Drones Affirmative - MSDI 2015

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Drones AFF
DRONE 1AC
Drones 1AC Inherency

Drones are set to expand fast domestically due to a lack
of domestic federal regulation.
Robert A. Heverly, February 6, 2015, Robert Heverly is an Associate
Professor of Law at the Albany Law School, THE STATE OF DRONES: STATE
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE DRONES, Albany Government Law Review vol. 8,
pp. 30-61,
http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol08_1/8.1.0029Heverly.pdf, p. 30-32
Unmanned aircraft systems are the newest entrant into realms of flight. Though varied in their specific
configurations and capabilities, unmanned aircraft systems, known more popularly as drones, are exactly
what their name implies: flying vehicles that do not have an onboard pilot.4 Originally developed as
training aids to facilitate targeting practice in WWII, they have since progressed into sophisticated flying
systems that include both those piloted from the ground and those that can pilot themselves based on
When it comes to drones in the skies, however, and

regardless of the federal governments control of the nations airspace, the
federal government has been relatively slow to act. Some have argued that the federal
programmed instructions.5
governments failure to act more quickly in this area has slowed development of and deployment of drone
In 2012, Congress passed and

the President signed the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 (the 2012 Act).7 Among other things, the 2012 Act directed the
Federal Aviation Administration (the FAA) to safely accelerate the integration of
civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system.8 Since 2012,
the FAA has taken a number of actions required or permitted by the legislation.9 The FAAs current
drone authority covers some aspects of regulation in relation to some users, but not other
technology, with its attendant benefits, in the United States.6
relevant aspects, and not as to all users.10 Even with these legislative and regulatory acts, however,
federal drone regulation is considered thin , at best, and the basic

structure of the FAAs drone regulation programthe dissection of drone operations into
commercial and noncommercial uses, with the latter allowed and the former allowed only on special
application to the FAAis
in question.11 It is thus not surprising that states and local

governments have stepped into the perceived vacuum, passing laws directed at a variety of aspects
of drone regulation.12 Some of these are suspect on grounds of federal supremacy. 13
Others are suspect on simple policy grounds, as they put states in the position of limiting
what is a growing and likely important aspect of future commerce and
development.14 The laws follow quite expectedly from public and media pressure to react to the
perceived threats that drones present to safety, property and privacy.15
Drones are tentatively in use now, but are set to expand

dramatically 2015 is the key year.
Richard M. Thompson II, April 3, 2013, Richard Thompson II is a CRS
researcher and legislative attorney, Drones in Domestic Surveillance
Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses,
Congressional Research Service, pp. 1-21,
http://www.a51.nl/storage/pdf/R42701.pdf, p. i
Although relatively few drones are currently flown over U.S. soil, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) predicts that 30,000 drones will fill the nations skies in less
than 20 years. Congress has played a large role in this expansion. In February 2012, Congress
enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (P.L. 112-95), which calls for the
FAA to accelerate the integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace
system
by 2015 . However, some Members of Congress and the public fear there are
insufficient safeguards in place to ensure that drones are not used to spy on
American citizens and unduly infringe upon their fundamental privacy . These
observers caution that the FAA is primarily charged with ensuring air traffic safety,
and is not adequately prepared to handle the issues of privacy and civil
liberties raised by drone use.
Drones 1AC Proliferation advantage

ADVANTAGE:__ Proliferation
Other countries are looking to acquire drone technology
U.S. so far remains unchallenged.
William Wan and Peter Finn, July 4, 2011, William Wan and Peter Finn
are both staff researchers, Global race on to match U.S. dron e capabilities,
The Washington Post,
http://www.agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/files/file/drones_517/5
17V_2_2011_Global_Race_on_to_Match_U.S._Drone_Capabilities_July_4_2012_
Washington_Post.pdf
No country has ramped up its research in recent years faster than China. It displayed a drone model for the
the Chinese
military has a research center devoted to drones, according to Chinese analysts. Much
of this work remains secret, but the large number of drones at recent exhibitions underlines not
only Chinas determination to catch up in that sector by building equivalents to the
first time at the Zhuhai air show five years ago, but now every major manufacturer for
leading U.S. combat and surveillance models, the Predator and the Global Hawk but also its desire to
sell this technology abroad. The United States doesnt export many attack drones, so were taking
advantage of that hole in the market, said Zhang Qiaoliang, a representative of the Chengdu Aircraft
Design and Research Institute, which manufactures many of the most advanced military aircraft for the
Peoples Liberation Army. The main reason is the amazing demand in the market for drones after 9/11.
Although surveillance drones have become widely used around the world, armed drones are more difficult
to acquire. Israel, the second-largest drone manufacturer after the United States, has flown armed models,
but few details are available. India announced this year that it is developing ones that will fire missiles and
Russia has shown models of drones with weapons, but there is little
evidence that they are operational. Pakistan has said it plans to obtain armed
drones from China, which has already sold the nation ones for surveillance. And Iran last summer
unveiled a drone that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the ambassador of death
but whose effectiveness is still unproven, according to military analysts. The United States is not
yet threatened by any of these developments. No other country can match its
fly at 30,000 feet.
array of aircraft with advanced weapons and sensors, coupled with the necessary satellite and
telecommunications systems to deploy
drones successfully across the globe.
Lack of push for U.S. drone surveillance has so far

stymied efforts to export this technology to other states
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.
Micah Zenko, January 2013, Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in
the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, Council on Foreign Relations,
Council Special Report, no. 65, pp. 1-35,
http://upstatedroneaction.org/documents/Reports/Thinktank/Drones_CSR65.p
df, p. 19-20
In the absence of an indigenous
armed
drone capacity, interested states
are looking to buy . Thus far, the United States has refrained from selling
armed drones to states, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), that have requested the technology, though it has made exceptions
for Great Britain and possibly Italy.

export
U.S. aerospace companies have lobbied to relax the
regulations for drones, primarily those that conduct surveillance
missions.56 One hurdle is that the United States is a member of the 1987 Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), an informal and voluntary multilateral arrangement comprising thirty-four states that
attempts to constrain ballistic missile proliferation. Under the MTCR, drones capable of delivering at least a
five-hundred-kilogram payload a minimum of three hundred kilometers are classified as Category I items,
So far, the United States

has largely followed the Category I guidelines. General Atomics, manufacturer of
the Predator, recently unveiled the Predator XP surveillance drone, which
lacks the hard pointsor mounting brackets for aerial munitionswing strength, and fire
control system required for weaponization. There are also few examples of armed drone
for which there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers.
sales by other countries. After the United States, Israel has the most developed and varied drone
capabilities; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Israel was
responsible for 41 percent of drones exported between 2001 and 2011. 57 While Israel has used armed
drones in the Palestinian territories and is not a member of the MTCR, it has predominantly sold
surveillance drones that lack hard points and electrical engineering. Israel reportedly sold the Harop, a
short-range attack drone, to France, Germany, Turkey, and India. Furthermore, Israel allows the United
States to veto transfers of weapons with U.S.-origin technology to select states, including China.58Other
states invested in developing and selling surveillance drones have reportedly refrained from selling fully
armed versions. For example, the UAE spent five years building the armed United-40 drone with an
associated Namrod missile, but there have been no reported deliveries.59 A March 2011 analysis by the
marketing research firm Lucintel projected that a fully developed [armed drone] product will take another
decade.60
U.S. domestic drone policy has been fueling proliferation

lack of appropriate regulatory framework and
undermining of international legal norms 2015 ensures
rapid expansion.
Tom Barry, April 2013, Tom Barry works for the Center for International
Policy, DRONES OVER THE HOMELAND HOW POLITICS, MONEY AND LACK OF
OVERSIGHT HAVE SPARKED DRONE PROLIFERATION, AND WHAT WE CAN DO,
International Policy Report, http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/dronesover-the-homeland
the United States is the world leader in drone
production and deployment. Other nations, especially China, are also rapidly gaining a larger market share of the
international drone market. The United States, however, will remain the dominant
driver in drone manufacturing and deployment for at least another decade. The central
Due to a surge in U.S. military contracting since 2001,
U.S. role in drone proliferation is the direct result of
the Pentagons
rapidly
increasing expenditures for UAVs. Also fueling drone proliferation is UAV

procurement by the Department of Homeland Security, by other federal
agencies such as NASA, and by local police, as well as by individuals and
corporations. Drones are also proliferating among state-level Air National Guard units. Despite its lead
role in the proliferation of drones, the U.S. government has failed to take the
lead in establishing appropriate regulatory frameworks and oversight
processes. Without this necessary regulatory infrastructure at both the
national and international levels drone proliferation threatens to undermine
constitutional guarantees, civil liberties and international law.
Now is key to shape international norms - only the U.S.

can lead in setting drone policy.
James Whibley, February 6, 2013, James Whibley received a M.A. in
International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand,
"The Proliferation of Drone Warfare: The Weakening of Norms and
International Precedent," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/06/the-proliferation-of-drone-warfare-theweakening-of-norms-and-international-precedent-by-james-whibley/
While drone advocates such as Max Boot argue that other countries are unlikely to follow any precedents about drone use established by
America, power has an undeniable effect in establishing which norms are

respected or enforced. America used its power in the international system after World War 2 to embed norms about human
rights and liberal political organization, not only in allies, but in former adversaries and the international system as a whole. Likewise, the
norms have set precedents
literature on rule-oriented constructivism presents a powerful case that

on the appropriate
war-fighting and deterrence policies when using weapons of mass destruction and the practices of colonialism and human intervention.
Therefore, drones advocates must consider the possible unintended

consequences of lending legitimacy to the unrestricted use of drones. However, with the Obama
the
US may miss an opportunity to entrench international norms about drone
operations. If countries begin to follow the precedent set by the US, there is also the risk of weakening pre-existing international
norms about the use of violence. In the summer 2000 issue of International Security, Ward Thomas warned that, while the long-standing norm
administration only now beginning to formulate rules about using drones and seemingly uninterested in restraining its current practices,
against assassination has always been less applicable to terrorist groups, the targeting of terrorists is, likely to undermine the norm as a
whole and erode the barriers to the use of assassination in other circumstances. Such an occurrence would represent a deleterious
unintended consequence to an already inhumane international system, justifying greater scrutiny of the drone program. Realism cautions
scholars not to expect ethical behaviour in international politics. Yet,
the widespread use of drones by recent
administrations with little accountability
and the lack of any normative framework about their
could come to be seen as a serious strategic error and moral

failing. If the Obama administration was nervous about leaving an amorphous
drone policy to a possible Romney Presidency, then surely China or Russia
possessing such a program would be terrifying.
deployment on the battlefield
Lack of legal reform and an increase in drone proliferation

risks causing a laundry list of problems undermining rule
of law, human rights, and prevention of great power war.
df, p. 25
History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is
often influenced by how other states haveor have notused them in the past.
Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new tech nologies.72
Normssometimes but not always codified as legal regimeshave dissuaded states
from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons. A Recommendations 25 well-articulated and internationally supported
normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone
proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not
hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize alreadynecessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar
And even if hostile
states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative
framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve Washingtons
ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based
as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives.
in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinctionto
which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikesand should be informed by comparable
In short, a world characterized by the

proliferation of armed dronesused with little transparency or constraint
efforts in the realms of cyber and space.
would undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict,

promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would
be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone
deemed an enemy by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for
legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it
would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of
sovereign states. Because of drones inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states
and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force
against the United States and its allies.
Escalation is likely too tempting to use once you acquire.

Eric Posner, May 15, 2013, Eric Posner is a professor at the University of
Chicago Law School, "The Killer Robot War is Coming," Slate,
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/05/drone_
warfare_and_spying_we_need_new_laws.html
Drone defenders mocked
for demanding the
administration declare
whether it
it could kill people with drones on American territory
also
Rand Paul
that
Obama
believed that
. Existing law permits the
police to shoot criminals who pose an imminent threat to others; if police can gun down hostage takers and rampaging shooters, why cant they drone them down too? While there is much to be said in favor of
drone technology poses a paradox that its defenders have not

confronted. Because drones are cheap, effective, riskless for their operators,
these arguments,
and adept at minimizing civilian casualties, governments may be tempted

to use them too frequently .
Indeed, a
panic has already arisen that the
government will use drones to place the public under surveillance .
Many municipalities have
passed laws prohibiting such spying even though it has not yet taken place. Why cant we just assume that existing privacy laws and constitutional rights are sufficient to prevent abuses? To see why, consider U.S.
v. Jones, a 2012 case in which the Supreme Court held that the police must get a search warrant before attaching a GPS tracking device to a car, because the physical attachment of the device trespassed on
property rights. Justice Samuel Alito argued that this protection was insufficient, because the government could still spy on people from the air. While piloted aircraft are too expensive to use routinely, drones are
not, or will not be. One might argue that if the police can observe and follow you in public without obtaining a search warrant, they should be able to do the same thing with drones. But when the cost of surveillance
If police can launch

limitless drones, then we may fear that police will be tempted
declines, more surveillance takes place. If police face manpower limits, then they will spy only when strong suspicions justify the intrusion on targets privacy.
to shadow ordinary people without good
reason. Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force on his own when he must put soldiers into harms way, knowing that he will not risk lives lightly. Presidents have
when drones eliminate

the risk of casualties
The same problem arises
internationally. The international laws that predate drones assume that
military intervention across borders risks significant casualties.
international law could give a lot of leeway
if the risk of
learned through hard experience that the public will not tolerate even a handful of casualties if it does not believe that the mission is justified. But
, the president is more likely to launch wars too often.
Since that check normally kept the
peace,
for using military force to chase down terrorists. But
casualties disappears, then nations might too eagerly attack , resulting
in blowback and retaliation

reduced threat to civilians in tactical
operations could wind up destabilizing relationships between countries,
including even major powers like the United States and China, making the
long-term threat to human life much greater
When those technological barriers
fall, legal restrictions need to be tightened.
. Ironically, the
. These three scenarios illustrate the same lesson: that law and technology work in tandem.
When technological barriers limit the risk of government abuse, legal restrictions on governmental action can be looser.
may
A strong rule of law serves as a framework to de-escalate

conflict some of these could escalate to nuclear war.
Charles S. Rhyne, May 1, 1958, Charles S. Rhyne has is J.D, and is a U.N.
High Commissioner on Refugees, President of the American Bar Association,
Law Day Speech for Voice of America delivered on the first Law Day,
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html
Law and courts exist to protect every citizen of the United States in his person and property and in his
individual rights and privileges under the Constitution. The ultimate power to change or expand the law in
our system remains with its source, the people. They can elect as lawmakers those who will vote for wise
laws and vote out of office those who do not. They can also amend the Constitution as experience dictates
the necessity of change. In these days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of basic
concepts and principles brought on by the expansion of mans vision to the new frontiers and horizons of
outer space, we want the people of the world to know that we in America have an unshakable belief in the
most essential ingredient of our way of life the
rule of law. The law we honor is the basis and

foundation of our nations freedom and the freedom for the individual, which exists here. And to
Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of law has been the bulwark of our
democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities, the unpopular; it has
made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands as the very
antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about justice under our rule of law, the
absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about freedom for the
individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when
we talk about peace under
lawpeace without the bloodbath of warwe are appealing to the foremost desire of all
peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use
of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that
best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellitemissile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of
justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers
mankinds
from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will
compel its general acceptance. Mans relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and
development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our
generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased
Men must either live together in

peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the
rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations
and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism
to achieve and maintain peace between nations . The lawyer is the technician in mans
international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world.
relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace
weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people . It is said that an
idea can be more powerful than an atom because strength today resides in mans mindnot his muscle.
We lawyers of the world must take the idea of peace under the rule of law and make it a force superior to
weapons and thus outlaw wars of weapons. Law offers the best hope for order in a disordered world. The
law of force or the force of law will rule the world. In the field of human conduct the law has never
confessed failure. The struggle for a world ruled by law must go on with increased intensity. We must
prove that the genius of man in the field of science and technology has not so far outstripped his
inventiveness in the sphere of human relations as to make catastrophe inevitable. If man
can conquer
solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and

lasting peace. In our country ignorance of the value of law in international relations and what it could
space he can also
do for the people of the world is appalling. A major purpose of Law Day-U.S.A. is therefore to
demonstrate to our people that the need for law in the world community is the greatest gap in the growing
structure of civilization. And we lawyers of America are anxious to work with lawyers and men of good of
all nations in filling this gap in that structure. We believe that no greater challenge exists for any profession
and that
no greater service
to mankind
can be performed.
Drone proliferation increases the chance of terrorists

compromising the UAVs and turning them against the
U.S.
William Wan and Peter Finn, July 4, 2011, William Wan and Peter Finn
are both staff researchers, Global race on to match U.S. drone capabilities,
The Washington Post,
17V_2_2011_Global_Race_on_to_Match_U.S._Drone_Capabilities_July_4_2012_
Washington_Post.pdf
Chinas rapid development has pushed its neighbors into action . After a diplomatic
clash with China last fall over disputed territories in the South China Sea, Japan announced that it
planned to send military officials to the United States to study how it operates and
maintains its Global Hawk high-altitude surveillance drones. In South Korea,
lawmakers this year accused China of hacking into military computers to learn about the countrys plans to
acquire Global Hawk, which could peer into not only North Korea but also parts of China and other
there also are

international concerns that some governments might not be able to protect
these new weapons from hackers and terrorists. Sharkey, the University of
Sheffield professor who also co-founded the International Committee for
Robot Arms Control, noted that Iraqi insurgents, using a $30 piece of
software, intercepted live feeds from U.S. drones ; the video was later found on the
neighboring countries. On top of the increasing anxieties of individual countries,
laptop of a captured militant.
Terrorists could commandeer UAVs to carry out chemical,

biological, or radiological attacks.
Bart Elias, September 10, 2012, Bart Elias is a specialist in aviation policy
and a researcher for the Congressional Research Service, Pilotless Drones:
Background and Considerations for Congress Regarding Unmanned Aircraft
Operations in the National Airspace System, Congressional Research
Service, pp. 1-21, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/crs/R42718.pdf, p. 11
In addition to safety risks, the operation of civilian unmanned aircraft in
domestic airspace raises potential security risks, including the possibility that
terrorists could use a drone to carry out an attack against a ground target . It is
also possible that drones themselves could be targeted by terrorists or
cybercriminals seeking to tap into sensor data transmissions or to cause mayhem
by hacking or jamming command and control signals. Drone Weapons Terrorists could potentially
use drones to carry out small-scale attacks using explosives, or as platforms for
chemical, biological , or radiological attacks. In September 2011, the FBI arrested
Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen from Ashland, MA, charging him in a terrorist plot to attack the Pentagon
and the Capitol using large model aircraft packed with high explosives. While the small payload of the
model aircraft may have limited the lethality of the explosions, Ferdaus planned to recruit others to use
assault rifles to target people fleeing the Pentagon after the drone attack.26 In July 2012, Ferdaus pleaded
guilty to attempting to provide material support to terrorists and attempting to damage and destroy
federal buildings by means of an explosive in a plea agreement under which additional charges were
dropped. The incident has raised specific concerns about potential terrorist attacks using unmanned
aircraft, although the payload capacities of small UAVs would limit the damage these attacks could inflict
using only conventional explosives.
Terrorist development of biological agents is likely all

they need are the means.
Gary Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran, March 2011, Gary Ackerman is
the U.S. Representative for New York's 5th congressional district, Kevin S.
Moran is in the foreign service, U.S. Department of State, Executive Assistant
to the National Security Advisor, Chief of Staff, International Information
Programs, U.S. Information Agency, special assistant to two presidential
Chiefs of Staff, special assistant for White House Communications, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment, PREPARED
FOR THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Terrorism Research Program, http://www.blixassociates.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/No22.pdf
Regarding the capability of terrorists to engage in mass-casualty
biological attack10, several authors contend that previous technical obstacles to
obtaining or developing biological weapons have eroded, and that a biological
weapons capability is most likely within the reach of at least a certain subset of terrorist
groups. The group most commonly cited as being likely to overcome the technical, organizational and
logistical obstacles to WMD11is the al-Qa`ida network, which is reported to be pursuing several types of
WMD, including biological weapons. Other commentators are more sanguine about current terrorist
capabilities, believing that they have been exaggerated and that technical hurdles still prevent terrorists
from engaging in anything more than small to medium-sized attacks using biological weapons (which
would not constitute true WMD events). For example, at the more conservative end of the spectrum, a
renowned expert like Donald Henderson believes that it is unlikely that more than a few terrorist groups
would be able to succeed in procuring any of the agents of highest concern in a form that could be
even the most

conservative of these authors do not unequivocally dismiss the prospect of a group
currently (or in the near future) being able to field a biological weapon. Indeed, the only
discernible area of agreement between analysts seems to be that there exists at least a minimal
possibility of a technologically and organizationally adept terrorist organization
succeeding in acquiring a biological weapon capable of causing mass casualties. One
dispensed by aerosol in a manner that would result in masscasualties.12Yet
remarkable feature within the broader discussion about terrorist capabilities for bioterrorism is that hardly
any of those who believe terrorists currently lack this capacity mention anything about future
developments. If recent trends in terrorism have taught us anything, it is that terrorists are nimble, highly
adaptive actors who can be innovative when necessary. Terrorist capabilities in general display an upward
even though a terrorist groups ideology may seem in

the eyes of their opponents to be archaic and obscurantist, this does not mean that the
group lacks a solid grasp of the most modern technology. At the same time, general
advances in several areas of biotechnology and the rapid commercialization and
diffusion of this technology mean that equipment and techniques that once resided
within the sole purview of a states military apparatus (such as the ability to synthesize
trend and one must bear in mind that
complex chemicals or identify single nucleotide polymorphisms) can now be found in off-the-shelf
commercial applications.
Biological weapons culminate in a possibility of extinction

of human life on the planet - this is far more likely than a
nuclear war escalating.
Richard Ochs, April 9, 2002, Richard Ochs has published articles in the
Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Chronicle, Science magazine, past president of the
Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the
Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of
the Chemical Weapons Working Group, Biological Weapons must be
abolished immediately,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological
weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to
the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or
deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just
sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of
nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of
future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other
hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks have demonstrated.
There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be
stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of
the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition
of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their
persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence,
chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural
With nuclear
biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last
tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than
that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck
even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS
environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over.
and
and Ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine.
Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues ? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW

POSSIBLE.
Drones 1AC Privacy advantage

ADVANTAGE:__PRIVACY
Drone searches are not subject to fourth amendment
curtailment.
http://www.a51.nl/storage/pdf/R42701.pdf, p. 7-8
In a series of cases that provide the closest analogy to UAVs, the Supreme
Court addressed the use of manned aircraft to conduct domestic surveillance
over residential and industrial areas. In each, the Court held that the fly-over at issue
was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment , as the areas
surveilled were open to public view. In California v. Ciraolo, police received a
tip that an individual was growing marijuana in his backyard next to his suburban home.54
Because two fences blocked their view of the yard, officers flew a fixed-wing
aircraft at an altitude of 1,000 feet over the property to conduct a visual inspection .
From this vantage point, the officers readily identified with the naked eye marijuana plants growing in the
The Court held that the defendants expectation of privacy in

the area immediately surrounding his home was not reasonable , since what a
defendants yard.
person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.55 Any
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything these officers
observed, the Court remarked.56 Much weight was placed on the fact that the plane was at all times in
Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, local police

received a tip that an individual was growing marijuana in a greenhouse
located 10 to 20 feet away from his mobile home .58 The officers could not see the
navigable airspace as defined by federal statute.57
contents of the greenhouse from the ground, so they flew a helicopter over the defendants backyard at an
altitude of 400 feet. While overhead, an officer saw marijuana plants through a crack in the greenhouse
Because the helicopter, like the plane in Ciraolo, was in navigable airspace
where any member of the public could have flown the Court did not consider
this a search for which a warrant was required .59 In the final case of the
series, Dow Chemical v. United States, the Court was asked whether a theory of industrial
roof.
curtilage would prevent a government agency from conducting aerial surveillance over a 2,000-acre
commercial plant.60 There, after Dow Chemical Co. refused access to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the EPA hired a commercial aerial photographer to take photos of the facility using a precision aerial
mapping camera. Having ruled out the argument that the areas surrounding an industrial complex are
the Court concluded that

photographing the plant from navigable airspace was not a search.61
entitled to the same protection as similar areas surrounding a home,
Domestic drone expansion could push for miniaturization

will create society of constant surveillance.
Jim Dratwa, May 20, 2014, Jim Dratwa is the Chief Editor and head of the
EGE Secretariat, Ethics of Security and Surveillance Technologies, European
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European
Commission, pp. 17-31,
http://www.grundrechte.ch/2014/opinion_28_securityandsurveillancetechnolo
gies.pdf, p. 79-80
rapid advances in drone technologies have also sparked interest from law
enforcement agencies, as it would allow them to bolster their surveillance
capacity. Drones could be introduced for a fraction of the cost of manned vehicles and helicopters,
which are limited in areas they can access. Drones equipped with cameras, communication interception
and listening devices, and by linking images with facial recognition software, could
continuously track individuals in a public space. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and
The
the Office of Community Orientated Policing Services (COPS) in the US have provided US$1.2 million to
seven local law enforcement agencies to purchase drones for testing or use241. Drones were considered
particularly suited to law enforcement because this type of aircraft had the capability to manoeuvre
covertly in areas where individual expectations of privacy are not well defined, such as in the immediate
vicinity of residences. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has expressed concerns that
increased domestic deployment of drones will eventually result in routine

aerial surveillance, which would profoundly change the character of public
life. The ACLU has called for limits and regulations to be put on law enforcement use of drones in order to
avoid a "surveillance society in which our every move is monitored, tracked, recorded and scrutinized by
Privacy concerns are exacerbated by developments in drone

miniaturisation. Researchers have turned to birds and insects as models and have mimicked their
complex aerodynamics and navigation techniques to produce micro air vehicles (MAVs). Due to there
small size they can access confined spaces and navigate their interiors more
effectively than ground robots, all without those under observation knowing
they are there. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the USA has funded the
the authorities"242.
development of a tiny drone called the "nano hummingbird" whose purpose is for stealth surveillance;
flying through open windows and doorways. It can fly up to 11 miles per hour and can hover for up to eight
minutes. With a wingspan of just six and a half inches and weighing 19g (less than a single AA battery),
the hummingbird includes a video camera and communications links 243. The ability for pervasive
surveillance using drone technology will not be limited to Governments, or organisations in the future.
The personal drone revolution is piggy backing on the popularity of existing

consumer technology particularly smart phones. Their small efficient batteries, GPS
receivers and cheap memory chips have all become components of micro drones. Mass-produced,
miniature electronics have made drones small and cheap enough to be
accessible to the individual. The French company Parrot has sold over half a million of the AR
drone 2.0 since its launch in 2010. It can be operated by a smart phone or tablet and can be purchased on
Amazon for around $250. Online communities have sprung up on the Internet of do-it-yourself drone
enthusiasts, raising the spectre of skies full of drones for personal uses ranging from aerial photography to
spying on your neighbours. In the USA, it is illegal for to operate a drone above 120 metres and beyond the
line of sight for any non-military purpose unless authorisation has been granted by the Federal Aviation
authority (FAA). Between 2007 and February 2013, the FAA has issued 1,428 licences to federal and law
enforcement agencies, as well as universities engaged in research projects244. In anticipation of growing
drone use, Barack Obama signed the FAA Modernisation Act into law in February 2012, which tasks the FAA
with opening American airspace to unarmed drones by 2015. In November 2013, the FAA published a
Roadmap for Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System 245.
Without statutory limits widespread surveillance will take

place no court doctrine to prevent privacy violations.
Paul Rosenzwei et al., September 20, 2012, Paul Rosenzweig is a
Visiting Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies and in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation, Steven P. Bucci, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow for Defense and
Homeland Security in the Allison Center, Charles D. Stimson is Senior Legal
Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies, and James Jay Carafano, PhD,
is Deputy Director of the Davis Institute and Director of the Allison Center at
The Heritage Foundation, Drones in U.S. Airspace: Principles for

Governance, The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/drones-in-us-airspaceprinciples-for-governance
widespread and
large-scale observation and data-collection mechanisms are enabled . Here, the
Supreme Court doctrine is still in development , but the Court has sounded a cautionary
Limits on domestic drone use may also arise when and if drones proliferate such that
note. This past term, in United States v. Jones,[9] Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurrence (speaking for
though the collection of an individual

piece of data might be lawful without a warrant, the collection of numerous
such pieces of data to form a larger mosaic picture would raise constitutional
concerns. Under this so-called mosaic theory, limits on the collection of routine images throughout a
only four Justices) in which he posited that even
citylinked to a facial recognition program, for instancemight exist. As mentioned, this legal doctrine
the
routine and systematic use of drones for widespread surveillance and
analysis is likely to be suspect on constitutional grounds. These precedents clearly suggest a
sweet spot for lawful domestic drone activity. Camera-equipped drones used for routine
purposes, such as observing public activity, will likely pass constitutional
muster. Legal limits on such use, if any, will come from policy development or
statutory enactments.
has yet to be adopted by the Supreme Court, but it, too, sounds a cautionary note: Certainly,
Independently, a decline in U.S. privacy standards by

UAVs is catastrophic privacy is fundamental to human
existence.
Saby Ghoshray, 2013, Saby Ghoshray founded the Institute of
Interdisciplinary Studies to foster and disseminate advanced legal
scholarship, Domestic Surveillance Via Drones: Looking Through the Lens of
the Fourth Amendment, Northern Illinois University Law Review vol. 33, pp.
580-599,
http://www.iia.niu.edu/law/organizations/law_review/pdfs/full_issues/33_3/Gho
shray%204.pdf, p. 583
The seduction of drones within the law enforcement parlance is a product of two diverging strands of
The use of
drones and their superficial success in dealing with terror suspects on foreign shores has jump started
this seduction, which unfortunately is unfolding into a future state of affairs that would
shrink individual privacy to a nonexistent dystopian reality. Despite
technologys broader intrusion into our lives, privacy is still recognized as a
societal progressionsuperior technological advancement and debilitating addiction of fear.
fundamental life force of human existence . There is a universal recognition of

technologys
advancement has allowed individual privacy to rapidly shrink along many
dimensions. With the reality of drones buzzing the domestic skylines, the time is now
for an introspective look at the emerging chasm between privacy laws inert
contour and technologys innovative trajectory . 16 In this evolving reality, mass adoption
privacy as a necessary steppingstone for fulfilling the promise of individual liberty.15 Yet,
of drones for law enforcement is simply following the contour of least resistance by developing societal
conditions that are conducive to lowering individuals subjective evaluation of privacy. Will the drone
culture destroy individual privacy for the post-modern individual? Is domestic surveillance a
constitutionally sanctified governmental intrusion? The facial inconsistency of this new paradigm calls for a
reevaluation of both the constitutional framework and ethical dialectic of this drone-induced privacy
intrusion.17
An erosion of the Fourth Amendment protection of privacy

by UAVs threatens U.S. democracy.
Abigail Rehfuss, February 6, 2015, Abigail Rehfuss is an Associate at
Rehfuss, Liguori & Associates, P.C., THE DOMESTIC USE OF DRONES AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, Albany Government Law Review vol. 8, pp. 314335, http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol08_1/8.1.313Rehfuss.pdf, p. 332-333
The Fourth Amendment, as it is now interpreted, is highly inadequate to
protect the substantive privacy rights that Americans have always enjoyed.
Arguably, our society has simply evolved towards requiring less privacy than it did centuries ago, possibly
because some people are willing to sacrifice privacy for convenience or have come to accept this reduced
privacy will never stop being a

fundamental human right.135 While the introduction of drones on the home front has the
potential to offer many significant advantages on a number of different levels, sufficient safeguards
need to be in place if the integrity of our democratic system of government is
to be preserved. Technology moves faster than the laws that govern it.136 This
axiomatic principle has compelled numerous states throughout the country to
become actively engaged in efforts to implement appropriate safeguards to
prevent the abuse and misuse of modern day technology, particularly commercial
drones.137 Undoubtedly, the states are viable alternative sources equipped to rectify current Fourth
privacy as an inevitable consequence of increased luxury, but
Amendment issues. In fact, as the late Justice Brennan once argued, Americans should look to the states
as a beacon of protection in a new federalism.138 According to an ACLU review of state constitutions
and jurisprudence, a significant number of states have departed from the Supreme Court in areas where
the states consider federal jurisprudence to be problematic.139 Some states have shifted away from the
third party doctrine test simply because they feel their state constitutions lack the language to sustain it,
while other states whose constitutions practically mirror the federal constitution have similarly paved a
different path.140
Democracy key to avoid extinction.

Larry Diamond, 1995, Larry Diamond is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years
and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could
easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime
syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly
endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with
its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
Countries that govern

themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse"
their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons.
do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of
mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another . Democratic countries
form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships . In the long run they
offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because
they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.
They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
within their
own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the
rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new
world order of international security and prosperity can be built .
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because,
Drones 1AC Plan

The United States Federal Government should
substantially curtail its domestic surveillance by passing
the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013.
Drones 1AC Solvency

DAPTA solves - addresses Fourth Amendment concerns
while establishing new norms to limit purpose and
capability.
J. Tyler Black, 2013, J. Tyler Black is an associate in the firm Thompson
Coburn LLPs transportation regulatory practice, Over Your Head, Under the
Radar: An Examination of Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible
Solutions to the Domestic Police Drone Puzzle, Washington and Lee Law
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4347&context=wlulr, p. 1868-1872
recently proposed Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013187
(DAPTA) would, if enacted, fill many critical privacy holes. The bill would amend the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to provide guidance and limitations
absent from that legislation regarding the integration of drones into the
national airspace system.188 Acknowledging the potential for unmanned aircraft system
technology to enable invasive and pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy protections, the bill
presents a detailed series of findings and requirements that would severely
restrict the ability of law enforcement to use drones as evidence-gathering
machines.189 For example, the Secretary of Transportation would first be required to carry out a study,
The
in conjunction with other executive agencies, that will identify any potential threats to privacy protections
The bill would constrain the Secretary of Transportation

from approving drone licenses for organizations, including law
enforcement bodies, that do not comply with data collection requirements in the
bill.191 Law enforcement agencies would have to supply a data minimization
statement before they would be permitted to operate drones for police
posed by the integration of drones.190
(and thereby, the FAA)
purposes.192 The inclusion of these extra requirements for police is potentially significant, beyond the
public notice provided by these reporting requirements. The bill explicitly interjects the authority of the
Secretary of Transportation into the privacy considerations of drone operation.193 This potentially subjects
law enforcement agencies to an extra layer of review and an extra forum to which people can bring their
grievances. The bill also prohibits generalized surveillance , with exceptions made for
exigent circumstances.194 Even in those exigent circumstances, however, documentation justifying the
exception shall be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation, (6) the specific steps that will be taken to
mitigate any possible impact identified under paragraph (5), including steps to protect against
unauthorized disclosure of any information or data described in paragraph (4), such as the use of
encryption methods and other security features that will be used; (7) a telephone number or electronic
mail address that an individual with complaints about the operation of the unmanned aircraft system may
use to report such complaints and to request confirmation that personally identifiable data relating to such
individual has been collected; (8) in the case that personally identifiable data relating to such individual
has been collected, a reasonable process for such individual to request to obtain such data in a timely and
an intelligible manner; (9) in the case that a request described in paragraph (8) is denied, a process by
which such individual may obtain the reasons for the denial and challenge the denial; and (10) in the case
that personally identifiable data relating to such individual has been collected, a process by which such
individual may challenge the accuracy of such data and, if the challenge is successful, have such data
The bill would disallow the direct or indirect gathering of that

evidence without a warrant.196 This is perhaps the most important aspect of
the bill because it imposes resource costs (namely, time and money) on law enforcement
agencies that will likely have the effect of reducing the number of drones in the
air.197 Any bill with a realistic hope of controlling the use of such an inexpensive and nimble technology
erased or amended.
must impose these kinds of procedural impediments, the added benefit of which is to inform the public
Finally, the bill articulates a

comprehensive system of enforcement and remedies , including injunctive
relief, and, in the case of intentional violations, treble damages.198 While it is unknown how many of
these protections will survive the legislative process, in its present state the bill systematically
addresses the most fundamental Fourth Amendment concerns raised by
police drone use. This legislation, or another bill like it, would validate the notion that drones are
about how and when the government uses this technology.
different and deserve special safeguards because of their unique capabilities.199 In order to stay ahead of
the technologys problems, substantial safeguards should be in place before drones widespread use.
DAPTA is needed to provide opposition to drone

proliferation.
Max Bauer, 2013, Max Bauer works for the ACLU of Massachusetts,
Domestic Drone Surveillance Usage: Threats and Opportunities for
Regulation, PrivacySOS, https://privacysos.org/domestic_drones
While the acceleration of local law enforcement to military-style operations may be inevitable, [26]
legislative and public opposition to drone proliferation can be successful. Already,

efforts to restrict drone surveillance powers have been successful in multiple state legislatures. And
communities have rebelled against the technology. Earlier this year in Seattle, public pressure caused the
Seattle Police Department to cancel its drone program. [27] Around the same time, Charlottesville, Virginia
passed a law banning any use of drones by its municipal agencies, becoming the first city in the country to
pass anti-drone legislation. [28] More recently, the governor of Florida signed a drone-regulation bill,
endorsed by both Republicans and the ACLU, which requires a judge to approve most drone surveillance
operations (with an imminent danger exception). [29] A bill pending in Massachusetts provides similar
protections. [30] The federal government also has opportunities to act on drone privacy.
In Congress, several bills have been introduced to reign in domestic drone usage. The Preserving Freedom
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013 requires a probable-cause warrant for drone surveillance, with
some exceptions. [31] (Senator Rand Paul filed similar legislation during the previous session but has not
re-introduced it.) Another bill, the Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, prohibits domestic drones
except with warrants, or for border searches or emergencies. The bill also requires government entities to
the Drone
Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, which would amend the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, requiring a study of privacy concerns,
a data collection statement for each drone operation, including a data
minimization statement, and enforcement mechanisms including license
revocation for violators of these requirements.
file a detailed data collection statements about their drone surveillance. [32] Then there's
The FAAs guidelines are primarily put in place to provide

an avenue for future domestic drone activity expansion
a change in Congressional attitudes is needed.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
The FAA has issued several sets of guidelines outlining its treatment of
domestic drones.51 Prior to 2012, a rigid, individualized licensing process stymied the prospect of widespread
drone usage in the United States.52 The FAA approval system now employed requires careful,
case-by-case agency evaluation of the operators request to use drones .53 The
FAA also has different approval standards for drones based on size and
capability.54 Many smaller drones, and drones operated recreationally as model airplanes, are currently permitted
by regulation to operate at altitudes much lower than the minimum acceptable altitudes for helicopters and fixed-wing
Government usersincluding local law enforcement and public universitiesmay operate

drones only after obtaining a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA)
from the FAA.56 The COA restricts the drone operation to a defined airspace
and includes special provisions unique to the proposed operation.57
Designation of the drone as an experimental aircraft is another avenue for
drone licensing, but public-use drones typically go through the more detailed COA process.58 The FAA will
sometimes deny COA requests, but those denials are almost invariably for
safety-of-flight reasons, not privacy considerations .59 A new mandate for the expanded use
of drones, however, will scrap the current policies of case-by-case authorization. Congress has made clear
its intention to rapidly expand domestic drone activity . In February 2012, the legislative
aircrafts.55
reauthorization of the FAA carried with it a requirement that the Agency promulgate regulations and develop a
comprehensive plan for the integration of drones into the national airspace system.60 As a result, by some estimates
there could be 30,000 or more drones operating in U.S. skies in the next few decades.61 The increasing law enforcement
preference for warrantless spying techniquesfor example, the Justice Departments warrantless surveillance has
increased 600% in the past decade62may help explain why a third of the public fears that the use of drones by police
will threaten their privacy interests.63
Drone surveillance systems are inefficient and create new

problems utilize biases, which can harm people theyre
monitoring.
Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan, August 2011, Tyler Wall is an Assistant
Professor in the School of Justice Studies as Eastern Kentucky University and
Torin Monahan is an Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Surveillance and Violence from
Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-scapes, Theoretical
Criminology vol. 15, issue 3, pp. 239-254, SAGE Journals, p. 240
UAV systems are
being used for managing emergencies caused by natural disasters (Dean, 2007),
spying on foreign drug cartels (Padgett, 2009), finding criminal activity in urban
and rural areas (Lewis, 2010; Public Intelligence, 2010), and conducting border control
operations (Walters and Weber, 2010). While drones appear to affirm the primacy of visual modalities
In addition to being used in warzones in Afghanistan, Iraq, and northern Pakistan,
of surveillance, their underlying rationalities are more nuanced and problematic. As complex technological
systems, drones are both predicated upon and productive of an actuarial form of surveillance. They are
employed to amass data about risk probabilities and then manage populations or eliminate network nodes
considered to exceed acceptable risk thresholds. In part, drones are forms of surveillance in keeping with
the precepts of categorical suspicion and social sorting that define other contemporary surveillance
Drones may
perform predominately in the discursive register of automated precision and
positive identification of known threats, but in practice, these surveillance
systems and their agents actively interpret ambiguous information that
continuously defies exact matches or clear responses. In the process, UAV
systems may force homogenization upon difference, thereby reducing variation
to functional categories that correspond to the needs and biases of the
operators, not the targets, of surveillance. All surveillance and dataveillance systems
are prone to errors that have harsh ramifications for the subjects whose
flawed data doubles haunt them (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). Drone-based surveillance
systems (Gandy, 1993; Murakami Wood et al., 2006; Lyon, 2007; Monahan, 2010).
as witnessed by verified cases of collateral damage

caused by drone strikes (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2010).
systems are no exception,
A drastic increase in drones would be catastrophic too

many technological problems to make it safe.
Michael J. Jordan, March 15, 2006, Michael Jordan is a Lieutenant Colonel
in the U.S. Army and student at the U.S. Army War College in the Strategic
Studies Masters Program, MERGING THE TRIBES: STREAMLINING DODS
ACQUISITION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, USAWC Strategy Research
Project, pp. 1-17, p. 11
Senior Commanders have repeatedly identified airspace control and deconfliction
issues as a potentially serious problem. In fact, there have already been three
collisions between small UAS and helicopters, and the airspace deconfliction issues
have still not been resolved. 81 Theater airspace control measures are the responsibility of the
Joint Force Commander, who normally delegates airspace control authority to the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC is responsible for developing the overall airspace control plan
and produces the airspace control order (ACO). The ACO and the corresponding air tasking order (ATO)
serve as the single-source documents for integration and deconfliction of fixed wing aviation, rotary-wing
aviation, and indirect fires.82 UAS missions scheduled on the ATO must comply with procedures in the
ACO, and normally operate in a specifically designated restricted operating zone, which is airspace
specially reserved and protected for the duration of UAS operations. But as UAS continue to proliferate and
acquire new missions and capabilities, the deconlifction issues on the battlefield have become increasingly
complex. The range, endurance, performance, and flexibility of UAS have constantly improved, which has
allowed commanders to seek additional opportunities to exploit the full capabilities of the systems. This
places demands for frequency and airspace deconlifction procedures. The increased complexity of airspace
control measures required for deconfliction are likely to become so complex and ponderous that airpower
will lose its inherent flexibility, and manned aircraft will find it difficult to operate efficiently in such
complex environment. As UAS become the predominant imagery collection systems across virtually every
echelon of command, the need to coordinate, share, and integrate into the larger warfighting community
Due in large part to persistence, range, and improved

communications capability, UAS no longer serve a single user or even a
single Service. Recent combat operations have highlighted the deficiencies in
several areas, including lack of standard communications frequencies and
waveforms, lack of standardized sensor products, lack of standardized data
for both sensors and platform information, and lack of a common tasking
system that crosses the traditional command seams.83 The 2005 Roadmap also identifies issues
concerning training, logistics support, airspace integration, and CONOPS that could
benefit from greater cross-Service interoperability .84 Air Force officials worry that, as more
has become painfully apparent.
UAS from every service join the battle, it will become increasingly difficult to manage and coordinate air
combat operations, because each UAS comes with its own unique software and mission-control stations.85
Finally, as UAS capabilities increase, the services will seek to expand the roles and missions UAS are
expected to perform. UAS have traditionally been used for ISR, but the weaponization of the Predator and
the development of the Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle clearly demonstrate that the role of the UAS
is expanding. In fact, in 2004 the Joint Staff had each Combatant Commander rank the importance of 18
different types of missions for future UAS, to include electronic warfare, combat search and rescue, and
strike.86 While there is no doubt that the services will expect more from future UAS, the challenge will be
ensuring the services do not acquire redundant capabilities or attempt to perform missions that are not
included in their core competencies. For example, brigade commanders with a robust UAS capability
should not seek to use the stroke capability inherent in the systems to perform missions that have
traditionally belonged to manned aircraft.
***INHERENCY***
FAA pushing to expand

The FAA is expediting the process to streamline drone use
for domestic surveillance.
Philip J. Hiltner, 2013, Phil Hiltner is currently a lawyer in the Washtenaw
County Office of Public Defenders Office and also works for the Law Offices of
Jonathan Dills, North Carolina Thirteenth Prosecutorial District, THE DRONES
ARE COMING: USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES FOR POLICE
SURVEILLANCE AND ITS FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS, Wake Forest
Journal of Law and Policy vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 397-415,
http://lawpolicyjournal.law.wfu.edu/files/2013/06/Vol.3-2-Comment-Hiltner.pdf,
p. 398-399
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) projects that as many as 30,000 drones
could be patrolling the United States airspace by the year 2020.6 In 2011, the FAA
issued 313 certificates authorizing government agencies to use UASs, 295 of which were still active at the
Furthermore, Congress recently passed legislation requiring the

FAA to create a system that will expedite the process of issuing Certificates of Waiver
and Authorization (COAs) for both civil and public unmanned aircraft systems .8 This
end of the year.7
was in large part a response to pressure placed on the legislature by the burgeoning UAS industry,9 as the
The
combination of the forthcoming streamlined procedures for UAS licensure and
the opportunity for big profits almost guarantee that the use of UASs by
domestic police forces is here to stay. Increased police use of UASs is not, in itself, a bad thing.
value of the potential UAS market has been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars.10
These machines offer the opportunity for police officers to more safely conduct surveillance11 and
apprehend criminals.12 Drones can also be used for noncriminal functions, such as searching for missing
persons and responding to automobile accidents or chemical spills.13 They are also less expensive to
purchase and operate than traditional helicopters. The Montgomery County Police Department outside of
Houston, Texas estimates that its UAS costs $30 per hour to operate as compared to the $500 per hour
minimum for operating a helicopter.14 Improved public safety at a lower cost is better for everyone.
Drone authorization has been going on for years prior to

the FMRA only codified national airspace policy.
Wells C. Bennett, December 2012, Wells C. Bennett is a visiting fellow in
National Security Law at the Brookings Institution, Unmanned at Any Speed:
Bringing Drones into Our National Airspace, The Brookings Institute, no. 55,
pp. 1-20,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/14-dronesbennett/1214_drones_bennett.pdf, p. 10-11
In carrying its FMRA-mandated assignments, the FAA wont have to paint on a
blank canvass: in fact, domestic unmanned flight had been on its radar screen
for a good time before the statutes enactment. The FAA has permitted UAS
operations albeit on a limited and ad hoc basis since as early as 2003. Thus
FMRA is mostly an effort to accelerate and expand a policy that has existed, if
only in rough form, for nearly a decade.54 (The lone exception here, again, has to do with
civil UAS: FMRA contemplates the widespread commercial operation of drones something the law
currently forbids.) To put the point another way: with FMRA, Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the
the name of the game is speeding

things up. Officially, the FAA first glanced towards domestic unmanned flight back in 1981, by issuing
gradual development of domestic UAS norms. These days,
voluntary standards for hobbyists use of remote-controlled model aircraft. This terse, one-page document
recommended a maximum altitude of four hundred feet and encouraged amateur pilots to fly their aircraft
at a reasonably safe distance from populated areas.55 At the time, no other policies or laws touched on
domestic UAS flight, in no small part because, apart from enthusiasts remote-controlled planes and
experimental projects conducted by the military unmanned aircraft did not make consistent use of the
skies. Nevertheless, by issuing some standards, the FAA raised the question of whether, and how,
unmanned machines eventually might do just that. The answer has a lot to do with technology. The next
twenty years would witness a spike in UAS research, design, and manufacturing, even as UAS remained
mostly a military concern. 56 But the more the military harvested the technology, the more evident its
civilian applications became. That, in turn, created pressure to relax some of the restrictions on domestic
UAS flight. The progression evidently was on Congresss mind in 2003, when it passed the Vision 100 The
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. In broad strokes, this statute sketched out an ambitious
transformation of the aerospace industry and of the regulation of domestic air traffic. Essential to this was
the creation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System or NextGen a modernized, satellitebased aviation management scheme that, Congress hoped, would address the exponentially increasing
volume of aviation in the United States.57 As legislators imagined things, NextGen essentially would
accommodate a wide range of aircraft operations, including airlines, air taxis, helicopters, general
aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicles.58 A special entity within the FAA, the Joint Planning and
Development Office, was established in order to realize that objective, along with the others Congress had
set forth in Vision 100. 59 Of course none of this meant changing federal law immediately, so as to permit
by including unmanned aircraft in its long-term revamping

of the aviation sector, the legislature made explicit what the FAA had implied
so many years earlier, when it issued its model aircraft standards. In the notdomestic UAS flights. Still,
toodistant future, more and more aircraft would not have a human pilot inside.
Agencies want drones

Various police departments are looking to utilize UAVs for
routine law enforcement activities.
the Houston Police Department in Texas controversially tested the use
of unarmed surveillance drones, with the eventual objective of monitoring traffic, aiding
In 2007,
evacuations during natural disasters, helping with search and rescue operations, and assisting with other
tactical police incidents (Dean, 2007). The Executive Assistant Police Chief admitted that UAVs over the
skies of Houston could include covert police actions and that the police force was not ruling out someday
using the drones for writing traffic tickets (Dean, 2007). In another example, a confidential document
the Las Vegas Police Department may have been using UAVs above
the city of Las Vegas as early as 2007 (Public Intelligence, 2010). The document
further outlines a plan for UAVs to help monitor special events and discusses
ways in which the Las Vegas UAVs are integrated into Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) fusion centers to assist with the investigation of suspicious
activity reports (Public Intelligence, 2010). As noted in other work on the militarization of cities, the
application of drone technologies to urban areas promises to extend the
surveillance networks within which people are caught (Murakami Wood, 2007) and
revealed that
intensify the policing of cultural difference and political dissent that have historically marked cities as
vibrant, democratic spaces (Graham, 2010).
Drone use is starting to increase domestically.

Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
Drone technology burst onto the public scene during Americas relatively
recent military involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq, 25 but remotely controlled aircraft have
been around in one form or another for nearly one hundred years.26 Indeed, drones have long been a part
their presence has

often seemed distant. Now, rather than on a far-off planet or above a foreign battlefield, the
next stop for drones is directly above American backyards. Drones go by many
names,28 but they are essentially aircraft remotely controlled by pilots on the
ground, by preprogrammed instruction, or by pilots in chase aircraft .29 Dozens
of agencies have already applied for and use drones to perform agency
functions.30 Drone certificate holders presently include more than one
hundred agencies, universities, companies, and organizations .31 Those groups
of public imagination through works of literature and science fiction.27 Yet
include the U.S. Air Force, numerous local police and sheriffs departments, the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection, universities and community colleges, the Department of Agriculture, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Raytheon Company, and Blackwater Airships LLC.32 From
that sample of interested parties alone, drone technologys economic and lifesaving usefulness appears
limited only by the imagination. Wirelessly controlled airplanes marketed as spy drones dotted the
shelves during the 2012 holiday shopping season at major U.S. retailers.33 The number of anticipated uses
for commercial and private drones seems to be matched in quantity only by the number of news articles
fearing their misuse.34 Pleas for caution and safeguards are understandable, given the types of presently
available drones and the knowledge that technology tends to shrink size and expand capabilities over
time.
No guidelines
FBI is using drones for surveillance purposes now no
guidelines in place.
Kevin Johnson, June 20, 2013, Mueller tells lawmakers FBI has used
drones in U.S., USA Today, Ebsco Host
FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged Wednesday that the agency has deployed
drones to conduct surveillance in the U.S., and that the bureau is developing
guidelines for their future law enforcement use. Mueller told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the unmanned aerial vehicles, whose use by law enforcement has raised questions from
privacy advocates and civil liberties groups, are deployed in "a very minimal way and very seldom."
Responding to questions posed by lawmakers, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., Mueller said he
would provide more details about how information and images collected during surveillance operations are
used and stored. He said drone use was "narrowly focused on particular cases and particular needs." Iowa
Sen. Chuck Grassley, the panel's ranking Republican, said that Attorney General Eric Holder in previous
testimony had said the Drug Enforcement Administration and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives had "purchased drones and were exploring their use." "Absent from (Holder's) response was an
Calabrese, American Civil

Liberties Union's legislative counsel on privacy issues, said it was "a little
troubling" that the bureau had begun using the tech nology as guidelines were
still being developed: "If you are going to use potentially invasive surveillance, it seems like you
indication of how the FBI was using" drone technology, he said. Chris
should have the standards in advance." Sen. Mark Udall, D-Utah, also expressed concern that the FBI was
only in the initial stages of "developing privacy guidelines that protect civil liberties." Drones "have the
potential to more efficiently and effectively perform law enforcement duties," he said, "but the American
people expect the FBI and other government agencies to first and foremost protect their constitutional
rights." In a separate written statement following the director's testimony, the FBI said drone use is limited
to learning "critical information that otherwise would be difficult to obtain without introducing serious risk
to law enforcement personnel."
There is a large amount of flexibility within FAA drone

regulations that allow for them to be operated in national
airspace.
pp. 1-20,
Other regulations do come into play, though, and can frustrate unmanned flight. This category includes
some of the FAAs bedrock safety principles, like the requirement that vigilance shall be maintained by
each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.62 Not even the most lens-laden
drone can see neighboring air traffic like an ordinary pilot can. Sure, a ground-based operator or
observer might be able to see passing planes with his or her naked eye but only if the UAS does not stray
beyond the line of sight, the skies are clear and sufficient daylight remains. For these reasons, in 2005, the
FAA publicly concluded that UAS could not meet the see and avoid standard and thus also could not fly
in strict accordance with federal law.63 See and avoid being out of the question, the UAS community has
focused instead on developing a means for UAS to sense and avoid potential collisions.64 Of course,
simply because a drone cannot satisfy every jot and tittle of federal aviation
law does not mean it can never be operated safely. The FAA long has
recognized this, by authorizing domestic UAS operations on a case-by-case
basis. The agencys approach has been to consider individual requests to exempt UAS from otherwise
There are two exemption regimes. Which one applies

depends upon the intended use of a particular UAS. For a public use say, a
survey of a controlled fires progress through a national park the applicant must obtain a
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA before it may operate the
UAS. Conversely, if the UAS operation is private in nature or civil, to use the
aviation jargon then another body of regulations is triggered . Private concerns wishing
prohibitive aviation rules.
to fly a UAS must apply for a Special Airworthiness Certificate in the experimental category (SAC).
The COA and SAC procedures differ. In theory, for example, a COA may issue for any public purpose. By
contrast, an SAC authorizes private drone flights only for research and development, market survey and
crew training objectives. (Again, Civil UAS cannot fly on a for-hire basis.) And because governments drive
most of todays drones, the COA process naturally has done the bulk of the exemption work. Early this
year, the FAA claimed that, since 2006, it had approved between 700 and 750 COAs65, as opposed to only
94 SACs though the FAA last tallied SAC numbers in July of 2011.66 Still, regardless of whether the
applicant seeks a COA or an SAC, the point of the exercise is the same. Either way, the FAA examines the
proposed UAS project, and asks if, despite the failure to meet this or that safety standard, the applicant
nevertheless can mitigate the risks of non-compliance. If the answer is yes, then a COA or SAC will issue
and the UAS can fly, subject to the conditions imposed by the FAA in granting the exemption. The agency
might, for example, insist on flight within the operators visual line of sight, or with a manned aircraft
tailing along. Such has been the FAAs method since at least 2003, when it permitted the Department of
Defense to operate, on a nation-wide basis, Northrop Grummans Global Hawk Aerial Reconnaissance
System. The criteria underlying that authorization were spelled out two years later, in what appeared to be
Among other
things, the agency said it would require UAS pilots to understand the aviation
rules relevant to the airspace where their robots planned to fly ; the UAS also would
the first official FAA policy regarding the temporary licensure of domestic drones.67
have to possess a lost-link capability, so as to permit the aircrafts safe recovery in the event of a break
in communications between operator and aircraft.68 Such guidance accompanied an increase in drone
approvals. In 2005, for example, the FAA blessed a bid by General Atomics to fly, on an experimental basis,
its Altair UAS.
***NUTS/BOLTS***
Drones cause accidents

The frequency of UAV accidents ensures hampered
national airspace integration.
Chad C. Haddal and Jeremiah Gertler, July 8, 2010, Chad Haddal is a
coordinator specialist in immigration policy and Jeremiah Gertler is a
specialist in military aviation for the Congressional Research Service,
Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524297.pdf, p. 6-7
technical capabilities of the UAVs have been tested in a military context,
but safety and technical issues need to be addressed if the program is to be
expanded domestically. Chief among these issues is the FAAs concerns about
the NAS and whether UAVs can be safely incorporated into the nations
crowded skies. It has been noted that UAVs suffer accident rates multiple
times higher than manned aircraft. However, in an effort to support the wars in Afghanistan
The
and Iraq, DOD fielded UAVs such as Predator and Global Hawk before their development programs were
complete. Thus, the UAV accident rate might be lower if these systems had been allowed to mature under
the full development program.
UAVs could potentially cause as much damage as a large

corporate jet when it crashes accidents happen
frequently.
UAVs may be expected to crash more frequently, the potential for catastrophic
consequences is less given that these vehicles do not weigh enough or carry enough fuel to cause major
UAVs, like the MQ-9 Reaper or the RQ-4

Global Hawk, can potentially cause as much damage as a mid- to large-sized
corporate jet. However, safety considerations in the design and operation of these more complex
damage on the ground. On the other hand, larger
systems may reduce the likelihood of a crash. Additional procedures that can be incorporated into safety
regulations for unmanned aircraft systems may further mitigate flight risks. These procedures may include
formal risk assessments for systems certification and mission planning; development of ground impact
models and mitigation plans to reduce risks to persons and property on the ground;23 and structured
training and certification requirements for unmanned aircraft pilots, systems operators, and other safety
critical personnel.
Human interaction is required for UAVs causing crashes

new forms of training needs to happen.
The issue of training and certification requirements for unmanned aircraft

systems personnel raises a much broader issue regarding the role of humans
in these systems. Indeed, the term unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a
misnomer: while the aircraft themselves may be unmanned, the systems
needed to operate them safely depend extensively on human interaction .
Although drones operate without a pilot on board, human performance is a major consideration in setting
Key human factors to

be considered include operator interfaces and controls and the training and
qualifications of drone pilots, systems operators, and other safety critical personnel. The previously
mentioned 2006 crash of a UAV operated by Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) illustrates the importance of these human factors considerations. On April
policy for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems in domestic airspace.
25, 2006, a Predator B (MQ-9) drone crashed in a remote area along the U.S.-Mexico border near Nogales,
AZ following a loss of engine power. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the
probable cause of the mishap was the drone pilots failure to follow appropriate procedures when switching
to an alternate control console in the ground control station following a computer malfunction.24 The error
resulted in the pilot inadvertently cutting off the vehicles fuel supply. CBP had only been operating the
Predator B aircraft since September 2005, eight months prior to the mishap. NTSB concluded that during
this time CBP was providing a minimal amount of operational oversight of its UAS program and cited its
inadequate surveillance of the program as a contributing factor in the crash.
UAVs suffer from high accident rates due to an inability in

adapting to differences in weather and climate.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, Albany Government Law Review vol. 8, pp. 314335, http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol08_1/8.1.313Rehfuss.pdf,p. 323
Despite the marked advantages of drone technology, a 2003 report raised
concerns about the high accident rate of UAVs when its findings indicated that UAV
accident rates are multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft.70 One projected reason
for this emanates from the fact that the advent and development of UAV
technology is relatively recent and ongoing .71 Ultimately, it has been suggested that
there is less redundancy built into the operating system of UAVs than of
manned aircraft and until redundant systems are perfected mishap rates are expected to remain
high[er] than crash rates of manned aircraft.72 Inclement weather further threatens UAVs
surveillance capability, especially those UAVs that are only equipped with an ElectroOptical (EO)
camera and Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) equipment.73 In cloudy conditions and high
humidity climates, the imagery produced by EO and FLIR equipment can become
extremely distorted.74 Moreover, it has been further estimated that unlike control system failures
in manned aircraft where a well-trained pilot is better positioned to discover the source of the problem due
to his or her proximity to the issue in question, an operator of a UAV is at a significant disadvantage
because he or she is much further removed from the problematic event.75 Regardless, as one
commentator points out, [t]here tend to be more mishaps and mistakes with any new technology,
manned or unmanned . . . . When the kinks get worked out and expertise builds, crash rates tend to go
down.76
Drones are anti-immigration

UAVs are utilized for domestic surveillance purposes
immigration.
By meshing aerial reconnaissance with aerial bombardment, drones function
primarily as technologies of war. Yet UAVs are also being used as technologies
of state surveillance and policing and are deployed in security-scapes other than military
combat zones. For instance, in the USA drones are increasingly being used to police
foreign migrants in relationship to its territorial borderzones , particularly by locating
people who are attempting to enter the country illegally. In addition, as we will detail below, some
police departments are now conceiving of drones as surveillance devices that
might prove useful in the routine policing and monitoring of domestic
territories. Soon after President Obama announced in May 2010 that 1200 National Guard soldiers
(Werner and Billeaud, 2010) would be deployed to the already heavily militarized Downloaded from
tcr.sagepub.com at MISSOURI STATE UNIV on June 1, 2015 244 Theoretical Criminology 15(3) and
surveilled USMexico border (Dunn, 1996; Pallitto and Heyman, 2008), conservative Arizona Governor Jan
Brewer wrote a letter to Obama urging him to send also what she referred to as aviation assets,
specifically military UAVs and helicopters (Lach, 2010).
Border security is trying to utilize drones to prevent

terrorist crossings along ineffective despite the amount
theyre spending.
This appeal for drones at the border obscures the fact that UAVs have already
been providing aerial surveillance over US border regions (Shachtman, 2005; Gilson,
2010). Since 2006, the USA has spent approximately $100 million for UAVs on
both the southern and northern US borders as part of its efforts to create a so-called
virtual fence (Canwest News Service, 2007). As of 2010 the US Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) was operating six unarmed Predator drones for overhead
surveillance missions along the USMexico border, five of which were based in Brewers state of
Arizona (Gilson, 2010). Since late 2007 or early 2008, the CBP has been testing drones in US/ Canada
border regions (Canwest News Service, 2007). CBP officials credit their drones with helping bust 15,000
lbs of pot and 4,000 illegal immigrants (Gilson, 2010). In the words of a defense executive: It
is quite
easy to envision a future in which (UAVs ), unaffected by pilot fatigue, provide
247 border and port surveillance to protect against terrorist intrusion
Other examples [of possible uses] are limited only by our imagination
Clearly, drones have been enlisted in efforts to restrict illegal

immigration and combat the war on drugs. The notion of drug drones has
become fashionable in international drug enforcement, especially for use in
maritime operations (Padgett, 2009). For instance, under the name Monitoreo, which is Spanish
(McCullagh, 2006).
for monitoring, the US Southern Command recently conducted a drone testing project that mobilized an
Israeli-made $6.5 million Heron drone from El Salvadors Comalapa Air Base to track down suspected drug
cartel members who were allegedly using the open waters to smuggle drugs into the USA (Padgett, 2009;
see also Shachtman, 2009). By remaining thousands of feet in the air for up to 20-hours while being
equipped with a set of sensors better suited for spotting the subs [mini-submarines] that have become so
popular among narco-cartels (Shachtman, 2009), this particular Heron drone promises to be a longer
endurance technology than conventional planes commonly used in drug surveillance.
Multiple problems with UAVs prove it wont be effective

at patrolling the border.
Jason Blazakis, January 2, 2004, Jason Blazakis is an analyst in the Social
Legislation Domestic Social Policy Division, Border Security and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, pp. 1-6,
p. 4-5
Despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security, various
problems encountered in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border.
There are concerns regarding UAVs high accident rate. Currently, the UAV
accident rate is 100 times higher than that of manned aircraft.17 Because UAV
technology is still evolving there is less redundancy built into the operating system of
UAVs than of manned aircraft and until redundant systems are perfected mishap rates are
expected to remain high. Additionally, if control systems fail in a manned aircraft, a well-trained pilot is
better positioned to find the source of the problem because of his/her physical proximity. If a UAV
if a UAV landing was attempted during difficult

weather conditions, the ground control pilot would be at a disadvantage
because he or she is removed from the event. Unlike a manned pilot, the remote pilot
would not be able to assess important sensory information such as wind speed.18
encountered a similar system failure, or
The key component of Operation Safeguard was to identify potential threats crossing the southern border
surveillance capabilities of UAVs equipped with only an E-O camera

and Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) sensor have been limited in the past
illegally. The
by poor weather conditions. Cloudy conditions and high humidity climates can distort the imagery
produced by E-O and FLIR equipment. Although the Predator B is operating in the low-humidity
environment of the Southwest, the effects of extreme climatic or atmospheric conditions on its sensors
reportedly can be mitigated if DHS decides to outfit the Predator B with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
system.19 Radars can produce high-resolution imagery in inclement weather. The ability of SAR to function
during adverse weather conditions sets it apart from optical or infrared systems.20 However,
its ability
to track moving targets is limited. This limitation can be mitigated by accompanying SAR with
moving target indicator (MTI) radar technology. Adding SAR and MTI to the Predator Bs platform could
significantly enhance its operational capability for border missions. By adding SAR and MTI to the UAV
platform, however, the costs of using UAVs on the border would increase.
UAVs are not as cost-effective as alternative technologies

provided at a lower cost ineffective at curtailing illegal
immigration.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524297.pdf, p. 6
Questions as to the effectiveness of UAVs persist . Although Homeland Security officials
praised the (UAVs) as a safe and important tool that has contributed to the seizing of more than 22,000
pounds of marijuana and the apprehension of 5,000 illegal immigrants, others disagree.24 Unmanned
aircraft serve a very useful role in military combat situations, but are not economical or efficient in civilian
law enforcement applications, said T. J. Bonner, president of the Border Patrol union. There
are a
number of other technologies that are capable of providing a greater level of
usefulness at a far lower cost.25 The DHS Inspector General noted that UAVs were less
effective, in their limited tests, than manned aircraft in supporting the
apprehension of unauthorized aliens.26 In addition, the UAVs were used to assist in the
apprehensions of aliens who had already been detected by other means. However, the ability of UAVs to
maintain position for over 20 hours represents a significant advantage over manned aircraft; in the future,
they may be used to actually detect unauthorized entries as opposed to merely supporting apprehensions
of aliens already detected. An issue for Congress could entail whether UAVs are an effective tool for
securing the border.
Drone use expanding

Drones are currently heavily restricted due to FAA
regulations.
M. Ryan Calo, December 12, 2011, M. Ryan Calo is the Director for Privacy
and Robotics at the Center for Internet & Society, The Drone as Privacy
Catalyst, Stanford Law Review Online vol. 64, issue 29,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst?
utm_source=publish2&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=www.kpbs.org
You might think drones would already be ubiquitous. There are, however, Federal
Aviation Administration restrictions on the use of unmanned aircraft systems,
restrictions that date back several years. Some public agencies have petitioned for
waiver. Customs and Border Protection uses drones to police our borders.
Recently the state of Oklahoma asked the FAA for a blanket waiver of eighty miles of airspace. Going
forward, waiver may not be necessary. The FAA faces increasing pressure to
relax its restrictions and is considering rulemaking to reexamine drone use in domestic
airspace.[4]
There is a lack of national airspace restrictions pertaining

to UAVs just now expanding into homeland security
roles.
Until recently, civilian interest in operating unmanned aircraft in U.S. airspace
had largely been limited to long-standing hobbyist use of radio-controlled model aircraft. The
Academy of Model Aeronautics, a national organization representing model aviation enthusiasts, was
founded in 1936 and claims a membership of more than 150,000.4 It serves as the chartering organization
At present, radio-controlled
model aircraft operate under a voluntary standard that generally permits
flights only below 400 feet above the surface . These guidelines specify that model aircraft
for more than 2,400 model airplane clubs across the United States.
be flown away from populated areas and not in close proximity to full-scale aircraft. They further request
coordination with air traffic facilities when planning operations within 3 miles of an airport and suggest that
model aircraft be adequately flight tested before being operated in front of spectators.5 While most radiocontrolled model aircraft are powered by small propeller engines and weigh only a few pounds, some are
The distinction between functional

model aircraft and small unmanned aerial vehicles is, therefore, largely based
on an aircrafts use rather than its size or capabilities: whereas model aircraft are
regarded as being used for recreational purposes, UAVs serve public use missions , such as
law enforcement and disaster relief, and commercial applications. The
prospect of robust growth in use of UAVs had triggered more formal analysis
of the process for granting approvals and development of regulations for UAV
operations. The challenges associated with safely integrating civilian UAVs into domestic airspace are
discussed in detail below (see Domestic Airspace Integration Issues). Flight missions considered to
be dirty, dull, or dangerous are regarded as prime candidates for the use of
jet-powered scale models weighing over 100 pounds.
unmanned aircraft. Examples include aerial surveillance missions for homeland

security, border protection, and law enforcement ; highway traffic monitoring; forest fire
scouting; disaster response; aerial applications of pesticides; pipeline and transmission line inspection;
aerial surveying and geospatial imaging; atmospheric and environmental science; wildlife and natural
resources management; scientific data collection; and hurricane and severe storm monitoring. Some
industry experts foresee eventual use of unmanned aircraft for cargo transport. At this point, however,
passenger-carrying UAVs are not on the horizon. Industry analysts anticipate a robust market for
unmanned aircraft systems, although the extent to which civilian sales will contribute to this market is
highly dependent on how the regulation of civilian drones proceeds. The Teal Group, an aviation and
aerospace consulting firm, predicted that, over the next ten years, annual spending on unmanned aircraft
systems and sensor payloads will increase by 73% and worldwide spending on unmanned aircraft systems
will total $89 billion, with the United States accounting for 62% of the research and development spending
and 55% of procurement totals.6 Similarly, VisionGain, a UK-based business information provider, foresees
strong demand for unmanned aircraft payloads and subsystems, as well for UAV flight training and
simulation.7
Drones are resource intensive

Drones require an immense amount of personnel to
provide support and keep them in the air.
Scott Shane and Thom Shanker, October 1, 2011, Strike Reflects U.S.
Shift to Drones in Terror Fight, The New York Times,
17V_2_2011_Yemen_U.S._Drone_Strikes_Yemen_Reflects_U.S._Shift_to_Drone_
Use_OCT_1_2011_NYTimes_Questions_Targeting_Americans.pdf
simplicity of a drone aloft, with its pilot operating from the United States, can be
misleading. Behind each aircraft is a team of 150 or more personnel,
repairing and maintaining the plane and the heap of ground technology that
keeps it in the air, poring over the hours of videos and radio signals it
collects, and gathering the voluminous intelligence necessary to prompt a
single strike.
The apparent
No airspace
Public agencies utilizing unmanned aircraft have the
disadvantage of not designating airspace for their
operation.
One significant difference between military unmanned aircraft and unmanned
aircraft operated by other public agencies or by civilian users is that the military,
for many years, has negotiated with FAA to set aside airspace designated for
military training, testing, and other purposes . Military airspace consists of military
operations areas, military training routes, test ranges, and other restricted or prohibited airspace.
Military operations areas and training routes are typically located in remote
areas. While not set aside exclusively for military use, these areas and routes are charted and
documented, allowing other airspace users, especially smaller general aviation aircraft, to be
alert for military flight operations, including operations involving unmanned aircraft.
The military has also worked with FAA to set aside specific restricted and prohibited airspace (e.g., above
test sites and bombing ranges) to accommodate operations that pose greater risks to other air traffic. This
airspace is charted and documented to allow pilots to avoid these areas when restrictions designating
them as off limits to non-military users are in effect. Airspace restrictions can serve as an effective tool for
mitigating risks to civilian air traffic. However, their use concerns some airspace users because they pose
inconveniences and sometimes raise additional safety issues. With additional restrictions, civilian pilots
may be forced to fly more circuitous routes, leaving pilots with fewer options to avoid bad weather or plan
for fuel stops. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), which represents more than 400,000
general aviation pilots and aviation enthusiasts across the United States, has been particularly critical of
the use of restricted airspace designations to separate unmanned aircraft operations from other air traffic.
AOPA has asserted that unmanned aircraft operations should not have a negative impact on general
aviation operations and should not require special airspace designations, such as restricted airspace, for
their operation.34 It, however, generally supports the integration of unmanned aircraft so long as they do
no harm to current manned operations.35
Kyllo decision
Kyllo helped establish a firm bright line for when to use or
not use drone technology in the United States.
p. 410-411
It has already been shown that UASs may be equipped with a variety of tools
to increase their surveillance capabilities. What information we have about the
Fourth Amendment implications of observations that cannot be made by the naked eye
comes primarily from the Supreme Court case of Kyllo v. United States. 99 In
Kyllo, Department of the Interior agents suspected that the defendant was
growing marijuana in his home, which requires the use of high-powered
halide lamps.100 In order to detect the amount of heat emanating from the
home, two agents used a thermal imager to scan the home from across the street.101 The
thermal imager used by the agents detects infrared radiation coming off of objects, and converts the
radiation into an image on a small screen in black-and-white.102 Cooler objects appear as darker shades
of gray, while hotter images are whiter.103 The agents could see that the defendants house was emitting
an unusual amount of heat compared to his neighbors and were able to acquire a search warrant based on
this information.104
The Supreme Court held that this was an unlawful intrusion
into the home.105 The Court opened its reasoning saying, It would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the
advance of technology.106 Justice Scalia reasoned that the information the officers obtained through the
thermal imager was information that could not otherwise be obtained without intrusion into a
It appears that the Court wanted to create a firm,

bright-line rule at the threshold of the home. However, this holding came with
an important limitation. The Court said that such observations with technologically
sophisticated devices would be considered searches at least where . . . the
technology in question is not in general public use.108 Therefore, the Court left
open the possibility that, if a technology became easily accessible by the
general population, intrusions into the home through use of that technology
might not be constitutionally protected. Another concern that arises with drone technology
constitutionally protected area.107
is the ability for the police to easily follow individuals undetected for extended periods of time. In these
cases, the police are not using technology to do what would be impossible to the naked eyelike detect
the amount of heat radiating from a homebut they are using it to do what otherwise might be impractical
namely, constantly track an objects whereabouts over a several-day period. The Supreme Courts
decisions in United States v. Knotts109 and United States v. Karo110 are particularly helpful in this
area.111 In Knotts, Minnesota police tracked the movements of a suspected drug manufacturer for three
days by placing a radio transmitter (or beeper) in a drum of chloroform that was purchased by the
defendant. 112 The police were able to use the information they gained from tracking the defendant to
secure a search warrant, which lead to the discovery of a methamphetamine laboratory.113 The Court held
that the information gained from tracking the defendant on public roads was not protected.114
Kyllo helps leave open the possibility to restrict drone

usage for privacy reasons in the future.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether police use of a thermal
imaging device constituted an improper residential search in Kyllo. 134 Its ruling
has potential implications in the context of emerging drone technology. The
five-to-four majority held that the use of a sense-enhancing technology to view the contents of a home
The case also discussed the

appropriate interpretation of Katz under more modern circumstances.136 The
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.135
Kyllo majority rejected the contention that a passive collection of extra-sensory information emanating
from the exterior of a home (without revealing intimate details of the interior) was reasonable.137 Instead,
the Court determined that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical, in-person inspection of
a residence constitutes a searchat least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.138 This statement effectively means that a naked-eye observation from a public vantage
point is likely not a search, while technology that improves observation beyond what an un-aided person
can sense must be questioned further. The majoritys test in Kyllo tracks closely with Katz. Police are not
required to avert their eyes from criminal activity.139 There will always be close cases involving rapidly
Kyllos
standard applies: (1) when there is an enhancement technology, (2) when the
interior contents of a house could be ascertained through no other means,
and (3) when a technology is not so prevalent as to defeat a reasonable
individuals expectation of privacy .141 An interesting question arises when one
considers whether a drone is inherently a sense-enhancing technology
emerging technologies. But the majoritys test may not actually demand eye aversion.140
(regardless of the onboard cameras or equipment). Arguably, a drone augments the users ability to collect
sensory information by extending the operators visual and auditory capacities to previously impossible
vantage points. But it is unlikely a court would adopt this reasoning because without any additional
equipment (such as telescopic camera lenses, thermal imaging devices, etc.), drones provide no
independent sensory enhancement. It remains to be seen whether courts will distinguish between images
captured by navigational cameras onboard drones and those directed intentionally downward on their
A court using Kyllo to evaluate the facts of a drone case may

wish to distinguish between these different cameras. The closest analogue is,
surveillance subjects.
understandably, to helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft which are discussed in Part IV.AC of this Note.142
Like those aircraft, they are more accurately a platform technology that carries sensory technology on
board.143 Therefore, the equipment carried by the drone should determine whether Kyllo applies.144
Interestingly, the Kyllo test leaves open the possibility that the permissibility
of using a particular technology can change over time. Widespread drone
usage may have precisely that effect on the social conceptions of the
reasonable expectation of privacy.145 Drones may someday share the same familiarity that
the public apparently had with the small planes in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical.146 If so, the existing aerial
observation cases would offer little constitutional protection because many drones would have the
capability to remain at a legal altitude, yet also make observations far beyond the abilities of a manned
helicopter or plane considered by Riley.
Navy - FYI
Navy has their own fleet of drone aircraft.
Valerie Insinna, May 2014, Navy Surveillance Drone Undergoes First
Round of Flight Tests, National Defense vol. 98, issue 726, Ebsco Host, p. 13
The Navy is one step closer to having its own fleet of unmanned aircraft capable of conducting longendurance surveillance missions at high altitudes. The MQ-4C Triton completed its initial test flight phase in
March. The system performed exceptionally well during flight test, Capt. Jim Hoke, the services Triton
plans to buy 70 aircraft from prime

contractor Northrop Grumman at a cost of $189 million per unit, according to a
UAS program manager, said in a statement. The service
2013 report by the Government Accountability Office. Initial operating capability is scheduled for 2017.
During testing designed to evaluate the air vehicles performance at various

altitudes and speeds, the Triton flew a combined 81 hours during 13 flights. It
reached a maximum altitude of almost 60,000 feet.
DOD - FYI
Domestic military flights utilizing drones can only
currently operate freely within restricted areas
exceptions require intense scrutiny and issuance of a
COA.
Hector L. Cruz, 2010, Hector Cruz is a Lieutenant Colonel with the United
States Air Force Reserve, Role of DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for
Homeland Security, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, pp. 132, p. 16
Access to National Airspace System. According to a Defense Science Board study, DoD
has an
urgent need to allow UAVs unencumbered access to the National Airspace
System (NAS) outside of restricted areas here in the US and around the
world.74 Currently UAV operations inside restricted and warning areas in the United States are
conducted at the discretion of the Air Force. Operations outside these areas and within
the NAS require a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate of
Authorization (COA), as well as a Letter of Authorization negotiated with the
appropriate FAA region.75 This process can take up to 60 days and COAs remain valid for no
longer than a year.76 Exceptions to this are the National COA issued to the Air Force for Global Hawk
operations and the Disaster Relief COA issued to Northern Commands (NORTHCOM) Joint Force Air
Component Commander for the Predator and Global Hawk UAVs along the southern and northern
borders.77 Policy and procedures to allow UAVs routine access to the NAS is currently in development.
Currently airspace coordination must

begin several months prior to planned missions. However in the event of an emergency
However this change may not occur until 2020.78
response mission, exceptions can be made fairly quickly. UAV operations in airspace not requiring aircraft
to participate with air traffic control (below 18,000 feet in the U.S.) will normally require the UAV to be
followed by a chase aircraft and/or primary radar coverage until it reaches restricted or military airspace,
which adds significant cost.79 Furthermore, UAVs must avoid flight over populated areas and must remain
clear of commercial air traffic corridors.80
A2 Drones better than manned aircraft

UAV collisions are likely due to an adequate substitute for
manned observance of aerial separation.
Homeland Security, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, pp. 132, p. 17-18
UAVs are currently unable
to see and avoid. As manned aviation increased through the years the
ability to ensure traffic separation was needed in order to increase safety of flight.
Vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see
and avoid other aircraft.84 This is the most universal means to ensure
separations when all other means, to include air traffic control (ATC) radar, fail and holds pilots
responsible when operating in a visual environment. This basic tenet will not be easily
changed or waived for UAV operations.85 Since UAVs by definition do not have a person on
Another major challenge with unrestricted access to the NAS is that
board the aircraft, on-board equipment, radar, or direct human observation must substitute for this
No technology has been identified as a suitable substitute for a

person on board the aircraft in seeing and avoiding other aircraft.86 The FAA is assisting DoD
capability.
efforts by sponsoring research on detect, sense and avoid (DSA).87 Current situational awareness/collision
avoidance technologies such as Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and 18 Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-B provide a level of DSA but only against cooperating traffic equipped with appropriate
transponders. Additional DSA technologies will be required to detect general aviation aircraft not equipped
with transponders. Systems providing protection from both may be required in each UAV to satisfy the
FAA.88
Drone manufacturing is shoddy and expensive.

Amy Butler, August 23, 2010, Risk Avoidance, Aviation Week & Space
Technology vol. 172, issue 32, Ebsco Host, p. 60
Just over one year into the contract to develop a new U.S. Navy maritime surveillance aircraft,
service
officials are preparing for a critical design review
in February and laying plans to avoid

the same technology pitfalls of building a high-flying unmanned aerial system (UAS) now plaguing the U.S.
Air Force. The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program, an $11-billion project to field 68 highaltitude UAS, expects to conduct its first flight in Fiscal 2012, says Jennifer Clarke, the Navy's BAMS
program deputy director. Northrop Grumman won the $1.16-billion contract in April 2008 to develop BAMS,
including two developmental vehicles for the Navy. A third developmental vehicle will be built, but the
BAMS is
being designed to provide intelligence on surface shipping targets; together
with the 737-based P-8 being built by Boeing, the new aircraft will replace the Navy's
company will retain ownership of it, says Steve Enewold, Northrop's BAMS vice president.
aging P-3 fleet. The BAMS UAS is being built on the Air Force Global Hawk Block 40 platform, including
thickened skins and spars on the wing to allow the UAS to transit turbulent air over the littorals, Enewold
says. While the Air Force system carries the Northrop Grumman/Raytheon Multi-Platform Radar Technology
Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) side-looking active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, BAMS will
employ the Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS). It is a 360-deg. mechanically steered AESA based on a
special project funded through the Office of Naval Research. BAMS will also use an Automatic Identification
System (AIS) shipping tracking capability and a nose mounted air-to-air AESA to provide a situational
awareness capability. "It is the first step in providing a due-regard capability in hopes of getting to an
autonomous sense-and-avoid," system, Clarke says. "Once we can get [due regard] solved for the big
platforms, then let's work on making the solution smaller" for other UAS. BAMS will also carry the Raytheon
MTS-B electro-optical/infrared sensor, full-motion video system carried by the Predator fleet, as well as an
electronic support measures (ESM) system for radio-frequency monitoring. All of these elements are
wrapped into the Northrop Grumman BAMS contract managed by a single office at Naval Air Systems
Command. This management approach resulted from difficult lessons learned by the Air Force on the
Global Hawk. In that program, the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center in Ohio oversees the airframe
is handling the previously turbulent MP-RTIP work.

timelines didn't marry well, and the program is over budget with
deliveries expected late. Also, Air Force officials were issuing too many
undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) in order to keep work flow moving, sparking concern by
development while the Electronic Systems Center
The two
some in Congress. UCAs are used to allow a contractor to start work without defining the contract price,
which is usually set at a later time; the upshot is that if these pile up, accounting for a program can be
problematic. "We are learning from everyone else's challenges," Clarke says. "If we see a problem that
they are having we are going to go triple check and try and avoid that same problem." She adds that the
Navy has taken measures to allow for the time needed to get and approve proposals from Northrop (Air
Force officials claimed the company took too long to build proposals). The Office of the Secretary of
Defense is also conducting preliminary meetings to assess whether Global Hawk is at risk for a second
breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute, which mandates a review of over-budget programs. Much of the
cost growth, however, includes items such as depot work and spares never
included in the original Air Force program budget. David Van Buren, the Air Force's top
procurement official, has upbraided Northrop for cost and contracting problems. "We've
had a very good experience with Northrop," Clarke says, unlike Van Buren. "It [the program] is managed
out of [an office in Bethpage, N.Y.], which has a strong systems engineering background." To avoid
surprises, Navy officials obtained an independent assessment from experts at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory
on Northrop's modeling for the MFAS sensor, and Clarke says the models from both are "very close." Also,
the Navy decided upfront to use a leased Gulfstream G-II as a surrogate aircraft for early MFAS flighttesting, in advance of an available UAS. During the Global Hawk development the Air Force added
Northrop's high-flying Proteus as a surrogate asset to work out software problems with the MP-RTIP.
***SOLVENCY***
DAPTA solves
Congressional action to curtail drone privacy would allay
many public concerns about UAV adoption.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
there are certain general principles that Congress should consider
adopting. Legal author Troy Roberts has assembled a list of recommendations for legislative fixes that
would plug many privacy holes.173 His proposed solutions include some of the following: 1. Write plain
language statutes requiring warrants for [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)] searches. 2.
Focus efforts on nonvisual navigation and safety of flight tech nology. 3.
Require any UAVs to power down sensory enhancing technology when
transitioning to the target of the warrant or other mission. 4. Require logs of sensory
enhancing technology use on all UAVs. 5. Create exceptions for immediate
warrantless observation requirements, such as criminal chases, fires, and chemical
exposures. 6. Establish an objective regulatory body to enforce the rules on
operators.174 In particular, Robertss third, fourth, and fifth recommendations
would allay many general societal fears regarding drones because they would reduce
To begin with,
police incentives to employ large numbers of drones for observational purposes.175 Brookings Institute
fellow John Villasenor has added that federal legislation may be prone to over-reaching
by containing so many privacy protections that legitimate police work will be impeded with little victory for
Villasenor describes one

scenario where more stringent rules would stifle an otherwise critically
important piece of criminal evidence: Suppose that a brutal assault that takes place on a
privacy.176 In a recent article addressing drones and privacy,
sidewalk is captured on video by a governmentoperated [drone] that happens to be monitoring traffic on
Suppose further that the video from the [drone] turns out to be
the only available evidence that can identify the perpetrator. It would defy
common sense if the police or prosecutors were barred by new [drone] privacy
rules from making use of this information.177 Villasenor therefore cautions that a blanket
the adjacent street.
warrant requirement would be foolish.178 He instead argues for a more limited scope of legislated privacy
protections targeting the data retention of drone images and mandating that police keep thorough public
records of drone operations.179 In addition to Robertss and Villasenors recommendations, police drones
should be employed only on specific missions, not sent to scour a city for undiscovered crimes. At a
minimum, this limitation would minimize the number of ethical quandaries like the one raised by professor
Despite its appeal to logic, Villasenors hypothetical seems to

concede too much ground to the technical capabilities of drones. This same
sort of logic would seemingly justify almost any form of invasiveness widely
deployed in public spaces so long as the technical capability exists.180 But the legislature has
Villasenor above.
the flexibility to customize its laws to address a unique technical threat while taking advantage of its
political will permits passage of a drone privacy bill, the

real challenge will be to carve out the right exceptions . Perhaps the best way to
unique capabilities.181 If
ensure that private citizens are not the subject of regular Fourth Amendment search violations from any
sourceis to incentivize police and prosecutors by restricting the availability of drone-collected evidence
at trial.182
Legal restrictions key to industry

Without a robust national legal framework the drone
industry will collapse altogether.
Pierre Hines, September 17, 2013, Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the
Drones, The Daily Beast,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/17/learn-to-stop-worrying-andlove-the-drones.html
there is a legitimate fear that lawenforcement officials will use them to monitor the activities of American
citizens, a scenario made possible by advancements in wide-area
surveillance. Military drones, with ominous code names like Gorgon Stare and Constant Hawk, can
However, given the precedent for drone use,
monitor movement across an entire urban area. Efforts to curtail the domestic use of drones generally call
for four privacy protections: (1) limiting tracking operations to specific individuals; (2) obtaining a warrant;
(3) discarding any data unrelated to the specific target of the investigation; and (4) denying the use of
The current
legal regime is well suited to deal with most, but not all, of the privacy
concerns drones create. For instance, it is settled law that high-powered technology cannot be
drone-collected evidence in court if the evidence was obtained unlawfully or unintentionally.
used without a warrant to spy on Americans in their residences because the home is a protected place
under the Constitution. One issue the legal regime is not prepared for is how to deal with constant
surveillance outside the homein parks, on roads, and in other public areas. Theoretically, the police could
still tail you to accomplish the same objective without a warrant, but limited resources serve as a check on
The decreasing cost of drones and increasing capabilities mean that

drones wont strain police resources the same way old-fashioned police work
would. Legislation to restrict drone use amid privacy concerns has been
proposed in at least 42 states. That isnt the problem; the problem is that theres no
coherent legal framework at a national level . At least one state, Arizona, proposed
this power.
legislation that distinguishes between how police can use drones to track U.S. citizens and noncitizens.
One of the many benefits of drones is the ability to travel long distances, but
if the law changes every time a drone crosses a county line, it could
significantly affect the cost-benefit analysis of using them . While safety and privacy
concerns are well founded, we shouldnt let them stunt the growth of an entire industry. And without an
overall legal framework that aligns state laws, an overabundance of regulation has
the potential to ground the drone industry before it ever takes off . Beyond the
military and law-enforcement applications, drones have the potential to benefit our lives in everything from
disaster relief to assessing power lines. In the not-too-distant future, if drone policy is properly established,
you might look up and see not a bird, not a plane, but a drone.
Until a regulatory framework is put in place safe drone

expansion will be hampered.
While a substantial portion of this market will be accounted for by the
defense sector, manufacturers are increasingly looking toward the civilian
sector, fearing that military sales may stagnate as operations in Afghanistan are scaled
However, some forecasters have concluded

that growth in the civilian market is unlikely until a regulatory framework
allowing routine UAS operations is established .8 FAA anticipates that once
such regulations are put in place, roughly 10,000 active civilian UASs will
commence operations within the first five years.9 It is important to distinguish publicuse missions from purely civilian activities involving UAVs, although certain
back and U.S. defense budgets grow tighter.
commercial operations, such as utility line inspection, may serve a public benefit. The distinction matters
aircraft owned or leased by federal and state agencies, counties, and

municipalities, are regulated differently from civil aircraft operated by private
because
individuals and corporations.10 Although the regulatory distinctions are complex, in general, FAA oversight
and authority over public-use aircraft are more limited. For this reason, some public sector entities,
particularly homeland security and law enforcement agencies and public

universities, are already making limited use of UAVs while the commercial
market awaits FAA regulatory action.
Current technological limitations hamper widespread

effective UAV adoption.
Domestic airspace accommodates more than 70,000 flights per day 18 at a
variety of altitudes, including low- and high-altitude military training flights, high-altitude air
carrier and business jet flights, medium-altitude commuter and general aviation flights, and low-altitude
The risk of collision between

these users and unmanned aircraft must be adequately mitigated before
unmanned aircraft can routinely utilize the national airspace system. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that no suitable
technology is currently available to provide unmanned aircraft, particularly small UAVs,
recreational and sightseeing flights and helicopter operations.
with the detect, sense, and avoid requirements needed to safely operate within the national airspace
GAO noted that small-unmanned aircraft pose a particular challenge

Many other aircraft operating at these altitudes do not use
electronic transponders to broadcast their position and altitude, and in any case
many small UAVs lack the ability to receive transponder signals. The needed equipment
is simply too large and heavy to install on many small UAVs.19 Currently, these limitations
substantially restrict UAV operations to line-of-sight scenarios, where operators on
system.
because they operate at low altitudes.
the ground or spotters in chase planes can provide the necessary capabilities to detect and avoid other air
traffic. FAA is currently evaluating options for routinely allowing small-unmanned aircraft to use line-ofsight as an acceptable means to detect and avoid manned aircraft under a regulatory regime for small
UAVs. For more sophisticated medium and large-sized UAVs seeking approval for operations beyond line of
sight, technology advancements are needed to assure safety in an environment shared with manned
flights. Remote sensing capabilities, including onboard cameras, airborne radars, and equipment to
interrogate aircraft transponder signals (similar to the traffic collision avoidance systems on jetliners) can
combine to provide operators with robust air traffic information.
A2 Law enforcement use

Law enforcement confidence in UAV surveillance use has
declined.
William Bloss, 2007, William Bloss is Chair of the Department of Criminal
Justice, College of Human Ecology, at East Carolina University, Escalating
U.S. Police Surveillance after 9/11: an Examination of Causes and Effects,
Surveillance and Society vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 208-228,
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-andsociety/article/viewFile/3448/3411, p. 221
surveillance technology being used by the police in border protection is the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Designed primarily for military applications ,
these unmanned drones are being used by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct aerial surveillance of perimeter and border regions
Another
(Fairbank, 2005). The stated purpose is to increase electronic monitoring and surveillance capability across
UAV efficacy
remains uncertain and border apprehensions have declined by 50 percent,
a broad span of territory to detect illegal border crossings. Reports have shown that the
since 2000, during the period of drone use along U.S. territorial borders (Electronic Privacy Information
Center, 2005a).
A2 Legal restrictions solve now

The courts have net yet ruled on privacy concerns for
drones.
Melanie Reid, 2014, Melanie Reid is an Associate Professor of Law at the
Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law, GROUNDING DRONES:
BIG BROTHERS TOOL BOX NEEDS REGULATION NOT ELIMINATION, Richmond
Journal of Law & Technology vol. 20, issue 3, pp. 1-73,
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i3/article9.pdf, p. 4-5
With the expected rise in drone use in the next several years, Congress appears to
have two concerns: safety and privacy. Congress passed its safety concerns
onto the FAA with the passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.10 The FAA has
been assigned the task to create regulations for government and civilian
drone use by September 2015.11 These regulations, Congress hopes, will
alleviate any safety concerns surrounding drone flights. As to privacy, the federal
government has yet to pass legislation arising from privacy concerns with the
increase in drone use by civilians and government actors alike; however, several bills are being considered.
The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013 would effectively require a warrant before a drone could be
As mentioned, several states have already tackled the privacy

implications of government drone use head-on. [5] These safety and privacy concerns
used.12
will lead to regulations for two types of drone users: government actors or law enforcement, and civilians.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the use of drones by government
actors or private civilians and whether it would constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment with respect to law enforcement use, or a trespass or invasion of privacy
with respect to private actors.13 With the influx of state regulations and increased usage by both
government and civilian actors,
the Supreme Court will undoubtedly face this issue in
the near future.
No significant court case in twenty-three years to place

limits on drone surveillance.
Brandon Nagy, May 1, 2014, Brandon Nagy practices Business Litigation at
Stinson Leonard Street, Why They Can Watch You: Assessing the
Constitutionality of Warrantless Unmanned Aerial Surveillance by Law
Enforcement, Berkeley Technology Law Journal vol. 29, issue 1, pp. 136-152,
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2020&context=btlj, p. 155-156
In the twenty-three years since Riley, the Court has not commented
specifically on the constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance despite
the many questions left unanswered by Riley, Dow, and Ciraolo . For example, by
speaking only to aerial surveillance of curtilage, Riley did not opine on the constitutionality
of aerial surveillance of the inside of a home. Additionally, while the aerial
surveillance cases appear to allow the use of cameras, they do not explain
the extent to which law enforcement agencies may use technology, such as
infrared, electro-optical, or night-vision cameras, to enhance their observational powers
without a warrant. Clues to the answers to these questions, however, can be found in three recent,
notable cases: Minnesota v. Carter, 143 Kyllo v. United States, 144 and United States v. Jones. 145
Courts are divided on what to do with UAV surveillance

no concrete legal action.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
Supreme Court cases dealing with rapidly advancing surveillance
technologies have divided the Court over how to best handle Fourth
Amendment implications. In the recent case of United States v. Jones ,157 five
of the Justices expressed their considerable hesitation in the face of a cheap,
newly widespread, and useful police surveillance technologyGlobal Positioning
System (GPS) tracking technology.158 The Court examined whether a GPS tracking device mounted on the
undercarriage of a suspects Jeep constituted a search.159 The four-justice plurality opinion authored by
Justice Scalia looked largely to the property law of trespass to conclude there was a search, and a warrant
was required.160 But Justice Scalia acknowledged, with caution, that [w]e may have to grapple with . . .
vexing problems in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must
Drone
technology should present precisely this sort of nontrespassory search issue
that could compel Justice Scalia and others to revive a more basic, Katz-like
approach. For instance, in a recent and fiery dissent, Justice Scalia excoriated the Court for its
be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.161
allowance of unwarranted DNA collection for the purpose of cross referencing it against a database of
incriminating samples.162 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor opined that the unique qualities of a new
technology should be evaluated to properly apply Katz analysis.163 GPS tracking technology presents a
problem for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community hostility.164
Justice Sotomayor identified GPS technology as a tool so amenable to misuse that its unique attributes
should be taken into account when evaluating applying Katz. 165 Justice Sotomayor asked, somewhat
rhetorically, whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in
a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.166 She implied they would not.167 Justice Alitos concurrence in Jones
also noted that science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a persons privacy
than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and which
inspired the Fourth Amendment.168 He determined that the Constitutions protections should adapt with
technology.169 Justices Sotomayor and Alito thus described the dangers of GPS technology that, almost
word-for-word, could be applied to the capabilities of drones and the problems that widespread police
If the Supreme Court views the threat of

drone surveillance similarly, restrictions on unwarranted drone use could be
forthcoming.
surveillance employing drones would entail.
A2 Certificate is enough restriction

Special certificates only address part of the problem.
p. 402-403
Presently, there are only two ways one can legally operate a UAS in the NAS ,
and permissible use of UASs is, of course, limited to nonrestricted airspace.
The only way for civil operators to use UASs is to obtain a Special
Airworthiness Certificate in the Experimental Category (SAC-EC).39 These certificates
allow civil UAS users to perform operations for research and development,
market survey, and crew training.40 Only ninety-four SAC-ECs have been issued by the FAA
since 2005.41 The second alternative is through Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COAs), which are
Applications for COAs may

be filled out online, and the issuance of these certificates is quickly growing .43
available to governmental agencies, including law enforcement.42
The number of COAs issued by the FAA more than doubled, up from 146 in 2009 to 298 in 2010.44 COAs
generally define the permitted airspace in which the UAS may be used, require coordination with an air
traffic control facility, require operation within eyesight when used in public airspace, and include special
provisions unique to the specific UASs operation.45 When looking at the numbers above, there does not
seem to be much cause for alarm. Three hundred UASs across the entire United States does not indicate a
significant privacy threat. However, one can expect that number to skyrocket over the next few years.46
Congress expressed this intention with the enactment of the FAA

Modernization and Reform Act on February 14, 2012.47 This Act calls for the Secretary of
Transportation to expedite the process for issuing COAs to both civil organizations48 and government
The
message from the legislature was loud and clear: they wanted to open the
door wide for the use of UASs in domestic airspace . A rapid influx of UASs
should give rise to serious misgivings for those concerned with privacy
protection if corresponding privacy regulations are not forthcoming .
agencies.49 H.R. 658 passed the House 248 to 169 and easily cleared the Senate 75 to 20.50
FAA regulations do not pertain to what drones can do

after being licensed to fly.
Ajoke Oyegunle, 2013, Aioke Oyengunle was at the Catholic University
School of Law, DRONES IN THE HOMELAND: A POTENTIAL PRIVACY
OBSTRUCTION UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE COMMON LAW
TRESPASS DOCTRINE, Commlaw Conspectus vol. 21, pp. 365-393,
http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1528&context=commlaw, p. 368-370
The FAA Act amends Title 49 of the U.S. Code to address the expansion of drones in American airspace.3 2
Though innocuously titled, the FAA Act introduces the potential wide-scale use of drones into American
airspace, prompting concerns over its long-term effects.33 Notably, the FAA Act does not contemplate an
effort to inform the public of the impending expansion of drones, as other agencies have done in the
past.34 Likewise, the Act fails to articulate requirements for applicants to secure approval for drone
deployment. 5 Concerns persist over the private sector's authority to sell or share the information
the FAA Act fails

to address what entities may use drones, and, pertinently, the ways in which
the information gathered may be used. 7 The Act directs the FAA to clear
airspace in order to accommodate increased drone presence," giving the FAA the
collected from private individuals through the use of drones.36 Equally important,
exclusive authority to issue licenses for drones.39 In addition, the Act requires the FAA to permit not only
the government (e.g., law enforcement agencies), but also public and private entities to operate drones in
The Act directs the FAA to expedite the process through which
applicants for drone operation become licensed to fly in the NAS.4 When the FAA
domestic airspace."0
shortens the application process, the criteria may also be simplified, which is an alarming possibility
considering the possible lack of comprehensive privacy and safety assessments.42 Until the FAA publishes
regulations in 2014 or explains what the regulations might include, public uncertainty will persist. Private
companies that have received authorization to operate drones-including Raytheon and General Atomics,"may operate with little oversight in just a few short years." Drones present an untapped and lucrative
market, valued at $5.9 billion. 5 NASA forecasts "significant capacity growth for [civil] UAVs."46 Integration
of drones into national airspace will begin with drone deployments at six testing sites throughout the
country-in order to vary in climate and geography, presumably to increase the chance of detecting
complications-as mandated in the Act.47
***PROLIFERATION ADV***
Drone use internationally

Drone production for surveillance purposes has increased
internationally.
df, p. 18-19
the number of states that have acquired a complete drone
system has grown from forty-one in 2005 to seventy-six in 2012.49 Over that same
period of time, the number of total drone programs within those states
increased from one hundred ninety-five to nine hundred.50 Like the United States, the vast
majority of all drones developed by other countries will be used exclusively
for government or civilian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Some
It is estimated that
advanced industrial economiessuch as Russia, Taiwan, and South Koreahave developed increasingly
sophisticated and largely indigenous drone capabilities, but they have also missed deadlines for when they
There is no international
association for drone manufacturers and operatorssimilar to those that exist for
would field armed drones, according to their own defense ministries.
civilian nuclear facilities or commercial space launchesthat provides reliable information Drone Strikes by
Other States or Nonstate Actors Drone Strikes by Other States or Nonstate Actors 19 on drones or serves
as a forum to exchange best practices to limit the associated risks and costs. Since most publicly available
information is limited to air shows and the defense trade press, it is possible that there have been
intentionally hidden advances toward states development of weaponized drones.
Domestic use secondary acquisition

With future drone expansion this lead in drone technology
will become eroded secondary acquisition.
Scott Shane, October 8, 2011, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, The
New York Times,
17K_2_2011_Coming_Soon_The_Drone_Arms_Race_October_8_2011_NYTimes.
pdf
The virtue of most U.A.V.s is that they have long wings and you can strap anything to them, Mr. Gormley
says. That includes video cameras, eavesdropping equipment and munitions, he says. Its spreading like
So far, the United States has a huge lead in the number and
sophistication of unmanned aerial vehicles (about 7,000, by one officials estimate, mostly
wildfire.
unarmed). The Air Force prefers to call them not U.A.V.s but R.P.A.s, or remotely piloted aircraft, in
acknowledgment of the human role; Air Force officials should know, since their service is now training more
pilots to operate drones than fighters and bombers. Philip Finnegan, director of corporate analysis for the
global spending on
procurement of drones over the next decade is expected to total
more than $94 billion, including $9 billion on remotely piloted combat aircraft. Israel and
China are aggressively developing and marketing drones, and Russia, Iran, India,
Pakistan and several other countries are not far behind. The Defense Security Service,
Teal Group, a company that tracks defense and aerospace markets, says
research and
which protects the Pentagon and its contractors from espionage, warned in a report last year that
American drone technology had become a prime target for foreign spies .
Drone prolif lacks safeguards

States that acquire drone technology second hand
endanger U.S. interests lack of safeguards present in
current U.S. military infrastructure.
df, p. 20
Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten
years, the complete system architecture required to carry out distant drone
strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. However, those
candidates able to obtain this technology will most likely be states with the
financial resources to purchase or the industrial base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones
that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions ; the

intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed
to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder
adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks by manned aircraft, such as Israel
into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into
Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these
with limited firepower
contingencies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. Given the costs to conduct
manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the
significant investment required for armed drones in the near term.
Having a lack of oversight and regulation on drone use

and manufacturing risks states acquiring drone
technology and using it in harmful ways.
df, p. 24
drones are proliferating even as they are becoming increasingly
sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and autonomous . At least a dozen other states
and nonstate actors could possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the
technology in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the Obama administration
Beyond the United States,
that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President
Obama revealed, I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks
on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for me and for my
successors for some time to comepartly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.71
Drones = military purposes

Domestic drone demand over the next decade is expected
to increase with new technological innovation utilized
for military purposes.
Ann Cavoukian, August 2012, Ann Cavoukian is the former Information
and Privacy Commissioner for the Canadian province of Ontario serving from
1997 to 2014, Privacy and Drones: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Privacy by
Design, pp. 1-27, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcsplcng/cn29822-eng.pdf, p. 4
The domestic use of UAVs is nonetheless expected to continually push toward
smaller platforms that are more manageable and more affordable. It has been
noted that the reduced cost of UAVs has become a significant selling point. This is being enabled
by the ongoing process of miniaturization of sensors, controls, data link solutions, and
computing elements. A UAV system that includes a ground operating computer can cost less than
US $50,000, whereas a police helicopter performing the same function can cost up to US $1 million.9 A
lack of access to national airspace, as well as lack of suitable UAV standards and practices, are among the
Domestic
demand is expected to increase over the next decade, starting with
government organizations requiring surveillance systems similar to military
UAVs, such as coast guards, border patrol organizations, and similar national security agencies.10
reasons cited for the relatively slow emergence of the UAV market in the domestic context.
U.S. is modeled
By setting an example of lax control on drone technology
the U.S. is sending a message abroad that development
and use is permissible.
Scott Shane, October 8, 2011, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, The
New York Times,
17K_2_2011_Coming_Soon_The_Drone_Arms_Race_October_8_2011_NYTimes.
pdf
Chinese companies startled
some Americans by unveiling 25 different models of remotely controlled
aircraft and showing video animation of a missile-armed drone taking out an
armored vehicle and attacking a United States aircraft carrier. The presentation appeared to be more
AT the Zhuhai air show in southeastern China last November,
marketing hype than military threat; the event is Chinas biggest aviation market, drawing both Chinese
the United States near monopoly

on armed drones was coming to an end, with far-reaching consequences for
American security, international law and the future of warfare. Eventually, the
United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with
drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an
attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the
political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the
American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama
and foreign military buyers. But it was stark evidence that
administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon
over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.
Failure to adopt rules for U.S. drones sets a dangerous

international precedent.
Kristen Roberts, March 21, 2013, Kristen Roberts is a news editor for
National Journal, master's in security studies from Georgetown University,
master's degree in journalism from Columbia University, "When the Whole
World Has Drones," National Journal,
www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones20130321
the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the
threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding
counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has
To implement this covert program,
given friends and foes a
green light
to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that
could not only affect
relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire

regions and potentially upset geopolitical order . Hyperbole? Consider this:
Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian
forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines
in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish
militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the
border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may
point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan,
Yemen, and Afghanistan.
This is the unintended consequence
of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the
drone program in recent weeksabout Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branchs legal authority to kill by drone outside war
what goes undiscussed is Washingtons deliberate

failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at
minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between
legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics
capabilities of this generation.
zones (thin, by officials own private admission)
U.S. leadership solves

U.S. regulation and restrictions on drones spurs other
countries to cooperate on their proliferation.
Omar S. Bashir, September 24, 2012, Omar Bashir is a Ph.D. candidate in
the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a graduate of the
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, "Who Watches the
Drones?" Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-sbashir/who-watches-the-drones
Aside from enabling accountability at home, the
oversight system could also help with foreign
publics and governments. The United States has taken expensive steps in order to avoid
perceptions of recklessness abroad: for instance, Georgetown professor David Koplow argues that the
Pentagon's recent investments in less-destructive weaponry reflect, in part, a growing emphasis on global
more than half of respondents in 17 of 20

countries disapprove of U.S. drone strikes, according to a Pew Global survey. An
perceptions. Washington should thus worry that
independent oversight program is not going to change minds in Lahore or Karachi, where opposition to
drones seems to be driven more by the perceived violation of sovereignty than by indiscriminate killing
(there are indications that opposition to drones is actually lower in regions where drone strikes are
because the drone is a salient symbol of American recklessness,

oversight might reduce public opposition to U.S. policy in Europe and elsewhere.
That would make it easier for foreign leaders to overcome domestic
opposition to security cooperation with the United States. Further, the U.S.
counterterrorism chief John Brennan has noted that the administration is "establishing
precedents that other nations may follow." But, for now, other countries have no reason to
believe that the United States carries out its own targeted killing operations responsibly. Without a
clustered). Still,
credible oversight program ,
those
negative perceptions of U.S. behavior
will fill the vacuum, and an anything-goes standard might be the result. U.S. denunciations of other
countries' programs could come to ring hollow. If the United States did adopt an oversight system, those
denunciations would carry more weight. So, too, would U.S. pressure on other states to adopt similar
systems: just as suspicions grow when countries refuse nuclear inspection, foreign governments that
turned down invitations to apply a proven system of oversight to their own drone campaigns would reveal
their disregard for humanitarian concerns.
International norms = real

Norm setting is effective the U.S. can make a difference
on drones.
Micah Zenko, January 2013, CFR Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for
Preventive Action, PhD in Political Science from Brandeis University,
Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, CFR Special Report 65
how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often
influenced by how other states haveor have notused them in the past.
History shows that
Furthermore,
norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms
dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers

and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported
sometimes but not always codified as legal regimeshave
normative framework, bolstered by
a strong U.S. example , can shape armed drone
proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would
internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones
furthered U.S. objectives. And
existence
even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the
of an international normative framework, and
U.S. compliance
with that framework,
would preserve
Washingtons ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in
existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinctionto which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes
and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space.
Prolif impact ext.

Drone prolif conflicts go nuclear.
Michael J. Boyle, January 2013, Michael Boyle is an Assistant Professor of
Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International
Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and
Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge
University, The costs and consequences of drone warfare, International
Affairs vol. 89, issue 1, pp. 129,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International
%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional
concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be
radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability
among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence,
specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and
tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to
While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will

conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military
confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed
to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these
states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is
one another.136
unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to
engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage
see what kind of drone-led incursion , if any, will motivate a
response.137 This may have been Hezbollahs logic in sending a drone into
Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israels
nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident
demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival statesfor
example, India and Pakistandeploying drones to test each others capability
and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were
in salami tactics to
misinterpreted
by the other
as an attack . As drones get physically smaller and
the temptation to use them to spy

on a rivals nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to
more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range,
resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent
relationships
that exist
between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a
spiral of conflict between them.
Terrorists can hack drones

Terrorists to take over control of aircraft operations could
easily spoof UAVs.
unmanned aircraft command and control links could potentially be
intentionally jammed or hacked resulting in a loss or hostile takeover of
control. For example, Todd Humphreys, an assistant professor at the University of
Texas at Austin, demonstrated a remote hijacking of an unmanned aircraft by
GPS guidance signals. In congressional testimony, he warned that advances in softwaredefined radio and the availability of GPS signal simulators may provide
average hackers with the capability to interfere with unmanned aircraft
operations.27 Humphreys recommended that non-recreational civilian unmanned aircraft weighing
Additionally,
more than 18 pounds be required to have spoof-resistant navigation systems. More broadly, he
recommended that GPS-based timing and navigation systems used in national critical infrastructure also
be required to be spoof-resistant. He noted that while [t]here
is no quick, easy, and cheap

fix for the civil GPS spoofing problemreasonable, cost-effective spoofing defenses exist
which, if implemented, will make successful spoofing much harder.28 As a long-range solution, he further
recommended that the Department of Homeland Security commit to funding the development and
implementation of methods for performing cryptographic authentication of GPS signals, or at least for the
augmented GPS signals used for civil aviation.
CBW causes extinction

Many rogue leaders are willing and able to use CBWs that
spread rapidly and kill hundreds of millions in hours alone
which also cause extinction.
Clifford Singer, Spring 2001, Director of the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at
Urbana, Champaign, The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security, Will Mankind Survive the
Millennium?, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm
In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War,
but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the
majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a
millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of
the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much
different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the
globes population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage
was certainly possible.
chance
There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small
that dust raised by an all-out
nuclear war would cause a so-called nuclear
winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As
noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty
thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in
the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by
widely seen works such as "On the Beach," was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than
The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear

tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in
radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at
the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the
variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a
reality.
number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to
our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind
as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years.
There
are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more
serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological
warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural
biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity
to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this
disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the
globe will be at an all time high . In the absence of other complications such as nuclear
war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to
limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in
unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available
knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants
could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to
substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however,
there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for

combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather
than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori

known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the
survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this
is achieved.
Biological weapons cannot be controlled once they are

released making escalation inevitable.
Michael Quinlan, 2009, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State UK Ministry of
Defense, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p.
31, Google Books
There are good reasons for fearing escalation: the confusion of war, its stresses, anger, hatred, and the
desire for revenge , reluctance to accept the humiliation of backing down; perhaps the temptation to get
further blows in first. Given all this, the risk of escalationwhich Western leaders were rightly want to
emphasise in the interests of deterrenceare grave. But this is not to say that they are virtually certain,
or even necessarily odds-on; still less that they are so for all the assorted circumstances in which the
situation might arise, in a nuclear world to which past experience is only a limited guide. It is entirely
the initial use of nuclear weapons, breaching a barrier that has

been held since 1945, might so appall both sides in a conflict that they
possible, for example, that
recognised an overwhelming common interest in composing their

differences.
human pressures in that direction would be very great . Even if

initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum
in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and
uncertainty, is implausible; it fails to consider what the decision-makers situation would really be.
The
Neither side could want escalation ; both would be appalled at what was going on;
both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a
halt; both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery
systems can possess, could have in reserve ample forces invulnerable
enough not to impose use or lose pressures .
As a result, neither could have
any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of enormous risk, that the right course when in
none of this analysis rests on any

presumtion of highly subtle, pre-concerterd or cultural-specific rationality ; the
doubt was to go on copiously launching weapons. And
rationality required is plain and basic.
Bioweapons cause retaliation

Absent extinction, a small biological weapon death toll on
U.S. soil shatters American restraint triggering nuclear
reprisal.
Harry W Conley, spring 2003, is chief of the Systems Analysis Branch,
Directorate of Requirements, Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC),
Langley AFB, Virginia, Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well
be the most important variable in determining the nature of the US reprisal. A
key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt
a massive response by the U nited S tates. The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the
Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of
roughly the same magnitude (150300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for
retaliation among the American public, they prompted no serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation.
The body count from a single biological attack could easily be one or
two orders of magnitude higher than the casualties caused by these events.
Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the United States should
use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths. However, what if
the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not
beyond the realm of possibility: According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kg
of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be between
Would the deaths of

300,000 Americans be enough to trigger a nuclear response ? In this case,
two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.46
proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Besides simply the total number of
casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect the nature and
scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a
significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were
against civilians. World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstance
A CBW event that produced a

shock and death toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor
might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Trumans decision to
that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response.
drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that up to one million casualties
might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland 47- is an example of the kind of thought
process that would have to occur prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that
CB attacks
and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had
caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics,
if nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further
nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever

promises had been made.
Countries are developing

Multiple experts confirm Syria and North Korea have
smallpox that overcomes vaccines a long incubation
period means it spreads rapidly.
Janet E. Levy, 6-8-2007, an independent scholar whose research interests
covered the theory and analysis, The American Thinker, The Threat of
Bioweapons,
www.americanthinker.com/2007/06/the_threat_of_bioweapons.html
Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed
anthrax, plague, and botulism toxin and conducted extensive research on
smallpox, typhoid and cholera. A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed
that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the
cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox, a very closely related virus. The researcher further reports that
Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and

possibly in the Sudan. Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively, rogue
nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulinum, tularemia
and viral hemorrhagic fevers. With the exception of smallpox, which is exclusively a human host disease, all of the
other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic, or can be transmitted to humans by other
Biological weapons are among the most dangerous in the world today
and can be engineered and disseminated to achieve a more deadly result
than a nuclear attack. Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific
species.
location, a biological attack with smallpox could infect multitudes of people across the globe. With incubation periods of
up to 17 days, human disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure before diagnosable symptoms
indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place. Unlike any other type of weapon,
bioweapons such as smallpox can replicate and infect a chain of people over
an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of
release. According to science writer and author of The Hot Zone, Richard Preston, "If you took a gram of
smallpox, which is highly contagious and lethal, and for which there's no vaccine available globally now, and
released it in the air and created about a hundred cases, the chances are excellent that the virus would go global in six
weeks as people moved from city to city......the
death toll could easily hit the hundreds of

millions.....in scale, that's like a nuclear war."[1]
Cant contain the spread

Bioweapons would lead to huge casualties and collapse
health care systems.
Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, 2003, Jennifer Brower is the RAND
Co-Project Director and Peter Chalk is a RAND Political Scientist specializing in
emerging threats, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious
Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy,
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1602/
disease can assume a highly significant strategic dimension, through
the threat of biowarfare (BW) and/or bioterrorism (BT). Considerations of
virulence, morbidity, and rapidity of infectious spread would make the threat
far greater than that posed by conventional or even chemical weapons. 30
Finally,
International attention on BW and BT has increased over the last ten years, particularly in the United
States, due to a number of factors: Anthrax attacks in fall 2001 Discoveries of the scope of Iraqs BW
efforts after the Persian Gulf War Revelations by Boris Yeltsin and Ken Alibek31 about the depth and
breadth of the Soviet Unions BW program Evidence that Aum Shinrikyo was actively trying to acquire
and disseminate biological agents both prior to and after its 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo
Indications that terrorist organizations not sponsored by states, including Osama bin Ladens al-Qaeda
network, have an interest in developing a BT capability.32 The consequences of a large-scale, successful
Whereas the spread of most infectious diseases

spread slowly through natural processes of contagion, deliberate, large-scale
releases of virus or bacteria, especially in unvaccinated populations, would
lead to the immediate exposure of a specific target to a large quantity of
(possibly enhanced) infectious organisms. The result would be a massive, largely
simultaneous outbreak of disease after an incubation period of only a few
days. This would not only cause widespread casualties and panic, but also
severely strain and possibly collapse entire public health and response
capacities.33
act of BW or BT would be catastrophic.
A biological attack would kill more than a nuclear attack.

Jessica Stern, March 2003, Jessica Stern is a Lecturer in Public Policy at
Harvard, International Security, Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological
Weapons, 89-123, Project Muse
Technical Difficulties with Predicting The Impact of BW Attacks There are also technical problems with
predicting the likely impact of a biological attack.
Biological weapons are potentially as
deadly as thermonuclear weapons. For example, one U.S. government study concluded that
100 kilograms of Bacillus anthracis, a fraction of the amount produced by
Iraq, could kill from 1 to 3 million people if dispersed under optimal
conditions. 47 In comparison, a Hiroshima-type fission bomb could kill as
many as 80,000, while a more powerful hydrogen bomb could kill 600,000 to
2 million. 48 Contagious agents could kill even more people than anthrax. Joshua Lederberg calls the
1918 flu pandemic, which is estimated to have killed more than 20 million people
worldwide, a model for the type of disaster that a biological weapon containing a
contagious pathogen could wreak. 49 The public health infrastructure [End Page 100] was
overwhelmed in the first couple of weeks, despite the low case fatality rate of influenza compared with a
typical biological warfare threat agent. 50
A2 Weather will stop it

Some pathogens do not rely on weather and terrorist
would release many strains to maximize death toll.
Mark Wheelis, July 1, 2002, Mark Wheellis works in the Section of
Microbiology, University of California, research interests are in the history of
biological warfare, especially in the First World War, and the scientific aspects
of biological and chemical arms control, BioScience, Lexis Nexis
Dissemination of many introduced pathogens likewise requires relatively little expertise. Animal virus
preparations could be diluted and disseminated with a simple atomizer in close proximity to target
animals, or the preparation smeared directly on the nostrils or mouths of a small number of animals. This
could be done from rural roads with essentially no chance of detection. Dissemination of animal diseases
could also be done surreptitiously at an animal auction or near barns where animals are densely penned
(as in chicken houses or piggeries). For plant diseases, simply exposing a mass of sporulating fungi to the
air immediately upwind of a target field could be effective, if environmental conditions were favorable for
The biggest challenge of introducing a plant pathogen is probably

timing the release with the appropriate weather conditions (Campbell and Madden
infection.
1990). If pathogens are released immediately before the start of a dry period, few, if any, infections are
If released at the start of a rainy period, these pathogens

could cause a major epidemic. The technical ease of introducing many
agricultural pathogens makes it more likely that terrorists or criminals would release
pathogens in several locations in an attempt to initiate multiple,
simultaneous outbreaks. This would ensure that trade sanctions would be imposed, because it
likely to result. However,
would undermine any argument that the outbreaks are localized and do not jeopardize importing countries.
It would also be more likely to overwhelm the response capacity and lead to the
uncontrollable spread of disease. This is the principal way in which a bioterrorist attack would
differ from a natural disease introduction, and it raises the question whether a system designed to respond
to natural introductions can deal effectively with sudden, multifocal outbreaks.
Their weather argument is wrong terrorist will still try

no matter what.
The Record, October 7, 2001, Bergen County, NJ, Lexis Nexis
To produce mass casualties, airborne delivery would be the preferred method for unleashing all types of
chemical or biological weapons. The poisoning of water supplies is unlikely, experts say, because the
amount of toxic agent required would be prohibitively large .
Airborne delivery, however, is

fraught with problems. There's an optimal size for particles to be inhaled into the lungs. Many
terrorism experts are reluctant to discuss this topic, although details are readily available from many
sources. In general, producing aerosols of the right size, either of liquids or powders, is extremely difficult
or impossible without special equipment and expertise. Crop dusting sprayers, for instance, are designed
Weather conditions can also make a

huge difference. Efficiency, though, may be low on a terrorist's list of
concerns. That fact alone raises the chance that some group may eventually
attempt an act of terror using biological or chemical means.
to produce droplets many times larger than ideal.
A2 BW wont be used
Biological weapons will be used in future conflicts.
Gregory Koblentz, Winter 2004, Gregory Koblentz has a PhD in Political
Science at MIT, MA Public Policy at Kennedy School, Harvard, Visiting
Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
and a Research Fellow with the Security Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Security, Pathogens as
Weapons, The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,
Ebsco Host
The third likely objection is that because biological weapons have been used so
rarely, this restraint is likely to hold. Therefore, despite their potential military utility,
biological weapons will remain marginal in most states' national security calculations. Although modern
biological weapons based on aerosol dissemination technology have not been successfully employed by
There are also disturbing

signs that the normative, operational, and political restraints that have
limited the use of these weapons are weaker now then they were thirty years
ago. Most of the states currently suspected of developing biological weapons are parties to the 1972
BWC, which illustrates the permeability of the normative barrier to proliferation. 165 The 2001
anthrax letter attacks, the first overt use of biological weapons, weakened the taboo
against using disease as a weapon. In addition, advanced biotechnologies that
can ameliorate problems in safely producing, storing, and handling these
weapons as well as effectively employing them in combat are becoming
increasingly available. 166 Furthermore, [End Page 119] the overwhelming
conventional superiority of Western states and their allies provides
dissatisfied actors with strong incentives to employ biological weapons as
part of an asymmetric strategy that may outweigh the political andstrategic
hazards of using these weapons. 167 Leaders may calculate that they can use
their biological weapons as force multipliers to accomplish a faitaccompli, tailor their use of these
weapons to avoid provoking regime- threatening retaliation, or conduct anonymous
attacks and avoid retaliation. Extremist religious terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates that
states or terrorists, cruder weapons have been used in modern times. 164
have emerged as direct threats to the United States and its allies are among those most likely to resort to
unconventional weapons in their drive to inflict as many casualties and as much terror as possible. As with
nuclear weapons, the lack of large-scale use of biological weapons since 1945 is a cause for celebration,
but not grounds for complacency.
A2 Dispersal issues
Careful selection of agents and delivery systems
overcomes dispersal issues.
Gregory Koblentz, Winter 2004, Gregory Koblentz has a PhD in Political
Science at MIT, MA Public Policy at Kennedy School, Harvard, Visiting
Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
and a Research Fellow with the Security Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Security, Pathogens as
Weapons, The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,
Ebsco Host
Modern biological weapons are designed to disseminate pathogens or toxins
in an aerosol cloud of microscopic particles that can be readily inhaled and retained in the lungs of the exposed population .10 These aerosols are most effective
when composed of particles ranging from 1 to 10 microns that can stay airborne longer and cause more
severe cases of disease.11 Aerosols are taste- less, odorless, and invisible, thus facilitating clandestine
They can be generated either by bomblets loaded into cluster bombs

or missile warheads or by spraying devices that are mounted on aircraft,
helicopters, cruise missiles, ships, or vehicles, or that are carried by hand .12
The key drawbacks to biologi-cal weapons include their delayed effects; their sensitivity to
environmental and meteorological conditions, which could result in uncertain area
coverage and effects; the risk of infecting friendly forces; and the prospect of longterm contamination. For example, wind speed and direction, humidity, atmospheric stability, and
the presence of sunlight can all inuence the performance of a biological weapon.13 The careful
selection of agents, delivery systems, and targets , however, as well as the
timing of the attack, could compensate for most of these limitations.14
attacks.
A2 We can respond
The U.S. is unprepared to respond to terrorist attacks.
Tara OToole, March 29, 2007, Tara O Toole provides testimony before
Congress, Center for Biosecurity, Hearing on Bioterrorism Preparedness and
the Role of DHS Chief Medical Officer,
http://www.upmcbiosecurity.org/website/resources/hearings/content/Hearings
_2007/20070329-btprepanddhscmo.html
The U.S. healthcare delivery sector is not equipped or prepared to provide
timely medical care to the tens or possibly even hundreds of thousands of
casualties that could result from a successful bioattack. No municipality could
care for a sudden flood of even 500 victims with inhalational anthraxthere
simply is not enough surge capacity in todays financially stressed
healthcare system to handle this load. The problem of lack of medical surge capacity is not
specific to bioterrorist attacks. Nearly every type of terrorist attack or large-scale natural disaster would
impose significant demands on healthcare facilities. At a March 15, 2007, meeting of medical and public
health experts sponsored by the White House Homeland Security Council, attendees warned that the U.S.
healthcare system would likely collapse in such events. Yet, as we saw in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, there is no national doctrine or operational plan that guides how healthcare facilities should
prepare for or react to such calamities. Astonishingly, more than five years after high grade anthrax was
mailed to members of Congress and the media, there is no conduct of operations plan for how the U.S.
healthcare system would cope with the casualties of an anthrax attack. This is the case even though a
bioterrorist attack is the mass casualty scenario judged by the National Intelligence Council to be of
The federal government has not proposed or endorsed a

coherent strategy or conduct of operations plan for medical response to mass
casualty events, and has not adequately funded even minimal hospital
preparedness activities. Responsibility and accountability for medical preparedness and response
greatest concern.
during large-scale catastrophes within HHS and DHS are unclear, and in both agencies these functions are
grossly understaffed and underfunded.
The U.S. remains woefully unprepared for a biological

attack increasing its vulnerability.
Jessica Stern, 2003, Jessica Stern is a Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard,
International Security, Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological
Weapons, 89-123, Project Muse
U.S. efforts to characterize the
terrorist threat have entailed assessments of the country's vulnerability.
Inadequate Preparedness Against the Terrorist Threat
Exercises in the 1990s tested the U.S. government's preparedness for responding to WMD attacks. The
tests revealed that hospitals were likely to quickly exhaust their supplies of antidotes and vaccines; first
responders (police, firefighters, and other emergency workers) were inadequately trained and likely to
succumb themselves; and coordination among [End Page 97] federal, state, and local officials was all but
Hospital laboratories were poorly prepared for biological attacks.

Secure communication links among doctors , veterinarians, and local and
federal public-health officials were inadequate. Systems for ensuring that medication and
personnel were distributed appropriately were undeveloped. The public health infrastructure
wasand remainsunprepared for timely response and containment of outbreaks. Moreover,
nonexistent.
critics argue that the lack of a fully coordinated global disease surveillance system could obstruct early
response to a bioterrorist attack. Congress enacted legislation to address some of these shortfalls, but
many of these problems remain unresolved. 40
***PRIVACY ADV***
Drones cause constant surveillance

With a lack of legal restrictions drones can constantly spy
on the U.S. public constantly.
Brandon Nagy, May 1, 2014, Brandon Nagy practices Business Litigation at
Stinson Leonard Street, Why They Can Watch You: Assessing the
Constitutionality of Warrantless Unmanned Aerial Surveillance by Law
Enforcement, Berkeley Technology Law Journal vol. 29, issue 1, pp. 136-152,
article=2020&context=btlj, p. 170-172
Riley and Ciraolo establish the lawfulness of a vantage point as critical to
whether or not a Fourth Amendment search occurred . Kyllo and Joness return of
A
UAS surveilling from the same vantage point as Ciraolos fixed-wing craft or
Rileys helicopter would likely be considered to be similarly lawful . However, it is
property concepts to the equation further confirmed that visual surveillance must not be trespassory.
easy to imagine (and perhaps expect) that law enforcement agencies will deploy UAS to surveil from
vantage points impossible in conventional aircraft simply because UASs can provide the capability to do so.
In his dissent in Riley, Justice Brennan could have been describing current UAS technology and FAA
regulations when he asked the reader to imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at alland, for good measure, without
posing any threat of injury.245 Law enforcement use under then- controlling FAA regulations meant that
the vantage point was lawful and therefore observations from that vantage point, even into the house,
Current FAA regulations, which still emphasize

safety over privacy, are not materially different from those in Riley. Even
assuming the presence of the UAS did not interfere with the use of the home
(an important factor in Riley and the FAA regulations), under Riley, it would appear that this
type of law enforcement UAS surveillance remains constitutional. In contrast, Kyllo
were not a Fourth Amendment search.246
and Joness emphasis on a property-based approach suggests that the Court might entertain the argument
that the physical presence of the UAS over the property at sufficiently low heights renders it a trespass,
and, therefore, a Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Causby may have abolished the common-law
ancient doctrine . . . that ownership of the land extend[s] to the periphery of the universe,247 but the
Court could find that a resident retains some right of exclusion from the airspace above her property that is
not usable by conventional craft. It is difficult to imagine that the airspace between a houses curtilage and
the height of its roof is a public highway such that granting the property owner some right of exclusion
seriously interfere[s] with [its] control and development in the public interest.248 It is also possible that
UAS surveillance from a non-trespassory, lawful vantage point could be found to be sufficiently intrusive.
Imagine that law enforcement officers, like those in Carter, wish to peer inside of an apartment several
stories above ground to confirm a tip that criminal activity was occurring. Unable to walk up to the window
and peer in, the officers warrantlessly launch a small UAS from the street below. The UAS quickly ascends
to the height of the apartments window and relays video of the activities within to the officers on the
ground. Assuming the UAS flight was within FAA guidelines and that no trespass or physical intrusion into
the apartment occurred, the vantage point was clearly lawful and appears constitutional under existing
Once FAA regulations open the skies to low-altitude UAS flight, such a
holding effectively creates an Orwellian state: using UAS, law enforcement
could surveil from the position of any possible viewer at any possible vantage
point. If the Court wishes to avoid such Orwellian effects, it may be
persuaded by a Kyllo-based argument . More specifically, because the activity within the
precedent.
apartment could only have been seen via the angle of the UAS or through an actual physical law
enforcement intrusion into the apartment, the Court could use Kyllos rule to interpret that a Fourth
Amendment search occurred as long as the Court first finds that UASs are not within general public
use.249 However, if such an angle of observation could have been achieved from an adjacent building,
regardless of police law enforcement agents actual ability to physically observe from that location, it is
unlikely that Kyllo would be found applicable because the general public could have been afforded the
the Court may choose to differentiate the hypothetical

above from Riley and Ciraolo because a traditional aircraft would have been
incapable of observing from the angle the UAS observed from . This potential
same view. Alternatively,
differentiation underscores Justice OConnors criticism of judicial reliance on FAA regulations for a
A future Court could find grounds to

declare that the lawfulness of a vantage point is not determined merely by
compliance with FAA regulations because the FAA is primarily concerned with
safety and not privacy or Fourth Amendment protections , as highlighted by its recent
determination of the lawfulness of a vantage point.
mandate from Congress in the FAAMA.250 In such a case, law enforcement attempting to introduce
evidence so obtained may need to heed Justice OConnors suggestion and demonstrate that UAS flights at
that altitude are routine enough to prevent an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Unfortunately
this argument for the unconstitutionality of certain UAS surveillance may expire soon: the FAAMAs stated
goal is to rapidly increase the routine private and governmental use of UAS in the United States.25
A lack of restraint risks drone use in a way that risks

peoples privacy and security.
Ann Cavoukian, August 2012, Ann Cavoukian is the former Information
and Privacy Commissioner for the Canadian province of Ontario serving from
1997 to 2014, Privacy and Drones: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Privacy by
Design, pp. 1-27, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcsplcng/cn29822-eng.pdf, p. 10-11
The United States has followed an interesting trajectory in the use of
surveillance devices and video cameras. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that police use of a private plane deploying video surveillance cameras to
detect otherwise hidden marijuana plants in a backyard, did not constitute a
search because the observations were made from public navigable
airspace.20 However, in 2001, in Kyllo v. United States,21 it was held that the
use of a thermal imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the
radiation of heat from a persons home constituted a search within the meaning
of the Constitution and thus required a warrant. The court in Kyllo viewed use of thermal
imaging equipment (not readily accessible to the public) as being different from observations made in
plain view. The courts reasoning in these cases centres upon individual expectations of privacy.
However individual expectations are likely to change as the technologies of

surveillance become more widespread . More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
United States v. Jones,22 considered whether the warrantless use of a tracking
device on a motor vehicle operating on public roadways constituted a search and
therefore violated the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. On
January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Governments attachment of the GPS
device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicles movements, constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. The decision recognizes that judicial warrants may be constitutionally
required to protect privacy interests implicated by the use of sophisticated surveillance technologies,
in 2012, the Obama administration

signed into law a re-authorization of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA),23 requiring that agency to write rules opening U.S. airspace to UAVs .
Professors Wittes and Villasenor have suggested that this re-authorization places the FAA at
the centre of a set of considerable policy changes, effectively obliging the
agency to take on the role of privacy czar for UAVs.24 In a partial response to the
including in public spaces. In the context of civil aviation,
privacy implications of civilian drones operating in US airspace, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle
Systems International (AUVSI) issued an
Unmanned Aircraft System Operations Industry
Code of Conduct.25 (The AUVSI is an influential group representing the UAV industry.) Though this
is a step in the right direction, the code of conduct is very broad and consists
of generic promises not to operate UAVs in a manner that presents undue
risk and to respect the privacy of individuals. Critics have noted that there
is nothing in the document that attempts to provide a detailed explanation as
to how the code will be enforced and by whom.26
Tech leads to surveillance

Surveillance of citizens has become the norm with new
technology.
Christopher Slobogin, 2012, Christopher Slobogin is a Professor of Law at
Vanderbuilt University Law School, Making the Most of United States v. Jones
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory,
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy Special Issue vol. 8, pp.
1-37, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1056&context=djclpp, p. 2
The decision in Jones is long overdue. Federal, state, and local governments
are rapidly taking advantage of advances in tech nology to keep tabs on their
citizenry, in increasingly intrusive ways. Millions of times each year, the police track individuals using
technology attached to cars, as in Jones, or signals from either phones or 3factoryinstalled transponders.4
Thousands of cameras, many with zoom, tracking, and facial recognition capacity, continuously scan
hundreds of urban and suburban areas.5 Equipped with powerful magnification devices, hundreds of
The capacity of computers to

access, store, and analyze data has made mountains of personal information
ranging from phone and e-mail logs to credit card and bank transactions available to
government officials at virtually the touch of a button.7 Before Jones, the third
party doctrine ensured that none of this activity was regulated by the Fourth
Amendment.8
drones will soon be flying over a number of jurisdictions.6
Drones undermine 4th amendment

Domestic drone use will undermine the Fourth
Amendment.
David L. Hudson Jr., February 2015, How Should States Regulate Drones
and Aerial Surveillance?, ABA Journal, pp. 1-1, Ebsco Host, p. 1
"Domestic drones will devastate the Fourth Amendment unless there are some really
strict guidelines," warns John Whitehead, president of the Rutherford Institute, a Charlottesville, Virginiabased nonprofit legal group. "Information collected by a drone should not be used as evidence by a court
of law," adds Whitehead, who wrote about the technology in his 2013 book, A Government of Wolves: The
Emerging American Police State. States are taking notice and considering regulation. According to the
National Conference of State Legislators, more than 20 states have passed laws related to drones. Some
limit law enforcement's use of drones or other unmanned aircraft. For example, in Idaho, a law signed in
2013 provides that, except for emergencies "for safety, search-and-rescue or controlled substance
investigations," no person or agency may use a drone to conduct surveillance of private property without a
warrant. Tennessee has a similar law known as the Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act. The law
allows aggrieved individuals the right to sue law enforcement agencies in civil court for violations. It also
provides that "no data collected on an individual, home or areas other than the target that justified
deployment may be used, copied or disclosed for any purpose," and that such data must be deleted within
24 hours of collection. "The legislation doesn't eliminate the use of drones," says Austin, Texas-based
attorney Gerry Morris, co-chair of the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys' Fourth
showing of probable cause. This is

something that is constantly overlooked. Just because government officials
are required to go get a warrant doesn't mean they won't be able to use the
drones. It just means that they are required to follow the Constitution when they use them." However, in
Amendment Committee. They "require some sort of
California, Gov. Jerry Brown vetoed a measure in September that would have required law enforcement to
obtain a warrant for the vast majority of uses of drones. Brown claimed the bill, AB 1327, would put greater
standards on law enforcement than those required by the U.S. and state constitutions. "AB 1327 would
have been the first law in California to regulate drones," says constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky,
dean of the University of California at Irvine School of Law. "Drones may be a very valuable tool for
investigation in some cases. Under AB 1327, the police still could use drones if they demonstrated to a
judge that there was probable cause. I strongly favored AB 1327 and was very disappointed when Gov.
Brown vetoed it." On the other hand, states have passed laws related to drones that fund the technology
or encourage the development of testing sites. For example, the North Dakota legislature passed a law
Legal experts believe that at some point courts will need to

address the constitutionality of these measures and of law enforcement's use
of the technology. "I do think more legislation is needed," Morris says. "I don't think
the court opinions at this point have caught up with the technology .
Legislators have to address the issue and get out in front of it." On the federal
level, the 2012 Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act
governs the rules regulating drones' domestic use .
funding a drone test site.
Widespread drone use presents a serious threat to

privacy individual violations and lingering presence.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
The novel and
widespread use of drones will likely impact many areas of the
law.19 This Note considers a small slice of relevant jurisprudence, mainly how courts should treat law
enforcement observations made by drones of American citizens or their property in or near the domestic
Privacy threats will no doubt originate from sources other than

law enforcement entities.21 In order to preserve a manageable scope of review, this Note will not
residence setting.20
address the significant privacy threats posed by privately operated drones, drones flying near the border,
or those used against foreign nationals in the United States. But the primary threat to the average
The routine use of

drones by police would, under present law, constitute a more serious threat to
privacy if the evidence gathered therefrom is permitted to be used in court or stored indefinitely.
Rapidly evolving drone technology raises two primary privacy concerns in the
law enforcement setting: (1) that the privacy rights of an individual will be
violated; and (2) that the presence of numerous lingering drones overhead
will threaten privacy in society as a whole by providing police with an Orwellian
omniscience.23 These two distinct privacy threats are correlated , because the
remedies for one problem will indirectly alleviate the other.24 Therefore, both
Americans privacy arguably does not come from some of these sources.22
individual and societal impacts must be considered when attempting to craft solutions to the problems that
drones pose.
Drone surveillance is undercutting the spirit of the Fourth

Amendment new regulations are needed now.
Saby Ghoshray, 2013, Saby Ghoshray founded the Institute of
Interdisciplinary Studies to foster and disseminate advanced legal
scholarship, Domestic Surveillance Via Drones: Looking Through the Lens of
the Fourth Amendment, Northern Illinois University Law Review vol. 33, pp.
580-599,
http://www.iia.niu.edu/law/organizations/law_review/pdfs/full_issues/33_3/Gho
shray%204.pdf, p. 585-586
Surveillance via drones is a violent assault against individual privacy. The
Framers introduced the Fourth Amendment as a constitutional bulwark against privacy violation. It was
intended to protect private space and personal property, including an individuals zone of private
the original contour of the Fourth Amendment was shaped by the

Framers natural conception of common law. As the Framers were predominantly driven
seclusion. Thus,
towards prohibiting trespass into an individuals secluded zone of private affairs, they were reluctant to
allow law enforcement wider discretion within the search and seizure framework. Unfortunately, various
interacting components of privacy, fundamental possessory interest, trespass prohibition, and the warrant
requirement posed doctrinal difficulties for the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, later
jurisprudence allowed wider latitude in police search and seizure on account of exigencies of situations.
Regardless of facial exigencies articulated by law enforcement, allowing domestic surveillance by drones
will certainly jeopardize such trespass barriers, which until now has been solemnized in law as a
constitutional inheritance of the U.S. citizen. As the post-9/11 societal landscape continues to dilute the
the absence of
passionate discourse on drones intruding our privacy is a hallmark of a
society that is gradually failing to recognize its constitutional roots . Yet, this
various sacrosanct constitutional grants, such as the individual privacy,
failure is the historic emerging reality of the twenty-first century evolution of the Fourth Amendment. The
modern doctrinal constructions of the Fourth Amendment have authorized carving out countless
this evolution in jurisprudence is contrary to

the original intent. The post-Framing period has witnessed the Supreme Court
crafting various exceptions to the warrant requirement . This outgrowth of creative
exceptions to warrantless searches. However,
judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was primarily designed to satisfy the needs of law
enforcements administrative responsibilities. As political manipulation started to shape societal
aspirations for individual liberty, judicial constructions began to relegate individual liberty interests in favor
of administrative interests.27 As a result, the judiciary began to grant maximal discretion to the law
enforcement administrative mechanisms. With this, the doctrinal components of warrantless search and
seizure and law enforcement trespass became distorted by the predominance of the basic law
paradigm.28 Consequently, police power rose asymmetrically, and warrantless intrusions became the
prominent Fourth Amendment concern for individuals. Thus, the amendments original aspiration has
become nearly forgotten under the reality of modern times and, now, is quickly losing its original context
and relevance. The above interpretative lens of law enforcements trespass into an individuals private
space provides a necessary construct through which to understand drone surveillances deleterious impact
on individual privacy. While the framing periods privacy debate was focused at securing a persons right
in our
current discourse, we must introspect over how secure a persons secluded
zone of private affairs must be from digital and remote trespass via
unmanned aerial vehicles.
from physical trespass, the construct nonetheless calls for a revitalized discussion. Therefore,
Absence of privacy protections in FAA regulations

threatens massive fourth amendment violations with
drones.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
The absence of privacy protections in the Reauthorization is conspicuous ,
considering the ease with which some measures could have been included .75
Congresss intent may simply have been to confront privacy at a later date with
separate legislation. But regardless of why privacy protections were not originally
included in the Reauthorization, the effect is, in essence, to accelerate a speeding car
toward an unfinished bridge. Whether that bridge can best be spanned by further congressional
action, state legislative responses, or judicial reinterpretation is the subject of Part V.76 As it stands,
Congress continues to pressure the FAA to meet legislative deadlinessome of

which having already been missed77and the Agency has been putting portions of its
plan into action.78 While the main portion of the FAAs response to the Reauthorization is
forthcoming, there will likely be an explosion of drone usage by interested
parties, including law enforcement agencies.79 The Reauthorization will likely decrease administrative
burdens to own and operate a drone, and therefore increase the market for creating new drones.80
increased drone
operation by police may have significant legal consequences for courts
applying Fourth Amendment principles because expanded drone use may
change the calculus for determining when a search by drones has occurred .81
Irrespective of how Congress responds to the privacy problem it now confronts,
Fourth Amendment = poor condition

The Fourth Amendment is in need of reform its
effectiveness is low in checking privacy concerns.
our current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is in dire need of
reform. As we continue to maneuver through a dynamic era dominated by technology, the ability to
conceptualize what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure has become a
daunting endeavor. Although our Constitution and many of the amendments thereto have withstood the
test of time, the Fourth Amendment has faced exceptional pressure imploring it
to adapt with the changing technological era.90 Despite its tenure of strength and reliability,
the mercurial application of the Amendment has rendered it constitutionally
infirm, and many of the cracks in its foundation stem from three current,
unworkable tests: (1) the 18th century tort law test, which renders any physical
trespass unconstitutional; (2) the reasonable expectation of privacy test , which strips
The broken state of
Fourth Amendment protection from situations where no reasonable expectation of privacy is deemed to
exist; and (3) the third-party doctrine test, which deprives information shared with any
third party of all Fourth Amendment protection.91 Prior to the formulation of both the reasonable
expectation of privacy and the third party doctrine tests, Fourth Amendment violations were thought to
have occurred strictly in those circumstances where technical, physical trespasses were committed.92 This
heavy reliance on the common-law trespass controlled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence all the way
through the latter half of twentieth century.93 Application of this test rendered a wiretap attached to
telephone wires on public streets constitutional on the grounds that neither the offices nor houses of the
defendants were unlawfully entered.94 This common law rule also included the understanding that the
admissibility of evidence [was] not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained, and
the only limitation imposed was that the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where rights
under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it.95 This rule was justified on the premise that [a]
standard which would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by
government officials would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity . . . .96 Thus, where
federal officers intercepted telephone messages over the course of several months without committing
any trespass upon any property of the defendants, the Court sustained the admission of the evidence.97
Although this exclusively property-based approach guided Fourth Amendment

applications for quite some time, it has since been discredited .98 Perhaps the
most influential decision to initiate the shift away from this property based
approach was Katz v. United States, wherein the Court realized that the strict
trespass test in the present day, [is] bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical
invasion.99 In Katz, a petitioner was convicted under an eight-count indictment that charged him with
disclosing wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a
federal statute.100 At the petitioners trial, the District Court allowed the Government to present evidence
of the petitioners end of telephone conversations, which were overheard by FBI agents who had affixed an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth where petitioner had
placed his calls.101 In holding that the Governments actions violated the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court noted that, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.102 The Court further remarked that the reach of the Fourth Amendment can no longer depend
on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.103
The Fourth Amendments disorienting interpretation is

anachronistic with regards to modern day surveillance
technology.
As it pertains to the third party doctrine test, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid the
procurement of information revealed to a third party , even in situations where the
information is communicated on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
the
Court applied the third party doctrine test to a situation where, at the request
of law enforcement authorities, a telephone company installed a pen register
confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed.128 For example, in Smith v. Maryland,
to record the telephone numbers dialed by the suspect, and the information derived from it was later used
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the

installation and use of the pen register was not a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because [w]hen he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
to obtain a search warrant of his home.129
information to the telephone company and exposed that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business. In doing so, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
This third party doctrine test continues to be endorsed

today, as was recently exemplified by United States v. Madison. 131 There, a
numbers that he dialed.130
defendant knowingly and freely gave specific location information to his cell phone provider when he made
and received telephone calls on his cell phone.132 Ultimately, the court relied on earlier precedent and
rejected the contention that the Defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cell tower
location data for his cell-phone usage.133 As illustrated by the disparate results emanating from these
the Fourth Amendment is currently entangled in a disorienting state of

flux that has left many citizens and lawmakers unsure of the laws modern
day parameters. The inconsistent applications of the 18th century tort law
test, the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and the third party doctrine
test have led to incongruous outcomes, and ultimately, this absence of
uniformity renders it difficult for citizens to manage their affairs
successfully.134 While there may be some historical value to these three
enumerated tests, they have consistently proven to be unworkable in todays
highly advanced technological era.
tests,
Drone surveillance ineffective

Drones are poor at domestic surveillance tasks for several
reasons.
various problems encountered
in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border. According to a 2003
report, there have been concerns regarding the high accident rate of UAVs ,
which can be multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft .15 Because UAV
technology is still evolving, there is less redundancy built into the operating system
of UAVs than of manned aircraft and until redundant systems are perfected mishap rates are expected
to remain high. Additionally, if control systems fail in a manned aircraft, a welltrained pilot is better positioned to find the source of the problem because of
his/her physical proximity. If a UAV encountered a similar system failure, or if a
UAV landing was attempted during difficult weather conditions, the ground
control pilot would be at a disadvantage because he or she is removed from the event.
Unlike a manned pilot, the remote pilot would not be able to assess important
sensory information such as wind speed.16
Despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security,
Weather conditions make drones ineffective at

surveillance tasks.
Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAVs surveillance
capability, especially UAVs equipped with only an EO camera and Forward Looking Infrared Radar
(FLIR), because cloudy conditions and high humidity climates can distort the
imagery produced by EO and FLIR equipment. Although the Predator B is operating in the low-humidity
environment of the Southwest, the effects of extreme climatic or atmospheric
conditions on its sensors reportedly can be mitigated if DHS decides to outfit the
Predator B with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system17 and a moving target indicator (MTI) radar.
Adding SAR and MTI to the Predator Bs platform could significantly enhance its operational capability for
However, adding SAR and MTI to the UAV platform would

increase the costs associated with using UAVs on the border.
border missions.
Privacy bright line key

A bright line needs to be established with regards to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
determining whether a person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy requires a two-part analysis: first, has
the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?104 In ascertaining whether or not an expectation is reasonable, [the] test of
Ultimately,
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity, but instead
whether the governments intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the
Fourth Amendment.105 Yet, despite the formulation of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz,
The need for a brightline rule to determine when a search and seizure is unconstitutional was most
recently demonstrated in the United States Supreme Courts decision United
States v. Jones, where there was a discernible split in reasoning among the Justices despite the fact
confusion has persisted as to whether or not this is the guiding standard.
that they all reached a unanimous result.106 Jones involved the Governments warrantless attachment of a
GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of a vehicle belonging to an individual (Jones) who was the target
of an FBI investigation for the suspected trafficking of narcotics.107 Over the course of four weeks, the
Government used the GPS device to monitor the vehicles movements on public streets.108 The device
ultimately transmitted more than 2,000 pages of data that led to a multiplecount indictment arising from
violations of 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846.109
Democracy impact ext.

Global democratic transitions are inevitable preventing
democratic sliding prevents war.
Fareed Zakaria, 1997, Fareed Zakaria has a PhD in Political Science from
Harvard, hes also the managing editor for Foreign Affairs, Lexis Nexis
This is not a plea for the wholesale
adoption of the American way but rather for a more variegated conception of
liberal democracy, one that emphasizes both parts of that phrase.
there lies an intellectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal
tradition, central to
the development of good government
throughout the world
If a democracy does not preserve
liberty and law, that it is a democracy is a small consolation .
Of course cultures vary, and different societies will require different frameworks of government.
Before new policies can be
adopted,
the Western experience and to
. Political progress in Western history has been the result of a growing recognition over the centuries that, as the Declaration of Independence puts it,
human beings have "certain inalienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments are instituted."
LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY A proper
appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility. While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push
constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a
false step. Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster constitutional liberalism in developing countries. The National
Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements, and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end, however, elections
trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and symbols,
elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there. Conversely, the absence of free and fair elections should be
viewed as one flaw, not the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue. Governments should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional liberalism as
well. Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands these freedoms, it should not be branded a dictatorship. Despite
the limited political choice they offer, countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a better environment for the life, liberty, and happiness of their citizens than do either dictatorships like Iraq and Libya
or illiberal democracies like Slovakia or Ghana. And the pressures of global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward. Markets and morals can work together. Even China, which remains a deeply
repressive regime, has given its citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they have had in generations. Much more needs to change before China can even be called a liberalizing autocracy, but that
should not mask the fact that much has changed. Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for
transitional countries. Constitutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth century exponents, such as Montesquieu and Madison, is a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent
the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be
included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
tame the passions of the public
Constitutions were also meant to
, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government. Unfortunately, the rich variety of unelected bodies, indirect
voting, federal arrangements, and checks and balances that characterized so many of the formal and informal constitutions of Europe are now regarded with suspicion. What could be called the Weimar syndrome -named after interwar Germany's beautifully constructed constitution, which failed to avert fascism -- has made people regard constitutions as simply paperwork that cannot make much difference. (As if any political
system in Germany would have easily weathered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and hyperinflation.) Procedures that inhibit direct democracy are seen as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of
the people. Today around the world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democratizing countries, the winner really does take all.
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS
We live in a democratic age.
Through much of human history the danger to an individual's life, liberty and happiness came from the
absolutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror of dictatorships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. Dictators and a few straggling totalitarian regimes still persist, but increasingly they are
anachronisms in a world of global markets, information, and media.
democracy
There are no longer respectable alternatives to

Thus the problems of governance in the 21st
; it is part of the fashionable attire of modernity.
century will likely be problems within democracy .
This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in
the greatest danger that

illiberal democracy poses
is that it will discredit liberal democracy
itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance .
Every wave
of democracy has been followed by setbacks
The last such period of disenchantment, in Europe during the
interwar years, was seized upon by demagogues
the mantle of legitimacy. Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably democratic. Conversely,
-- other than to its own people --
This would not be unprecedented.
in which the system was seen as inadequate and new alternatives were sought by
ambitious leaders and restless masses.
, many of whom were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a
spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most importantly the United States, can play is -- instead of searching for new lands to democratize and new places to hold
elections -- to consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply
inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a challenge, to
make the world safe for democracy. As we approach the next century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.
Democratic backsliding causes great power war.

Azar Gat, 2011, Azar Gat is the Ezer Weizman Professor of National
Security at Tel Aviv University, 2011, The Changing Character of War, in The
Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32
Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear
weapons have concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the
institutionalization of free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth
throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at
least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always
sufficiently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and
with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist economy, the prospect of a
major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main
sources for the feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted
radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a zone of peace.
War
now seems to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the

worlds zone of war, where countries that have so far failed to embrace
modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be engaged in
wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries. While the trend is very real, one
wonders if the near disappearance of armed conflict within the developed
world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the collapse of
communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a fleeting
one.
The
probability of major wars within the developed world remains lowbecause of the
factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear
But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the
far more radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the
irresistible ultimate victory of democracy; and that in an affluent and democratic world,
deterrence.
major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for.
This notion, however, is fast
eroding with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have
been absent from the international system since 1945 . Above all, there is the formerly
communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents
the greatest change in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating
from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian
character. Authoritarian capitalism may be more viable than people
tend to assume . 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger
capitalist
authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half of the twentieth century,
Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efficient economically as, and if
anything more successful militarily than, their democratic counterparts . They were
than the democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the
defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional
continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World
new non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China

in particular is the largest player in the international system in terms of
population and is showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or
two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower. Although the return of capitalist nondemocratic great powers does not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate
that the democratic hegemony since the Soviet Unions collapse could be
War). However, the
short-lived and that a universal democratic peace may still be far

off . The new capitalist authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake
of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus, it
is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for
markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and
conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does
not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it
grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible
exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially
confined Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more
problematic. However,
as China grows in power, it is likely to become more
assertive, flex its muscles, and behave like a superpower, even if it does not become
particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may coexist
more or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion,
as a result of the so-called security dilemma, and against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the
prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated ideological rivalry,
potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even new cold wars,
with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary from
those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the
same, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.
A2 Requires a warrant
UAV surveillance is distinct enough from traditional
aircraft it would not require a warrant.
http://www.a51.nl/storage/pdf/R42701.pdf, p. 13
Based on the aerial surveillance cases, it may be reasonable to presume a
warrant would not be required (nor, perhaps, any suspicion, for that matter) to conduct
drone surveillance of most public places for a relatively short period of time. The Supreme
Court remarked in Ciraolo that the Fourth Amendment simply does not
require the police traveling in the public airways at [1,000 feet] to obtain a
warrant to observe what is visible to the naked eye .100 However, the rarity of
drone flights may distinguish their use from surveillance by the piloted aircraft used in
the three aerial cases decided by the Court. All three of these cases were premised on the
fact that each aircraft was flying in navigable airspace , and that these flights were not
sufficiently rare to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area to be searched. To this point,
Justice White remarked in Riley that there is nothing in the record or before us to suggest that helicopters
flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to respondents claim that he
reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude.101
Presently, use of UAVs in U.S. airspace is considerably less common. The FAA has
issued only approximately 300 licenses for drone use in U.S. airspace.102
A2 Privacy is protected
Manned surveillance privacy protections are not enough
new legislation is needed.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
In Riley, the Supreme Court decided to apply the same method-focused
rationale, despite the use of a different aerial technologypolice helicopters. This similar approach
suggests a deliberate retreat from what could have been a firmer defense of
privacyan approach made and evaluated without regard to the surveillance
technology employed. The Riley decision was badly split. The four-justice plurality
concluded that an aerial police observation made from a public vantage point
where [the aircraft has] a right to be does not require a search warrant so long as a
reasonable man would not have expected that his [curtilage] was protected
from public or official observation .113 This rationale leans heavily on whether the aircraft
making the observation had a legal right to be where it was in the sky (pursuant to FAA regulations
governing airspace).114 Interestingly, a majority of the Court did not accept this rationale.115 Justice
OConnor agreed with the final disposition but differed in her analysis.116 Along with Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, Justice OConnor deemphasized the FAA regulations in any privacy
analysis, and did not endorse the pluralitys analogy between helicopter observations and ground-level
observations.117 These five Justices instead focused their judgment on the reasonableness of an
This reasonableness determination is based on

the circumstances of the case (such as where the individual was and what precautions the
individuals expectation of privacy.118
individual took to shield the property from public view).119 Justice OConnor argued that the Court should
ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel
with sufficient regularity and that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, regardless of technical
compliance with FAA safety regulations.120 Additionally, Justice Brennans dissent, as joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, appears to anticipate a future technology that would be more intrusive than the
helicopters of the 1980s.121 He noted that the plurality appeared to dismiss the intrusiveness of the
helicopter merely because it had a legal right to be where it was and due to the lack of undue noise . . .
wind, dust, or threat of injury122 created by its presence. Arguing that the proper analysis depends on
safeguarding the privacy and security of private citizens, Justice Brennan asked the Court to imagine a
helicopter capable of hovering just above [the ground] without generating any noise, wind, or dust at
all . . . . Suppose police employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what crops people were growing
This hypothetical is quite similar to the

capabilities possessed by certain modern high-tech drones.124 The dissent thus
. . . but also what books they were reading.123
addresses a model approach for the Supreme Court to take when applying aerial observation law to drones
precisely because it imagines the potential abuse of the pluralitys emphasis on the location of the
Courts may decide to break from present case law because of

the differences between helicopter and manned aircraft compared with
unmanned drones.125 These cases may not apply to observations made from
aircraft using cameras that enhance sensory abilitiesas would be the case with most drones because
observing aircraft.
such an observation loses any tenable comparison to the proverbial policeman on a public street.126 At
some point, the analogy loses its credence in the face of an overly piercing spy technology, at least if some
degree of privacy is to be retained. When technology emerges that fundamentally alters the privacy
analysis, change becomes appropriate.127
Drones may very well be the line in the sand .
Law enforcement surveillance enjoys legal flexibility

hampers privacy protections.
law enforcement agencies are
granted significant deference to conduct surveillance at or near American borders.
The federal government has a significant interest in protecting American
borders from crossings by persons attempting to enter unlawfully, drug trafficking, and, perhaps most
Even more so than surveillance of public places generally,
importantly, the transit of weapons and persons seeking to do harm to American people and infrastructure.
Congress has granted federal law enforcement agencies significant search

powers at the border. Section 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C.
Section 1357, authorizes immigration officers to conduct warrantless searches of any vessel within a
reasonable distance from the United States border and any vehicle within 25 miles from a border for the
purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.71 Similarly,
19 U.S.C. Section 482 authorizes customs officers to search vehicles and persons on which or whom they
The
Supreme Court has likewise acknowledged this federal interest in the borders,
observing that [t]he Governments interest in preventing the entry of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border .73
Again, the touchstone in every Fourth Amendment case is whether the search
is reasonable. 74 The Court observed in United States v. Montoya De
Hernandez the Fourth Amendment balance of reasonableness is qualitatively
different at the international border.75 Routine searches, the Court continued, are not
have reasonable cause to believe are carrying goods unlawfully into the United States.72
subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.76
A2 Court checks
Applying the Fourth Amendment to drones requires a
court case that can draw a meaningful distinction
between UAVs and traditional forms of aerial surveillance
unlikely to happen.
Applying the Fourth Amendment to drones requires application of the
threshold question: was there a search? Again, this will depend on all the factors discussed
abovethe area of the search, the technology used, and whether society would
respect the targets expectation of privacy in the place searched. If a reviewing
court concludes that the drone surveillance was not a search, neither a
warrant nor any degree of individualized suspicion would be required. If,
however, the court concluded there was a search, then a court would ask
whether a warrant is required, if one of the exceptions apply, and what level of
suspicion, if any, is necessary to uphold the search. Unless a meaningful
distinction can be made between drone surveillance and more traditional
forms of government tracking, existing jurisprudence suggests that a
reviewing court would likely uphold drone surveillance conducted with no
individualized suspicion when conducted for purposes other than strict law enforcement. The
Supreme Court has hesitated from interfering in what they see as the executives function in protecting the
health and safety of the American population.
So far there is no legal restriction on the use of drones in

domestic airspace.
p. 409-410
UASs provide the government with an unprecedented ability to observe ones
home and its curtilage from a much closer distance than crop dusters and helicopters. The
Court has permitted observation from an elevation of four hundred feet , but
what about observation from four feet? There is nothing in the Courts previous
decisions that would point to a different outcome as long as the observation
was being made from authorized airspace. The fact that much more intimate observations
may be made with a drone hovering just above a skylight than by a helicopter several hundred feet in the
air hardly needs to be noted. The concern with such capabilities may be obvious, but that does not
necessarily mean courts will be able to find an exception for such observations in their Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Finally, there is the remaining question about what type of sense enhancement may be
In Dow Chemical, the court said the use of a commercial

aerial mapping camera did not raise constitutional concerns but reserved
judgment on what other types of technological enhancements might be
used to observe the home.
problematic.97 Additionally, caution should be used when expanding Dow Chemicals analysis to different
contexts. Dow Chemical involved surveillance of an industrial facility, which is not an area immediately
adjacent to the private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.98
With the expansion of drone use for domestic surveillance

purposes court rulings will be invalidated.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
Currently, when police observe from the air, courts will inquire whether the
aircraft had a legal right to be flying there and whether a reasonable man
should have expected that his activities were exposed to public viewing from
the air.13 Some of these inquiries likely now protect Americans from much drone observation,14 but issues
Widespread police operation of drones has the potential to upend

current Supreme Court precedent.15 While previous cases have held that
mere visual observation does not constitute a search ,16 that law is, in part,
predicated on assumptions of resource scarcity that will cease to be true in
the face of widespread police use of drones .17 Concerned members of Congress and civil
remain.
libertarians tend to focus on the broad societal implications of increased [drone] use including potential
the Supreme
Court will likely have new opportunities to revisit its decisions governing
aerial observation. Before evaluating legislative or judicial solutions, however, the upcoming
privacy implications.18 In the face of new legislation and confusion in the lower courts,
changes to drone policy must be outlined so that the precise vulnerabilities of existing jurisprudence can
be appreciated.
A2 FAA checks
UAVs presents an immense privacy challenge no
jurisdictional protection and breadth of surveillance
capabilities.
pp. 1-20,
UAS pose serious privacy challenges. The reasons are straightforward. When mounted
on a remotely-piloted craft, todays sensors can scoop up quite a lot of
information, at times more easily or more broadly than can helicopters, airplanes, or
ground-mounted surveillance equipment. Theres also the relevant but outdated case law:
the Supreme Court has suggested that warrantless surveillance, if conducted from FAA-defined public
navigable airspace, will not trigger a violation of the Fourth Amendment.94 Just how much use will UAS
The FAA
reportedly believes that as many as 30,000 unmanned craft could take to our
skies by 2020. Having all of this in mind, the groundswell of privacy concerns
seems pretty well justified. The question is how privacy fits with the FAAs integration effort.
Some legislators want to ensure the agencys engagement with privacy
issues, by adding them to FMRAs task list. Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) would amend FMRA, by (among
make of that and other airspace for surveillance, among myriad other purposes?
other things) directing the Secretary of Transportation to identify privacy threats posed by domestic UAS
endeavors, and by precluding the FAA from licensing domestic UAS unless and until the operator has
explained, in detail, how he or she will mitigate possible harms to third-party privacy interests.95 Other
proposals focus on the FAAs independent authority. Just days after the FMRAs signing, advocacy
organizations wrote to the FAAs Acting Director, Michael Huerta, and urged his agency to conduct a
rulemaking to address the threat to privacy and civil liberties that will result from the deployment of aerial
drones within the United States.96 The FAA balked at that request, but similar ones followed. Others have
urged the FAA to account for privacy matters, as the agency works through the FMRA timetable. That latter
approach seems to have caught on. As discussed in Section Two, the Acting FAA Administrator, Michael
Huerta, publicly cited the need to resolve privacy concerns before selecting experimental UAS flight
ranges. Why do so if, as some have suggested,
the FAA has no special jurisdiction over the
issue? One answer has to do with expediency; the FAA might have thought that, regardless of its FMRA
obligations, the agency nevertheless must address a matter of tremendous significance to the public.
the FAA indeed views itself as legally bound to resolve

privacy issues as they arise though this does not follow from FMRAs plain text, and
also doesnt neatly jibe with some legislative proposals to shunt privacy into the
FMRA process. The latter would not be necessary if, indeed, FMRA already obligated the FAA to
Another theory is that
account for privacy concerns. Whatever the explanation, one thing is certain. By emphasizing privacys
centrality to the test site selection exercise, the Acting Administrators response effectively commits the
FAA to tackling other privacy problems in the future, as it reaches other statutory milestones. Although its
mission is only to ensure safe flight within the national airspace system, the agency now is officially in the
privacy game, for better or worse.
The FAA is lacking any coherent regulatory framework for

the integration of UAVs into national airspace.

UAV manufacturers and users are seeking a regulatory structure for the
certification of UAV systems and approval for operation in domestic airspace.
Ideally, operators of approved systems want the ability to file and fly, meaning that they would be
granted vehicle certification with broad operating authority akin to current manned aircraft certification
standards. Such regulation would potentially allow unmanned aircraft operators to file routine flight plans,
or in some cases simply carry out flight operations without any specific notification requirements, much as
While FAAs approach to address the mandates set forth in P.L. 112-95
regarding unmanned aircraft integration into the national airspace system is yet
to be defined, it is most likely that FAA regulation and oversight of UAVs will
adopt an evolving, risk-based approach toward this end goal of seamless integration. As a
manned aircraft do.15
first step, P.L. 112-95 mandated that FAA identify six test sites to specifically test concepts and
technologies for integrated unmanned aircraft operations. FAA held public meetings and webinars and
solicited public comments on the selection of test sites in March 2012, but has not yet gone through a
formal source selection process or announced further details regarding test site selection, even though it
was mandated to identify the sites by the summer of 2012 and have at least one site operational by
FAA is also required to develop a comprehensive

plan to safely accelerate integration of civilian unmanned aircraft into the
national airspace system as soon as practical but not later than September
2015. Meeting this mandate will require extensive research and regulatory action over the next three
February 2013. Under P.L. 112-95,
years.
The lack of reasonable privacy expectations puts strain on

FAA regulations pertaining to drones.
p. 408-409
What does this tell us about the use of drones for aerial surveillance of private property? One principle that
if the police can see something from

airspace where they have a legal right to be, then there is no reasonable
privacy expectation in that item. This puts a lot of weight on FAA regulations.
If the FAA drafts highly restrictive regulations of where and at what elevations
drones may be flown, there are fewer vantage points from which police may
lawfully observe private property. The problem with this approach is that
highly restrictive airspace regulations of UASs will likely diminish their utility to
can be distilled from these three cases is that
police forces. Furthermore, how much weight should be given FAA regulations is not entirely certain. As
Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Riley dissent, five of the justices agreed that the case should not turn
Additionally, the Courts indication in Dow

Chemical that sophisticated technology that is generally unavailable to the
public might trigger constitutional protection seems to indicate that this
principle should not be taken to its logical extreme . Police use of military satellites for
on compliance with FAA regulations.94
surveillance purposes would likely require a warrant.95 However, the use of a small, remotely operated
helicopter with a high-powered zoom lens seems closer to the facts of the above cases than the satellite
hypothetical. For those desirous of greater protection from aerial surveillance, the approach used by Justice
OConnor and the dissent in Riley has some immediate appeal. That test asked not whether the police had
a right to be in the place from where they made their observation, but whether the homeowner could
reasonably expect someone to observe their property from that location.96 However, this test is not
How frequent does travel in the

airspace at that specific altitude have to be in order for the individual to have
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize? Does such air
travel have to be frequent, or does it simply have to be plausible? Would people in
without its problems. First, it raises line-drawing issues.
urban locations or that live near airports be afforded less constitutional protection than those who live in
the desert? Another issue that arises with such an approach is that ones expectation of privacy would be
diminished as the use of drones becomes more frequent. Ten years ago, no one could reasonably expect a
three-foot, remote controlled police helicopter to be peering over their backyard fence. But ten years from
now, if virtually every police department has its own fleet of UASs, that expectation would be considerably
more reasonable. Should ones expectations of privacy be diminished as technology advances?
A2 Jones standard for privacy

Jones doesnt go far enough in curtailing privacy
concerns does away with individualized suspicion.
Christopher Slobogin, 2012, Christopher Slobogin is a Professor of Law at
Vanderbuilt University Law School, Making the Most of United States v. Jones
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory,
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy Special Issue vol. 8, pp.
1-37, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1056&context=djclpp, p. 32
a drone or camera surveillance system would be permissible
only if the relevant municipal government approved it and the
system covered the entire municipality or rotated its focus on a random or
neutral basis. If instead the drones or cameras were programmed to monitor particular areas,
Thus, for instance,
under this provision
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, depending upon the length of the surveillance, would be required.
Rather than individualized suspicion, the justification in such cases could be

based on statistical analysis of crime within the area . As another example, a datamining program run by the federal government that will access monthly
records would have to be authorized by Congress and would need to apply to
the entire country unless algorithms can produce, within a subset of targets, evidence
of crime against fifty percent of that subset during the time of the warrant.150
***ADD-ONS***
Drones dehumanization add-on

Use of domestic drone use, with vague judicial review,
could be used to target U.S. citizens to kill.
Marshall Thompson, March 1, 2013, Marshall Thompson is currently an
attorney at Thompson Appeals, The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes against
U.S. Citizens within the United States, BYU Law Review vol. 1, article 4, pp.
153-182, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2704&context=lawreview, p. 171
The first element for targeting a U.S. citizen has two main parts. The
government must conduct a "thorough and careful review," and that review
must conclude that the targeted person poses an "imminent threat of violent
attack against the United States."116 The review process is apparently where the
Obama administration is attempting to satisfy the requirements of due
process. The vague nature of Holder's statement, however, raises questions about
notice and independent judicial review. Al-Aulaqi had effective notice of his status as a
targeted enemy combatant, but he did not have official notice. 117 Giving notice to a target
would cause the U.S. military to lose a strategic advantage, but it may also
encourage targeted individuals to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda.
These considerations, however, are not legal, but strategic and tactical and probably reside within an
executive's discretion as Commander-inChief.118 However, the Supreme Court in Hamdi found that for
detention, a person must at least "receive notice of the factual basis for his classification." ng This
assumes, however, that the government already has custody of an enemy combatant.120 Targeting
assumes the opposite: that it is not feasible to detain the enemy combatant. 121 Using the balancing test
in Matthews, 122 failure to give notice to a potential target increases the chances of error, but may be
outweighed by the government's interest in an effective and workable strategy during armed conflict.
Drones create a dehumanized perception of men they are

surveying its compounded by the track, monitor, and kill
mentality.
Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the US
Mexico border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of
dronemediated perceptions: Everyone looks like germs, like ants, from the Hunters 15,000foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody scatters in a dozen
different directions. But this particular articulation makes no distinction between
illegal immigrants, political refugees, or Mexican-American citizens. In this sense,
Journalist Noah
the drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a single cluster of racialized information that is used for
Bodies below become things to track,

monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and
remote-controlled processes of control and harm.
Dehumanization should be treated like extinction.

David Berube, 1997, David Berube is a Professor of English at the
University of South Carolina, Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down
Side, http://www.cas.sc.ed...ube/prolong.htm
Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire resultant worldview
smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve valuing people as means. Moreover, there
would always be a superhuman more super than the current ones, humans would never be able to escape
their treatment as means to an always further and distant end. This means-ends dispute is at the core of
dehumanization of humanity. They warn: "its destructive

toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity
on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of
civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul
might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse .... Behind the genocide of
Montagu and Matson's treatise on the
the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the
cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it
may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to
When we
calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly
inestimable value greater than any tools, which we can currently use to measure it.
Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international
genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any
conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone.
and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and
dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.
Drones border security add-on

UAVs lose control when in close proximity to each other,
causing accidents not enough resources to identify
false-positives and causes overstretch.
Testing of UAVs along the border has been limited. A robust program to test
multiple UAVs on the borders might ascertain where, how, and whether UAVs
should be deployed. Larger scale testing would provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the
limitations of UAVs would hinder their utility on the border. In the past, multiple UAVs piloted in
close proximity have experienced interference and loss of control between
the UAV and the remote pilot. In many cases, interference led to accidents . A
possible issue for Congress could include whether testing should be expanded before any decisions are
UAVs may, in the future, be

used to detect unauthorized entries, the fact remains that USBP agents must
be deployed to apprehend any aliens identified. A possible issue for Congress
could entail whether there are enough border patrol resources to investigate
all UAV identified targets.
made regarding the wide-scale use of UAVs along the border. While
With a strain in resources and a decrease in surveillance

effectiveness, the risk of WMD terrorism increases
drastically.
Homeland Security, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, pp. 132, p. 1-2
The U.S. border with Canada stretches over 5,400 miles. To the south, the border with Mexico is in excess
the U.S. has over 12,380 miles of coastline to defend.2

These expansive borders and vast amounts of coastline present a large
challenge to those agencies responsible for U.S. security . The difficulty with
securing our southern border, in particular, is well documented. The U.S.-Mexico border has
of 1,950 miles. Additionally,
43 legitimate crossing points. However the rest of the border consists of open desert terrain, rugged
Inability of U.S. security forces

to monitor the whole border all of the time makes it easier to smuggle drugs
and illegal aliens into the United States.3 Not only are 2 drugs a menace to the U.S., a
larger concern would be if terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda choose to
smuggle in their operatives and/or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) via the
mountains and other geographic obstacles making surveillance.
same routes used for drug trafficking. Today, numerous federal and state organizations are charged with
maintaining the security and defense of the homeland: Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Border Patrol, Coast Guard, state and local police departments.
Many of
organizations operate under strained budgets and may lack sufficient

funding and personnel to acquire and maintain all of the surveillance
capabilities they seek.
these
Nuclear material is easy to acquire they only need the

means to sneak it in.
Stephen Menesick, Summer 2011, Stephen Menesick is a Political
Science Peace, War and Defense, public policy analysis, University of Chapel
Hill, Global Security Studies, Vol. 2 Issue 3, Preventing the Unthinkable: An
Overview of Threats, Risks, and US Policy Response to Nuclear Terrorism, p.
5-6, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Menesick%20Nuclear%20Final.pdf
by Russian officials have confirmed that terrorists have conducted
intelligence-gathering operations on Russian stockpiles, and to date, it is the only
country where documentation of terrorist surveillance exists (Bunn 2010, 35).
Equipping all sites with state of the art security measures has been a difficult
Reports
challenge. The Russian government, and consequently the security contractors who are responsible for the upkeep of
these facilities, suffers from a lack of financial resources (Joyner & Parkhouse 2009, 215). Additionally, significant internal
threats are present. Because the government employs independent security companies to coordinate much of
management of nuclear materials, there are two channels for insiders to aid terrorist groupshigh level government
officials and low level technical personnel. Both groups have incentive to divulge information at the right price, and Russia
has a political environment that has been rife with corruption for decades (Bunn 2010, 32-33 and Joyner & Parkhouse
Because of its
chemical composition and refinement, HEU can be used easily to make crude
nuclear weapons even by non-experts (Norwegian Project Secretariat). Because of the ease with
2009, 216). Finally, there is the security risk of Highly Enriched Uranium-fueled reactors (HEUs).
which a weapon can be made out of HEU, it is easy to see why terrorist acquisition is a direct security risk. As of 2009,
about half of the 200 remaining reactors were still using HEU fuel, and do not have capability to be converted to lower
enriched uranium (LEU) (World Nuclear Association 2011). Most of these are in Russia, where the government has
invested little in research to convert their own reactors to LEU power or other alternatives (World Nuclear Association
2011). Further, and most alarming, is that the security at many of these HEU sites is inadequate to prevent theft of HEU,
making research reactors a prime target for terrorists seeking to obtain nuclear material (Bunn, 2010, 45). If a terrorist
group only acquires nuclear material, and not a functional weapon, they will have to successfully create a weapon that
they can detonate. Unfortunately, this is an achievable end that can be done with little resources or expertise. As
discussed above, Highly Enriched Uranium is pure enough that it can be made into a devastating weapon relatively easily,
and it is also the most likely nuclear material that terrorists would get their hands on. The perception of modern nuclear
weapons may be that they are highly technical instruments of warfare backed by complex science. While this may be true,
a crude nuclear weapon, one that takes little skill to create, would still be incredibly deadlycapable of destroying the
downtown of a major city (Bunn, 2010, 16). The process of building a weapon of this type is not entirely simple, and
anyone who wanted to construct such a device would need a technical team with at least some experience. However, in
comparison to the nuclear weapons manufactured today, a crude bomb would be a more feasible project, as it would not
have to comply with rigorous military and safety specifications. Thus, it is plausible to see that this kind of power is not
out of reach for dedicated terrorist groups, should they acquire nuclear material (Ferguson & Potter 2003, 116). Having
acquired nuclear material and created a weapon, the final obstacle a terrorist group would need to pass would be delivery
and detonation in the target location. Likely, this would involve them smuggling a bomb or device into the United States,
and then into a major city, undetected. Nuclear material is quite difficult to track, especially the small amounts that would
be needed for a crude weapon (Bunn 2010, 18). Journalists have repeatedly demonstrated the ease with which radioactive
Even with
the most advanced technology, HEU is among the most difficult kind of
radiological material to detect (Montgomery 2009, 79). Also, terrorists could use existing port and
materials can be transported and shielded from detection while traveling (Ferguson & Potter 2003, 141).
transport systems in place, as they are relatively unsecure. Customs and Border Patrol inspects only around 6% of cargo
containers entering the US (Medalia 2005). Even with increased security measures and Port Authority reorganization in
2003, there are still plausible scenarios for terrorist groups sneaking radioactive materials into the US via boat undetected
(Ferguson & Potter 2003, 300). Furthermore, terrorists could avoid this obstacle entirely by taking materials that were
already inside the US. Once inside the US, delivery and detonation to target site would also not be insurmountable. As
Matthew Bunn and E. P. Maslin write: The length of national borders, the diversity of means of transport, the vast scale of
legitimate traffic across borders, and the ease of shielding the radiation from plutonium or especially from HEU all operate
in favor of the terrorists. Building the overall system of legal infrastructure, intelligence, law enforcement, border and
customs forces, and radiation detectors needed to find and recover stolen nuclear weapons or materials, or to interdict
these as they crossnational borders, is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. (Bun & Maslin 2010) In order for a terrorist
group to be successful in carrying out a nuclear attack, many elements must come together. There is no doubt that the
end result of a nuclear terrorist attack would be terrible, so
even with a low probability of attack,
the high impact possibility means steps should still be taken to prevent it. In
each link of the chain of attack, there are security measures that have been put in place, and continue to be upgraded.
make it into a usable weapon if they cannot themselves.
By itself terrorism causes extinction.

Owen B. Toon, April 19, 2007, Owen B. Toon is a professor of Atmospheric
and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado received his Ph.D. from
Cornell University, in cloud physics, atmospheric chemistry and radiative
transfer, Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale
nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism, Atmosphere
Chemistry Physics
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the worlds great urban
centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the
same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small
size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We
demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities
approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million.
Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least
six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons invento- ries. In all, thirty-three countries
control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear
explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15kt has
the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface
nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire
metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive
contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences
of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international
Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear

attacks because low yield det- onations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would
be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the www.atmos-chemeconomic consequences.
phys.net/7/1973/2007/ Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 19732002, 2007 Page 28 2000 O. B. Toon et al.:
Consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists
supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once
predicted for a full-scale nuclear counterforce exchange in a superpower
conflict . Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated
about one megaton of nuclear explosives
by attacks totaling
could lead to significant global climate
perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to
include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have
been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchin- son, 1985). Such a
study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.
Nuclear terrorism likely

Nuclear terrorism is extremely likely and is comparatively
the largest threat to international stability.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 2012, is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations,
Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, is advisor on Non-Proliferation at the South Asian Strategic
Stability Institute, London, Center of Excellence: Defense against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey and Armed
Forces War College, National Defense University, Islamabad, Command and Staff College Quetta, a Course
Coordinator at the Foreign Services Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Research Fellow at the Institute
of Strategic Studies, Islamabad and Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19
Issue 1, "Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?, Ebsco Host
The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are
in an age of transnational terrorism and

unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear
terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to
perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed,
engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same
absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/radiological terrorism

does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be
remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational
terrorist groups whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish of acquiring
time, the
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be
huge amount of nuclear material is spread

around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000
Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming
sensible about the published information that
fact is that a few storage sites of
secured
nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately
and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February).
Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003:
18).Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their
AL Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear

weapons was a religious duty (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that alterrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of
Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial
testimony had revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda
(Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that we have chemical and
nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir,
2001, November 10). On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist
confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11not to give
him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May
29). He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence
agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how
the terrorist organization

was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the
with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that
nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Ladens Deputy Ayman Zawahiris claim which he
made in December 2001: If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any
disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison,2010,
January: 2).The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be
the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is

real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that what keeps every senior government
interpreted as idle threats and thereby
leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially
nuclear(Mueller, 2011, August 2). Indeed,
the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot
deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist
attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not
only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually
welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on
governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the
consequences cannot be deterred (Whiteneck, 2005, summer: 187) since taking office, President Obama
has been reiterating that nuclear weapons represent the gravest threat to United States and
international security. While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks
singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about
the increasing threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: Black
market
trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to
build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our
efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and
nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President
Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). He added: One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive
destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we
know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe (Remarks by President Barack Obama,
2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear
Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear
smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obamas
nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding the threat of nuclear
terrorism. It also recognized the need for all States to take effective measures to prevent nuclear
material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists. The UNSC Resolution called for
universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005
Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. (UNSC Resolution,
2009)The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April6, 2010 declared that
terrorism
and proliferation are far greater threats to the U nited S tates and
international stability. (Security of Defense, 2010, April 6:i). The United States declared that it
reserved the right to hold fully accountable any state or group that supports or enables terrorist efforts
to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or
safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12). This declaration underscores
the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states.
Terrorism bad impact

Nuclear terrorism causes the same causalities and fullscale nuke war and nuclear winter.
Owen B. Toon, April 19, 2007, Owen Toon is a professor of Atmospheric
and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado received his Ph.D. from
Cornell University, in cloud physics, atmospheric chemistry and radiative
transfer, Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale
nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism, Atmosphere
Chemistry Physics
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the worlds great urban
centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the
same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small
size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We
demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities
approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million.
Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least
six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons invento- ries. In all, thirty-three countries
control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear
explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15kt has
the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface
nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire
metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive
contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences
of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international
Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear

attacks because low yield det- onations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would
be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the www.atmos-chemeconomic consequences.
phys.net/7/1973/2007/ Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 19732002, 2007 Page 28 2000 O. B. Toon et al.:
Consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists
supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once
predicted for a full-scale nuclear counterforce exchange in a superpower
conflict . Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated
about one megaton of nuclear explosives
by attacks totaling
could lead to significant global climate
perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to
include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have
been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchin- son, 1985). Such a
study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.
***POLITICS***
Drones unpopular - media

Drone use is politically and publically unpopular media
spin and leaked memo.
Sara Sorcher, March 9, 2013, The Wonderful World of Drones, National
Journal, Ebsco Host, p. 5
Congress directed the Federal Aviation Administration to make it safe for
drones to fly domestically by 2015. The agency expects some 10,000
commercial drones (think news outlets and private businesses) to fly by 2017. And all 18,000
state and local law-enforcement agencies will be potential customers . But the
public's suspicions about drones could stifle their positive potential.
And the leaked
Justice Department memo justifying the targeted killing of American terrorism
suspects in far-off countries raised concerns that armed drones might
eventually take out citizens on U.S. soil. Washington's drone lobby is not happy. "We've
Lawmakers in 30 states are seeking to restrict or require warrants for their use.
come to recognize that 'drone' is a pejorative term," says Mario Mairena of the Association for Unmanned
Vehicle Systems International, which has more than 600 corporate members, including Northrop Grumman
and Raytheon. "People picture the unmanned aircraft systems that are used in-theater, and that scares
people, because all they see are these images of [the aircraft] used with missiles." Mairena laments that
media outlets often illustrate their stories about domestic drones with
pictures of Predator aircraft, while the FAA is working to expedite permits for much smaller
robots (under 25 pounds).
Drones unpopular privacy

The public is rejecting drone use, as groups fear privacy
problems.
Paul Marks, March 2, 2013, Drone Backlash Begins, New Scientist vol.
217, issue 2906, pp. 24-24, Ebsco Host, p. 24
Privacy fears are fuelling the US public's rejection of civilian drones "THE first guy
who uses a weapon to bring down a drone that's hovering over his house is going to become a folk hero in
the US
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said that drones will soon be licensed
for law enforcement and commercial surveillance work . Krauthammer's words seem to
have captured the mood of a nation. Privacy fears are sparking a backlash against the
use of drones in civilian airspace. Seattle's police force was forced to abandon its drone
this country." So said commentator Charles Krauthammer on Fox News in May last year, after
programme last month, following anger from residents. Meanwhile, Virginia has imposed a two-year
moratorium on the use of drones by police and at least 13 other states are now deliberating similar anti-
privacy advocates have gone beyond lobbying their local

councilor. Online discussion groups have sprung up about what kind of drone countermeasures could
drone legislation. But some
prevent privacy invasion from the air. Their ideas range from the absurd -- wearing drone-camera-proof
clothing or using stunt kites to tangle their rotors -- to the more plausible -- jamming radio-control
frequencies or shooting the drones out of the sky. The FAA's announcement on 14 February that it is
pressing ahead with the opening of six test centres for civilian drones will only have reinforced such
sentiments. After Krauthammer's comments, pro-gun shock jock Alex Jones ran a video on his website,
Infowars.com, which shows him visiting a sprawling Texas ranch to practise shooting down the coming
wave of drones with assault rifles. Steve Hindi of Geneva, Illinois, who runs an animal rights charity, has
first-hand experience of what happens when those being watched by a drone decide to do something
about it. He uses eight-rotor drones, which cost about $8000 each, to expose a controversial type of
pigeon shoot in which birds are ejected from a box on the ground and shot with a shotgun. "We've had
drones shot down losing one permanently, and twice more they were hit but made it back," Hindi says.
He flies his drones beyond shotgun range but says the shooters are switching to rifles to down his drones.
"Mister Krauthammer is completely wrong. The shooters are like the people who wanted to ban the
internet in case people learned something," he says. "They are not folk heroes. They are cowards." So what
happens next? A shake-up of the law is needed, says Peter van Blyenburgh, head of drone trade body
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, based in Paris, France. He says small drones, like the $300 Parrot
AR Drone, sold as a toy, could become a real neighbourhood nuisance, provoking risky shoot-downs. "Big
Texas landowners now talk of firing shoulder-fired rockets at drones," he says. "They are in cloud cuckoo
land." In May, the European Commission's Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems panel, on which van
Blyenburgh sits, will investigate if the rules that govern radio-controlled model aircraft can be enforced on
users of "toy" drones. This could go some way towards addressing the concerns of privacy advocates, van
Blyenburgh believes. "Model planes cannot take a camera anywhere near to a house or garden," he says.
"If they do, the operator can't get public liability insurance. That could apply to these toys, too."
Drones are publically unpopular for use domestically

Fourth Amendment problems.
angst over the vacillating scope of Fourth Amendment
protections has left many Americans antagonistic to the idea of introducing
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (hereinafter UAVs) 6 into the national security system.7
For many, the fear of Big Brothers Prying Eyes in the Sky has generated
Not surprisingly,
overwhelming trepidation that law enforcement agencies will abuse the

convenience of the technology to monitor individuals for no cause at all , and in
doing so will incidentally collect private information about individuals who are perfectly innocent, law
abiding citizens.8 In short, the fear is that the use of UAVs will erode the very axiom the Fourth
as legitimate as these concerns may

be, it is doubtful that they are strong enough to categorically prohibit the
assimilation of this incredibly powerful, highly sophisticated technology into
the national sphere. For years, the United States has relied on the use of unmanned aircraft to carry
out dangerous missions in foreign territories such as Afghanistan and Yemen.9 As a result of the
remarkable success of UAVs overseas, today there is a tremendous demand
and congressional pressure to use these aircrafts at home to carry out an
abundance of tasks, ranging from the dangerous and dirty, to the dull and
boring.10 In February 2012, President Obama signed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act into law,
Amendment stands to protect personal privacy. But
which calls for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to accelerate the integration of unmanned aircraft
into the national airspace system by 2015.11 While numerous privacy and safety concerns continue to be
ironed out in preparation for the deployment of domestic UAVs, predictions secured by the FAA estimate
that as many as 30,000 drones will fill the nations skies by 2020.12
Drones popular - lobbying

FAA certification for UAS has been increasing as pressure
has grown from the Unmanned Systems Caucus.
Micah Zenko, March/April 2012, 10 Things You Didn't Know About
Drones, Foreign Policy, issue 192, pp. 1-5, Ebsco Host, p. 5
Worried about the militarization of U.S. airspace by unmanned aerial
vehicles? As of October, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had reportedly
issued 285 active certificates for 85 users, covering 82 drone types . The FAA has
refused to say who received the clearances, but it was estimated over a year ago that
35 percent were held by the Pentagon, 11 percent by NASA, and 5 percent by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). And it's growing. U.S. Customs
and Border Protection already operates eight Predator drones. Under pressure
from the congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus -- yes, there's already a drone
lobby, with 50 members -- two additional Predators were sent to Texas in the fall, though a
DHS official noted: "We didn't ask for them." Last June, a Predator drone intended to patrol the U.S.-Canada
border helped locate three suspected cattle rustlers in North Dakota in what was the first reported use of a
drone to arrest U.S. citizens.
Drones popular kids

Conservatives strongly support drone use security and
Universalist values.
Jarret T. Crawford et al., 2013, Jarret Crawford is an Associate Professor
of Psychology at The College of New Jersey, Shaun Wiley is an Association
Professor of Psychology at The College of New Jersey, and Nina Ventresco is a
Research Assistant at Lehigh University, Examining Americans Attitudes
toward Drone Strikes on the Eve of the 2012 Presidential Election, Analyses
of Social Issues and Public Policy vol. 0, no. 0, pp. 1-15,
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jarret_Crawford/publication/256414649_E
xamining_Americans_attitudes_towards_drone_strikes_on_the_eve_of_the_201
2_Presidential_election/links/0c960524c0fdb06236000000.pdf, p. 2-3
People who hold right-wing attitudes and beliefs support war and militarism more strongly, both generally
and in specific conflicts (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Doty, Winter, Peterson, &
conservatives should more strongly support the U.S. militarys

drone warfare policy and liberals should more strongly oppose it. Moreover, distinct values may
explain ideological differences in support for drone strikes. Personal values are theorized to
form the bases of political belief systems (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). According to
Schwartzs (1992) theory of basic human values, there are ten universal value orientations ,
two of which we expected to be directly relevant to drone policy attitudes:
security values, which express the goal of maintaining the safety, harmony
and stability of society, and universalism values, which express the goal of
protecting the welfare of all people (Schwartz, 1992). A host of studies have found positive
Kemmelmeier, 1997). Thus,
correlations between conservatism and security values, on the one hand, and liberalism and universalism
values, on the other (Braithwaite, 1998; Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielman, 2007; Morgan, Mullen, &
Skitka, 2010). Other evidence indicates that security values are positively associated with support for war,
whereas universalism values are negatively associated with support for war (Cohrs et al., 2005). Together,
these findings suggest that conservatives should support drone warfare because of its relevance to
security values, whereas liberals should oppose drone warfare because of its relevance to universalism
values.
Drones popular media

Drone policy is popular in the U.S. due to political and
media manipulation.
Jarret T. Crawford et al., 2013, Jarret Crawford is an Associate Professor
of Psychology at The College of New Jersey, Shaun Wiley is an Association
Professor of Psychology at The College of New Jersey, and Nina Ventresco is a
Research Assistant at Lehigh University, Examining Americans Attitudes
toward Drone Strikes on the Eve of the 2012 Presidential Election, Analyses
of Social Issues and Public Policy vol. 0, no. 0, pp. 1-15,
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jarret_Crawford/publication/256414649_E
xamining_Americans_attitudes_towards_drone_strikes_on_the_eve_of_the_201
2_Presidential_election/links/0c960524c0fdb06236000000.pdf, p. 3-4
Conservatism alone, however, cannot account for the widespread support for
drone strikes in the United States; while polling shows a majority of
Americans support drone strikes (Pew Research Center, 2012), only one-third of Americans
identify as conservative (American National Election Studies, 2008). Anecdotal evidence suggests that
politicians and the media play a role in shaping Americans attitudes toward
drone strikes, across party lines. For example, Margaret Sullivan (2012), public editor of the
New York Times, cites critics who attribute public support for drone strikes to uncritical reporting. Those
the media have neither challenged the Obama administrations

portrayal of the policy as necessary to combat enemy fighters, nor adequately
emphasized the policys human costs. This argument is consistent with research on
message framing. There is ample evidence that individual attitudes on a political
issue can be shifted by making some values and concerns more relevant to
that issue than others (see Chong & Druckman, 2007 for a review). Thus, people would be
more likely to evaluate drone strikes in terms of security valuesand
subsequently support the policy if they see the issue in terms of the Obama administrations
critics argue that
national security frame. In contrast, people would be more likely to evaluate drone strikes in terms of
universalism valuesand subsequently oppose the policyif they see the issue in terms of a human
costs frame. These frames are echoed in the arguments for and against drone strikes: supporters argue
that drone warfare is a necessary and efficient means of ensuring U.S. national security (e.g., Curtis,
2011), whereas critics have called on the United States to clarify, revise or dismantle its drone warfare
policy because of the resulting civilian casualties (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2011).
***AFF COUNTERPLANS***
2AC states CP
Perm do both will be seen as government
implementing states lead - shields the link to politics
Perm do the CP - must be textually and functionally
competitive.
The federal government has expertise regulating drone
surveillance and should be used as the floor for future
state action.
Margot E. Kaminski, May 2013, Margot Kaminski is an Assistant Professor
at The Ohio State Law School and the former Executive Director of the
Information Society Project at Yale Law, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones
and the Things They Carry, California Law Review vol. 4, pp. 57-74,
article=1007&context=clrcircuit, p. 59
Civilians will fly drones in the national airspace soon, if Congress has its way. 1
Drones can carry a wide array of privacy-invading technologies , from cameras
to heat sensors to sensors that detect movement to odor detectors that can sniff the air.2
Drones are also cheap to own and operate, compared to manned aircraft.3 States,
fearing dragnet surveillance, have started examining gaps in privacy law .4
Their fears are well-founded; a Seattle woman recently reported a drone hovering over her yard and
outside her third-story window.5 At the time of this Essays writing, over thirty states are actively
the federal government has proposed several

bills, one of which likely preempts most state regulation.6 This legislative surge demands a
study of whether drone privacy law is better handled by the federal
government, or by the states. The federal government has a history of
regulating law enforcement surveillance through the federal wiretap statute, which
could be updated to govern other law enforcement uses of drones. An
updated federal statute could therefore provide the floor for state regulation
considering drone related legislation, and
of law enforcement drone use, and the more limited subject matter of remote wiretapping by private
parties.7 However, governing civilian drone use on other matters, particularly video and image capture,
will be far more complex, and will more closely resemble the regulation of subject matter traditionally
covered by the states. Like all laws governing videos by private actors, drone surveillance laws will exist
between a privacy floor and a First Amendment ceiling. For now, I argue, this complex space of privacy
regulation is best left to the states.
50-state fiat is voting issue
Fiating uniformity decreases education its not real

world and robs-us of patchwork arguments the central
question in the literature.
Crushes fairness Aff could always re-create the Federal
government on a sub-national level and run politics. We
could never win.
Conditionality bad - 2AC time and strategy skew - depth
better than breadth - best for clash and generating
offense dispo solves - voter for fairness and education.
A federal action, utilizing the framework for ECPA, would
be the best actor to avoid lengthy legal experimentation.
article=1007&context=clrcircuit, p. 65
A federal, or mixed state and federal , approach to law enforcement drone use
makes perfect sense. A federal law governing law enforcement drone use
would follow in the well-trodalbeit, outdatedfootsteps of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).44 Like ECPA, federal legislation on law enforcement
drone use could establish a statutory core to be shared by the states, or a statutory floor, permitting state
Additionally, because ECPA already establishes a

familiar framework for warrants and court orders governing law enforcement
surveillance, a federal law enforcement drone statute need not wait on
extensive state experimentation. The updates need not be drone-specific, and could cover
deviation towards more protection.
location tracking, video surveillance, or use of biometric identification, or other new technologies, if these
are the concerns raised by drone surveillance. As noted, legislation governing video or photographic
surveillance by civilian drone users will be far trickier. It will have to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis of
privacy and the First Amendment. And if enacted federally, it will deviate from how privacy regulation has
historically been divided between the federal government and the states. There is no federal omnibus
privacy law in the United States. Federal privacy law consists of a series of sectoral regulations, enacted
somewhat haphazardly. One federal statute governs privacy in video watching, one governs drivers
license information, one governs health information, one governs financial privacy, and so on.45 Dronespecific regulation would add to this patchwork.
Links to politics if fifty states acted uniformly there is no

realistic way the public can tell the difference.
There is no legal downside to federal preemption

regarding drone surveillance.
article=1007&context=clrcircuit, p. 59-60
The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it has
historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor for state
laws.12 Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of wiretaps
and pen registers.13 Drone surveillance is likely to additionally involve video surveillance, location
tracking, and/or facial recognition, among other possible technologies. Thus federal legislation
governing law enforcement surveillance could be expanded to govern location
tracking, video surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law enforcement.14
Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from
legislating thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth
Amendment rights rather than First Amendment rights, so the worst case scenario is
that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to protect
enough privacy.15 The more interesting and difficult privacy puzzle arises from drone use by private
not publicactors. Regulating civilian drone use will be treacherous, as such regulation potentially
threatens First Amendment rights. Because of that threat, civilian drone regulation may get overturned, as
courts sort out the scope of those First Amendment rights. Regulating civilian drone use on the federal
level thus risks being unconstitutional or, barring that, unstable. Several states are considering banning
civilian drone photography, or more broadly, civilian drone use.16 The proposed Texas Privacy Act, H.B.
912, bans drone photography without the consent of the property owner on whose property the image is
taken, and at the time of this Essays writing, has passed the Texas House and is up for debate in the state
Senate.17 Two proposed federal bills restrict the gathering of images and other information by civilians.18
One of these federal bills can be read to preempt state regulation of drone flights between states. 19 This
Essay argues that preemption of state drone regulation would be a mistake.
2AC Courts
Perm do the CP - agent CPs set a bad interp. for debate
allows the neg to infinitely break down processes allowing
bad CPs like signing statement or veto cheato which skirts
topic-based debate and education The means to
emphasize one of a group or type as the most outstanding
or prominent or to indicate uniqueness.
American Heritage Dictionary, 2009,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/the
Must be textually and functionally competitive

And, federal government just denotes separation between
central and disaggregated authority doesnt mean it
acts in unison.
D. Elazar, 1954, prominent political theorist and scientist, American
Federalism
Perm do both if their shielding links arguments are true

then this should resolve the link to politics
Congress is preferable over the courts - sends the
necessary signal to solve for privacy and proliferation
issues.
p. 413-415
The arrival of UASs at domestic police offices has serious Fourth Amendment
implications. UASs give police departments the ability to easily survey vast
areas as well make intimate observations. The sorts of protections afforded by current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are not particularly reassuring. The ability to make aerial
observations has been so far unbounded. If the FAA does not restrict the
elevations at which UASs may fly, the area constituting curtilage, or possibly even observation
of the interior of ones residence, then the public is rendered almost completely
unprotected from aerial observation . Furthermore, the ability to use the devices to track
individuals outside of their homes is restricted only by a UASs flight time limitations. Finally, if UASs
ever become a part of general public use, there might not even be protection
from their observations inside the home. However, their surveillance abilities could be
restricted through four possible means. First, change could come through judicial
decision-making. Courts could decide to create new rules that limit the types of
observations that may be made by UASs. The Supreme Court has already created reasonable
protection for individuals inside the home. The Court may very well decide that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy from observations made only a few feet outside their windows or above
if limitations on police UAS use are to come from the courts,

change will likely be slow. If exponential growth can continue to be expected in the UAS market,
their patios. However,
police surveillance by UAS may become commonplace by the time such a case reaches the Supreme
Court. As discussed above, there might be even less chance of constitutional protection as technological
A more democratic and slightly faster means

of protection could come from the legislature . Much like wiretapping, privacy
protection from UAS observation could become the purview of Congress
rather than the courts. Congress could pass legislation that defines the types of
and circumstances under which observations are permitted by UASs and what is forbidden. A
devices become a part of general public use.
further benefit of change coming through the legislature is that changes can continue to be made in the
future as technology advances, and parts of the law that prove unworkable or impractical can be adjusted.
the proper balance can be achieved between allowing the police to use
a tool that makes them more efficient in their work and protecting the privacy
of citizens. However, this same benefit of legislative action can also be its downfall. It does not provide
Thereby,
the permanence of constitutional interpretation, and, therefore, the protections it affords can be eroded
over time. A third avenue of protection is through FAA regulation. This is less powerful than the above two
options but would not be insignificant. In Riley, the Court put particular emphasis on the fact that the
police officer was making an observation from unrestricted airspace.122 If the FAA restricted the ability of
UASs to fly below certain elevations, then their ability to track individuals and to look inside homes would
be diminished. Still, the FAA is concerned with safety, not privacy. Any regulations they craft regarding the
airspace UASs may occupy will be based on safety concerns. Furthermore, considering the fact that
Congress recently pushed the FAA to widen the door for UAS usage, it is unlikely that it will regulate
permissible airspace too severely. And highly restrictive regulations might not be desired, after all. If UAS
use is too restricted, then they will lose their usefulness to police departments. Finally, police department
policies are a simple tool that may be used to protect privacy concerns. Though policies are the least
permanent and formal of any of the above options, they can still be meaningful. A sergeant with the
Miami-Dade Police Department said that its UASs were only going to be used for emergencies, like car
crashes, and not surveillance.123 Even if restrictions on a police departments use of drones do not come
from above, local police departments may limit themselves. They are especially likely to do so when they
know that the members of their community have serious concerns about UAS use. Much like the direction
of technology, what protections the Fourth Amendment provides to citizens from drone observation is
unknown. The best that citizens concerned with their privacy protection can do is make sure that their
lawmakers and local police departments are aware of these concerns. If citizens are able to make their
concerns about unfettered drone usage well-known, a court would be hard-pressed to find the expectation
of privacy at the foundation of those concerns unreasonable.
Time based competition is bad no link offensive

argument against the CP by protracting the delay forces
us to garner offense only of reasons why the aff is bad voting issue for fairness

Congress is preferable over the courts for restricting
drone surveillance speedy and consistent.
Review vol. 70, pp. 1830-1883,
Congress should use its advantages over courts to take speedy action
and make comprehensive and consistent rules .212 activity under circumstances in which
Overall,
the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing
device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing
Recently, the House Committee on the Judiciary , Subcommittee

on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations held a lengthy
series of hearings on the subject of privacy solutions to police drones.213 Among
device was used.
the panelists were John Villasenor (Brookings Institution), Gregory S. McNeal (Pepperdine University School
of Law), Tracey Maclin (Boston University School of Law), and Chris Calabrese (American Civil Liberties
Union).214 Villasenor argues, both in his scholarly writing and testimony, that a judicial solution to the
problem will have fewer legal consequences as compared with congressional legislation.215 This argument
judicial solutions are prone to inconsistencies .216 By contrast,

panelist Calabrese advocated for legislative action because Congress is in the
best position to swiftly effect change.217
is misguided because
Obama gets blame for courts Republican spin.

Time, January 26, 2009, Obama's Supreme Move to the Center,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1818334,00.html
When the Supreme Court issues rulings on hot-button issues like gun control and
the death penalty in the middle of a presidential campaign, Republicans could be excused for
thinking they'll have the perfect opportunity to paint their Democratic
opponent as an out-of-touch social liberal. But while Barack Obama may be ranked
as one of the Senate's most liberal members, his reactions to this week's
controversial court decisions showed yet again how he is carefully moving to
the center ahead of the fall campaign. On Wednesday, after the Supreme Court ruled that the death
penalty was unconstitutional in cases of child rape, Obama surprised some observers by siding with the
hardline minority of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts and Alito. At a press conference after the decision,
Obama said, "I think that the rape of a small child, six or eight years old, is a heinous crime and if a state
makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the death penalty is at least
potentially applicable, that that does not violate our Constitution." Then Thursday, after Justice Scalia
released his majority opinion knocking down the city of Washington's ban on handguns, Obama said in a
statement, "I have always believed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear
arms, but I also identify with the need for crime-ravaged communities to save their children from the
violence that plagues our streets through common-sense, effective safety measures. The Supreme Court
has now endorsed that view." John McCain's camp wasted no time in attacking, with one surrogate,
conservative Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, calling Obama's gun control statement "incredible flipflopping." McCain advisor Randy Scheunemann was even tougher in a conference call Thursday. "What's
becoming clear in this campaign," Scheunemann said, is "that for Senator Obama the most important issue
in the election is the political fortunes of Senator Obama. He has demonstrated that there really is no
position he holds that isn't negotiable or isn't subject to change depending on how he calculates it will
Politicians are always happy to get a chance to accuse

opponents of flip-flopping, but McCain's team may be more afraid of Obama's
shift to the center than their words betray. Obama has some centrist positions to highlight
affect his political fortunes."
in the general election campaign on foreign policy and national security, social issues and economics. His
position on the child rape death penalty case, for example, is in line with his record in Illinois of supporting
the death penalty. He is on less solid ground on the gun ban as his campaign said during the primary that
he believed the D.C. law was constitutional. A top legal adviser to Obama says both cases are consistent
with his previous positions. "I don't see him as moving in his statements on the death penalty or the gun
case," says Cass Sunstein, a former colleague of Obama's at the University of Chicago. Sunstein says
Obama is "not easily characterized" on social issues, and says the Senator's support for allowing
government use of the Ten Commandments in public, in some cases, is another example of his
unpredictability on such issues. On the issue of gun control, he says Obama has always expressed a belief
that the Second Amendment guarantees a private right to bear arms, as the court found Thursday. But
Obama's sudden social centrism would sound more convincing in a different context. Since he wrapped up
the primary earlier this month and began to concentrate on the independent and moderate swing voters
so key in a general election, Obama has consistently moved to the middle. He hired centrist economist
Jason Furman, known for defending the benefits of globalization and private Social Security accounts, to
the displeasure of liberal economists. On Father's Day, Obama gave a speech about the problem of
absentee fathers and the negative effects it has on society, in particular scolding some fathers for failing to
"realize that what makes you a man is not the ability to have a child it's the courage to raise one." Last
week, after the House passed a compromise bill on domestic spying that enraged liberals and civil
libertarians, Obama announced that though he was against other eavesdropping compromises in the past,
this time he was going to vote for it. Whether Obama's new centrist sheen is the result of flip-flopping or
reemphasizing moderate positions, the Supreme Court decisions have focused attention again on the role
of the court in the campaign season. McCain himself is vulnerable to charges of using the Supreme Court
for political purposes. Earlier this month, when the court granted habeas corpus rights to accused terrorist
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, McCain attacked the opinion in particularly harsh language, though advisers
say closing the prison there is high on his list of actions to rehabilitate America's image around the world.
despite Obama's moderate response to the Supreme Court

decisions, the issues alone will rally supporters to him. "What both of these decisions say
to me is that the Supreme Court really is an election-year issue," says Kathryn
Liberals are hoping that
Kolbert, president of People For the American Way. "We're still only one justice away from a range of really
negative decisions that would take away rights that most Americans take for granted," she says. And
Obama's run to the center surely won't stop conservatives from using the
specter of a Democratic-appointed Supreme Court to try to rally support.
Justices will be hampered by seeming too political.

Mark Tushnet, 2009, Mark Tushnet is a Professor of Law at Georgetown
Law School, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law, p. 11
tying the Supreme Court to party
politics is not all that new. The standard view of the Warren Court, for example, is
that it worked in conjunction with the Democratic Party to implement a New
Deal/Great Society vision of the Constitution. The Rehnquist Court resembles the Warren
So the Rehnquist Court is a political court. For scholars,
Court in implementing a constitutional vision associated with the nations dominant political party. What
makes its story more complicated (and interesting) is that the Republican Party has remained a coalition of
economic and cultural conservatives. The Republicans on the Court who would use the Constitution to
agendas of the modern Republican Party have been

able to lay the groundwork for later advances. But their actual
accomplishments have been meager because they have been thwarted, not by
advance the economic and cultural
activist liberals or by Democrats but
cultural agenda.
by Republicans uneasy about the Republican
2AC Executive order CP

Perm do the CP agent CPs set a bad interp. For debate
allows the neg to infinitely break down processes allowing
bad CPs like signing statement or veto cheato which skirts
topic-based debate and education The means to
emphasize one of a group or type as the most outstanding
or prominent or to indicate uniqueness.
American Heritage Dictionary, 2009,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/the
Must be textually and functionally competitive

Perm do both if their shielding links arguments are true
then this should resolve the link to politics
An executive order links to politics more.

Billy Hallowell, February 11, 2013, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism
and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint Vincent in Riverdale, New
York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan,
HERES HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamasusing-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-ofexecutive-orders/
In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far
between, Howell said. So
do.
presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they
And the political opposition howls.
Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible
on the gun-control front in

Obama is abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive
fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress. The Republican
reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at
contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that
particular,
the University of California in Santa Barbara. For years
there has been a growing
concern about unchecked executive power , Woolley said. It tends to have

a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent
presidents opponents.
Congress is key to democratic legitimacy and preventing

future vacillation in executive policy.
Benjamin Wittes, November 3, 2009, senior fellow and research director
in public law at the Brookings Institution, Stuart Taylor, an American
journalist, graduated from Princeton University and Harvard Law School,
Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform, p. 329-330
While President Obamas policy makes a clean break with the Bush record, it actually does not effectively answer the
new policy seems likely to fail on both a

substantive and a procedural level. First, it goes too far by banning all coercion all the time. Second,
the rule is unstable because it can so easily be changed at the whim of the
president, whether Obama or, perhaps, a successor more like Bush. An
administration down the road that wanted to resume waterboarding could
rescind the current order and adopt legal positions like those of the prior administration. Unless the
question of how best to handle this group. Indeed, the
Obama
administration
interrogators with
and Congress hammer out rules that provide
clear guidance about what is and is not allowed and
write those rules into statute, the U nited S tates risks vacillating under the
vagaries of current law between overly permissive and overly restrictive
guidance. The general goals of new legislation should be threefold: To make it a crime beyond cavil to use
interrogation methods considered by reasonable people to be torture. The torture statute already does that to some
degree, but the fact that it arguably permitted techniques as severe as waterboarding suggests that it may require some
tightening. The key here is that the statute should cover all techniques the use of which ought to prompt criminal
prosecution. To subject CIA interrogators in almost all cases to rules that, without relaxing current laws ban on cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, permit relatively mild forms of coercion that are properly off limits to military
interrogators. To allow the president, subject to strict safeguards, to authorize use of harsher methods short of torture
(as defined in the revised criminal statute) in true emergencies or on extraordinarily high-value captives such as KSM.
Only Congress can provide the democratic legitimacy and the finetuning of criminal laws that can deliver such a regime. Only
Congress can , for example, pass a new law making it clear
that waterboarding or
any other technique of comparable severity will henceforth be a federal crime. Only Congress can offer clear assurances
to operatives in the field that there exists a safe harbor against prosecution for conduct ordered by higher-ups in a crisis in
Only Congress, in other words, can

create a regime that plausibly turns away from the past without giving up
what the United States will need in the future.
the genuine belief that an attack may be around the corner.

2AC Regulatory authority CP

Perm do both Congress will blame the FAA for regulatory
mishaps shielding them from political backlash
FAA regulates the national airspace for drone flights.
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i3/article9.pdf, p. 14-15
Who owns the airspace and who can regulate drone flights? In early English
and American common law, courts followed the rule that whoever owned the
land possessed all the space above the land extending upwards into the heavens.61 Much
later, Congress changed that tradition by passing the Air Commerce Act of 192662 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 63 which granted the United States complete sovereignty over its own airspace.
Then, in 1958, the passage of the Federal Aviation Act 64 gave the new
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the responsibility to set uniform rules
for the operation of aircraft in United States airspace.65 [17] According to FAA
regulations, fixed-wing aircraft must operate at least 1,000 feet above the
highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft in
congested areas and 500 feet above the surface in non-congested areas.66
A helicopter may fly below the minimum safe altitudes prescribed for fixed-wing aircraft if it is operated
without hazard to persons or property on the surface.67 According to a 1981 FAA advisory circular,
recreational users of model aircraft may fly a sufficient distance from populated areas and may not fly in
the vicinity of full scale aircraft, into noise-sensitive areas such as parks, schools, hospitals, or churches, or
more than 400 feet above the surface.68

Must obtain a certificate of authorization by the FAA in
order to fly a drone.
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i3/article9.pdf, p. 18
any federal, state, or local agency wanting to operate a drone in
national airspace needs a certificate of authorization from the FAA .81 The FAA
conducts an operational and technical review of the drone in order to ensure
Currently,
citizens safety when the drone is in use in national airspace.82 Private commercial
operators must receive a special airworthiness certificate in order to operate
a drone.83 [24] While drafting new regulations, the FAA is also creating a series of test
ranges and designating specific airspace throughout the country to be used
to operate drone flights in order to develop better certification and air traffic standards.84 These
test flights will assist the FAA in learning more about the safe operation of drones while traveling in
navigable U.S. airspace.85 Twenty-five applicants from twenty-four states applied to be test sites and of
those twenty-five applicants, the FAA chose Alaska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia to
host drone test sites.86
***AFF DISADVANTAGES***
2AC Spending
This disad doesnt make sense restricting drone
surveillance would reduce spending and reign in fiscal
irresponsibility.
Drones are set to take off this year until NAS integration
this DA links just as much to the status quo as the plan.
Drones are inefficient cost wise requires a large amount
of support personnel and results in fewer successful
surveillance patrols.
According to the CBP Inspector General, the costs of operating a UAV are
more than double the costs of operating a manned aircraft. This is because UAVs
require a significant amount of logistical support and specialized operator and
maintenance training. Operating one UAV requires a crew of up to 20 support
personnel. Additionally, the use of UAVs has resulted in fewer alien
apprehensions per flight hour than the use of manned aircraft.18 The high
comparative costs of operating a UAV may be offset somewhat by their comparatively lower unit costs. The
unit cost of UAVs varies widely, from $350,000 for the Shadow UAV to $4.5 million for the Predator.19 In
contrast, the unit cost for manned aircraft used along the border varies from $8.6 million for the CBP
Blackhawk helicopters to $36 million for Immigration and Custom Enforcements P-3 airplanes. However,
the benefit of the Blackhawks relative low unit cost is offset by its lack of
endurance, given its maximum flight time of 2 hours and 18 minutes.20
Plan solves costly overstretch.

Testing of UAVs along the border has been limited. A robust program to test
multiple UAVs on the borders might ascertain where, how, and whether UAVs
should be deployed. Larger scale testing would provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the
limitations of UAVs would hinder their utility on the border. In the past, multiple UAVs piloted in
close proximity have experienced interference and loss of control between
the UAV and the remote pilot. In many cases, interference led to accidents . A
possible issue for Congress could include whether testing should be expanded before any decisions are
UAVs may, in the future, be

used to detect unauthorized entries, the fact remains that USBP agents must
be deployed to apprehend any aliens identified. A possible issue for Congress
could entail whether there are enough border patrol resources to investigate
all UAV identified targets.
made regarding the wide-scale use of UAVs along the border. While
No deficit collapse.
James K. Galbraith, 2011, professor at University of Texas at Austin, Lloyd
M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations at the LBJ School of
Public Affairs, Is the Federal Debt Unsustainable?, Levy Economics Institute
of Bard College, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_11_02.pdf
By general agreement, the federal budget is on an unsustainable path. Try typing the phrase into Google
News. When I did it, 19 of the first 20 hits referred to the federal debt.But what does this mean? The
phrase is often stated, but rarely defined clearly. One is led to suspect that some who use the phrase are
guided by vague fears, or even that they do not quite know what to be afraid of. After a brief discussion of
the major worries, this note will attempt to clarify one, and only one, critical issue: the actual behavior of
the public-debt-to-GDP ratio under differing economic assumptions through time. Some people
fear
that there may come a moment when the governments bond markets would
close, forcing a default or bankruptcy. But this betrays nonunderstanding of
both public finances and debt markets. The government controls the legaltender currency in which its bonds are issued and can always pay its bills with
cash. Apart (possibly) from the self-imposed politics of debt ceilings, a US government default on dollar
bonds is impossible, and the word bank- ruptcywhich is a court proceeding to protect private debtors
from their creditorsalso does not apply.A more plausible worry is inflation, alongside depreciation of the
dollar, either of which would reduce the real return on government bonds.1 There are reasons to fear
inflation: notably, the threat of rising energy prices in an oil-short world. And a lower dollar is not only
happening at the moment, its actual US government policy, at least with respect to one major currency:
theChinese renminbi. But neither oil-price inflation nor dollar devaluation constitutes default, and neither
would be intrinsi- cally unsustainable.Runaway inflation actually generated by the budget deficits is
harder to worry about. Except for commodities, the economy remains depressed, with nearly 9 percent
unemployment and falling home prices. Medical costs are a problembut theyre not a problem caused by
the runaway inflation scenario is based on a

fringe fearthat the money deficits create will magically translate into price increases without first
budget deficits. So far as I can tell,
having any effect on real activity. Or perhaps that the world will someday suddenly panic and dump the
dollar for the euro, yen, or renminbi. That would mean selling US bonds en masse to buy (say) Italian
bonds. It could happen, maybe, on some political planet far from this one.2A more prosaic problem with
the nonpartisan, professional economic forecasters of the

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), whose work is often cited as the benchmark proof
of an unsustainable path, do not expect it to happen. The CBO baseline resolutely
the runaway-inflation scenario is that
asserts that inflation will stay where it is now: around 2 percent. So one cant logically cite the inflation
threat and the CBO baseline at the same time. So far as I know, the CBO does not trouble itself to model
the exchange value of the dollar.What the
CBO does warn is that, under their assumptions, the
ratio of US federal debt
(held by the public) to GDP will rise relentlessly, passing 200

percent by 2035 and 300 percent by midcentury. Correspondingly, net interest payments on that debt
the CBO warns about

investor confidence and crowding out without actually building these
things into their model. Indeed, in their model this remarkable and
unprecedented ratio of debt to GDP goes right along with steady growth, full
employment, and low inflation, world without end! Why one should care about mere financial
would rise to exceed 20 percent of GDP. This certainly seems worrisome, and
ratios if they produce such goodand, according to the CBO model sustainable results is another
mystery the CBO does not explain.
DHS allocations
DHS appropriations are already allocated for domestic
drone use.
Congress has directed DHS to study the feasibility of using UAVs and to
implement the technology to surveil the border on numerous occasions. In the
108th Congress, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) included provisions
calling for a pilot program to study the use of these technologies, including UAVs, along the northern
The law also required DHS to present a plan within six months of
enactment to comprehensively monitor the southwest border with UAVs , and
to implement the plan as a pilot program as soon as funds are appropriated
for that purpose.12 The 2003 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136) required the President to issue a
border.
report on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for support of homeland security missions. In the 109th
DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-295) urged

DHS to work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to implement a
pilot program for the use of UAVs to surveil the northern border.13 Outside
CBP, UAVs have also been used by other agencies in domestic settings . The
NASA-sponsored Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology
(ERAST) program has produced civilian UAVs to monitor pollution and measure
ozone levels. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has been involved in developing Global
Congress, the conference report to the FY2007
Positioning Systems (GPS) and video camera guidance for using UAVs to locate and identify toxic
substances (Hugh McDaid, Smart Weapons (New York: Barnes and Nobles Books, 1997), p. 9.). Lastly,
the
Department of Energy recently announced in 2003 that it would test UAVs

outfitted with radiation sensors to detect potential nuclear reactor accidents
(Jefferson Morris, GoldenEye UAV to perform flight demo for DOE, Aerospace Daily, December 5, 2003.).
A Predator B UAV model was used as part of the Arizona Border Control Initiative, a multi-disciplinary
initiative that seeks to coordinate federal, state, and local authorities to control the Arizona border, until it
was destroyed in a crash on April 25, 2006. Congress required DHS to report on its findings related to this
The FY2006
DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-90) provided $35.2 million to establish a Northern
Border air wing and tasked the DHS Under Secretary of Border and
Transportation Security to devise a report outlining operational plans by which the Air and Marine
crash and other UAV mishaps by January 23, 2007, in the conference report to P.L. 109-295.
Operations Center (AMOC) would eliminate surveillance gaps affecting the northern border and western
United States. The act also provided $10 million for the use of UAVs. P.L. 108-334, the FY2006 Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, provided another $10 million for UAVs in border security. P.L. 109-295 provided
$20 million in FY2007 for DHSs use of UAVs. P.L. 110-161 provided $14.7 million in FY2008 for the
operation and maintenance of UAVs. In FY2009, Congress did not specify the amount of funding A&M
should put toward UAVs. The Supplemental Appropriations Bill of FY2010 (H.R. 4899) would include $32
million for the acquisition of two additional UAVs by A&M.

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About MSDI & Missouri State U..

Drones 1AC Inherency

When it comes to drones in the skies, however, and

In 2012, Congress passed and

federal drone regulation is considered thin , at best, and the basic

in question.11 It is thus not surprising that states and local

Drones are tentatively in use now, but are set to expand

Drones 1AC Proliferation advantage

drones successfully across the globe.

Lack of push for U.S. drone surveillance has so far

drone capacity, interested states

for Great Britain and possibly Italy.

U.S. aerospace companies have lobbied to relax the

regulations for drones, primarily those that conduct surveillance

So far, the United States

U.S. domestic drone policy has been fueling proliferation

U.S. role in drone proliferation is the direct result of

increasing expenditures for UAVs. Also fueling drone proliferation is UAV

Now is key to shape international norms - only the U.S.

America, power has an undeniable effect in establishing which norms are

norms have set precedents

literature on rule-oriented constructivism presents a powerful case that

Therefore, drones advocates must consider the possible unintended

the widespread use of drones by recent

administrations with little accountability

and the lack of any normative framework about their

could come to be seen as a serious strategic error and moral

Lack of legal reform and an increase in drone proliferation

In short, a world characterized by the

would undermine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict,

Escalation is likely too tempting to use once you acquire.

. Existing law permits the

drone technology poses a paradox that its defenders have not

and adept at minimizing civilian casualties, governments may be tempted

panic has already arisen that the

government will use drones to place the public under surveillance .

Many municipalities have

If police can launch

to shadow ordinary people without good

when drones eliminate

Since that check normally kept the

for using military force to chase down terrorists. But

casualties disappears, then nations might too eagerly attack , resulting

in blowback and retaliation

A strong rule of law serves as a framework to de-escalate

rule of law. The law we honor is the basis and

we talk about peace under

Men must either live together in

solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and

Drone proliferation increases the chance of terrorists

there also are

laptop of a captured militant.

Terrorists could commandeer UAVs to carry out chemical,

Terrorist development of biological agents is likely all

even the most

even though a terrorist groups ideology may seem in

Biological weapons culminate in a possibility of extinction

Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues ? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW

Drones 1AC Privacy advantage

The Court held that the defendants expectation of privacy in

Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, local police

the Court concluded that

Domestic drone expansion could push for miniaturization

increased domestic deployment of drones will eventually result in routine