databases are not subject
At a minimum, the regulation of a local DNA database should be

consistent with the regulation of that jurisdiction's statewide database. Amending an already-existing
to any regulatory guidelines. n331
statutory scheme
to achieve consistency across databases would not be [*693]
difficult , and Alaska, Missouri, and Washington have already explicitly done so. n332
Inherency
Data from states/local

Most CODIS data is from states not USFG
Acc. 6-29-2015)
When law enforcement officials find DNA at a crime scene that they believe may be from the perpetrator, they
generally analyze it for the thirteen CODIS markers. They can then check the genotype found in crime-scene DNA
The FBI claims that, through

November 2005, the CODIS system has assisted in nearly 30,000 criminal
investigations by providing a DNA match that would not otherwise have been
developed. n17 Its power seems certain to increase as more DNA samples from offenders are taken, analyzed,
and submitted to CODIS. The rate-limiting factor has been the speed of states in spending
the money needed to analyze the DNA samples they receive from convicts. (The
federal database largely depends on submissions of DNA analyzed by the states;
less than ten percent of felons in the United States are convicted of federal
felonies.)
against the Offender Indexes in their state DNA database or in CODIS.
Local databases will expand due to lack of regulation

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
In spite of the threat to individual privacy, law enforcement officials trumpet the
value of local DNA databases as an effective crime-solving tool . n176 Local DNA
databases "operate under their own rules," and as a result, they can catalogue a far
greater number of DNA samples than their state and federal counterparts . n177 Laws
regulating local DNA databases exist in a very small number of states. n178 Even among the limited laws regulating
local DNA databases, there is "little consensus about what DNA retention policies are appropriate at the local level."
Without strict rules governing local DNA databases, local law enforcement
agencies are able to exercise great discretion in the collection and use of DNA
samples. n180 According to experts, with technological advances allowing for "rapid DNA testing," local DNA
n179
databases will continue to expand. n181
Tech advances
Current DNA legislation does not take into account tech
advances.
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The ease of collection, swift processing, and low cost, combined with the
opportunity to indefinitely retain DNA samples in underregulated local or state DNA
databases, creates a powerful incentive for police to target disfavored individuals
for DNA collection. Courts have mostly been unwilling to scrutinize unwarranted
search claims arising out of collection from persons who consent to a buccal swab, finding
that consent constitutes a waiver of any privacy interest in DNA identification. n275 And, the lack of transparency
shields underregulated databases from any meaningful legislative oversight on the utility or disproportionate
impact of police collection practices. As technology advances, lawyers, judges, and lawmakers struggle to deal with
the associated changes. n276 The gap between the technology and the law often leads to scenarios that "can
potentially conflict with existing social ... and cultural values." n277 Legislative checks and balances are designed to
ensure that laws are a reflection of discourse and debate - they safeguard against reactionary legislation. Emerging
technologies do not yet have those safeguards. Once new technology is introduced to the market, the legislature
The rapid pace at which new technologies are created

and integrated into society means that even newly enacted legislation may not truly
reflect what [*682] is currently possible. n278 In turn, society is left dealing with legal uncertainty. n279
Uncertainty is unacceptable when the technology calls into question basic rights like the right to privacy - and whether or how the government is permitted to utilize
new technologies to advance a legitimate governmental interest while still
upholding the rights of those affected . Often, cases involving governmental use of new technology
must still follow its lawmaking processes.
are litigated long before the legislature addresses the legal ramifications. n280 Consequently, courts must interpret
and apply existing laws to rule on technology questions, but judges are often left trying to apply antiquated laws to
novel issues. n281 Courts cannot use today's law to address tomorrow's technology - the courts are limited to
court decisions address

social and legal issues arising from new technology relatively quickly, but often
inadequately. n283 The decisions often predate legislation. n284 Once courts create new rules through judicial
interpreting the law as it applies to the facts [*683] before it. n282 Accordingly,
interpretation, the public is often left guessing how such rulings, based on narrow and specific factual
legislature usually
appears content to let the public bear this burden, allowing the judiciary to create
laws that govern matters better suited for legislative action. The task of shaping
legal arguments is left, not to politicians, but rather to litigators, because courts
necessarily craft legal standards dealing with technological advancements . Litigators
circumstances, apply to other situations left unaddressed by courts and lawmakers. The
craft creative arguments, draw parallels between policy considerations of yesterday's laws and today's problems,
and react to issues lawmakers are unable to foresee or address in a timely manner. Laws that do not reflect the
advances of society either restrict the way technology may be used or are effectively obsolete. n285
Current rules and approaches to Genetic Identification

Information are inadequate. (Structural)
Existing rules--whether statutory, regulatory, or judicial in nature--cannot hope to address the

more numerous stakeholders that have an interest in a single cell's genetic
information as a matter of biological fact. As this Part explains, that is so because identifiable
genetic information is shared, immutably and involuntarily
, and
that shared
nature renders existing rules a poor fit for adjudicating claims to genetic information. If we
are to take seriously the multiple and competing interests in identifiable genetic information,
these kinds
of traditional rules and approaches are inadequate . A. Identifiable Genetic Information

Is Shared As I have suggested elsewhere, genetic information is decidedly not atomistic . n148
Children and parents share roughly 50% of their genetic variations due to relatedness, while the mix of genetic
Identical
twins, of course, are very nearly genetically identical. n150 This substantial genetic
similarity among closely related individuals occurs in the thirteen regions of
noncoding DNA analyzed to create CODIS profiles. Indeed, it is the predictable patterns of that
similarity that makes forensic familial identification possible. The fact that genetic information is
shared also means that medical or other information revealed through genetic
analysis may affect close genetic relatives as well . A child's genetic information discloses that at
variation full siblings inherit from their parents, taken together, is also roughly 50% similar. n149
least one parent carries the same sequence, and the presence of a particular gene variant in a parent or sibling
the
shared nature of identifiable genetic information means that individuals' authority to
control their "own" identifiable genetic Page 9 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873, *897 information may
be affected by how the government, research entities, or genetic testing firms make use of
genetic information drawn from close genetic relatives. As one expert put it: "[T]he fact of the matter is that
indicates an increased likelihood that that variant is also present in another family member. Accordingly,
my DNA is not just my DNA. It's my family's DNA. It's related to my sons. It's related to my mom. It's related to my
At a minimum, the shared nature of identifiable genetic information means

that the popular analogy between genetic profiles and finger-prints [*900] is inapt
when partial matching is at issue. That is so because, "unlike DNA, fingerprints have a limited
sister." n151
identification value. By themselves, fingerprints cannot reveal any more information about the person from whom
they have been collected (other than a prior criminal record)." n152 Whether as a matter of science or of social
policy, fingerprints are identifying only to the person from whom they come. n153
Familial Targeting Adv
Cost
Familial Targeting is expensive
Acc. 6-29-2015)
Under the current CODIS system in the United States, the tactic of investigating
partial matches may often be inefficient, not because of the cost of the familial search, but
because of the cost of investigating the relatives of all the partial matches identified
in the Offender Index. That efficiency could be substantially improved in two very different ways. First,
information could be collected and stored about the relatives of people in the
Offender Index. If, instead of interviewing the people in the Offender Index who
were partial matches, the police could check a database to find out information
about their parents, siblings, and children, the cost of this kind of investigation
would be greatly reduced. The police could quickly determine whether the partial
match in the Offender Index had a relative (often the police will be only or primarily interested in
young male relatives) of the right age and geographical location to be a suspect in the case. There would, of course,
be costs in collecting this information and putting it in a database. There may be questions, which this article does
not explore, about whether an offender could be compelled to provide that information, which, after all, is not
And the offender might lie, or be

mistaken, about his relatives, thus lowering the efficiency of this approach . (Of course,
he might also lie in a specific interview with police.) Information from the offender might be
checked before entry, but that step would increase the initial costs.
relevant to the crime for which he has been convicted or charged.
Race Bias
Low Stringency searches are the worst race bias and privacy
Acc. 6-29-2015)
The legal and policy implications of family forensic DNA have largely been overlooked in the voluminous literature
on forensic DNA. One set of discussions took place at a September 2004 workshop organized by the American
Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics. The report from this workshop lists five fairly broad areas of consensus among
the participants about the use of what they call "low stringency searches," searches where an exact match is not
Low stringency searches are an implicit database expansion that should be

open to public debate. . The investigations that follow low stringency database
searches can involve asking non-suspects to reveal extremely intimate information . .
Low stringency searches and the subsequent investigations will amplify any racial or
geographic bias already in the DNA database system. . Clear standards and care are
needed for choosing when and how to perform low stringency searches . . The substantial
required: .
costs to the criminal justice system and to the number of subjects of investigations must be weighed against the
benefits of using low stringency searches. n27
Both real and perceived racial abuse of DNA are internal links
Acc. 6-29-2015)
Of course, African-Americans are disproportionately harmed by crime committed by
other African-Americans. Some African-Americans may see the usefulness of family
forensic DNA in solving crimes as a net benefit to their community. Similarly, those
interviewed by police, as witnesses or as possible suspects, when crimes take place
in African-American communities are likely to be African-American themselves.
Successful uses of family forensic DNA might reduce the number of people so interviewed. Although there is no
empirical evidence on this point, we suspect that such positive reactions would be overwhelmed by unhappiness at
the number of times African-American relatives of offenders are interviewed by the police as a result of a partial
match, particularly as the people who are spared either victimization by criminals or interviews by the police as the
result of family forensic DNA are "statistical people" and not individuals who know that they have individually
we suspect that African-Americans are likely to oppose family

forensic DNA and to view its use as another racist action by the American criminal
justice system. This unfairness, real and perceived, is important and deserves
attention in the context of America's historical and current problems with race .
benefited. On balance,
Over represented in database

DNA Familial search is facially race discrimination it risks
underreporting of crime
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Many factors may lead minorities to be disproportionately represented in local and
state DNA databases. First, there are multiple studies that show that police officials on
the local level, for example in San Francisco, underreport arrests of minorities . n303
Further, minorities and people of color are disproportionately represented in the
criminal justice system. n304 This overrepresentation correlates directly with an
overrepresentation of people of color in familial searches given that minorities have
a greater and unequal probability of having their DNA collected and stored upon
arrest. n305 With the known bias against minority groups and people of color, some scholars believe the
familial searches themselves are discriminatory because collection of DNA and the
arrest itself is discretionary [*687] and based on criminal suspicion, which is led by
a person's race or ethnicity alone in some cases. n306 Although the fear of racial discrimination
does exist, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) insists that DNA specimens in DNA databases do not indicate
race and that there is no ability to specify a particular race in a search. n307 Moreover, the BJA emphasizes that law
enforcement must comply with constitutional law and other legal ramifications to successfully seize biological
evidence; if they do not comply, law enforcement runs the risk of "subsequent suppression of evidence at a trial."
n308 The problem with the BJA's assertion is that many local law enforcement agencies have no guidelines directing
The concern regarding racial

inequality in the criminal justice system has been evident for at least the past 200
years. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that complaints about the personal
motivations of the police are irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment . n310 Thus, if a
local law enforcement agent detains an individual and collects DNA samples upon
an arrest motivated by personal bias, there is the possibility that a court would find
that the law enforcement agent would be justified by doing so and protected under
the notion that he or she acted on the basis of probable cause. n311 This idea is also
connected to the fear that crimes will be underreported : if minorities and people of color ran a
higher risk of having their DNA profiles abused by the familial search process, it
would be no surprise if they became less likely to report crime.
the collection of DNA and the practice of familial searches. n309
Minorities genetic information risks unethical misuse

The disproportionate DNA sampling of minority arrestees may have a negative
effect on minorities through the unethical use of the genetic information contained
within DNA samples. First, although the DNA collected from arrestees is allegedly
"junk DNA," the idea that DNA samples contain no personal information has been
questioned, especially by DNA researchers who have uncovered coding DNA in what
was previously classified as "junk DNA." n92 Further, although this "junk DNA" is supposedly used
only for identification purposes, DNA information may be used for purposes other than
identification, such as identification of genetic diseases or disorders. n93 This may
occur due to function creep, n94 or due to the use of DNA against relatives through
familial searching. Second, because DNA contains vast amounts of information that
may negatively impact those individuals sampled if it is used for other purposes,
there is risk in taking samples that may be stored and used for discriminatory
purposes
Familial DNA matches result in African American families being

misrepresented in the courts.
Lauren Kirchner Aug 20, 2013 The Flaws of Familial DNA Matching New research warns investigators of
inaccurate results, and unfairness to minorities. http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/the-flaws-of-familialdna-matching-64736%3Futm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:%2520miller-mccune
%252Fmain_feed%2520(Pacific%2520Standard%2520-%2520Main%2520Feed)?
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:%20miller-mccune%2Fmain_feed%20(Pacific
%20Standard%20-%20Main%20Feed) (ac: 6-30-15)
Maybe thats wise, too, because familial matching happens to be under the microscope right now. A new study
published last week in the journal PLOS ONE raised doubts about the methods accuracy and efficacy. According to
familial DNA
searching will often indicate that two people are close relatives when they are in
fact distant relatives. For instances, in an experiment that tested the process of familial
DNA matching in the California DNA database (using simulated genetic profiles based on publicly
available data), the researchers found that cousins could be misidentified as siblings.
This type of mistake could cost investigators a lot of time and money, as well as intrude on
innocent peoples lives and privacy. Investigators may be interrogating immediate
family members who have nothing to do with the crime. Or, the familial search
could implicate very distant relativesso distant that their relationship with the suspects will not be
helpful to investigators at all. "Both of these consequences exacerbate the numerous ethical
problems presented by familial searching," the researchers write. "The greater the number
of persons involved, and the less likely that one of them is in fact the perpetrator,
the more such investigations may begin to feel like a fishing expedition rather than
a reasonable search." The study brings up another important consideration about familial searches :
because the accuracy of the matching depends on the number and types of
samples that already exist in the database, the accuracy of the matching will vary
with ethnicity. For instance, its a fact that African Americans are disproportionately
represented in the criminal justice system as well as in crime-fighting databases . In
this experiment, "while the overall rate of false identification of unrelated individuals
remains low," the rate of false positives of African Americans was "much higher,
roughly two orders of magnitude higher" than other groups . (By comparison, there
were relatively few Native American DNA samples in their sample group; the familial
matching of Native American samples produced no false positives. ) If African
Americans suffer disproportionately from false-positive matches, and also from
very-distant-relative matches, it follows that they will suffer disproportionately from
intrusions of privacy and police interrogations:
researchers at the University of California-Berkeley and New York University, led by Rori Rohlfs,
Familial searching disproportionately afects minorities

Mary McCarthy, 2011 J.D. Candidate @ Notre Dame Law School
86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 381 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015) //RH
Moreover, racial disparities are already prevalent in the American criminal justice
system, so the addition of partial match familial searches might instigate "a growing
self-consciousness within particular communities that will tend to be overrepresented on forensic databases, by virtue of their age, gender, and ethnicity."
n178 Although some argue that legal and policy arguments in general are weak
against familial DNA searches, the racial disparity in the American criminal justice
system raises some red flags. n179 Although African Americans constitute
approximately thirteen percent of the U.S. population, on average over forty percent
of convicted felons in the United States each year are African American. n180
Assuming that African Americans constitute a corresponding forty percent of the
CODIS Offender database and assuming that the average person in the offender
database has five first-degree relatives, approximately seventeen percent of all
African Americans might be identified as suspects through familial searching,
compared to approximately four percent of Caucasians. n181 By another estimate,
using familial searches for the national DNA database would effectively [*402] mean
surveillance of approximately one-third of the African American population but only
7.5% of the Caucasian population. n182 For these reasons, African Americans may
oppose familial DNA searching. n183 Additionally, Latinos were about thirteen
percent of the national population and committed forty percent of federal offenses
in 2008. n184 Latinos could also comprise a significant portion of the DNA database
profile n185 and may object to familial searches for similar reasons. Another
consideration is that, if Y-chromosome testing is increasingly used, n186 males may
be disproportionately Page 8 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 381, *399 represented in DNA
databases and partial match searches. But since the majority of criminal
perpetrators are male, n187 increased use of Y-chromosome testing might not have
a great effect. It is also possible that in the future, mtDNA testing might be used to
augment partial match searches. Overall, there are many strong policy reasons to
object to regular use of familial DNA searches.
Pre-emptive detaining
Under-regulated DNA databases risk pre-emptive law
enforcement
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The resurgence of the idea of a biological root for criminality has resulted in a massive and disturbing potential for
abuse of DNA databases. This troubling ethical question is yet another reason citizens [*688] may find themselves
targeted in criminal investigations. James Watson, one of the discoverers of the double helix structure of DNA, aptly
commented on this possible concern: A DNA sample taken for fingerprinting purposes can, in principle, be used for
a lot more than merely proving identity: it can tell you a lot about me - whether I carry mutations for disorders like
cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell disease, or Tay-Sachs disease. Some time in the not so distant future, it may even tell you
whether I carry the genetic variations predisposing me to schizophrenia or alcoholism - or traits even more likely to
disturb the peace. Might the authorities, for instance, one day subject me to a more intensive scrutiny than would
otherwise be the case simply because I have a mutation in the monoamine oxidase gene that reduces the activity
of the enzyme? Some research suggests that this mutation may predispose me to antisocial behavior under certain
Could genetic profiling indeed become a new tool for preemptive action
in law enforcement? Philip K. Dick's 1956 story (which inspired the 2002 movie) "The Minority Report" may
circumstances.
not be such far-fetched science fiction as we like to imagine. n312 In his provocative book, The Anatomy of
how the scientific community is indeed now returning to a

paradigm of human behavior - and in particular criminal behavior - that includes
biological roots. n313 Raine argues that the study of the biological roots of criminal
behavior, or "neurocriminology," will lead to "effective" techniques, such as
preventive detention, that will reduce crime. n314 History is full of examples where
science has been used to justify heinous mistreatment of groups of individuals . In the
Violence, Adrian Raine details
late 1800s, the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso proposed that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks who
could be identified by primitive features like sloping foreheads and large jaws, and he went on to propose an
evolutionary hierarchy of the races, with northern Italians at the apex. n315 Such ideas inspired Mussolini's racial
laws in the 1930s and are at the core of some of the ugliest social movements of our time - including forced
the pendulum continues

to swing back to a biological basis for criminal behavior, the notion of a database of
DNA from criminals is entirely foreseeable and will become an irresistible source of
data to study for correlations between genes and criminal behavior. n317 The
potential for misuse of DNA information is heightened when the executive branch is
permitted, without legislative oversight or judicial approval, to engage in the DNA
collection practices at issue in this Article.
sterilization of "imbeciles" in the United States through the 1970s. n316 As [*689]
Law enforcement targets minorities

Law enforcement has a propensity to target minority populations as a result of
several factors, including unconscious stereotyping that tends to associate race with
crime, n40 overt racial profiling, n41 and even the way crime is defined by the
United States legal system. n42 National statistics consistently show that minorities are
disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system, both as victims and
perpetrators, through the use of "stop and frisks," n43 arrests, imprisonment, and
capital punishment. n44 For example, in 2009, African Americans accounted for less than
13% of the U.S. population, but 28.3% of arrests. n45 A 2004 report prepared for the ACLU of
Southern California found that the rate at which police stop African Americans for investigation is 3,400 stops
higher, and the Hispanic stop rate 350 stops higher, than the white stop rate per 10,000 residents. n46 The report
stopped African Americans are 127% more likely, and

stopped Hispanics are 43% more likely to be frisked. n47 It also found that relative
to stopped whites, stopped African Americans are 76% more likely, and stopped
Hispanics [*161] are 16% more likely to be searched. n48 Last, it found that relative
to stopped whites, stopped African Americans are 29% more likely, and stopped
Hispanics are 32% more likely to be arrested. n49 This report therefore indicates that the rate
at which African American and Hispanic individuals are stopped, frisked, searched,
and arrested is higher, sometimes dramatically so, than the rate at which white
individuals are stopped, frisked, searched, and arrested. A mid-1980s study conducted by the
found that relative to stopped whites,
California Attorney General's office found that "two-thirds of nonwhite California males between the ages of 18 and
that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s,

African Americans "consistently accounted for about 45 percent of those arrested
for murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault." n51 The disproportionate
impact of the criminal justice system on racial minorities may be partially due to
social inequalities unrelated to the actions of law enforcement, n52 such as the incidence of
widespread poverty among racial minorities, n53 which causes increased crime
rates among minority populations. However, evidence shows that racial discrimination by law
enforcement in conducting arrests occurs through the presence of officer bias and
the use of racial profiling. n54 Further, regardless of the reason minorities are
disproportionately arrested, procedures tying DNA sampling to arrest will
necessarily have a disproportionate impact on minorities. Therefore procedures
such as an increased rate of DNA sampling are unethical because they
disproportionately intrude on the privacy of minority populations.
30 had been arrested." n50 Another study found
Law enforcement arrests minorities on basis of pretext

Under Whren v. United States, n62 law enforcement may stop individuals regardless
of their subjective motivation. n63 This means that they are allowed to stop individuals on
the basis of pretext, n64 including on the basis of the law enforcement officer's
discriminatory beliefs about the link between race and crime, as long as it cannot be proven that the stop
"had in fact been motivated by race." n65 The Terry "stop-and-frisk" rule is, in theory, colorblind, as it does not allow [*163] stops on the basis of pretext where there is proof that the stop was motivated by
race. However, "[it] has in practice created a double standard" by giving law
enforcement officers great latitude in situations where they may be inclined to use
race and class considerations to make their decisions . n66 Whether police decide to stop a
vehicle, stop and frisk a pedestrian, or leave the individual alone is based on subjective perceptions that are
frequently, whether implicitly or explicitly, based on the personal biases of the officer. For example, the ability of
officers to stop individuals on the basis of pretext "makes it easy for an officer to construct a legal basis of
investigating virtually anyone in a vehicle" because of "the sheer scope of traffic regulations." n67
Because of
this, police use traffic stops to enforce laws unrelated to traffic violations, such as
drug laws. n68 For example, police may stop cars of drivers who fit within
established profiles of drug couriers, n69 and those profiles may include racial
classifications. "If the motorist 'fits' the profile, then the officer's goal becomes to conduct a warrantless
search of the car and its occupants, in the hope of finding drugs, cash and/or guns," either through the use of
consent of the driver or probable cause. n70 There is evidence that the breadth of traffic regulations, along with the
improbability of proving that a stop was based on race, n71 allows
racial profiling in traffic stops to go
unchecked. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as "driving while black." n72 A

study in Maryland examined the I-95 corridor, a reputed "drug distribution pipeline." n73 The study found that over
African Americans constituted only about seventeen percent of

motorists yet represented seventy percent of individuals stopped by police. n74
a three-year period,
Additionally, it found that when an African American or Hispanic driver was stopped, there was a higher probability
that the driver's vehicle would be searched. n75 [*164] A traffic study conducted in New Jersey similarly found that
African American drivers were disproportionately stopped by police. n76 In that study, fifteen percent of traffic
violators were African American, yet African American drivers made up more than forty-six percent of the drivers
stopped by law enforcement. n77 The results of these studies, along with similar evidence from studies conducted
in Missouri and Florida n78 suggests that "traffic stops are routinely used as a 'pretext' to stop minority drivers,"
African American motorists are "especially liable to be stopped and

searched in predominantly white, suburban neighborhoods." n80 Based on this
evidence it can be inferred that the ability of law enforcement to stop on the basis
of pretext, including racial stereotypes, disproportionately increases the arrest rates
of racial minorities.
n79 and that
Inaccurate
New data shows that incorrect matches occur frequently.
Can DNA testing be trusted? The shockingly imprecise science of a proven courtroom tool Katie Worth is a
freelancer and a student at Columbia Universitys Master of Arts program for working journalists June 24,
2015 http://fusion.net/story/153996/can-dna-testing-be-trusted-the-shockingly-imprecise-science-of-a-provencourtroom-tool/
Its not clear how often coincidental matches occur. The FBI has argued that its
rare, but some statisticians disagree, as a 2008 investigation by the Los Angeles Times revealed. The newspaper
wrote that a rogue Arizona state employee had run tests on the states database without
the FBIs permission and found 122 pairs of profiles that matched at 9 or more loci.
Twenty of them matched at 10 loci. One pair matched at 11 and another at 12. This
all happened in a database with just 65,493 profiles. The Arizona results were not
anomalous: In Illinoiss database of 220,000 profiles, a search found 903 pairs that
matched at nine or more loci. Bureau experts say some matches can be expected in a large database, and that others may be
close relatives or accidental duplicates. But they have halted further investigation of their statistics,
citing privacy concerns.
Courts and attorneys feel reluctant to announce results of

familial DNA matches because of inaccuracy.
Lauren Kirchner Aug 20, 2013 The Flaws of Familial DNA Matching New research warns investigators of
inaccurate results, and unfairness to minorities. http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/the-flaws-of-familialdna-matching-64736%3Futm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:%2520miller-mccune
%252Fmain_feed%2520(Pacific%2520Standard%2520-%2520Main%2520Feed)?
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:%20miller-mccune%2Fmain_feed%20(Pacific
%20Standard%20-%20Main%20Feed) (ac: 6-30-15)
Its always been true that a family members guilty conscience could be a criminals ultimate downfall. Now, thanks
to familial DNA matching, a brother or sister can be a snitch without ever saying a word. But what about that
criminals cousin? Half-cousin? Third cousin twice removed? Virginias Department of Forensic Science confirmed on
Monday that it had facilitated the arrest of a suspect through this very new and very controversial forensic tool.
Familial
DNA searches are sometimes used to help identify suspects whose DNA
isnt on record in agency databases through a near-match between crime-scene
DNA and that of a suspects close relative whose DNA is on record. This would never be the
only evidence used in a case, but it can help to focus an investigation and to avoid dead-ends when exact matches
The U.K.s first arrest based on a familial match was announced in 2004, following
a random act of violence involving a brick thrown from a bridge onto a car driving
below. The accused, who had no prior criminal record, was nevertheless identified
because DNA evidence on the brick matched the DNA of "a close relative" whose
DNA was on file. When confronted by the police, the alleged brick-thrower provided another DNA sample that
arent possible.
proved to be an exact match to the crime DNA, and then apparently confessed. At least 200 cases in the U.K. have
involved the familial matching method, but in the U.S. it has not yet been widely used. Virginia Governor Robert
McDonnell only authorized it in 2011, according to the Richmond Times-Dispatch. Texas, California, and Colorado
are the only other states in the U.S. that currently acknowledge using it. In Virginia, at least, this isnt a tool that
investigators plan on pulling out of the box for any petty thief, not least because it is so expensive to use: Under
Department of Forensic Science policy, familial searching is performed only to help solve violent crimes in which
public safety remains at risk, other investigative leads have been exhausted, and a chief law enforcement officer
makes the request. Most famously, familial DNA matching was credited with catching Californias Grim Sleeper in
2010, after the serial-killing suspect had evaded cops since 1985. Another notorious murder case, involving the
1960s-era "Boston Strangler," was finally put to bed just last month when a familial DNA match confirmed that
Albert DeSalvo was the killer. DeSalvo had been suspected, but never tried for the murders, though he was
convicted of other crimes and was later killed in prison. That DeSalvo died in 1973 did not prevent investigators
from matching the DNA from old crime scene evidence to DeSalvos brother's discarded water bottle in 2013.
the law enforcement agency and the

prosecutor involved in the Virginia case have been reluctant to announce who the
suspect is, or even what type of crime was involved. They have only said that there
were several cases that they were now able to link together with new DNA
evidence. A Richmond criminal-defense lawyer and DNA expert, Betty Layne
DesPortes, told the Times-Dispatch that this lack of disclosure could mean that the
prosecution is afraid that the defense will focus its argument on the controversial
nature of familial DNA matching.
Despite the incredible promise of this new method, however,
Cross racial witness identification is inaccurate

The production of sufficient probable cause for arrest may depend on witness
identifications of suspects, which are known to be unreliable, having caused a
number of wrongful convictions. n81 Cross-racial identifications tend to be
particularly unreliable, n82 creating the potential for law enforcement to arrest
innocent minorities whose DNA samples will then, pursuant to policies of statutes
such as Maryland, be placed on file with the state. For example, ten of twelve studies
found a significant difference between the abilities of white Americans to recognize
white and black faces, noting a substantial impairment in the ability of white
individuals to recognize African American faces. n83 In one study, white individuals charged with
identifying African American and white individuals misidentified African Americans 54.8% of
the time and whites only 34.9% of the time. n84 Assuming that such laboratory data on the ability
[*165] of white subjects to recognize black subjects is valid in practice, n85 the risk that suspects will be
misidentified and potentially wrongly arrested is greatest when the victim is white and the suspect is African
American. n86 This problem has been recognized by some states, which have acknowledged the inaccuracy of
cross-racial identifications and have attempted to negate the prejudicial effect of such inaccurate identifications
through measures that protect criminal defendants. For example, in 2008, Maryland created a jury instruction n87
for cases that involved cross-racial identifications to inform the jury of their unreliability. n88 Additionally, in 2008,
the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association recommended that state and local governments
recognize the inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications. n89 It also recommended that states take measures to
abrogate the effect of such misleading identifications, such as ensuring the admissibility of expert testimony on the
inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications, ensuring that indigent defendants were able to obtain such expert
testimony, and creating jury instructions similar to Maryland's instruction that would inform jurors of the risk of
Even with the addition of such protections, however, innocent

minorities are at greater risk of being arrested on the basis of inaccurate pre-charge
identifications, as these protections help prevent wrongful convictions rather than
wrongful arrests. Further, it is difficult to mitigate the effects of these inaccurate
[*166] identifications, as the line-ups often tend to be more suggestive when
dealing with racial minorities. n91 Just as the disproportionate arrest rates of minorities create an
considering such identifications. n90
unethical, disproportionate intrusion on the privacy of minorities, the inaccuracy of cross racial identifications
These innocent
individuals will have their DNA placed on file and compared with previous crime
scene evidence, potentially implicating them in other crimes, even though they
have not committed the crime that furnished the DNA evidence.
creates an unethical, disproportionate intrusion on the privacy of innocent minorities.
Familial DNA searches can be inaccurate and allows profiling

However, familial DNA searches implicate concerns over false positive results and
placing family members of offenders, whose DNA profiles remain in a DNA
database, under lifelong genetic surveillance. Also, because minorities constitute a
disproportionate percentage of offenders in DNA database systems, familial
searches may have a disproportionate effect on minority communities. Such
concerns are of even greater importance because recent state and federal laws are
beginning to allow DNA collection from arrestees, rapidly expanding the pool of
available DNA profiles. With these changes occurring, society and national and state
governments must address the growing role of DNA profiling in the American
criminal justice system.
4th Amendment/ privacy

4th Amendment protections include Common DNA
Lina Alexandra Hogan, 2008, Associate Lawyer at Shatz, Schwartz and Fentin,
P.C., Guilt by Relation: If Your Brother Is Convicted of a Crime, You Too May Do
Time, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 543 (Lexis, Acc. 7-1-15) // LO
The term "person" in the Fourth Amendment n229 should not be narrowly construed
to mean the actual person. Common or shared DNA is, in essence, a partial genetic
makeup of the family member's person. Rather, the term "person" should be
construed more broadly to protect the family member so as to avoid the denial of
the family member's reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the intrusion
does not occur to his actual person. n230 The Fourth Amendment expressly protects
"persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."
n231 However, Katz v. United States, one of the most significant Fourth Amendment decisions, held that
people - not places - are protected by the Fourth Amendment. n232 Katz overturned
Olmstead v. United States, n233 which read the Constitution more narrowly, holding [*572] that the Fourth
Amendment protects only material things such a person and his house, papers, and effects. n234 With the demise
of Olmstead, the notion that the Fourth Amendment analysis was based in property law was extinguished. n235
Although the parties in Katz put great emphasis on the issue of whether the phone booth was a "constitutionally
protected area," n236 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the "area" was of constitutional significance,
because the court has "never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem." n237 Fortunately, the Supreme Court had the forethought to avoid making bright-line rules
about what constitutes a constitutionally protected area. n238 The Constitution expressly guarantees the right of
the people to be free unreasonable searches of their person. n239 However, it is clear in Brian's hypothetical that
the DNA, which was searched in the database, was not extracted from Brian's person. n240 If the hypothetical was
analyzed under a rigid reading of the Constitution, Brian would have no protection from the familial search because
Brian's person was not actually physically searched. Such an analysis would deprive Brian of his expectation of
privacy in the personal and common DNA information that Brian shares with his brother. In light of Katz, n241 it
should not be dispositive that the family member's actual person has not been searched, as long a family member
such as Brian has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common DNA. This is true especially in light of the fact
that the content of the search reveals extremely private information. n242 [*573] In Minnesota v. Olson, the Court
ruled that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion in a home that is
not his own. n243 The government argued that Olson, an overnight guest, did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his host's home because he did not have exclusive control of the premises and was not free to exclude or
admit others as he wished. n244 The Court rejected this contention and ruled that exclusive control over the place
searched is not a necessary factor in order to find that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
society recognizes the individual's expectation of

privacy in the host's home because being a host or an overnight guest is a longstanding tradition in our country that serves many beneficial functions in our society
- most people will either be a host or an overnight guest in their lifetime. n246
Overnight guests seek shelter from the elements when at the host's home. n247
People are most vulnerable when they sleep, so they expect privacy and safety
when in the host's home. n248 Just as society acknowledges that a person reasonably
expects privacy from governmental intrusion in his host's home, a family member
has the same type of reasonable expectation that the DNA he shares in common
with his family will be kept private from unreasonable governmental intrusion. In the
place searched. n245 The Court reasoned that
hypothetical, Brian took great pains to disassociate from his family. Therefore, he has a subjective expectation of
privacy that the genetic link will not be traced by the government or anyone else. Furthermore, Brian's expectation
of privacy should be recognized by society as reasonable because family relationships are considered private and
sacred. n249
Familial searches are unreasonable under the 4th amendment

Lina Alexandra Hogan, 2008, Associate Lawyer at Shatz, Schwartz and Fentin,
P.C., Guilt by Relation: If Your Brother Is Convicted of a Crime, You Too May Do
Time, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 543 (Lexis, Acc. 7-1-15) // LO
Familial searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because a familial
search does not serve any purpose beyond assisting the government to solve more
crimes. When running a familial search, the government has no suspect. The
familial search is in fact conducted in order to contrive individualized suspicion
against a convict's family member in order to solve a particular crime. n284 For example,
before the law enforcement authorities ran the familial search in Brian's hypothetical, they had ruled out Brian as
the culprit. They used the search to implicate Brian.
Racial profiling is prevalent and intrudes on privacy of

minorities with DNA testing
Racial profiling is the use by law enforcement of "membership in a racial or ethnic
group as a predictor in considering whether an individual is likely to have committed
a crime." n55 Legislation expressly prohibiting racial profiling is sparse, n56 and
evidence that racial profiling occurs, whether institutionally or merely in practice, is
voluminous. For example, one California study found that police make unfounded arrests of [*162] minorities,
meaning arrests "where the suspect was innocent, or there was inadequate evidence, or there was an illegal search
or seizure," n57 at rates significantly higher than that of whites. For African American individuals, the rate was four
times greater than that of whites, and for Hispanic individuals, the rate was more than double that of whites. n58
discriminatory police
practices are more severe in urban areas. Racial profiling has also become a
concern for "people of Arabic, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent" since
September 11, 2001, as many "have been detained, arrested, or harassed by
government authorities. In numerous incidences, such individuals have been handcuffed, detained, or
searched essentially because of their background." n60 Further, in order for criminal defendants to
establish a defense of racial profiling, the availability of which depends on state law,
they must "show that the government treated them differently than similarly
situated groups of another race." n61 Because such claims are difficult to prove,
racial profiling by law enforcement is generally allowed to go unchecked. Because the
ability of law enforcement to use racial profiling to target minorities
disproportionately affects the rate at which minorities are arrested, statutes such as
Maryland's that require DNA testing upon arrest disproportionately intrude on the
privacy of racial minorities, and should therefore be prohibited .
Further, these disparities were exacerbated in urban areas, n59 indicating that
Familial DNA Searching Invades Privacy

Carlos Jordi, 2014, Juris Doctor Candidate St. Thomas University School of Law
The Exorbitance of Collecting DNA from All Arrestees, 26 St. Thomas L. Rev. 346 St. Thomas Law Review (Lexis
Acc. 62915)
The BTK killer investigation highlights the pervasive power given to law enforcement by DNA forensics. n162 This
power allows law enforcement to confiscate and test the DNA of an individual who they know is innocent. n163
Rader's daughter had never been convicted of a crime, did not have her DNA in a criminal database, and was in no
that law enforcement

does not need consent to collect the DNA samples of an innocent party . n165 Rader's
daughter's DNA was taken surreptitiously to help solve an investigation pertaining to her father's crimes. n166 The
invasion of privacy posed by familial searching has prompted many critics to
suggest that DNA forensics is an impingement on American civil liberties . n167
Although some states regulate the use of familial searching, other states openly
embrace this power which allows law enforcement to cast an incredibly wide net
when searching for criminals. n168 The [*364] effectiveness of this wide net prompts proponents to
way connected to her father's killings. n164 Furthermore, the BTK investigation shows
suggest that familial searching is a major technological breakthrough that should be frequently employed by law
enforcement. n169
Racism now
Racism engrained in society now
Critical race theory involves examining the relationship between race and power, questioning socially accepted
foundations such as traditional legal reasoning and neutral principles of constitutional law,n8and engaging in
activism to change the social organization that perpetuates racism. n9Although
critical race theory

involves a variety of perspectives and does not have a single definition, there are
several generally accepted propositions.n10First, racism and the resulting inequality
along race lines are recognizedn11as the ordinary, rather than exceptional, reaction
of society to race.n12Second, because racism advantages both elite and working-class
whites, the majority of society lacks incentive to eradicate it. n13Third, race is based on
social construction rather than reality, meaning that it is a socially created
distinction.n14Last, society has a tendency to shift the way it racializes and
stereotypes minority groups depending on its current needs .n15On the[*157]basis of these
tenets, the legal system has a propensity to disproportionately and unfairly impact
racial minorities. Therefore, in examining DNA samples of arrestees from a critical race theory perspective,
this note will examine the disproportionate negative impact of DNA sampling of arrestees on racial minorities.
Used now
States moving toward partial matching tactics
In 1987, Florida prosecutors advanced criminal investigations by successfully convicting a man for the first time
using DNA testing in the United States. n1 Eight years later, the highly publicized O.J. Simpson murder trial
catapulted the method into the mainstream. Today, investigators routinely use DNA testing to both
convict and exonerate suspects by comparing the alleged perpetrator's DNA to evidence found at a crime scene.
increasing familiarity with the science, as well as its advancements, has led to broader uses. In
2008, California became the first state to expand the parameters of DNA testing and
actively search for "partial matches," n2 an aggressive approach that the public has both
The
applauded and criticized. n3 Amidst its controversy, this method led to the arrest of Lonnie David Franklin Jr. in July
2010. Also known as the "Grim Sleeper," Franklin allegedly murdered at least ten women over the last twenty[*714] five years. n4 While many consider his capture a success story, there are still concerns over the expanding
role of DNA in criminal investigations. This paper will explore the evolution of DNA testing and consider its future
potential. Parts II and III focus on California's current approach to partial match searches. Part IV examines the
constitutional, social, and policy issues surrounding this practice. Finally, Part V proposes formal guidelines that
would provide more guidance to the application of this new and controversial technology. The guidelines serve as a
compromise to appease concerns such as privacy, constitutional rights, and costs, while maximizing its potential
utility.
Government can use DNA against relatives

The collection of DNA from arrestees has implications on the genetic privacy of
arrestees' family members due to the possibility of familial DNA searching . n130
"'[F]amilial DNA searches' compare crime scene DNA evidence to offender profiles already in a DNA database,
searching for a partial DNA match in the hopes that the perpetrator is a relative of an offender whose profile is
When law enforcement obtains a "partial match" from

a DNA sample, it indicates that a close biological relative of the offender may be the
source of the unknown DNA sample because of "a similarity in alleles between the
forensic unknown and the candidate offender profile ." n132 Currently, five states conduct
familial searching using partial matches. n133 Additionally, the use of Y-chromosome markers may
be used to trace paternal lineage, and the use of mitochondrial DNA markers may
be used to trace maternal lineage. n134 "[C]ourts in Maryland and Michigan have permitted the use of
already present in the database." n131
mtDNA [mitochondrial DNA] evidence in a murder conviction." n135 Aside from serving as an example of function
there are several ethical issues with allowing the use of familial DNA
searching. First, such methods allow [*172] law enforcement to identify individuals
whose genetic information is not in a criminal DNA database--"individuals for whom
no probable cause has yet existed with respect to any crime" n137 --and have the potential
to yield personal information about those individuals. The use of familial DNA searching thereby
"plac[es] a class of Americans under greater scrutiny merely because their relatives
have committed crimes." n138 "The idea of holding people responsible for who they
are," or who they are related to, "rather than what they've done could challenge
creep, n136
deep American principles of privacy and equality. " n139 Second, "it turns family members into
genetic informants without their knowledge or consent." n140 Those family members who have their DNA placed in
a database subsequently subject their family members to law enforcement scrutiny. Allowing individuals to place
family members under such scrutiny makes those individuals responsible for the genetic privacy of their family
members, and culpable for any intrusions on the privacy of those family members that result from familial DNA
matching. Not only may this give the offender feelings of guilt for subjecting her family members to law
enforcement scrutiny, but "family
members might also ostracize the offender if this is the

first time they are made aware of his or her genetic presence on the database."
n141 This danger may be greater for arrestees, whose family members "might
assume that presence on the database meant a conviction ." n142 Last, familial
searching may, in itself, reveal personal information that was unknown to the
offender or her family members. "A familial search and ensuing investigation could
reveal a previously unknown genetic connection or reveal a lack of genetic
connection between persons thought to have been related ," n143 thus unacceptably
intruding on the family relationship. Because of these concerns, the sampling of arrestees' DNA should
cause greater concern than, for example, fingerprinting arrestees; the privacy of these individuals' family members
is at stake. In the case of minorities, familial searching may perpetuate the targeting of minorities by law
the use of
familial searching using DNA sampled upon arrest may put "roughly a third of the
African American population" under surveillance, "compared with about 7.5 percent
of the European American [*173] population." n144 The DNA sampling of arrestees, which in itself will
enforcement. Because minority individuals are arrested at much higher rates than white individuals,
disproportionately impact minority populations, may therefore have an even greater impact on minority populations
Additionally, the use of familial searching "may reinforce

views about the alleged prevalence of criminality within families" or within ethnic
populations that are over-represented in forensic databases . n145
through the use of familial searching.
Incriminates innocent
Familial searching incriminates potentially innocent people
After the DNA profile is uploaded into CODIS , the profile is instantaneously compared to all of the crime scene
CODIS is designed to compare a DNA profile against all other DNA

profiles in the database, and once a match is identified, the laboratories involved
are contacted, and CODIS establishes coordination between the law enforcement
agencies. n47 As long as a profile remains in CODIS , any new DNA samples from
crime scenes will be compared to the profile . n48 [*481] Each week, the FBI performs an entire
samples in CODIS . n46
system search of all crime scene DNA profiles and all known individual profiles. n49 Once a match between the
sample and the database is made, the DNA evidence can lead to the arrest of the person for the unsolved crime,
and the DNA evidence can be used in court. n50 A CODIS search can affect the person whose profile is included in
the database in several ways. When a profile in the database matches a profile taken from a crime scene, the
agency that provided the DNA sample to the CODIS database is notified because of the implication that the person
had, at some point, been present at the crime scene. n51 The providing agency can then notify the agency with
jurisdiction over the person of the identity of the person for questioning or arrest. n52 2. CODIS: Keeping it in the
CODIS can affect a person's life is through

familial searching. Familial searches are a relatively new phenomenon, but have
been the subject of much scrutiny because many states permit them. n53 Familial
Family Perhaps one of the more disturbing ways
searches are searches in CODIS where law enforcement uses the database to focus on a person whose DNA does
The familial search is conducted on the belief that

the person with the partial DNA match might be a relative of the culprit who
provided the similar DNA sample. Essentially, in a familial search, the law
enforcement agency [*482] searching a DNA database can examine the special
inheritance patterns that link siblings, parents, children, and other close relatives to
search for an offender's kin. n55 In 2008, California police used familial searching when investigating the
not match the crime scene DNA evidence. n54
crimes of a serial killer known as the "Grim Sleeper." n56. In their investigations, the police used some of the killer's
DNA , which had been left at a crime scene, and began testing prison inmates to determine whether a family
relationship to the killer could be discovered. n57 In their searches, one close relative was discovered, and using the
information obtained, the police constructed a family tree and then "surreptitiously obtained a discarded pizza slice
Familial DNA searching in a database is

easy to perform, because the searcher only has to change the threshold on a
database search. "Whereas an exact hit requires that all 26 alleles match at all 13 CODIS markers - signifying
from the convict's father. A DNA match came back." n58
exact parity between two profiles - searches can also be performed at a lower stringency, reporting profiles that
match at some fraction of the 26 alleles." n59 These near-matches are often useful in the case of degraded DNA ,
"a low stringency search with a

crime-scene sample can sometimes return the offender's close-matching relatives in
the database." n60 By requiring matches of fewer alleles, the search returns multiple
hits with similar, though not exact, DNA profiles: i.e., family. These low-threshold
searches will return thousands of matches, but by restricting the search
geographically, law enforcement can, for example, find the DNA profiles of an entire
family living in a certain area. n61 In the United Kingdom, where statistical analysis about DNA
but because first-degree relatives are often a very close match,
databases has been conducted, these familial searches provided a useful investigative lead approximately 10% of
the time they were used. n62 The United States has also seen success with familial searching, and as the popularity
of [*483] DNA databases grows, presumably so too will familial searches.
By including more profiles in
CODIS , it is likely that familial searching will be used with increasing frequency,
resulting in more family members being considered suspects. n63
Racism Ext
CODIS database will afect people of color in a negative
manner
Michael T. Risher, 1-1-2009, ("Gene Watch Page:
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=204, Michael
Risher, JD, is a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California where he
handles a wide range of cases involving freedom of expression, criminal justice, and other civil liberties
issues. Risher was a Deputy Public Defender in Alameda County from 1998 to 2005. // RH)
Of the hundreds of thousands of arrests every year in California on suspicion of a

felony, nearly 320,000 in 2006, approximately 30% never lead to any conviction. [1] A
disproportionate number of these innocent arrestees are people of color. In the U.S.
justice system, people who are arrested but never convicted are presumed
innocent; yet, as of January 1, 2009, all arrestees have been forced to let the State
of California take a DNA sample, analyze it and include the resulting profile in a
criminal database, to be compared evermore with crime-scene evidence . There are procedures for
some of these people to try to get the samples and profiles expunged; however, these procedures often require arrestees to
wait three or more years before even requesting expungement and necessitate the
help of a lawyer. As a result, the overwhelming majority of people arrested but not
convicted of any crime are unlikely even to try to get their samples destroyed . Tens of
thousands of profiles taken from innocent people will thus remain in these criminal databases. The consequence will be a magnification
of the current racial disparities in our criminal justice system as more and more
people of color's DNA profiles are included in databases that make them potential
suspects whenever DNA is recovered from a crime scene. The effects of this
disproportionate inclusion of people of color in the databanks are made clear by the
other papers in this series on genetics and race. What is perhaps less clear is how our criminal justice system, which promises
equal justice under the law, can tolerate this injustice . This paper, after outlining the legal growth and transformation of DNA databanks, examines how various steps in our criminal
justice system create and magnify racial disparities, and how the law makes it nearly impossible to effectively address the problem. It also looks at how taking DNA samples at various
stages in this process may affect these disparities and the factors that cause them. I use as my primary example California's system because it is one of the world's largest criminal
justice systems in one of the nation's most diverse states. It is also the system in which I have practiced law for the last decade, and is representative of where DNA databanks
throughout the country will likely be in the next few years as more and more states and the federal government collect DNA from arrestees.[2] DNA databanks comprise two distinct
components: the actual biological samples and the computerized database of the profiles generated by analyzing these samples In criminal-justice databanks, the biological samples
are collected from crime scenes (forensic samples) and from known individuals (known samples). Until recently, known samples were usually obtained by drawing blood, although now
The government
analyzes both forensic samples and known samples to create DNA profiles , which are essentially
a digitized description of 26 parts of the DNA molecule. The profiles are then uploaded to the Combined DNA
Index System ("CODIS"), a centralized, searchable law enforcement database accessible to state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies. CODIS
was created by the FBI in 1994 after Congress authorized it to establish a national DNA database to link existing state and local databanks. The biological
samples themselves are retained by the local police or crime lab for later testing.
Once an arrestee's profile is uploaded into CODIS, it is immediately compared to the
thousands of crime-scene samples in the CODIS forensic database. As long as the
arrestee's profile remains in CODIS, any new crime-scene samples will be searched
against it. When an arrestee profile exactly matches a crime-scene profile, CODIS
automatically notifies agencies that provided the sample. Then that agency will usually provide the identity of the
most states and the federal government primarily obtain samples by swabbing the inside of the person's cheek to collect skin cells.[3]
arrestee to the agency with jurisdiction over the crime so that it can follow up. DNA databanks have grown exponentially in the last decade as new laws have expanded the range of
. It was originally
conceived as a way to connect people convicted of serious violent crimes with other
such crimes in which DNA evidence is most useful. The original 1989 DNA-collection
law established a databank and required people convicted of murder or a felony sex
offense to provide DNA samples before they were released from custody .[4] The state department
of justice had the authority to analyze these samples and include the resulting analysis in the new statewide databank.[5] From today's perspective , this program
seems quite limited: the only people subject to having their DNA databanked had
been convicted of very serious crimes, either by pleading guilty or after the charges
people subject to having their DNA forcibly seized, analyzed, and the resulting profile databanked. California's databank is a good example of this
had been proved beyond all reasonable doubt to a jury. But the law soon began to
expand to include more people. The first steps were modest: in the late 1990s, new
crimes were added to the list of qualifying offenses, and the law was amended to
require that samples be taken immediately after conviction, rather than just before
release. The latter change was enacted as the focus shifted from preventing new
crimes to solving old crimes. In 2004, California voters enacted Proposition 69, drastically expanding the database. The two biggest changes were that,
as of November 2004, every person convicted of any felony - which can include simple drug
possession, shoplifting, or even intentionally writing a check without sufficient funds
to cover it - has had to provide DNA samples. And, as of January 1, 2009, every person arrested for a felony in California must give a DNA sample. Prop. 69 thus radically
changed the database from one comprising profiles of individuals convicted of violent felonies to one that includes profiles from suspected shoplifters. This huge increase is not
distributed equitably among all people. African-Americans comprise 6.7% of California's population, but 21.5% of those arrested for felonies in the state.[6] Although, as discussed below,
the possibility of race-based decision-making at all levels of the criminal justice system makes it impossible to know whether changing from a database of people convicted of felonies to
one including everybody arrested for felonies will result in an increase in the proportion of people of color in the database it will clearly result in a significant increase in the absolute
Racial disparities fluctuate depending on the stage of the criminal

proceeding from the high-level initial decision to make certain acts criminal, to a
police officer's decision to contact or arrest an individual, to the decisions made by
prosecutors, judges, jurors, and defense lawyers. Thus, the stage at which DNA
samples are taken will affect the racial disparities in the databank, albeit in
unpredictable ways. The first and broadest stage at which racial disparities are
introduced into the criminal justice system is at the legislative level, where crimes
are defined and classified. The basic question is, of course what conduct is considered criminal: why is a person who possesses drugs subject to criminal
number of minorities included.
sanctions while a business that puts its workers or consumers at risk with dangerous or unsanitary facilities subject only to civil sanctions? Even beyond that basic issue, our criminal
justice system treats very similar conduct differently in ways that create racial disparities. The most notorious example of this is the crack versus powder forms of cocaine disparity in the
federal system, which for years punished people convicted of crack cocaine offenses (well over 80% of whom are African- American) much more severely than powder cocaine offenders
(72% of whom are white or Hispanic).[7] The legislative establishment of "drug-free zones," often around schools, parks, or public-housing projects, can also have racially disparate
effects.[8] These laws mean that people who live and commit drug crimes in dense urban areas, where few locations are not close to a school or park, will be punished more harshly for
the same conduct than are their suburban or rural counterparts. Because urban areas usually have higher proportions of people of color, these harsher punishments will reinforce racial
disparities. Laws like these interact with seemingly race-neutral DNA collection laws to produce great disparities in the databank. A databank that includes all persons convicted of
felonies will include every person - primarily people of color - convicted of possessing cocaine or heroin, no matter how small the amount; but it will not contain samples from people -
primarily white - convicted of minor methamphetamine offenses that were prosecuted as misdemeanors Conversely, a databank that includes only violent crimes or sex crimes - as
many originally did - should result in fewer disparities than an all-felony database for the reasons just described. Excluding non-violent crimes is reasonable since DNA evidence is almost
never involved in non-violent offenses. DNA databanks themselves create a feedback loop that further magnifies these disparities. Well over half of all serious crimes go completely
. If DNA databanks work as they are intended, they will

identify suspects for at least some - perhaps many - of these crimes. But a racially
skewed databank will produce racially skewed results; because racial disparities in
the criminal-justice system have led to the inclusion of a disproportionate number of
profiles of African-Americans in CODIS, the databank will return a disproportionate
number of matches to African-American suspects. In contrast, crimes committed by
members of groups that are underrepresented in CODIS will escape detection,
particularly as the police spend an increasing amount of their limited time and
resources focusing on cases where they have found a DNA match . The U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by
the courts, does not prohibit this shift, regardless of the racial disparities it introduces. The courts have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of equal protection of the law prohibits only intentional
discrimination, which means that challenges to criminal laws that result in racially
disparate impacts are extremely difficult. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court,
discriminatory intent means "more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker, in this case a state legislature,
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group ." If the governmental body would have
unsolved, with the police never even identifying a suspect
acted the same way even without the discriminatory intent, the law stands. The United States Court of Appeals has applied these same principles to reject an argument that the racial
disparities in the federal DNA database made it unconstitutional.[9] No matter how disparate the impact of the database, without indications that Congress enacted it in order to
adversely affect African-Americans, the challenge failed. A second policy-level set of decisions also creates racial disparities: the allocation of law-enforcement resources. The clearest
big-picture example of this is the so-called "war on drugs," which is largely responsible for filling our prisons with men and women of color over the last 30 years.[10] A war on securities
fraud or tax evasion would result in the arrest and prosecution of a very different demographic. Yet resources for combating white-collar crimes have been cut, despite evidence that
violations are common and devastating to our society, as evidenced by the current global impacts of finance fraud On a smaller scale, police decisions to conduct buy-bust operations
in specific neighborhoods - where undercover officers attempt to buy drugs from people on the street and then arrest anybody who sells them the drugs - mean that the police choose
who will be targeted based on what neighborhood is chosen for the operation. These operations usually occur in poor, urban neighborhoods with large minority populations. Racial
disparities also enter through racial profiling by individual officers. Studies have shown that some mixture of unconscious racism, conscious racism, and the middle-ground use of
criminal profiles often leads law enforcement to focus its attention and authority on people of color. This can include everything from discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws to
detainment and arrests of people of color without sufficient individualized suspicion. As with challenges to legislative actions, challenges to racial profiling under the Constitution are
extremely difficult because of the need to show discriminatory intent. The difficulty is magnified because the law gives police officers substantial discretion as to who they approach,
stop, question, or search. The Supreme Court has held that the police may lawfully make pretextual stops - for example, singling out one speeding driver among many because the
officer has a hunch that they may be carrying drugs. This means that, although the police may not stop a person based solely on race, there are many explanations an officer can give if
called upon to explain a stop: the driver or passenger's nervous glance, reduced speed upon seeing the officer, a pedestrian wearing a heavy coat on a warm day, and so on. None of this
behavior alone would justify the stop of a car, but such seemingly innocent actions are enough to justify the officer's decision to stop this particular car for driving a few miles per hour
over the speed limit while ignoring all the others that did the same, or to stop a particular individual for jaywalking while ignoring similar violations
. Even if a court
determines that an officer did make a stop based on nothing more than the driver's
race, the only remedy is the possibility of a civil suit against the officer. Unless
serious harm was done, this is highly unlikely to occur, so it is not a significant
deterrent to such police abuse of power. Arrestee sampling adds another incentive
for police officers to make questionable or outright illegal arrests. Whether or not
the arrest leads directly to charges being filed, the arrestee's DNA profile will
automatically be included in the database and run against all crime-scene evidence,
now and in the future. Because of the barriers to having DNA samples removed, few
arrestees will be able to have their samples and profiles expunged, thus allowing a
single law enforcement officer the power to place people under lifetime genetic
surveillance. The low level of proof required to make an arrest, combined with the difficulties of preventing arrests that are illegal for lack of proof or for discriminatory
enforcement of laws, means that allowing DNA collection immediately after arrest will lead to large databases full of innocent people. Furthermore , given the
ubiquity of racial profiling, people of color will largely populate the databases. The
bottom line is that police end up with enormous discretion to determine who is in a
database, with absolutely no review of many of their arrests. The consequence of
the arrest of a plainly and indisputably innocent person will be not only a short stint
in jail, but a lifetime of genetic surveillance.
Racism in unethical and must be rejected.

Memmi, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, 1997 [Albert,
RACISM, p. 165]
Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough,
the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of
remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust
society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to
treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the
Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to
respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk
becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is
a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the
condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical
choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by
all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and
destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace.
True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
Racism outweighs death

Patricia Williams, Associate Professor of Law at City University of New York,
September, 1987
Spirit-murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger-Pointing as the Laws
Response to Racism, University of Miami Law Review, Lexis
The second purpose of this article is to examine racism as a crime, an offense so
deeply painful and assaultive as to constitute something I call "spirit-murder."
Society is only beginning to recognize that racism is as devastating, as costly, and

as psychically obliterating as robbery or assault; For example, death may occur
long before the body ceases to function, and under the proper circumstances, life
may continue for some time after the body is carried to its grave. 71 These nonbody-bound, uncompartmentalized ideas recognize the power of spirit, or what we
in our secularized society might describe as the dynamism of self as reinterpreted
by the perceptions of [*151] other. 72 These ideas comprehend the fact that a part
of ourselves is beyond the control of pure physical will and resides in the sanctuary
of those around us. A fundamental part of ourselves and of our dignity is dependent
upon the uncontrollable, powerful, external observers who constitute society. 73
Surely a part of socialization ought to include a sense of caring responsibility for the
images of others that are reposited within us. 74 Taking the example of the man
who was stabbed thirty-nine times out of the context of our compartmentalized
legal system, and considering it in the hypothetical framework of a legal system
that encompasses and recognizes morality, religion, and psychology, I am moved to
see this act as not merely body murder but spirit-murder as well. I see it as spiritmurder, only one of whose manifestations is racism -- cultural obliteration,
prostitution, abandonment of the elderly and the homeless, and genocide are some
of its other guises. I see spirit-murder as no less than the equivalent of body
murder. One of the reasons that I fear what I call spirit-murder, or disregard for
others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard, is that its product is a system
of formalized distortions of thought. It produces social structures centered around
fear and hate; it provides a tumorous outlet for feelings elsewhere unexpressed. 75
For example, when Bernhard Goetz shot four black teenagers in a New York City
subway, an acquaintance of mine said that she could understand his fear because it
is a "fact" that blacks commit most crimes. What impressed me, beyond the factual
inaccuracy of this statement, 76 was the reduction of Goetz' crime to "his fear,"
which I translate to mean her fear. The four teenage victims became all blacks
everywhere, and "most crimes" clearly meant that most blacks commit crimes.
Racism makes global war inevitable.

Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar
College, 7
[Pinar, Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide, Handbook of the
Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, 2007, RSR]
Albert Memmi argued that We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what
happened as a result of it(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global
exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated

by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and
actions. The second one is the continuation of violence , either sporadically or
systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to
genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is
embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course , and there is
racism. The first one is that segregation,
no way to challenge global racism . Together these three points facilitate the base
for war and genocide
In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized
the future of global conflict by declaring that the clash of civilizations will domi- nate global politics(Huntington 1993: 22). He
declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntingtons end of ideology meant the West is now expected to
confront the Confucian-Islamic other. Huntington intoned Islam has bloody borders, and he expected the West to develop
cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the Confucian-Islamic civilizations, by exploiting the
conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded
with September 11. The new color line means we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what
they believe in.
Mass incarceration debilitates resistance movementswe must

use every tactic to challenge it
Williams 68
[March 1968, Robert F. Williams was a civil rights leader and author, best known for
serving as president of the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the NAACP in the
1950s and early 1960s. Black Panther Party founder Huey Newton cited Williamss
Negroes with Guns as a major inspiration. Reaction Without Positive Change, The
Crusader, Volume 9, Number 4,
http://freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC513_scans/Robert_F_Williams/513
.RobertFWilliams.Crusader.March.1968.pdf]
Next to naked violence and unmitigated terror, racist America's bigoted court
system is the cardinal scourge of the powerless Black and white masses. The
constitutional myth about "trial by one's peers" is a cardinal sacrilege against the
sacredness of truth. When a Black man is a defendant in Americanism's dock of
Anglo-Saxon law he is pretty much in the same position as an humble lamb on an
altar of sacrifice. White America's savage culture erects a pious facade of devotion
to the rule of law rather than of man and hypocritically attempts to project the
ritualistic victimization of the Black man to some remote and spiritual realm of
divinity above and beyond the tawdry arena of satanic man. To proclaim AngloSaxon jurisprudence to be a rule of law; and to allow its application to be left to the
whim of insensate brigands is tantamount to casting pearls before swine. The
kangaroo court system in racist America is the most archaic of reactionary
institutionalized injustice. Some phases of society modernizes and advances.
Certain aspects of culture are in a constant state of transition, but to and behold
Anglo-Saxon law doggedly clings to a Magna Charta steeped in the traditions of a
Middle Ages mentality. Why does this so-called rule of law so readily invoke the
heritage of ancient vanity in justifying modern injustice predicated on feudalistic
logic and morality? Why is it so inclined to look backwards instead of forward? Why
is it a quilted patchwork of sham reform rather than a bold new uniformed structure
created out of sociology's up-to-date discoveries and premises? It is because it is an
instrument of social reaction in the employ of reactionaries hell-bent on preserving
an ante-bellum and vulturous power structure frenetically trying to maintain its
encircled and battered position. Tyrants do not change of themselves. The pressure
of the people stimulated by the enlightenment derived from their social being is the
driving wheel that propels the vehicle of change. The Black and the powerless, who
face the wrath of so-called Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, must come to realize the
futility of leaving their fate to the rule of law as implemented by puppet judges who
pander to the savage emotions of a cold blooded aristocracy. The true power of the
state derives from the people. The weakness of the people in a confrontation with
state tyranny evolves from the apathy, confusion, demoralization, disunity and
ignorance of their own power. All over degenerate and fascist America today the
most complimentary citizens of a civilized society are being railroaded to prison, are
being removed from a decadent and sheepish society that is in dire need of highly
moral and resistant fiber. These courageous and upright citizens constitute the last
thin line between regression and progression. They are the sparse in numbers but
firm pillars that so precariously prevent the society from plunging into the tragic and
chaotic depth of despotic fascism. America's jails are teaming with principled Black
Nationalists, freedom fighters, war resisters, peace advocates, resisters of false
arrest, those forced into crime as a means of survival, the penniless and powerless
guilty of minor infractions, but unable to pay the court's tribute money and the
state's bribery. America's racist courts have assumed the despotic posture of
institutionalized lynch mobs enjoying the sanctimonious solicitude of the state's
ritualistic buffoonery. This inhumane and oppressive situation can only be rectified
by an aroused, united and determined citizenry. The power of the enraged masses
must be arrayed against this Anglo=Saxon kangarooism. We must strive to create
more favorable legal conditions to disrupt the orderly and uninhibited process of
perennial racist kangaroo justice. A life-and-death struggle must be waged to break
this antiquated first line of the reactionary power structure's defense of its fast
eroding position. Science changes, medicine changes, education changes, customs
change, styles change but the archaic courts still arrogantly pride themselves on
the fact that they are the true and noble hermits from the dark ages. In our life-anddeath struggle, we must convert everything possible into a weapon of defense and
survival. We must not be narrowminded and sectarian in our scope. When possible
we must use the ballot, we must use the school, the church, the arts and even the
evil legal system that we know to be stacked against us. We must fight in the
assemblies, we must fight in the streets. We must make war on all fronts. We must
use the word as well as the bullet. We must not only master the techniques of our
enemy, but we must surpass him in a technique that will serve our cause of
liberation rather than his cause of slavery. A liberation struggle cannot afford to
hamper its possibilities of success by straddling itself with narrow limitations, by
limiting itself to only one method of struggle. While the gun is essential and basic, it
must be supplemented by actions, sometimes less dramatic, less decisive.
Challenging the prison industrial complex is critical to

resistanceprison expansion is a tool of colonization
Ogden 14
[2014, Stormy Ogden, The Prison-Industrial-Complex in Indigenous California, pp.
57-58 in Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-Industrial Complex]
I write this chapter from the position of a California Indian woman , a tribal woman of Yokuts
and Pomo ancestry. I also write as an ex-prisoner and a survivor of colonization. At the beginning of the colonization
process two tools of genocide were forced upon Native people: the bottle and the bible.
Along with these
tools the traditional ways of behavior and conduct of Native people were
criminalized . State and federal governments defined Native Americans as deviant
and criminal through such procedures as the Dawes Act . With the enforcement of
these new laws, Native people were locked up in a spectrum of punishing
institutions , including military forts, missions, reservations, boarding schools, and more recently, state and
the most brutal methods of social control have been directed at
a societys most oppressed groups. In North America, the groups that are most likely to
federal prisons. Historically,
be sent to jail and prison are the poor and people of color . A large proportion of
people who end up behind bars are indigenous
. On any given day,
one in twenty-
five Native Americans are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice syst em, a
rate that is 2.4 times that of whites. Native American women are particularly
targeted for punishment. For example, Native American women in South Dakota make
up 32 percent of the prison population but only 8.3 percent of the general
population. Angela Y. Davis describes the prison-industrial complex as a
complex web of racism, social control, and profit . The experience of racial
subordination, repression, and economic exploitation is not new to the Native
people of these land. From the missions to the reservations, California Indians have struggled for survival in
the face of an array of brutal mechanisms designed to control and eliminate the regions first peoples.
The
prison-industrial complex was built on the ancestral lands of the

indigenous people of this continent and has contributed to the
devastating process of colonization . It is essential for prison scholars and activists to
understand the colonial roots of the prison-industrial complex and to make visible the stories of Native prisoners.
Medical Advances Adv
Extra info IS kept

More info than DNA profiles is kept
Jessica D. Gabel, 2013, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University
College of Law, University of Baltimore Law Review, INDECENT EXPOSURE: GENES
ARE MORE THAN A BRAND NAME LABEL IN THE DNA DATABASE DEBATE, 42 U. Balt.
L. Rev. 561 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015) // LO
Before we started expanding the use of DNA databases, we should have considered
three things: (1) would expansion increase investigative outcomes; (2) are those
outcomes worth the consequences; and (3) is the advancement of DNA technology
fixed? [*589] While the first may have been a no-brainer, it seems that we have not given any real thought to the
other two. It seems likely that with the Supreme Court's decision this year, DNA databases and the
populations housed within them will continue to explode in numbers. n215 As
citizens, DNA and the concept of turning it over freely has become as routine as
giving private information over to the likes of Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social
media outlets. n216 We are indifferent to the number of situations that call for the
submission of genetic material to medical providers, businesses selling at-home
genetic tests, ancestry websites, and other public and private institutions. The reality is
that troves of our genetic data are "persistent and widely shared" and incredibly
difficult for us later to "access, to verify, or to correct." n217 It should not surprise us, then, that
the criminal justice system wants to collect DNA from an ever-increasing spectrum
of people who come into contact with it. n218 The notion of privacy and the
presumption of innocence are now blurred figures in this landscape. These concerns do
not pertain to simply the collection of DNA profiles and samples, but also to the
other information that may be kept. n219 While criminal investigations and medical research
previously operated in different genetic spheres, those spheres are starting to converge. When DNA is collected on
arrest and uploaded into the database, it is not simply translated into an identity-free criminal bar code. n220
Ultimately, that digitized profile must link to a name, to a location, and possibly to a criminal record. n221 Other
records may also be available, especially for released offenders because police must be able to track that person
when police do [*590] contact

a database offender they may also be able to tell that person his or her
predisposition to kidney disease. n223 In the wake of the King case, the fingerprint-DNA
analogy has overstayed its welcome. Nonetheless, it seems that it is not slated for
retirement any time soon despite enduring concerns about the expansion of DNA
collection. n224 If the extension of DNA databases is in fact inevitable, then it should
likewise be foreseeable that DNA technology may advance and outpace the
restrictions once thought sufficient to keep databases sufficiently void of identifying
information. As for now, it seems we would rather be content to operate databases
at the margins of technology and tolerate a certain margin of error when things go
awry. n225 The criminal justice system hungers for the ability to solve crime and convict the guilty. Databases
certainly feed that insatiable beast, but we need to respect that DNA is not the
tame dormouse we once thought it to be.
down if there is a hit in the database later. n222 Ultimately, we may find that
DNA can be used for more than identification purposes citizens

should be concerned
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court allowed DNA sampling and profiling by law enforcement because it served
the purpose of allowing "law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons...
DNA
information has the potential to be used for non-identification purposes because it
contains a variety of information about the sampled individual outside of that
person's identity. Unlike fingerprints, which are merely two-dimensional
representations of an outward physical marker and are therefore only useful as a
form of identification, DNA contains a wealth of information beyond the information
that may be used in identifying individuals. n96 To call DNA information a genetic
fingerprint trivializes the wealth of information that DNA has already been found to hold. n97
Citizens should be concerned about the wealth of new information indicating that
"junk" DNA contains personal information, the risk of DNA databases being subject to function
creep, and the risks created by familial DNA searching. Because of these concerns, the ability of
law enforcement (or potentially other government entities) to use the information
for purposes other than identification should cause states greater concern regarding
DNA sampling of arrestees.
[*167] they must take into custody," similar to, but more accurate than, fingerprints. n95 However,
Junk DNA
ENCODE project finds junk DNA contains personal
information
The use of DNA sampling of arrestees and convicts relies on the premise that the
thirteen loci used in the DNA profile contains only "junk" DNA . n98 According to proponents
of DNA sampling, "junk" DNA is not currently known to hold or predict any personal, medical, or behavioral
information, and therefore only serves to create an identification profile. n99 However, unlike other types of medical
genetic information creates the blueprint for each individual--it "bears a

part of our personality, of our identity and autonomy. It cannot be deemed as
neutral." n100 Additionally, the coding nature of specific genes and the extent to which
genetic information explains differences in individuals has not been fully explored .
n101 Therefore, no genetic information [*168] can be conclusively termed "junk," useless,
or non-coding at this point in time. Genetic information may be distinguished from other
methods of identification, such as fingerprinting, because it contains information about an
individual's "racial and ethnic heritage, disease susceptibility . . . behavioral
propensities," n102 "gender, and susceptibility to Type 1 Diabetes," n103 "family history,
predisposition to various diseases, appearance, and behavioral traits, as well as
their legitimacy of birth." n104 Additionally, as scientists continue to map the human genome, "DNA may
information,
also be able to shed light on a person's aggression, substance addiction, criminal tendency, and sexual orientation,"
among other specific, personal, and potentially embarrassing information about an individual. n105 In fact,
recent efforts by the ENCODE Project, n106 a consortium established by the National
Human Genome Research Institute in 2003, have uncovered coding DNA among
"[l]ong stretches of DNA previously dismissed as 'junk.'" n107 The Project assigned
"biochemical functions for 80% of the [human] genome, in particular outside of the well-studied protein-coding
regions," and found that "[m]any non-coding variants in individual genome sequences lie in ENCODE-annotated
This thorough mapping of the human genome will help

researchers understand the genetic component of a variety of common diseases
"that depend on the complex interaction of hundreds of genes and their associated
regulatory elements." n109 As a result of this study, the concept of "junk" DNA is rapidly
falling out of favor, n110 and DNA sampling and profiling therefore presents a much greater risk than
functional regions." n108
previously considered to the individuals sampled. The Project also recognized that genomic research such as this is
incomplete, and that additional information [*169] could be revealed in subsequent experiments. n111
DNA can be used to predict more than the individual may even
know themselves
DNA also contains other personal information beyond these common forensic uses. A
person's observable characteristics - such as appearance, health, and behavior - are called the person's phenotype.
Phenotype is a result of the interaction between a person's genetics and [*1296] environment, and it can be partly
predicted by DNA testing. Some phenotypic information, like eye color, can be easily observed by looking at a
a predisposition to a genetic disease,

may not even be known by the individual herself. Some genetic correlates of disease are
highly predictive. For example, if a person has the nucleotide bases CAG repeated more than thirty-six times
person and is not private. Other phenotypic information, like
at a particular location on the short arm of one of their copies of chromosome four, that person will develop
Huntington's disease, a fatal neurological and motor disorder. The number of CAG repeats can also predict how
early that person will start to experience symptoms of Huntington's disease. Similarly, other gene mutations are
highly predictive of diseases like early-onset Alzheimer's disease or Lynch syndrome, which can lead to many forms
of cancer. Other diseases, like hemophilia and Tay-Sachs disease, require a person to have two copies of a diseaselinked gene. A person with only one version of the gene will not show symptoms, but could have an affected child if
the other parent is also a carrier. In contrast to these rare, highly predictive mutations, there are many common
variants that more modestly predict disease risk, for example risk for some kinds of cancer n19 and late-onset
Alzheimer's disease. n20
DNA used
Nothing stands in the way of the FBI using your DNA
even if the thirteen loci that compose DNA profiles do only contain "junk"
DNA, there is no current statutory bar to using DNA samples for other purposes,
meaning that "the FBI is free to alter its current practice at will and to require crime
labs to use more revealing portions of the DNA sequence when creating the DNA
profile." n112 The information taken from a DNA sample may, and according to some, "inevitably will be . . .
abused in a number of ways." n113 This belief is supported by the FBI's own admission that it
intends to expand the way it collects and uses DNA in the future , at least with respect to
Additionally,
the use of DNA in the CODIS system to identify and find missing persons. It states that: Through the combination of
increased federal funding and expanded database laws . . . the number of profiles in NDIS [National DNA Index
System] has and will continue to dramatically increase resulting in a need to re-architect the CODIS software. A
considerable focus during this time will be to enhance kinship analysis software for use in the identification of
missing persons. The next generation of CODIS will utilize STR and mtDNA information as well as meta data (such
as sex, date of last sighting, age, etc.) to help in the identification of missing persons. The re-architecture will also
enable CODIS to include additional DNA technologies such as a Y Short Tandem Repeat (Y-TSR) and mini-Short
Tandem Repeat (miniSTR) . . . . [T]he future of DNA, CODIS, and NDIS holds even greater promise to solve crime and
Although the FBI states that the benefit of using this

information is to identify and find missing persons, it also identifies improved law
enforcement as a goal of the re-architecture of the CODIS database , n115 indicating
that the increased use of identifying information contained within DNA will
imminently be used for law enforcement purposes
identify missing persons. n114
Bioterror Add On
Patient-doctor trust is high
Giroux, 14 -- Bloomberg reporter
[Greg, "Doctors Running for Congress Ditch Suits for White Coats," Bloomberg, 7-1314, www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-14/doctors-running-for-congress-ditch-suitsfor-white-coats.html, accessed 8-24-14]
On the 2014 campaign trail, white is the new olive drab. After the 2001
terrorist attacks on the U.S., political candidates with military ties showed up in their
ads in uniform. This year, those with medical backgrounds are attacking Obamacare
wearing their white coats. Its no accident: polls show nurses and doctors are
among the most trusted people in America . Politicians are among the least
trusted. All three commercials for Monica Wehby, an Oregon Republican seeking to
unseat Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley, have shown her in a hospital setting. As a
pediatric neurosurgeon, I know firsthand how devastating Obamacare is for Oregon
families and patients, Wehby said in one of her ads, which was interspersed with
footage of the candidate in surgical scrubs. The Greys Anatomy backdrop comes
as Republicans seek to gain control of the U.S. Senate and, with their House
majority counterparts, pass a law repealing 2010s Affordable Care Act. The quest is
gaining urgency as Americans become more accepting of the law. Republicans need
a net gain of six seats for a Senate majority. Fifty-three percent of Americans oppose
the law, though just 32 percent say it should be repealed, according to a Bloomberg
National Poll last month. Fifty-six percent say they want to keep Obamacare with
small modifications. Wardrobe Messaging The latest wardrobe preferences for
political ads also put distance between some candidates and the unpopular
Congress they are seeking to join. About 82 percent of Americans say nurses
have a high or very high level of honesty and ethical standards, the top spot
among 22 professions rated in a December Gallup survey. Pharmacists were tied
for second at 70 percent, and medical doctors were tied with military veterans
for fourth at 69 percent. Medical professionals have high approval ratings
because people view them as primary care-givers, said Frank Newport,
Gallups editor-in-chief.
Key to solve bioterror- research, response and treatment

Jacobs, 5 MD; Boston University professor of medicine
[Alice, director of Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory and Interventional Cardiology,
"Rebuilding an Enduring Trust in Medicine," Circulation, 2005,
circ.ahajournals.org/content/111/25/3494.full#xref-ref-3-1, accessed 8-18-14]
To be sure, we will learn about the emerging science and clinical practice of cardiovascular disease over the next
there is an internal disease of the heart that confronts us as

scientists, as physicians, and as healthcare professionals. It is a threat to us all
insidious and pervasiveand one that we unknowingly may spread. This threat is one of the
most critical issues facing our profession today. How we address this problem will
shape the future of medical care. This issue is the erosion of trust. Lack of trust is
four days. But
a barrier between our intellectual renewal and our ability to deliver

new
this
knowledge to our research labs , to our offices, to the bedside of our patients, and
the public. Trust is a vital, unseen, and essential element in diagnosis, treatment,
and healing. So it is fundamental that we understand what it is, why its important in medicine, its recent
to
decline, and what we can all do to rebuild trust in our profession. Trust is intrinsic to the relationship between
citizens around the world and the institutions that serve their needs: government, education, business, religion,
and, most certainly, medicine. Albert Einstein recognized the importance of trust when he said, Every kind of
peaceful cooperation among men is primarily based on mutual trust.1 In our time, trust has been broken, abused,
misplaced, and violated. The media have been replete with commentaries, citing stories of negligence, corruption,
and betrayal by individuals and groups in the public and private sectors, from governments to corporations, from
educational institutions to the Olympic Organizing Committee. These all are front-page news. Perhaps the most
extreme example is terrorism, in which strangers use acts of violence to shatter trust and splinter society in an
ongoing assault on our shared reverence for human life. Unfortunately, we are not immune in our own sphere of
cardiovascular medicine. The physician-investigator conflicts of interest concerning enrollment of patients in clinical
trials, the focus on medical and nursing errors, the high-profile medical malpractice cases, the mandate to control
the cost of health care in ways that may not be aligned with the best interest of the patientall of these undermine
trust in our profession. At this time, when more and more public and private institutions have fallen in public
esteem, restoring trust in the healthcare professions will require that we understand the importance of trust and the
implications of its absence. Trust is intuitive confidence and a sense of comfort that comes from the belief that we
can rely on an individual or organization to perform competently, responsibly, and in a manner considerate of our
interests.2 It is dynamic, it is fragile, and it is vulnerable. Trust can be damaged, but it can be repaired and restored.
It is praised where it is evident and acknowledged in every profession. Yet it is very difficult to define and quantify.
Trust is easier to understand than to measure. For us, trust may be particularly difficult to embrace because it is not
trust is
inherent to our profession, precisely because patients turn to us in their most
vulnerable moments, for knowledge about their health and disease. We know
trust when we experience it: when we advise patients in need of highly technical
procedures that are associated with increased risk or when we return from being away to learn
a science. Few instruments have been designed to allow us to evaluate it with any scientific rigor. Yet,
that our patient who became ill waited for us to make a decision and to discuss their concerns, despite being
leaders in the medical field

understand the importance of trust.3 When asked whether the public health
system could be overrun by public panic over SARS and bioterror ism, C enters for
surrounded by competent colleagues acting on our behalf. Many thought
D isease C ontrol and Prevention Director
Julie
Gerberding replied, You can manage
people if they trust you . Weve put a great deal of effort into improving state and
building credibility,
competence and trust.4 Former H ealth and H uman S ervices Secretary Donna Shalala
recognized the importance of trust when she said, If we are to keep
local communications and scaled up our own public affairs capacitywere
also
testing new med icine s and new approaches to curing disease, we cannot
compromise the trust and willingness of patients to participate in clinical
trials .5 These seemingly intuitive concepts of the importance of trust in 21st century medicine actually have
little foundation in our medical heritage. In fact, a review of the early history of medicine is astonishingly devoid of
medical ethics. Even the Codes and Principles of Ethics of the American Medical Association, founded in 1847,
required patients to place total trust in their physicians judgment, to obey promptly, and to entertain a just and
enduring sense of value of the services rendered.6 Such a bold assertion of the authority of the physician and the
gratitude of the patient seems unimaginable today. It was not until the early 1920s that role models such as
Bostons Richard Cabot linked patient-centered medical ethics with the best that scientific medicine had to offer,6
and Frances Weld Peabody, the first Director of the Thorndike Memorial Laboratory at the Boston City Hospital,
crystallized the ethical obligation of the physician to his patient in his essay The Care of the Patient.7 In one
particularly insightful passage, Peabody captures the essence of the two elements of the physicians ethical
obligation: He must know his professional business and he must trouble to know the patient well enough to draw
conclusions, jointly with the patient, as to what actions are indeed in the patients best interest. He states: The
The care of the patient must be

completely personal. The significance of the intimate personal relationship between
physician and patient cannot be too strongly emphasized, for in an
extraordinarily large number of cases both diagnosis and treatment are
directly dependent on it. Truly, as Peabody said, The secret to the care of the patientis in caring for
the patient.7 This concept that links the quality of the physician-patient
relationship to health outcomes has indeed stood the test of time. Trust has
been shown to be important in its own right. It is essential to patients, in their
willingness to seek care, their willingness to reveal sensitive information, their
willingness to submit to treatment, and their willingness to follow
recommendations. They must be willing for us to be able.
treatment of a disease may be entirely impersonal:
Continual research solves and deters bioterror

Chyba 4 - Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
(CISAC), Stanford Institute for International Studies, and an Associate Professor at
Stanford University
[Christopher & Alex Greninger, Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented
World Survival, 46:2, Summer 2004, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/20722/Chyba_2004.pdf]
In the absence of a comprehensive and effective system of global review of potential high-consequence
research, we are instead trapped in a kind of offencedefence arms race. Even as legitimate
biomedical
researchers develop defences against biological pathogens, bad actors could in turn
engineer countermeasures in a kind of directed version of the way natural pathogens evolve resistance to
anti-microbial drugs. The mousepox case provides a harbinger of what is to come: just as the United States
was stockpiling 300m doses of smallpox vaccine as a defence against a terrorist smallpox attack, experimental
modification of the mousepox virus showed how the vaccine could possibly be circumvented. The United
States is now funding research on antiviral drugs and other ways of combating smallpox that might be
effective against the engineered organism. Yet there are indications that smallpox can be made resistant to
The future has the appearance of an

eternal arms race of measures and countermeasures. The arms race metaphor should be used
one of the few known antiviral drugs.
with caution; it too is in danger of calling up misleading analogies to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War.
First,
the biological arms race is an ofencedefence race , rather than a
competition between offensive means. Under the BWC, only defensive research is legitimate. But more
fundamentally, the driver of de facto offensive capabilities in this arms race is not primarily a particular
adversary, but rather the ongoing global advance of microbiological and biomedical research.
Defensive
measures are in a race with nefarious applicationsof basic research, much

of which is itself undertaken for protection against natural disease. In a sense, we are in an arms race with
ourselves. It is hard to see how this arms race is stable an offence granted comparable resources would
seem to be necessarily favoured. As with ballistic missile defence, particular defensive measures may be
defeated by offensive countermeasures.
measures will require
In the biological case, implementing defensive
not only
research
but drug development and distribution plans.
Offensive measures need not exercise this care, although fortunately they will likely face comparative resource
constraints (especially if not associated with a state programme), and may find that some approaches (for
example, to confer antibiotic resistance) have the simultaneous effect of inadvertently reducing a pathogens
virulence. The defence must always guard against committing the fallacy of the last move, whereas the
offence may embrace the view of the Irish Republican Army after it failed to assassinate the British cabinet in
the 1984 Brighton bombing: Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once you will
the defence will have to be vigilant and

collectively smarter than the offence. The only way for the defence to win convincingly in
the biological arms race would seem to be to succeed in discovering and
implementing certain de facto last-move defences, at least on an organism-by-organism
have to be lucky always.40 At the very least,
basis. Perhaps there are defences, or a web of defences, that will prove too difficult for any plausible non-state
such defences exist is unclear at this time, but their exploration

should be a long-term research goal of US biodefence efforts. Progress might also
actor to engineer around. Whether
have an important impact on international public health. One of the Grand Challenges identified by the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation in its $200m initiative to improve global health calls for the discovery of drugs
that minimise the emergence of drug resistance a kind of last move defence against the evolutionary
countermeasures of natural microbes.41
Should
a collection of such
defensive moves prove
possible, bioterrorism might
ultimately
succumb to a kind of globalised dissuasion
by denial :42 non-state groups would calculate that they could not hope to
achieve dramatic results through biological programmes and would choose to

direct their efforts elsewhere.
Extinction- engineered pathogens

Sandberg, 8 -- Oxford University Future of Humanity Institute research fellow
[Anders, PhD in computation neuroscience, and Milan Cirkovic, senior research
associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, "How can we reduce the risk
of human extinction?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9-9-2008,
thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction, accessed 8-13-14]
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from
natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of
nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a
global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater
risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make
it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics .

The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are
more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike
other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to
become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the
extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by
reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host

ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The
intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high
transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human

extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase
as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
Biotech K to Econ
US genomics innovation is key to competitiveness and
economic growth---its the industry of the future
Simon Tripp 12, researcher for Battelle Technology Partnership Practice, Battelle
is the worlds largest non-profit independent research and development
organization that assists local, state, and regional organizations, universities,
nonprofit technology organizations, and others in designing, implementing, and
assessing technology-based economic development programs, with Martin Grueber
and Deborah Cummings, The Economic and Functional Impacts of Genetic and
Genomic Clinical Laboratory Testing in the United States,
http://www.labresultsforlife.org/news/Battelle_Impact_Report.pdf
genomic testing can thus be seen to be at the heart of a new paradigm of
medicine that is evidence-based and rooted in quantitative science. It is facilitating a move
towards personalized, predictive and preventive medicine, and away from a more reactive medicine
Genetic and
that only responds to emergent symptoms, or provides general, one-size fits all therapies without an
understanding of the underlying individualized response that may occur (positively or negatively) to such a trial-
genomic testing makes possible what Leroy Hood at the Institute

has termed P4 medicinemedicine that is personalized, predictive,
preventive and participatory. The benefits of this approach to medicine are highlighted by Hood and
and-error approach. Genetic and
for Systems Biology
Galas as being able to:2 Detect disease at an earlier stage, when it is easier and less expensive to treat
effectively; Stratify patients into groups that enable the selection of optimal therapy; Reduce adverse drug
reactions by more effective early assessment of individual drug responses; Improve the selection of new
biochemical targets for drug discovery; Reduce the time, cost, and failure rate of clinical trials for new therapies;
and Shift the emphasis in medicine from reaction to prevention and from disease to wellness. It is clear that
genetic and genomic testing provides a new suite of quantitative test tools for diagnosing diseasetools that hold
promise for enhancing the accuracy of a diagnosis for symptomatic patients, predicting the risk of disease in
asymptomatic individuals, guiding safer therapeutic approaches, and preventing diseases from occurring in the
first place. Tests rooted in genetic and genomic advancements have emerged as accurate tools for diagnosing
monogenic and polygenic diseases and disorders, and as predictive tools for enhancing public health and personal
health decisions. Genetic and genomic testing is also able to characterize specific cancers, definitively identify
infectious organisms and organismal strains, and guide the prescription and dosing of appropriate therapeutic
approaches.
From an economic standpoint, genetics and genomics tests and
diagnostics development represent an expanding industry for the United States.

Built upon biomedical research programs, such as the Human Genome Project (HGP), and
subsequent genomics research and development (R&D), the U.S. is a global leader in this
advanced field of science and is home to many successful and growing companies
leveraging genetic and genomic advancements to produce new diagnostic tests and technologies. Likewise, the
growth of genetic and genomic testing is providing new job and economic
growth opportunities within clinical laboratories (both freestanding commercial laboratories
and within other laboratory settings, such as in hospitals).
The genetic and genomic clinical
laboratory testing industry is an R&D-driven, innovative sector that is important

to the U.S. economy not only for the economic benefits it generates , but also the
health care enhancements provided by the application of its testing products . Using
input/output analysis, Battelle has quantified both the direct economic impact of the U.S.
genetic and genomic clinical laboratory testing industry, and the total impact of the industry
generated in the economy via direct, indirect and induced economic impacts (also known as
multiplier-effect impacts)3 . As Table ES-1 illustrates, the results of the input/output analysis
show that while genetic and genomic testing is still in the relatively early stages of
its development, and much future growth is expected to occur, the genetic and genomic testing
industry is responsible for generating: More than 116,000 U.S. jobs; Nearly $6
billion in personal income for U.S. workers; $9.2 billion in value-added 4 activity; and
$16.5 billion in national economic output. In addition, state and local governments
across the U.S. receive an estimated $657 million in annual tax revenues allocable
to the genetic and genomic clinical laboratory testing industry, while the federal government
receives nearly $1.2 billion in related taxes annually. [Table ES-1: Economic Impacts of U.S.
Genetic and Genomic Clinical Laboratory Testing on the U.S. ($Millions)] The expenditure-based economic impacts,
while notable and substantial, represent only part of the overall beneficial impact of genetic and genomic testing.
As a result of the industrys focus, genetic and genomic testing is bringing new capabilities and enhanced accuracy
to the diagnosis of diseases and disorders in symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals. As the universe of
genetic and genomic tests grows, their ability to improve human health, longevity and quality of life is the primary
purpose of their development and deployment, and ultimately results in the industrys functional impacts on
society. Functional impacts, also known as forward linkage impacts, are the benefits generated by the industrys
products and services. In the case of the genetic and genomic clinical testing industry, the products and services
make possible multiple desirable societal benefits, both economic and non-economic: Providing a definitive,
accurate diagnosis of a disease or disorder, thereby helping to avoid misdiagnoses and the associated stress on
patients and healthcare spending on unnecessary or ineffective treatments. Detecting a disease or disorder at an
early stage, or even a pre-symptomatic stage, when it is easier and less expensive to treat effectively, thereby
saving healthcare costs and increasing labor force productivity. Providing information on disease susceptibility
associated with specific genes or genomic characteristics, thereby facilitating preventive measures and
appropriate life planning. Minimizing the impact of devastating childhood diseases through testing of potential
parents for carrier-status of genetic disorders. Directing the application and dosing of therapeutics most likely to
be safe and effective given the patients genotype, thereby avoiding adverse drug reactions and the healthcare
costs associated with treating them. Using genetic and genomic testing applications in occupational health
practices to determine the effects of worker exposure to hazardous agents, and to determine individual
hypersusceptibility to the diseases that exposure may cause. With the reference human genome sequence only
completed a decade ago, and the Human Genome Project unveiling a far more complex genetic structure than
previously thought, the development of commercially available genetic and genomic testing tools and techniques
is still in a relatively early stage. That said, in each of the bulleted categories of societal benefits shown above and
illustrated in Figure ES-1, genetic and genomic testing is being applied today to improve the care and prognosis of
patients. Furthermore, each area holds significant future promise for far more wide-ranging application and
subsequent benefits. [Figure ES-1: Functional Applications of Genetic and Genomic Clinical Laboratory testing] The
platform of knowledge and the technologies resulting from human genome sequencing have formed the basis of
nothing less than a medical revolution. The primary impacts of this revolution may not yet be felt in every daily
clinical practice, but that day is accelerating towards us. Writing in Nature, Eric Lander notes that: Medical
revolutions require many decades to achieve their full promise. Genomics has only just begun to permeate
biomedical research: advances must proceed through fundamental tools, basic discoveries, medical studies,
candidate interventions, clinical trials, regulatory approval and widespread adoption. We must be scrupulous not to
promise the public a pharmacopoeia of quick pay-offs. At the same time, we should remain unabashed about the
ultimate impact of genomic medicine, which will be to transform the health of our children and our childrens
children. 5
This medical revolution will in turn lead to significant global economic
opportunities. For these economic opportunities to be captured within the

United States, however, the genetic and genomic clinical testing industry needs
to be able to operate in a business environment that encourages continued R&D
investment and facilitates profitable business operations
reinvestment in the innovation cycle).
(generating profits for
Sustaining U.S. industrial leadership as the
innovative genetic and genomic clinical testing sector continues to grow and
prosper carries the promise of significant future economic and societal benefits.
Thats key to economic recovery and future growth

Michael D. Becker 9, President and Chief Executive Officer of MD Becker Partners
LLC, Janet L. Dally, Managing Director and Founder at MaidStone Life Sciences , LLC,
and Jeffrey Martini, Ph.D., Vice President, MD Becker Partners LLC, Healthcare
Reform vs Innovation and Growth? http://seekingalpha.com/article/166150healthcare-reform-vs-innovation-and-growth
The life sciences industry [herein includes pharmaceutical, biotechnology, diagnostic and medical device companies] plays a
critical role in the U.S. economy. Innovative new medicines developed by life sciences
companies
provide better patient outcomes, improved quality of care, increased life expectancy,
and lead to economic gains . Currently, the strengths [e.g. innovation, quality of care] and weaknesses [e.g. gaps in
it is
essential for all parties involved to place the importance of medical and scientific innovation at the
healthcare coverage, high costs and inefficiencies] of the U.S. healthcare system are the subject of great debate. During this period,
forefront of the conversation. New medicines should be viewed as investments in

the future , not only in patient health but also in economic recovery and growth . For example, in 2006,
University of Chicago economists Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel reported that
from 1970 to 2000, gains in life
expectancy added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth , with half of these gains
due to progress against heart disease alone [1]. Looking ahead, they estimated that
even modest progress against
major diseases would be extremely valuable . A permanent one percent reduction in mortality from cancer
alone has a present value to current and future generations of Americans of nearly $500 billion and a cure would be worth about $50 trillion.
Diseases Risk Extinction

So do zoonotic diseases no burnout because infectivity
precedes symptoms
Quammen 12 award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for Outside
magazine, writer for National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone, the New York
Times Book Review and others, 9/29
(David, Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?, The Guardian,
pg. 29, Lexis)
Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators
are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can
under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do

to wildebeests and zebras. But conditions aren't always ordinary . Just as predators have their
seem grisly and dreadful,
accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a
Aberrations occur . When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an
infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the
biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic. It 's a word of the
future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century . Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague. So was the sopathogen can shift to a new target.
called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are
monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of
zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from
other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now
these
passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between
other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with
Zoonotic pathogens
can hide. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk within what's called a
reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering
little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat?
their effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years.
To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes
diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came
from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser
effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid,
with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had
taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious
of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening
2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the
day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in
suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita,
arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength
and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested
again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a
journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had
visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He
agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes:
"You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a
small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the
situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and
out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their
families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than
1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death,
another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my
suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts
implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus
is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that
question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of
Sars, the scenario could have been very much worse.
Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people
died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of
the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were
If the virus had arrived in a different sort

of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions - it might have burned through a
instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto.
much larger segment of humanity. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body:
symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in
isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death
1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global pandemic occurred in the era before globalisation. Everything
nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. When the Next Big One comes, it will likely conform
to the same perverse pattern as the 1918 influenza: high infectivity
during the
preceding notable symptoms . That will help it move through cities

and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most
recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately,
not every virus goes airborne from one host to another. If HIV-1 could, you and I might
already be dead. If the rabies virus could, it would be the most horrific
pathogen on the planet. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne
transmission, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and
coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary
Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is

what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global
pandemic. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because
in 2003 to the people who understood it best.
avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009),
sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists
because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so
far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just
the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially
problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of
bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus
hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its
recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health
officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly
transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there in the world," Webster told me, "
there is the possibility of
disaster . . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the
history of mammals. No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like
the degree we do. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant. We are an
outbreak . And here's the thing about outbreaks: they end. In some cases they end after many years,
in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for
example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could
account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.
Parasitic volcanoes cause extinction -- no adaptation because

thats how they spread
Mehlhorn 11Professor of parasitology @ Dsseldorf University [Dr. Heinz
Mehlhorn (Former President of the Union of the German Biological Societies),
Parasites and Their World Records in Their Fight for Survival, Progress in
Parasitology, Parasitology Research Monographs Volume 2, 2011, pg. 41-68]
In their fight for survival
parasites depend absolutely on their ability to adapt
themselves to
the life cycle, behavior, food and physiology of peculiar hosts and on their capacity to create sophisticated ways of
evolution supported only the

winners and suppressed as losers all less well-adapted specimens . Therefore it is
not astonishing that these winners developed admirable skills that are listed as top
records in the scorebook of nature being often unbelievable when compared to the
host finding. Since all these tasks needed huge numbers of trials,
range of human skills.
However,
the fight for survival is never finally decided,
especially not for those parasites that may harm the health of humans and animals, since
humans science declared war on these beasts that may endanger human
survival
on earth.
We are not in round 11 out of 12 in the fight for survival nothing
has been decided, since vector-transmitted viruses lurk everywhere in a globalized

world. The sudden outbreak of the West Niles virosis in 2006 in the USA (transmitted by
mosquitos), the unexpected outbreak of Blue Tongue virosis in 2006 in in Central Europe (transmitted by
Ceratopogonid midges)
syndrome), bird
or the pandemics of the virus-based disease SARS (severe acute respiratory
flu and pig flu prove that we live
on very thin ice or
on a still silent
volcano . Pg. 41
Lack of antibiotic innovation causes extinction -- academic

responses via research are key
Davies 8Professor of Microbiology and Immunology @ University of British
Columbia [Dr. Julian Davies, Resistance redux: Infectious diseases, antibiotic
resistance and the future of mankind, The European Molecular Biology
Organization Report, Jul 2008; 9(Suppl 1): S18S21]
For many years,
antibiotic-resistant pathogens have been recognized as one of the
main threats to human survival , as some experts predict a return to the preantibiotic era . So far, national efforts to exert strict control over the use of antibiotics have had limited
it is not yet possible to achieve worldwide concerted action to reduce the
growing threat of multi-resistant pathogens: there are too many parties involved .
success and
Furthermore, the problem has not yet really arrived on the radar screen of many physicians and clinicians, as
antimicrobials still work most of the timeapart from the occasional news headline that yet another nasty superbug
has emerged in the local hospital. Legislating the use of antibiotics for non-therapeutic applications and curtailing
general public access to them is conceivable, but legislating the medical profession is an entirely different matter.
In order to meet the growing problem of antibiotic resistance among pathogens, the
discovery and development of new antibiotics
and alternative treatments
for
infectious diseases, together with tools for rapid diagnosis that will ensure effective and appropriate use of
existing antibiotics,
are imperative . How the health services, pharmaceutical industry and academia
respond in the coming years will determine the future of treating infectious
diseases. This challenge is not to be underestimated : microbes are formidable
adversaries and, despite our best efforts, continues to exact a toll on the human race . Pg.
S21
Research Checks Warming

Gene based research via biotech solve a host of environmental
threats including warming
Mtui 11
[Godliving Y. S. Mtui. Department of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, University of Dar es Salaam. International
Journal for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology Research Vol. 2(13), pp. 222-231, 30 December, 2011. ETB]
Climate change is a significant and lasting change in the statistical properties of

the climatic system when considered over long periods of time. It can be caused either by the
Earth's natural forces, which include solar radiation and continental drift, or human activities
(Theodore, 2001). Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural
and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within
the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earths surface, the atmosphere and clouds
(IPCC, 2007). Water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3) are
the primary greenhouse gases in the Earths atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely man-made
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine and bromine containing
substances. Beside CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol (http://kyotoprotocol.com) deals with the greenhouse
An
increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases leads to increased infrared
opacity of the atmosphere, an imbalance that can only be compensated for by an
increase in the temperature of the surface-troposphere system. This phenomenon
is termed the greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2007). Adaptation to climate change is a
response that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems to
climate change effects (IPCC, 2007). Another policy response to climate change is known as climate
change mitigation. It refers to human intervention to reduce the sources or decrease
intensity of negative climate change effects. Most often, climate change mitigation scenarios
gases such as sulphur hexafluoride (SF6),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
involve reductions in the concentrations of greenhouse
gases, either by reducing their sources or by increasing
Examples of mitigation measures include using fossil fuels more efficiently

for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching from biomass to
renewable energy, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forest and
other sinks to remove more carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007; Sallema
and Mtui, 2008). The decline of crops yield, heat stress and ocean acidification are
among some of the negative effects of climate change. In order to feed the ever
increasing world population, there is a need to double the rate of agricultural
production. Biotechnology can contribute positively by mitigating the impact of
climate change through green house gas reduction, crops adaptation and increase
in yield using less land (Treasury, 2009). This paper seeks to address the contribution of biotechnology
their sinks.
to adaptation and mitigation of negative climatic effects. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY Agricultural

biotechnology involves the practical application of biological organisms, or their sub-cellular components in
agriculture. The techniques currently in use include tissue culture, conventional breeding, molecular markerassisted breeding and genetic engineering. Tissue culture is the cultivation of plant cells or tissues on specifically
formulated nutrient media. Under optimal conditions, a whole plant can be regenerated from a single cell; a
rapid and essential tool for mass propagation and production of disease-free plants (Kumar and Naidu, 2006).
Advances in breeding help agriculture achieve higher yields and meet the needs
of expanding population with limited land and water resources. As a result of
improved plant breeding techniques, the productivity gains in worldwide
production of primary crops, including maize, wheat, rice and oilseed has increased by 21% percent
since 1995, while total land devoted to these crops has increased by only 2% (Treasury, 2009). In molecular
assisted breeding, molecular markers (identifiable DNA sequences found at specific location of the genome) are
By determining location and likely actions of genes, scientists can

quickly and accurately identify plants carrying desirable characteristics, hence
conventional breeding can be conducted with greater precision (Mneney et al., 2001;
Sharma et al., 2002). Molecular markers can be used in plant breeding to increase the
speed and efficiency of the introduction of new genes (marker assisted introgression),
understanding of genetic diversity, taxonomic relationships between plant species
and biological processes such as mating systems, pollen or disease dispersal
(Johanson and Ives, 2001). Biotechnology enables development of disease diagnostic kits
for use in laboratory and field. These kits are able to detect plant diseases early, by
being used.
testing for the presence of pathogens deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or proteins which are produced by
pathogens or plants during infection (Kumar and Naidu, 2006). Conventional agricultural biotechnologies works
better when combined with modern biotechnological approaches. Modern agricultural biotechnology refers to
biotechnological techniques for the manipulation of genetic material and the fusion of cells beyond normal
breeding barriers. The most obvious example is genetic engineering to create genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) through transgenic technology involving the insertion or deletion of genes. In genetic engineering or
genetic transformation, the genetic material is modified by artificial means. It involves isolation and cutting of a
gene at a precise location by using specific enzymes. Selected DNA fragments can then be transferred into the
cells of the target organism. The common practice in genetic engineering is the use of a bacterium
Agrobacterium tumafaciens as a vector to transfer the genetic trait (Johanson and Ives, 2001). A more recent
technology is ballistic impregnation method whereby a DNA is attached to a minute gold or tungsten particle and
Crops may be modified for improved flavour,

increased resistance to pests and diseases, or enhanced growth in adverse
weather conditions. In recent years, biosafety and genetic engineering projects have been initiated in
then fired into the plant tissue (Morris, 2011).
Africa, with the aim of introducing genetically modified organisms into Africas agricultural systems. Already,
countries like South Africa, Egypt and Burkina Faso have commercialized GMOs while many others have
developed the capacity to conduct research and development in modern agricultural biotechnology (Mayet,
2007). Green biotechnology is the term referring to the use of environmentally friendly solutions in agriculture,
horticulture, and animal breeding processes (Treasury, 2009). Recombinant DNA technology has significantly
augmented the conventional crop improvement, and has the potential to assist plant breeders to meet the
Dramatic progress has been made over the

past two decades in manipulating genes from diverse and exotic sources, and
inserting them into microorganisms and crops to confer resistance to pests and
diseases, tolerance to herbicides, drought, soil salinity and aluminium toxicity,
improve post-harvest quality, enhance nutrient uptake and nutritional quality;
increase photosynthetic rate, sugar and starch production, increase effectiveness
of bio control agents, improve understanding of gene action and metabolic
pathways, and production of drugs and vaccines in crops (Sharma et al., 2002 ; Vallad and
increased food demand predicted for the 21st century.
Goodman, 2004). BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION Greenhouse gas reduction
Agricultural practices such as deforestation, inorganic fertilizer use and

overgrazing currently account for about 25% of green house gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O)
emission (Treasury, 2009). Various initiatives under the banner of green biotechnology, may offer
solution to decrease green house gases and mitigate climate change by giving
farmers opportunities to use less and environmentally friendly energy, carbon
sequestration and reduce fertilizer usage (Treasury, 2009). Use of environmentally friendly fuels
Given the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity and the role played by agriculture practices in
global warming, agricultural techniques must play a crucial role in the fight against climate change. Production
of biofuels, both from traditional and GMO crops such as sugarcane, oilseed, rapeseed, and jatropha will help to
reduce the adverse effects of CO2 emission by the transport sector (Sarin et al., 2007; Treasury, 2009). Energy
efficient farming will therefore adopt machines that use bioethanol and biodiesel instead of the conventional
fossil fuels. Green energy programs through plantations of perennial non edible oil-seed producing plants will
help in cleansing the atmosphere and production of biodiesel for direct use in the energy sector, or in blending
biofuels with fossil fuels in certain proportions thereby minimizing use of fossil fuels to some extent (Lua et al.,
2009; Jain and Sharma, 2010; Lybbert and Summer, 2010) Less fuel consumptions Organic farming uses less fuel
by the application of compost and mulching techniques which reduce weeds and herbicides spraying due to less
ploughing (Maeder et al., 2002). Reduced irrigation would also contribute to reduced fuel usage, thereby
reducing the amount of CO2 release into the atmosphere. Using modern biotechnology such as GMOs and other
related technologies facilitate less fuel usage by decreasing necessity and frequency of spraying and reducing
tillage or excluding the tillage practice. For example, insect resistant GM crops reduce fuel usage and CO2
production by reducing insecticides application. Reduction of fuel usage due to the application of biotechnology
amounted to savings of about 962 million kg of CO2 emitted in 2005, while the adoption of reduced tillage or no
tillage practices led to a reduction of 40.43 kg/ha or 89.44 kg/ha CO2 emissions due to less fuel usage
respectively (Brookes and Barfoot, 2006, 2008). Carbon sequestration The capture or uptake of carbon
containing substances, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2), is often called carbon sequestration. It is commonly
used to describe any increase in soil organic carbon content caused by change of land management, with
increased soil carbon storage mitigates climate change (Powlson et al.,

2011). Therefore, soil carbon sequestration is an important strategy to mitigate the
increase of atmospheric CO2 concentration. Reducing the amount of conventional tillage is one
way of enhancing carbon sequestration. By leaving at least 30% of residue on the soil surface,
no-till agriculture reduces loss of CO2 from agricultural systems and may also play a role
implication that the
in reducing water loss through
evaporation, increase soil stability and creation of cooler
soil microclimate.
Conservation practices that help prevent soil erosion, may also sequester soil
carbon and enhance methane (CH4) consumption (West and Post, 2002; Johnsona et al., 2007).
Powlson et al. (2011) have suggested that the climate change benefit of increased soil organic carbon from
enhanced crop growth (for example using industrial fertilizers) must be balanced against greenhouse gas
emissions emanating from the manufacture and use of such fertilizers. In modern agricultural practices,
genetically modified Round up Ready TM (herbicide resistant) soybean technology has accounted for up to 95%
of no-till area in the United States of America (USA) and Argentina, and led to sequestration of 63,859 million
tones of CO2 (Fawcett and Towery, 2003; Brimner et al., 2004; Kleter et al., 2008). The modified crops reduce the
need for tillage or ploughing to allow farmers to adopt no till farming practices. In terms of climate change
mitigation, this practice enhances soil quality and retails more carbon in the soil (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008).
The dependency on agricultural chemicals to sustain

productivity in marginal landscapes has led to a global scale contamination of the
environment with toxins that change the course of biogeochemical cycles
Reduced artificial fertilizer use
(Ogunseitan, 2003). Reduced fertilizer use also means
less nitrogen pollution of ground and surface waters.
Artificial inorganic nitrogenous fertilizers such as ammonium sulphate, ammonium chloride,

ammonium phosphates, sodium nitrate and calcium nitrate are responsible for the formation and
release of greenhouse gases (particularly N2O) from the soil to the atmosphere when
they interact with common soil bacteria (Brookes and Barfoot, 2009). To reduce the negative
effects of artificial fertilizers, the use of environmentally friendly biotechnology-based
fertilizes are being encouraged. Biofertilizers Organic farming technologies utilizing bio-based
fertilizers (composted humus and animal manure), or crop rotation and intercropping with leguminous plants
with nitrogen-fixing abilities are some of the conventional biotechnological options for reducing artificial fertilizer
In modern biotechnology, the use of mutation or genetic engineering

techniques to improve Rhizobium inoculants have resulted to strains with improved
nitrogen-fixing characteristics (Zahran, 2001). Biotechnological advances involving the induction of
use.
nodular structures on the roots of cereal crops such as rice and wheat offer a bright prospect of non-leguminous
plants being enabled to fix nitrogen in the soil (Kennedy and Tchan, 1992; Paau, 2002; Saikia and Jain, 2007; Yan
et al., 2008). Another option is the cultivation of GM crops that use nitrogen more efficiently. An example of such
crops is the nitrogen-efficient GM canola which not only reduces the amount of nitrogen fertilizer that is lost into
the atmosphere or leached into soil and waterways, but it also impacts positively on the economies of farmers
Managing soil nitrogen to match crop needs can

reduce N2O emission and avoid adverse impacts on water quality. Also, manipulating
through improved profitability (Treasury, 2009).
animal diet and manure management
can reduce CH4 and N2O emission from animal
husbandry (Johnsona et
Climate change leads in reduced crop yield

due to inadequate rainfall, emergence of potential weeds, pests and diseases
caused by fungi, bacteria and viruses (Johnsona et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2008). One way of
adapting to such calamities is to apply agricultural biotechnologies that counter the
effects of such changes by improving crop productivities per unit area of land
al., 2007). BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR CROP ADAPTATION
cultivated. Biotechnology for increased yield per unit area of land To satisfy the growing worldwide demand
for food crops, two options are available: Either to increase the area under production, or improve productivity
on existing farmland (Edgerton, 2009). Given the worlds available arable land, and the climate change
dynamics, the second option is more feasible. Utilizing organic residues as a source of nutrients for plants, good
agronomical practices such as landscape management, crop rotation or mixed farming, and use of traditional
and indigenous knowledge on non-chemical pests and diseases control are some of conventional options
Biotechnology and application of advanced techniques in

breeding can help agriculture further to achieve higher yields and meet needs of
expanding population with limited land and water resources (Treasury, 2009). Adaptation
to biotic stresses The major aim of agricultural biotechnology is to enhance
productivity and maximize productive capacity of diminishing resources. Conventional
(Bianchi et al., 2006).
landscape management practices and breeding initiatives have contributed significantly to crop adaptations
through the development of strains that are resistant to biotic stresses such as insects, fungi, bacteria and
In modern biotechnology, the ability of

a soil bacterium (Baccilus thuringiensis, Bt) gene to be transformed into maize, cotton
and other crops to impart internal protection against insects (mainly of the order
lepidoptera and diptera) significantly contributes to agricultural pest control strategies.
viruses (Valllad and
Goodman, 2004; Bianchi et al., 2006).
For many farmers, Bt crops are proving to be valuable tools for integrated pest management programs by giving
farmers new pest control choices (Zhe and Mithcell, 2011). Transgenic canola (oil seed rape) and soybean have
been modified to be resistant to specific herbicides (May et al., 2005; Bonny, 2008). Also, GM cassava, potatoes,
bananas and other crops that are resistant to fungi, bacteria and viruses are in development; some have already
been commercialised while others are undergoing field trials (Mneney, 2001; Van Camp, 2005). Studies carried
out between 2002 and 2005 found out that biotic stress resistant GM crops account for increases in average yield
of 11 to 12% for canola and maize compared to conventional crops (Qaim and Zilberman, 2003; Gomez Barbero
Adaptation to abiotic stresses Climate change

poses an enormous challenge in terms of available agricultural land and fresh
water use. Abiotic stresses including salinity, drought, extreme temperatures,
chemical toxicity and oxidative stress have negative impacts on agriculture and
natural status of the environment. The agricultural sector uses about 70% of the available fresh
et al., 2008; Brookes and Barfoot, 2008, 2009).
water and this is likely to increase as temperature rises (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008). Moreover, about 25 million
acres of land is lost each year due to salinity caused by unsustainable irrigation techniques (Ruane et al., 2008). It
is anticipated that increased salinity of arable land will lead to 30% land loss within 25 years and up to 50% by
the year 2050 (Wang et al., 2003; Valliyodan et al., 2006). Therefore, solutions to facilitate crop adaptation to
abiotic stressful conditions (drought and salinity) need to be developed. Plant biotechnology programs should
breeding for drought and salinity tolerance in crops and forests. Conventional
approaches to mitigate the effects of drought and salinity stresses involve
selection and growing drought resistant crops that can tolerate harsh conditions
on marginal lands. Such crops include cassava, millet and sunflower (Manavalan et al., 2009). While
give priority to the
mulching to prevent surface water loss has been a common practice for organic farmers; tissue culture and
breeding are being used to cross drought tolerant crops with other high yielding species to create a drought
tolerant, high yielding hybrids (Apse and Blumwald, 2002; Ruane et al., 2008). However, although adaptation to
stress under natural conditions has some ecological advantages, the metabolic and energy costs may
blending traditional and molecular breeding

techniques would be most desirable (Wang et al, 2001; Apse and Blumwald, 2002). Molecular
control mechanisms for abiotic stress tolerance are based on activation and
regulation of specific stress-related genes. Transgenic plants are engineered based on different
overshadow its benefit to agriculture. Therefore,
stress mechanisms: metabolism, regulatory controls, ion transport, antioxidants and detoxification, late
embryogenesis abundance, heat shock processes and heat proteins (Wang et al., 2001, 2003). It has been
reported by Zhu (2001) that salt tolerant plants also often tolerate other stresses including chilling, freezing heat
and drought. Already, a number of abiotic stress tolerant, high performance GM crop plants have been
developed. These include tobacco (Hong et al., 2000); Arabinopsis thaliana and Brasicca napus (Jaglo et al.,
2001); Tomato (Hsieh et al., 2002; Zhang and Blumwald, 2002); rice (Yamanouchi et al., 2002); maize, cotton,
wheat and oilseed rape (Yamaguchi and Blumwals, 2005; Brookes and Barfoot, 2006). Plants may also be
engineered to reduce the levels of poly (ADP ribose) polymerise, a key stress related enzyme, resulting in plants
that are able to survive drought compared to their non-GM counterparts. Field trial results have shown a 44%
increase in yield in favour of such GM crop plants (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008). Another technology involving the
use of genetic switches (transcription factors and stress genes) from microbial sources is currently under
research by the United Kingdom (UK) Agricultural Biotechnology Council (ABC; http://www.abcinformation.org).
This technology has been tested and resulted in two-fold increase in productivity for Arabidopsis and 30% yield
increase for maize during severe water stress. It has been suggested that comprehensive breeding plan for
abiotic stress should include conventional breeding and germplasm selection, elucidation of specific molecular
control mechanisms in tolerant and sensitive genotypes, biotechnology-oriented improvement of selection and
breeding procedures (functional analysis, marker probes and transformation with specific genes) and
improvement and adaptation of current agricultural practices (Wang et al., 2003). With the availability of whole
genome sequences of plants, physical maps, genetics and functional genomics tools, integrated approaches
using molecular breeding and genetic engineering offer new opportunities for improving stress resistance
et al., 2009). Agroecology and agroforestry Consequences of global climate
change responsible for altering patterns of temperature and precipitation are
threatening agriculture in many tropical regions . Agroecological and agroforest
management systems, such as shade management in crop systems, may
mitigate the effects of extreme temperature and precipitation, thereby reducing
the ecological and economic vulnerability of many rural farmers, and improving
the agroecological resistance to extreme climate events (Lin et al., 2008). Fungal
(Manavalan
applications in biotechnology, termed mycobiotechnology, are part of a larger trend toward using living systems
to solve environmental problems and restore degraded ecosystems. The sciences of mycoforestry and
mycorestoration are part of an emerging field of research and application for regeneration of degraded forest
Mycorestoration attempts to use fungi to help repair

or restore ecologically harmed habitats. Whether the habitats have been damaged from human
ecosystems (Cheung and Chang, 2009).
activities or natural disasters, saprophytic and mycorrhizal fungi can help steer the course to recovery. A number
of non-legume woody plants such as casuarinas (Casuartna sp.) and alders (Alnus sp.) can fix nitrogen
symbiotically with actinomycete bacteria (Frankia sp.), a phenomenon that is beneficial to forestry and
agroforesty (Franche et al., 1998). Both endo- and ectomycorrhizal symbiotic fungi together with actinomycetes
have been used as inoculants in regeneration of degraded forests (Saikia and Jain, 2007). Therefore, both
mycorrhizal fungi and actinorhizal bacteria technologies can be applied with the aim of increasing soil fertility
Afforestation would indirectly

contribute to improved agricultural productivity and food security because forests
create microclimates that improve rainfall availability. Furthermore, forests act as
carbon sinks thereby contributing towards sequestration and concomitant
greenhouse reduction effects for climate change mitigation. Consequently, forestry
and agroforestry offer the potential to develop synergies between efforts to
mitigate climate change and efforts to help vulnerable populations to adapt to
negative consequences of climate change (Verchot et al., 2007). The conventional and modern
and improving water uptake
biotechnological initiatives
related to climate change adaptation and mitigation are
by plants (Ruane et al., 2008).
summarized in Tables 1 and
the world population is expected to reach 8

billion people by 2028, the demand for food is also expected to increase by 55%.
2. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES As
Moreover, out of worlds total land area of 13 billion hectares (ha), only 12% is cultivated. In the next 30 years,
developing countries will need an additional 120 million hecters for crops (Ruane et al., 2008). Therefore,
science and technology should take a lead in spearheading increased agricultural

productivity. If we want to feed the world without destroying our resources,
science and technology should drive the development of modern agriculture.
Genetically modified
crop varieties are the most cost effective ways to sustain
production (Treasury, 2009).
farming in marginal areas and
Efforts should be made to integrate local

and conventional biotechnologies with modern biotechnology strategies within
national policies and legal frameworks in order to increase resilience of local crop
varieties against changes in environmental dynamics (Stinger et al., 2009). Despite the
availability of promising research results, many applications of biotechnology have not met
their full potential to deliver practical solutions to end-users in developing countries (Ruane et
al., 2008). The challenges for the bioenergy sector are concerns about imminent land, water, food
restore degraded lands to
and feed conflicts as a result of introduction of large scale plantations of energy

crops in limited arable land (Rubin, 2008; Mtui, 2009). In the area of increased soil fertility
using biofertilizers, nitrogen fixation research is moving towards genomic studies whereby complete sequences
of nitrogen-fixing bacteria are being elucidated (Yan et al., 2008). In forest biotechnology, there is a poor
understanding of forest genomics and complex ecosystem processes at landscape scales. It is argued that
genomic approaches for monitoring soil microbial communities could become an important tool in understanding
the effects of biomass removal for biofuels, or enhancing durable below-ground carbon sequestration (Groover,
2007). Modern biotechnology has encountered enormous public debates related to risks and benefits of the
GMOs technology in terms of health, environment, socio economic and ethical issues (Bakshi, 2003). The attitudes
and interests of various stakeholder groups supporting or opposing modern biotechnology have led to polarized
opinions (Bruinsma et al., 2003; Aerni 2005). There have been opponent activists who dispute the safety of the
technology, citing possible risks including: creation of more rigorous pests and pathogens, exacerbating the
effects of existing pests, harm to non target species, disruption of biotic communities and loss of species and
genetic diversity within species (Snow et al., 2005). Political, socio-economic, cultural and ethical concerns about
modern biotechnology are related to the fear of technological neo-colonialism in developing countries,
intellectual property rights, land ownership, customer choices, negative cultural and religious perceptions, and
fear of the unknown (Brink et al., 1998, Makinde et al., 2009). Such public concerns have led to over-regulation
of the technology, which threatens to retard its applications (Qaim, 2009). It is suggested that the effects of
GMOs should be studied case-by-case, incorporating assessment of potential plant/ecosystem interactions,
accessible and relevant indicators and tests for unforeseen effects (Bruinsma et al., 2003). In order to overcome
the challenges currently encountered in development and application of modern biotechnology, governments
ought to put in place appropriate biosafety and biotechnology policies and legal frameworks before adopting
such technologies (Stringer et al., 2009). Table 3 summarizes major challenges to climate change and
CONCLUSION This review shows that safe
development and application of plant biotechnology can contribute positively
towards climate change adaptation and mitigation through reduction of CO2
emissions, carbon sequestration, reduced fuel use, adoption of environmentally friendly fuels, and
agricultural biotechnology, and some proposed solutions.
reduced artificial fertilizer use, employing biofuels for improved soil fertility and crop adaptability.
measures are meant to improve agricultural productivity and food security, and at the same time
These
protecting our
There is consensus among scientific

community that climate variability is a result of direct and indirect anthropogenic
activities. An integrated approach to safe applications of both conventional and
modern agricultural biotechnologies will not only contribute to increased yield
and food security, but it will also significantly contribute to climate change
adaptation and mitigation initiatives.
environment from adverse effects of climate change.
Warming causes extinction- only genetic biotechnology

applications solve adaptation and global disease pandemics
Baum and Wilson 13 (Seth D. Baum* and Grant S. Wilson Global Catastrophic Risk
Institute * The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering Ethics in
Biology, Engineering and Medicine, 4(1):59-72 (2013). Pg lexis)
Note: GCR: Global Catastrophic Risk
In addition to itself being a GCR, bioengineering can also reduce the chances that other
GCRs will occur . One such GCR is climate change. Catastrophic climate change scenarios
could involve sea level rise of up to 10 meters, droughts, increased extreme weather events,
loss of most threatened and endangered species, and temperature increases of 6 degrees
Celsius.37 Still worse than that would be outcomes in which large portions of the land surface
on Earth become too warm for mammals (including humans) to survive .38 And the worst
scenario could involve climate engineering backfiring to result in extremely rapid temperature
increase.39 6 Despite the risks of climate change, the international community has struggled to
satisfactorily address the issue, for a variety of political, technological, and economical reasons.
Bioengineering may be able to help . An army of bioengineered algae that is specifically
designed to convert carbon dioxide into a biocrude fuel ready to be made into fuel for
any vehicle type a technology that Craig Venters Synthetic Genomics, Inc. is developing
with a $600 million investment from ExxonMobil could remove greenhouse gases from
the atmosphere and provide a plentiful, carbon-neutral fuel source that does not pose
many of the downsides of todays biofuel options (although this technology has its own risks).40
Or, despite being a bizarre proposition , humans could be genetically engineered to reduce
our CO2 output, such as by engineering humans to be intolerant to meat or to be
smaller in size. 41 Likewise, while a deadly bioengineered virus has the potential to
escape from a lab oratory and cause a global catastrophe , such research may be
necessary to create vaccines for viruses that could cause worldwide pandemics . For
example, the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 (the Spanish flu) killed about 50 million people
worldwide.42 Would modern bioengineering technology have been able to avoid this global
catastrophe ? In fact, researchers justified the airborne H5N1 virus, discussed above, as
helping to prevent the spread of a similar strain that could mutate naturally. Overall, there is a
dynamic relationship between bioengineering and other GCRs that should be assessed when
considering how to respond to these risks.
Genetics key to food

Genetic research key to biotech agriculture- solves food
instability
Zilberman 14 (David Zilberman is a professor and holds the Robinson Chair in the
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at UC Berkeley. He is also a member of
the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics. The research leading to this paper was
supported by the Energy Biosciences Institute and Cotton, Inc. The author thanks Scott Kaplan,
Eunice Kim, and Angela Erickson for their assistance. The Economics of Sustainable
Development http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/2/385.short)
The major applications of the new bioeconomy considered here include genetic modification,
biofuels, and green chemistry. Genetic modification has had a large range of applications in
medicine and is a foundation of the fast-growing medical biotechnology industry (Lebkowski et
al. 2001). Agricultural biotechnology has also grown rapidly. However, the use of genetically
modified crops (GMOs) is a subject of restrictive regulation, and their utilization has been limited
to four major crops (corn, soybeans, cotton, and rapeseed). Furthermore, the United States,
Brazil, and Argentina are the major users of GM technology in these four crops, and China and
India have adopted GM cotton. In spite of its limited use, GM technology already provides
major benefits by increasing the estimated supply of corn and soybeans by 13% and 20%,
respectively, and reducing their estimated prices by 20% and 30%, respectively (Barrows,
Sexton, and Zilberman 2013). The adoption of GM varieties in Europe and Africa, and the
expansion of its use to major food crops like wheat and rice, is likely to significantly reduce
the food price inflation seen in recent years (Sexton and Zilberman 2011). Some of the key
elements of the new bioeconomy are listed below, and include genetic modification, and biofuels
and developments in green chemistry. Genetic modification: Genetic modification of crops
is a major contributor to sustainable development . Existing GM varieties significantly
reduce crop damage (Qaim and Zilberman 2003), greenhouse gas emissions , and the
footprint of agriculture (Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman 2013). Today GMOs are in their
infancy, but they provide new and more precise means to improve crops and adapt to
changing conditions. New innovations instituted at various stages of developments are likely to
increase the input use efficiency of water and fertilizers in crop production and of grains as
sources of animal feed. The development and adoption of these innovations has stalled
because of regulations (Bennett et al. 2013). Nonetheless, GMOs improve the speed of
development or modification of crop varieties and thus can provide a means of adapting to
climate change (Zilberman, Zhao, and Heiman 2012). Biofuels: For millennia, wood, dung, and
oils supplied energy for cooking, heating, and other functions. Here we refer to the agricultural
(broadly defined) production of feedstocks and their industrial processing for modern
applications. Examples include the production of ethanol, biodiesel, and wood chips to replace
fossil fuels. The production of biofuels for transport fuel was motivated by the high price of oil
and other fuels, balance of trade considerations, and concerns about climate change (Rajagopal
and Zilberman 2007). However, direct and indirect effects on food prices (Zilberman et al. 2013)
and the environment (greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation (Khanna and Crago 2012)
raised questions about biofuels. Yet liquid fuels have relative advantages in major applications
and are most likely to be produced sustainably through biofuels. Learning by doing in sugarcane
and corn biofuels production has improved their environmental and economic performance
(Khanna and Crago 2012). Research on second and third generation biofuels is promising, and
several will be produced on nonagricultural lands in the foreseeable future (Youngs and
Somerville 2012). The evolution of biofuels is dependent on policy, and the emergence of clean
and efficient biofuels is more likely to be followed by continued investment in research and
appropriate pricing of carbon (Chen and Khanna 2013). The future of biofuels is also
affected by the future of GMOs . Policy changes that will enable the introduction and largescale adoption of GMO rice and wheat varieties, which will increase rice and wheat yields by
more than 10%, and the adoption of GM traits in Africa and Europe may reduce food
commodity prices and free up lands that will allow the adoption of sugarcane for biofuel in
India and other developing countries. Greater acceptance of transgenic technology is likely to
increase its utilization in biofuel feedstock production and improve the productivity of sugarcane,
grasses, and trees considered for the production of second-generation biofuels. The design
of biofuel policy and the interaction of biofuels and biotechnology policies are subjects for future
research. Green chemistry (broadly defined): Green chemistry represents a transition from
petroleum-based chemicals to biomass-based chemicals (Clark, Luque, and Matharu 2012).
Green chemistry emphasizes a reduction in the toxicity of outputs, recycling, energy efficiency,
and production of decomposable products with minimal waste. Its principles of operation are
consistent with some of the concepts associated with sustainable development elucidated
above. The reliance on biomass suggests that the transition to green chemistry will lead to a
more spatially distributed network of bio-refineries instead of the highly centralized refinery
systems in place today, suggesting that the transition to green chemistry will be an engine for
regional development. Increased reliance on plant and animal feedstocks will enhance
investment in bio-prospecting in order to discover new feedstocks and valuable chemicals.
Research to develop advanced biotechnology methods and products will be crucial to
the development of the bioeconomy . For example, one of the impediments to using many
crops as feedstocks is their high lignin content, and the development of varieties with lower
lignin content will reduce the cost and increase the range of products that can serve as
feedstock for fuel and other applications.
Extinction inevitable- try or die for sustainable GM food

production
Trewavas 00 [Anthony, Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology University of Edinburgh, GM Is
the Best Option We Have, AgBioWorld, 6-5, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotechinfo/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html]
But these are foreign examples; global warming is the problem that requires the UK to develop
GM technology. 1998 was the warmest year in the last one thousand years. Many think global
warming will simply lead to a wetter climate and be benign. I do not. Excess rainfall in northern
seas has been predicted to halt the Gulf Stream. In this situation, average UK temperatures
would fall by 5 degrees centigrade and give us Moscow-like winters. There are already worrying
signs of salinity changes in the deep oceans. Agriculture would be seriously damaged and
necessitate the rapid development of new crop varieties to secure our food supply. We would
not have much warning. Recent detailed analyses of arctic ice cores has shown that the climate
can switch between stable states in fractions of a decade. Even if the climate is only wetter and
warmer new crop pests and rampant disease will be the consequence. GM technology can
enable new crops to be constructed in months and to be in the fields within a few years. This is
the unique benefit GM offers. The UK populace needs to much more positive about GM or we
may pay a very heavy price. In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the
force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the
sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and
elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a
rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and
human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign
nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we
make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that
could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our
climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is
tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our
civilisation. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance
at survival. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking
accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation.
Global food insecurity causes global war

Vidal 12 (John Vidal, UN University, Guardian's Environment Editor, Food scarcity: the
timebomb setting nation against nation, http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/food-scarcity-the-timebombsetting-nation-against-nation/, October 15, 2012)
Brandon Hunnicutt has had a year to remember. The young Nebraskan from Hamilton County farms 2,600 acres of the High Plains
with his father and brother. What looked certain in an almost perfect May to be a phenomenal harvest of maize and soy beans has
turned into a near disaster. A three-month heatwave and drought with temperatures often well over 38C burned up his crops. He
lost a third and was saved only by pumping irrigation water from the aquifer below his farm. From 1 July to 1 October we had 4
inches of rain (10 centimeters) and long stretches when we didnt have any. Folk in the east had nothing at all. Theyve been
significantly hurt. We are left wondering whether the same will happen again, he says. On the other side of the world, Mary Banda,
who lives in Mphaka village near Nambuma in Malawi, has had a year during which she has barely been able to feed her children,
one of whom has just gone to hospital with malnutrition. Government health worker Patrick Kamzitu says: We are seeing more
hunger among children. The price of maize has doubled in the last year. Families used to have one or two meals a day; now they
are finding it hard to have one. Hunnicutt and Banda are linked by food. What she must pay for her maize is determined largely by
how much farmers such as Brandon grow and export. This year the US maize harvest is down 15% and nearly 40% of what is left
has gone to make vehicle fuel. The result is less food than usual on to the international market, high prices and people around the
world suffering. This situation is not going to go away, says Lester Brown, an environmental analyst and president
of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington. In a new book, Full Planet, Empty Plates, he predicts ever increasing food prices, leading
to political instability, spreading hunger and, unless governments act, a catastrophic breakdown in food. Food
is the new oil

and land is the new gold, he says. We saw early signs of the food system unravelling in 2008
following an abrupt doubling of world grain prices. As they climbed, exporting countries [such as
Russia] began restricting exports to keep their domestic prices down. In response, importing
countries panicked and turned to buying or leasing land in other countries to produce food for
themselves. The result is that a new geopolitics of food has emerged, where the
competition for land and water is intensifying and each country is fending for itself .
Brown has
been backed by an Oxfam report released last week. It calculated that the land sold or leased to richer countries and speculators in
the last decade could have grown enough food to feed a billion people almost exactly the number of malnourished people in the
world today. Nearly 60% of global land deals in the last decade have been to grow crops that can be used for biofuels, says Oxfam.
The next danger signal, says Brown, is in rising food prices. In the last 10 years prices have
doubled as demand for food has increased with a rapidly growing world population and millions
have switched to animal-based diets, which require more grain and land. Most grain prices have risen
between 10% and 25% this year after droughts and heatwaves in Ukraine and Australia as well as the US and other food growing
centres. The UN says prices are now close to the crisis levels of 2008. Meat and dairy prices are likely to surge in the new year as
farmers find it expensive to feed cattle and poultry. Brown says: Those who live in the United States, where 9% of income goes for
food, are insulated from these price shifts. But how do those who live on the lower rungs of the global economic ladder cope? They
were already spending 50% to 70% of their income on food. Many were down to one meal a day already before the recent price
rises. What happens with the next price surge? Oxfam said last week it expected the price of key food staples, including wheat and
rice, to double again in the next 20 years, threatening disastrous consequences for the poor. But the surest sign, says Brown, that
food supplies are precarious is seen in the amount of surplus food that countries hold in reserve, or carry over from one year to the
next. Ever since agriculture began, carry-over stocks of grain have been the most basic indicator of food security. From 1986 to
2001 the annual world carry-over stocks of grain averaged 107 days of consumption. After that, world consumption exceeded
production and from 2002 to 2011 they averaged just 74 days of consumption, says Brown. Last week the UN estimated US maize
reserves to be at a historic low, only 6.3% below estimated consumption and the equivalent of a three-week supply. Global carry-
Although there is still

theoretically enough food for everyone to eat, global supplies have fallen this year by 2.6%
with grains such as wheat declining 5.2% and only rice holding level, says the UN. There is no
guarantee, says Brown, that the world can continue to increase production as it has done for
many years. Yields are plateauing in many countries and new better seeds have failed to
increase yields very much for some years, he said. Evan Fraser, author of Empires of Food and a geography
over reserves last week stood at 20%, compared to long term averages of well above 30%.
lecturer at Guelph University in Ontario, Canada, says: For six of the last 11 years the world has consumed more food than it has
grown. We do not have any buffer and are running down reserves. Our stocks are very low and if we have a dry winter and a poor
Even if things do not boil over this year, by next

summer well have used up this buffer and consumers in the poorer parts of the world will once
rice harvest we could see a major food crisis across the board.
again be exposed to the effects of anything that hurts production.
Brown says:
An
unprecedented period of world food security has come to an end. The world has lost its
safety cushions and is living from year to year. This is the new politics of food scarcity. We are
moving into a new food era, one in which it is every country for itself.
Privacy Adv
Low stringency investigations violate privacy the person is
already cleared
Acc. 6-29-2015)
Next, Williams and Johnson posit that the police intervention with the "offender," particularly an
offender never convicted of a criminal offense, may invade that person's privacy
rights: Such individuals will have to be approached by the police to name relatives
whose own profiles are not on the NDNAD [National DNA Database]. It may well be
claimed that this constitutes a disproportionate interference with their privacy rights
under the European Convention. Even if the approach itself is licensed by their lessened right
to privacy, which has resulted from their previous criminal arrest, a question is
raised regarding their obligation to help the police with their inquiries in a case
where their own DNA profile has already exonerated them from direct involvement .
n34 Being compelled to assist the criminal justice system, in this or any other way, may be annoying, but is
common. The argument that the police inappropriately invade a person's privacy by asking, without any obligation,
Whether cooperation with the police in such circumstances

should be considered truly "voluntary" might be doubted . (Of course, if one were concerned
about his relatives, is very weak.
about the inconvenience or irritation to the "offender," one could minimize the intrusions by collecting information
about relatives only once and storing it for future use.)
Privacy is afected by DNA collection

Duncan Carling, 2008 J.D. Candidate @ Univ of California, Hastings
College of the Law
31 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 487 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015) //RH
Privacy is implicated by DNA evidence in several ways. First, there is the concern
over the vast amount of information that DNA contains about a person. DNA may
function in some ways like a fingerprint, but of course it is much more than that.
Precisely what a person's DNA reveals about him is debated, but it certainly
includes genetic defects, predisposition to disease and possibly the propensity to engage in certain
behavior. n91 Proponents of DNA databases point out that the current profiling systems do
no use any of that information. Systems like CODIS only include numbers
generated from alleles in "junk DNA," pieces of the genome that are useful for
identification but nothing else. Some privacy advocates are not assuaged by that
response. They point to research that indicates this so-called "junk" DNA may in
fact contain useful genetic information. n92 Furthermore, the state and federal laws
that authorize the collection of DNA generally do not require that tissue samples be
destroyed after the numerical profile is created . n93 The state is often keeping a
complete genetic sample of [*501] these people, even if it is not using it. But
current law enforcement methods of DNA comparison and investigation do not
involve any of this genetic information. DNA collection statutes in both the United
States and United Kingdom only allow investigators to look at numeric
representations of the markers for the sole purpose of solving crimes. So the
question of what other information may be available in a tissue sample, or in "junk"
regions of the genome is largely irrelevant. Regardless of how well genetic privacy is being
maintained today, another common concern is how the government might use this genetic information in the
future. In March of 2000, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held hearings regarding CODIS and the use
Barry Steinhardt, who is the Director of the

Technology and Liberty Program at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
of DNA databases in criminal investigations.
testified on behalf of the ACLU and described one of the organization's concerns
about DNA database programs: "While a DNA data bank for criminal identification
purposes may have legitimate uses, I am skeptical that we can hold the line and
ward off the temptation to expand its use to non-forensic purposes ." n94 Steinhardt
pointed the Subcommittee to two previous examples of what he called "function
creep" in other government database programs. One was social security numbers,
which the government stated in the 1930s would only be used to facilitate a new
retirement program, and the other was census records, which were used during
World War II to round up Japanese Americans for internment camps, despite their
original, benign, statistical purpose. n95 It should be noted that most of these privacy concerns
involve future, hypothetical scenarios. In their current implementations, DNA database programs do not reveal
anything about the subjects other than their gender. Proponents of these databases argue that DNA is a uniquely
powerful investigative tool, which should not be underutilized because of theoretical concerns about possible future
use or misuse. As their current use is permitted narrowly by statute, [*502] any new use would have to be
legislated as well.
The government collects DNA from crime victims, felons,

arrestees, and military personnel.
The government is now collecting DNA from an increasingly large number of people. DNA is taken from
convicted felons in nearly every state, n25 people arrested for certain offenses in twenty-one
states, n26 crime victims, and military personnel n27 to test for identification purposes.
In addition to testing for identity, DNA can be taken from suspects of crimes to test
for other purposes, like paternity. Blood samples containing DNA are also taken from newborn babies n28 to
test for treatable genetic diseases. This testing requires taking a small amount of blood by pricking the newborn's
heel and collecting the blood on paper cards, which, in most states, are destroyed after testing. Newborns who have
some detectable disorders, such as phenylketonuria, can be treated to prevent or mitigate the disorder. n29
DNA Violations are worse

DNA privacy violations are the most intimate
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Moreover, courts have held that CODIS is not designed for intentional familial searches and that local DNA
In United States v. Mitchell, the court relied on expert

opinions that expressed familial searches would not produce [*690] useful information.
n320 If courts have expressed skepticism about familial search practices, it would not
be farfetched for individuals to feel the same. At the very least, individuals may feel
personally violated as the most intimate aspect of their being - their genetic
makeup - is exposed against their will.
databases are modeled after CODIS.
Privacy of genetic information is important

Disproportionate DNA sampling of racial minorities allows the government
disproportionate access to personal information of those individuals . n146 This
personal information may be used to discriminate against those particular
individuals, for example, in education, n147 employment, or the provision of insurance .
n148 Proponents of DNA sampling of arrestees argue that the benefit to law enforcement and victims of crime
outweighs the slight privacy intrusion of taking DNA samples from arrestees. n149 However, privacy, particularly
privacy surrounding genetic information, is more important than those proponents

acknowledge for two reasons. First, privacy has been deemed an important
American value that should be protected under the law . n150 United States citizens
place value "on individual privacy, sometimes referred to as 'the right to be left alone' and the
right to be free of outside intrusion, not as an end in itself, but as a means of
enhancing individual freedom." n151 [*174] Second, privacy surrounding genetic
information is particularly important due to the potentially "sensitive, personal and
intimate . . . character of such information ." n152 The invasion of privacy goes beyond the mere
intrusion into an arrestee's mouth to take a DNA sample. The seizure of DNA information is
"extraordinary in both its nature and scope" due to the amount of private personal
data contained within DNA: n153 The DNA samples that are being held by federal, state, and local
governments can provide insights into the most personal family relationships and the most intimate workings of the
human body, including the likelihood of the occurrence of thousands of genetic conditions and diseases . . . .
[T]here are many who claim that there are genetic markers for aggression, substance addiction, criminal
tendencies, and sexual orientation. n154 Despite assurances that this information is only used for identification
purposes and that the loci used to create a DNA profile contain only "junk" DNA, n155 " current
laws provide
little protection against potential abuses of DNA data--a disturbing possibility given
the tremendous power of genetic information." n156
The totality of privacy violations overwhelms negative defense


Opponents have criticized DNA collection of arrestees and familial testing on various
constitutional grounds. The Fourth Amendment seems to carry the most weight, guaranteeing the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures," and
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." n82 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions limiting the government's ability to intrude into an individual's
personal privacy. n83 In proving that an action violates the Fourth Amendment, the action must: (1) Constitute a
collecting samples from

convicted offenders is no longer an issue , and many courts have upheld statutes compelling DNA
from arrestees of certain crimes. However, courts have not yet considered the greater implications with
the advent of familial searches. That issue carries privacy concerns in itself for the pivot and the suspect.
search or seizure, and (2) be unreasonable. n84 As previously mentioned, [*722]
While isolated parts of the DNA network may pass constitutional muster, the
totality of the approach foreshadows unpalatable consequences.
As new technology is created our right to privacy is infringed

upon.
Kelly
Ferrell, 2013 Kelley currently serves as Adjunct Professor for Trial Practice for
Washington University School of Law (2011-present). Kelley is a member of the Missouri Bar and the
Illinois Bar. Kelley also has been recognized as a Missouri and Kansas Rising Star, Missouri Super
Lawyer and by Best Lawyers in America. She was also elected and served as a barrister member of the
Theodore McMillian American Inn of Court.
It happens every second. Every time a person visits a webpage, runs a search
engine, or makes a call, text, or purchase - data is collected and analyzed in order
to determine that person's individual propensities and predict their future behavior .
n1 Corporations justify "data-mining" technology as an efficient means of targeting interested consumers, n2
while the government boasts of national security and public safety to rationalize the surveillance technique. n3 In
a society that shares both an obsession with social media, where many eagerly [*231] volunteer their personal
information, n4 and a post-9/11 willingness to allow intrusive government policies, such as airport body scanners
Consequently,
an Orwellian threat n6 arises when invasive new technologies go too far and disrupt the
delicate balance between the right to privacy and the need for public safety . n7 For
example, while the information revealed through traditional data-mining technology
is limited to voluntary disclosures to third parties , n8 a new wave of data collection,
DNA sampling, n9 currently allows the government to forcibly obtain private
biological information without a warrant. n10 The Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. n11 However, the advent of DNA
analysis as a crime-solving tool and frequent advancements in genetic research
have triggered constitutional uncertainty regarding an area of privacy rights that did
not exist when the Fourth Amendment was conceived . n12 Inconsistencies among the states
and discretionary wiretapping, the constitutional right to privacy is easily put in jeopardy. n5
reveal that there is an enormous disparity among jurisdictions [*232] regarding an individual's expectation of DNA
privacy. n13 Specifically, courts across the country have struggled with whether, under the Fourth Amendment, it
is constitutional to (1) physically seize a preconviction arrestee's DNA sample, and (2) use that sample by
analyzing it in its DNA profile form.
DNA privacy interests are critical and extend beyond a specific

investigation
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Recognizing that no single law enforcement investigation method is perfect - even
one with "as good a record as CODIS" - the Kriesel dissent urged that investigative
tools are "intended to aid in investigation, not to supplant it entirely ." n164 The dissent
strongly urged that "this case dealt not just with junk DNA or a CODIS profile derived from junk DNA, but the
the
dissent urged that there is no justification for "the retention of the entirety of that
individual's, and millions of others', private genetic information for the rest of their
lives." n166 In opposition to the majority's dismissal of Kriesel's Fourth Amendment arguments, the dissent also
observed, "We do not need scientists to discover anything new to know that a full
specimen of an individual's DNA reveals private information about that individual's
predisposition for certain diseases and disorders, paternity and other familial
relationships, and racial ancestry." n167 The Kriesel dissent underscores that the retention of a DNA
profile and sample intrudes upon a privacy interest that extends beyond an interest in not getting caught. A
"seized for one, seized for all" approach to volunteered DNA samples cannot be
squared with the substantial privacy interests at stake. When police indefinitely
retain consent samples in a database to search for evidence of criminality in
unrelated cases, they must demonstrate that any consent [*666] to the bodily
intrusion was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given . n168 Because a person who consents to a
retention, for at least the remainder of an individual's lifetime, of his full genetic code." n165 In essence,
search "may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search," the police must also prove that the search
was within the actual scope of consent. n169 Does that mean the police must give advice to the target of a consent
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that police do not

have to tell a person that he can decline to consent. n170
search that is in his best interest?
4th Amendment
Kyllo v. United States addresses that DNA testing as going
against the 4th amendment
Loyola Law Review is the property of Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Stephanie Beaugh 6/18/
Congress should make the following changes

to the Act. First, Congress should revert the statute to its prior language, excluding
pre-trial detainees and arrestees, and only allow mandatory DNA testing for persons
convicted. In the alternative, Congress should hold pre-trial detainees and arrestees privacy interests above
those of the government. Second, Congress needs to shift the burden of retrieving and
destroying the DNA profile to the government instead of imposing it on the arrestee
or pretrial detainee who is subsequently freed or exonerated . Such changes to the DNA Act
In order to cure the current problems of the DNA Act,
would ensure privacy protections of pretrial detainees and arrestees, prevent abuse of such DNA collection, and still
allow the government to use DNA obtained post-conviction to solve other crimes. A. CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES
The easiest method of correcting the statute is simply to change the statute back to
its former state, which would allow mandatory DNA testing strictly for postconviction individuals and not arrestees or pre-trial detainees . The removal of arrestees and
pre-trial detainees from the statute would cure the resulting privacy issues and burden problems placed on
arrestees and pre-trial detainees. In the event that Congress does not revert back to the original statutory language
Congress should give due weight to the pre-conviction status of arrestees

and pre-trial detainees, to Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, and to the
advancement of science and technology that will further effect the constitutionality
of DNA sampling. In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the Fourth
Amendment in relation to the use of advancing technology in searches.173 DNA
analysis falls within the ambit of sense-enhancing technology described in Kyllo,
as it explores details of a persons genetic makeup that would be unknowable
without some sort of physical intrusion.
of the Act,
Technology used in DNA tests are an unreasonable violation to

the 4th amendment.
Furthermore,
the Supreme Court held that when the government conducts a search by
using specialized technology to perceive what it otherwise could not, and when that
search invades a persons home, it is unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.175 The Court has also frequently held that a persons home enjoys the highest
expectation of privacy and the greatest Fourth Amendment protection .176 A persons
body is the home to their genetic makeup. A persons own body should be
sacrosanct, and the government is using specialized technology to perceive what
otherwise cannot be perceived by the naked eye. Therefore, Congress should revise the DNA Act
and remove arrestees and pre-trial detainees from its language because arrestees and pre-trial detainees should
Additionally, the burden of retrieving

and expunging the DNA profile should shift to the government, as it was the
be accorded the same rights as other non-convicted citizens.
governments error that led to the wrongfully obtained DNA profile. Congress should
transfer the burden by imposing strict deadlines for the government to retrieve the final court
order establishing that such conviction has been overturned or that the charge has been dismissed
or [has] resulted in an acquittal or that no charge was filed within the applicable
time period. For example, suppose the government was required to implement a system whereby they were
required to update their databases quarterly as to the arrestees and pre-trial detainees conviction or release status
with verifiable case-identification numbers, or else the DNA profile would automatically be destroyed from CODIS.
This system would give a great incentive to the government because if the government wished to keep DNA profiles
in CODIS indefinitely, then it would be the governments burden to guarantee that the DNA profiles are of post-
Pursuant to this framework, the government should also bear the

costs and responsibility associated with DNA collection and maintaining DNA
databases, rather than forcing the innocent to bear the costs of their own
constitutional deprivation. Also, once a DNA profile is removed from CODIS, the
government should not be allowed to keep the DNA sample indefinitely and should
be required to destroy it and all records of it
conviction individuals.
Under the status quo the way that evidence is fished for
through DNA is not allowed under the 4th amendment.
use of DNA to solve other crimes to justify the search and seizure of such DNA is
not a compelling argument in light of the fact that the searches and seizures being
conducted under the expanded statute are of persons presumed innocent. Additionally,
there is no government interest in an arrestee or pre-trial detainees DNA except to
discover or solve past or future crimes. Such a fishing expedition for evidence of
other crimes is not allowed under the Fourth Amendment , because courts have consistently
The
held such general searches are unreasonable.207 When balancing the privacy interests of an innocent individual
privacy should always trump warrantless

and suspicionless searches and seizures. 208 If not, then why not require mandatory DNA testing at
against the governments interests in solving other crimes,
birth? Then the government could solve, and possibly even prevent, a multitude of crimes. However, the thought
of requiring every born child to submit to a DNA test for the governments database seems extreme and
it is easy to see both the flaws in the

justifications for continued use of pre-trial arrestee DNA and the enormous potential
for abuse and misuse, as well as the extreme costs associated with regulating and
maintaining such a massive database. Such costs, including those to liberty and
privacy, are too great to justify such disregard for the Fourth Amendment .
outrageous. Extrapolated to its logical conclusion,
If the 4th amendment has no role, at some point DNA will be

used for things without consent

If the Fourth Amendment has no role in protecting DNA after it has been collected ,
then the worries voiced by plaintiffs and amici in United States v. Kincade, and by
many opponents of warrantless DNA collection, may be realized. "It is inevitable
that as technology advances, at some point, [DNA samples] will be used for other
purposes [*1306] without the consent or knowledge of the individual tested." n69 And
"soon, if not already, scientists will request access to what would serve as [a]
preexisting goldmine of DNA data for their research." n70 In Kincade, although the majority
acknowledged these concerns were "weighty ones" and did "not dismiss them lightly," they specifically declined to
address how the Fourth Amendment would apply if those analyses became reality; that issue remains unresolved.
n71 In order to prevent these future analyses, Judge Reinhardt argued that DNA collection should not be permitted
because "it is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have
entered." n72 Now that the constitutionality of DNA collection has been upheld in many circumstances and the
proverbial wolf has been let in, is he permitted to bite? If the only act that could be regarded as a search were the
taking of DNA from a person's body and its initial analysis, a large amount of genetic information would be
unprotected. Although limiting the initial government intrusion and collection of evidence is sufficient to protect a
person's expectation of privacy in many searches, DNA is distinct from other types of seized materials in ways that
make applying Fourth Amendment law more complicated. Specifically, genetic information is intermingled, and the
government will be unable to avoid seizing irrelevant, private information with sought-after evidence. As a result,
intermingled
genetic information will be stored, sometimes indefinitely, after its initial analysis,
making it available for future testing and amplifying the risk of any gaps in Fourth
Amendment protection.
particularity will not be able to precisely limit what information can be seized. Additionally, the
The government can collect, analyze, and retain DNA, but the
law doesnt say is it can be reanalyzed
The government can lawfully collect, analyze, and retain DNA from many groups of people convicts, arrestees, military personnel, suspects, crime victims, and newborn babies. This collection and
initial analysis must pass Fourth Amendment muster, but the law is not clear on
whether these DNA samples, once analyzed, can be analyzed a second or a third time
DNA searches are hard to define under the 4th amendment.


First, this Article looks at how courts have defined the zone of a computer search and what that indicates for
once material has been searched, privacy

interests in the material are extinguished. The material can be searched again more
thoroughly, without any justification required. Looking at something that falls within
the zone of the initial search is not a new Fourth Amendment action. If something is
outside the zone of the initial search, however, it remains vested with its original
expectation of privacy, and searching that material must be justified and
reasonable. In many searches, determining the zone of what has already been searched is simple: when police
defining the zone of a DNA search. As mentioned above,
open a container, everything in that container is within the zone of the search. Traditionally, Fourth Amendment law
has focused on whether it is reasonable to penetrate the boundaries of a physical space. Once those boundaries are
Determining what expectations of privacy have

already been compromised by an initial search is more difficult when there are no
physical walls to define the zone of that search. To extend this principle to
penetrated, privacy in that zone is extinguished.
laboratory searches, one must define what privacy interests are compromised when
a search is conducted in a much smaller space, like the inside of a hard drive or a
human cell. This inquiry is critical to determining what information remains private after police have analyzed
some information in a computer or for that matter a DNA sample.
Pre-detainees v felons
The government uses the pretext of solving crime at the
expense of privacy
Despite these counter-arguments, there are numerous shortfalls with the DNA Act and its regulations as they affect
arrestees and pre-trial detainees, as well as with courts analyses and the upholding of the statutes
there are no interests in an arrestee or pre-trial detainees DNA

that cannot be served post-conviction. The differences between an arrestee or pretrial detainee and a convict are blatant enough that the analysis and application of
the Fourth Amendment should reflect such distinctions. Thus, courts should stray away from
applying post-convict DNA testing precedent to current arrestees or pre-trial detainees. Secondly, the
safeguards implemented within the statute and in practice to protect against
improper utilization of DNA are arbitrary and ineffective and have great potential for
abuse. Third, the court uses the statutes identification purposes as a pretext to
further the governments interests in solving other crimes at the expense of
individual privacy interests
constitutionality. First,
The government is using the collection of pre-detainees DNA

as a pre text for investigative purposes when they should still
be considered innocent.
Courts have incorrectly relied on extending the mandatory DNA testing of prisoners,
probationers, or parolees to arrestees and pre-trial detainees . In Sczubelek, for example, the
defendant was a probationer, who had previously been convicted of a crime. A conviction causes a
permanent change in the convicted persons status because the status changes
from an ordinary citizen to a lawfully adjudicated criminal [ ] whose proven conduct
substantially heightens the governments interest in monitoring him and quite
properly carries lasting consequences.186 Therefore, once a person becomes a
convict, the governments interests, rightfully so, become more compelling in
overseeing that the convict is rehabilitated and does no further harm to society .
However, arrestees and pre-trial detainees have not yet been branded as a convict;
therefore their status as a person still carries a greater expectation of privacy than
that of a convict. Additionally, advocates of the statute have argued that, once arrested, a person is subject
to fingerprinting and possibly even body cavity searches during booking. These advocates take the position that
there are vast differences between the reasons and

policies behind fingerprinting and body cavity searches of arrestees . As will be stated in
Section III.B.3, using DNA for identification purposes is a pretext. The Buza court
rejected such reasoning, stating that DNA evidence is primarily used for
investigative purposes.187 Also, it can take up to thirty-one days to process and
analyze a DNA sample, but fingerprints are transmitted electronically almost
obtaining DNA is no different. However,
immediately.188 Furthermore, the purpose behind body cavity searches for incoming
arrestees is primarily for the safety of the guards , as well as the other inmates, in case an
arrestee is hiding contrabandsuch as drugs or weapons. Such a search is permitted by the
Fourth Amendment due to the greater weight of the safety and protection of other
persons. The collection and testing of DNA from arrestees does not serve as a
means of protecting guards and inmates from contraband . Thus, these two arguments are
distinguishable from DNA testing for two reasons: (1) fingerprinting already exists as a successful means of
identification without need for further identification,189 and (2) the same safety concerns behind body cavity
searches, as to law enforcement and prison personnel, do not apply to DNA testing. For all of the reasons stated
above, the rationale used to support DNA testing on those who are convicted is inapplicable to arrestees and
detainees.
A pre-detainees privacy should come before governmental

interests.
Additionally,
consider if a mistakenly identified person is arrested for a federal crime.

The government receives the automatic right to sample the arrestees DNA, to
analyze it, and to include a profile derived from the DNA sample in CODIS .209 This
mistakenly identified person, now an arrestee, has no recourse and is required to submit his
DNA or be charged with a class A misdemeanor.210 And should an innocent,
mistakenly identified individual choose not to submit to the DNA test and be
charged with a class A misdemeanor, when the mistaken identity comes to light and
initial charges are dropped, that individual is still facing a federal offense for not
submitting his DNA for a crime he did not commit in the first place. Moreover, although his DNA
profile will be expunged from CODIS, the Government will retain his DNA sample
indefinitely, leaving the government still in possession and control of an
individuals person and property, whether it was lawfully obtained or not .211 The Third
Circut, in relying on post-conviction precedent, further states that arrestees and pre-trial detainees have a
if a person on trial is innocent until proven

guilty, then his expectation of privacy is the same as any other non-convicted
person. It is incorrect to assume that arrestees and pre-trial detainees are more
likely to commit future crimes in order to justify the collection and analysis of their
DNA.213 Arrestees and pre-trial detainees have much stronger and weightier interests in their privacy than the
governments interest in collecting potential evidence for crime solving.214 Hence, their privacy interests
should prevail over the governments interests in conducting a fishing expedition.
Taking into account these considerations, when balancing the governments
interests against privacy interests, the scale should be tipped in favor of privacy and
the Fourth Amendment. However, that is currently not the case.
diminished expectation of privacy.212 However,
Mandating DNA collection from pre- detainees is an unjustified

invasion of privacy.
the current federal statute3 places the longstanding

presumption of innocence in jeopardy and also endangers the deep-rooted notions
of privacy and due process protected by the Fourth Amendment . Unbeknownst to Alex,
As this hypothetical demonstrates,
possessing nude pictures of his girlfriend was illegal because, despite being only two years his junior, she was a
After the government forced him to submit to a DNA test, they could use his
DNA profile to compare it to other crime-scene samples to determine if Alex
committed any other crimes. All of this occurred before Alex was even allowed a
trial to determine his innocence or guilt. A fundamental cornerstone of the United
States criminal justice system has always been the presumption of innocence.4
This innocent until proven guilty principle in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law .5 Therefore, by mandating DNA
collection from, and creating DNA profiles of, persons not yet convicted , 42 U.S.C.
14135a(a)(1)(A) (the DNA Act) requires an unjustified invasion of privacy upon persons who
are presumed to be innocent.
minor.
AT: Felons dont have privacy rights

Convicted felons have a diminished expectation of privacy
Even though an arrestee or detainee has a somewhat diminished expectation of privacy compared to a nonarrested person, arrestees and pre-trial detainees retain greater privacy rights than that of a convicted felon.
There are no interests in an arrestee or pre-trial detainees DNA that cannot be served postconviction, and the
reliance on precedent that suggests otherwise is an incorrect assumption.182 These types of analogies are
the distinguishable issues between pre-conviction and postconviction. A convict has little to no expectation of privacy, while an arrestee or
pre-trial detainee has a higher expectation of privacy .183 When considering
questions related to an individuals rights to privacy, courts have expanded
Supreme Court precedent in order to conclude that convicts, either incarcerated or
on supervised release, have a diminished expectation of privacy; therefore, courts
have reasoned that such individuals can be subject to DNA collection even in the absence
of individualized suspicion that they have committed additional crimes. 184 However, that does not
apply to arrestees and pretrial detainees.
inherently flawed because of
DNA database vulnerable

Current DNA collection and databases in insufficient privacywise
Jessica D. Gabel, 2013, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University
College of Law, University of Baltimore Law Review, INDECENT EXPOSURE: GENES
ARE MORE THAN A BRAND NAME LABEL IN THE DNA DATABASE DEBATE, 42 U. Balt.
L. Rev. 561 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015) // LO
Some of the rather bombastic reasoning telling us that DNA databases are safe,
effective, and present no intrusion into the lives of the average person is false. n195
After all, so the false logic goes, only criminals (or criminals-in-the-making) are caught within the snares of the database. n196 The
proliferation of databases, however, is not limited to use in criminal investigations.
n197 Genetic data is also compiled and maintained for medical research. n198 In fact, Maryland mingles the two. The Maryland
public safety code sanctions the use of DNA information for "research" and maintenance of a "population data base." n199 In
the statute [*587] also permits the state to utilize genetic

samples "for research and administrative purposes." n200 The illustrative researchrelated uses include "development of a population data base after personal
identifying information is removed." n201 The provisions addressing the population
database also mandate removal of all personal information prior to entering the
data. n202 There is mounting evidence, however, that simply deleting identifying
information is insufficient to protect privacy. n203 In a widely-reported study, investigators were able to
identify both individual donors and their families from "anonymous" genetic data. n204 Alarmingly, the authors found "that data
release, even of a few markers, from one person can spread through deep
genealogical ties." n205 Even a small data-leak could ultimately identify people who
lacked any social ties to the donor. n206 Although perhaps the most disconcerting,
this study is not the first to demonstrate the vulnerability of genetic information. n207
These findings suggest that maintaining the anonymity of genetic information may
be impossible. Moreover, the authors speculate that privacy breaches will become
both easier and more common. n208
addition to the crime-related provisions,
A legal concern of ones privacy is the duration of time the

DNA profile is used by the USFG.
Bartusiak, 11

A significant privacy concern is the duration of time that DNA profiles are retained
by the government . The Privacy Act of 1974 has ben interpreted to prevent federal
law enforcement agencies from maintaining dossiers of information on individuals not
suspected of wrongdoing. n76 In contrast, the DNA of convicted criminals can be [*1126] kept in
CODIS indefinitely , even after a prison sentence or parole term has concluded. n77 As a result, these
profiles will continue to be searched in every crime run through CODIS . The
information can also be used indefinitely to make familial matches against those whom the government has no
While an individual not suspected of wrongdoing may

petition to remove his DNA from NDIS , the process is legally complex and involves a
very onerous standard. n78 Further, that person may not petition for removal until at
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
least two years from the date of arrest . n79 During that time, or indefinitely if a person is
unable or unwilling to go through these burdensome procedures , his DNA will be
included in all searches run on the database.
An ordinary citizen with no convictions has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. n80 Once this person's DNA is included in a DNA database, however, it will be
Given the onerous standards

and lengthy period of time required to remove a DNA profile from the databases ,
subject to all future database searches without individualized suspicion.
an Page 5 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1115, *1124 argument could be made that the profile will be
subjected to an indefinite license for unlimited searches absent new reasonable suspicion.
Where the DNA profile came from an arrestee who was never convicted, these searches continue despite the
restoration of his reasonable expectation of privacy.
Minorities privacy
Law enforcement invades minorities privacy
As acknowledged in Maryland v. King, the maintenance of DNA databases has provided a valuable tool for law
enforcement--it has allowed law enforcement to become more effective and convict more individuals based on
evidence obtained from crime scenes. n169 However,
the needs of law enforcement should give

way when the practice in question has a disproportionate negative effect on racial
minorities. This is especially true when there is not sufficient proof that the
individuals in question, arrestees, have engaged in any wrongdoing . The ability of law
enforcement to take DNA samples at arrest and maintain DNA profiles of arrestees in databases intrudes on the
privacy of many individuals who will never be convicted of a felony n170 and therefore would otherwise not have
their DNA placed in a database.
AT: Probable cause

Probable cause does not justify DNA collection
The Act impermissibly uses a judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest as a substitute for the probable
cause required to issue a search warrant. But, just as in Schmerber, no such dual use of probable cause is
the
probable cause to seize the blood sample arose from the officer's belief that it would
reasonably produce evidence related to the crime for which the defendant was
arrested. n148 The fact that a magistrate has determined probable cause exists for
the individual to be arrested does not signify that the magistrate has also
determined that there is a fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in
the biological specimen taken from the defendant. n149 These two determinations are distinct.
permissible. Probable cause to arrest is not sufficient to intrude into the body without a warrant. In Schmerber,
[*498] The Act is applied indiscriminately to all of the enumerated crimes, regardless of whether DNA evidence is
The mere chance that the evidence might be obtained with a

search is not sufficient to support probable cause for a search . n151 The Act dispenses with
relevant to the crime charged.
the requirement that law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to a search or seizure. n152 Under the Act, it is
unnecessary to consider whether the DNA sample will relate to the charged crime or to any other criminal activity.
For example, an individual could be arrested for a crime in which DNA plays no role, but his DNA will still be
While there may be probable cause for the arrest, there is no

probable cause to take the DNA incident to the arrest. In this situation, there would
be no possibility, nor any probable cause to believe, that the DNA could reveal
evidence related to the crime committed. If such probable cause did exist -probable
cause that the DNA would provide evidence of the person who committed the crime
for which the arrestee is in custody- law enforcement would be free to obtain a
warrant. Because there is no probable cause, the question of exigent circumstances is inapplicable. Even if
probable cause existed, there still would be no exigency because DNA is immutable.
sampled under the Act. n153
n154 As in Schmerber, there is no threat of destruction of the evidence. The Act authorizes a search and seizure
without probable cause or any sort of reasonable suspicion. Such an authorization certainly should not pass
because there is no probable cause to search and seize the

DNA for evidence relating to crimes for which the arrestee has not been arrested,
and there are not exigent circumstances that may permit the unwarranted search
and seizure, the Act should be viewed as an unconstitutional search and seizure. Schmerber can be analogized
constitutional muster. In sum,
to the North Carolina DNA Database Act of 2010 because both Schmerber and the Act address the warrantless
search and seizure of bodily material upon arrest for a crime. Given their factual similarities, the principles dictating
the outcome of Schmerber should control an analysis of the DNA Database [*499] Act of 2010. Thus, mandatory
arrestee DNA sampling should be ruled unconstitutional under Schmerber. 3
Privacy Impacts
Human Rights key to survival
George Kateb, Philosopher, 1992 (THE INNER OCEAN, p. 66)
Rights emerge as the
only or best way of protecting human dignity, and human dignity remains the
highest standard. That is not to deny that there will be strenuous differences of interpretation of various rights
and quarrels over the comparative importance of various rights. But by now even some antiindividualists, whether secular or religious, accept the idea of rights as useful
or even as an indispensable ingredient to their own thinking.
In sum, there seems to be no generally credible foundation for a critique of rights.
Rule of Law key to survival

Carn 96
(Robert A., University of Houston, and Ronald Stidham, Appalachian State University, 1996, (Judicial Process in America, p. 9)
Some persons in history have believed that there should be no government (and hence no laws) at all. Such individuals,
called anarchists, have argued that governments by nature make rules and laws and that such restrictions impinge on
personal freedom. In the past anarchists have used violence to overthrow governments and have assassinated heads of
attempts to abolish law and authority have resulted in much

destruction of life and property and temporary reigns of terror, but they have
never brought about the elimination of law or government. Instead of increasing
state. Such
personal freedom, a state of anarchy virtually destroys personal freedom for all but the most powerful and savage of
individuals. Few would deny that in todays world if people are to live together amicably,
law must be an
essential part of life.
As our population expands and modern transportation and communication link us all
together, every action that each of us takes affects another either directly or indirectly and may even cause harm.
When the inevitable conflict results, it must be resolved peaceably using a

rule of law. Otherwise there is lust disorder, death, and chaos . We must have some
common set of rules that we agree to live by-a rule of law and order.
Social control invalidates the value of life

Cohen 85
[Stanly, Professor of Criminology, University of Jerusalem, 1985,
Visions of Social Control)
But however we view the emerging control systems as responses to the dangerous classes, as
attempts to recreate community, as exercises in the micro-physics of power or merely as part of the
rationalization of the state they could never leave behind and utopian after-images. Quite the contrary.
As Mumford eloquently shows, here, already the real dystopia. The dark shadow of the good city is the
collective human machine: the dehumanized routine and suppression of autonomy ,
first imposed
by the despotic monarch and the army, is now the invisible machine of the
modern technocratic state. Well before Foucault (and more clearly and simple), Mumford
described how the utopian ideal of total control from about and absolute obedience below had never
passed out of existence, but was reassembled in a different form after kingship by divine right was
defeated. He also stressed that the new machine must be seen not in terms of its visible parts but the
The new invisible

machine is not longer an agent for creating heaven on earth, the holy city, but itself become the
utopia which is worshiped and enlarged indefinitely. It was just this horror of
the invisible machine which was to produce the radical destructing
movements, the romantic impulses, the anti-industrial visions of the 1960s. So invisible was the
minute, intangible assembly of science, knowledge, and administration.
machine, that its most-benign parts (therapy, social work, humanitarianism) hid its most repressive
operations. Here was Illichs foreboding of industrial nemesis: divine retribution for tampering with nature.
The machine had to be exposed and taken apart. But alongside this vision of alienation (too much
control), there lies, as in the nineteenth century, the more powerful vision of anomie (too little control).
The fear is that the machine is breaking down by itself, and that outside in
the chaos of urban life, in the desolate city streets abandoned to the
predators, lies the ultimate horror chaos, disorder, entropy.
Undermining the Constitution causes extinction

Henkin 88
(Columbia, 1988, (Atlantic Comm Qtly, Spring)
Lawyers, even constitutional lawyers, argue "technically," with references to text and principles of
construction, drawing lines, and insisting on sharp distinctions. Such discussion sometimes seems
But behind the words of

the Constitution and the technicalities of constitutional construction lie the
basic values of the United Stateslimited government even at the cost of inefficiency;
safeguards against autarchy and oligarchy; democratic values represented
differently in the presidency and in Congress, as well as in the intelligent participation and
consent of the governed. In the nuclear age the technicalities of
constitutionalism and of constitutional jurisprudence safeguard also the values
and concerns of civilized people committed to human survival.
ludicrous when it addresses issues of life and death and Armaggedon.
Democracy checks genocide and mass murder

Diamond 99
[Larry, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 6]
Beyond the violence between states and between or against ethnic groups within states lies a more
absolute power kills absolutely. 112 2 Rudolph Rummel's

exhaustive study of deaths from war, genocide, mass murder, and domestic
violence in this, history's most murderous, century, demonstrates that every instance of
mass murder by a state against its own people has happened under
authoritarian rule and that the more absolutist the regime the greater the
tendency toward democide (genocide and mass murder of innocent civilians. Thus, "the way
to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through
restricting and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom ."
stunning generalization: "Power kills,
Solvency
Database large
CODIS database is nearly 3 million and set to rapidly expand
Acc. 6-29-2015)
The NDIS actually comprises two different indexes as part of CODIS. The "Forensic
Index" contains geno-types from crime scene evidence; the "Offender Index " (originally
the "Convicted Offender" index) contains the genotypes of those convicted or charged with
crimes that state or federal law enforcement groups have submitted. n15 A law
enforcement agency can, via computer, check the genotype of an analyzed DNA
sample against either (or both) of these two indexes. It can check crime scene DNA
against DNA collected from previous offenders (the Offender Index) or from other
crimes (the Forensic Index). Alternatively, it can check a particular suspect's genotype against the
Forensic Index to look for his possible involvement in other crimes. As of November 2005, the CODIS
Offender Index included information about 2.75 million people, while the Forensic
Index had about 125,000 entries. n16 Throughout the United States, roughly one
million people are convicted of a felony each year. Some of those will already be in the CODIS
database; nonetheless, the possibilities exist for rapid expansion of this database.
National DNA Index System is Big and Growing
Jesika S. Wehunt 2013 J.D. Candidate, Georgia State University Law
DRAWING THE LINE: DNA DATABASING AT ARREST AND SAMPLE EXPUNGEMENT
Georgia State University Law Review (Lexis, accessed 6/29/15)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
created the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). n48 CODIS "coordinate[s] the
various national, state, and local DNA databases in a centralized system" that
allows for the exchange of DNA information nationwide. n49 Following the creation of
CODIS in 1994, "the DNA Identification Act ('DNA Act') authorized the FBI [*1072] to
create the National DNA Index System ('NDIS')," which allows sharing profile
information between federal and state DNA databases, and provides states with
financial support to create or improve their existing state DNA databases. n50 As of March
2013, this multi-tiered system of local, state, and national databases contains more
than ten million offender profiles, more than 1.3 million arrestee profiles, and almost
half a million forensic profiles.
Additionally, recognizing the need for an overarching profile organization system, the
DNA Collection is expanding rapidly and is incentivized by the

Federal Govt.
Within the past several years, many states have passed laws to expand or establish
their DNA databases to include the DNA samples of arrestees for certain crimes . n16
Currently, twenty-five states and the federal [*476] government authorize DNA collection at arrest. n17 In
promoting the expansion of these databases, lawmakers cite justifications such as the increased resolution of cold
cases or the exoneration of innocent people in jail. n18
Many legislators have simply called the idea
of seizing DNA from an arrestee the twenty-first century's version of fingerprinting .

n19 Though these justifications are laudable, this Comment illustrates how they are misguided. While politicians
claim to act in the best interest of the criminal justice system, other motives exist .
States are prompted to

adopt arrestee DNA collection schemes in response to federal programs offering
additional funding to laboratories that retain a backlog of DNA samples . n20 Essentially,
the federal government is willing to give states more money if those states have a
backlog of untested DNA samples. n21 In response to the potential receipt of federal
money, states are passing laws requiring more samples to be taken in order to allow
the state to increase backlog and thereby increase the amount of federal dollars
coming into [*477] the state. n22 Essentially, more samples equals more money. In
addition to funding the creation of more state backlogs, the United States House of
Representatives passed the Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act in May 2010,
which creates further incentives for states to collect DNA samples from arrestees .
n23 Federal incentives promote the processing of offender DNA samples instead of
actual DNA evidence from crime scenes . n24 Under these incentives, an estimated 51,000 DNA
samples from arrestees move to the head of the testing line while DNA evidence from crime scenes and rape kits go
untested. n25 The expansion of DNA databases contributes to the continuing backlog of unprocessed rape kits and
other evidence so states may fill their coffers. n26 While sold as tools for law enforcement, DNA databases are
instead used to generate revenue in sluggish economies and fill gaps in states' budgets with the federal dollars
coming in because of the creation of the backlog. n27 In addition to the financial Page 2 34 Campbell L. Rev. 473,
*473 incentives involved, many opponents believe that the measures to expand DNA collection are nothing but the
product of a lobbying push from companies that would profit from increased testing sales and sales in equipment
and chemicals utilized in DNA collection and processing. n28 Whatever the [*478] reasoning, North Carolina has
joined the coalition of states that require the search and seizure of DNA samples from arrestees - people who
supposedly enjoy a presumption of innocence.
Tech advancements
First Generation DNA techniques are sufficient they include
touch DNA
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The first generation of forensic DNA testing , however, had practical limitations that
checked the growth of DNA databases and limited their use to crimes where the
DNA evidence was highly relevant to the identity of the perpetrator : early tests were
expensive; n31 they required a blood sample from the suspect; n32 and, relative to [*646] the subnanogram
sensitivity of current technology,
DNA profiles could only be developed from large amounts

of biological evidence collected at a crime scene. n33 However, a visible amount of semen or
blood meant certain identity evidence of the perpetrator. n34 As awareness of the power of DNA grew, the
increased demand for DNA analysis spurred the development of swifter, cheaper, and more sensitive tests. n35 The
practical limitation of a blood draw as a means to collect a DNA sample from a person no longer exists; police can
readily - and surreptitiously - collect a person's DNA sample from a discarded cigarette butt, chewing gum, saliva on
Mass screenings of possible suspects can be accomplished

with swabs of saliva. n37 A visible amount of a bodily fluid like semen, blood, or
saliva at a crime scene is also no longer needed; police can collect and analyze
trace amounts of "touch" DNA from surfaces like doorknobs, steering wheels, or
windows. n38 "Touch" DNA is used in the prosecution of property crimes, drug offenses, and quality-of-life
a straw, or sweat on a chair. n36
offenses like vandalism or trespass. n39 Unlike a visible amount of bodily fluid found at a crime scene, however, the
relevance and reliability of low-level DNA profiles from surfaces likely to contain DNA from more than one person
This revolution in forensic DNA technology has created an

opportunity for law enforcement to aggressively expand the collection and retention
of DNA samples from known persons and crime scenes . n41 The first wave of
expansion occurred at the national and state levels of CODIS: Congress and nearly
every state relentlessly expanded the categories of convicted offenders and
arrestees subject to mandatory DNA collection laws; n42 the courts routinely upheld
these laws against challenges; n43 and powerful special interest groups advocated
for mandatory DNA sampling from all convicted offenders and arrestees. n44
can be very uncertain. n40 [*647]
2nd generation DNA is unregulated risks lifelong surveillance

federal funding is central
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The second-generation expansion of forensic DNA testing is now occurring largely
under the radar at the state and local levels of CODIS . Precisely because federal law
limits DNA profiles of known individuals in the national databank to persons who
must [*648] submit to DNA collection during a criminal prosecution, n45 police are
exploiting the underregulated state and local levels of CODIS to retain DNA
collected during investigations. n46 DNA profiles collected from a crime scene and
analyzed during an investigation are called "casework" samples . n47 To be eligible for entry
into the "forensic index" of the national databank, a casework sample must: (1) be reasonably probative of the
identity of the perpetrator of a crime; (2) be not from a known person; and (3) not consist of complex mixtures or
partial profiles that may hit to more than one person in [*649] the databank. n48 These limitations do not exist at
A regulatory gap allows state and local laboratories to

collect, retain, and distribute their casework samples in the CODIS network at the
state and local levels; federal law leaves to the states the regulation of these
databases of DNA profiles that cannot be uploaded to the national databank . n50 All
the state and local levels of CODIS. n49
states mandate DNA collection from certain criminals, but only a few states regulate the collection, retention, or
The courts have similarly failed to develop new rules

or faithfully apply existing rules to safeguard the privacy interests of persons who
have volunteered their DNA to help police investigate a crime. n52 The result is that
people who have not been convicted of a crime end up under lifelong genetic
surveillance. n53 New technology continues to expand the reach of underregulated
databases. New advances, such as increases in the sensitivity of DNA testing, the lower cost of testing,
distribution of casework DNA samples. n51
simplified collection techniques, rapid results, and enhancements to the CODIS software create more opportunities
for police to collect DNA from crime scenes and known individuals as a routine part of police work. n54 Increased
[*650] federal funding may encourage police to exploit these opportunities. n55 Accordingly, the number of profiles
in underregulated state and local indices that cannot be uploaded to the national DNA databank is likely to continue
to increase dramatically in the presence of lax database laws.
Plan checks local databases

CODIS enables local database surveillance
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The software also provided participating local and state DNA laboratories with the
ability to operate a local DNA index system (LDIS) and to share DNA profiles with
other DNA laboratories in their state through a state DNA index system (SDIS). n61 The
availability of the CODIS platform to retain and search DNA profiles provided local law enforcement laboratories the
opportunity to compare DNA profiles from their casework that could not be [*651] uploaded to the national DNA
These databases may potentially include partial or mixed DNA profiles

from crime scene evidence, of crime victims, of persons who voluntarily provided
DNA samples to be eliminated from crime scene evidence, and of suspects who
were not arrested or convicted. n63 While CODIS was still in its pilot phase, the National Research
databank. n62
Council published a seminal report on the use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system (NRC I). n64 NRC I
presciently observed that "if
DNA profiles of samples from a population were stored in

computer databanks (databases), DNA typing could be applied in crimes without
suspects." n65 NRC I acknowledged the general similarity between a fingerprint databank and a DNA databank,
but decisively rejected that analogy because "ordinary fingerprints and DNA profiles differ substantially in ways that
Confidentiality
and security of DNA-related information are especially important and difficult issues,
because we are in the midst of two extraordinary technological revolutions that
show no signs of abating: in molecular biology, which is yielding an explosion of
information about human genetics, and in computer technology, which is moving
towards national and international networks connecting growing information
resources. n67
bear on the creation and design of a national DNA profile databank." n66 NRC I explained:
Court rules not sufficient to solve state & local

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Traditionally,
in the absence of a valid warrant the "state assumes the burden of

overcoming the presumption of invalidity by demonstrating ... that the warrantless
search satisfied one of the firmly established exceptions to the warrant
requirement." n149 When the government seeks to rely upon consent to justify the
lawfulness of a search, it has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact,
freely and voluntarily given. n150 Because a person who consents to a search "may of course delimit as
he chooses the scope of the search," n151 the government must also prove that the search was
within the actual scope of consent. n152 The allocation of the burden of proof means that "'where the
evidence is inconclusive ... the defendant wins.'" n153 In the context of DNA analysis, a court
must decide between two basic consent scenarios: first, a nonoffender may have
expressly consented to any future use of his DNA, or in the absence of express
consent, the court may have determined that general consent to all future uses is
implied; n154 and second, a nonoffender may have [*664] expressly limited the scope
of a consent search to a particular investigation or the court may imply such a limit
from the circumstances. Under the traditional analysis, the government bears the burden of demonstrating
either express consent, or that the use of the DNA was within the scope of implied consent as measured by the
Objective reasonableness evaluates scope of

consent as that which "an ordinary reasonable person would understand to be the
scope of consent between the officer and the consenting person ." n156 The
effectiveness of court regulation of local and state DNA databases is both uncertain
and inconsistent, with perhaps too much focus on the particular facts of the instant
case. For example, in United States v. Kriesel, a sharply divided panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed the
standard of objective reasonableness. n155
government's interest in retention of a physical DNA sample. n157 After pleading guilty to a drug conspiracy
charge, Edward Kriesel agreed to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis as a condition of his supervised release.
n158 After his DNA profile was added to CODIS, Kriesel demanded the return of his actual blood sample, claiming
the sample qualified as property. n159 The majority determined that although a blood sample qualifies as property,
the government has a legitimate interest in retaining it. n160
All local DNA analysis is grounded in federal CODIS

surveillance
Acc. 6-29-2015)
These STRs can be used for identification. In the United States, crime laboratories typically use a set
of thirteen STRs, known as the "CODIS markers," named after the FBI's Combined
DNA Information System. These STRs are spread over twelve chromosomes. n11 Each individual has two
copies of each of the thirteen STRs. On average, one of the CODIS markers has twelve different lengths, or alleles,
found in significant numbers of the population, but the least variable CODIS marker has seven alleles and the most
variable has twenty-three. One person might have two copies of the first marker that are four and eight repeats
long, copies of the second that are eleven and twenty-three copies long, copies of the third that are three and ten
That person -- someone, possibly the

perpetrator, who left DNA at a crime scene; someone who left DNA on some
important evidence to a crime; or an unidentified person whose remains have been
found -- can thus be identified as thirteen pairs of numbers, one pair for each of the
thirteen STRs. Those numbers constitute a "genotype" of the individual for those
STRs (based on the alleles they have of those STRs).
copies long, and so on through all thirteen markers.
CODIS affiliation drives the local databases

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The lack of effective regulation for CODIS-affiliated local DNA databases also
encourages police to obtain DNA database software in the private market . The Local
DNA Index System (LODIS) is one example of such software. It functions "to bring forensic DNA
technology down to the average city or county level." n247 The Palm [*677] Bay Police
Department in Florida deployed LODIS in three separate phases. n248 The first phase, completed in November
Police officers were

"encouraged to collect samples at all crime scenes." n250 The second phase of the
project allowed officers to "review DNA test results from a car computer over an
encrypted, secure network." n251 Phase three culminated in the analysis of the "overall results in impact
2007, "had as its primary goal the training of patrol officers in DNA collection." n249
on crime" in order to "determine if the process is affordable for the average agency." n252 "LODIS was designed
specifically to provide local agencies with a system to create local DNA databases, which are flexible to meet the
unique investigative needs of local law enforcement agencies." n253
Ultimately, local agencies benefit
from LODIS by being able to "deploy CODIS at their agencies [] to be used in

conjunction with other investigative techniques on more commonly committed
crimes." n254 "As such, it provides an approach for implementing the local DNA
index system (LDIS) component of CODIS on a broad scale and independent of any
limitations in DNA testing capacity at the state laboratory level ." n255
Warrants Key
Local databases are still tied to federal surveillance
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The scope of the problem is magnified when the casework of a local DNA laboratory
intersects - as it often does - with DNA dragnets to identify the source of DNA
collected at a crime scene. n214 When there is no hit of the unknown suspect
profile to any offender profile in the national DNA databank, police may utilize a
DNA dragnet - requesting DNA swabs from a target population that may largely be
defined by economic class, race, or sex - to expand the collection of DNA to a
selected group of individuals who are "associated" with the crime. n215 When these
mass screenings of DNA sampling take place, typically the police have no
particularized [*672] suspicion of any individual and focus the dragnet on those who
may have had access to the crime scene, were in the vicinity, were of the same
race as the perpetrator, or simply knew the victim. n216 In a dragnet situation,
police lack probable cause to obtain a search warrant of any one individual in the
group and therefore need consent to collect a DNA sample from the target. n217
Usually, individual targets in the group are excluded as suspects through DNA
testing. n218 Conversely, when any individual target refuses consent, he comes
under the heightened suspicion of police who may try to obtain a search warrant or
surreptitiously collect a DNA sample. n219 And while these voluntarily submitted
samples cannot be uploaded to the national DNA databank, n220 police maintain
that they may upload the profiles into local and state DNA databases that
participate in CODIS to search for evidence connecting the person to other crimes
beyond the purview of the dragnet. n221
Pre detainee v felon

DNA collection includes those NOT convicted of crimes
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics Summer, PART I: Family Ties: The Use of DNA
Offender Databases to Catch Offenders' Kin 2006 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 248 (Lexis,
Acc. 6-29-2015)
Every jurisdiction in the United States has established its own "offender" database.
n12 States set out different requirements about who must provide DNA for these
databases. In some states only convicted sex offenders or violent criminals must
provide DNA; increasingly, states are requiring DNA from all felons. More than thirty
states have now gone to "all felon" databases and it seems likely that all states will
adopt at least that broad a database soon. Several states , including California, Texas, Virginia,
and Louisiana, now require DNA samples from some people merely arrested for or
charged with felonies, and recent federal law amendments have allowed the
Attorney General "to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested or from
non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United
States." n13 Many states also collect and analyze DNA from unsolved crime scenes, from missing persons, and
from unidentified human remains.
The Maryland v King case makes DNA identification of predetainees as a reasonable.

Innocent persons, still waiting to be either charged or tried, are now required to
assist the government in solving other crimes through the use of their own DNA,
and may be found guilty before they are even tried . The crucial portion of the
DNA Act provides that [t]he Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney
General in regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing
charges, or convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained under
the authority of the United States.7 The statute, in conjunction with its regulation,8 not only
allows, but mandates, the invasion of an individuals privacy via DNA sampling and
profiling for persons merely arrested and/or facing charges,9 both of which are
categories of persons who are not yet convicted of any crime. Recent court decisions have
questioned whether the mandatory DNA testing of arrestees and pre-trial detainees pursuant to this statute violates
the Fourth Amendment.10 Mistakenly, the majority of courts have ultimately held that the collection and profiling of
DNA samples without suspicion, as permitted by the DNA Act, is entirely constitutional and not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.11 These courts have found that the governments interests in the collection of DNA for
identification purposes outweigh the diminished expectations of privacy of the defendants, who are considered
a state statute authorizing DNA collection

of arrestees was argued before the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v.
King.13 Characterizing the DNA collection statute as a more accurate means of
identification, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that DNA identification of arrestees
is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking
procedure.14 However, the conflicting majority and dissenting opinions in these decisions, as well as the
either arrestees or pre-trial detainees.12 Most recently,
disparate holdings of the various circuits, demonstrate that courts continue to struggle with this issue.15 In light of
the King decision, this comment proposes that the current DNA Act violates the fundamental notions of privacy
established by the Fourth Amendment, and, thus, it is unconstitutional. Once an individuals DNA is taken and
submitted into a federal database, there are no guarantees or unfailing safety measures for retrieval of that DNA if
The statute should be

modified to prevent this invasion of privacy and to ensure the protections provided
by the Fourth Amendment to persons whose arrests or pre-trial detentions do not
result in eventual conviction
the arrest is subsequently voided, or if the charges are thrown out or dismissed.
The expansion to include individuals in DNA testing does not

make logical sense.
When Congress amended the statute to broaden the scope of the categories of
individuals subject to DNA collection, the legislative history indicates that the
purpose was to allow both state and federal law enforcement to apprehend rapists, murderers,
and other violent criminals whom it otherwise would be impossible to identify and
arrest.217 Senator Kyl, the sponsor of the bill, stated that the revisions would make
it easier to maintain national databases of criminal arrestees in order to compare
the DNA profile to crime-scene evidence, and it would prevent serial rapists and
murderers from committing more crimes. Considering the lengthy DNA processing
time,219 if the matter actually involved a serial rapist or murderer, thirty-one days is enough time to
commit more crimes. Undeniably, there is great interest in catching and prosecuting criminals, but those
interests should not trump the rights granted by the United States Constitution to individuals. Taken to its
illogical conclusion, assuming the actual purpose is to prevent rapes and murders,
why not require that the arrestee be detained for the thirty-one days until his DNA
profile is entered into CODIS. Then, if there are no matches to crimes, he is allowed to go. But if there
are matches, regardless of the type of crime, he remains in detention. The notion of denying someone release
pending DNA testing provokes flagrant misuses of the law.
Pre-detainees should not be put into the same category as

convicted felons, having their DNA retrieved.
Some critics of this proposal argue that there are multitudes of crimes and cases that are aided or solved by DNA.
the taking of DNA in order to determine whether a presumably innocent

arrestee is implicated in any other unrelated offenses lacks not only probable cause,
but also does not meet the lower standard of individualized suspicion as required by
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, DNA sampling for purposes of aiding in solving other
crimes should only be applied to post-conviction offenders. This proposal does not
seek to let the guilty go free, but recognizes the fundamental principle that an
individual is innocent until proven guiltyall innocent people should be afforded the same rights as
However,
guaranteed by the Constitution. While arrestees and pre-trial detainees have diminished expectations of privacy
compared to non-arrested persons, the arrestee/pre-trial detainees expectation of privacy is still greater than that
arrestees and pre-trial detainees should not be classified

together with convicted felons and subject to searches and seizures of their persons
specifically their blood and DNAthat they can never retrieve. Proponents of the statute,
of a convicted felon. Thus,
including some courts, argue that possible technological advancements, which could reveal a wealth of sensitive
information, do not warrant a Fourth Amendment analysis.178 However, the bigger picture must be considered.
DNA technology has already come a long way and is projected to expand even further in the future.179
Specifically, DNA can already be used to discover biological traits, medical conditions, and relationships between
As long as the government has the DNA samples within their control,
they have access to this sensitive and private information and potentially other
information in the future. Thus, the only solution to prevent this unprecedented
infringement on citizens is to limit the governments retrieval of DNA samples to
only after conviction.
individuals.180
The DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 allows for DNA collection of

those arrested or detained before convicted.
Library of Congress Summary The summary below was written by the Congressional Research
Service, which is a nonpartisan division of the Library of Congress.
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s1606/summary Summaries for the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 - Amends the DNA Identification Act of 1994 to repeal
provisions prohibiting the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) profiles from arrestees who have
not been charged in an indictment or information with a crime, and DNA samples
that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes, from being included
in the National DNA Index System. Requires, for the expungement by a state from
such System of the DNA analysis of a person who has not been convicted of an
offense, that the responsible state agency or official receive a certified copy of a
final court order establishing that each charge serving as the basis for the analysis has been
dismissed or resulted in an acquittal. Repeals a provision granting authority for a one-time keyboard search of such
System by any person authorized to access it. Permits states or local governments to use grant funds to include
within such System DNA samples collected under applicable legal authority (currently, samples taken from
Amends the DNA Analysis Background

Elimination Act of 2000 to authorize the Attorney General to: (1) collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested or detained under U.S. authority; and (2)
authorize any other federal agency that arrests or detains individuals or supervises
individuals facing charges to so collect DNA samples. Eliminates the exception for sexual abuse
individuals convicted of a qualifying state offense).
offenses to the tolling of the statute of limitations in cases where DNA testing implicates a person in the
commission of a felony.
DNA collections norms vary across states, but all states must
collect DNA from pre- detainees.
Sarah B. Berson is on the communications staff of the National Institute of Justice. She received her Juris
Doctorate from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2008 NIJ Journal No. 264, November 2009 NCJ 228383
Debating DNA Collection http://www.nij.gov/journals/264/pages/debating-DNA.aspx (access: 7/2/2015)
The DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 requires that, beginning

January 1, 2009, any adult arrested for a federal crime provide a DNA sample.[2]
The law also mandates DNA collection from persons detained under the authority of
the United States who are not U.S. citizens or are not lawfully in the country. Even
Preconviction DNA Sample Collection
before passage of the act, five states California, Louisiana, Minnesota, Texas and Virginia had statutes that
some states limit

preconviction DNA collection to violent offenses or sex crimes, other states include
all felonies, and some extend the requirement to misdemeanors as well. States'
legislation requiring preconviction DNA collection varies. Variations include the types of crimes
for which samples are collected, applicability of the law to juveniles and procedures for deleting profiles . Some
state laws have faced Fourth Amendment challenges in court.
mandated collecting DNA from people arrested for various qualifying offenses. Although
Backdoor to CODIS
State & Local databases are the backdoor to CODIS regulation
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The success of CODIS in generating investigatory leads from offender profiles stored
in the national databank incentivizes police to expand state and local DNA
databases to include more profiles. n182 Commentators have noted the opportunity
for police to create "offline" DNA databases that are not connected to CODIS to
target the "usual suspects" who are defined by demographics like race, class, and
geographic location. n183 However, police are expanding state and local DNA databases
that are connected to CODIS in ways that were probably never legislatively intended.
Police [*668] have discovered the backdoor to CODIS: federal law limits the DNA
profiles that can be stored in the national databank, but these limits do not extend
to state and local DNA databases. n184 At the national level, DNA samples must adhere to federal
requirements (including the offense and laboratory processing standards) before qualifying for inclusion in CODIS.
While many states have also adopted requisite standards for their own
statewide DNA databases, some local police departments have established their
own databases with little or no regulation. n186 In recent years, "a growing number of law
n185
enforcement agencies collect DNA for their own 'offline' databases." n187 Out of either frustration with the
inefficiencies of state DNA laboratories or a desire to utilize DNA samples ineligible for collection under state or
federal law, many local law enforcement agencies view local DNA databases "as valuable investigative tools." n188
Rather than limiting collection of DNA samples to convicted offenders and arrestees, many local law enforcement
agencies also collect samples from "volunteers, victims, and suspects." n189 Innocent crime victims may "not
necessarily realize their DNA will be saved for future searches." n190 Such collections are "profoundly disturbing"
because DNA voluntarily given to the police to clear a name can be retained and used in the investigation of future
crimes. n191
Transparency Key
Efectiveness data is cherry picked transparency solves
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Orange County, California, serves as a prime example of a city using a local DNA database on steroids. Law
The Orange County local database has reached

80,000 offender profiles and shares information with neighboring jurisdictions . n201
enforcement claims more is better, but is it?
Local officials tout a recently solved kidnapping and rape case from 2001 as an example of the database's
effectiveness. n202 In 2012, a man was arrested for driving under the influence. n203 When his DNA sample was
submitted to the local database following his conviction, it matched the DNA evidence collected from a 2001 crime
Proponents, citing this example, argue that

solving even one case justifies the expansion of underregulated local DNA
databases at any cost. n205 But without greater transparency, it is not possible to
determine whether data like this is being cherry picked. The lack of transparency in
the demographics of the persons in the database and self-selected data about
matches should make one skeptical of extraordinary claims of effectiveness . n206
scene, which was housed in the county lab. n204
Uniform regulation
Tying CODIS access to uniform regulation creates strategic and
procedural components the plan expunges non-qualifying
DNA
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
In order to prevent institutional abuse of local DNA databases and to help protect
privacy interests in the genetic information stored in those local DNA databases,
effective regulation should have both procedural and strategic components in place .
n333 The procedural component should focus on already-acquired genetic samples
and encompass the proper use, maintenance, and storage of samples in the database. The
strategic component should deal with which genetic samples are entered into and remain in the database; its focus
would thus be on policies affecting the acquisition and retention of genetic samples in the database. n334
Regulations should contain robust expungement provisions to protect an individual's privacy interest in the
These provisions could prevent many of

the abuses of law enforcement DNA databases. n335 If a DNA sample that qualifies
for expungement is removed from the database on the front end, there is nothing to
abuse subsequently. The ideal expungement policy would give enough room for
effective law enforcement while adequately protecting valuable privacy interests .
government's use of her personally identifying information.
Criminal investigations may lead to the collection of a wide range of individually identifying DNA information, but
casework samples of known persons should not be entered in a searchable local

DNA database. DNA samples of known persons should only be permitted in local DNA databases that are
collected pursuant to a state's DNA collection law. Biological samples of victims, mere suspects, and even those
who voluntarily offer their cheeks for swabbing [*694] for elimination purposes should not be included without
Such a statute should require informed consent confirmed

in an authenticated writing, a reasonable basis for the police to request the consent,
and the opportunity for the person consenting to qualify for expungement upon
request. The state should bear the burden of expunging the record from all national,
state, and local databases. Any match that occurs after the date the sample
qualifies for expungement should not be used for any purpose. DNA samples
collected pursuant to a warrant or court order should be searched in the local and
state databases (and the national databank, if a one-time search is permitted) and should be
destroyed if the person later qualifies for expungement or if no criminal action has
begun within a defined period of time after the collection. The application of a particular
meeting statutory requirements.
expungement policy to a particular type of DNA sample should be mapped along the spectrum between effective
law enforcement and the extent of privacy interests implicated .
At one end of the spectrum,

convicted felons should receive the least amount of privacy protection and
generally should not have the option of being removed from DNA databases. At the
other end of the spectrum are voluntarily submitted samples collected for purely
elimination purposes; these individuals should receive the most privacy protection
since there is no reason to connect them with the crime being investigated. Once
the criminal investigatory interest ends or the duration of the investigation reaches
a defined point, DNA samples from non-qualifying individuals should qualify for
automatic expungement. n336 The same expungement policy that is applied to elimination samples
should apply to victim and suspect samples as well. Once a case is closed, there should be no
legitimate law enforcement reason for retaining the sample beyond the specific
context of the investigation for which the sample was drawn, analyzed, and
centralized. Arrested individuals are arguably entitled to less privacy protection than elimination, victim, or
suspect individuals, but to more protection than convicted individuals. Just as the level of justification required to
arrest someone for a serious crime is sufficient to warrant an intrusion upon their privacy interests in terms of
search and seizure law, it should be sufficient to warrant a comparable intrusion [*695] regarding the retention of
someone's genetic information in a public government database only after there has been a judicial finding of
probable cause on the qualifying offense to detain the person for trial. If the qualifying charge does not result in a
The purpose of DNA analysis

and recordkeeping in the law enforcement context is simply to provide a method of
identification. n337 The goal is to determine, from the genetic information gathered,
who the information belongs to - specifically, to identify an individual using a very
basic genetic marker. n338 Conversely, the particular purposes to which DNA analysis and management are
conviction, then the individual should qualify for automatic expungement.
put in the private sphere vary, but the general goal is to extract as many details as possible about the person from
the genetic sample to create a complete genetic profile. n339 Private company DNA databases are likely among the
most unregulated databases around and contain much more genetic information about the individual than is
necessary or permitted for law enforcement purposes like identification. n340 Yet allowing law enforcement to tap
into these databases essentially allows an end-run around regulations that pertain only to law enforcement-created
samples and database inclusion. The genetic information from private databases is likely to contain much more
comprehensive personal information than is necessary only to identify the individual. Generally, only internal
policies of private databases guide how and when they share information with law enforcement. n341
Regulations that restrict the flow of information between the private and law
enforcement spheres would help safeguard against abuse and privacy violations.
These regulations should prohibit law enforcement from buying, obtaining, or
otherwise using private DNA information, whether through voluntary (e.g., direct
solicitation) or involuntary (e.g., subpoena) means. This would prevent the criminal
investigatory use of information obtained for non-criminal investigatory reasons .
[*696] Similarly, law enforcement agencies should not be able to share information
with private companies. At all levels, government DNA databases should be
prohibited from selling, licensing, or otherwise making available for non-criminal
investigatory purposes the genetic information under their control . Because the purposes
for acquiring the genetic data should be consistent with their use, private companies should not be able to use
compulsorily obtained DNA information used for criminal investigations. Further, there must be reporting
requirements on the collection practices of police to document the effect of different qualifying offense or
convictions across various demographics of race, class, age, sex, and geography. The reporting requirements should
include disclosure of any discrepancies in the collection of DNA samples and the management and security of the
samples and data, such as whether information is stored in the cloud or on an internal server. Police department
procedures that govern any DNA database should be deemed public documents that are subject to disclosure upon
a public information act request. Additionally,
an individual should have the right to inspect the

information contained in the database and to challenge its accuracy. These
procedural components are essential protections for individual rights.
Plans restrictions achieve the best balance

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
regulation of both state and local DNA databases should exhibit certain
minimum features in order to strike a healthy balance between effective law
enforcement and the protection of individual privacy interests . Collection practices
should include informed consent forms, limitations on future use, and the
opportunity to expunge and/or automatic expungement. Regulatory policies should
In summary,
be consistently applied to both the state and local management and use of DNA
databases. Automatic expungement policies should be coupled with statutory suppression and applied to
different types of DNA samples as follows: elimination, victim, and suspect samples should not
be retained or searched in LDIS and should be automatically expunged once the
related criminal action has concluded; convicted offender samples and arrestee
samples should be automatically expunged if a conviction does not result for the
qualifying offense or a conviction is overturned, reversed, pardon, and there is no
retrial; and convicted felon samples should be subject to automatic expungement at
the conclusion of the sentence or probation . Finally, private entities should not be
permitted to use DNA records stored in a law enforcement database for the purpose
of predicting medical or behavioral traits or linking DNA records to other databases
of information, whether government or private, such as financial records, voting
records, motor vehicle records, and Choice Point style databases . As DNA databases
expand their coverage, so too will they continue to advance beyond subpar regulations that are poorly positioned to
keep databases in check. In response, meaningful restrictions should balance the need to solve crimes with the
otherwise overlooked privacy interests.
Non-CODIS database regulation is local

the FBI began a project to coordinate DNA collection and evaluation. n25 The DNA Identification
Act of 1994 authorized the FBI to establish the National DNA Index System ("NDIS"). n26 Today, NDIS is one part of the Combined
DNA Index System (" CODIS "), a database used by law enforcement throughout the United States and in over thirty other
countries. n27 CODIS also collects and incorporates [*716] profiles from state DNA index systems ("SDIS")
and local DNA index systems ("LDIS"). n28 CODIS collects DNA profiles from convicted offenders, arrestees, crime
In 1990,
scene evidence, missing persons, biological relatives of missing persons, and unidentified human remains. n29 Though each agency
must conform to the minimum standards that the FBI has laid out, each state determines its own policies . n30
For example, while some states permit DNA sampling upon arrest, other states require that an offender be convicted.
DNA Collection Should Be Limited

The Exorbitance of Collecting DNA from All Arrestees, 26 St. Thomas L. Rev. 346
St. Thomas Law Review (Lexis Acc. 62915)
Each state should deny legislation that would enact a database where DNA is collected from all arrestees because
State law should limit DNA

collection to arrestees that are charged with serious crimes. n231 For the purposes of the
regulation, serious crimes should include all crimes where DNA evidence is particularly
useful. n232 DNA evidence is useful in investigating the following: homicide; sexual
crimes; assault; burglary; and theft . n233 Such legislation would allow law
enforcement sufficient leeway to exercise the power of DNA forensics and would
only require the analysis of a reasonable amount of DNA samples. n234 Limiting the
analysis of arrestee DNA to a reasonable number of samples would ensure that
investigations are performed in a cost-efficient manner . n235
such legislation would create a [*372] situation of diminishing returns. n230
Without regulation, itll hurt the person whose DNA is being

analyzed

Without regulation of what tests can be done, individuals whose DNA has been collected
will be open to privacy harms, In addition to the dignitary harm done by having
personal information exposed, the genetic information yielded from the additional
tests or general protocols discussed above - identity, paternity, other familial
relationships, ancestry, disease risk, and behavioral propensities - could have
negative consequences for the individual. If a person's genetic identification profile
is created, that person can be implicated in future crimes and will constantly be
compared to crime scene DNA samples, which some have referred to as lifelong
"genetic surveillance." n114 Also, if DNA is subject to familial searching, to reveal other
family relationships, the individual may feel responsible for making his entire family
subject to such genetic surveillance. Furthermore, if a family member were to be subsequently
prosecuted for a crime, that individual could feel responsible for implicating their family member. Information about
paternity could be used as evidence of statutory rape if the mother of the child is underage or as evidence in a civil
case to require the father to pay child support. Aside from the legal setting, evidence of paternity could also give
the child a claim for inheritance or disrupt the father's existing family if he was not previously aware of the child.
Additionally, government-conducted paternity testing could harm [*1318] the mother if it keeps a man involved in
her life whom she had hoped to avoid. Additionally, if a person's DNA is made available for research, a person may
be unwillingly supporting research she opposes. For example, some groups of people have declined to participate in
genetic ancestry research that might contradict their beliefs about their own ancestry. Recently, members of the
Havasupai tribe in Arizona brought a lawsuit against Arizona State University for genetic research conducted
without their consent, which indicated that the tribe had Asian ancestry in contradiction to the tribe's traditional
A person whose DNA is taken and later used in research will

have no say over the type of research conducted, the results of which may affect
how she understands herself.
stories about its origin. n115
Insurance denial
DNA databasing risking insurance denial
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Without regulation governing these local databases, people may fear that insurance
companies will gain access to the databases. Civil rights and privacy groups are
justifiably concerned that the local databases will heighten genetic discrimination
and lead to individuals being denied coverage based on findings from stored
samples. n321 Although these databases primarily serve law enforcement currently, it is not
unconceivable that information may be shared or even sold in the future.
DNA can be contaminated/ tampered with

DNA can easily be contaminated and can become worse with
newer technology
Peter Gill is a giant in the forensic DNA community, counted among the scientists
who wrote the original paper conceptualizing DNA as a forensic tool in 1985. But he
has spent recent years warning people using his tool against blindly trusting its
results. In a 2014 book called Misleading DNA Evidence: Reasons for Miscarriages of Justice, Gill wrote that
contamination is dangerous because investigators are eager to believe that DNA
found at a crime scene must come from the perpetrator. The presence of a DNA
profile says nothing about the time frame or the circumstances under which it came
to be there, says defense expert and researcher Dan Krane. Test results cant distinguish
between the possibility of contamination, or evidence tampering, or, you know,
murder. Technology may soon increase the danger of implicating innocent people .
Today, most DNA analytical machines are optimized to parse the DNA of about 100 human cells. Future generations
The DNA of a person who drives by a crime

scene with an open window could wind up somewhere suspicious; shake someones
hand before he commits a crime, and you may be implicated. Next gen sequencing
might generate lots of data from small amounts of DNA, but youre still faced with
the same fundamental question what does it mean? said John Butler, special assistant to
of forensic robots may extract a profile from just one.
the director for forensic science at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who has written several
You could detect a single cell on a knife blade, but that doesnt
mean anything it might have arrived there long before the crime or been
transferred there by chance.
textbooks on DNA analysis.
DNA data matches are not objective

Worth is a
2015 http://fusion.net/story/153996/can-dna-testing-be-trusted-the-shockingly-imprecise-science-of-a-provenCan DNA testing be trusted? The shockingly imprecise science of a proven courtroom tool Katie
courtroom-tool/
A 2013 survey by the National Institute of Standards and Technology asked analysts
from 108 labs to look at a three-person mixture and determine if a suspects DNA
was present. Seventy percent of the analysts said the suspect might be in the mix;
24 percent said the data was inconclusive. Just six percent arrived at the truth: The
suspect was not in the sample. Not only do analysts vary in their interpretation of
evidence, they also disagree over how certain to feel about the results. In another
NIST survey, labs interpreting a two-person mixture came back with match
probabilities that varied by 10 orders of magnitude . Imagine if you take a pregnancy test and
you send it to two different labs, said Greg Hampikian, who authored the study on bias in the Atlanta rapist case,
Because
different analysts can reach different conclusions about the same DNA evidence,
savvy investigators shop evidence around to get the results they want . In one instance,
and one said the odds are a billion to one that youre pregnant, and the other said its 50-50.
the California Innocence Project had a large private lab test evidence attorneys believed could exonerate a
convicted murderer in Los Angeles. That lab reported the DNA was inconclusive. So lawyers took the same data to
another analyst. By her assessment, the evidence plainly cleared the convict.
DNA testing can become inaccurate due to handling of data

DNA forensics not as infallible as investigators claim But not because of science Andrew Porterfield is a
writer, editor and communications consultant for academic institutions, companies and non-profits in the life
June 29, 2015
sciences|
| Genetic Literacy Project http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2015/06/29/dnaforensics-not-as-infallible-as-investigators-claim-but-not-because-of-science/ (ac: 6-30-15)
German investigators, like many other police departments, felt assured that if
they could get a DNA match on a real person, theyd have their culprit. For DNA was
considered nearly completely infallible. After all, the U.S. National Research Council
had declared that the reliability and validity of properly collected and analyzed
DNA data should not be in doubt. This reputation was being held up in courtroom testimony and
appeals court decisions not just in the United States, but worldwide. And the Germans got their suspect . The
problem was, the phantom wasnt a criminal at all, but a female worker in a crime
lab. Her DNA contaminated the cotton swabs used by investigators to gather
samples at the six murder scenes as well as other crime scenes. The phantom case is not
an isolated incident. Since DNA has taken over fingerprints or hair analysis as the most
scientific method of crime scene forensics, a number of blunders involving
mishandling of DNA has contaminated not only DNA samples, but also the reliability
of criminal investigations: In Houston, the police department was forced to shut down
its DNA and serology crime lab sections completely, after it was revealed that the
lab had botched the processing of DNA samples.Two men who were falsely
convicted based on botched lab work were released from prison after subsequent
DNA testing proved their innocence. The lab eventually reopened, but in 2014 it was transferred from
The
the police department to a civilian board after a laboratory technician resigned for allegedly falsifying a worksheet,
The FBI, after an investigation of its

discovered in 2002 that staff biologist Jacqueline Blake had not
conducted the proper negative controls when performing a polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) test on DNA samples. These controls are necessary to rule out
contamination from technicians or any other laboratory processes. She nonetheless filled
failing to recalibrate a machine and tampering with government records.
DNA forensics lab,
out her paperwork indicating that she had performed the negative controls. Her shortcuts, according to the FBI
Inspector General, necessitated the removal of 29 DNA samples from the bureaus national DNA database, delayed
delivery of DNA reports crucial to some criminal cases, and eliminated DNA evidence from other cases. In 2013,
DNA found on the fingernails of a murder victim in San Jose, California, was run
through DNA databases. A hit (aka, a DNA profile that matched the crime scene sample) led
police to 26-year-old Lukas Anderson, who was charged with murder. But Anderson
couldnt have done it: paramedics had transported him to the hospital for extreme
drunkenness, and he was in the hospital at the time of the murder. What really happened?
Andersons DNA had been transferred from the paramedics, who were dispatched to the murder scene shortly after
dropping off Anderson at the hospital.
AT: Consent
Under the DNA Act refusing to allow DNA collection will result
in a misdemeanor.
A. THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT AND THE DNA ACT According to federal law, a DNA
sample is defined as a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a DNA analysis can be carried
out.16 The definition of DNA analysis under federal law is an analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
identification information in a bodily sample.17 In other words ,
a DNA sample is an actual physical

sample from an individual, while DNA analysis is the examination and breakdown of
that bodily sample into a DNA profile.18 Both the DNA sample and DNA analysis are fundamental to
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act and the DNA Act. In 1994, Congress approved and
enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act ,19 which gave the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the authorization to create an index of DNA
samples.20 After being given such authority, the FBI developed the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), which allowed forensics laboratories to exchange and
compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime
scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on
file in the system.21 Later, in 2000, Congress passed the DNA Act, requiring a DNA sample collected from
each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal
According to the DNA

Act, [t]he Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or the probation
office responsible (as applicable) may use or authorize the use of such means as are
reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an
individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of the sample .23 Furthermore,
[a]n individual from whom the collection of a DNA sample is authorized under this
subsection who fails to cooperate in the collection of that sample shall be . . . guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.24 Once the proper authority collects the DNA sample,
the collection is sent to the FBI for analysis and entry into CODIS .25 The following suboffense and from each individual on probation, parole, or supervised release.22
sections discuss the process for creating a DNA profile in CODIS, the statutory safeguards in the DNA Act, and the
additional policies that were created by the FBI to afford protection against the improper use of the DNA profiles.
Original DNA Act

The DNA Act before changes had safeguards.
Loyola Law Review is the property of Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Stephanie
Beaugh
6/18/
the DNA Act, Congress included safeguards to prevent the improper use of
the DNA samples.41 First, it explicitly prohibits the use of DNA test results for
specific reasons that are enumerated under privacy protection standards in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.42 Further, the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act only allows the disclosure of DNA test results in the
following situations: (A) to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement
identification purposes; (B) in legal proceedings , if it is otherwise admissible . . . ; (C) for
criminal defense purposes, to a defendant who shall have access to samples and analyses performed in
connection with the case in which such defendant is charged; or ( D) if personally identifiable
information is removed, for apopulation statistics database, for identification research and protocol
development purposes, or for quality control purposes.43 The second safeguard set by the DNA Act states
that a person who knowingly discloses a sample or result . . . in any manner to any
person not authorized to receive it, or obtains or uses, without authorization, such
sample or result carries a criminal penalty of a fine of up to $250,000 or
imprisonment for up to one year.44 Each instance of an unlawful disclosure of the DNA sample or
result is treated as and punishable as a separate offense.45 Furthermore, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act holds that a failure to act in accordance with the quality
control and privacy requirements described in 42 U.S.C. 14132(b) can result in cancellation
of access to the DNA index CODIS. 46 As a final safeguard, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act requires the DNA record be expunged from CODIS in very
specific and limited circumstances.47 First, if a conviction for a qualifying offense is
overturned, and if the Director receives, for each conviction . . . , a certified copy of a final court order
When enacting
establishing that such conviction has been overturned, then expungement is mandatory.48 Second,
expungement of the DNA record is required when a DNA sample is taken following
an arrest but the charge is subsequently dismissed or results in an acquittal or the
charge is not timely filed, and if the Attorney General receives, for each charge against the person . . . , a
certified copy of a final court order establishing such.49 Finally, even if expungement is required,
sought, and obtained, only an individuals DNA profile will be expunged from
CODIS, the Government will retain his DNA sample indefinitely .
CODIS
CODIS is only composed of DNA profile, Agency Identifier,
Specimen ID Number, and the lab personnel.
the FBI, in accordance with the legislative historys

indication that additional safeguards should be added to protect against improper
use of DNA profiles, later implemented two significant policies and practices .51 The
first policy safeguard states that the FBI limits the type and amount of information
stored in CODIS.52 The CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System states
that [n]o names or other personal identifiers of the offenders, arrestees, or
detainees are stored using the CODIS software. 53 The National DNA Index System
part of CODIS is subsequently only composed of the following information: (1) The DNA profile
the set of identification characteristics or numerical representation at each of the various loci analyzed; (2 ) The
Agency Identifier of the agency submitting the DNA profile; (3) The Specimen Identification
Numbergenerally a number assigned sequentially at the time of sample collection. This number does not
In addition to statutory safeguards,
correspond to the individuals social security number, criminal history identifier, or correctional facility identifier;
The DNA laboratory personnel associated with a DNA profile analysis .54 Thus,
when conducting a search in CODIS, a user can access only a limited amount of
information, none of which identifies the person to whom the profile belongs .55 Such
and (4)
restrictions enacted by the FBI regarding the information stored in CODIS reflect Congresss concern and reasons for
creating strict safeguards for privacy.56
Deletion cost
Even if this would be a cost to the government they should
assume the responsibility because the DNA was taken
unlawfully in the first place.
Another criticism of this proposal is that shifting the burden of retrieving and expunging the DNA profile to the
While this mayor may notbe true, this policy argument

should be given little weight; if it is in the governments interest to retrieve DNA,
then the government should naturally be responsible for it. Frequently in tort and
contract cases, courts prefer placing the financial burden on the party causing
injury, especially when that party is best able to bear the cost .181 In the instant
circumstances, the government is the party responsible for causing injury by invading
ones privacy to obtain a DNA sample. Thus, the government, with its vast amount
of resources, is best able to and should bear the costs associated with maintaining
and expunging DNA
government is too costly.
junk DNA
Just because junk DNA is not used now does not mean that
with new technological advances that this will not quickly
changeit can already be used for familial searches and
Medical history
The court states that the amount and type of personal information to be contained
in the DNA profile is nominal.203 However, this is a specious conclusion that evinces a
fundamental ignorance of the amount and type of information actually available or
a willful blindness to it. If familial and biological searches can be conducted, the
information appears to be more than nominal. Even if the search merely yielded nominal
information on matches, the government still possesses the sample from which the DNA
profile is made. This intrusion on privacy is significant and unreasonable given that
the scope of other personal information that can be obtained from a DNA sample is
extraordinarily broad.204 Significantly, as a district court correctly concluded, DNA is an information
science, not an identification science. Furthermore , it is not out of the realm of possibility that
the government might disregard or change its policy of using only junk DNA.
Considering ongoing technological advances, junk DNA could potentially reveal far
more extensive information than it currently divulges.206 Even though junk DNA is
a minimal DNA sample, the amount of information and detail extracted from it is
huge. As mentioned, DNA can already be used to ascertain ones biological traits,
medical conditions, and other relatives. This information is not only private, but it is
irrelevant for identification purposes. Access to all this private information is an
invasion of privacy of arrestees and pre-trial detainees, which the Fourth
Amendment was enacted to protect.
Function Creep
DNA collection risk Function Creep
One major risk that may accompany the DNA sampling of large populations , along with
the placing of such samples in databases, is the risk that that database will be subject to
function creep. Databases in the United States have a history of being subject to function creep. Two major
examples are the Social Security number system and census records. [*170] The stated purpose of developing a
system of Social Security numbers was to aid the installation of the Social Security retirement program, and
assurances were made that that would be the only purpose for which Social Security numbers would be used. n116
However, Social Security numbers gradually became "the universal identifier that their creators claimed they would
not be." n117 Census records, which were created and still used for statistical purposes, developed a more
frightening function in World War II--they were used "to round up innocent Japanese Americans and to place them in
Function creep has already started to occur with respect to DNA

databases. For example, familial DNA searching allows law enforcement to connect
DNA found at crime scenes to family members of individuals whose profiles are in
DNA databases. n119 Additionally, DNA analysis companies have been marketing services to law enforcement
internment camps." n118
that would allow them to use DNA to predict the specific ancestry of an offender or infer the offender's eye color.
Although this information may allow police to better identify and arrest
criminals, n121 such expanded use comes with the risk of infringing on personal
liberties. For example, DNA collection may be used to bolster racial profiling efforts, especially when DNA is
n120
generally collected from racial minorities. The risk of function creep is made greater by the fact that DNA databases
are continually expanding. n122 "[W]e
have witnessed the ever-widening scope of the target

groups from whom law enforcement collects DNA and rapid-fire proposals to expand
genetic databases to include new categories and ever-greater numbers of persons ,"
n123 one example of which is the subject of this note--the addition of arrestees to the group of individuals whose
In less than a decade, we have gone from collecting DNA

from convicted sex offenders--on the theory that they are likely to be recidivists and that they frequently
leave biological evidence--to collecting it from all violent offenders; to collecting it from all
persons convicted of a crime; to collecting it from juvenile offenders in twenty-nine
states; and now to proposals, and laws . . . to collect it from mere arrestees . n124 It can
DNA can be sampled and stored:
be expected that if states do not take action to curb the current trend toward broadening DNA databases, DNA
databases will likely grow to include [*171] everyone "designated 'criminal'" n125 meaning that DNA databases will
The risk of function creep

is also made greater by the fact that "there is not one state or federal statute that
requires that biological samples collected for identification purposes be destroyed
after identification testing is completed," allowing "an unlimited span of improper
uses . . . so long as those samples are retained ." n127 Proponents of DNA sampling of arrestees
include all those individuals who have a run-in with the criminal justice system.
urge that the genetic information of innocent arrestees is protected because the samples will be destroyed when an
individual's record is expunged. n128 However, in practice, after samples are analyzed in order to extract a profile
for CODIS, the federal government, Maryland, and a majority of states retain whole samples indefinitely. n129
New Framework needed

New advancements complicate ordinary frameworks of
Genetic Information
Ram;
, 2015.
Natalie
May
(Assistant Professor at University of Baltimore Law School). DNA by the
Individuals do not voluntarily share identifying genetic information
in common with their
close genetic relatives. n175 Genetic similarity is a product of biology, not choice. "[W]e all well know that we do
Parents might be said to share their

identifiable genetic material volitionally by choosing to procreate, but even that
notion of voluntariness is open to question . n177 At a minimum, there is no sense in which
not choose the families into which we are born." n176
children may be said to have chosen their genetic parents, and siblings likewise do not control whether their
parents have additional children. Thus
, the number and identity of one's close genetic
relatives is most often out of one's contro l. Here again , this feature complicates the
ordinary frameworks applied to genetic information . Most saliently, "[i]n light of the
involuntariness and intractability of the genetic link, . .
. it seems indefensible to claim a voluntary
relinquishment of privacy by the relative on account of mere biology . " n178

Voluntariness shapes the scope of many legal rights . As set forth above, civil
forfeiture sometimes turns on the voluntary decision of an [*905] owner or co-owner to continue to share property
The tort of public disclosure of private facts has been held to turn
on one's voluntary public appearance . n180 And courts have deemed the Fourth
with a criminal. n179
Amendment inapplicable to information individuals voluntarily share with others
n181 Notions of abandonment, which play a key role in both research and forensic uses of genetic information,
similarly turn on some notion of volition--the "knowing exposure" of material or information to the public. n182 In
the principle most commonly applied seems to be that of 'finders

keepers' where pathologists, physicians, and researchers who have access to
patient tissue feel no qualms about keeping [*906 ] it for their own use , beyond the
purposes for which the tissue was collected." n183 The rule of " finders keepers" at work here stems
the research context, "
from the doctrine of abandonment , in which the former title-holder surrenders all
rights to the object in question , and title is assigned to the first person who takes possession. n184 In
individuals have been held to have "abandoned" genetic material
left on cigarette butts, coffee cups, and envelopes, such that analysis of that
material did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. n185
the forensic context,
The law of criminal and civil forfeitures construct legal

framework.
Ram;
, 2015.
Natalie
May
(Assistant Professor at University of Baltimore Law School). DNA by the
The rule barring unilateral encumbrances has legal consequences even as against
the federal government . Consider federal forfeiture law. Although courts typically have analyzed
forensic genetic identification under the Fourth Amendment , n276 the notion of
forfeiture is not foreign to the Fourth Amendment
. n277 Courts frequently speak of defendants
[*921] whose actions have thereby "forfeited" any reasonable expectation of privacy in objects or information.
n278 Moreover, courts have addressed criminal and civil forfeitures of entireties property directly in determining
The legal burdens applicable to

forfeitures also are largely similar to those giving rise to the legal authority to take
and analyze genetic material--criminal conviction or at least probable cause. n280 The law
of criminal and civil forfeitures and the concept of tenancy by the entirety thus
provide an instructive framework for considering the appropriateness of forensic familial
whether and in what forms the government may forfeit property. n279
identification . Pursuant to the federal criminal forfeiture statute, the government may forfeit
property used in or derived from a Page 17 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873, *918 statutory violation .
n281 As criminal forfeiture requires a nexus to the defendant's illegal conduct, however, "only the defendant's
interest in property may be forfeited." n282
The interests of third parties are beyond the scope
of forfeiture , "even if the third party was fully aware of the criminal acts and the way the property [*922] was
used to facilitate them." n283 More than one court has cautioned that failure to exclude third-party interests from
forfeiture where multiple individuals have interests in a single parcel of real property "raises serious constitutional
concerns." n284 "If partial forfeitures are forbidden, then a criminal's activity may result in the forfeiture of an
innocent third party's interest in property," which "may thus constitute an unconstitutional taking of a third party's
interest or a deprivation of that party's property without due process." n285 Courts considering criminal
forfeitures where tenancies by the entirety are at issue have often worked contortions in the law in order to
permit the government to forfeit its due while not encroaching on the interest of a nondefendant spouse. Where a
criminal defendant is a joint tenant with an innocent party,
the federal government's
forfeiture authority takes the defendant's interest in the property ,

presumably severing the joint tenancy, destroying rights of survivorship, and creating a tenancy in common with
the innocent co-owner. n286 But where a tenancy by the entirety is at issue, the result is often quite different. For
instance, in United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, the Sixth Circuit held that, because "entireties property may not be
attached to satisfy the personal tax liability of a single spouse," "[w]hile
the federal forfeiture
scheme permits the Government to assume Mr. Marks' interest in the

property, it may not by virtue of the forfeiture alter the essential characteristics of the
entireties estate." n287 The court concluded that "the government could not execute on a defendant's interest in
a tenancy by the entireties while the interest was still intact, even if such interest was subject to forfeiture. To do
so would burden the interests of . . . third party owners in the criminal forfeiture [*923] context." n288 Some
courts have gone further still, holding that a property held in tenancy by the entirety is not subject to federal
forfeiture at all. n289
Current legal framework isnt resolving.

The
criminal forfeiture cases do not
, however,
fully resolve the issue of forensic
familial identification. Recall that Maryland v. King sustained the taking of genetic
information from individuals arrested for , but not yet convicted of, serious offenses . n290
The criminal forfeiture context, which requires a criminal conviction, may therefore be underinclusive. n291
Looking to the civil forfeiture context, however, yields the same result. Civil forfeitures result from in rem
proceedings against the property itself. n292 Unlike criminal forfeitures, civil forfeitures do not require proof of an
owner's guilt; rather, they require the government to establish only probable cause to believe that the property in
a]n
innocent owner's interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture
[*924] statute ." n294 In considering the innocent owner defense to civil forfeiture, courts sometimes have
question was involved in unlawful conduct. n293 Nonetheless, at least with respect to federal law, "[
tangled with contortions similar to those in the criminal forfeiture context. Indeed, 2525 Leroy Lane held that the
result under the civil forfeiture law was the same as under the criminal forfeiture statute. n295 In United States v.
1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third Circuit similarly held that an innocent spouse who holds otherwise forfeitable
property as a tenant by the entirety is entitled to retain the "right to full and exclusive use and possession of the
property during her life, her protection against conveyance of or execution by third parties upon her husband's
former interest, and her survivorship right." n296 And as in the criminal forfeiture context, some courts have
found entireties properties Page 18 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873, *921 beyond the scope of federal civil forfeiture
where there is an innocent spouse. n297 Moreover, courts in the civil forfeiture context have implied, and
sometimes held, that forfeiture of property used in criminal activity without any voluntary action by an innocent
the Supreme
Court reiterated that its cases have "implied that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
owner raises constitutional concerns. n298 [*925] In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
taken from him without his privity or consent
." n299
The Court has consistently
distinguished between forfeitures in which property was used without

the owner's consent and forfeitures in which, after the owner "entrusted" the property to another user,
the property was used in a manner to which the owner did not consent. n300 The
Supreme Court has
implied , and other courts have held, that forfeitures of the latter type are constitutionally
permissible , while forfeitures of the former type are not. n301
There is uncertainty in the doctrine of consent in regards to

DNA collection.
Bartusiak, 11

Uncertainty in the Application of the Doctrine of Consent When Applied to DNA Collection Traditionally, in the
the "state assumes the burden of overcoming the presumption

of invalidity by demonstrating ... that the warrantless search satisfied one of the
firmly established exceptions to the warrant requirement ." n149 When the government
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, it has the burden of
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. n150 Because a person who
consents to a search "may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search ,"
n151 the government must also prove that the search was within the actual scope of
consent. n152 The allocation of the burden of proof means that "'where the evidence is inconclusive ... the
absence of a valid warrant
defendant wins.'" n153 In the context of DNA analysis, a court must decide between two basic consent scenarios:
first, a nonoffender may have expressly consented to any future use of his DNA, or in the absence of express
consent, the court may have determined that general consent to all future uses is implied; n154 and second, a
nonoffender may have [*664] expressly limited the scope of a consent search to a particular investigation or the
the government bears

the burden of demonstrating either express consent, or that the use of the DNA was within the
scope of implied consent as measured by the standard of objective reasonableness. n155 Objective
reasonableness evaluates scope of consent as that which "an ordinary reasonable
person would understand to be the scope of consent between the officer and the
consenting person." n156 The effectiveness of court regulation of local and state DNA
databases is both uncertain and inconsistent , with perhaps too much focus on the particular facts
court may imply such a limit from the circumstances. Under the traditional analysis,
of the instant case. For example, in United States v. Kriesel, a sharply divided panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed
the government's interest in retention of a physical DNA sample. n157 After pleading guilty to a drug conspiracy
charge, Edward Kriesel agreed to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis as a condition of his supervised release.
n158 After his DNA profile was added to CODIS, Kriesel demanded the return of his actual blood sample, claiming
the sample qualified as property. n159 The majority determined that although a blood sample qualifies as property,
the government has a legitimate interest in retaining it. n16
AT: Crime
DNA misuse reduces rape reports each week increases risk
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
To do her part to help law enforcement, a Louisiana rape victim voluntarily provided her DNA so
that her genetic information might help bring her attacker to justice. n1 After all, DNA saves lives and helps solve
crimes. n2 Much to her horror, her DNA did not lead law enforcement to her rapist; rather,
her DNA sample led
to her brother's conviction for a separate string of crimes. n3 In Louisiana, DNA profiles from
victims and suspects remain warehoused in local DNA databases indefinitely. n4 As a result, this woman essentially
this rape victim felt

betrayed, because the police "did everything behind [her] back." n5 Her brother's attorney cautioned that
"such cases might make rape victims think twice before reporting an attack." n6 Louisiana's
unexpected use of crime victim DNA and local DNA databases n7 to investigate crimes is not unique. This also
occurs in Maryland, where police in Baltimore City and Prince George's County retain crime victim DNA in
became a genetic informant on her brother. At arguably her most vulnerable point,
underregulated local DNA [*641] databases from known persons that police cannot enter into the FBI's Combined
Offender DNA Indexing System national DNA databank (CODIS). n8 These local police departments also maintain
underregulated databases of DNA profiles from crime scenes that contain low-quality samples that are not
permitted in CODIS. n9 Every week these local underregulated databases are compared to find complete or partial
matches that link a known individual to crime scene evidence, or an unknown individual across multiple crime
Louisiana and Maryland are not the exception, but

rather the norm. The more than 190 public DNA laboratories that participate in the FBI's CODIS program
also maintain databases at the state or local level n11 that may contain DNA from known
persons or crime scenes that cannot be entered into the national databank. n12 The FBI closely regulates
the categories of DNA profiles that can be entered into the national databank, but not the
categories that participating [*642] laboratories can store and search in databases at the
local and state levels, creating a gap in regulation. n13
scenes n10 - with unintended consequences.
Unregulated local databases risk false positives

639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
The underregulation of state and local DNA databases also means that low-quality
DNA profiles developed from crime scene samples that cannot be uploaded to the
national DNA databank are placed in state and local databases. n233 The risk of
misidentification increases when degraded, partial, or irrelevant crime scene profiles
are stored in databases. n234 DNA analysis of low amounts of DNA, called "low-copy
number DNA," often fails to detect a complete profile and can add erroneous
information. n235 In addition, state and local DNA databases are now being
expanded to include other poor-quality DNA samples like "touch" DNA, driven by the
increasing sensitivity of DNA analysis and an insatiable demand for DNA testing in a
wide array of cases from property and drug crimes to quality-of-life offenses. n236
[*675] The number of partial crime scene profiles that matched multiple persons in
Great Britian's national DNA databank illustrates the scope of the concern. Between
May 2001 and September 2006, 182,612 crime scene profiles were matched. n237
A single suspect was reported for 132,178 of these match groups; for the remainder
of matches (nearly 50,000), a list of potential suspects was produced. n238 In its
annual report, the agency overseeing the database explained that "the
identification of more than one potential suspect as the source of the DNA at some
scenes is largely due to the significant proportion of crime scene sample profiles
that are partial." n239 The existence of a database that contains low-quality DNA
profiles developed from crime scene samples means that individuals whose profiles
are contained in the database, and their family members, may be falsely connected
to criminal investigations. n240 Whereas FBI regulations exclude these poor-quality
samples from the U.S. national databank in an attempt to ensure the quality of
investigative leads generated from a "hit" to an individual in the convicted offender
or arrestee indices, many state and local [*676] databases may include them. n241
Furthermore, while the FBI audits the profiles that local and state laboratories
upload to the national databank to further ensure the quality of its investigative
leads and ensure compliance with its upload standards, these audits do not extend
to profiles contained in the local and state laboratories. n242
Under-regulated DNA databases risk chilling efect on crime

reporting
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
Familial searching of an individual's DNA sample raises fears about intrusions of
privacy and potential abuse at all levels. However, these fears are greater at the
local level because of the lack of regulations governing local practices, especially
because those practices are usually only limited by controlling constitutional
authority. n318 Further, the chilling effect of underreporting crime would likely be
more prominent at the local level where individuals are more likely to encounter
their local law enforcement, as opposed to state or federal agencies. This would be
especially likely for victims of crimes where DNA is needed to help catch the
perpetrator, and for individuals who would likely turn themselves in for crimes they
personally committed. Further, knowledge of familial search practices can hinder
community support in crime investigations. Individuals may be less likely to
persuade a family member to turn himself in if there is a chance that the individual
will be personally tracked through a DNA sample given by the family member.
Although there is a notion that innocent individuals have nothing to fear because
familial DNA would not result in a hit, there is still the risk of wrongful convictions
due to "the multitude of possible errors that can arise during laboratory analysis
and data entry; and the great potential for corruption and fabrication." n319 Thus,
underreporting of crimes could be an inevitable result of the natural desire to
preserve one's privacy.
Databases frequently give incorrect suspects prolonging the

case.
Database matches are tricky. They can sometimes solve otherwise inscrutable
cases, but they can also lead investigators down the wrong path. In one case in Bolton,
England, police deduced a 6-loci profile from blood discovered on the window of a burglarized home. The trouble
was, the DNA matched a man with advanced Parkinsons disease who could barely walk. But the match statistic 1
in 37 million seemed so definitive that police arrested him anyway. He was finally vindicated after more
advanced DNA tests revealed that he shared a partial profile with the culprit. When a suspect has been discovered
because of a database match, courts must decide how much weight to give that evidence, and different statistical
methods can arrive at wildly different results. The method used by Fahnestock calculates how often the profile is
expected to occur randomly in the population.
After his initial tests, he calculated that the

probability of a random person having the profile he found on the cheese wrapper
was 1 in 741,000 among Caucasians. Defense expert Dan Krane came up with a
different statistic: 1 in 2.5. The reason for the yawning difference, Krane explained, is that his method
takes into account the likelihood of a coincidental match in a specific database. For instance, if you search a
database of 1 million for a profile that 1 in 100,000 people share, you would expect
around ten hits. If you arrested any of them without other evidence, youd probably
get the wrong person. The method was endorsed by a special advisory group to the
FBI and a National Research Council panel , but is sometimes withheld from court in an attempt not
to confuse jurors with statistical arguments
DNA Forensics does Not Deter Crime

An ethnographic study consisting of twenty-six volunteer inmates examined the extent of prisoners' knowledge of
DNA forensics. n189 The study showed that prisoners were familiar with the power of DNA forensics. n190 Although
the prisoners did not have a sophisticated knowledge of how DNA forensics works, most of the prisoners believed
that DNA forensics is very effective and extremely difficult to avoid. n191 [*368] Prisoners knew that even a small
amount of blood, hair, or saliva can render a readable DNA sample. n192 The interviews with the prisoners show
According to rational choice

theory, the prisoners in the study should have been deterred from committing their
respective crime because they were aware of the high likelihood of arrest posed by
DNA forensics. n194 However, these prisoners were obviously not deterred from
committing crime. n195 The study states that the interviewees did not consider DNA
as a particularly important factor in the decision to commit a crime . n196 This incongruous
that the rational choice argument should not be given credence. n193
outcome may be explained by the fact that potential offenders may doubt the certainty of arrest posed by DNA
potential offenders believe that

steps can be taken to successfully avoid leaving DNA evidence at crime scenes . n198
forensics. n197 This doubt can be reasonably inferred from the fact that
Criminals attempt to avoid leaving DNA at crime scenes in a variety of ways. n199 Rapists have avoided leaving
post-coital DNA by wearing condoms or forcing victims to bathe after an attack. n200 Additionally, criminals refrain
DNA databases may not

successfully deter crime because potential offenders may have a lowered
perception of the certainty of being apprehended by DNA identification . n202
from spitting or leaving cigarette butts at the site of a crime. n201 Thus,
DNA Profiling Can Lead Youngsters to a Life of Crime

DNA databases may exacerbate crime among particular groups instead of causing deterrence. n206 When a
young offender is convicted of a crime, his or her DNA profile is uploaded into the
database and will remain in the database for the duration of his or her life . n207 The
presence of young offender profiles will ensure that law enforcement can quickly
apprehend any young recidivists when another crime is committed . n208 This can be
damaging because consistent incarceration at a young age will force offenders to have
frequent and intimate association with other convicted criminals . n209 This experience may
cause the young offender to further develop definitions that favor the violation of the law,
which can turn young individuals into hardened criminals by potentially severing
any hope of rehabilitation and dooming the youngster to a life of crime. n210 Thus, DNA
databases may not substantially deter crime nor provide rehabilitative effects. n211
DNA Collection Not Efficient Means of identifying arrestees

Acc. 62915)
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion in King where he strongly disagreed with the majority, and was joined by
three other justices. n53 The dissent argued that DNA collection upon arrest is not a
significant governmental interest because it is not an efficient means for the
identification of arrestees. n54 Fingerprints already give reliable identification results that can be rendered
in a fraction of the time required by DNA analysis. n55 Additionally, the Maryland statute does not even allow [*352]
DNA to be processed until after arraignment and thus cannot be used for pretrial release purposes. n56
Furthermore,
the logic where DNA is considered an efficient means of identification is

problematic because it can apply equally to serious and non-serious offenses.
DNA Collection Over-Inclusive and Problematic

Acc. 62915)
"If one believes that DNA will "identify' someone arrested for assault, he must
believe that it will "identify' someone arrested for a traffic offense. " n58 Thus, the
decision sets a precedent where future state legislation may allow DNA collection of
non-serious arrestees. n59 Justice Scalia stated that the majority's logic will support
an over-inclusive DNA database and thus impinge on the liberties granted by the
Constitution because the real function of the DNA tests is to run suspicionless
searches on arrestees, which are unjustified absent any special need or probable
cause.DNA Samples Have
Variety of Problems for Reliability

Acc. 62915)
When a DNA sample is taken with a buccal swab during the arrest procedure, as was the case in King, the integrity of that sample
may be easily preserved because of the controlled conditions of the extraction. n116 Thus, the integrity of the offender index
profiles in CODIS are well preserved and all thirteen loci can be discriminately examined. n117 However, the DNA samples that
comprise the offender index are compared to samples from the forensic index, which are samples collected from crime scenes. n118
The integrity of the samples found at crime scenes are more often compromised
because controlled conditions are not present during the [*359] commission of a
crime. n119 Thus, DNA samples from the forensic index may not render reliable results
for a variety of reasons. n120 A sample may be deemed unreadable if it is of
insufficient quantity. n121 The types of samples that are found at crime scenes may
vary in DNA content. n122 A reliable sample must have anywhere from fifty to one
hundred billionths of a gram of DNA. n123 That means that receiving a successful
DNA match from a crime scene may depend on the sample that is left at the scene .
n124 For instance, a one centimeter stain of blood has a success rate of over ninety-five
percent. n125 However, blood and semen have a higher DNA content than hair or
skin cells. n126 Accordingly, a root [*360] end of shed hair has less than a twenty
percent chance of success for a reliable reading. n127 The quality of a DNA sample
may also render the sample unreliable. n128 Samples found at crime scenes may
be exposed to extreme temperatures, oxygen, and water, which can degrade DNA .
n129 Contamination poses the biggest threat of degradation to DNA. n130
Contamination may result in the recognition of a microbial DNA sequence. n131 This
presents a second DNA sequence within one sample and may interfere with the
analysis of the initial and intended sample. n132 However, testing procedures
instituted by a lab can eliminate the problems posed by contamination. n133
Collection of DNA is Not Cost-Efective

The conclusion that DNA databases do not deter crime nor provide rehabilitative effects should not be implied to
suggest that DNA forensics is not a valuable and useful tool. n212 DNA databases still remain useful because they
allow police to quickly identify and apprehend dangerous criminals. n213 DNA forensics mainly provide law
enforcement with a [*370] function of restraint and incapacitation. n214 However, instating a criminal justice
system where DNA is collected from all arrestees is not a cost-efficient use of the
function of DNA databases because of the social implications that may be involved. n215 The costs
involved with analyzing DNA varies given the circumstances of the testing . n216
Processing the DNA of an arrestee that has been collected during an arrest
procedure can cost anywhere from $ 25 to $ 110 dollars . n217 Analyzing the DNA
found at crime scenes can be more expensive . n218 Testing the post-coital DNA of
an unnamed rape suspect can cost about $ 1,000 dollars. n219 Laboratories are
currently struggling to analyze all the DNA samples that are submitted from law
enforcement. n220 Collecting samples from every arrestee would substantially
increase the demand of DNA forensics and aggravate the backlogs of many laboratories . n221 A
backlog is a situation where a laboratory is overburdened and cannot test all of the samples that have been
laboratories will
exacerbate laboratory backlogs and costs states a great deal of money. n223
submitted. n222 Submitting a slew of arrestee samples to overburdened [*371]
Impact Framing
Evaluating risk with a one percent doctrine makes life
impossible everything could theoretically cause extinction
Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, The "One Percent Doctrine"
and Environmental Faith, Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-andenvironmental.html)
Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can
applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the

environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this
doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant . It is
intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many
potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the
asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original
scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one
percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all
of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have
to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs . But why then should we only make these trade-offs
between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more
cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow
fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact,
this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of
coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee
shop. We are constantly risking death , if slightly, in order to pursue the things we
value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not
even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor
not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety . Friedman's approach reminds me
remember ever reading. He
somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's
wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in
it's striking how

descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five
to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to
act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless
and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the
early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming
apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action .
him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out,
AT:Topicality
All DNA analysis is federal surveillance CODIS sets the
standards
Acc. 6-29-2015)
Each state may analyze the DNA for any specific markers, and any number of
markers it chooses, but general uniformity has been assured by CODIS. The FBI will
accept entries from states for its database only if the states submit markers from its
specified set of thirteen markers, federal law encourages states to join the CODIS
system and to submit qualifying genotypes to the federal database from their own
records. n14 The genotypes are accompanied by identifiers for the specimen
analyzed and for the laboratory and the personnel who performed the analysis. The
federal database, called the National DNA Index System (NDIS), is made up of
entries submitted by the states and federal law enforcement agencies. Every state
except Mississippi has submitted genotypes, sending identifying information plus
the twenty-six identifying numbers (thirteen pairs of STR lengths) from its own
[*251] DNA collections, based on whichever set of criminals or suspects it has
decided to require to submit DNA samples -- and whichever among those it has
collected that it has actually analyzed -- to the FBI.
DNA collection is a search

A search becomes subject to constitutional scrutiny when the government intrudes beyond public aspects. n85 A
blood or urine sample, because it is an intrusion into a person's body, is a plain example of a search. n86 Other
personal, physical samples such as handwriting exemplars have no such expectation of privacy. n87 In California,
eligible arrestees and convicted offenders submit DNA samples using buccal swabs. n88 A buccal swab is much less
intrusive than a blood sample, as it merely involves collecting cells from the inside cheek of a person's mouth.
Previous
holdings that " DNA tests are analogous to fingerprinting for identification purposes,"
lead to the argument that non-invasive methods of obtaining DNA do not

implicate the Fourth Amendment. n89 Nevertheless, courts have held that a swab
constitutes a search because
n90
it " unquestionably implicates the right to personal security."
DNA is inherently different
from fingerprints
because of the information that can
be extracted from it, including identifying and potentially implicating family members.
AT:Politics
Plan has vast public support
639 (Lexis, Acc. 6-29-2015)
There should be widespread public support for closely regulated DNA databases at
the national and state levels. There should also be public acceptance of the premise
that an individual who has been convicted or charged with a serious crime has a
lesser interest in his DNA profile than the government. So long as law enforcement's
focus is solving crimes with identifying genetic features that are not associated with
any physical, medical, or behavioral trait, the public may be comfortable with this
lesser expectation of privacy. Public support may shift, however, as awareness
grows about underregulated state and local DNA databases expanding collection
and retention practices to include crime victim DNA, voluntarily provided elimination
samples, and surreptitiously collected DNA from persons of interest who may never
be charged with a crime. However intermingled with good intentions, the expansion
of underregulated local and state DNA databases represents: [An] alarming trend
whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled away by ...
imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But
when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite [*697] unlike any
we have seen - a society in which government may intrude into the secret regions
of man's life at will. n342 These underregulated state and local DNA databases
already intrude upon the privacy rights of crime victims, and the rest of us might
not be far behind. As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit cautioned, "Privacy erodes
first at the margins, but once eliminated, its protections are lost for good, and the
resultant damage cannot be undone." n343
DNA databases like CODIS unpopular due to public backlash

California has already experienced some backlash over these recent changes to its
DNA database system, and some advocates of DNA databases are apprehensive of
expanding the size and function of DNA databases too rapidly. n234 There are
already concerns that California's database expansion would "encourage an overreliance on DNA technology and 'cold hits,'" n235 a problem that would likely be
exacerbated by law enforcement use of familial searches to provide leads.
Additionally, the former head of the FBI CODIS has indicated that the FBI declined
allowing familial searches in the CODIS system because of a lack of congressional or
judicial authorization, as well as from a concern that a negative public reaction to
familial searches would destabilize support for recent federal laws expanding the
national DNA database by requiring DNA samples from arrestees. n236
DNA collection from arrest is controversial

The nation is almost evenly split on whether to collect DNA samples from
arrestees. Although President Obama has publicly endorsed this practice, n43 California is one of only twentyfour states [*718] that implement this practice. n44 Though the trend is growing, people
continue to fight
against it. In 2009, Lily Haskell and Reginald Ento were arrested for separate unrelated
crimes. n45 They both submitted DNA samples, but neither was prosecuted. n46 Haskell and Ento brought charges
against the government asserting that arrestees are distinguishable from convicted offenders and entitled to a
much higher expectation of privacy. n47 While the court agreed with this rationale, it also pointed out that arrestees
have a "lesser privacy interest than the general population." n48 After balancing other factors, the court ultimately
upheld compulsory DNA sampling of arrestees. n49

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About MSDI & Missouri State U..

n53 Like the crime scene sample, these

there is a strong probability that close genetic relatives will share a

Moreover, relatedness is more likely where two

partial matching methods presently have a significant rate of

Unregulated local databases will expand in the SQ

This expansion is not

Familial Targeting Advantage

Familial searches negate the credibility of the criminal justice

"We can't just open the floodgates

tremendous potential as an investigative tool."

Courts dont check familial DNA tests which result in racial

DNA approaches lead to 4x greater surveillance for black

African-Americans constitute about thirteen percent of the U.S. population, or about

be roughly four to five times as high as the corresponding percentage of U.S.

more than four

like racial profiling, it does seem fundamentally unfair , in a way

Prohibiting arrestees from DNA testing protects minority

minority populations who have a large

Because of the potential for discrimination against large groups of racial

Familial searches criminalize family members

We must reject every instance of racism.

Medical Advances Advantage

citizens manifest a desire to control what is done with their identifiable

identifiers. n114 "Personal control over [one's genetic information] is central to

citizens also express privacy-related concerns

Under regulated DNA databases hinder medical research

Local DNA databases can also hinder

advancement of clinical research.

Clinical trials key to fighting new diseases

Developing new medicines is a lengthy and complex process, relying heavily on

Delays in recruitment can mean delays in the

Lack of antibiotic innovation causes extinction -- research is

For many years,

antibiotic-resistant pathogens have been recognized as one of the

and alternative treatments

Gene based biotech research solves environmental threats

Biotechnology can contribute

double the rate of agricultural production.

Advances in breeding help agriculture achieve

plants (Kumar and Naidu, 2006).

disease dispersal (Johanson and Ives, 2001).

Conservation practices that help prevent soil erosion, may also

Artificial inorganic nitrogenous fertilizers such as ammonium sulphate,

ammonium chloride, ammonium

Climate change leads in reduced crop yield due to inadequate rainfall,

Apse and Blumwald,

Afforestation would indirectly

by plants (Ruane et al., 2008).

indirect anthropogenic activities. An integrated approach

Genetic biotechnology averts extinction from warming &

Science leadership checks all war scenarios

security threats now extend beyond the military

contribute to coalition building and conflict resolution.

scientific exchange can

Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive

(Linda; JD candidate for University of Pennsylvania. May, 2011). University of Pennsylvania

Aside from due

DNA is seized, kept, and searched regardless of probable

When arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, the arrestee's DNA is seized

If the arrestee refuses to provide a DNA sample, he "shall"

After the arrestee's DNA sample is seized, the arrestee is then

Privacy is key to the 4th Amendment

Probable cause or a warrant are required prior to a