Foucault Aff Starter Pack

Foucault Aff Starter Pack................................................................................................................................................1

1AC-Geneology..............................................................................................................................................................3
Contention 1 is the Panopticon...................................................................................................................................4
Contention 2 is solvency...........................................................................................................................................16
Case...............................................................................................................................................................................22
Inherency...................................................................................................................................................................23
A2-702 Reform.....................................................................................................................................................24
Internal Link-Imperialism/Panopticism....................................................................................................................27
More Impacts............................................................................................................................................................29
2AC-Biopolitics Generic......................................................................................................................................30
2AC-Surveillance=Extinction...............................................................................................................................34
2AC-Thought Colonization Impact......................................................................................................................35
Solvency....................................................................................................................................................................36
Policy Solvency Mechanism-HR 1466.................................................................................................................37
A2-Democracy Turn.................................................................................................................................................39
A2-Util......................................................................................................................................................................41
A2-Future Generations..........................................................................................................................................44
Heg Bad........................................................................................................................................................................45
2AC-Critique of Hegemony..................................................................................................................................46
2AC-Defense.........................................................................................................................................................49
2AC-Imperialism..................................................................................................................................................51
2AC-Not Sustainable............................................................................................................................................54
2AC-Risk-Heg......................................................................................................................................................57
2AC-Risk-Prolif....................................................................................................................................................58
A2-Middle East.....................................................................................................................................................59
A2-Prolif...............................................................................................................................................................63
A2-Realism...........................................................................................................................................................64
A2-Terrorism.........................................................................................................................................................66
A2-Transition Wars...............................................................................................................................................68
Procedurals....................................................................................................................................................................69
2AC-ASPEC.............................................................................................................................................................70
2AC-Framework.......................................................................................................................................................71
2AC-General.........................................................................................................................................................72
A2-Agonism..........................................................................................................................................................75
A2-Education........................................................................................................................................................78
A2-Limits..............................................................................................................................................................80
A2-Process Education...........................................................................................................................................81
A2-Roleplaying.....................................................................................................................................................82
A2-T-Version.........................................................................................................................................................83
2AC-Resolved...................................................................................................................................................84
2AC-Should.......................................................................................................................................................85
2AC-United States.............................................................................................................................................86
Disadvantages...............................................................................................................................................................87
2AC-Cyber Security DA...........................................................................................................................................88
2AC-Risk..............................................................................................................................................................89
2AC-Cybersecurity K...........................................................................................................................................92
2AC-Impact Defense............................................................................................................................................96
2AC-Elections DA....................................................................................................................................................98
2AC-Clinton..........................................................................................................................................................99
2AC-Warming Impact-D.....................................................................................................................................102
2AC-Warming Securitization..............................................................................................................................104
Critiques......................................................................................................................................................................105

2AC-Cap K.............................................................................................................................................................106
2AC-Foucauldian Resistance..............................................................................................................................107
2AC-Alt Fails......................................................................................................................................................109
2AC-Gibson-Graham..........................................................................................................................................114
2AC-No Root Cause...........................................................................................................................................115
2AC-Permutation-Generic..................................................................................................................................116
2AC-Permutation-Surveillance Specific.............................................................................................................118
2AC-Racism First...............................................................................................................................................120
Cap good 2ac environment..............................................................................................................................123
Cap good 2ac poverty......................................................................................................................................124
Cap Good - 2ac War............................................................................................................................................125
Cap good 2ac space..........................................................................................................................................127
Cap good Tech/Innovation 2AC......................................................................................................................129
Cap Inevitable.....................................................................................................................................................130
Cap good 2ac transition wars...........................................................................................................................132

1AC-Geneology

Contention 1 is the Panopticon

This story picks up in August 1898, when the Philippines served as the site of a social
experiment in the use of police as an instrument of state power.
McCoy 15-J.R. W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [Alfred W,
Policing the Imperial Periphery: The Philippine-American War and the Origins of U.S. Global Surveillance, Surveillance & Society, Vol 13, No
1, 2015, DKP]

From the first hours of the American colonial conquest in August 1898, the Philippines served as the
site of a social experiment in the use of police as an instrument of state power . During the next
decade, the U.S. Army plunged into a crucible of counterinsurgency , forming its first field intelligence unit that
combined voracious data gathering with rapid dissemination of tactical intelligence. At this
periphery of empire, freed from the constraints of courts, constitution, and civil society, the U.S.
imperial regime fused new technologies, the product of Americas first information revolution, to create a modern
police and fashion what was arguably the worlds first full surveillance state. A decade later, these
illiberal lessons percolated homeward through the invisible capillaries of empire to foster a
domestic security apparatus during the social crisis surrounding World War I. In the first weeks of war, a small cadre of Philippine
veterans established the Military Intelligence Division, creating U.S. counterintelligence as a unique fusion of federal security agencies and
citizen adjuncts that persisted for the next half century. Americas experimentation with policing at this periphery

of

its global power was thus seminal in the formation of a U.S. internal security apparatus with
extensive domestic surveillance.

Advancing through rapid stages of development, surveillance becomes the foundation for a
new global empireMcCoy continues
Over the past century, this same process has recurred, with striking similarities, as three U.S. pacification campaigns in Asia have dragged on for
a decade or more, skirting defeat if not disaster. During each of these attempts to subjugate a dense Asian rural society,

the U.S. military was pushed to the breaking point and responded by drawing together all extant
information resources, fusing them into an infrastructure of unprecedented power, and producing a new regime for
data managementcreating innovative systems for domestic surveillance and global control. Forged in these crucibles of
counterinsurgency, the U.S. militarys information infrastructure has advanced through three distinct
technological regimes: first, the manual during the Philippine War, 1898 1907; next, the computerized
in the Vietnam War, 196375; and, most recently, the robotic in Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001 to perhaps
2014. These campaigns have proved seminal in fostering a distinctive U.S. imperial epistemology that
privileges extrinsic, quantifiable data over deep cultural knowledge a defining attribute evident during Americas
computerized information regime in Vietnam and its robotic regime now taking form in space and cyberspace. At the level of
methodology, such historical analysis adds analytical depth to contemporary events, such as Edward
Snowdens revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA). Indeed, the salience, and significance, of
contemporary surveillance practices

explored in this article

can only be fully understood via an approach

that contextualizes their historical unfolding within the changing character of U.S. imperial
controls.

Through the historians habitual search for origins or watersheds, we can push the formation of the U.S. security apparatus back

another half century to the Philippine Insurrection and World War I, mitigating what one historian has called the debilitating liability (Walker
2009: xi) of the usual focus on World War II or the Vietnam War as seminal and the consequent omission of any antecedents (Immerman 2014: 9
19, 7688; Prados 1996: 1522; Moran and Murphy 2013: 114). Such a shift can also broaden our analysis to actors

beyond the FBI, showing that the U.S. surveillance state did not simply spring, Athena-like, full
grown from the head of J. Edgar Hoover (Weiner 2013: xvi, 3, 910, 13, 25, 4043, 6162, 8490, 195201, 26487). This
broader time frame indicates that, once introduced, potent covert controls such as surveillance prove
persistent, resisting reform and reviving in any crisis. Moreover, a comparison of colonial policing

and political scandal offers insight into the logic of current NSA surveillance of allied leaders
worldwide. With Clio thus whispering in our ear, we can sort through these billions of purloined bytes to discern nothing less than a
changing array of global power. At the level of theory, this history of U.S. intelligence compels a revision of Max Webers hypothesis
about the monopoly of physical force as the distinctive attribute of the modern state (Gerth and Mills 1946: 7778). The state is not
defined solely by a monopoly on raw physical force, but instead by its use of coercion to extract
information for heightened social control, simultaneously shaping mass consciousness and
penetrating private lives. At the start of the 19th century, as James C. Scott argues, the European state launched bureaucratic reforms
that rendered land and society legible by extrinsic means such as the metric standard for measurement and patronyms for conscriptiona
fundamental change but one that still left the state politically blind (Scott 1998: 13, 1172, 373). At the start of the 20th century, however,
America moved beyond such passive data collection to become the site of an accelerating information

revolution whose synergies represent a second, significant phase in the perfection of modern state
powerrendering its subjects not simply legible but permeable.

This century long history of technological surveillance goes beyond just invading privacy,
but is the cornerstone for insidious programs like COINTELPRO and political blackmail
McCoy 14-J.R. W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [Alfred W, Surveillance and Scandal: Weapons in an
Emerging Array for U.S. Global Power, Monthly Review 66.3 (Jul/Aug 2014): 70-81, DKP]
Over the past century, the

tension between state expansion and citizen-driven contraction has pushed U.S.
surveillance through a recurring cycle. First comes the rapid development of stunning
counterintelligence techniques under the pressures of fighting foreign wars; next, the unchecked, usually illegal,
application of those surveillance technologies back home behind a veil of secrecy; and finally,
belated, grudging reforms as press and public discover the outrageous excesses of the FBI, the CIA, or now, the
NSA. In this hundred-year span-as modern communications advanced from the mail to the telephone to the Internet-state
surveillance has leapt forward in technology's ten-league boots, while civil liberties have crawled
along behind at the snail's pace of law and legislation. The first and, until recently, most spectacular round of surveillance came during the First
World War and its aftermath. Fearing subversion by German-Americans after the declaration of war on Germany in 1917, the FBI and Military Intelligence swelled
from bureaucratic nonentities into all-powerful agencies charged with extirpating any flicker of disloyalty anywhere in America, whether by word or deed. Since only
9 percent of the country's population then had telephones, monitoring the loyalties of some 10 million German-Americans proved incredibly labor-intensive, requiring
legions of postal workers to physically examine some 30 million first-class letters and 350,000 badge-carrying vigilantes to perform shoe-leather snooping on
immigrants, unions, and socialists of every sort. During the 1920s, Republican conservatives, appalled by this threat to privacy, slowly began to curtail Washington's
security apparatus. This change culminated in Secretary of State Henry Stimson's abolition, in 1929, of the government's cryptography unit-the "black chamber"
famous for cracking delegates' codes at the Washington Naval Conference-with his memorable admonition, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."11 In the next
round of mass surveillance during the Second World War, the FBI discovered that the wiretapping of telephones produced an unanticipated by-product with
extraordinary potential for garnering political power: scandal. To block enemy espionage, President Franklin Roosevelt

gave the FBI control

over all U.S. counterintelligence and, in May 1940, authorized its director, J. Edgar Hoover, to engage in
wiretapping. What made Hoover a Washington powerhouse was the telephone. With 20 percent of the country and the entire political elite
by now owning phones, FBI wiretaps at local switchboards could readily monitor conversations by both suspected
subversives and the president's domestic enemies, particularly leaders of the isolationist movement such as aviator Charles Lindbergh
and Senator Burton Wheeler. Even with these centralized communications, however, the Bureau still needed massive manpower for its wartime counterintelligence. Its
staff soared from just 650 in 1924 to 13,000 by 1943. Upon taking office on Roosevelt's death in early 1945, Harry Truman soon learned the extraordinary extent of
FBI surveillance. "We want no Gestapo or Secret Police," Truman wrote in his diary that May. "FBI is tending in that direction. They are dabbling in sex-life scandals
and plain blackmail."12 After

a quarter of a century of warrantless wiretaps, Hoover built up a veritable

archive of sexual preferences among America's powerful and used it to shape the direction of U.S.
politics. He distributed a dossier on Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson's alleged
homosexuality to assure his defeat in the 1952 presidential elections, circulated audio tapes of Martin Luther
King, Jr.'s philandering, and monitored President Kennedy's affair with mafia mistress Judith Exner.n And these are just a
small sampling of Hoover's uses of scandal to keep the Washington power elite under his influence.
"The moment [Hoover] would get something on a senator," recalled William Sullivan, the FBI's chief of domestic intelligence
during the 1960s, "he'd send one of the errand boys up and advise the senator that 'we're in the course of an investigation, and we by chance
happened to come up with this data on your daughter... ' From that time on, the senator's right in his pocket." After his death, an
official tally found Hoover had 883 such files on senators and 722 more on congressmen.14 Armed with such sensitive information, Hoover gained the
unchecked power to dictate the country's direction and launch programs of his choosing, including
the FBI's notorious Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that illegally harassed the civil rights and antiVietnam War movements with black propaganda, break-ins, and agent provocateur-style

violence.15 At the end of the Vietnam War, Senator Frank Church headed a committee that investigated these excesses. "The intent of
COINTELPRO," recalled one aide to the Church investigation, "was to destroy lives and ruin reputations."16 These
findings prompted the formation, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, of "FISA courts" to approve in advance requests for future national security
wiretaps.17 Surveillance in the Age of the Internet Looking for new weapons to fight terrorism after 9/11, Washington turned to electronic surveillance, which has
since become integral to its strategy for exercising global power. In October 2001, not satisfied with the sweeping and extraordinary powers of the newly passed
PATRIOT Act, President Bush

ordered the NSA to commence covert monitoring of private communications

through the nation's telephone companies without requisite FISA warrants.18 Somewhat later, the agency began sweeping the
Internet for emails, financial data, and voice messaging on the tenuous theory that such "metadata" was "not constitutionally protected."19 In
effect, by penetrating the Internet for text and the parallel Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) for voice, the NSA had gained access to
much of the world's telecommunications. By the end of Bush's term in 2008, Congress had enacted laws that
not only retroactively legalized these illegal programs, but also prepared the way for NSA
surveillance to grow unchecked.20 ' Rather than restrain the agency, President Obama oversaw the expansion of its operations
in ways remarkable for both the sheer scale of the billions of messages collected globally and for the
selective monitoring of world leaders. What made the NSA so powerful was , of course, the Internet that
global grid of fiber optic cables that now connects 40 percent of all humanity.21 By the time Obama took office,
the agency had finally harnessed the power of modern telecommunications for near-perfect
surveillance. It was capable of both blanketing the globe and targeting specific individuals. For this secret mission, it had assembled the requisite
technological tool-kit-specifically, cable access points to collect data, computer codes to break encryption, data farms to store its massive digital harvest, and
supercomputers for nanosecond processing of what it was engorging itself on.22 By 2012, the

centralization via digitization of all voice,

video, textual, and financial communications into a worldwide network of fiber optic cables allowed the
NSA to monitor the globe by penetrating just 190 data hubs-an extraordinary economy of force for both political surveillance
and cyberwarfare.23 With a few hundred cable probes and computerized decryption, the NSA can now capture the kind of gritty details of private life that
J. Edgar Hoover so treasured and provide the sort of comprehensive coverage of populations once epitomized by secret police like East Germany's Stasi. And yet, such
comparisons only go so far. After all, once FBI agents had tapped thousands of phones, stenographers had typed up countless transcripts, and clerks had stored this
salacious paper harvest in floor-to-ceiling filing cabinets, Hoover still only knew about the inner-workings of the elite in one city: Washington, D.C. By contrast, the

marriage of the NSA's technology to the Internet's data hubs now allows the agency's 37,000
employees a similarly close coverage of the entire globe with just one operative for every 200,000
people on the planet.24

With the rise of fiscal austerity and war fatigue, NSA surveillance has become the new
frontier for American power projection, the rapid expansion of these technologies has
culminated in a global imperial panopticon and the surveillance industrial complex
Ball and Snider 13-*Professor of Organization @ the Open University Business School, director of the Surveillance Studies Network
**Professor Sociology @ Queens University [Kirstie, Laureen, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: A political economy of surveillance,
Introduction: The surveillance-industrial complex: towards a political economy of surveillance? 2013, pg. 1-5, DKP]

The origins of the surveillance- industrial complex Todays surveillance society (Lyon 2001) emerged from a
complex of military and corporate priorities, intimately linked with developments in the natural sciences, that were nourished
through the active and cold wars that marked the twentieth century. Two massive configurations of power state
and corporate have become the dominant players. Their evolution and growth was dialectical
rather than linear; each conglomeration of networks and actors was and is mutually constituted
from, by and through the other. This synergy was made possible by the complementarities of
government and corporate needs, and their mutual and complementary dependence on and faith in
the limitless capabilities of science which in turn depended on state and corporate funding. There is nothing
conspiratorial about this process: todays surveillance- industrial complex emerged in unpredictable, uncontrollable, non- linear ways as Haggerty and Ericson
(2006) remind us, there

were a multiplicity of causes and of effects. But it is not at all accidental that the
vast majority of the technologies that shape our lives today, the winners of thousands of internecine battles for supremacy, are
those that extend the social control of dominant institutions over designated others, making the
other visible in ever more novel ways (Mosco 1996, 2004; Williams 1961, 1980). Military involvement in surveillance technologies dates
back to warfare in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. At the beginning of World War I, the British Navy appointed physicist and engineer Alfred Ewing to
decipher Morse code intercepts picked up from the Germans at listening stations belonging to the Navy, Post Office, and the Marconi company (Jones 1989: 175). By
World War II a formal cryptography division was established at Bletchley Park. This assemblage of scientists and engineers was charged with (and eventually credited
for) breaking the codes used in the Enigma machine, the main German encoding and decoding system. Alan Turing, described as a brilliant mathematician, and his
colleagues at Bletchley Park were instrumental in establishing the theoretical underpinnings of machine intelligence and the thinking machine which eventually
became the computer (Jones 1978: 63). The logistics of warfare the need to supply and control large numbers of people in widely dispersed armies also spurred the
development of the computer. These wartime

connections the interpersonal, cultural, political and corporate networks created through this quest

laid the groundwork for cold war developments and post- war industrial applications. Controlling
external enemies, however, was not the only priority of the state and its elite supporters. From communists to
terrorists, from agitators and union members to demonstrators and yobs, documenting, predicting and altering the behaviour of
internal groups deemed problematic has been equally important to nation- states. With the loss of the colonies,
sending troublemakers to far- flung lands became difficult. And the visible, dramatic use of force historically associated with sovereign power
became increasingly counterproductive eighteenth- and nineteenth- century rabble (as designated by bourgeois elites), rather than being
awed and frightened by the public torture and dismemberment of lawbreakers, was equally likely to riot on behalf of the victim (Foucault 1977; Thompson 1975).
New ways to keep the lower orders in line were therefore urgently required. By

instilling the bourgeois conscience in the offender,

he (or she lower- class women and girls, particularly their sexuality, were primary targets of the new discipline) would learn new ways of
behaving and punish themselves for transgressions, thereby lessening the need for legitimacy threatening displays of coercion by the
state. Institutions and regimes to discipline and train lawbreakers, the young and the mentally disordered became popular. As Coleman and McCahill (2010: 228) have
argued, surveillance

does not merely react to crime, it creates truth regimes and constructs target
populations. To do this, many traditional working- class pursuits, both leisure activities such as gambling and cock- fighting and
subsistence behaviours such as gleaning (taking the crops left on landowners fields after harvest) were criminalised. A number of traditional,
formerly accepted forms of getting by such as poaching became capital offences (the Black Acts, see Thompson 1975; Hay et al. 1976).
Medical and legal authorities constructed elaborate scientific theories to explain the promiscuous
behaviour, low intelligence or violent tendencies of criminals, prostitutes (and other categories of the weaker sex)
and the mentally ill (Hooton 1939; Pollak 1950; Snider 2003). New discursive categories singled out a weak and
morally deficient criminal class. Surveillance through the discipline of statistics as well as hands- on (often literally) techniques
practiced by the newly established authorities, in institutions and on the streets, made certain populations more visible,
distinguished them from law- abiding or respectable working- class folk, and singled them out
for particular moral and legal sanctions. Beliefs in the imminent breakdown of elite control grew out of the increased mobility and
urbanization created by industrial capitalism. People rooted for generations in village and parish, bound by
traditional, religious, patriarchal and agrarian controls, were persuaded or forced by destitution, famine, or
expulsion from their traditional lands to move into burgeoning factory towns and cities. As large populations of poor, often
desperate men and women gathered in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century English cities, the religious, political and propertied elites who dominated, enforced and
benefited from the dominant social order grew fearful. As these cities became havens for theft, prostitution, gambling and drunkenness, pastors and first- wave
feminists worried about children running wild, about the morality and sexuality of women and girls. Then (and also now), as Hardt and Negri argue, the concept of
property and the defence of property remain[ed] the foundation of every modern political constitution (2009: 15). Surveillance,

therefore, is the
sociotechnical means through which the logic of juridical concepts articulate with social relations of
commodity production, finding its expression in systems of public and private law. In a myriad of ways,
what Hardt and Negri term the republic of property (2009: 421) is facilitated through the institutional
goals and biopolitical dimensions of modernity involving surveillance mechanisms. In addition to
statemilitary roots, the surveillance- industrial complex has also been shaped by commerce, the
life- blood of the free enterprise capitalist state. Business elites were key architects and cheerleaders in the
statemilitaryindustrial networks that funded, designed, legitimized and built the machineries of surveillance from the earliest days on.
Corporations such as Marconi, General Electric, General Dynamics and their nineteenth- century predecessors were the go- to players in
the military machine, states depended on them to manufacture weapons and manage the logistics of advanced warfare. This did not change when the
locus of state power shifted west after World War II and the American empire replaced the British. The cold war and Russias successful launch of Sputnik in 1957
injected billions into the coffers of corporate conglomerates such as IBM, GE, Sperry Rand, and Raytheon, most of it channelled through the Pentagons Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Kline et al. 2003: 85).2 Lucrative military contracts enticed
scientists and engineering laboratories at Harvard, Stanford, UCLA and MIT to investigate the potential of artificial intelligence and to develop faster, smaller
computers separate from a mainframe (Kline et al. 2003). But business

was also keen to develop technologies to control its

own designated other, its labour force. From nineteenth- century Taylorist time- motion studies to the computer- monitored electronic
workplace of today (Ball and Wilson 2000), private enterprise has been a prime architect of surveillance. Today it is possible for corporations
to see (and therefore monitor and control) virtually every act of low- level employees in digitised factories,
warehouses and call centres (Snider 2002). Call centre, warehouse and assembly line workers are monitored to the last keystroke and bathroom
break (Ehrenreich 1998); bank and financial sector workers are made knowable and to some extent
controllable by disciplinary matrices woven into [the] discourse of computer- based performance
monitoring (Ball and Wilson 2000: 17). The burgeoning domain of cyberspace, created through the mutual
constitution of digitisation and commodification (Mosco 2004: 156), has also been developed to maximise
its potential as a marketing opportunity. As written records that once languished in separate corporate and state bureaucracies were
digitised, they became mobile, transferable across and between private and public institutions, giving business the ability to know the customer as thoroughly as the
employee. Customers,

citizens, employees and criminals could all be reconstructed through the

aggregation of data collected in bits of information from a myriad of sources. This information could then be
disassembled and reassembled to suit the priorities and interests of the institution involved. The computerized dataveillance made
possible through this integration of surveillance capabilities (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 4) has become a key
component of governance and of commerce. Indeed, dataveillance on the Web allows the entire communication process to be turned into
a commodity, packaged and sold. Every thought, gene, scientific advance and emotion, the desire for entertainment, education, or solace, can be packaged and sold to
increasingly fragmented audiences. Cyberspace and its many spin- offs, like the technological developments that preceded it, has been touted as beneficial,
progressive, inevitable and finally inescapable (Mosco 2004: 1501).Todays

state-subsidised surveillance- industrial complex,

then, was designed to facilitate conquest and control over those categorised as the other, groups
seen as problematic by the elites developing and sponsoring technological growth. And as Mosco (2004) points
out, although we, the employee, consumer and citizen, can use these technologies in a number of ways , for a variety of
purposes, the basic choices about deployment and anticipated use have already been built into the
design of hardware and software (Feenberg 1999). The institutional goals of the scientists at Bletchley, and at similar research clusters in the United States and
Germany, were to win the war. These scientists were not funded to develop technologies to maximise creativity, facilitate cooperative decision- making or fulfil human
needs for shelter and sustenance. Thus it is hardly surprising that the

resulting scientific and technological advances focused

on developing new and better methods of controlling and punishing the designated other. And this
is a quest they were willing to fund. Guided by focused questions from their funders, money given with . . . expectations of a [specific] return
(Smart 1992: 44), highly trained scientists, interacting in networks of complex, multifaceted organisations,
produced the surveillance-industrial complex we see today.

AND, surveillance provides the foundation for colonial dominationblackmail, spying,

and threats are used to force foreign leaders under US control
McCoy 14-J.R. W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [Alfred W, Surveillance and Scandal: Weapons in an
Emerging Array for U.S. Global Power, Monthly Review 66.3 (Jul/Aug 2014): 70-81, DKP]
In the Obama years, the first

signs have appeared that NSA surveillance will use the information gathered to
traffic in scandal, much like Hoover's FBI once did. In September 2013, the New York Times reported that the NSA has, since 2010, applied
sophisticated software to create "social network diagramsunlock as many secrets about
individuals as possible...and pick up sensitive information like regular calls to a psychiatrist's office
[or] late-night messages to an extramarital partner." 25 Through the expenditure of $250 million annually under its Sigint Enabling
Project, the NSA has stealthily penetrated all encryption designed to protect privacy. "In the future, superpowers will be made or
broken based on the strength of their cryptanalytic programs," reads a 2007 NSA document. "It is
the price of admission for the U.S. to maintain unrestricted access to and use of cyberspace." 26
Imperial proconsuls, from ancient Rome to modern America, have gained both the intelligence and aura of
authority necessary for dominion over alien societies by collecting knowledge-routine, intimate, or
scandalous-about foreign leaders. The importance, and challenge, for hegemons to control obstreperous
local elites cannot be overstated. During its pacification of the Philippines after 1898, for instance, the
U.S. colonial regime subdued the contentious Filipino leaders via pervasive policing that swept up both
political intelligence and personal scandal.27 And that, of course, was just what J. Edgar Hoover was doing in Washington during the
1950s and '60s. Indeed, the mighty British Empire, like all empires, was a global tapestry woven out of political ties to
local leaders or "subordinate elites"-from Malay sultans and Indian maharajas to Gulf sheiks and West African tribal chiefs. As historian
Ronald Robinson once observed, the British Empire spread around the globe for two centuries through the collaboration of these local leaders and then unraveled, in
just two decades, when that collaboration turned to "non-cooperation."28 After

rapid decolonization during the 1960s transformed half-aleaders soon found themselves the subordinate elites
of a spreading American global imperium. Washington suddenly needed the sort of private
information that could keep such figures in line. Surveillance of foreign leaders provides world powers-Britain
then, America now-with critical information for the exercise of global hegemony. Such spying gave special
penetrating power to the imperial gaze, to that sense of superiority necessary for dominion over
others. It also provided operational information on dissidents who might need to be countered with
covert action or military force; political and economic intelligence so useful for getting the jump on
allies in negotiations; and, perhaps most important of all, scurrilous information about the derelictions of
leaders useful in coercing their compliance. In late 2013, the New York Times reported that, when it came to spying
on global elites, there were "more than 1,000 targets of American and British surveillance in recent
dozen European empires into one hundred new nations, their national

years," reaching down to mid-level political actors in the international arena .29 Revelations from Edward
Snowden's cache of leaked documents indicate that the NSA has monitored leaders in some thirtyfive nations worldwide-including Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, Mexican presidents Felipe Caldern and Enrique Pea Nieto, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, and Indonesia's president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Count in as well, among so many other operations, the monitoring of
"French diplomatic interests" during the June 2010 UN vote on Iran sanctions and "widespread
surveillance" of world leaders during the G-20 summit meeting at Ottawa in June 2010.30 Apparently, only members
of the historic "Five Eyes" signals-intelligence alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) remain exempt-at
least theoretically-from NSA surveillance.31 Such secret intelligence about allies can obviously give Washington a significant diplomatic advantage. During
U.N. wrangling over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2002-2003, for example, the NSA intercepted SecretaryGeneral Kofi Anan's conversations and monitored the "Middle Six"-third world nations on the
Security Council-offering what were, in essence, well-timed bribes to win votes.32 The NSA's
deputy chief for regional targets sent a memo to the agency's Five Eyes allies asking "for insights as to how
membership is reacting to on-going debate regarding Iraq, plans to vote on any related resolutions" and "the whole
gamut of information that could give U.S. policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to
U.S. goals."33 More recently, in 2010, Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., asked the NSA for
assistance in monitoring the Security Council debate over sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.
Through NSA monitoring of the missions of four permanent and four transient members-Bosnia, Gabon, Nigeria, and Uganda-the NSA, said
Rice, "gave us an upper hand in negotiations...and provided information about various countries' red lines," winning approval
of the U.S. position by twelve of the fifteen delegations. Apart from such special assignments, the NSA has routinely
penetrated, according to Snowden's documents, the missions or embassies of at least seventeen nations.34 Indicating
Washington's need for incriminating information in bilateral negotiations, the State Department
pressed its Bahrain embassy in 2009 for details, damaging in an Islamic society, on the crown princes, asking: "Is there
any derogatory information on either prince? Does either prince drink alcohol? Does either one use drugs?"35 Indeed, in October 2012 an NSA official identified as
"DIRNSA," or Director General Keith Alexander,

proposed the following for countering Muslim radicals: "[Their]

vulnerabilities, if exposed, would likely call into question a radicalizer's devotion to the jihadist
cause, leading to the degradation or loss of his authority." The agency suggested such
vulnerabilities could include "viewing sexually explicit material online" or "using a portion of the
donations they are receiving... to defray personal expenses." The NSA document identified one potential target as a "respected
academic" whose "vulnerabilities" are "online promiscuity."36 Just as the Internet has centralized communications, so it has moved most commercial sex into
cyberspace. With an estimated 25 million salacious sites worldwide and a combined 10.6 billion page views per month in 2013 at the five top sex sites, online
pornography has become a global business; by 2006, in fact, it generated $97 billion in revenue.37 With

countless Internet viewers visiting

porn sites and almost nobody admitting it, the NSA has easy access to the embarrassing habits of
targets worldwide, whether Muslim militants or European leaders. According to James Bamford, author of several authoritative books on the agency,
"The NSA's operation is eerily similar to the FBI's operations under J. Edgar Hoover in the 1960s
where the bureau used wiretapping to discover vulnerabilities, such as sexual activity, to
'neutralize' their targets."38 The ACLU's Jameel Jaffer has warned that a president might "ask the NSA to use the
fruits of surveillance to discredit a political opponent, journalist, or human rights activist. The NSA
has used its power that way in the past and it would be nave to think it couldn't use its power that
way in the future."39 Even President Obama's recently convened executive review of the NSA admitted: "in light of the lessons of our own history... at
some point in the future, high-level government officials will decide that this massive database of
extraordinarily sensitive private information is there for the plucking." 40 Indeed, whistleblower Edward Snowden has
accused the NSA of actually conducting such surveillance. In a December 2013 letter to the Brazilian people, he wrote, "They even keep track of who is having an
affair or looking at pornography, in case they need to damage their target's reputation."41 If Snowden is right, then one

key goal of NSA

surveillance of world leaders is not U.S. national security, but political blackmail -as it has been since 1898.
Such digital surveillance has tremendous potential for scandal, as anyone who remembers New York Governor Elliot
Spitzer's forced resignation in 2008 after routine phone taps revealed his use of escort services; or, to take another obvious example, the
ouster of France's budget minister Jrme Cahuzac in 2013 following wire taps that exposed his secret Swiss bank account.42 As always, the
source of political scandal remains sex or money, both of which the NSA can track with remarkable
ease. Given the acute sensitivity of executive communications, world leaders have reacted sharply to reports of NSA surveillance-with Chancellor Merkel
demanding Five-Eyes-exempt status for Germany, the European Parliament voting to curtail sharing of bank data with Washington, and Brazil's President Rousseff
canceling a U.S. state visit and contracting a $560 million satellite communications system to free her country from the U.S.-controlled version of the Internet.43

AND, disciplinary power extends beyond punishment, the NSA uses panoptic surveillance
to foster a culture of self-regulation and self-discipline that crushes activism
ONeill 14-Joint Programme Director - Contextual Studies @ the University of Wales [Timi, Michel Foucault predicts the NSA's cyber Panopticon, Pg. 7-9,
DKP]
The first thing we should highlight in our attempt to see the actions of the NSA through the eyes of Foucault should be look at the work of Jeremy Bentham and his
Panopticon prison. This will help us later transfigure this physical prison into something much more ethereal and cyber; i.e. the Internet. The utilitarian Jeremy
Bentham (17481832) created plans to develop a circular prison that would act as a fairer and more just way of incarcerating prisoners. He was also at the forefront of
creating a system whereby punishment would lead to individuals within society actively altering their behaviour in order to avoid punishment and imprisonment. In
this thought, he developed plans for his Panopticon

prison (Fig.1 below). Although he tried to have prisons such as these built in both Great Britain and

Russian, none were erected in the UK. These prisons were designed to maximise surveillance of prisoners and would led, he argued
to make prison control safer, more effective, more humane, and efficient by increasing discipline while reducing staff resources required to maintain it. Prisoners in
the panopticon would work rather than sitting idle, and, in the process, would not only learn the benefits of discipline but also make a profit for the prison itself.

How does this help us understand the current issue of the NSA, PRISM and the Internet? This requires us
to look at the architecture of the Internet. Now granted, the internet does not have a centre as envisioned in Benthams prison, but it does have ISPs and companies
who monitor (albeit they say loosely) internet traffic and management of metadata. What

we saw with the actions of the NSA could

be seen as the prison guards making us aware of the power of surveillance and their ability to watch
and direct our behaviour; i.e. our patterns and content of our internet searches and telephone calls. Unlike, Benthams aims however, the
effects of such surveillance do little to promote a fairer society; instead it breeds distrust, paranoia
and panic. This could be seen as far as the Kremlin where President Putin has issued warnings of the power and function of the Internet, However Moscow
has recently changed its tune, with Mr Putin branding the internet an ongoing "CIA project". 30 This is mirrored in the writings of Foucault where he argued that the
Panopticon, or in our case the internet was used as a way to change peoples behaviour, the

major effect of the Panopticon [is to] to

induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power. 31 This makes us see how through observation, the body and mind of the individual is
constantly under interrogation. We need only see how users of facebook curtail their behaviour and body image through the eyes of others.
This impacts on the bio-political aspects of surveillance, but also and perhaps more importantly it impacts on the way we
use the Internet to seek questions to issues that perhaps runs the risk of establishing the dominant vision of society. This link to
power is at the heart of the relevancy of Foucault and the actions of the NSA; In his famous Discipline and Punish , Foucault argues that we live
in a world where the state exercises power in the same fashion as the Panopticons guards. Foucault
called it disciplinary power; the basic idea is that the omnipresent fear of being watched by the state or judged according to prevailing social
norms caused people to adjust the way they acted and even thought without ever actually punished. People had become self-regulating
agents, people who voluntarily changed who they were to fit social and political expectations
without any need for actual coercion. 32 In this way, we could argue that the NSA wanted to be seen as being
caught out so that the panic of observation or surveillance would produce a radical movement
towards self-regulating and docile bodies a situation that would in many ways suit the needs
and demands of an elite and their exercise in control, When one undertakes to correct a prisoner, someone who has been
sentenced, one tries to correct the person according to the risk of relapse, of recidivism, that is to say according to what will very soon be called dangerousness that
is to say, again, a mechanism of security. 33 In this way, we could see that Foucault warns us to see the controversy as one where that the historically determined
subject/self is the real victim in the cyber attacks. By attempting to mould individuals through surveillance and self-regulation, it is possible that we are in the middle

We're
an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality - judiciously, as you will of a needed reset of individuals in a new age. This is supported, perhaps in the following un-sourced quotation from a George Bush jnr political aide;

we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just
study what we do. 34 In a previous quotation, the use of the word security is one overplayed by western politicians. Whether it be the chemical weapons of Assad or
the actions of ISIS, the national security card is played regularly. In this sense, Foucaults

idea of surveillance help us see the NSA

as prison guards watching over a yet undisciplined populace. This is indeed a scary thought and one that should be seen
within the dynamics of a battle for the control of power within society. The West prides itself on freedoms and ideas of enlightened thinking, but also politicians know

Sovereignty is exercised within the

borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised
over a whole population. 35 Security here is quite easily be replaced by the adjective power. When power is exercised over
the population, we find ourselves in a position of seeing the state in many ways as a hidden fascist
elite, hell-bent on controlling the mind, bodies and actions of an enslaved prison populace. one of the
characteristic traits of our society. Its a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, in the form of
control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is the moulding and
transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. 3
that with such freedoms comes a potential crisis in control, legitimacy and in many ways, sovereignty;

10

The impact is the normalization of militant surveillance that perpetuates totalitarian

violence, Henry Giroux writes in 2014Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished
Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout, February 10,
2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward Snowden about government
lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a revitalized urgency and relevance
to George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984. Orwell offered his readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which
privacy as a civil virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. Orwell
was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious assault. But the right to privacy pointed to something more

sinister than the violation of individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy
became a moral and political principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of an
emerging totalitarian state. As important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century totalitarianism
and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a brilliant but limited metaphor for
mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism now characteristic of
the first decades of the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn has indicated, "Orwell never could have imagined
that the National Security Agency (NSA) would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every
day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails, file transfers, and live chats from the social media
we use."1
*TEXT OMITTED BETWEEN CARDS*

The point of no return, he later continues, is not strictly confined to illegal and violent
actions, but in the normalization of surveillance as part of the fabric of a modern civil
society via a war on debate and dissent
The point of no return in the emergence of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus is not strictly confined to the task of
archiving immense pools of data collection to be used in a number of illegal ways.18 It is in creating a
culture in which surveillance becomes trivialized, celebrated, and legitimated as reasonable and unquestioned
behavior. Evidence that diverse forms of public pedagogy are sanctioning the security state is on full
display in post-Orwellian America, obvious in schools that demand that students wear radio chips
so they can be tracked.19 Such anti-democratic projects are now also funded by billionaires like Bill Gates who push for the use of biometric bracelets
to monitor students' attentiveness in classrooms.20 The normalization of surveillance is also evident in the actions of
giant Internet providers who use social messaging to pry personal information from their users. The reach of the
surveillance culture can also be seen in the use of radio chips and GPS technologies used to track a person's movements across time and space. At the same time,

cultures of surveillance work hard to trivialize the importance of a massive surveillance

environment by transforming it into a source of entertainment. This is evident in the popularity of realty TV shows such as
"Big Brother" or "Undercover Boss," which turn the event of constant surveillance into a voyeuristic pleasure.21 The atrophy of democratic
intuitions of culture and governance are evident in popular representations that undermine the
meaning of democracy as a collective ethos that unconditionally stands for social, economic, and political rights.22 One example can be
found in Hollywood films that glorify hackers such as those in the Matrix trilogy, or movies that celebrate professionalized modern spying and the government agents
using their omniscient technological gizmos to fight terrorists and other forces of evil. What

is lost in the culture of surveillance is that

spying and the unwarranted collection of personal information from people who have not broken the law in the name of
national security and for commercial purposes is a procedure often adopted by totalitarian states. The surveillance state with
its immense data mining capabilities represents a historical rupture from traditional notions of modernity with its emphasis on enlightenment, reason, and the social
contract. The older modernity held up the ideals of justice, equality, freedom, and democracy, however flawed. The investment in public goods was seen as central to a
social contract that implied that all citizens should have access to those provisions, resources, institutions, and benefits that expanded their sense of agency and social
responsibility. The

new modernity and its expanding surveillance net subordinates human needs, public
goods, and justice to the demands of commerce and the accumulation of capital, at all costs. The
contemporary citizen is primarily a consumer and entrepreneur wedded to the belief that the most desirable features of human behavior are rooted in a "basic tendency
towards competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested behavior which is the central fact of human social life."23 Modernity

is now driven by
the imperatives of a savage neoliberal political and economic system that embrace what Charles Derber and June Sekera
call a "public goods deficit" in which "budgetary priorities" are relentlessly pushed so as to hollow out the welfare state and drastically reduce social provisions as part

11

of a larger neoliberal counter revolution to lower the taxes of the rich and mega-corporations while selling off public good to private interests.24 Debates

about the meaning and purpose of the public and social good have been co-opted by a politics of
fear, relegating notions of the civic good, public sphere, and even the very word "public" to the status of a liability, if not a pathology.25 Fear has lost its social
connotations and no longer references fear of social deprivations such as poverty, homelessness, lack of health care, and other fundamental conditions of agency.

Fear is now personalized, reduced to an atomized fear that revolves around crime, safety,
apocalypse, and survival. In this instance, as the late Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith once warned, modernity now
privileges "a disgraceful combination of 'private opulence and public squalor.' " 26 This is not surprising given
the basic elements of neoliberal policy, which as Jeremy Gilbert indicates, include the: privatization of public assets, contraction and centralization of democratic
institutions, deregulation of labor markets, reductions in progressive taxation, restrictions on labor organization, labor market deregulation, active encouragement of
competitive and entrepreneurial modes of relation across the public and commercial sectors.27 Under

the regime of neoliberal capitalism,

the expansion of government and corporate surveillance measures become synonymous with new
forms of governance and an intensification of material and symbolic violence. 28 Rather than wage a war on
terrorists, the neoliberal security state wages a war on dissent in the interest of consolidating class
power. How else to explain the merging of corporate and state surveillance systems updated with the most
sophisticated shared technologies used in the last few years to engage in illicit counterintelligence operations, participate in
industrial espionage29 and disrupt and attack pro-democracy movements such as Occupy and a range of other
nonviolent social movements protesting a myriad of state and corporate injustices. 30 This type of illegal spying
in the interest of stealing industrial secrets and closing down dissent by peaceful protesters has less to do with national security than it has to do with mimicking the
abuses and tactics used by the Stasi in East Germany during the Cold War. How else to explain why many law-abiding citizens "and those with dissenting views
within the law can be singled out for surveillance and placed on wide-ranging watch lists relating to terrorism."31 Public

outrage seems to
disappear, with few exceptions, as the state and its corporate allies do little to protect privacy rights, civil
liberties and a culture of critical exchange and dissent. Even worse, they shut down a culture of
questioning and engage in forms of domestic terrorism. State violence in this case becomes the preferred
antidote to the demanding work of reflection, analysis, dialogue and imagining the points of views
of others. The war against dissent waged by secret counterintelligence agencies is a mode of
domestic terrorism in which, as David Graeber has argued, violence is "often the preferred weapon of the stupid."32
Modernity in this instance has been updated, wired and militarized. No longer content to play out
its historical role of a modernized panopticon, it has become militarized and a multilayered source
of insecurity, entertainment and commerce. In addition, this new stage of modernity is driven not only
by the need to watch but also the will to punish. Phone calls, emails, social networks and almost every other vestige of electronic
communication are now being collected and stored by corporate and government organizations such as the NSA and numerous other intelligence agencies. Snowden's
exposure of the massive reach of the surveillance state with its biosensors, scanners, face recognition technologies, miniature drones, high speed computers, massive
data mining capabilities and other stealth technologies made visible "the stark realities of disappearing privacy and diminishing liberties."33 But the NSA and the
other 16 intelligence agencies are not the only threat to privacy, freedom and democracy. Corporations now have their own intelligence agencies and data mining
offices and use these agencies and new surveillance technologies largely to spy on those who question the abuses of corporate power. The emergence of fusion centers
exemplifies how power is now a mix of corporate, local, federal and global intelligence agencies, all sharing information that can be used by various agencies to stifle
dissent and punish pro-democracy activists. What is clear is that this combination of gathering and sharing information often results in a lethal mix of anti-democratic
practices in which surveillance now extends not only to potential terrorists but to all law-abiding citizens. Within this

sinister web of secrecy,

suspicion, state-sanctioned violence and illegality, the culture of authoritarianism thrives and poses a
dangerous threat to democratic freedoms and rights. It also poses a threat to those outside the U nited States who, in the name
of national security, are subject to "a grand international campaign with drones and special
operations forces that is generating potential terrorists at every step." 34 Behind this veil of
concentrated power and secrecy lies not only a threat to privacy rights but the very real threat of
violence on both a domestic and global level.
Furthemore, The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. Minority groups
represent the bulk of those targeted
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP] ellipses
included in original article

The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. ... Welfare recipients ... are more
vulnerable to surveillance because they are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate
target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor women, especially women of color, as

12

inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare
programs that track their financial and social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of
biometric data collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people are
subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and
observation in law enforcement, the welfare system, and the low-wage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct
forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the
groups often targeted by traditional and new forms of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either
being a threat to authority, reject the consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal
capitalism. The political, class and racial nature of suppression has a long history in the U nited States
and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of state violence by
making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security.

Specifically, the constant targeting of people of color creates what DuBois calls double
consciousness upon where people of color must self-identify as criminalized in order to
maintain the dream of citizenship
Deflem 8-prof of sociology @ University of South Carolina [Mathieu, Citizenship, hyper-surveillance, double-consciousness: racial profiling
as panoptic governance, Surveillance and Governance: Crime Control and Beyond, 2008, pp. 254-255, aps]

Any examination of surveillance and governance concerns in a racial state such as the United States must
include the contemporary phenomenon of racial profiling. This chapter examines how the personal experiences of people of
color in racialized encounters with law enforcement go well beyond the local, micro-level
association focused on in the current racial profiling literature. My respondents clearly reflect on
these encounters as racializing and criminalizing experiences with the state that are experienced as watershed
moments in their lives. The overarching theme that emerges from their narratives is one of a break from citizenship and the liberty and justice rights
frame that encompasses it. In other examinations of how race operates in the criminal justice system, this process is referred to as an attenuation of citizenship
(Pettit & Western, 2004). Western (2006, p. 193), in his examination of the role and effects of status differentials in regard to incarceration, views

the
effects of race and socioeconomic status as an evolutionary aspect of African-American
citizenship because of the retrenchment of citizenship that results from disenfranchisement
resulting from incarceration (of which racial profiling is a potential precursor to). Yet, as shown by the active and frequent engagement of the
justice and liberty rights frame that many of my respondents engage, my respondents continue to make claim to the citizenship
realm and resist denial of full citizenship by the racial state. Writing in the late 1800s, DuBois (1986, p. 364)
described this same struggle to reconcile the warring ideals of minority identity and citizen
identity imposed by the racial state with the self-identified sense of being a full citizen. In this regard, the
current study finds that for people of color, the racialized traffic stop is deeply contextualized within a welldeveloped base of knowledge about how race operates in the United States. This goes to the DuBoisian perspective that
people of color possess insight into the inner workings of the social world they know the souls of white folks to a greater
extent than Whites understand the experiences of people of color. My respondents indicate that they assess their
encounters with the state by comparing similarly-situated conditions with Whites or through a process of elimination that racial status is the motivating factor in their
being stopped, among other things. Indeed, many, though not all, respondents articulated initial reluctance to view a traffic stop (and the criminal justice system
generally) as raced, having adopted and believed in much of the liberty and justice frame that orients our national, and specifically criminal justice, discourse. This

classic construction of living in both worlds is very much a part of the contemporary experience of
people of color. Strides that have been made in the years following DuBoiss 1897 treatise may have dulled the demarcation of citizenship that existed
in DuBoiss day, but those strides remain outweighed by the restricted substance of citizenship for communities of color. As Foucault argues,
surveillance as a tool of governance by the state is a form of disciplinary power that is: exercised
through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of
compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It
is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the
disciplined individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power , instead of
emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. (Foucault,
1977, p. 187) Foucaults conception of panopticonism, as argued earlier, is an appropriate backdrop for
contextualizing racialized traffic stops and the more general idea of the criminalization of

13

communities of color. The obvious connection concerns the foundation of racial profiling processes: the omnipresent eye of the
state on communities of color, especially young minority males. The Panopticon effect, as discussed, also
includes a permanent change in the individual under its effects to where views of the state (as
embodied by the panoptic processes) become alienated from previously neutral or even positive standpoints. The racial
surveillance and governance that manifests in racial profiling practices complicates the notion that surveillance as a tool of
the state is primarily about crime control. These processes are fundamentally about racialized social control that exploit societys emphasis on particularly forms of
behavior in

order to maintain racial ordering spatially, ideologically, and politically. Ultimately, while my
respondents acknowledge that racial governance via panoptic surveillance processes limits full
citizenship, they still engage the promise of citizenship by self-identifying as such and resisting the
criminal identity imposed upon them by the state.

Racism and biopolitics are co-constitutive, while certain populations become marked as
worthy of preservation, others become disposable commodities
Mendieta 02-[Eduardo Prof. & Chair of Philosophy at SUNY at Stony Brook To make live and to let die Foucault on Racism Meeting of
the Foucault Circle APA Central Division Meeting Chicago, April 25th2002,
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/docs/foucault.pdf]

The narrative developed by Foucault in these lectures is more fractious and detailed that I am portraying. The canvass that Foucault is panting in these lectures
concerns not just the wars that gave birth to our society, and its novel forms of knowledge, it also concerns something which I find fascinating, and provocative: the
invention of a people. To counter and challenge the power of the invaders, as well as the power of popes and kings, and using the narratives to unmask their acts of
usurpation and tyranny, elements within a social body begin to appeal to the ideas of a people, which then refers to a race, which then refers to a populations, and then
is enshrined in the anodyne notion of society. From a Foucauldian perspective, the

objects of scientific study are partly constituted

by the disciplines that seek to study them. So, just as psychiatry produces the madman, and
sexology the sexual deviant, and so on, political theory in conjunction with historical discourse,
produces a people. But the discourse of political rationality that emerged since the sixteenth century does not secrete a univocal idea of a people. As
the political rationality of the modern state develops and grows in intensity, as it augments its
claims to power, a people becomes a nation, becomes a population, becomes a biological
phenomenon to be tended by all the sciences at the service of the state. Analogously to how sexuality
became the locus of the production of control, insofar as it was the pivot of interaction between
individuals and their surrounding social environment, race also became the pivot around which the
biopower state came to exert its claims, so as to be able to produce certain power effects. What is
provocative here is the link that Foucault establishes between the emergence of biopower and the constitution of something that we have now become accustomed to
calling society, by which we in fact mean a population, a people, a particular nation. For Foucault the emergence of political rationality is directly linked to the
constitution of the object over which it must act. And here I am able to foreground one of the central lessons of these lectures, namely that political theory has to
attend to the emergence of political rationality in terms not of its rationality, or claims to reason, but in terms of its modalities of operation. Behind political rationality
does not stand reason, or rather, reason is not the alibi of political rationality; instead, political rationality has to do with the horizon of its enactment. If we accept that
Foucault is a historical nominalist, and he is a nominalist through and through, in the way that Rorty reads him, and correctly I would argue, then there is no reason
behind political power. Political power itself cannot be mystified. There is no power without the horizon of its enactment and the vehicles of its transmission. This is
still a misleading way of putting. The effects produced by a certain way of organizing the social body, of studying it, of policing it, of taking care of it, of making sure
that its health and protection are attended to in the most detailed and careful ways possible, produce a confrontation of forces, whose momentary stalemates, clashes,
subjugations and dispersal, are summarized in the name of power. And that power is the power over life. The

political rationality of the

modern state is above all a rationality grounded in the way it tends to the life of the population. The
power of the biopolitical state is a regulation of life, a tending, a nurturing and management of the
living. The political rationality of the modern total state is management of the living body of the
people. This logic was epitomized in the paroxysm of the Nazi state, but also in the communist
states, withtheir Gulags. I have thus far discussed Foucaults triangulation between the discourses of the production of truth, the power that these
discourse enact and make available to social agents, and the constitution of a political rationality that is linked to the invention and creation of its horizon of activity
and surveillance. I want now to focus on the main theme of this courses last lecture. This theme discloses in a unique way the power and perspicacity of Foucaults
method. The theme concerns the kind of power that biopower renders available, or rather, how biopolitics produces certain power effects by thinking of the living in a
novel way. We will approach the theme by way of a contrast:

whereas the power of the sovereign under Medieval and early

Modern times was the power to make die and to let live, the power of the total state, which is the
biopower state, is the power to make live and to let die. Foucault discerned here a telling asymmetry. If the sovereign exercised
his power with the executioners axe, with the perpetual threat of death, then life was abandoned to its devices. Power was exhibited only on the scaffold, or the
guillotine its terror was the shimmer of the unsheathed sword. Power was ritualistic, ceremonial, theatrical, and to that extent partial, molecular, and calendrical. It
was also a power that by its own juridical logic had to submit to the jostling of rights and claims. In the very performance of its might, the power of the sovereign
revealed its limitation. It is a power that is localized and circumscribed to the theater of its cruelty, and the staging of its pomp. In contrast, however, the power of the
biopower state is over life [expand]. And here Foucault asks how can biopolitics then reclaim the power over death? or rather, how can it make die in light of the
fact that its claim to legitimacy is that it is guarding, nurturing, tending to life? In so far as biopolitics is the management of life, how does it make die, how does it

14

kill? This is a similar question to the one that theologians asked about the Christian God. If God is a god of life, the giver of life, how can he put to death, how can he
allow death to descend upon his gift of life why is death a possibility if god is the giver of life? Foucaults answer is that in order to re-claim death, to be able to
inflict death on its subjects, its living beings, biopower must make use of racism; more precisely, racism intervenes here to grant access to death to the biopower state.
We must recall that the political rationality of biopower is deployed over a population, which is understood as a continuum of life. It is this continuum of life that
eugenics, social hygiene, civil engineering, civil medicine, military engineers, doctors and nurses, policeman, and so on, tended to by a careful management of roads,
factories, living quarters, brothels, red-districts, planning and planting of gardens and recreation centers, and the gerrymandering of populations by means of roads,
access to public transformations, placement of schools, and so on. Biopolitics

is the result of the development and maintenance

of the hothouse of the political body, of the body-politic. Society has become the vivarium of the
political rationality, and biopolitics acts on the teeming biomass contained within the parameters of
that structure built up by the institutions of health, education, and production. This is where racism
intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of
biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very
logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: the
conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a
society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and
first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in
order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrire] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality
of bio-power, can only be assured by racism (Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture The Political Technology of Individuals which
incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the
population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, since the population is nothing more than what the state takes

Racism,
is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political
technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the
tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of
biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of
peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn
into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters
and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires
of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the
permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As
I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the
health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence
by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we
be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of
the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.
care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics. (Foucault 2000, 416).

We affirm curtailing domestic surveillance by the United States Federal Government.

15

Contention 2 is solvency
The AFFs critical interrogation and analyses of surveillance is crucial to analyzing the way
in which daily life and the body itself has become a feature of securitizationour dissent
functions as an unravelling and exposure of dominant power relations
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

Surveillance has become a growing feature of daily life. In fact, it is more appropriate to analyze the
culture of surveillance, rather than address exclusively the violations committed by the corporatesurveillance state. In this instance, the surveillance and security state is one that not only listens, watches
and gathers massive amounts of information through data mining necessary for identifying consumer populations but also acculturates
the public into accepting the intrusion of surveillance technologies and privatized commodified
values into all aspects of their lives. Personal information is willingly given over to social media and other corporate-based websites and
gathered daily as people move from one targeted web site to the next across multiple screens and digital apparatuses. As Ariel Dorfman points out, social media users
gladly give up their liberty and privacy, invariably for the most benevolent of platitudes and reasons, all the while endlessly shopping online and texting.7A This
collecting of information might be most evident in the video cameras that inhabit every public space from the streets, commercial establishments and workplaces to

Yet the most

important transgression may not only be happening through the unwarranted watching, listening and
collecting of information but also in a culture that normalizes surveillance by upping the pleasure quotient and
the schools our children attend as well as in the myriad scanners placed at the entry points of airports, stores, sporting events and the like.

enticements for consumers who use the new digital technologies and social networks to simulate false notions of community and to socialize young people into a
culture of security and commodification in which their identities, values and desires are inextricably tied to a culture of private addictions, self-help and
commodification. Surveillance feeds on the related notions of fear and delusion. Authoritarianism

in its contemporary
manifestations, as evidenced so grippingly in Orwell's text, no longer depends on the raw displays of power but
instead has become omniscient in a culture of control in which the most cherished notions of agency
collapse into unabashed narcissistic exhibitions and confessions of the self, serving as willing fodder
for the spying state. The self has become not simply the subject of surveillance but a willing participant and object. Operating off the assumption that
some individuals will not willingly turn their private lives over to the spying state and corporations, the NSA and other intelligence agencies work hard to create a
turnkey authoritarian state in which the "electronic self" becomes public property. Every space is now enclosed within the purview of an authoritarian society that
attempts to govern the entirety of social life. As Jonathan Schell points out: Thanks to Snowden, we also know that unknown volumes of like information are being
extracted from Internet and computer companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. The first thing to note
about these data is that a mere generation ago, they did not exist. They are a new power in our midst, flowing from new technology, waiting to be picked up; and
power, as always, creates temptation, especially for the already powerful. Our cellphones track our whereabouts. Our communications pass through centralized servers
and are saved and kept for a potential eternity in age banks, from which they can be recovered and examined. Our purchases and contacts and illnesses and
entertainments are tracked and agglomerated. If

we are arrested, even our DNA can be taken and stored by the state.
Today, alongside each one of us, there exists a second, electronic self , created in part by us, in part by others. This
other self has become de facto public property , owned chiefly by immense data-crunching corporations, which use it for commercial
purposes. Now government is reaching its hand into those corporations for its own purposes, creating a brand-new domain of the state-corporate complex.8 Social

Surveillance and
its accompanying culture of fear now produce subjects that revel in being watched, turning the
practice if not the threat posed by surveillance into just another condition for performing the self .
cynicism and societal indifference accelerate a broken culture in which reason has been replaced by consumer-fed hallucinatory hopes.9

Every human act and behavior is now potential fodder for YouTube, Facebook or some other social network. Privacy has become a curse, an impediment that subverts
the endless public display of the self. Zygmunt Bauman echoes this sentiment in arguing that: These days, it is not so much the possibility of a betrayal or violation of
privacy that frightens us, but the opposite: shutting down the exits. The area of privacy turns into a site of incarceration, the owner
of private space being condemned and doomed to stew in his or her own juice; forced into a condition marked by an absence of avid listeners eager to wring out and
tear away the secrets from behind the ramparts of privacy, to put them on public display and make them everybody's shared property and a property everybody wishes
to share.10 Everything that moves is

monitored, along with information that is endlessly amassed and stored

by private and government agencies. No one, it seems, can escape the tentacles of the NSA or the spy
agencies that are scouring mobile phone apps for personal data and intercepting computer and
cellphone shipments to plant tracking devices and malware in them. 11 Surveillance is now global,
reaching beyond borders that no longer provide an obstacle to collecting information and spying on
governments, individuals, prominent politicians, corporations and pro-democracy protest groups.

16

details of our daily lives are not only on full display but are being monitored, collected and stored in databanks
waiting to be used for commercial, security or political purposes . At the same time, the right to privacy is eagerly given up
The

by millions of people for the wonders of social networking or the varied seductions inspired by consumer fantasies. The loss of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality
also has had the adverse effect of providing the basis for what Bauman and David Lyons call the undemocratic process of "social sorting," in which different

populations are subject to differential treatment extending from being protected by the state to
being killed by drone attacks launched under the auspices of global surveillance and state power.12
Privacy is no longer a principled and cherished civil right. On the contrary, it has been absorbed and transformed within the purview of a celebrity and market-driven
culture in which people publicize themselves and their innermost secrets to promote and advance their personal brand. Or it is often a principle invoked by
conservatives who claim their rights to privacy have been trampled when confronted with ideas or arguments that unsettle their notions of common sense or their
worldviews. It is worth repeating that privacy has mostly become synonymous with a form of self-generated, nonstop performance - a type of public relations in which
privacy makes possible the unearthing of secrets, a cult of commodified confessionals and an infusion of narcissistic, self-referencing narratives, all of which serve to
expand the pleasure quotient of surveillance while normalizing its expanding practices and modes of repression that Orwell could never have imagined. Where
Orwell's characters loathed the intrusion of surveillance, according to Bauman and Lyons, today We seem to experience no joy in having secrets, unless they are the
kinds of secrets likely to enhance our egos by attracting the attention of researchers and editors of TV talk shows, tabloid front pages and the....covers of glossy
magazines.Everything private is now done, potentially, in public - and is potentially available for public consumption; and remains available for the duration, till the
end of time, as the internet 'can't be made to forget' anything once recorded on any of its innumerable servers. This erosion of anonymity is a product of pervasive
social media services, cheap cell phone cameras, free photo and video Web hosts, and perhaps most important of all, a change in people's views about what ought to be
public and what ought to be private.13 Orwell's 1984 looks subdued next to the current parameters, intrusions, technologies and disciplinary apparatuses wielded by
the new corporate-government surveillance state. Surveillance has not only become more pervasive, intruding into the most private of spaces and activities in order to
collect massive amounts of data, it also permeates and inhabits everyday activities so as to be taken-for-granted. Surveillance is not simply pervasive, it has become
normalized. Orwell could not have imagined either the intrusive capabilities of the the new high-powered digital technologies of surveillance and display, nor could he
have envisioned the growing web of political, cultural and economic partnerships between modes of government and corporate sovereignty capable of collecting
almost every form of communication in which human beings engage. What is new in the post-Orwellian world is not just the emergence of new and powerful
technologies used by governments and corporations to spy on people and assess personal information as a way to either attract ready-made customers or to sell
information to advertising agencies, but the emergence of a widespread culture of surveillance. Intelligence networks now inhabit the world of Disney as well as the
secret domains of the NSA and the FBI. I think the renowned intellectual historian Quentin Skinner is right in insisting that surveillance is about more than the
violation of privacy rights, however important. Under the surveillance state, the

greatest threat one faces is not simply the

violation of one's right to privacy, but the fact that the public is subject to the dictates of arbitrary
power it no longer seems interested in contesting. And it is precisely this existence of unchecked power and the wider culture of
political indifference that puts at risk the broader principles of liberty and freedom, which are fundamental to democracy itself. According to Skinner, who is worth
quoting at length: The response of those who are worried about surveillance has so far been too much couched, it seems to me, in terms of the violation of the right to
privacy. Of course it's true that my privacy has been violated if someone is reading my emails without my knowledge. But my point is that my liberty is also being
violated, and not merely by the fact that someone is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they choose. We have to insist
that this in itself takes away liberty because it leaves us at the mercy of arbitrary power. It's no use those who have possession of this power promising that they won't
necessarily use it, or will use it only for the common good. What

is offensive to liberty is the very existence of such

arbitrary power.14 The dangers of the surveillance state far exceed the attack on privacy or warrant
simply a discussion about balancing security against civil liberties. The latter argument fails to address how the growth of
the surveillance state is connected to the rise of the punishing state, the militarization of American society, secret prisons, state-sanctioned torture, a growing culture of
violence, the criminalization of social problems, the depoliticization of public memory, and one of the largest prison systems in the world, all of which "are only the
most concrete, condensed manifestations of a diffuse security regime in which we are all interned and enlisted."15 The

authoritarian nature of
the corporate-state surveillance apparatus and security system with its "urge to surveill, eavesdrop
on, spy on, monitor, record, and save every communication of any sort on the planet" 16 can only be
fully understood when its ubiquitous tentacles are connected to wider cultures of control and
punishment, including security-patrolled corridors of public schools, the rise in super-max prisons,
the hyper-militarization of local police forces, the rise of the military-industrial-academic complex,
and the increasing labeling of dissent as an act of terrorism in the United States.17
Our impact occurs at the level of pedagogythe combination of neoliberal modernity and the
surveillance state creates a desert of organized forgetting that re-writes violence and atrocity out
of the history booksbreaking through censorship and repression is a pre-condition to activism
and fighting oppression
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP] edited for
ablest language

Some of the most dreadful consequences of neoliberal modernity and cultures of surveillance
include the elimination of those public spheres capable of educating the public to hold power
accountable, and the dissolution of all social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility toward
others. In this instance, politics has not only become dysfunctional and corrupt in the face of massive
inequalities in wealth and power, it also has been emptied of any substantive meaning. Government
not only has fallen into the hands of the elite and right-wing extremists, it has embraced a mode of

17

lawlessness evident in forms of foreign and domestic terrorism that undercuts the obligations of
citizenship, justice and morality. As surveillance and fear become a constant condition of American
society, there is a growing indifference, if not distaste, for politics among large segments of the population.
This distaste is purposely manufactured by the ongoing operations of political repression against
intellectuals, artists, nonviolent protesters and journalists on the left and right. Increasingly, as such populations
engage in dissent and the free flow of ideas, whether online or offline, they are considered dangerous to the state and
become subject to the mechanizations of a massive security apparatuses designed to monitor,
control and punish dissenting populations. For instance, in England, the new head of MI5, the British intelligence service, mimicking the
US government's distrust of journalists, stated that the stories The Guardian published about Snowden's revelations "were a gift to terrorists," reinforcing the notion
that whistle-blowers and journalists might be considered terrorists.42 Similar comments about Snowden have been made in the United States by members of Congress
who have labeled Snowden a traitor, including Sens. Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat; John McCain, an Arizona Republican; Saxby Chambliss, a Georgia
Republican; and House Speaker John Boehner, as well as former Vice President Dick Cheney.43 Greenwald, one of the first journalists to divulge Snowden's
revelations about the NSA's secret "unaccountable system of pervasive surveillance"44 has been accused by Rep. Peter King of New York along with others of being a
terrorist.45 More ominously, "Snowden told German TV ... about reports that U.S. government officials want to assassinate him for leaking secret documents about
the NSA's collection of telephone records and emails."46 As the line collapses between authoritarian power and democratic governance, state

and
corporate repression intensifies and increasingly engulfs the nation in a toxic climate of fear and
self-censorship in which free speech, if not critical thought, itself is viewed as too dangerous in which to
engage. The NSA, alone, has become what Scott Shane has called an "electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities,
eavesdropping and hacking its way around the world to strip governments and other targets of their secrets, all while enforcing the utmost secrecy about its own
operations. It spies routinely on friends as well as foes."47 Intelligence benefits are far outweighed by the illegal use of the Internet, telecommunication companies and
stealth malware for data collection and government interventions that erode civil liberties and target individuals and groups that pose no threat whatsoever to national
security. New technologies that range from webcams and spycams to biometrics and Internet drilling reinforce not only the fear of being watched, monitored and
investigated but also a propensity toward confessing one's intimate thoughts and sharing the most personal of information. What is profoundly disturbing and worth
repeating in this case is the new intimacy between digital technologies and cultures of surveillance in which there exists a profound an unseen intimate connection into
the most personal and private areas as subjects publish and document their interests, identities, hopes and fears online in massive quantities.48 Surveillance
propped up as the new face of intimacy becomes

the order of the day, eradicating free expression and , to some degree,

even thinking itself. In the age of the self-absorbed self and its mirror image, the selfie, intimacy becomes its opposite and the exit from privacy
becomes symptomatic of a society that gave up on the social and historical memory. One of the most serious conditions that enable
the expansion of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus is the erasure of public memory. The
renowned anthropologist David Price rightly argues that historical memory is one of the primary weapons to be used
against the abuse of power and that is why "those who have power create a 'desert of organized
forgetting.' "49 For Price, it is crucial to reclaim America's battered public memories as a political and pedagogical task as part of the broader struggle to
regain lost privacy and civil liberties."50 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, America has succumbed to a form of historical
amnesia fed by a culture of fear, militarization and precarity. Relegated to the dustbin of organized
forgetting were the long-standing abuses carried out by America's intelligence agencies and the
public's long-standing distrust of the FBI, government wiretaps and police actions that threatened
privacy rights, civil liberties and those freedoms fundamental to a democracy. In the present historical moment, it
is almost impossible to imagine that wiretapping was once denounced by the FBI or that legislation was passed in the early part of the 20th century that criminalized

illegal
surveillance and disruption campaigns carried out by the FBI and local police forces, most of which
were aimed at anti-war demonstrators, the leaders of the civil rights movement and the Black
Panthers. And while laws implementing judicial oversight for federal wiretaps were put in place, they were systematically dismantled under the Reagan,
and outlawed the federal use of wiretaps.51 Nor has much been written about the Church and Pike committees, which in the 1970s exposed a wave of

Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. As Price points out, while there was a steady increase in federal wiretaps throughout the 1980s and 1990s, "in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the American public hastily abandoned a century of fairly consistent opposition to govern wiretaps."52 As

the historical
memory of such abuses disappeared, repressive legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act and
growing support for a panoptical surveillance and "homeland" security state increased to the point of dissolving the
line between private and public, on the one hand, and tilting the balance between security and civil liberties largely in favor of a culture of fear
and its underside, a managed emphasis on a one-dimensional notion of safety and security. The violence of organized forgetting has
another component besides the prevalence of a culture of fear and hyper-nationalism that emerged
after 9/11. Since the 1980s, the culture of neoliberalism with its emphasis on the self, privatization and consumerism largely has
functioned to disparage any notion of the public good, social responsibility and collective action, if
not politics itself. Historical memories of collective struggles against government and corporate
abuses have been deposited down the memory hole, leaving largely unquestioned the growing
inequalities in wealth and income, along with the increased militarization and financialization of
American society. Even the history of authoritarian movements appears to have been forgotten as right-wing extremists in North Carolina, Wisconsin,
Maine, Florida and other states attempt to suppress long-established voting rights, use big money to sway elections, destroy public and higher education as a public

18

good, and substitute emotion and hatred for reasoned arguments.53 Manufactured

ignorance spreads through the dominant

cultural apparatuses like a wildfire promoting the financialization of everything as a virtue and
ethics as a liability. The flight from historical memory has been buttressed by a retreat into a
politics of self-help and a culture of self-blame in which all problems are viewed as "evidence of
personal shortcomings that, if left uncorrected, hold individuals back from attaining stability and security."54 Within the crippling
[devastating] "affective and ideological spaces of neoliberalism," memory recedes, social
responsibility erodes, and individual outrage and collective resistance are [silenced] muted.55 Under
such circumstances, public issues collapse into private troubles and the language of the politics is
emptied so that it becomes impossible to connect the ravages that bear down on individuals to
broader systemic, structural and social considerations. Under such circumstances, historical memory offers no
buffer to the proliferation of a kind of mad violence and paranoid culture of media-induced fear that turns every public
space into a war zone. Consequently, it is not surprising that the American public barely blinks in the face of a growing surveillance state. Nor is it
surprising that intellectuals such as Sean Wilentz can claim that "the lack of fealty to the imperatives of the surveillance community as demonstrated by Edward
Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, and Julian Assange is an assault on the modern liberal state itself."56 Indeed, what the new apologists for the surveillance state refuse to
recognize is a history of abuse and criminal behavior by US intelligence apparatuses that were less concerned with implementing the law, arresting criminals and
preventing terrorist acts than they were in suppressing dissent and punishing those groups marginalized by race and class. In a moving account of the use of
surveillance by Pinochet under the Chilean dictatorship, Ariel Dorfman argues that surveillance not only was linked "to a legacy of broken bodies and twisted minds,
the lingering aftermath of executions and torture" but also to an assault on the imagination itself, which under Pinochet's reign of terror lived in fear that no word,
gesture, comment would be "immune from surveillance."57 What is to be learned from this period of history in which surveillance became central to a machinery of
torture and death? Dorfman answers the question with great clarity and insight, one that should serve as a warning to those so willing to sacrifice civil liberties to
security. He writes: Who was to guarantee that someday, someone might not activate a network like this one all over again? Someday? Someone? Why not right then
and there, in democratic, supposedly post-atrocity Santiago in 2006? Were not similar links and nexuses and connections and eyes and ears doing the same job,
eavesdropping, collecting data and voices and knowledge for a day when the men in the shadows might be asked once again to act drastically and lethally?And why
only in Santiago? What about America today, where, compared to the data-crunching clout of the NSA and other dis-intelligence agencies, Pinochet's [surveillance
state] looks puny and outdated - like a samurai sword noticed by an airman above, about to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima? What about elsewhere on this planet,
where democratic governments far and wide systematically spy on their own citizens? Aren't we all in harm's way?58 America is not simply in harm's way, it stands at
the end of precipice about to fall into what Hannah Arendt once called "dark times." As memory recedes so does political consciousness, particularly the danger that
the surveillance state has posed to poor and working-class Americans who have been monitored for years and as Virginia Eubanks points out "already live in the
surveillance future."59 She writes: The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. ... Welfare recipients ... are more vulnerable to surveillance because they
are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor women, especially women of color, as inherently
suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare programs that track their financial and social behavior. Immigrant communities
are more likely to be the site of biometric data collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people are
subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the welfare system, and the lowwage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects
troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new forms of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either
being a threat to authority, reject the consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal capitalism. The political, class and racial
nature of suppression has a long history in the United States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of state violence by making an
appeal to the necessity of safety and security. Totalitarian paranoia runs deep in American society, and it now inhabits the highest levels of government.61 There is no
excuse for intellectuals or any other member of the American public to address the existence, meaning and purpose of the surveillance-security state without placing it
in the historical structure of the times. Or what might be called a historical conjuncture in which the legacy of totalitarianism is once again reasserting itself in new

Historical memory is about more than recovering the past; it is also about imputing history
with a sense of responsibility, treating it with respect rather than with reverence. Historical memory
should always be insurgent, rubbing "taken-for-granted history against the grain so as to revitalize
and rearticulate what one sees as desirable and necessary for an open, just and life sustaining"
democracy and future.62 Historical memory is a crucial battleground for challenging a corporatesurveillance state that is motivated by the anti-democratic legal, economic and political interests. But
if memory is to function as a witness to injustice and the practice of criticism and renewal, it must embrace the pedagogical task of
connecting the historical, personal and social. It is worth repeating that C.W. Mills was right in arguing that those without
power need to connect personal troubles with public issues and that is as much an educational
endeavour and responsibility as it is a political and cultural task.63
forms.

Our genealogical praxis is a transgressive cutting through regimes of truth that opens up
space for radical political becoming necessary for a new subject-formation
Clifford 1-Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at
Mississippi State University [Michael, 2001, Political Genealogy After Foucault. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7]
Foucaults counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of active forgetfulness (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 Counter-memory consists of essentially
forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in
forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the selfthis identity
apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. Counter-memory
dislodges the propriety of our-selves. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to
act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a
forgetfulness of its necessitya freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits,
outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where

19

lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self
through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. Counter-discourses

anticipate a subjectival freedom of open

possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves
as subjects.22 These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations
imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the
form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this
refusal, in this transgressionfor those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting,
ones identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of
ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge
relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a
conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through

genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects the systematic dissociation of identity
by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of
genealogy, says Foucault, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its
dissipation.25 Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of
disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition . Genealogy turns the firm
posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through dissension and disparity.

Wherever the self fabricates a coherent identity, genealogy puts into play a subversive counteranalysis that permits the dissociation of the self , its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.26
Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive,
assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more
than a colorful mask. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and
ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity,
no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix
of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex
of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he
listens to history, he finds that there is something altogether different behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they
have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.27 Contrary to what Ren Descartes or John Locke
would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a

mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify
subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unityidentityis imposed on subjects as the mask of their
fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the
limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen
through the differential knowledge of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses . Countermemory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a
possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no
longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think. In this sense, genealogy gives new impetus, as far and wide as
possible, to the undefined work of freedom. 28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of
negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for itfor disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of
liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from ita freedom from individualization, from the
practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the office of

government, but against governmentalityagainst a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular

space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of
mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak
from the politicized body. In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy enables one to get free of oneself.29 That is, by
exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens
the possibility of going beyond those limits.30 This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space
and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense,
genealogy opens up a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more
precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of

possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous
rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish
nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformationwhich
means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point
20

is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early
1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political
movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the liberal tolerance of the homophile community:
Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a new human who is able
to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and
womens liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.32 This
requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that what

is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or
teleological model of a more genuine form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in
replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly truer or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and
unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the

freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being

able to become other than what we are.

21

Case

22

Inherency

23

A2-702 Reform
Status quo Reforms of Section 702 are Lip Service - NSA Bulk data collection from
Domestic Citizens is still perpetuated
Laperruque 15-Political Correspondant and Research Staff Member at the Center for Democracy and Technology SHARE POST [Updates
to section 702 minimization rules still leave loopholes Author Image JAKE LAPERRUQUE Updates to Section 702 Minimization Rules Still
Leave Loopholes, FEBRUARY 09, 2015 https://cdt.org/blog/updates-to-section-702-minimization-rules-still-leave-loopholes/ Security &
Surveillance]

On February 3, 2015, the Administration announced numerous changes to surveillance activities to

protect privacy and civil liberties, including reforms to its Minimization Rules last updated in July 2014 and
released publicly as part of the announcement for Section 702, concerning retention and use of communications of or about US persons.
Some of these reforms are significant improvements, but they do not adequately address ongoing problems
with overbroad collection, retention, and use of information pursuant to Section 702. New Restrictions on
Use as Evidence in Criminal Cases: Previously, Section 702 Minimization Guidelines (including the 2009 Guidelines leaked by Edward
Snowden, the 2011 Guidelines released by the government in 2013, and the 2014 Guidelines released last week) permitted NSA to retain, share,
and use communications of or about US persons that may constitute evidence of any crime. Under the new policy announced on
February 3, such information

will not be introduced as evidence against that [US] person in any

criminal proceeding except 1) with the approval of the Attorney General, and 2) in criminal cases
with national security implications or certain other serious crimes, a policy similar to
Recommendation 12(2) by the Presidents Review Group. DNI General Counsel Robert Litt
specified that serious crimes is limited to crimes involving: 1) death, 2) kidnapping, 3) substantial
bodily harm, 4) conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a
minor as defined in 42 USC 16911, 5) incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure as
defined in 42 USC 5195c(e), 6) cybersecurity, 7) transnational crimes, and 8) human trafficking.
This list is imperfect;notably, criminal cases with national security implications and crimes
involving cybersecurity are undefined, and could be applied in an overbroad manner. Further, it does not appear in
the Minimization Guidelines themselves, and could be expanded at any time. However, it represents a substantial
improvement over current minimization practices, which allows use of information collected under Section 702 for prosecution of any domestic
crime, including misdemeanors and non-violent offenses. Continued Overbroad Retention and Use for Law Enforcement Investigations:
Although use as evidence in criminal cases is curtailed as set forth above, the new policy contains a significant loophole that will permit
continued retention, dissemination, and some uses of US persons communications collected under Section 702 that contain evidence of any
crime. While the new policy restricts use of such communications as evidence in prosecutions, it does

not limit retention or other uses by law enforcement. Therefore, communications of or about US
persons believed to contain evidence of any crime could still be retained for years, as is currently permitted.
While this information could not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings (except for the serious crimes as set forth above) NSA could still
disseminate this information to law enforcement for use in investigations. This is especially troubling given the DEAs use

of parallel construction to rely on information obtained through intelligence surveillance, then

obscure the source of information provided by the Intelligence Community so that the defendant is
unaware. In 2013 the Department of Justice changed its policy and began providing defendants notice when information obtained from
Section 702 is used, but questions remain as to whether the scope of this notification policy is sufficient. And even if notification is eventually
provided, the government could still use communications obtained using Section 702 as the foundation

for investigation of minor domestic crimes, so long as it gathers other evidence for the purpose of
prosecution. If the Administration is sincere in its commitment to limiting the range of crimes that
information on US persons obtained through Section 702 can be used for, it should change the
Minimization Guidelines and support statutory reform that requires communications of or
about US persons that does not contain evidence of the crimes listed above (or foreign intelligence information)
be immediately purged upon discovery. New Restrictions on US Person Querying: The policies announced on February 3 also
create new restrictions on the NSAs ability to querying its database of Section 702 communications for the communications of US persons. This
practice is commonly referred to as the backdoor search loophole because if the NSA wanted to conduct the surveillance of the US person
directly, it would be a search that would require a full FISA court order based on a finding of probable cause that the US person is a terrorist,
spy, or other agent of a foreign power. Previously, minimization procedures vaguely required that querying construction be reasonably likely to
return foreign intelligence information, effectively allowing NSA to deliberately seek out in a vast database of content collected under Section
702 Americans communications without judicial authorization. Under the new rules, the NSA and CIA will be permitted to query the database

24

with US person identifiers (a unique identifier associated such as a name, phone number, email address, etc.) only after developing a written
statement of facts showing that a query is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information, as recommended by the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board in its report on Section 702. This is a step forward for preventing some potential abuse posed by the backdoor search
loophole, but it is a far cry from requiring a judicial finding of probable cause that the person whose communications are sought is an agent of a
foreign power, as Senator Wyden has proposed to close the backdoor search loophole. While the NSA will be prohibited from searching the
Section 702 database for an Americans communication with the goal of gathering evidence for domestic criminal investigations that have no
national security implications, or simply gathering personal information that could be used to hold a person in disrepute (troublingly, it is unclear
whether the FBI will be similarly restricted), it could still query the data base and obtain the contents of the US persons communications
for broad foreign intelligence purposes, such as when the analyst thinks the query would disclose information necessary to the conduct of US
foreign affairs or US national security. In addition, an NSA analyst, not a judge, would decide whether obtaining the

US persons communications was proper. The new restrictions reflect the privacy interest in Americans communications being
queried, but falls short of providing the protection that privacy interest is due.

Still allows bulk data collection

Laperruque 15-Political Correspondant and Research Staff Member at the Center for Democracy and Technology SHARE POST [Updates
to section 702 minimization rules still leave loopholes Author Image JAKE LAPERRUQUE Updates to Section 702 Minimization Rules Still
Leave Loopholes, FEBRUARY 09, 2015 https://cdt.org/blog/updates-to-section-702-minimization-rules-still-leave-loopholes/ Security &
Surveillance]
In 2013 the Department of Justice changed its policy and began providing defendants notice when information obtained from Section 702 is used,
but questions remain as to whether the scope of this notification policy is sufficient. And even if notification is eventually provided, the

government could still use communications obtained using Section 702 as the foundation for
investigation of minor domestic crimes, so long as it gathers other evidence for the purpose of
prosecution. If the Administration is sincere in its commitment to limiting the range of crimes that
information on US persons obtained through Section 702 can be used for, it should change the
Minimization Guidelines and support statutory reform that requires communications of or
about US persons that does not contain evidence of the crimes listed above (or foreign intelligence information)
be immediately purged upon discovery. New Restrictions on US Person Querying: The policies announced on February 3 also
create new restrictions on the NSAs ability to querying its database of Section 702 communications for the communications of US persons. This
practice is commonly referred to as the backdoor search loophole because if the NSA wanted to conduct the surveillance of the US person
directly, it would be a search that would require a full FISA court order based on a finding of probable cause that the US person is a terrorist,
spy, or other agent of a foreign power. Previously, minimization procedures vaguely required that querying construction be reasonably likely to
return foreign intelligence information, effectively allowing NSA to deliberately seek out in a vast database of content collected under Section
702 Americans communications without judicial authorization. Under the new rules, the NSA and CIA will be permitted to query the database
with US person identifiers (a unique identifier associated such as a name, phone number, email address, etc.) only after developing a written
statement of facts showing that a query is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information, as recommended by the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board in its report on Section 702. This is a step forward for preventing some potential abuse posed by the backdoor search
loophole, but it is a far cry from requiring a judicial finding of probable cause that the person whose communications are sought is an agent of a
foreign power, as Senator Wyden has proposed to close the backdoor search loophole. While the NSA will be prohibited from searching the
Section 702 database for an Americans communication with the goal of gathering evidence for domestic criminal investigations that have no
national security implications, or simply gathering personal information that could be used to hold a person in disrepute (troublingly, it is unclear
whether the FBI will be similarly restricted), it could still query the data base and obtain the contents of the US persons communications
for broad foreign intelligence purposes, such as when the analyst thinks the query would disclose information necessary to the conduct of US
foreign affairs or US national security. In addition, an NSA analyst, not a judge, would decide whether obtaining the

US persons communications was proper. The new restrictions reflect the privacy interest in Americans communications being
queried, but falls short of providing the protection that privacy interest is due.

The NSA currently uses Section 702 as an extension the Cyber War on Terror frenetic
information gathering tactics are unknowingly applied to U.S. Citizens
Walsh 15-political consultant and staff writer for bestvpn.net. (From war on terror to cyber war, and why you need a VPN 10 Jun 2015 |
Ray Walsh https://www.bestvpn.com/20718/from-war-on-terror-to-cyber-war-and-why-you-need-a-vpn/)

The post 9/11 climate was dominated by an anti-terrorist rhetoric that we have all come to be familiar with. Shortly
after the gruesome, heart-wrenching incident, George W. Bush signed into action a bill called the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF). The new legislation gave the US military authority to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those that were determined to have planned, authorized, committed or aided the
September 11th attacks. AUMF allowed the US military to chase down members of Al-Qaeda and its associated forces (an effort
largely known by its moniker the war on terror ), and was a piece of legislation that would ultimately be used to go after just about any target
the US government felt stood in its way. Associated forces came to mean any man of a military age in countries

25

that were deemed to be collaborators with the enemy. Anybody who helped or harbored Americas enemies was instantly
deemed a target, and a new and prolific form of warfare (namely that of drones) meant that these targets could be swiftly dealt a remote and
powerful blow, even when the US government had no real idea who the target was, or whether it was a legitimate target at all. Now, with the US
military firmly positioned in and around the Middle East, in a strategic stronghold that allows them to continue unfettered the mighty will of their
military-industrial complex, it would appear that the time has come to move mainstream consciousness into a

different reality construct. New Snowden documents published by the New York Times and Pro Publica
reveal that the same kind of mentality which took over after 9/11 in regards to terrorism is now being
assigned to the problem of cybersecurity. High level hacking incidents such as last Decembers Sony hack, and the ISIS hack
of US Central Commands Twitter page, earlier this year, are being used as fodder to get the nation on board for a whole new set of libertyinfringing ideals. When the war on terror was big news, liquids could no longer be brought on planes, and full body scanners were needed in all
airports. Now, in the very same way, cyber terrorism the threat that terrorists might have matured into cyber criminals is

being sold to the world as a reason for the unquestioning advancement of a total loss of online
privacy for everyone. All for our own safety, of course! According to the new documents, in 2012 the NSA was given permission to use
its warrantless surveillance program to target Internet addresses, malware, and other cyber-signatures associated with foreign governments who
the NSA feels might be collaborating with their rivals. These documents also reveal, however, that both the FBI and the NSA

used these extended powers to begin surveillance of signatures unassociated with foreign or
terrorist organizations, in order to hone in on domestic targets. As per usual, this was done in absolute
secrecy. The new Snowden revelations show that successful NSA lobbying led the Department of Justice to
secretly extend the NSAs powers according to Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act , in particular
allowing the NSA to move away from simply targeting knowledgeable and advanced cyber criminals
to being able to target IP addresses. This allowed for what is now recognized as the bulk collection of both
Americans, and foreigners communication assets. According to senior white hat hackers, this is not actually a surprise,
mainly because (black hat) hackers often use proxies and computers infected by malware to carry out their crimes, making it incredibly difficult
to investigate malicious cyber activity without also targeting innocent peoples machines. With this in mind, and with the level of intensity which
both US and international intelligence agencies appear to be attributing to the need to gain full control over cyberspace, there has never been a
better time to think about protecting your digital presence.

26

Internal Link-Imperialism/Panopticism
NSA surveillance is the cornerstone for 21st century imperialism and panoptic control
McCoy 14-J.R. W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [Alfred W, Surveillance and Scandal: Weapons in an
Emerging Array for U.S. Global Power, Monthly Review 66.3 (Jul/Aug 2014): 70-81, DKP]
During six riveting months in 2013-2014, Edward Snowden's

revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA) poured out from the
less than the
architecture of the U.S. global surveillance apparatus. Despite heavy media coverage and commentary, no one has pointed out the
Washington Post, the New York Times, the Guardian, Germany's Der Spiegel, and Brazil's O Globo, revealing nothing

combination of factors that made the NSA's expanding programs to monitor the world seem like such an alluring development for Washington's power elite. The
answer is remarkably simple: for

an imperial power losing its economic grip on the planet and heading into
more austere times, the NSA's latest technological breakthroughs look like a seductive bargain
when it comes to projecting power and keeping subordinate allies in line. Even when revelations about
spying on close allies roiled diplomatic relations with them, the NSA's surveillance programs have come with
such a discounted price tag that no Washington leader was going to reject them. For well over a
century, from the pacification of the Philippines in 1898 to trade negotiations with the European Union today, surveillance and its kissing cousins,
scandal and scurrilous information, have been key weapons in Washington's search for global
dominion. Not surprisingly, in a post-9/11 bipartisan exercise of executive power, George W. Bush and Barack
Obama have presided over building the NSA step by secret step into a digital panopticon designed to
monitor the communications of every American and foreign leader worldwide. What exactly was the aim of such an unprecedented program of massive domestic and
planetary spying, which clearly carried the risk of controversy at home and abroad? Here, an awareness of the more than century-long history of U.S. surveillance can
guide us through the billions of bytes swept up by the NSA to the strategic significance of such a program for the planet's last superpower.1 What

the past
reveals is a long-term relationship between American state surveillance and political scandal that
helps illuminate the unacknowledged reason why the NSA monitors America's closest allies. Not
only does such surveillance help gain intelligence advantageous to U.S. diplomacy, trade relations,
and war-making, but it also scoops up intimate information for leverage-akin to blackmail-in
sensitive global dealings and negotiations of every sort. The NSA's global panopticon thus fulfils an
ancient dream of empire. With a few computer key strokes, the agency has solved the problem that has bedeviled world powers since at least the time
of Caesar Augustus: how to control unruly local leaders, who are the foundation for imperial rule, by ferreting out crucial, often scurrilous, information to make them
more malleable. The Cost of Cost-Savings At the turn of the twentieth century, such surveillance was both expensive and labor intensive. Today, however, unlike the
U.S. Army's shoe-leather surveillance during the First World War or the FBI's break-ins and phone bugs in the Cold War years, the NSA can monitor the entire world
and its leaders with only one hundred-plus probes into the Internet's fiber-optic cables.2 This

new technology is both omniscient and

omnipresent beyond anything those lacking top-secret clearance could have imagined before the Edward Snowden revelations began.5 Not only is it
unimaginably pervasive, but NSA surveillance is also a particularly cost-effective strategy compared to just about any other form of
global power projection. And better yet, it fulfills the greatest imperial dream of all: to be omniscient not just for a
few islands, as in the Philippines a century ago, or a couple of countries during the Cold War, but now on a truly
global scale. In a time of increasing imperial austerity and exceptional technological capability,
everything about the NSA's surveillance told Washington to just "go for it." This cut-rate
mechanism for both projecting force and preserving U.S. global power surely looked like a musthave bargain for any American president in the twenty-first century-before new NSA documents started hitting front pages weekly, thanks to Snowden, and
the whole world began returning the favor by placing Washington's leaders beneath an incessant media gaze.4 As the gap has grown between
Washington's global reach and its shrinking mailed fist, as it struggles to maintain 40 percent of
world armaments (as of 2012) with only 23 percent of global gross output, the U nited States will need to
find new ways to exercise its power much more economically.5 When the Cold War started, a heavy-metal U.S. military-with
500 foreign bases worldwide circa 1950-was sustainable because the country controlled some 50 percent of the global gross product.6 But as America's
share of world output falls-to an estimated 17 percent by 2016-and its social-welfare costs climb relentlessly from 4
percent of gross domestic product in 2010 to a projected 18 percent by 2050, cost-cutting becomes imperative if Washington is to
survive as anything like the planet's "sole superpower."7 Compared to the $3 trillion cost of the U.S. invasion and occupation of
Iraq, the NSA's 2012 budget of just $11 billion for worldwide surveillance and cyberwarfare looks like cost saving the Pentagon can ill-afford to forego.8 Yet this
seeming "bargain" comes at what turns out to be an almost incalculable cost. The sheer scale of such surveillance
leaves it open to countless points of penetration, whether by a handful of anti-war activists breaking into an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, back in 1971 or

27

Edward Snowden downloading NSA documents at a Hawaiian outpost in 2012.9 Once these secret programs are exposed, it turns out nobody really likes being under
surveillance. Proud

national leaders refuse to tolerate foreign powers observing them like rats in a maze.
Ordinary citizens recoil at the idea of Big Brother watching their private lives like so many
microbes on a slide.10

28

More Impacts

29

2AC-Biopolitics Generic
Biopolitics is the root cause of all modern violencethe shift in sovereign power
simultaneously renders bodies productive and creates zones of exclusion
Duarte 5 professor of Philosophy at Universidade Federal do Paran (Andr, Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the Arendtian
critique of the present, April 2005, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=andre_duarte)
These historic transformations have not only brought more violence to the core of the political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical
violence. As stated, what

characterizes biopolitics is a dynamic of both protecting and abandoning life through its inclusion
and exclusion from the political and economic community. In Arendtian terms, the biopolitical danger is best described as
the risk of converting animal laborans into Agambens homo sacer, the human being who can be put to death by
anyone and whose killing does not imply any crime whatsoever 13). When politics is conceived of as biopolitics, as the
task of increasing the life and happiness of the national animal laborans, the nation-state becomes ever more violent and murderous. If we
link Arendts thesis from The Human Condition to those of The Origins of Totalitarianism, we can see the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps as the
most refined experiments in annihilating the bare life of animal laborans (although these are by no means the only instances in which the
modern state has devoted itself to human slaughter). Arendt is not concerned only with the process of the extermination itself, but also the historical situation in which
large-scale exterminations were made possible above all, the emergence of uprooted and superfluous modern masses, what we might describe as animal laborans
balanced on the knife-edge of bare life. Compare her words in Ideology and Terror (1953), which became the conclusion of later editions of The Origins of
Totalitarianism: Isolation is that impasse into which men [humans] are driven when the political sphere of their lives is destroyed Isolated man who lost his place
in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an animal laborans whose
necessary metabolism with nature is of concern to no one. Isolation then become loneliness Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian
government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have
been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and
the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by
others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all 14). The

conversion of homo faber, the human being as creator of

durable objects and institutions, into animal laborans and, later on, into homo sacer, can be traced in Arendts account of
nineteenth century imperialism. As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialism combined racism and
bureaucracy to perpetrate the most terrible massacres in recent history, the Boers extermination of Hottentot tribes, the wild murdering by Carl Peters in German
Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congo population from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, perhaps worst of all, it resulted in
the triumphant introduction of such means of pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies. 15) This simultaneous

protection and
destruction of life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in many other more local conflicts, during
which whole populations have become stateless or deprived of a public realm. In spite of all their political differences, the United
States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived of as states devoted to the needs of
the national animal laborans. According to Agamben, since

our contemporary politics recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and
which have taken bare life as their supreme political criterion are bound to remain standing
temptations 16). Finally, it is obvious that this same logic of promoting and annihilating life persists both in post-industrial and in
underdeveloped countries, inasmuch as economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of
political exclusion. When politics is reduced to the tasks of administering, preserving and promoting the life and
happiness of animal laborans it ceases to matter that those objectives require increasingly violent acts , both in national and
fascism, that is, regimes

international arenas. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the legality of state violence has become a secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really
matters is to protect and stimulate the life of the national (or, as the case may be, Western) animal laborans. In order to maintain sacrosanct ideals of increased mass
production and mass consumerism, developed countries ignore the finite character of natural reserves and refuse to sign International Protocols regarding natural
resource conservation or pollution reduction, thereby jeopardising future humanity. They also launch preventive attacks and wars, disregard basic human rights, for
instance in extra-legal detention camps such as Guantnamo,27) and multiply refugee camps. Some countries have even imprisoned whole populations, physically
isolating them from other communities, in a new form of social, political and economic apartheid. In short, states

permit themselves to impose

physical and structural violence against individuals and regimes (rogue states 18) ) that supposedly interfere with the
security and growth of their national life process. If, according to Arendt, the common world consists of an institutional in-between meant to
outlast both human natality and mortality, in modern mass societies we find the progressive abolition of the institutional artifice that separates and protects our world
from the forces of nature 19). This explains the contemporary feeling of disorientation and unhappiness, likewise the political impossibility we find in combining
stability and novelty 20). In the context of a waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world,

it is not only possible, but also necessary, that people themselves

become raw material to be consumed, discarded, annihilated. In other words, when Arendt announces the grave danger that eventually no
object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption, 22) we should also remember that human annihilation, once
elevated to the status of an end-in-itself in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur albeit in different degrees and by
if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end, 21)

different methods, in contemporary holes of oblivion such as miserably poor Third World neighbourhoods 23) and penitentiaries, underpaid and slave labour camps,
in the name of protecting the vital interests of animal laborans. To talk about a process of human consumption is not to speak metaphorically but literally.

Heidegger had realized this in his notes written during the late thirties, later published under the title of Overcoming Metaphysics. He claimed that the
difference between war and peace had already been blurred in a society in which metaphysical man [human], the animal rationale, gets
fixed as the labouring animal, so that labour is now reaching the metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present. 24) Heidegger
argued that once

the world becomes fully determined by the circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption it
is at the brink of becoming an unworld (Unwelt), since man [human], who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw

30

material, is also drawn into the process. Man is the most important raw material because he remains the subject of all consumption. 25) After the Second World
War and the release of detailed information concerning the death factories Heidegger took his critique even further, acknowledging that to understand man as both
subject and object of the consumption process would still not comprehend the process of deliberate mass extermination. He saw this, instead, in terms of the
conversion of man into no more than an item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses (Bestandestcke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen).
According to Heidegger, what happened in the extermination camps was that death became meaningless, and the existential importance of our anxiety in the face of
death was lost; instead, people were robbed of the essential possibility of dying, so that they merely passed away in the process of being inconspicuously

The human being as animal laborans (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an item of the reserve fund
the same process of dehumanisation whereby humankind is reduced to the bare fact of being
alive, with no further qualifications. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to differentiate between bis and
ze, that is, when bare life is transformed into a qualified or specific form of life, we face the emergence of a
biopolitical epoch 27). When states promote the animalisation of man by policies that aim at both protecting and destroying human life, we can interpret this
in terms of the widespread presence of the homo sacer in our world: If it is true that the figure proposed by our age is that of an
unsacrificeable life that has nevertheless become capable of being killed to an unprecedented degree , then the bare life of
homo sacer concerns us in a special way If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually
homines sacri. 28) Investigating changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn of the nineteenth century, Foucault realized that
when life turned out to be a constitutive political element, managed, calculated, and normalized by means of
biopolitics, political strategies soon became murderous . Paradoxically, when the Sovereigns prerogative ceased to be
simply that of imposing violent death, and became a matter of promoting the growth of life, wars became more and
more bloody, mass killing more frequent. Political conflicts now aimed at preserving and intensifying the life of the winners, so that enmity
ceased to be political and came to be seen biologically: it is not enough to defeat the enemy; it must be exterminated
as a danger to the health of the race, people or community. Thus Foucault on the formation of the modern biopolitical paradigm at the end of
the nineteenth century:death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the
right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century,
liquidated (unauffllig liquidiert). 26)
(Heidegger) all describe

and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death now presents itself as the
counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and
comprehensive regulations. Wars

are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on
behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the
name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have
been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men [humans] to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars have
caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are
in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of point of this
process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individuals
continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to
go on living has become the principle that defines the strategy of states . But the existence in question is no longer the juridical
existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of
the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. 29) Arendt
proposed no political utopias, but she remained convinced that our political dilemmas have no necessary outcome, that history has not and will not come to a tragic
end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she wanted only to understand the world in which she lived in and to stimulate our thinking and acting in the present. It is
always possible that radically new political constellations will come into our world, and responsibility for them will always be ours. If we wish to remain faithful to
the spirit of Arendts political thinking, then we

must think and act politically without constraining our thinking and acting in
terms of some pre-defined understanding of what politics is or should be. In other words, I believe that the political
challenge of the present is to multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can act politically. These may be
strategic actions destined to further the agendas of political parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favoured by small
groups at the margins of the bureaucratised party machines, promoting political interventions free of particular strategic intentions, since their goal is to invite radical
politicisation of existence. Finally, there

are also actions in which ethical openness towards otherness becomes political: small
and rather inconspicuous actions of acknowledging and welcoming, of extending hospitality and solidarity towards
others.

Biopowers normalizing practices are the root cause of otherization

Saltes 13-Professor of Sociology @ Queens University [Natasha, Abnormal Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox
of Disability Surveillance, Surveillance & Society 2013]
Ongoing debates

about the relationship between bodies (biological life ) and the state (politics) have
prompted scholars to revisit Foucaults writings and lectures on biopolitics . Among the competingarticulations,
Lazzarato provides a useful contextualization of the parameters of biopolitics noting that it can be understood as a government-populationpolitical economy relationship [that] refers to a dynamic of forces that establishes a new relationship between ontology and politics (2002: 102).
Scholars who have examined Foucaults lectures have traced biopolitical themes in his genealogy of race (Su Rasmussen 2011) showing how

otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races

(Fassin 2001). A parallel

drawn between the otherness of racialization and the abnormality of impairment

can be

in that

both are

31

the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization . A common theme that weaves
through diverging views of biopolitics is an emphasis on the dyadic relationship between life and politics. What has been largely overlooked is
the notion that biopolitics

is an active and reactive process that politicizes life by locating it within the

polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive
or unproductive and therefore worthy or risky. In this way, biopolitics operates on its own paradoxical axis in that its
strategic aims and methods are carried out through a range of practices that, according to Esposito, can on one hand be affirmative and
productive and on the other hand negative and lethal (2008: 46). To illustrate the underlying rationalization of biopolitics it is fruitful to return to
Foucault and his conception of biopower and biopolitics in the context of the normalizing society. In his lectures at the Collge de France in
1975-1976, Foucault (2003b) distinguishes between these two concepts noting that biopower is a disciplinary technology of

power aimed at the individualized body while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed
at the population. Foucault clarifies that while both are technologies of the body (2003b: 249), the trajectory of power
differs for each. Biopower is exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within
institutional arrangements that discipline and condition the individualized body through processes
of surveillance and training while biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and
political problem and operates through administrative and strategic arrangements of the state
through forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures and intervenes in the birth rate, the mortality rate,
various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment (2003b: 245-246). According to Foucault (2003b),
the concept that underpins biopower and biopolitics is the norm (253). It is the application of the norm to the body and
population that establishes the normalizing society (2003b: 253). Foucault defines the normalizing
society as a society in which the norm of disciplines [biopower] and the norm of regulation [biopolitics]
intersect (2003b: 253). It is a society in which power dominates the organic and the biological
through control over the life of both the body and the population (Foucault 2003b: 253). Foucault (2003a) suggests
that the norm is a political concept wherein processes of power emerge and are legitimized. He claims that the underlying
principles of the norm are that of qualification and correction (2003a: 50). Mader observes that processes of
qualification and correction are contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against quantifiable
qualities (2007: 6). Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be
controlled and managed

(2007: 6). Although Foucault recognizes the repressive outcomes of political power exercised through

processes of normalization, he is averse to conceptualizing political power in strictly repressive terms and suggests that repression is a secondary
effect (2003a: 52) and that the function of power that emerges in accordance with the norm is not to exclude and reject, but is a positive
technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project (2003a: 50). Foucaults association of the normative project with
positive intervention might seem curious given the underlying themes of power and its relation to social control that underlie much of his work.
Yet, he contends that disciplines of normalization that emerged in the eighteenth century produced a productive form of power aimed toward
transformation and innovation (2003a: 52).

This vested interest in preserving a vital community categorizes life according to purity,
creating a vicious form of state racism used to protect sovereignty
Foucault 76-Professor of Philosophy [Michel, Society Must Be Defended, Lectures at College de France, Lecture
Four, 1/28/76]

I think this provides us with a starting point for understandinghow and why historical discourse could become a new issue in themid
nineteenth century. At the time when this discourse was being displaced, translated, or converted into a

revolutionary discourse, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to bereplaced by that of class struggleand
in fact, when I say the mid-nineteenth century, thats too late; it was in the first half of thenineteenth century, as it was [Thiers]
who transformed race struggleinto class struggleat the time when this conversion was going on, it was in fact only natural

that attempts should he made by one sideto recode the old counterhistory not in terms of class, but in
termsof races-races in the biological and medical sense of that term. Andit was at the moment when a
counterhistory of the revolutionary typewas taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shapebut it will be a
counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that waspresent in
this discourse.

You thus see the appearance of what willbecome actual racism. This racism takes over

32

and reconverts the formand function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them,and it
will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its
victories, and itsdefeatswill be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the strugglefor existence. It is no
longer a battle in the sense that a warrior wouldunderstand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the
differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittestspecies. Similarly, the theme of
the binary society which is dividedinto two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and soon will he replaced by that of a
society that is, in contrast, biologicallymonist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous
elements which are not essential to it, which do notdivide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,and which are
in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreignershave infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are thissocietys by
products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted intoits
opposite: the State is no longer an instrument that one race usesagainst another: the State is, and

must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race . The idea of racialpurity,
with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: thatis what replaces the idea of race struggle.I think that racism is
born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle , and when
counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism. The connection between racism and
antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice
thatappears at a given moment in a sort of grand antirevolutionary protect.At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was
being transformed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionarythought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of
race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism nowbegan to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite
literally,revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we couldput it this way: Whereas the discourse of

races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historicopoliticaldiscourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the singular) was a way of turning
that weapon against those who had forged it,of using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State , a
sovereignty whoseluster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals,but by
medico-normalizing techniques . Thanks to the shift from lawto norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular,
from theemancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, sovereignty was ableto invest or take over the discourse of
race struggle and reutilize itfor its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative
toprotect the race. It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution
that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.

33

2AC-Surveillance=Extinction
The surveillance state ensures genocide and extinction
Saul, 15-[Quincy, Author, Editor, and Founder of Ecosocialist Horizons, March 23, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Truth Out,
http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/29664-the-four-horsemen-of-the-apocalypse]

1984 has arrived , only 30 years after Orwell predicted. The revelations brought to us by Chelsea Manning, Julian
Assange and Edward Snowden show us a world in which everything is under surveillance. Julian Assange has written with
great eloquence about the death of civil society overseen by the surveillance state. (1) Today in the United States alone there are more
than 5 million people working under security clearances - more than the population of Norway. The
mirror image of this army of spies is the enormous number of people in prison, including more
African Americans under state control than there were slaves prior to the Civil War. This is the last
stage of the state, the totalitarianism that is the last gasp of every totality. The surveillance state
Surveillance States:

has the capacity for not only genocide, but also extinction : It is capable of repressing and
destroying the revolutionary movements that still have hope to fight for life . The surveillance state
rides the pale horse of the apocalypse , representing death . It is difficult to interpret our times without reference to myths and
we
have created technological Golems and Babels who have immersed us in extreme confusion, and
confronted us with the infernal punishments of Prometheus, Sisyphus and Tantalus, bringing us to
prophecy. As Elias Capriles has written, the chickens of all the world's cultures and histories have come home to roost: Like a scientific sorcerer's apprentice,

the edge of our own annihilation . (2) We are witnessing an end times to the capitalist system. As Marx
the enemy of capital is capital. But since this is not comprehensible to the majority of those too invested in the
capitalist life-world to understand the contradiction, we are at an impasse of unconsciousness, just when we need to be
most awake. What lies ahead? It is almost impossible to see, and very few are looking. In the realms of elite economic planning, they rarely look more than
predicted in the most concise way,

five years in advance. As Jorge Riechmann has written, "It is an intellectual and moral scandal that in our societies of risk, 10 years for many people is long term." (3)
It is not only a scandal, it is a death sentence. As was known thousands of years ago, when there is no vision, the people perish. But in the ancient Greek, apocalypse
and revelation are the same word. What

is the tipping point between the end of the world and the beginning of
the world? You are. We are. It's time to realize it. Time to seize the day and never let go.

34

2AC-Thought Colonization Impact

The disciplinary practices of surveillance combined with the neoliberal security apparatus
colonization of thought by neoliberal security apparatuses make all neg impacts nonunique
Grahm 11-Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities [Cities
under siege: The New Military Urbanism Stephan Grahm STEPHEN GRAHAM is
http://keats.kcl.ac.uk/pluginfile.php/812227/mod_resource/content/1/Graham%20-%20Cities_Under_Siege.pdf First published by Verso 2010
This paperback edition first published by Verso 2011 Stephen Graham 2011]
Turning to our third key starting point - the new military urbanism's political economy - it is important to stress that

the colonization of
urban thinking and practice by militarized ideas of 'security' does not have a single source. In fact, it
emanates from a complex range of sources. These encompass sprawling, transnational industrial complexes that
stretch beyond the military and security sectors to span the technology, surveillance and entertainment industries; a
wide range of consultants, research labs and corporate universities who sell security solutions as
silver bullets to solve complex social problems; and a complex mass of security and military thinkers
who now argue that war and political violence centre overwhelmingly on the everyday spaces and
circuits of urban life. Though vague and all-encompassing, ideas about security infect virtually all aspects
of public policy and social life,'9 so these emerging industrial-security complexes work together on the
highly lucrative challenges of perpetually targeting everyday activities, spaces and behaviours in cities , as well
as the conduits that link conurbations. Amid global economic collapse, markets for security services and
technologies are booming like never before. Crucially, as the Raytheon example again demonstrates, the same
constellations of security companies are often involved in selling, establishing and overseeing the techniques and practices of the new military
urbanism in both war-zone and homeland cities. Often, as with the EU's new Europe-wide security policies, states or supranational blocks are not
necessarily bringing in high-tech and militarized means of tracking illegal immigrants because they are the best means to address their security
concerns. Rather, many such policies are intended to help build local industrial champions by developing their own defence, security or
technology companies so they can compete in booming global markets for security technology. In this lucrative export market, the Israeli
experience of locking down cities and turning the Occupied Territories into permanent, urban prison camps is proving especially influential. It is
the ultimate source of 'combat-proven' techniques and technology. The new high-tech border fence between the United States and Mexico, for
example, is being built by a consortium linking 19 See Giorgio Agamben, 'Security and Terror; Theory and Event, 5 : 4, 2002, 1-2.
INTRODUCTION: ' TARGET INTERCEPT .. : XXIII Boeing to the Israeli company Elbit, whose radar and targeting technologies have been
developed in the permanent lockdown of Palestinian urban life. It is also startling how much US counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq have
explicitly been based on efforts to emulate the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians during the Second Intifada. The political economies sustaining
the new military urbanism inevitably focus on the role of an elite group of so-called 'global' cities as the centres of neoliberal capitalism as well as
the main arenas and markets for rolling out the new security solutions. The world's major financial centres, in particular, orchestrate global
processes of militarization and securitization. They house the headquarters of global security, technology and military corporations, provide the
locations for the world's biggest corporate universities - which dominate research and development in new security technologies - and support the
global network of financial institutions which so often work to erase or appropriate cities and resources in colonized lands in the name of
neoliberal economics and 'free trade: The network of global cities through which neoliberal capitalism is primarily orchestrated - London, New
York, Paris, Frankfurt, and so on - thus helps to produce new logics of aggressive colonial acquisition and dispossession by multinational capital,
which works closely with state militaries and private military contractors. With the easing of state monopolies on violence

and the proliferation of acquisitive private military and mercenary corporations, the brutal
'urbicidal' violence and dispossession that so often helps bolster the parasitic aspects of Western
city economies, as well as feeding contemporary corporate capitalism, is more apparent than ever.10 In a
world increasingly haunted by the spectre of imminent resource exhaustion, the new military
urbanism is thus linked intimately with the neocolonial exploitation of distant resources in an effort
sustain the richer cities and wealthy urban lifestyles. New York and London provide the financial and corporate power
through which Iraqi oil reserves have been appropriated by Western oil companies since the 2003 invasion. Neocolonial land-grabs to grow
biofuels for cars or food for increasingly precarious urban populations of the rich North are also organized through global commodity markets
centred on the world's big financial cities. Finally, the rapid global growth in markets for high-tech security is

itself providing a major boost to these cities in a time of global economic meltdown

35

Solvency

36

Policy Solvency Mechanism-HR 1466

The plan repeals section 702 and effectively ends the U.S. Surveillence State
H.R. 1466 15-[H.R.1466 - Surveillance State Repeal Act 114th Congress (2015-2016) | Get alerts BILLHide Overview icon-hide Sponsor:
Rep. Pocan, Mark [D-WI-2] (Introduced 03/19/2015) Committees: House - Judiciary; Intelligence (Permanent); Financial Services; Foreign
Affairs; Energy and Commerce; Education and the Workforce; Transportation and Infrastructure; Armed Services Latest Action: 04/21/2015
Referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are
the steps for Status of Legislation: IntroducedPassed HousePassed SenateTo PresidentBecame Law More on This Bill Constitutional Authority
Statement Subject Policy Area: Armed Forces and National Security View subjects Summary (1) Text (1) Actions (14) Titles (2) Amendments
(0) Cosponsors (14) Committees (8) Related Bills (0) Text: H.R.1466 114th Congress (2015-2016)All Bill Information (Except Text) There is
one version of the bill. Text available as:XML/HTMLXML/HTML (new window)TXTPDF Shown Here: Introduced in House (03/19/2015)
114th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 1466 https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1466/text]
H. R. 1466 To repeal the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act of

2008 , and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES March 19, 2015 Mr. Pocan (for himself, Mr. Massie, Mr. Grayson, Mr. McGovern, and Mr. Doggett) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select),
Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, Education and the Workforce, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Armed Services,
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned A BILL To repeal the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled

, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the Surveillance State Repeal Act. SEC. 2. REPEAL OF USA
PATRIOT ACT. (a) Repeal.The USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 10756) is repealed , and the
provisions of law amended or repealed by such Act are restored or revived as if such Act had not been enacted. (

b) Destruction Of

Certain Information.The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall
destroy any information collected under the USA PATRIOT Act
amendments made by such Act,

(Public Law 10756)

and the

as in effect the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, concerning a United States

person that is not related to an investigation that is actively ongoing on such date.

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF THE FISA

AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008. (a) Repeal.The FISA Amendments Act of 2008

122 Stat. 2477)

(Public Law 110261;

is repealed, and the provisions of law amended or repealed by such Act are restored or

revived as if such Act had not been enacted.

(b) Exception.Subsection (a) of this Act shall not apply to sections 103 and

110 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110261; 122 Stat. 2477). ( c)

Destruction Of Certain Information.

The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall destroy any information
collected under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

(50 U.S.C. 1881a),

as in

effect the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, concerning a United States person that
is not related to an investigation that is actively ongoing on such date. S EC. 4. TERMS OF JUDGES ON
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT; REAPPOINTMENT; SPECIAL MASTERS. (a) Terms; Reappointment.Section
103(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(d)) is amended (1) by striking maximum of seven and inserting
maximum of ten; and (2) by striking and shall not be eligible for redesignation. (b) Special Masters.Section 103(f) of such Act, as amended
by section 3 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: (4) Special Masters. (A) The

courts established pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) may appoint one or more Special Masters to
advise the courts on technical issues raised during proceedings before the courts. (B) In this
paragraph, the term Special Master means an individual who has technological expertise in the
subject matter of a proceeding before a court established pursuant to subsection ( a) or (b).. SEC. 5.
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF SPECIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT REGARD TO
SPECIFIC DEVICE. Section 105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)) is amended to read as follows: (B) that, upon the request of the applicant,
any person or entity shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, or technical
assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its
37

secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord,
custodian, or other person is providing that target of electronic surveillance;. SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR COLLECTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978. (a) In General. Title
VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.),

as amended by section 3

of this Act, is further amended to read as follows: TITLE VIIADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701. WARRANT REQUIREMENT. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no
information relating to a United States person may be acquired pursuant to this Act without a
valid warrant based on probable cause..

(b) Table Of Contents Amendments.The table of contents in the first section of

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 3 of this Act, is further amended by striking the
items relating to title VII and section 701 and inserting the following new items: TITLE VIIADDITIONAL PROVISIONS. 701. Warrant
requirement.. SEC. 7.

ENCRYPTION AND PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES

AND SOFTWARE. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government shall not
mandate that the manufacturer of an electronic device or software for an electronic device build
into such device or software a mechanism that allows the Federal Government to bypass the
encryption or privacy technology of such device or software.

SEC. 8. GAO COMPLIANCE EVALUATIONS. (a) In

General.The Comptroller General of the United States shall annually evaluate compliance by the Federal Government with the provisions of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (b) Report.The Comptroller General shall annually submit to
Congress a report containing the results of the evaluation conducted under subsection (a). SEC. 9. WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS. (a)
Authorization To Report Complaints Or Information.An employee of or contractor to an element of the intelligence community that has
knowledge of the programs and activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) may submit a
covered complaint (1) to the Comptroller General of the United States; (2) to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; (3) to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; or (4) in accordance with the process established under section
103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)). (b) Investigations And Reports To Congress.The Comptroller General
shall investigate a covered complaint submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) and shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of the
investigation. (c) Covered Complaint Defined.In this section, the term covered complaint means a complaint or information concerning
programs and activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that an employee or contractor
reasonably believes is evidence of (1) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (2) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. SEC. 10. PROHIBITION ON INTERFERENCE WITH REPORTING
OF WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, OR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. (a) In General.Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer or
employee of an element of the intelligence community shall take any retaliatory action against an employee of or contractor to an element of the
intelligence community who seeks to disclose or discloses covered information to (1) the Comptroller General; (2) the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (3) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; or (4) the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. (b) Administrative Sanctions.An officer or employee of an element of the intelligence
community who violates subsection (a) shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination. (c) Definitions.In this
section: (1) COVERED INFORMATION.The term covered information means any information (including classified or sensitive
information) that an employee or contractor reasonably believes is evidence of (A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (B) gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. (2)
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.The term intelligence community has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). SEC. 11. PROHIBITION OF TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333
WITHOUT A WARRANT. (a) Prohibition On Targeting Of United States Persons Without A Warrant.Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no United States person may be the target of an acquisition under Executive Order 12333 without a valid warrant based on probable cause.
(b) Audit Of Compliance With Prohibition. (1) AUDIT.The Comptroller General of the United States shall annually conduct an audit of
intelligence collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure compliance with the requirement under subsection (a). (2) REPORT.The
Comptroller General shall annually submit to Congress a report containing the results of each audit conducted under paragraph (1). (c)
Destruction Of Certain Information.The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall destroy any information collected
under Executive Order 12333 without a valid warrant based on probable cause concerning a United States person that is not related to an
investigation that is actively ongoing on the date of the enactment of this Act.

38

A2-Democracy Turn
Turn-liberalism is incapable of checking the worst excesses of biopolitics
Dean 1- Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University (Mitchell, 2001, Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty.
Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 50-1)
Finally, although

liberalism may try to make safe the biopolitical imperative of the

optimization of life, it has shown itself permanently incapable of arrestingfrom eugenics to
contemporary genetics---the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of
the life of some dependent on the disallowing of the life of others . I can only suggest
some general reasons for this. Liberalism is fundamentally concerned to govern through
what it conceives as processes that are external to the sphere of government
limited by the respect for rights and liberties of individual subjects. Liberal
rule thus fosters forms of knowledge of vital processes and seeks to govern
through their application. Moreover, to the extent that liberalism depends on the
formation of responsible and autonomous subjects through biopolitics and
discipline, it fosters the type of governmental practices that are the ground
of such rationalities. Further, and perhaps more simply, we might consider the possibility that sovereignty and
biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of
political norms from the democratization of the former cannot act as a
prophylactic for the possible outcomes of the latter. We might also consider the alternative to this
thesis, that biopolitics captures and expands the division between political life
and mere existence, already found within sovereignty. In either case, the
framework of right and law can act as a resource for forces engaged in
contestation of the effects of biopower; it cannot provide a guarantee as the
efficacy of such struggle and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.
Democratic peace theory is wrongmore likely to produce conflict
Pazienza 14-MA in Government and International Affairs @ University of South Florida [Toni, Challenging the Democratic Peace Theory
The Role of US-China Relationship, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6294&context=etd, DKP] *includes indicts of
Gurr, Rummel, Small and Singer

Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on certain statistical tests and data bases that determine that
democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but by reason of restrictive definitions, have fought each other (Brown 304). Scientists
use differing definitions, differing decision rules for identifying international actors and different
variables and time periods that can all cause confusion. Different data collection can make a
significant difference in empirical results. Even identifying regimes possessing the political
structures of a democracy is no trivial task. The Correlates of War Project, as mentioned earlier, was founded in 1963, by J. David Singer.
The goal of the project has been the accumulation of scientific knowledge about war. Joined by Melvin Small, the project took on more accurate data on the incidence
and extent of inter-state and extra state systemic war. In 1972, they published, The Wages of War, a work that established a standard definition of war that has since
guided research. Singer and Small (1982), hypothesize that to be defined as an interstate war, there must exist at least one thousand battle deaths. Yet despite its

wide influence, problems with the Small and Singer research design made it a poor foundation of where to
begin to build consensus. Not only were Small and Singer's statistical tests simplistic (difference between means) and
their measure of democracy very rough (a dichotomous indicator), their analysis also suffered a fatal design
flaw that makes it irrelevant to the democratic peace issue. They sampled selected wars rather than regimes
with the potential for war as the theory would suggest. In other words, the probabi1ity of war, given regime type, is
central to the democratic peace question, whereas Small and Singer instead estimated the

39

probability of regime type given war involvement. The two are statistically nonequivalent. Rummel made a
significant attempt in dealing with this problem. He examined associations between regime type and conflict from 1976 to 1950, and discovered evidence that freer
regimes did indeed commit less acts of official violence. Although it stands as a lonely voice of dissent, Rummel's

study did not validate

democratic peace theory because it suffered from a narrow time period. Rummels measures of both
conflict and democracy were nonstandard, relying on media reports and a measure that included
economic freedom. Different periods from which data was collected muddied the waters further.
Rummel confined his research to a five (5) year term, from 1976 to 1980, and all interstate wars since 1816,
and claimed that there was an overabundance of evidence. Although political freedom erects a natural barrier to
violence between democracies, it does not apparently have the same restraining effect on the democracies when dealing with
nondemocracies (Rummel 25). Christopher Layne disagreed with Rummel's sampling set of wars in that several important cases of
wars between democratic states are not counted for reasons that are not persuasive. This coincides with Steve Chans research who, in
his article, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? criticized both Singer and Small and Rummel, and their quantitative analyses (38).
According to Chan, The

relationship between freedom and war is quite different, depending on whether

the analyst examines the empirical proposition in its dyadic or monadic form. (641). He argues that testing
the proposition in a monadic form or cross-sectionally, the evidence does not tend to support it.
(642). Singer and Small came to the same conclusion that, while although democracies do not fight each other; they are likely to go to war with nondemocracies.

The time period chosen by researchers to investigate the problem can make a significant difference in the empirical
results. Chan argues that Rummels study was restricted to the 1970s, and that if you include extrinsic wars
and wars from a post-1973 period that discrepancies surface in literature (642). In the end Chan does admit that some
countries have become freer over time and have at the same time undertaken more intense foreign violence, but this may simply be due to technological advances in
weaponry. It

is also possible that the theory is limited to the nuclear age, and factors such as power and
interests, rather than democracy, are the main determinants of war and peace between countries (Maoz 164). Most of the current
efforts to categorize regimes for the purpose of evaluating the democratic peace proposition are
based on data generated by Ted Gurr and his colleagues (Ray 32). Drawing on this data, Mansfield and Snyder argue that there is no
coincidence in this contemporary connection, that statistically democratizing states are more war
prone (303). After consideration of measures and length of time (a ten year period of stability), on average,
democratizing states are about two-thirds more likely to go to war than states that did not
experience a regime change (308). This statement is clear that the mechanism for conflict is a regime
change in itself; and not just from autocratic to democratic. The authors also acknowledge that
while autocratizing states are also likely to go to war, statistically, it is less so than democratizing
states. (314) Gurrs most current form of the dataset is referred to as Polity III. Although valuable, these data bases are not
without their limitations as a basis for resolving the debate about whether, or how often, there have been wars between democratic states (Gleditsch &
Ward 2). Gurr applies an 11-point ordinal scale of democracy to almost every state in the world for every year from 1800 to the
1900s. Those democracy scores are themselves sums of scores on various dimensions reflecting, for example, the section of
government executives by election, the openness of executive recruitment, and the parity between the executive and legislative branches of government. These
separate dimensions are themselves complex, and when their scores are added, the resulting overall
democracy score consists of compounded layers of complexity. Arguments that a particular state at
a given time cannot be categorized as democratic because it does not rate a score of seven on the Polity III
democracy index are not likely to be persuasive to skeptics because of the threshold of seven, or of any other score on the Polity III index, is unclear
because it is difficult to sort states into two categories, democratic and not democratic.

40

A2-Util
Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end
Weizman 11-professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London (Eyal Weizman, 2011, The Least of All Possible
Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza, pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so
deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts from individual situational ethics
and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the war on terror and
the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid that it seems to
have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the good. Moreover, the very evocation of the good seems
to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic
inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the
collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the war on terror, the terms of the
lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canadas Liberal Party
Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in balancing liberty against security liberal states
establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services
to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence which he saw as lesser evils in order to fend off or minimize
potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist
emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. Exceptions, Ignatieff
states, do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last
resort.12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a tolerated sin that functions as the very
justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various
types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but
to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this
logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical
minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level
of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles:
keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13
More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal
exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to
defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture ,15 to the use

of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even the intentional targeting of some
civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested
that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a
humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is
time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the banality of evil as the idiom to describe the
most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as
democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as
this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war
and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places
where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the

justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an enlightened manner; it is
sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatiotechnological means of domination, and advertises them as humanitarian technology. In these cases the logic of the
lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to
the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even
according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming
counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated
and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations
amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieffs Adi Ophirs philosophical essay The
Order of Evils. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the good but

the systemic logic of an economy of violence the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage but
insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them.

41

Inherent in Ophirs insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand
of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

Value is Not Based on Duration or Longevity Living As If Were Never-Going-to-Die, Just

Means We Will Die Having-Never-Really-Lived.
Razinsky 9-Lecturer in the Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies @ Bar-Ilan University [Liran Razinsky, How to Look Death
in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2) 2009 Pg 76-81 ProjectMuse]
Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form of praxis, in either a channeled,
ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep
identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Batailles perspective continuously brings
up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The
encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine
is Freuds attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freuds text is very confused, due to
true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, A Struggle). One manifestation of this confusion is Freuds position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude:
on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from deaths exclusion from
unconscious thought (Thoughts 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life.17 But then Freud suddenly
recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the

Life is impoverished , it loses in interest, when the

highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked . It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American

cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives.

flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its
serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to
us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant
countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the sons place with his mother, the husbands with his wife, the
fathers with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus

the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in

its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.
(It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.) (Thoughts 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freuds paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief.
Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freuds thought. One can hardly find any
other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic
considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.18 The examplesnot experimenting with explosive substancesseem irrelevant
and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It

is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our
calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as
is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the
preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make
death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but
insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the
situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freuds position more intelligible. He seems to articulate
better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I
asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It

might
be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight
with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving , something of the
true nature of life evades us . It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations necessary for
his preservation, that he asserts the nature of his being (La Littrature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive
as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Mans need to approach
death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value . Freud
carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where
he encourages us to give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due (Thoughts 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life more
tolerable for us once again (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and
on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for
the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out experiments with explosive
substances. In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by
Batailles worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere
spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. The sacred
horror, he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: the richest and most agonizing experience. It opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this
world and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (Hegel 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it
is for Hegel or Kojve. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The

presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner,

is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where
individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest .
Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: immanence between man and the world, between the
subject and the object (The Festival 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littrature 215; 70).
They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in
life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freuds text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is
life lacking in intensity , an impoverished, shallow and empty life . Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended:
the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and

42

exclusions. Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where
Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once.
War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. Death could no longer be denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become
interesting again; it has recovered its full content (Thoughts 291). Thus

what is needed is more than the mere accounting

of consequences , taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death ,
a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the accumulation of deaths of others. Life
can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery
around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of who is to take our
place,

the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a
fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty.19 Yet again, Freuds claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille
supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It
limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension
here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence
to the bare minimum , or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting,
more vital and valuable. Our usual world , according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the
future function, rather than by the present . Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future
time . This is one reason for the threat of death : it ruins value where value is only assured through duration . It also
exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs
its normal course. Man is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things (The Festival 312; 214). Sacrifice is the
opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order
of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. The power of death signifies
that this real world can only have a neutral image of life []. Death reveals life in its plenitude (309;
212). Batailles neutral image of life is the equivalent of Freuds shallow and empty life. What Freud
denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations . It is precisely
the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into
life. Who is to take the sons place with his mother, the husbands with his wife, the fathers with his children. Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but
it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the
present . The need for duration , in the words of Bataille, conceals life from us (The Festival 309; 212). For both authors, when
death is left out, life as it is is false and superficial .

43

A2-Future Generations
Risking extinction to protect rights is justified we shouldnt protect future generations if
they have no liberty
Shue 89-Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University [Henry, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, 1989, p. 64-5]
The issue raises interesting problems about obligations among generations. What obligations do we owe to future generations whose very existence will be affected by our risks? A crude

utilitarian calculation would suggest that since the pleasures of future generations may last infinitely (or until the sun burns out), no risk that we take to
assure certain values for our generation can compare with almost infinite value in the future. Thus we have no right to take such
risks. In effect, such an approach would establish a dictatorship of future generations over the present one. The only permissible role
for our generation would be biological procreation. If we care about other values in addition to survival, this crude utilitarian approach
produces intolerable consequences for the current generation. Moreover, utility is too crude a concept to support such a calculation. We have little idea of
what utility will mean to generations very distant from ours. We think we know something about our children, and perhaps our grandchildren, but what will people value 8,000 years from now? If
we do not know, then there is the ironic prospect that something we deny ourselves now for the sake of a future generation may be of little value to them. A more defensible approach to the issue

we shall not be certain of

the detailed preferences of increasingly distant generations, but we can assume that they will wish equal chances of survival. On the other hand, there
is no reason to assume that they would want survival as a sole value any more than the current generation does. On the
contrary, if they would wish equal access to other values that give meaning to life, we could infer that they might wish us to take some risks of species
extinction in order to provide them equal access to those values. If we have benefited from "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness," why should we assume that the next generation would want only life?
of justice among generations is the principle of equal access. Each generation should have roughly equal access to important values. We must admit that

44

Heg Bad

45

2AC-Critique of Hegemony
Anti-Americanism is inevitable and US Leadership Ensures Global Destruction We Only
Believe it is Stabilizing Because We Refuse to Question it
Burke 7-Professor

of Politics and International Relations @ the University of New South Wales [Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and
Violence, p. 231-2, 2007]
Yet the first act in America's

'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its
object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning.
This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text
divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing
relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will
maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration,
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be
characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the
part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war
and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of 'development'
and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in
favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising
from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this
light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical' violence that stretches back to
Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through
which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade
relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global
economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia,
'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in
the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's
benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the

The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard,
stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the eternal
recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is
'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73

how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will
have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into

believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and
that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a
journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."

The disads threat construction is a fantasy that perpetually creates new enemies to destroy
Chernus 6-Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder
[Ira, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, Published by Paradigm Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 53-54, 2006,
DKP]

The
neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it
wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons efforts
inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has
unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so
is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: For
the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it
maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this
anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the
problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale.

46

event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very
existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that
genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed , change of any kind , in any
nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might
have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often
turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke
resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of
course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other
nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To
the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be
destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons
want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others
usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret
plan for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering
intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve
the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on
the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a
statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of
finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only
as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can
never be defeated.

At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince

This vision of
endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and
the goal of the neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want.
Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict , so that the U.S. can go on
forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism.
They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has
unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a
shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant
changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find
new monsters to destroy. The neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order
because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a
society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of
social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always
people that things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40

requires an enemy.

The impact is extinctionexceptionalism engages in an active forgetting of the horrors of

past atrocities, paving the way for ever-increasing violence
Spanos 08-Distinguished

Professor of English at Binghamton University, State University of New York William V.,
American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472892,
p. ix-x, 2008)
In this book I contend that the

consequence of America's intervention and conduct of the war in

Vietnam was the self-destruction of the ontological, cultural, and political foundations on

47

which America had perennially justified its benign" self-image and global practice from the
time of the Puritan "errand in the wilderness." In the aftermath of the defeat of the
American Goliath by a small insurgent army, the "specter" of Vietnamby which I mean, among
other things, the violence, bordering on genocide, America perpetrated against an "Other" that
refused to accommodate itself to its mission in the wilderness of Vietnamcame to haunt
America as a contradiction that menaced the legitimacy of its perennial self-representation
as the exceptionalist and "redeemer nation." In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the
dominant culture in America (including the government, the media, Hollywood, and even educational institutions)
mounted a massive campaign to "forget Vietnam." This relentless recuperative momentum
to lay the ghost of that particular war culminated in the metamorphosis of an earlier general
will to "heal the wound inflicted on the American national psyche, into the "Vietnam
syndrome"; that is, it transformed a healthy debate over the idea of America into a national
neurosis. This monumentalist initiative was aided by a series of historical events between 1989 and 1991 that deflected the
American people's attention away from the divisive memory of the Vietnam War and were represented by the dominant
culture as manifestations of the global triumph of "America": Tiananmen Square, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the
first Gulf War. This "forgetting" of the actual history of the Vietnam War , represented in this book by
Graham Greene's The Quiet American, Philip Caputo's A Rumor of War, and Tim OBrien's Going After Cacciato (and many
other novels, memoirs, and films to which I refer parenthetically), contributed to the rise of neoconservatism

and the religious right to power in the United States. And it provided the context for the
renewal of America's exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness, now understood , as the
conservative think tank the Project for the New American [end page ix] Century put it long before the invasion of Afghanistan
and Iraq, as the preserving and perpetuation of the Pax Americana. Whatever vestigial

memory of the Vietnam War remained after this turn seemed to be decisively interred with
Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
Completely immune to dissent, the confident American government , under President George W.
Bush and his neoconservative intellectual deputiesand with the virtually total support of the America media resumed
its errand in the global wilderness that had been interrupted by the specter of Vietnam .
Armed with a resurgence of self-righteous indignation and exceptionalist pride, the American government, indifferent to the
reservations of the "Old World," unilaterally invaded Afghanistan and, then, after falsifying intelligence reports about Saddam
Hussein's nuclear capability, Iraq, with the intention, so reminiscent of its (failed) attempts in Vietnam, of imposing
American-style democracy on these alien cultures. The early representation by the media of the immediately successful "shock
and awe" acts of arrogant violence in the name of civilization" was euphoric. They were, it was said, compelling evidence not
only of the recuperation of American consensus, but also of the rejuvenation of America's national identity. But as

immediate "victory" turned into an occupation of a world unwilling to be occupied, and the
American peace into an insurgency that now verges on becoming a civil war, the specter of
Vietnam, like the Hydra in the story of Hercules, began to reassert itself: the
unidentifiability or invisibility of the enemy, their refusal to be answerable to the American
narrative, quagmire, military victories that accomplished nothing, search and destroy
missions, body counts, the alienation of allies, moral irresolution, and so on . It is the
memory of this "Vietnamthis specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial
exceptionalist discourse of post-Vietnam Americathat my book is intended to bring back to presence.
By retrieving a number of representative works that bore acute witness, even against themselves, to the singularity of a war
America waged against a people seeking liberation from colonial rule and by reconstellating them into the post-9/11 occasion,
such a project can contribute a new dimension not only to that shameful decade of American

history, but also, and more important, to our understanding of the deeply backgrounded origins
of America's war on terror" in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks . Indeed, it is my ultimate
purpose in this book to provide directives for resisting an American momentum that threatens
to destabilize the entire planet, if not to annihilate the human species itself, and also for
rethinking the very idea of America.

48

2AC-Defense
Heg doesnt solve war the international community is resilient and disruptions are
temporary
Preble 10 - Christopher A. Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a Ph.D in History from Temple
University (Christopher A., U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose? 8/2/2010, The Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/blog/us-military-powerpreeminence-what-purpose)

Over at National Journals National Security Experts blog, this weeks question focuses on the recently released Hadley-Perry alternative QDR.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. of NationalJournal.com asks: The U.S. military is already unaffordable and yet it needs to be larger to sustain Americas
global leadership, especially in the face of a rising China. Thats the bottom line from a congressionally chartered bipartisan panel, co-chaired by
Stephen Hadley, George W. Bushs national security adviser, and William Perry, Bill Clintons Defense secretary. The report, released July 29, is
the independent panels assessment of and commentary on the Pentagons own Quadrennial Defense Review, released earlier this year. Frequent
expert blog contributor Gordon Adams, among others, has already blasted the Hadley-Perry report for making the underlying assumption that the
U.S. can and should continue to invest heavily in being a global policeman. Is Adams right that the Hadley-Perry report calls for an
unaffordable answer to the wrong question? Or are the reports authors correct when they argue that the U.S. must be the leading guarantor of
global security? And if the U.S. must lead, has the Hadley-Perry panel laid out the right path to doing so? My response: Dan Goure says that U.S.
military preeminence is not unaffordable. That is probably correct. Even though we spend in excess of $800 billion annually on national security
(including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs) we could choose to
spend as much, or more, for a while longer. We could choose to shift money out of other government programs; we could raise taxes; or we could
continue to finance the whole thing on debt, and stick our children and grandchildren with the bill. But what is the point? Why do Americans
spend so much more on our military than does any other country, or any other combination of countries? Goure and the Hadley-Perry
commissioners who produced the alternate QDR argue that the purpose of American military power is to provide global public goods, to defend
other countries so that they dont have to defend themselves, and otherwise shape the international order to suit our ends. In other words, the
same justifications offered for American military dominance since the end of the Cold War. Most in Washington still embraces the notion that
America is, and forever will be, the worlds indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic

stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds
with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power ; the international
economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of
mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose or gain the most . Islamic
extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with
thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous
thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars
between nation-states; it

is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the

United States were to modestly refocus its efforts , draw down its military power, and call on other
countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are
credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy
establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and
indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the
schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldnt have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the
judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the
military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

Heg doesnt prevent war wars in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait prove
Monteiro 11 - Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University

(Nuno P. Monteiro, Unrest Assured Why

Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the

past decade has witnessed a

resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism,
preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them
to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but
peaceful . U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999,
Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010.22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the
twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War.23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity , which make up
less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nations total time at
war.24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace . Why? To
49

date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate.25 The debate on whether, when, and how
unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

50

2AC-Imperialism
US hegemonic imperialism will cause devastation on an unprecedented scale, causing
massive global war. We must reject this endless cycle of violence. Vote negative to resist
imperialism
Foster 3-Professor of Sociology @ the University of Oregon, Editor of the Monthly Review, PhD in Political Science @ York University
[John, The New Age of Imperialism, 55 (3), https://www.monthlyreview.org/0703jbf.htm]
At the same time, it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism

the United States is geared above all

to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its
interests. The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly increasing
proportion of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United States to
gain greater control of these resources--at the expense of its present and potential rivals. But U.S. imperial ambitions do not end there, since they
are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. As Harry Magdoff noted in the closing pages of The Age of Imperialism in 1969, "it is
the professed goal" of U.S. multinational corporations "to control as large a share of the world market as they do of the United States market,"
and this hunger for foreign markets persists today. Flo rida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization contracts in
Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands Antilles ("Prison Industry Goes Global,"
www.futurenet.org, fall 2000). Promotion of U.S. corporate interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities of the
U.S. state. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically modified food, Microsoft and intellectual property, Bechtel and the war on Iraq. It

would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this dual expansionism of U.S. corporations and the U.S. state
is to the world at large. As Istvan Meszaros observed in 2001 in Socialism or Barbarism, the U.S. attempt to seize global control,
which is inherent in the workings of capitalism and imperialism, is now threatening humanity with the "extreme violent rule of
the whole world by one hegemonic imperialist country on a permanent basis...an absurd and unsustainable way of
running the world order."* This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by
other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states
and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of
contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well
be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" the United
States may be paving the way to new global [catastrophes] holocausts. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances
lies in a rising tide of revolt from below, both in the United States and globally. The growth of the antiglobalization movement, which
dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest
global wave of antiwar protests in human history. Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the
attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The Vietnam Syndrome, which has so
worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to
have been coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale--something that no one really expected. This more

than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire
cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own--we hope not the world's--undoing.

Violent US leadership is wrong methodologically- making hegemony work better simply

greases the wheels of future interventions. Its essential to challenge the neoconservative
logic of their advantage to demilitarize American politics
Rule 10-Emeritus Professor of Sociology @ Stony Brook University, has been a researcher or teacher @ MIT, Oxford, Nuffield, and
Cambridge, Distinguished Affiliate Scholar @ the Center for the Study of Law and Society of UC Berkeley Law School, PhD in Sociology @
Harvard, MA Oxford, AB in Psychology @ Brandeis, [James B., The Military State of America and the Democratic Left, Dissent Vol. 57 No 1,
Winter 2010]
The invasion of Iraq

was a defining moment for the United States. This was the kind of war that many Americans
believed formed no part of this country's repertoire - an aggressive war of choice. Its aim was not to
stop some wider conflict or to prevent ethnic cleansing or mass killings; indeed, its predictable
effect was to promote these things. The purpose was to extirpate a regime that the United States had built up but that had morphed
into an obstacle to this country - and to replace it with one that would represent a more compliant instrument of American purpose. In short, the
war was a demonstration of American ability and willingness to remove and replace regimes
anywhere in the world. Even in the wake of the Iraq fiasco, no one in high places has declared
repetitions of such exploits "off the table" - to use the expression favored by this country's foreign policy elites. For those of us

51

who opposed the war, there is obvious relief at the conclusion - we hope - of a conflict that has consistently brought out the worst in this country.
But at the same time, those on the democratic Left look to the future with unease. Even under a reputedly

liberal president, we have reason to worry about new versions of Iraq - in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iran or venues yet undisclosed. To its credit, Dissent has not joined the rush to avert attention from the endgames of the Iraq
conflict. The Spring 2009 edition features a section of articles under the rubric "Leaving Iraq." The essays focus on the moral and political
quandaries of America's departure from a country that it did a great deal to break, but where its ability to repair things is rapidly diminishing. But,
a look at the proposals put forward there makes it clear that the thinking that gave us the American invasion of Iraq in

the first place has not gone away. George Packer, for example, inveighs against those seeking a quick exit
for American forces. The balance of power among Iraq's domestic forces could easily be upset , he
holds, and valuable progress undone, without a longlingering presence of Americans as enforcers. Obviously playing to the sensitivities of
Dissent readers, he concludes that "much as we might wish [the war] had never happened at all, America will have obligations as well as interests
in Iraq for a long time to come." The sense of all this, from Packer's standpoint, becomes clear when you

recall his efforts to discredit Americans' resistance to the war in the months before it began. The
antiwar movement, he wrote in the New York Times Magazine in December, 2002, "has a serious liability . . . it's
controlled by the furthest reaches of the American Left ." He goes on, in this same article, to envisage a quite different
role for those on the Left, like himself, who took what he considered a more enlightened view: The "liberal hawks could make the case for war to
suspicious Europeans and to wavering fellow Americans," he wrote; "they might even be able to explain the connection between the war in Iraq
and the war on terrorism ..." Brendan O'Leary, another contributor to Dissent's Spring 2009 "Leaving Iraq" section, also stresses

responsibility. He, too, means by this continued readiness to apply U.S. coercion to manage Iraqi domestic politics. To judge from his
words, he has no difficulty in principle with the notion of remaking Iraq by outside military force: "Reasonable historians should judge ... that
removing the genocidal Baathists was overdue," he avers. "The younger Bush made up for his father's mistake, though he did so for the wrong
reasons." Still, O'Leary allows that the invasion hasn't quite unfolded as he might have wished: "... grotesque mismanagement of regimereplacement ... unnecessary and arrogant occupation ... incompetence of American direct rule... numerous errors of policy and imagination ... in
the horrors and brutalities that have followed." The America occupiers have sometimes proved "blindly repressive," he allows - but sometimes,
apparently, not repressive enough. Still, leaving before America sets things straight would be irresponsible. If the United States just keeps trying,
it may yet get it all right. This country must now manage the political forces set in motion by its invasion according to O'Leary's exacting
formula: defend the federalist constitution, keep resurgent Sunni and Shiite forces from each other's throats, and preserve the autonomy of the
Kurds. Just the same, he notes, "After the United States exits, an Arab civil war may re-ignite, as well as Kurdish-Arab conflict." To some of us,
an invasion that leaves such possibilities simmering after six years of American-sponsored death and destruction itself seems more than a little
irresponsible. Some of the aims invoked by Packer and O'Leary are beyond reproach. Certainly the United States bears profound responsibilities
to protect Iraqis at risk from their collaboration with or employment by American forces - and for that matter, to help repair damage to the
country's infrastructure resulting from the invasion. And certainly this country should do everything possible to prevent regional, communal, and
ethnic groupings from exploiting a U.S. pullout to oppress others. But making good on any of these estimable goals, as the authors seem to
realize, will be a very big order - especially given America's record thus far. Yet the deeper, mostly unstated assumptions

underlying these authors' proposals ought to strike a chill throughout the democratic Left. Their
problems with the Iraq invasion - and implicitly, future American military exploits of the same kind - have to do with
execution, not the larger vision of American power that inspired the enterprise . Their words strike
an eerie resonance with those of Thomas L. Friedman, before the invasion occurred: he favored George W.
Bush's "audacious" war plan as "a job worth doing," but only "if we can do it right." America's violent remaking of
Iraq would have been entirely acceptable, it seems, if only Friedman's sensibilities could have guided it. More important: the continuing
mission of the United States as maker and breaker of regimes around the world remained
unquestioned. When any country gets seriously in the way of American power, the global
responsibilities of this country are apt to require action like that taken in Iraq. We hear this kind of
thinking in its most outof-the-closet form from neoconservatives - who gave us the Iraq invasion in the first place.
But its roots in American history lie at least as far back as notions of Manifest Destiny. Its key inspiration is a
particularly aggressive form of American exceptionalism. Some higher power - fate, Divine Providence, or
special "moral clarity" - has created opportunities, indeed obligations, for America to set things straight on
a global scale. Versions of this idea are pervasive among thinkers - American foreign policy elites, and those who
would guide them - who would disclaim identification with the neocons . Often conveying the doctrine are code words
referring to special "responsibilities" of the United States to guarantee world "stability." Or, as Madeleine Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations, stated, "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into
the future. . ." To her credit, Albright's effusions in this direction stopped short of support for invading Iraq - something that cannot be said for the
so-called liberal hawks. Accepting this view of America as the ultimate and rightful arbiter of global affairs

- as master hegemon or world superpower, to use less upbeat terms - triggers the weightiest implications and
consequences. Nearly all of them, I hold, run in collision course to the best aims and directions of the
democratic Left. Yet even for thinkers who identify themselves as being on the Left, acceptance of a
hyper-militarized America, and its concomitant role of global enforcer, often passes without

52

question. For those of us who challenge this view, the invasion of Iraq was wrong for fundamental
political and - indeed - moral reasons. Not because it was mismanaged. Not because too few troops were dispatched;
not because the Iraqi Army was disbanded; not because the occupation was incompetent, corrupt, and often criminally negligent. It was wrong
because wars of this kind are always wrong - aggressive, opportunistic wars of choice, aimed at revamping entire countries to fit the dictates of
the invaders. These wars are wrong because of the destruction and distortions that they spread both

abroad and at home. Among nations, they countervail against one of the subtle but hopeful tendencies in
the world today - the movement away from sole reliance on brute state power to resolve
international conflict and toward supranational authorities, multilateral decisi on -making, and
establishment of powers above the level of states . At home, the effects are even more insidious. For
in order to make itself the kind of country capable of "projecting power" anywhere in the world, as
America has done so unsuccessfully in Iraq, it has had to impose vast demands and distortions upon
its own domestic life.

53

2AC-Not Sustainable
Unipolarity is collapsing in the status quo and will result in multipolarity
Layne 12-(Christopher, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M Universitys George H. W. Bush School of
Government and Public Service, 1/27/12, The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almosttriumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1)
Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administrations new Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the first step in the United States adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana
the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document sayswithout spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implicationsthe United
States is facing an inflection point. In plain English, a

profound power shift in international politics is taking place,

which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role. The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic
decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to put our fiscal house in order here at home
and renew our long-term economic strength. The

best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and
its share of world manufacturing output. Chinas manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over
18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates,
Chinas aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe
China already is the worlds number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the
ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the
Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expendituresincluding on entitlements and defenseand raises taxes, it is headed
for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and Americas ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollars reserve-currency status. That
currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult guns-or-butter trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and
geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the
dollars long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift
in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as
Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War unipolar moment, when
the United States commanded the global stage as the sole remaining superpower, will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently
projected that Chinas defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By

the middle or end of the next decade, China will

be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefersand, perhaps, to provide the
international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are decline and imperial overstretch (the latter coined by the historian Paul
Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great powers economic resources cant support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the

DSG is the first move in what figures to be a dramatic strategic

retrenchment by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategyoffshore balancing. In a
1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace Americas primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to
sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages
eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would

require

scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities ; devolving the primary
responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article,
offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert
Pape.

Even if some degree of hegemony is sustainable, the type of deterrence their impacts
describe is dead
Simmun 14-(Sinmun July 12

th
2014, Rodong Sinmun (English: Workers' Newspaper) is a North Korean newspaper and the official
newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. It was first published on November 1, 1945, as Chngro (Chosn'gl: ;
hancha: ; "right path"), serving as a communication channel for the North Korea Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea. It was renamed
in September 1946 to its current name upon the steady development of the Workers' Party of Korea. Quoted frequently by the Korean Central
News Agency (KCNA) and international media, it is regarded as a source of official North Korean viewpoints on many issues.)
(Rodong, U.S. Decline and Ruin Are Inevitability of History: KCNA White Paper, http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?
strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2014-07-12-0011&chAction=T)

The Korean Central News Agency released white paper "Decline and Ruin of the U.S. Are Inevitability of History". Since

the demise of
the Cold War era, the U.S., obsessed by the ambition for building a uni-polar world, ignited wars in
different parts of the world without hesitation and stained the world arena with high-handed
practices and unilateral policies, the white paper said, and went on : When Bush doctrine reached the extremes, not
a few conservative scholars and politicians of the U.S. let loose such sophism as " American-style peace" and "American
empire" in a bid to build public opinion. The U.S. administration openly said that the future U.S.

54

will be related to Asia-Pacific and the future Asia-Pacific depends on the U.S. and that no other
country will be able to dominate Asia-Pacific, openly disclosing its hegemonic scenario for the
region. This met an immediate strong rebuff of regional countries and proved to be total bankrupt.
Referring to the U.S. new strategy, foreign media said that differences exist not only in U.S.
Congress but in the Democratic Party over Obama's strategic plan and its implementation.
Obama's strategy has faced three challenges called "imbalance of resources", "imbalance of
energy" and "imbalance of power," they added. The U.S. hegemonic position is sinking in different
parts of the world. The Russian magazine Expert said that the U.S. military edge will be contained and disappear
in the end due to the regional conflict in which this country is locked, adding that the U.S. is being
restricted in the sphere of its action where he employed all possible means such as alliance, division,
estrangement and engagement over geo-political issues. The U.S. obviously lacks of power. The U.S.
is at its wits' end over the civil war sweeping Iraq. As for the issue of Afghanistan, the U.S. is also
finding itself in a quagmire. The U.S. is in a weak position in the all-out confrontation with Russia
over the issue of Ukraine. The U.S. is wielding a sanctions stick against Russia but is proving to be
counterproductive as the latter is maintaining its hard-line stand not to compromise over its
national interests even a bit. China and India are opposed to the sanctions. The U.S. is hard hit,
isolated and rejected worldwide amid the anti-American spirit mounting worldwide . The U.S. is
also out of favor with its allies. All facts go to prove that the U.S. is paying a high price for its wars
and interventions worldwide and that its position as the "super power" remains in its name only . The
U.S. has long regarded dollars as one of twin pillars supporting its ambition for world domination along with its nuclear weapons. The U.S.
economy relying on dollars is on the verge of a slump. The financial crisis that hit the U.S. in 2008 is
precipitating its economic doom. As regards this economic situation, the international credit
estimation organization lowered the U.S. credit grade for the first/ time in 70 years . Foreign media
warns this is a big blow at the "heart" of the U.S. economy and that the U.S. economy will face the
"second recession", adding that now is the time for the U.S. to repent of its hegemonic way of
thinking and actions as it is driven into a tight corner in terms of economy. Its state debt and
budgetary deficit are out of control now. Due to serious financial shortage, the U.S. government is
undergoing unprecedented difficulties and evil cycle of financial bankruptcy, federal government's
automatic expenditure cutback, government shutdown and default on debts . The value of the U.S.
dollar is sharply sinking. The U.S. dollar has faced its third crisis in the 21st century. So the present
international financial system based on the U.S. dollar is rapidly collapsing. Russia is directing big efforts to
expanding the scope of use of ruble. Last year an agreement on exchange of currency was concluded between the Chinese People's Bank and the
European Central Bank. To counter the U.S. persistent financial sanctions the Iranian government declared

that it would stop the oil dealing by the U.S. dollar and from 2012 it is receiving part of the funds
for oil exports in national currency of relevant countries. BRICS, a multi-national cooperative body made up of Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa put up the slogan of building more equal and fair world, and is exerting positive efforts to this end. ALBA
nations of Latin America officially use their common currency Sukre as currency for trade among its member nations and it is expected that all
countries in the continent will introduce the currency in the future. Five countries in the western area of the African continent decided to use
common currency for the establishment of Western African currency zone and the member nations of the South Africa Development Community
announced a plan to set up a single currency by 2018. Besides this, oil producing countries in the Gulf region discussed the introduction of single
currency in the Mid-east. Efforts are being made in different parts of the world to introduce single currency. This trend of multi-

polarization in the financial field would destroy the U.S.-led international economic system affected
by pressure and arbitrary practices and lead to the establishment of a new order based on justice,
equality and democracy. Gone are the days when the U.S. swayed over the world economy by
brandishing dollars and the dollar empire is sure to collapse any time . The U.S. is on the verge of
ruin due to the fin de siecle lifestyle in the material life as well as mental and cultural life. The U.S.
capitalists are widely spreading reactionary ideology and culture and corrupt bourgeois lifestyle to
benumb the independent awareness of the toiling masses and make them slave of money
subservient to them. The U.S. is systematically training criminals at "gangsters university" and "pickpockets school" unprecedented in
history. All kinds of crimes like gun-related crimes and drug crimes are everyday occurrences among
Americans who are corrupt in their mental and cultural life. Gun-related crimes have become an incurable disease.
Drug-related crimes have become another headache in the U.S. The education in the U.S. is all the more deplorable. Anti-Wall Street
demonstration that took place in 2011 is the largest-ever anti-capitalist struggle in the U.S. history, an inevitable product of the extremely acute

55

social and class contradictions.

All facts go to clearly prove that the collapse of "American empire" is

becoming a reality.

56

2AC-Risk-Heg
Hegemonic polarity is an untestable abstraction with no provable relationship to the
complexities of existing geopolitics
Bernstein et al 2k Steven, Associate Professor of Political Science @ U of Toronto, Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman
Presidential Professor of Government @ Dartmouth, Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of
Political Science and the Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs @ U of Toronto, Steven Weber, PolySci Prof @ Berkeley God Gave
Physics the Easy Problems European Journal of International Relations March 6.1 43-76
In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2).

The concepts of polarity, relative power and the balance of power are among the most widely used
independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them. Yet without consensus on definition and
measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be `tested' decisively against evidence. What
we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence
outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in
their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan,
1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness although the latter cannot entirely be
dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves . Key terms in physics, like mass,
temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified

theories are for the most

built on 'idealizations', that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of
correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but implicit 'theories' about
actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences
in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely
varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough
samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the
variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes make the likelihood of
a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double
digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways. ' Complexity in the form of
multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more
through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science
part

sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate
causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997).

57

2AC-Risk-Prolif
Proliferation decisions deny one-shot linear decisions they occur within multiple complex
systems
Glass et. al. 8 [All at Sandia National Laboratory, Robert J. Glass, Systems Research, Analysis, and Applications Arlo L. Ames,
Infrastructure Modeling and Analysis and William A. Stubblefield, NG and Readiness Program Management Stephen H. Conrad, Infrastructure
Modeling and Analysis S. Louise Maffitt, Infrastructure and Economic Systems Analysis Leonard A. Malczynski, Geohydrology David G.
Wilson, Energy Systems Analysis Jeffrey J. Carlson, Energy Systems Analysis George A. Backus, Exploratory Simulation Technology Mark A.
Ehlen, Infrastructure and Economic Systems Analysis Keith B. Vanderveen, Exploratory Computer and Software Engineering Dennis Engi,
Systematics and Cognition, A Roadmap for the Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems (CASoS) Engineering Initiative,
http://www.sandia.gov/CasosEngineering/docs/CASoSEngineeringRoadmap_09.22.08.pdf]
Defining Example: Global Nuclear Nonproliferation 1. System: The system is the international community of nation states. Each participating
entity bases its decisions upon the decisions of a subset of all other entities with respect to the decision to proliferate and the actual mise en
scene of proliferation mechanisms. Interaction among entities can occur on planes other than proliferation
(conflict, alliances, trade, etc.) all of which may influence formal proliferation decisions. a. Environment: A near boundary might
be drawn around only those entities that currently possess nuclear capabilities; any entity not possessing those capabilities would be in the
environment. A further boundary would encompass all the human organizations on the planet that might be or

might become involved in things nuclear. The environment would be any human organizations/activities that are not contained,
along with the natural world. 2. System of Systems: The entities embroiled in nuclear nonproliferation include nation
states, each of which is itself a system. The entities may have already proliferated, renounced proliferation, considered proliferation,
or have indicated no preference. The states can voluntarily form subgroups where all members take a similar position. The entities may take
individual positions. 3. Complex: Given that nuclear weapons are considered dangerous and bad, recently citizens of some proliferation-inclined
states have staged public demonstrations in support of nuclear tests. These demonstrations could potentially be more in support of national
capability and pride than in support of, or even in spite of, the destructive power of the nuclear bomb per se. Cases exist in which capable nation
states have begun, then renounced, proliferation efforts. 4. Adaptive: Individuals and nations adapt in their approaches to

attempting to proliferate and attempting to control proliferation. Any approach to limit proliferation
(high security, treaties, etc) can be adapted to and possibly circumvented by sufficiently persistent
individuals. 5. Aspirations: Typical aspirations involve attempts to prevent or control attempts to proliferate. The CTBT is suggested as a
way to eliminate proliferation through a ban on testing of nuclear devices; achieving its promised benefit is difficult. Alternate aspirations might
be to devise a robust world system in which there was no incentive to proliferate (either through sufficient penalties, lack of resources, lack of
imbalance in world society), no means of proliferation (expertise removed from the earth), or a means of controlling use of weapons so that
possession of the technology or devices isnt sufficient to enable their use. 6. Approaches: While guards, fences and treaties continue to play their
part, there are other approaches to the problem. Transparency of government activities (possibly encouraged through media/intelligence
community cooperation) would reduce opportunity to divert assets to weapons development. Greater shared benefit from global economy might
reduce the value of a nuclear threat (its hard to want to bomb your customers/suppliers/partners). 7. Attainability: Ending proliferation

is difficult because this is a complex system the solution might be as complex as the system itself in
order to produce lasting results. Some entities will not relinquish their current capabilities, thus causing
trust issues. The solution might need to include agreements at many levels in order to ensure any
kind of complete answer, because disagreements occur at all levels. Indirect links through the
system produce opportunity for continued difficulty (e.g. the existence of a civilian nuclear power capability, which is
readily promoted, can provide resources for weapons proliferation).

58

A2-Middle East
Middle East influence is unsustainable
Duss 14 foreign policy analyst and a contributing writer for the Prospect [MATTHEW, For the U.S., Israel and Palestine: What's Plan B?,
http://prospect.org/article/us-israel-and-palestine-whats-plan-b]

If the Obama administrations view of the Israeli--Palestinian conflict could be summed up in a

sentence, it is this: The status quo is unsustainable. The status quo is unsustainable for all sides. It
promises only more violence and unrealized aspirations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the American Israel Public
Affairs Committees annual Washington policy conference in March 2010. The status quo is unsustainable, and Israel must too act boldly to
advance a lasting peace, President Barack Obama said in his May 2011 speech at the State Department, laying out his vision of the U.S. role in the
Middle East after the Arab Awakening. Todays status quo absolutely, to a certainty, I promise you 100 percent,
cannot be maintained. Its not sustainable, Secretary of State John Kerry told the Munich Security Conference in February. Its illusionary.
Theres a momentary prosperity, theres a momentary peace. Although the Obama administration
may have coined the phrase, the sentiment is not new. Every president since Jimmy Carter has, in some fashion, recognized that
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict creates costs for the United States in the region and that the U.S. has an interest in resolving it. In the words of General David Petraeus,

the conflict foments anti-American sentiment limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships
with governments and peoples in the [region], and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in
the Arab world. Since the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, the historic set of agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization aimed
at securing a peace treaty between the two sides, a strong international consensus has formed behind a two-state solution to the Israeli--Palestinian conflict. Yet
even in the face of this consensus, the status quo persists, year after year, defying the efforts of the
worlds most powerful country to change it. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations all put considerable effort into reaching a
deal that would end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Obama made achieving this goal a priority of his
presidency, appointing a special envoy in his first week as president in 2009, and yet now, five years later, Secretary Kerry is working overtime just to keep the parties
at the table (a task made even more complicated by the recently announced Fatah-Hamas reconciliation), never mind hammering out a final agreement. One of the
ironies is that, as a concept, the two-state solution is more broadly accepted than ever, even as achieving it seems more remote. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus
adoption of the two-state solution in his 2009 Bar-Ilan University speech may have been so heavily qualified as to make it almost meaningless, but the fact remains
that he recognized the need for making the speech. Even though polls of both Israelis and Palestinians over the past decade have consistently shown majority support
for a two-state solution, rejectionist factionshard-line Israeli settlers, Palestinian extremistshave managed to wrest control of the process at key moments and play
a spoiler role. Still, the two-state solution remains the most favorable one: Plan A. Its broad outlines have long been understood, and even many of its most difficult
details have been hashed out in exercises like the Geneva Accord, in which a group of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators signed a model final agreement, and in
negotiations between President Mahmoud Abbas and thenPrime Minister Ehud Olmert, as journalist Bernard Avishai reported in 2011. Still, its only responsible to
consider a Plan B in the event that Plan A remains elusive. In a recent interview, Obama

nodded toward some of the costs that

would accrue to Israel in the absence of a two-state deal. The Palestinians have made clear that if
talks break down, they will escalate their campaign to gain membership in various international
organizations, a move strongly supported by the Palestinian public. President Abbas took a step in this direction in early
April, responding to Israels reneging on its commitment to release prisoners by signing documents joining 15 international conventions. These efforts
could create an enormous headache for Israel, forcing it to play a game of diplomatic whack-a-mole
as it tries to head off challenges in various international venues, and it could become increasingly
costly for the U.S. to provide diplomatic cover. If Palestinians come to believe that the possibility of a contiguous, sovereign
Palestinian state is no longer within reach, the president said, then our ability to manage the international fallout is going to be limited. But beyond these warnings
of consequences, which have also been echoed by Secretary Kerry, there

has been little discussion of what the U.S. policy

response might be to the loss of faith in a two-state solution. How would the U.S. contend with the heightened international
criticism and isolation that would likely be directed at Israel when its control of the West Bank became formalized? With growing calls for divestment and boycott of
settlement products in Europe, how would the U.S. respond to its European partners developing a more independent approach, as they have been hinting at doing for
years? For understandable reasons, its difficult to get currently serving officials to respond to questions like these. Talking about Plan B kills Plan A, is how one
Israeli official put it. That may be true for those closest to the negotiations. But for others, its worth thinking about. Any attempt to understand Israels reticence to
draw down its presence in the West Bank must reckon with the second intifada, the Palestinian uprising that erupted after the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit,
which saw numerous terrorist attacks inside Israel. Confronted with a violent campaign, and with President Bill Clintons blaming Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat for
the summits failure, many Israelis decided that the Palestinians were not interested in peace. Although a solid majority of Israelis continue to support the two-state
solution, they remain cautious about steps, such as withdrawing troops from the West Bank, that, even if necessary to achieve such a solution, could result in a return
of attacks. Addressing those security requirements has been a primary focus of U.S. efforts. One of the most successful American initiatives in Palestine has been the
work to stand up a Palestinian security force capable of acting against terrorist groups in the West Bank. Established by the Bush administration in 2005, the Office of
the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) has two goals: First,

to build a key institution of an eventual Palestinian state, a

competent security force. Second, to prove to the Israelis that they could withdraw from the
territories with an expectation that calm would be maintained. Lieutenant General Keith Dayton served as U.S. security
coordinator from 2005 to 2010 and was hailed by Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans as doing a tremendous job. But he warned that a lack of meaningful diplomatic
progress would eventually cause the cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis to collapse. There is perhaps a two-year shelf life on being told that youre

59

creating a state when youre not, he said in 2009. In Ramallah in 2011, I spoke with Jerry Burke, a retired Massachusetts state police major who had trained officers
in Iraq and Afghanistan and was working with the USSC in the West Bank. The longer [the occupation] goes on, the less chance there is of a Palestinian state, he
said. Most Palestinians will tell you the two-state solution will never happen. Burke doesnt see an outbreak of organized violence as likely: The second intifada
wasnt that long ago. They dont want to go back. Palestinian security forces are dedicated and work hard, he said, but most of them dont think theyll ever see a
Palestinian state. Asked to guess at likely outcomes, he says, Id say were headed toward an American Indian model, with Palestinians on reservations amid a sea
of settlements and Israeli security zones. There is no irreversible moment for a two-state solution, except such developments like Israel annexing the occupied
territories, which I dont see coming, says Noam Sheizaf, an Israeli journalist and editor of +972 Magazine, a left-leaning Israeli Web magazine. [But] at a certain
point a viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital wont be a very plausible option anymore, because you will have to either evacuate so many people or
build such a complicated system of bypassing roads, tunnels, and bridges, that the solution itself becomes a problem. But what are the solutions? A number have been
offered, but theyre all problematic in different ways. Some people, most prominently the Palestinian American activist Ali Abunimah, have called for a single
democratic state of all its citizens, a vision that is slowly but steadily gaining allies. In 2011, former Knesset speaker and Peace Now activist Avraham Burg declared
the two-state paradigm finishedSo enough of the illusions, he wrote in Haaretz, there are no longer two states between the Jordan River and the seaand called
on the Israeli left to cease giving cover to the right by pretending that outcome was any longer in the offing. For a number of conservatives in Israel, an acceptable
alternative would be to withdraw unilaterally from parts of the West Bank and annex the parts it intends to keep. While this option has been discussed for years, it
recently acquired urgency when Michael Oren, former Israeli ambassador to the United States, raised the idea in a February interview with The Times of Israel: If we
declare our borders, that creates a de-facto situation of two nation states recognized by the UN. We would be one of dozens of pairs of countries in the world that
have a border dispute. Right-wing Israeli journalist Caroline Glick has an even more extreme plan. Glick recently published The Israeli Solution, in which she calls
for the country to annex all of the West Bank and offer the Palestinians living there a path to citizenship (a path, one imagines, that would be quite arduous). In
response to concerns that Israeli Palestinians would eventually outnumber Israeli Jews in such an arrangement, Glick insists that, without Gaza, this new Israel would
still safely retain a two-thirds Jewish majority. Some alternatives are baroque. In a 2008 piece for Tikkun, scholar Russell Nieli proposed an arrangement that he called
Two-State Condominialism: a two-state confederation in which Palestinian Israelis would be required to transfer their citizenship, national identity, and national
voting rightsbut not their residenceto the new Palestinian state. These Palestinians would retain their permanent right to live in Israel and they would also retain
their current benefits under the Jewish welfare state, but it would be required that they become citizens ofand permanent voting members ofthe Palestinian state,
not Israel. A much more pessimistic proposal was offered by Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh in his 2011 book-length essay, What Is a Palestinian State Worth?
Reflecting on the failure to create a state, Nusseibeh asked the reader to consider what a state is for in the first placesecuring the rights of those within it. To this
end, Nusseibeh proposed that Israel officially annex the occupied territories, and that Palestinians in the enlarged Israel agree that the state remain Jewish in return for
being granted all the civil, though not the political, rights of citizenship. In other words, Palestinians accept second-class status, rather than continuing to fight an
apparently unwinnable battle against the Israeli occupation. Recognizing his own proposal as so objectionable that it might well generate its own annulment, either
by making all parties see the need to find a tenable alternative or, if indeed adopted, by serving as a natural step toward a single democratic state, Nusseibeh
nevertheless insisted that such a plan would provide Palestinians with a far better life than they have had in more than forty years under occupation or would have
under another projected scenario: Israeli hegemony over scattered, autonomous Palestinian enclaves. Even though offered as a thought experiment, such a
proposal coming from a longtime supporter of two states like Nusseibeh is a sign of the Palestinian intelligentsias exhaustion with endless rounds of negotiations.
That exhaustion is shared broadly among the younger generation. Two Palestinians at opposite ends of the establishment spectrumthe first an activist leader in the
West Bank, the second a young Palestinian official close to the negotiations over the past several yearsillustrate a fundamental shift in views. The activist is done
with two states, with Oslo, and with the Palestinian government created under its auspices. I dont want a Palestinian Authority representing me that hasnt had
elections since 2006, she told me. Its time to get people out of thinking about land and into thinking about rights. Im tired of arguing about land. I want my rights.
The Palestinian official confessed to me that, after years of being at negotiations, I never thought Id say this, but I care less about a state than I do about being treated
with dignity. Give me an Israeli passport, but dont humiliate me at checkpoints. These sentiments were echoed in a recent New York Times article on growing
frustration with the two-state solution among younger Palestinians, including the son of President Abbas. If you dont want to give me independence, at least give me
civil rights, Tareq Abbas told the Times. Thats an easier way, peaceful way. I dont want to throw anything, I dont want to hate anybody, I dont want to shoot
anybody. I want to be under the law. Still, no one has articulated a plausible process for how that could happen. Theres no exact model, but theres no exact
situation like Israel-Palestine anywhere else in the world, says Yousef Munayyer, the executive director of the Jerusalem Fund, a Washington-based nonprofit that
does educational and humanitarian work on behalf of the Palestinians. I think there are lessons that can be borrowed from the outcomes in different places that can
help us move in a different direction in Israel-Palestine, but we have to always remember that it is a unique situation, and so unique solutions have to be thought
about. Given

the massive investment in diplomatic efforts over the past decades, its difficult to
imagine that U.S. policy can be redirected toward a solution beyond two states. But American policy is going to
have to confront openness to other answers on the part of Israelis and Palestinians. The logic of the Oslo process that created the Palestinian Authority was that it was

Because the
occupation was nearing its end, the thinking went, it was better to focus on the ultimate goal and
not get distracted arguing about the daily challenges that Palestinians face. After almost 47 years of occupation, that
a transitional period leading to the creation of a Palestinian state, in which the Palestinian people would enjoy sovereignty and self--determination.

thinking may need to change. We may be entering a nonsolution era, says Palestinian official Husam Zomlot. It doesnt mean renewed conflict, but it means we
need to ditch the idea that our peoples daily needs must wait for a solution. Finding a solution remains paramount, Zomlot stresses, but in a scenario of a
nonsolution, then what? The people of Gaza should remain under siege? The people of the West Bank should continue to see their land being robbed by the day? We

cannot afford any longer to continue behaving as if everything has to wait until a solution is
struck. Noam Sheizaf believes it is time to change the terms from a struggle for statehood to a struggle for human rights. When one addresses the occupation
as a human-rights issue, and I believe this to be its true essence, attitudes change, even dramatically , he says. The
existing reality in the West Bank, Sheizaf says, is two different legal systems in the same territory, access to resources based on ethnicity, the lack of due process
which is an inherent part of the occupation. All

of these are so foreign to the American ethos. Heightening the focus on that reality, he
the current negotiations
effort by the U.S. fails, its unlikely that any measure of trust between the sides will be preserved for
the next president to have another go at the issue. In such a scenario, the U.S. will find itself in a situation in
which it remains deeply implicated but seems to have even less ability to influence the course of
events. The time is now to start talking about Plan B, if only to give greater urgency to Plan A.
argues, rather than on a diplomatic process that has proved incapable of changing it, could be more constructive. If

60

Their impact framing is grounded in orientalist representations of the Middle Eastthese

are epistemically flawed and should be rejected
Bilgin 5, PhD International Politics, University of
Regional Security in the Middle East 2005 p. 1

Wales, Aberystwyth, Department of International Relations Bilkent Univ., [Pinar,

Throughout the twentieth century, the Middle East remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. As the
recent developments in Israel/Palestine and the US-led war on Iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the signifcance of Middle Eastern
insecurities for world politics. By adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the Middle East, this study
addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. Focusing on the constitutive relationship
between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of) security, the study argues that the current state of 'regional security' - often a
euphemism for regional insecurities - has its roots in practices that have throughout history been shaped by its various

representations - the geopolitical inventions of security. In doing this, it lays out the contours of a framework for
thinking differently about regional security in the Middle East. Prevailing approaches to regional security have had
their origins in the security concerns and interests of Western states, mainly the United States. The implication of this
Western bias in security thinking within the Middle Eastern context has been that much of the thinking done on
regional security in the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions of 'security' . During the Cold War what was meant
by 'security in the Middle East' was maintaining the security of Western (mostly US) interests in this part of the world and its
military defence against other external actors (such as the Soviet Union that could jeopardise the regional and/or global status quo). Western
security interests in the Middle East during the Cold War era could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable
prices, the cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the
maintenance of 'friendly' regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a top-down conception of security that
was military-focused, directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. Let us take a brief look at these
characteristics. The Cold War approach to regional security in the Middle East was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from
the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, communist
infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threats to security in the Middle East during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional
security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the Middle East Defence
Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran
(until the 1978-79 revolution), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers
begged to differ. Traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the US approach to security in the 'Middle
East'. During the 1990s, in following a policy of dual containment US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional
security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient to
US interests. In the aftermath of the events of September 11 US policy-makers have focused on 'terrorism' as a major threat to security in the Middle East
and elsewhere. Yet, US policy so far has been one of 'confronting the symptoms rather than the cause' (Zunes 2002:237) as it

has focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect of the socio-economic one) and relied on military
tools (as with the war on Iraq) in addressing these threats. This is not to underestimate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global
and regional security. Rather, the point is that these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional
insecurity at the same time hinder others. For example, societal and environmental problems caused by resource scarcity do
not only threaten the security of individual human beings but also exacerbate existing conflicts (as with the struggle over water resources in
Israel/Palestine; see Sosland 2002). Besides, the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were made insecure not only by
the threat caused by Iraq's military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes
that restrict women's rights under the cloak of religious tradition. For, it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism
and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health (see Mernissi 1993). What is more, the
measures that are adopted to meet such military threats sometimes constitute threats to the security of individuals and
social groups. The sanctions regime adopted to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction has caused a problem of food insecurity for Iraqi people during the
1990s. In the aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq, Iraqi people are still far from meeting their daily needs. Indeed, it is estimated that if it were not for the monthly
basket distributed as part of the United Nations' 'Oil for Food' programme, 'approximately 80 percent of the Iraqi population would become vulnerable to food
insecurity' (Hurd 2003). Such concerns rarely make it into analyses on regional security in the Middle East.

This strategic, militaristic worldview incorporated into their knowledge production means
that we can only conceive the other as a target for American bombs, making the logic of
perpetual nuclear war seem rational
Chow 6-Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and of Modern Culture & Media Studies @ Brow University [Rey, The Age of the World
Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, p. 40-42]

61

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the scientific
and objective production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special areas became the
institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other
words, despite claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of
area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the
politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic
information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of
aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises
as war if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes is
it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to know the other cultures ? Can knowledge that

is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not
simply warfares accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its
focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the
other that ultimately consolidates the omnipresence of the sovereign self / eye the I that is the United States, the
other will have no choice but to remain just that a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its
destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this
focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will
ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual world-ing that was unleashed by the dropping
of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures
always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not
fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily antiJapanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter will never receive the attention that is due to them.

62

A2-Prolif
Turn-heg causes nuclear prolif
Weber et. al 7-(Steven, Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen
Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, How Globalization Went Bad, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy)

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and
the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Theres effectively a market out
there for on, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon).
The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S.
national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much
of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesnt matter much from the perspective
of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is
simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so . No country in the world can

dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it.
And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the
United States could turn to the Soviet Unions nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan.
Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest
example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it
was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But , for 40 years,
North Korea didnt seek nuclear weapons. It didnt need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five
years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities.
North Koreas founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clintons administration readied war plans to strike his
nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kims son rules the country with
an iron fist. Americas conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Husseins great strategic blunder was
that he took too long to get to the same place.

63

A2-Realism
Turn-realism just means hegemony makes balancing and conflict inevitable
Roskin 14 Retired prof. of political science at Lycoming College, previously taught at the US Army War College
[Michael G. Michael G. Roskin: A Question for Mearsheimer, 7/10/2014, http://www.freepressonline.com/main.asp?
SectionID=50&SubSectionID=72&ArticleID=33446]

the
big question for him now is whether U.S.-China conflict is inevitable. The updated 2014 edition of his "Tragedy of
Great Power Politics" (first published in 2001) explains China's recent moves as a drive for "regional
hegemony" in Asia that excludes other powers, namely us. Mearsheimer's original 2001 theory could have predicted that
Getting John Mearsheimer to speak at the Midcoast Forum on Foreign Relations this coming Monday is a coup. Controversial for his "Israel lobby" claims,

Hillary's 2009 "reset button" would not work: it ignored Russia's imperative to reestablish its regional hegemony. A social scientist who can predict anything deserves
respect. The University of Chicago political

scientist's "offensive realism" thesis argues that geopolitics compels

major powers to control their regions to keep strategic threats distant. If another major power
intrudes into their area, they're vulnerable. Thus Moscow annexes Crimea and snarls at Ukraine's
turn to Europe, and Beijing reinforces its claims to the China Seas in what the Pentagon calls "anti-access/area denial." It's
not that they "want to," in Mearsheimer's theory, they've got to. Another plus of Mearsheimer's new last chapter on China is that it summarizes the entire
book, which is overlong and repetitive. The huge oil rig China placed in Vietnam's exclusive economic zone
illustrates Mearsheimer's thesis. Oil is not Beijing's chief concern here. One Chinese official called the rig a "floating sovereignty platform."
Some claim China is now building a "neo-tributary system," harkening back to its centuries-long regional hegemony in Asia. Until recently, Beijing followed the
ancient Chinese advice to "hide your capabilities and bide your time." China's economic growth and the 2008 U.S. financial meltdown seemed to prove Chinese
ascendancy, so Beijing abandoned hide-and-bide (in my view, too soon). The Chinese Nationalists' old "nine-dash line" covering most of the South China Sea went
from laughable to non-negotiable. China's claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (I suggest we call them the Slash Islands) just north of Taiwan in the East China Sea
also suddenly became a core national interest. Mearsheimer

stops short of calling a U.S.-China clash "inevitable" but

emphasizes that all rising powers fight their way up . Athens, Rome, the Arabs, the British, the Habsburgs, Napoleon's France,
Wilhelm's and Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and the U.S. engaged in long, deliberate warfare for security goals. (That some of these goals were absurd does not
interest Mearsheimer.) In the 19th century, the

U.S. brilliantly established hegemony in North America, the only total

success that Mearsheimer finds. But then, argues Mearsheimer, it becomes imperative that no other power do
likewise anywhere else. A divided Europe and a divided Asia pose no threat to the U.S. A Europe or Asia united under a single hand does. To
prevent this, the U.S. was drawn into two wars with Germany, one with Japan, and the Cold War
with the Soviet Union. The same now applies to an Asia about to fall under Chinese dominance,
which the U.S. "pivot" aims to counter. Thus the second prong of Mearsheimer's offensive realism is
that a great power, having secured hegemony in its region, tries to prevent rival powers from doing
the same in other regions. Long before Mearsheimer, thinkers argued that the U.S. adopted Britain's traditional strategy of keeping Europe from being
dominated by any one power, be it the Habsburgs, France, or Germany. Wilson and Roosevelt had to lead the U.S. into World Wars I and II to prevent German
dominance of Europe. Mearsheimer,

like most realists, downplays ideology, morality, and personality in

nations' motivations; geopolitics alone governs great-power thinking . He also doesn't mention national interests, the
mainstay of classic realists such as Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, whom he dismisses as "defensive realists" because they cannot explain the actual,
expansionist behavior of great powers. For Mearsheimer, the only national interest is regional hegemony and making sure no other power gains the equivalent
elsewhere. Small issues, such as fishing and mineral rights and open sea lanes, are mere public-relations talking points that distract from the real U.S. national interest:
preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia. Other strategic thinkers, including realists, object that Mearsheimer's two-pronged theory is much too limited. They see
important national interests in nukes, oil, distant wars, economics, cybersecurity, climate change, human rights, and terrorism. (Especially serious: Chinese pirating of
political-science textbooks.) For Mearsheimer, a fragmented region where no hegemon can arise merits little attention. A divided Europe should concern us only if
under threat of Russian hegemony. This does not explain why the U.S. deplores European disunity. Neither does his theory explain U.S. involvement in the chronically
unstable Middle East, where no country is a candidate for regional hegemon, not even Iran. (Actually, Israel epitomizes Mearsheimer's imperative of regional military
dominance: without it, Israel risks destruction.) Middle East terrorism is a non-category in Mearsheimer's theory because it cannot build a regional hegemony.

Mearsheimer ignores domestic politics. For him, all major-power chiefs, whatever their political
views and domestic pressures, automatically become hegemonists. But a realist analysis must take
domestic politics into account; mistaken or not, they often form the basis for policy . Republican pressure on
LBJ and Obama push them into military action. Neither does Mearsheimer handle misperception and manipulation,
such as North Vietnam as a Chinese proxy or Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If, as Mearsheimer
argues, all great powers are hegemons and all hegemons must battle each other, little can be done to
calm or curb their clashes. In a Hobbesian world, nations must build their strength in perpetual and justified
fear. Diplomacy may delay conflicts, but long-term, if Mearsheimer is correct, conflict cannot be
avoided. The classic realists offered some hope that power and national interests could be aligned to

64

build peace and stability, but the darkly pessimistic Mearsheimer looks at tragedy and sighs, "It
cannot be helped." If Mearsheimer is right that tragedy is the fate of great-power relations, we must resign ourselves to a dangerous U.S.-China clash.
Ask him about that.

65

A2-Terrorism
Terrorism not existentialall threat inflation and wont go nuclear
Mearsheimer 11-R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science @ University of Chicago, member of the
Committee of International Relations @ U. of Chicago, PhD in government/international relations @ Cornell, M.A. in International Relations @
USC, fellow @ Harvards Center for International Affairs, Whitney H. Shepardson fellow @ The Council on Foreign Relations, On the advisory
council of The National Interest, prominent International relations theorist, [John, The National Interest, Imperial By Design January-February
2011 issue, http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=3, DKP]

In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism was described as an existential threat. President Bush emphasized that virtually every
terrorist group on the planetincluding those that had no beef with Washingtonwas our enemy and had to be eliminated if we hoped to win
what became known as the global war on terror (GWOT). The administration also maintained that states like Iran, Iraq and Syria were not only
actively supporting terrorist organizations but were also likely to provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, it was
imperative for the United States to target these rogue states if it hoped to win the GWOTor what some neoconservatives like Norman
Podhoretz called World War IV. Indeed, Bush said that any country which continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the
United States as a hostile regime. Finally, the administration claimed that it was relatively easy for groups like al-Qaeda to

infiltrate and strike the homeland, and that we should expect more disasters like 9/11 in the near future. The greatest
danger for sure would be a WMD attack against a major American city. This assessment of Americas terrorism
problem was flawed on every count. It was threat inflation of the highest order. It made no sense to declare war against groups
that were not trying to harm the United States. They were not our enemies; and going after all terrorist organizations would greatly complicate the
daunting task of eliminating those groups that did have us in their crosshairs. In addition, there was no alliance between the so-called rogue states
and al-Qaeda. In fact, Iran and Syria cooperated with Washington after 9/11 to help quash Osama bin Laden and his cohorts. Although the Bush
administration and the neoconservatives repeatedly asserted that there was a genuine connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, they
never produced evidence to back up their claim for the simple reason that it did not exist. The fact is that states have strong incentives to

distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control
what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why
there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regimes leaders could
never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist groups actions. Nor could they be certain
that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided
terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get
down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would
happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion
to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their

weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being
detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The
obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely.
Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years
since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on

American soil is probableeven imminent. But this is simply not the case. 3 The only attempts we have seen are a
few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the shoe bomber, who attempted to blow up an American
Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the underwear bomber, who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight
from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In
fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Muellers telling comment
that the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the
number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to
peanuts.

Risk of terrorists getting a bomb is 0

Mueller 8-Department of Political Science @ Ohio State University [John, The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood, January 1, 2008,
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF]
Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would have to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to
manufacture a bomb and then populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists. They
would have to be assembled and retained for the task while no consequential suspicions are generated among friends,
family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. They would also have to be
utterly devoted to the cause, of course. And, in addition, they would have to be willing to risk their lives, and certainly their

66

careers, because after their bomb was discovered, or exploded, they would likely become the targets in an intense
worldwide dragnet operation facilitated by the fact that their skills would not be common ones.12 Applying jargon that
emerged in the aftermath of an earlier brutal conspiracy, their names would become Mudd. More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it
would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists,
perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safety can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007,
49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists would face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and
Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational
group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with
a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a
year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is
difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the
unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to
fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2). These problems are also emphasized in an earlier report by
five Los Alamos scientists: although schematic drawings showing the principles of bomb design in a qualitative way are

widely available, the detailed design drawings and specifications that are essential before it is possible to plan the
fabrication of actual parts are not available. The preparation of these drawings requires a large number of man-hours
and the direct participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, chemical, and
metallurgical properties of the various materials to be used, as well as the characteristics affecting their fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation
effects, both nuclear and biological; technology concerning high explosives and/or chemical propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical
circuitry; and others (Mark et al. 1987, 58).14 Moreover, stresses physicist David Albright, the process would also require "good
managers and organization people" (Keller 2002). The Los Alamos scientists additionally point out that the design and building
would require a base or installation at which experiments could be carried out over many months, results could be assessed,
and, as necessary, the effects of corrections or improvements could be observed in follow-on experiments. Similar considerations would apply
with respect to the chemical, fabrication, and other aspects of the program (Mark et al. 1987, 64-65). Although they think the problems can be
dealt with "provided adequate provisions have been made," they also stress that "there are a number of obvious potential hazards in any such
operation, among them those arising in the handling of a high explosive; the possibility of inadvertently inducing a critical configuration of the
fissile material at some stage in the procedure; and the chemical toxicity or radiological hazards inherent in the materials used. Failure to foresee
all the needs on these points," they conclude laconically, "could bring the operation to a close" (Mark et al. 1987, 62, emphasis added; see also
Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 64). Or, as Gary Milhollin puts it, "a single mistake in design could wreck the whole project" (2002, 48). Younger
has more recently made a similar argument: it would be wrong to assume that nuclear weapons are now easy to make....I am constantly amazed
when self-declared "nuclear weapons experts," many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon, hold forth on how easy it is to make a
functioning nuclear explosive....While it is true that one can obtain the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive from articles on the
Internet, none of these sources has enough detail to enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive (2007, 86, 88).15 Although he
remains concerned that a terrorist group could buy or steal a nuclear device or be given one by an established nuclear country (2007, 93), Younger
is quick to enumerate the difficulties the group would confront when trying to fabricate one on their own. He stresses that uranium is
"exceptionally difficult to machine" while "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are
sensitive to exactly how it is processed. Both need special machining technology that has evolved through a process of trial and error." Others
contend the crudest type of bomb would be "simple and robust" and "very simple" to detonate (Bunn and Wier 2006, 140).

Younger disagrees: Another challenge...is how to choose the right tolerances. "Just put a slug uranium into a gun
barrel and shoot it into another slug of uranium" is one deception of how easy it is to make a nuclear explosive.
However, if the gap between the barrel and the slug is too tight, then the slug may stick as it is accelerated down the barrel. If
the gap is too big, then other more complex, issues may arise. All of these problems can be solved by experimentation, but this
experimentation requires a level of technical resources that, until recently, few countries had. How do you measure the
progress of an explosive detonation without destroying the equipment doing the measurement? How do you perform precision measurements on
something that only lasts a fraction of a millionth of a second? (2007, 89) All this work would have to be carried out in utter secret ,
of course, even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl . "In addition to all the usual
intelligence methods," note the Los Alamos scientists, "the most sensitive technical detection equipment available would be at

their disposal," and effective airborne detectors used to prospect for uranium have been around for decades and
"great improvement in such equipment have been realized since" (Mark et al. 1987, 60). As Milhollin presents the terrorists
problem, "the theft of the uranium would probably be discovered soon enough, and it might be only a short matter of time before the
whole world showed up on their doorstep" (2002, 48).16 Moreover, points out Langewiesche, people in the area may observe with
increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals (2007, 65-69).17
In addition, the bombmakers would not be able to test the product to be sure they were on the right track (Linzer 2004; Mark et al.
1987, 64). The process of fabricating an IND requires, then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will
remain completely devoted to the cause. This is not an impossible task--some of the terrorists who tried to commit mayhem in Britain in 2007 had
medical degrees--but it certainly vastly complicates the problem. In addition, corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain
utterly reliable, no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off, and international and local
security services must be kept perpetually in the dark.

67

A2-Transition Wars
No impact to the transition
Ikenberry 08 -professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can
the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

observers believe that the American era is coming to an end,

Some
as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the
East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that
as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the

The result of
these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In
this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the
rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II
international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not
inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition . The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very
different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past
rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rulebased, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers
unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by
declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive
order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation
of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies
closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and
newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a
international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat.

unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

68

Procedurals

69

2AC-ASPEC
ALL THE STATES
US Code Online
7 U.S. Code 7702 Definitions, Accessed June 11th 2014,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7702
(20) United States The term United States means all of the States.
Resolutional basis o/w
CX solves your offense
Beurocratization disadxtend Girouxobsession over process is emblematic of how the state locks us into
debates about political utility that distract us from creating points of resistance
Process focus badcreates stale education where we regurgitate the same arguments over and over and dont
learn about the topicthis is the way biopolitics conditions us at the level of education to become productive
members of the community

70

2AC-Framework

71

2AC-General
Their framework is the surveillance state par-excellenceradical dissent is the only option
for meaningful politics
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

Dissent is crucial to any viable notion of democracy and provides a powerful counterforce to the
dystopian imagination that has descended like a plague on American society ; but dissent is not enough. In a time of
surging authoritarianism, it is crucial for everyone to find the courage to translate critique into the building of popular
movements dedicated to making education central to any viable notion of politics. This is a politics
that does the difficult work of assembling critical formative cultures by developing alternative media,
educational organizations, cultural apparatuses, infrastructures and new sites through which to
address the range of injustices plaguing the United States and the forces that reproduce them. The rise of cultures of surveillance along
with the defunding of public and higher education, the attack on the welfare state and the militarization of
everyday life can be addressed in ways that not only allow people to see how such issues are
interrelated to casino capitalism and the racial-security state but also what it might mean to make
such issues meaningful to make them critical and transformative. As Charlie Derber has written, "How to express
possibilities and convey them authentically and persuasively seems crucially important" if any viable notion of resistance is to take place.80 Nothing will change
unless the left and progressives take seriously the subjective underpinnings of oppression in the United States. The

power of the imagination,

dissent, and the willingness to hold power accountable constitute a major threat to authoritarian
regimes. Snowden's disclosures made clear that the authoritarian state is deeply fearful of those intellectuals, critics, journalists and others who dare to question
authority, expose the crimes of corrupt politicians and question the carcinogenic nature of a corporate state that has hijacked democracy: This is most evident in the
insults and patriotic gore heaped on Manning and Snowden. How else to explain, in light of Snowden's initial disclosures about the NSA, the concern on the part of
government and intelligence agencies that his "disclosures have renewed a longstanding concern: that young Internet aficionados whose skills the agencies need for
counterterrorism and cyber defense sometimes bring an anti-authority spirit that does not fit the security bureaucracy."81 Joel F. Brenner, a former inspector general of
the NSA made it very clear that the real challenge Snowden revealed was to make sure that a generation of young people were not taught to think critically or question
authority. As Brenner put it, young people who were brought into the national security apparatus were not only selling their brains but also their consciences. In other
words, they have to "adjust to the culture" by endorsing a regime of one that just happened to be engaging in a range of illegalities that threatened the foundations of
democracy.82 What

is clear is that the corporate-security state provides an honorable place for

intellectuals who are willing to live in a culture of conformity. In this case as Arthur Koestler said some years ago,
conformity becomes "a form of betrayal which can be carried out with a clear conscience." 83 At the same
time, it imposes its wrath on those who reject subordinating their consciences to the dictates of
authoritarian rule.
Turn-Policymaking operates at an imperial sphere in which elites constantly project

exceptionalist interests into politics that prevent effective macropolitical change. Affirming
our own master morality is a prerequisite to overcoming this subjectivity.
Hedges 9-journalist and activist, columnist at truthdig, honory doctorate @ Unitarian Universalist Seminary, MA in Divinity @ Harvard
[Transcript: Chris Hedges, "Empire of Illusion", 21 July 2009 - See more at: http://www.thomhartmann.com/blog/2009/07/transcript-chrishedges-empire-illusion-21-july-2009#sthash.UYJzvNOZ.dpuf 30. July 2009, http://www.thomhartmann.com/blog/2009/07/transcript-chrishedges-empire-illusion-21-july-2009]
Thom: Is the world dying? Is our culture dying? Is this mess one that we have created ourselves? Is this something that is unique to the United States? Is it planet
wide? Whats going on here? Chris Hedges, Pulitzer Prize winner, his new book, "Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle." And for our
listeners in Portland, listening on AM 620 KPOJ, Chris is going to be at Powells tonight on Burnside, the legendary bookstore, at 7:30 tonight, and it should be a lot
of fun. But hes in the studio with us live here today. Chris, welcome to the show. Chris Hedges: Thank you, Thom. Thom: So great to have you here. In synopsis you

paint a rather dire portrait of a bread and circus America. Chris Hedges: Yeah. Its the story of an America that has
transferred its allegiance to spectacle, to pseudo-events, that no longer can determine what is real and what is
illusion, that confuses how theyre made to feel with knowledge, that confuses propaganda with ideology , and
thats exceedingly dangerous. All totalitarian societies are image-based societies, and thats what our society has become .
Thom: Already.

Were past the point of saying were at a threshold . Youre saying we have passed the threshold. Chris Hedges:

Yeah. I think that you can easily, theres

enough indicators within the culture, to illustrate that print-based culture, those
people who deal in nuance and ambiguity and ideas are a minority . Thom: But cant there be a nuanced and thoughtful electronic, I

72

mean I read you all the time on the Internet. Youve got a piece up today on Commondreams.org. As do I, by the way. Chris Hedges: Sure, but the fact is shows like
yours, in the cultural mainstream, are marginal. Thom: Were anomalies. Were the exception that proves the rule. Chris Hedges: Yeah. Youre not interrupting me,
youre not insulting me, youre not shouting. Its not carnival barking. You

use the airwaves to actually try and discuss ideas and

allow your guests to flesh out opinions, opinions that you may not even agree with. Thats very different from
almost everything we see. And look, newspapers are dying, the publishing industry is dying, you have 42 million
Americans who are illiterate. You have another 50 million Americans who are semi literate, meaning they read
at a 4th of 5th grade level. And then you have people who are functionally literate, but they dont read . There
are tremendous consequences for that, because as you well know, having worked in the advertising industry,
these images are not benign. They are skillfully orchestrated and manipulated by for-profit corporations to
get us to do a lot of things that are not in our interests. And of course, this all ties into the rise of celebrity culture, well on display with our
3 week coverage of the death of Michael Jackson. Thom: Right, yeah, the whole circus around him. So how do we fix this? How do we recover some sense, I mean
you read DeTocqueville, you know, DeTocqueville's story, Democracy in America is the title, 1838. And he only spent 6 months here, he was in his late 30s, French
nobleman, came over, looked around, blew his mind. The average farmer was as literate as the average scholar. Chris Hedges: Yeah. Thats the tragedy, isnt it? Thom:
Yeah. And I would submit to you that while we could go back to the founding of the modern P.R. industry, and Woodrow Wilson, and you know all that kind of stuff,

in the 19 teens, that the idea of corporate personhood has played a big role in this. The rise of corporate
dominance and the theft of human rights, essentially, has played a big role in this . And that it really began
going downhill fast when the Reagan administration came to power. And particularly when they decided that
they were going to change our schools. Chris Hedges: Yeah. Although I think that, you know, its been decades in the making.
And I think that we have seen profound cultural transformation in American culture, or cultures. Because,
you know, we once had distinct regional and ethnic cultures, these were all systematically destroyed in the
early part of the 20th century by corporate interests who used mass communications as well as an
understanding of human psychology to turn consumption into an inner compulsion. And with that we lost the old
values of thrift, of regional identity that had its own iconography, esthetic expression and history, as well as
diverse immigrant traditions. Thom: But, you know, Chris, I guarantee it theres somebody listening right now going, These young kids these days!
They dont understand! You know, kind of thing. And is it possible that there is some redeeming value in this new culture that
has been created out of corporatocracy and what I would argue is a form of fascism, basically an external
control of our government? Or is it something that we just need to pull down and start over? And if so, how? Chris Hedges: Well, Sheldon Wolin, the
great political philosopher who taught at Berkeley and later Princeton, now 86, has written his sort of magnum opus called, Democracy Incorporated. And he argues
that

we live in a system that he calls inverted totalitarianism . The classical totalitarianism, in classical

totalitarianism, like fascism or communism, economics is always subordinate to politics. But in inverted
totalitarianism, politics is subordinate to economics. And with a rise of the consumer society, with the
commodification of everything, including human beings and natural resources, you have built into it a form,
an inevitable form of self annihilation. Because nothing has intrinsic value when society is no longer
recognized as sacred. You exhaust everything for their, for its ability to make money. No matter how much
human misery you create, no matter how much you go, how far you go to destroy the ecosystem that is
sustaining the human species. And that with the rise of celebrity culture, of consumer culture, and on federate
capitalism, you get what Benjamin Demott has called, I think quite correctly, junk politics. Thom: Yeah. And we have a junk politics
junk culture. And I think perhaps the most important point you just made is, and we just talked about for the last hour, is this loss of a sense of the
sacred. And, you know, its interesting, I think some months ago I had you on, and I was taking the atheist position and we were having this debate because in the
previous hour I had had an atheist on and I had taken the religious position and had a debate, my reality is a little bit of both, and between heart and mind, I guess, to
use Jeffersons old letter to his girlfriend in France. How do we, it seems

to me that we are wired for the sacred. And that there is

still, within the zeitgeist of America, within the soul of America, there is still this belief, that for example, the
constitution is something that is sacred. That the founding ideals of the enlightenment are sacred. And Im using that word in its broadest sense.
Secular religion of America, as it were. Some people call it American exceptionalism and ridicule it, but I think that in that,
setting aside the two major parties, in that in citizen movements, we can perhaps recapture those original
dreams. Am I just being hopelessly optimistic? Chris Hedges: No, no. The sacred, understanding the sacred, is absolutely key . And
although I dont like the new atheists, you know, I must throw in that almost any orthodox believer would consider me an atheist and lead, the London Review of
Books when they reviewed "I Don't Believe in Atheists" began by saying I was a non-believer. Thom: Right. Chris Hedges: But what does tie me to, and to you, is that
utter importance of the sacred. And you know Karl Polanyi, this great economist in 1944, wrote a book called "The Great Transformation" in which he said that a

society that no longer recognizes the sacred, that exhausts everything for profit, always kills itself. And I think thats
what were seeing. And as an economist, he actually used the word sacred. That human beings have an intrinsic worth, that the natural
world has an intrinsic worth, beyond its potential to generate profit. Thom: And this has nothing to do with religion. Chris
Hedges: No. Thom: Thats why I said. This is resacrilizing America. Chris Hedges: Right. Thom: And thus, perhaps, to the extent that were an example to the world,
perhaps saving the world. I mean these are big words. Chris Hedges: We

live in a corporate state. We live in a state that no longer

responds to the interests of its citizens, but does the bidding of corporations. There is no shortage of examples
of that, from the largest transference of wealth upwards in American history, to the so-called healthcare
debate, where for profit healthcare industries are literally profiting off of death, any debate about healthcare
must begin from the factual understanding that the for profit healthcare industry is the problem. Then we
can debate what we do. But unfortunately, and many, many citizens know that, across the floor, but we cant have it because we are

73

completely controlled. Weve undergone a kind of coup detat in slow motion. We live in a kind of inverted
totalitarianism where the faade of democracy and the constitution are held up as an ideal but the actual
levers of power are driven by very destructive forces.
9

74

A2-Agonism
Turn--their theorization of agonistic respect is life-denying. Fairness doesnt come from the
judge but from unfeterred contestation of will only by challenging the rules of the game
can we make this possible
Siemens 13 - Professor of modern philosophy at Leiden University in the Netherlands and is president of the
Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain. He is a chief editor and contributor to the ongoing Nietzsche
Dictionary project, based at Radboud University of Nijmegen and Leiden. [Herman, 2013, Nietzsche and Political
Thought, pp. 85-92] Gender modified
These political

agonisms exhibit two formal features that bear directly on Nietzsches concept of the
agon in Homers Contest (Homers Wettkampf, HC): 1. The first is the open-ended, counter-final character of agonism:
no results are permanent, all settlements remain open to contestation , so that contestation is incessant,
continuous. In HC, this is implied by the exclusion of the hervorragende Individuum from Nietzsches account of agon; that is, the conclusive
victor who cannot be challenged. This implies that the agon can only work and thrive where a plurality of

antagonistic forces (Krafte) or geniuses are engaged in an inconclusive, open-ended contestation of

victory (HC, KSA 1, 789). The agon admits mastery between the contests temporary, intermittent victors like the Olympic champion or the
winner of the contest of tragedies this year. The emergence of an absolute victor kills the agon. 2. The other formal element
concerns the scope of contestation. Contestation does not just take place within a specific politicallegal-institutional order, but also over the very terms of that order ; political agonism does not just
follow a set of rules and procedures but is also contestation over those very rules, procedures and
criteria . This formal characteristic coheres with the anomalous character of agon as game, as described by
Nietzsche in HC and MA 170.12 The

measure or standard of victory is not given or fixed independently of

each contest; it is the actual issue of contestation , so that the agonal antagonist does not just want
to win; his [their] ambition is to determine what counts as winning , so that you have a contest of
judgements of victory or a contestation of justice of the very standard or measure of victory. Despite
these formal convergences, Nietzsches account of the agon in Homers Contest does not translate well into democratic practices. This is (1)
because the text presents not a recipe for action or recommendation, but a highly stylized, not to say idealized model of the agon focused on
martial, artistic, athletic and pedagogic practices, rather than politics. In other, more realist contexts Nietzsche can be highly critical of the Greek
agon for its practical consequences, such as stifling lesser talents, and inhibiting the emergence of the individual.13 This suggests that, in taking
inspiration from Nietzsches idealized model of the agon in Homers Contest, agonistic theorists offer highly idealized accounts of democratic
practices which ignore the practical difficulties of real agonistic interaction. Furthermore (2), the relation between the agon and democracy is
tenuous at best for Nietzsche. Like his colleague at Basel, Jacob Burckhardt, he was suspicious of modern mass

democracies for promoting mediocrity . Both opposed the agon practised by Greek aristocrats not just to modern culture but
also to later Greek democracy.14 By disrupting one-to-one relations and introducing the masses into the equation,

ruined the agon

for Burckhardt, who writes of fifth century Greece: The

democracy actually

entire praxis of democracy becomes with

time an inauthentic agon in which despicable speech, sycophancy etc. come to the foreground .15 To
relate the agon to democratic practices in affirmative ways, as do political agonists like Hatab, Owen and Connolly, is therefore is to oppose, rather than succeed to Nietzsche. So how exactly do
they situate the agon in democracy? In Hatabs case it begins with the claim that there are deep compatibilities between Nietzsches thought and democracy, or at least: democracy under a certain
description. They concern not just (1) the notion of agon, but also (2) perspectivism and the open category of interpretation (in place of foundationalist claims to absolute, objective knowledge,
and (3) the Nietzschean suspicion of the underlying power-claims at stake in moral and cognitive claims.16 In his 1995 book A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, he argues that Nietzsche
opens the possibility of redescribing democracy in nonmetaphysical terms that incorporate critical insights of postmodernism and enable us to dispense with a positive concept of equality, with its
irreducibly metaphysical/ theological foundations. That is to say, Hatab takes one aspect of Nietzsches critique of democracy on board: the critique of equality, but argues that we can theorize
democracy without a substantive concept of equality. In place of equality, he proposes an ethos of agonistic respect for opponents, grounded in Will to Power (I shall return to this below).
Connolly and Owen advance a perfectionist version of agonistic democratic theory. Their question is how to ennoble democracy, and both argue against Nietzsche that the kinds of nobility of
character and culture he advanced are better anchored and expressed in democratic practices than he imagined. Nietzschean nobility, glossed by Connolly in terms of self-experimentation, grace
and plurality, exhibits traits that he contends are appropriate to our fast-paced world.17 Indeed, in Connollys view, Nietzsche offers unique constructive resources for rethinking key democratic
ideas in a present that seems to be outpacing slow pace of democratic deliberation, as well as the ideals bequeathed by classical democrats such as Rousseau, Tocqueville, Mill, or even
contemporaries like Rawls or Habermas. In all three cases we are clearly dealing with appropriations, rather than interpretations of Nietzsche. Their concern is not to interpret his texts in a way
that does justice to their specificity, but to take from them and adapt what is needed for their own post-Nietzschean democratic projects.18 But the question of interpretation remains: whether
what they take from Nietzsche most notably the affirmative notion of antagonism is adequate as an interpretation of his thought. In Section 1 of this Chapter I examine what divides Nietzsches
conception of the agon from the notions of antagonism at work in agonistic theory, in order to highlight some of the weaknesses in the latter that emerge out of these differences. Section 2 will

In advancing a concept of
democratic politics as antagonism, struggle and disagreement, any agonistic theory of democracy must in one
way or other confront the problem of limits or measure: How to contain political struggle so that it
then turn to the question of what constructive alternatives, if any, his philosophy of conflict has to offer. Against respect

75

remains this side of mutual annihilation? In HC this is the question of the relation between the Wett-kampf and the
Vernichtungs-kampf, between the good and the evil Eris. As part of their response, almost all agonists (Hatab, Owen, Connolly,
Mouffe) appeal to some form of respect agonistic respect for the other as a legitimate opponent . That is
to say, they appeal to self-restraint on the part of the agonist guided by a certain attitude, disposition
or ethos. In what follows, two examples will be considered. 4 1. The first is Hatab. In dispensing with a substantive notion of equality, Hatab tries to replace it with an ethos of equal
regard 19 and agonistic respect. 20 This ethos is supposedly derived from the antagonists insight into their agonistic interdependence, which in turn is presented by Hatab as a consequence of
Nietzsches Will to Power: [T]he will to power expresses an agonistic force-field, wherein any achievement or production of meaning is constituted by an overcoming of some opposing force.
Consequently, my Other is always implicated in my nature; the annulment of my Other would be the annulment of myself. [. . .] This is why Nietzsche often speaks of the need to affirm our
opponents as opponents, since they figure in our selfdevelopment.21 and upon this Hatab builds his concept of agonistic respect. Agonistic respect is a consequence of my insight into the
reciprocity and interdependence of antagonistic forces. Since the annulment of my Other would be the annulment of myself (or again: The elimination or degradation of the Other would be
self-defeating),22 I am bound to affirm my opponent as opponent. Hatabs analysis involves a curious, psychologistic translation of the Will to Power onto the plane of the subjective selfawareness. But I am not a Will to Power, and others are not opposing Wills to Power. We are all derivative, provisional unities resulting from the infinitely complex, pre-conscious, subject-less
organizations of Wills to Power. Furthermore,

Hatabs is a soft, altogether sanitized interpretation of the Will to Power

that dissolves the dynamic of creation-destruction , the activity of expansion through incorporation or functionalization of
opposing Will to Power complexes, and the logic of exploitation. In Nietzsches thought there is a tension between the agon and
the Will to Power, one that can be traced to the moment of measure or limits in the agon: in precluding
injury

and exploitation it

divides the agon against life as Will to Power , insofar as Will to Power includes injury and exploitation.23

This tension is overlooked by Hatab, who effectively reads agonal restraint back into the logic of the Will to Power. Finally, one can question whether the Will to Power allows for the kind of
recognition or acknowledgement of the Other that supposedly motivates agonistic self-restraint. Hegelian dialectics may allow for acknowledgement of the Other in its particular content, but it is
unclear whether the logic of exploitation in power-relations implies any more than the instrumental valuation by one power-complex of the resistance offered by another as means for its own
expansion.24 2. In the case of Connolly, one can see even more clearly than in Hatab that agonistic politics is based on an ontology of struggle and power that is quite alien to Nietzsche.
Connollys point of departure is a theory of identity, supposedly informed by Nietzsche and Foucault. In a world of flux without design, he argues, any life-form or self, in order to subsist as a
unity, needs an identity to organise and resist the chaos of raw sensibility.25 Yet life, understood as an excess of energy propelling possibilities into being, exceeds any purpose or identity to
which people already conform; for every way of life, settled practice or fixed identity produces difference in and around itself in the very process of specifying itself.26 Life, therefore, provides
a precondition for identity while resisting [because exceeding HS] the completion of any form of identity (ibid.). This account of identity-formation, conceived as a process of constituting or
producing difference, rests on a post-structuralist logic of the constitutive outside.27 In Nietzsches ontology of life, by contrast, difference like activity is a precondition (or presupposition)
for (thinking) identity as a life-process. It is only by virtue of differential relations with other forces, in the very process of confronting the resistance they offer, that any derivative identity is
possible. Identity, understood as the process whereby a complex or organization of Wills to Power is formed, does not produce difference; rather it seeks out resistance and difference in order to
expand by commanding and incorporating that which resists it.28 It is not therefore Nietzsches concept of diversity and difference to which Connollys agonistic politics of identity and
difference is hospitable. Connollys post-structuralist theory of identity is designed to address adequately and affirm the specific character of pluralism in late modern democracies; what he calls
the paradox of difference that haunts social life in late modern democracies.29 Identity (personal, group, collective) is defined and specified by the way it constitutes difference: identity needs
difference to be, but difference threatens the security and certainty of self-identity.30 Connollys question is, then: How best to respond to this paradox politically? The paradigmatic response, he
maintains, is to deny the constitutive role of the other and to seek the self-certainty of identity through closure against the other; that is, by defining the other as evil or (in the case of deliberative
theory) irrational, while making claims to absolute truth and value for oneself.31 Connollys agonistic alternative to this response turns on the need to acknowledge the contingency and
incompleteness of identity, and its constitutive dependence on difference and opposition. What is needed instead, he argues, are identities that can affirm themselves without denying their
constructed, relational, paradoxical character; only this will allow for a pluralization of identities appropriate to our contemporary world. The hope is that insight into our agonistic dependence on
the other can act as an incentive towards agonistic respect, which he characterizes as an empathy for what we are not, a care for difference.32 For Connolly, agonistic respect is a civic
virtue, one that goes as far as deep respect by which he means that those who bestow it acknowledge the dignity of those who embrace different sources of respect that they honor different
final sources.33 Yet Connolly insists that none of this excludes contesting other sources of respect, and he enlists Nietzsches spiritualisation of enmity (Vergeistigung der Feindschaft) in order
to explicate this peculiar agonistic empathy. He appeals in specific to Nietzsches pathos of distance and refers to TI Antinature 3 as a key source: The spiritualisation of sensuality is called love:
it is a great triumph over Christianity. Another triumph is our spiritualisation of enmity. It consists in profoundly grasping the value of having enemies [. . .] The church has at all times wanted the
destruction of its enemies: we, we immoralists and anti-Christians, see that it is to our advantage that the church exists. . . . In the domain of politics as well enmity has become more spiritual
nowadays much cleverer, much more thoughtful, much more considerate [schonender]. Almost every party grasps that its interest in self-preservation lies in the opposition party not losing its

the reciprocity and interdependence of

enmity leads to an agonistic respect for our enemies. Despite significant differences in their approaches, Hatab and Connolly have
two things in common. 1. Both approach the question of limits from the position of the subject and
the kind of ethos or attitude that must be adopted for political antagonism to remain this side of
mutual destruction. 2. Both theorists start from the subjects insight into the reciprocity and
interdependence implied by relations of antagonism or enmity, and derive from it an
acknowledgement or respect for the antagonist or enemy; that is, the attitude or ethos that limits or
contains the subjects antagonism. Both of these points are, I believe, deeply problematic and can be
criticized from a Nietzschean perspective. To begin with the second point: In Nietzsches passage on the spiritualization of
enmity, used by Connolly to support his notion of agonistic respect, there is no talk of respect, let alone respect for
powers [. . .] (TI Antinature 3, KSA 6, 84) According to Connolly, this passage illustrates how our insight into

ones enemy, much less empathy . Nietzsche writes of a deep understanding, i.e. acknowledgement of the the value of having
enemies; but

to value enmity is by no means the same as respecting ones enemy

a la Connolly. In Nietzsches

formulation, what is valued (not respected) are relations of enmity (not the enemy), and to value relations of enmity implies only that one

values the enemy for the resistance or opposition it offers one, not for the specificity of its content .
The same difficulty afflicts Hatabs account, as we have seen, since it is the opposition of the other, the resistance it offers, that is constitutive of
my Will to Power or perspective, and not its specific content. Both accounts raise the same question: Does the interdependence of antagonistic
relations imply any more than the instrumental value of the antagonistic other?34 This concern is completely missed if the value of enmity is
allowed to slide into respect for the enemy. Nietzsches emphasis on relations of enmity is by no means confined to this text. The late

Nietzsche writes of the relational character of all occurrence (Relations-charakter alles Geschehens: KSA 11, 26[36], 157) and develops
a relational ontology of tension, attraction-repulsion, action-resistance among forces without substance to
describe it. This suggests that there is something amiss with the first point shared by Hatab and Connolly: their attempt to

76

think agonistic interaction and the question of limits from the subject-position . This suspicion is confirmed
when we consider that for the young Nietzsche who authored Homers Contest, it was clear that the agon became important and effective as an
institution in a context where the Greeks could not rely on self-restraint. What drew Nietzsche to the Greek agon was the way it conjugated a
heroic pathos, the temptation to hubris and excess (Obermass) on the part of the subjects, with measured, creative conflict in the relations
between them: Wonderful process, how the generalized struggle [Kampf] of all Greeks gradually comes to acknowledge one Sikh in all domains:
where does this come from? The contest unleashes the individual: and at the same time, it restrains [or tames: bandigt] the individual according to
eternal laws. (KSA 7, 16[22], 402) If we ask with Nietzsche how this was possible, one clue lies in the social ontology of tension presupposed by
the agon. In Homers Contest he describes the principle of Greek pedagogy as the view that: Every gift [talent, capacity: Begabung] must unfold
[or flourish: sich entfalten] through contestation, this is what Hellenic popular pedagogy dictates (HC, KSA 1, 789). This implies that each

particular capacity, force or genius can only become what it is (sich entfalten) through antagonistic
striving [Gegenstreben] against others. This social ontology makes antagonistic relations essential to the
forging of identities in agonal action. However, these relations also act as a medium of resistance
that cuts subjective intentions off from resulting action or interaction, so that the identity -the who
-disclosed in agonal action is not the result of a wilful purpose, but the product of relations of
tension that are dynamic and unpredictable in nature.35 At stake is a resolutely relational social
ontology that is conditional upon an equilibrium of sorts among a plurality of forces or geniuses: the agonal
play of forces

(Wettspiel der Krafte), Nietzsche writes, presupposes that in a natural order of things, there are always several geniuses who

stimulate each other reciprocally to deeds, as they also hold each other reciprocally within the limits of measure (HC, KSA 1, 789)36 These
relations of mutual stimulation and mutual restraint are best understood with reference to the concept of equilibrium (ungefahres Gleichgewicht)
among more-or-less equal powers, proposed in Human, All Too Human as the origin of justice and anticipated in the Nachlass note cited above
(KSA 7, 16[22], 402) on the agonal origins of 8(Kh in Greece.37

By equality of power, Nietzsche does not mean a

quantitative measure of objective magnitudes, nor a judgement made from an external standpoint , but the expression of an
estimated correspondence between powers, where each power judges itself (as equal) in relation to another power.38 Unlike the measure of
equality, however, the concept of equilibrium cannot be understood from the subject-position, the

standpoint of the single antagonists or powers as their conscious goal. For the antagonists do not
aim at equilibrium; rather, each strives for supremacy

(Obermacht)

to be the best . Equilibrium is ,

an intersubjective or relational phenomenon, a function of the relations between more-or-less equal

forces, each striving for supremacy. So once again, the relational concept of equilibrium inserts a radical disjunction between the
subject-position of the antagonists their desires, intentions and claims and the qualities of their resulting agonal interaction: each wants to
be the best, yet an equilibrium is, or can be, achieved; each is tempted to excess and hubris, yet
limits or measure can be achieved. The relational sense of the agon means that the measure or limit on action is
then,

determined not by the players goals, interests or disposition; rather it is the contingent result of
dynamic relations that emerge between social forces competing for supremacy . Both the social
ontology of tension and the relational concept of equilibrium point to the impossibility of realizing
agonal interaction from the subject-position, by adopting a specific attitude or ethos . 3 Rethinking
agonistic theory: Nietzsches constructive alternatives Nietzsches relational concept of agonal interaction also has significant consequences for
the phenomenology of agonal agency. By inserting a disjunction between the subjects dispositions (intentions,
desires, claims, etc.) and

the measured character of their agonal interaction, it frees up the

phenomenology of agonal agency from the overriding need to locate sources of measure or selfrestraint in an ethos of respect. One of the problems with respect is that it cannot really be felt and, as such
cannot be relied on to really motivate or limit agonal action . What can be felt, as Nietzsche points out
repeatedly, are envy, jealousy, ambition,

hatred: the passions that are the real springs of the agon.

Nietzsches

relational concept of agonal interaction opens the space for a much richer, realist account of the subjects dispositions, a phenomenology of
enmity that brings the antagonism back into agonism and corrects the emphasis on empathy and reciprocal constitution in agonistic respect. In the
following section I argue that agonal interaction is motivated by hatred, rather than respect, and that

Nietzsches concept of agonal hatred combines antagonism with an affirmation of the other that
far exceeds agonistic respect. This forms part of my broader claim that Nietzsches phenomenology of enmity houses invaluable
constructive resources for agonistic democratic theory.

77

A2-Education
Their form of education frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered through
civilizing practices. This form of dispassionate subject construction eliminates care and
dooms millions to suffering and death.
Mourad 1-Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic
credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is
the author of Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several
recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized
education and its relation to the social good, Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility Teachers College Record Volume 103, Number
5, October 2001, pp. 739759/
EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR KICKING THE DOG Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or youre out of the
picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual
threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to
suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and
mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new
critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the
ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political,
and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational

The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made
into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of
versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good
citizen, leader, independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all
cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in
need of being made competentand safein the mind of the educator . From this vantage point, the pedagogic
presuppositions?

relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome,
namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the
school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become .

It must be resolved, or contained

in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower ~a follower of
the social order!both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of
the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppressionto become a competent comrade.
The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an
individual means being freeit means being self-determined, it means competing, and it
means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and
limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to

the remedy
tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of
children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the
basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition
that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the states reason for being should be to
care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any
endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and

wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be

We talk about equipping children and adults to solve problems. Yet, problems
do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In
contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to
understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is
very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an
instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order . It may be argued that modern
education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly
expressed that we live in a complex world and that children and adults must learn how to learn, in order
to succeed in a world of rapid change. The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects
about overcoming anything?

the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to
adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing
complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what
education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it
is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One

must be an active learner

78

or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality
in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the
perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to do your best, make an effort, earn a grade, be motivated,
work hard, overcome obstacles, achieve. Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent
with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about
improvement. This

philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living.

It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does
that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The

modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established

through Lockean empiricism

that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is
responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The
perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and
retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and
about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the
analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic . The more basic problem that I
have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think
and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a
variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer
to ground pedagogy in the notion of building community. The idea that something must be built
implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, community
carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member again, the presumption that
something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of
betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and
revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as
something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not
only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest
countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the
same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as
caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way
under the rubric that I called contention is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches
to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western
civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm
in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological
progress. We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred
years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new
formulation and for a proper responseone that cares for the individual rather than makes it
competent. The modern project of betterment through competency and opportunity must be
challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally
acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.
~and made pedagogic by Rousseaus Emile!,

79

A2-Limits
Pre-fixed limits eliminate the potential for new, imaginative critique and personal
experiencegenealogy demands the rejection of subjectively fixed structure
Kazarian 2k-professor of philosophy at Rowan University [Edward P, professor of philosophy at Rowan University, On Limits
Critique, Transgression, and the Practice of Freedom in Foucault, December 2000]
For this Kantian model of critique, Foucault

wants to substitute a procedure that he initially defines not in terms of its methods but
rather in terms of the field in which it would operate: a "domain of experience" that "is neither inner experience, nor
the fundamental structures of scientific knowledge," nor "a group of historical contents elaborated
elsewhere, treated by historians and received as ready-made facts" (Foucault 1978, 44). This domain of experience, which I will call
"archaeologicalgenealogical" for reasons that will become clear below, is thus constituted by the simultaneous rejection

of
fixed historical meaning, subjective interiority, and transcendental structures of any sort. This is just
what makes it a domain of experience in Foucaults sense of that term. It includes not only the possibility of analytical action, but more
importantly that of inventionwhich is why Foucault, even as he is careful to note that this "domain of experiencein no way excludes any
other" (Foucault, 1978, 44), claims in almost the same breath that here, "one has to make ones own history, fabricate

history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would be traversed by the question of the
relationships between structures of rationality which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms
of subjection which are linked to it" (Foucault 1978, 45). Unlike critical analysis a la Kantian transcendental
philosophy, which operates on a domain that is pre-formed according to a fixed abstract regime of
"possible experience" that ultimately amounts to nothing other than possible truth , and which
attempts to subordinate the imagination (productive and reproductive) to the dictates of rational synthesis a
priori, Foucaults critical attitude, proceeding entirely within and through an analysis of the contingencies of history and
engaging these by means of an imaginative variation, ultimately gives analysis itself the operative valence not of
synthesis but of disruption and dispersal, so that the work of analysis makes it not only possible but
indeed necessary to think otherwise. What I have described above is no different from what Foucault describes at the end of
"What is Enlightenment?" when he argues for a new form of critical analysis that is "genealogical in its design and
archaeological in its method" (Foucault 1984, 315), and which, precisely in order "not to settle for the affirmation or
the empty dream of freedommust also beexperimental" (Foucault 1984, 316). Glossing these two points,
Foucault begins by arguing directly against transcendental criticism: Archaeologicaland not transcendentalin the sense that it will not seek to
identify the universal structures of all knowledge [connaissance] or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse
that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And genealogical in the sense that

it will not deduce from

the form of what we are what it is important for us to do and to know ; but it will separate out,
from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or
thinking what we are, do, or think (Foucault 1984, 315-6).

80

A2-Process Education
Interpassivity DAthey become obsessed with process and crowd out possibility for good
advocacy

Van Owen 6- professor of ethics, legal philosophy and social philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of Erasmus University (Van
Oenen, Rotterdam Gijs A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life)
Slavoj Zizek once explained the difference between Verstand and Vernunft in Hegel by saying that Vernunft is the state in which we realize that Verstand suffices.
Vernunft is Verstand minus the illusion that there is something beyond it.17 Interactivity and interpassivity, the third and the fourth mode of the political process we
are studying, are related to each other in much the same way. Interpassivity constitutes a radicalization of interactivity, in the following sense: it expresses the view, or
rather the habitus, that interactivity in fact suffices. The

loss of the product of politics, or rather the loss of the sense that this
product is what matters primarily, characterizes the condition of political interpassivity. The main interest, or
perhaps we should say obsession, lies with the process, not with its eventual product . We may also recall here Jean
Baudrillard's account of 'the end of production'. Baudrillard argues that 'there is no longer any production' and, consequently, we cannot be liberated, or regain
authenticity, through revolution (that is to say, through the socialization of the means of production).18 Especially relevant here is his analysis of the relation of 'the
sign' to reality, represented as a four-stage sequence.19 From being a 'reflection of a basic reality', the sign evolves into a 'mask' of this reality, and later into a mask of
the absence of a basic reality; finally, the sign no longer bears a relation to any reality whatsoever. Baudrillard's four stages may well be viewed as the (postmodernist)
philosophical equivalent of the stages of politics I have distinguished. Of course, the difference between the philosophical and the political case I discuss is that in the
latter, the 'detachment' from the end-product is not necessarily reflective either at the individual or at the collective level. We do not consciously realize that we have
lost our interest to move beyond the state of policy-making, preparation and planning. But neither does it seem correct to say that we believe, even more resolutely
than before, that we are strongly interested in politics. Somehow we

suspect that our continuous 'access' to politics does not provide

us with what we want or need, but we feel powerless to change our condition, or even uninterested in doing so. In
other words, we feel ambiguous. On the one hand, we indulge in unwarranted optimism concerning the possible benefits of a
hyper-interactive political process. The political system tries to enhance its legitimacy by promising to be in
ever-closer contact with its citizens. The fine-tuning of the political process by interactive means promises an unprecedented capacity to
accommodate the plural and diverging demands of individuals and groups. The unrealistic nature of these promises is of course itself a source of disappointment. In an
attempt to win back our flagging interest, politics redoubles its promises, only to fail again to deliver on them, etc. But this sustained failure does not yet sufficiently

Politics fails us, or we fail politics, in a

do not really care anymore about what politics actually delivers. We do
not 'really' believe that politics may deliver everything it promises, but neither do we 'really' feel interested in whatever it is that
politics does produce. Our 'monitoring' of the product of politics constitutes the obverse of politics' monitoring of our behavior. Like people who converse
explain the sense of discontentment with politics that constitutes the other pole of our ambiguous state.

deeper sense.

This deeper sense, of course, is that we

in a room while a television set is turned on although noone is watching, we witness everything that politics delivers, without really noticing. Apparently, both
television ignorers and citizens assume that somehow someone else does, or might, take notice. In that sense, we have here a case of 'the illusions of others' as
analyzed by Robert Pfaller: an illusion owned or claimed by noone, yet shared by everyone. Certainly we do not 'confess' ourselves to be political beings, in Aristotle's
sense, nowadays. Citizenship in the traditional sense of being committed to the formulation and realization of collective goals increasingly constitutes a threatened
spieces. Nevertheless, as noticed, we do feel an intense connection to the political process and we do expect it to 'deliver'. We do not know why we still believe in

We do, because in some sense we realize that we would be lost without it. On the other hand, we strongly feel
it has fostered an instrumental attitude.
Rather than being engaged in politics, nowadays we perceive it as an object for use. This attitude has in fact been
politics, yet we do.

that we have 'outgrown' it. Chronic interactivity has not brought us closer to politics. To the contrary ,

encouraged by currently fashionable approaches to (the art of) government, particularly that of outsourcing.20 Just as in the industrial sphere, in government many
activities and branches have been outsourced, in the eighties and nineties. It was claimed that such activities could just as well, or better, be performed by external
organizations. Regardless of the merit of these claims, the trend of outsourcement has damaged government by undermining its credibility and authority. Citizens
concluded that perhaps there is nothing that government does especially well, compared to market actors. And worse, there is nothing that essentially needs to be done
by the state, and by the state alone. It seems that, under the right conditions, any government function could be outsourced. Thus there is nothing intrinsically political
worth committing to. And in reverse, nothing worth committing to is intrinsically political. Although it is perhaps true that almost all government activities can be
outsourced, even up to warfare, the attempt to undertake such a large-scale outsourcing undermines the authority of all government. In fact here we have the 'negative'
of the claim that government can actually make good on all its promises: either in the sense of itself being able to deliver every 'product' that citizens interactively put
on the agenda, or in the sense of being able to perfectly monitor and control all the outsourced activities that now take care of the actual delivery. Both claims entail
that government can, and should, be made fully 'transparent'. Every process, every function needs to be assessed, evaluated, and accounted for. Yet, somehow we
realize that this cannot really be true. We need both less and more from government. We need less, because 'transparency' is a fantasy, an empty place that can (and
should) never be filled. And we need more, something that is hard to grasp yet essential for the authority of government. We need to believe in government, and this
belief is exactly what gets lost when we outsource politics, or ask for transparency. Government or politics is necessarily more than the sum of its parts.
Government is also the shared illusion of government, so to speak the mutual suspension of disbelief in its possibility. Thus the shared illusion of government exists,
but it is no longer claimed by anyone. Moreover, this uncomfortable sense of politics is associated not with the products or results of politics, but primarily with the
political process. Thus this

process increasingly acquires the character of a fetish. We are very much attached to it,
although we do not really care about its possible real effects . Or again, the process has itself become the product.

81

A2-Roleplaying
Passivity DArelying solely on roleplaying produces passivity towards power
Antonio 95-Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas

[Robert; Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of

History; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male
professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify

with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain

advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They
are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The
role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The
powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness ." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and
pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and
unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp.
302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or
simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."
Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an
actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the
originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts
foreclose genuine attachment to others. This

type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of
interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality
rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading
the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to
throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and
anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that
contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the
self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he

deeply
feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of
the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social
selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party
conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves
the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

82

A2-T-Version
No T-versionreform empirically fails, just gets rolled back or ignoredradical critique is
key
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]
Modern history is replete with such struggles, and the arch of that history has to be carried forward before it is too late. In

a time of tyranny,
thoughtful and organized resistance is not a choice; it is a necessity. In the struggle to dismantle the
authoritarian state, reform is only partially acceptable. Surely, as Fred Branfman argues, rolling back the
surveillance state can take the form of fighting: to end bulk collection of information; demand Congressional
oversight; indict executive-branch officials when they commit perjury; give Congress the capacity to genuinely oversee executive agency;
provide strong whistle-blower protection; and restructure the present system of classification.84 These are important reforms worth fighting for,
but they do not go far enough. What is needed is a radical restructuring of our understanding of
democracy and what it means to bring it into being. The words of Zygmunt Bauman are useful in understanding what is at stake in
such a struggle. He writes: "Democracy expresses itself in continuous and relentless critique of institutions ;
democracy is an anarchic, disruptive element inside the political system; essential, as a force of dissent and change. One can best recognize a
democratic society by its constant complaints that it is not democratic enough."85 What cannot be emphasized enough is that only through collective
struggles can change take place against modern-day authoritarianism. If the first order of authoritarianism is
unchecked secrecy, the first moment of resistance to such an order is widespread critical awareness of state
and corporate power and its threat to democracy, coupled with a desire for radical change rather
than reformist corrections. Democracy involves a sharing of political existence, an embrace of the commons and the demand for a future that cannot
arrive quickly enough. In short, politics needs a jump start, because democracy is much too important to be left
to the whims, secrecy and power of those who have turned the principles of self-government against
themselves.

83

2AC-Resolved
And, Resolved is to reduce to a fundamental analysis
OED. Oxford English Dictionary No Date
trans. a. (a) To reduce (a subject, statement, phenomenon, etc.) by analysis into
forms, principles, etc.; to consider or demonstrate (something) to be divisible or
analysable into.*18

more elementary

84

2AC-Should
Should means a persuasive recommendation
Words and Phrases 2, 2002 (Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson
West. P. 370)
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term should, as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate
who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive.
Wests Ann.Pen Code, 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

Precision disad
Dilip 11, Aron Dilip (Contributing Editor India) Professor in Social Science Difference Between Should and Must Mar 17th, 2011
http://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-should-and-vs-must/#ixzz1yLDjLmkx BK

Should and Must are two modal auxiliary verbs in English language that should be used correctly and with difference. Both the
verbs differ in their forms and their meanings as well. The verb must is generally used expressive of certainty as in the sentence I
must get up at five tomorrow. In this sentence the modal auxiliary verb must is used expressive of certainty regarding getting up at five
in the morning. Must is used to indicative of strong advice to oneself or to others as in the sentences: 1. I really must stop
drinking alcohol. 2. You must be here by 9 oclock at the latest. In both the sentences given above you will find that must is used
supportive of an advice or order. Sometimes must is used in questions too. In such cases it seems to ask about the intentions of the
person who is spoken to as in the sentences: 1. Must I write down everything? 2. Why must you read till late in the night this week? You seem to
ask about the intentions of the person who is spoken to in both the sentences by the usage of the verb must. The modal auxiliary verb should
can be used as the past form of shall as in the sentence I said I should be in the temple before eleven. The verb should sometimes is
used after if to suggest some sort of possibility or chance as in the sentence If you should see Julie, give her my wishes. The
meaning that you get from the sentence is that in case you meet her you convey my wishes to her. The verb should is very frequently used
to express obligation and duty as in the sentence You should meet him today. Thus the two verbs are to be used with precision.

85

2AC-United States
United States is a linguistic referent
Valsiner 12
Jaan The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology
https://books.google.com/books?id=WljI1r2e-SUC&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=%22the+united+states+means
%22+people&source=bl&ots=3vBpoL9XCg&sig=Gg43ejwLbebceYvWUmn7o78jVh0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WaioVLeoMIW1oQSPg4HYAQ&ve
d=0CCAQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=%22the%20united%20states%20means%22%20people&f=false
Maybe

most of the people

of the world

result of acts performed by

other

have

somehow

had a direct or indirect impact on their life as

people in accordance to what the United Sates means for them .

And those other people, in turn, have experienced the United States in terms of the acts that other people performed in accordance with it- and so
forth, in an infinite intertwining of infinite dimensionality.

not a thing

(as I have defined above Namely, an entity endowed with substantial consistence.

to touch the United States

States. Yet I am aware that
frontier

Yet , people are able to recognize that the United States is

or invite them to dinner.

Nobody has ever been able

If I forget to ask for a visa , I will not be able to enter the United

it is not the United States that will prevent me from entering, but

someone a

police officer who will do it as if she were executing the United States willthat is, in accordance with what the United States

means for her/him. Moreover, the frontier police officer will be able to have a commitment to her action insofar as she regards the United States
as if it was an existing entity.

86

Disadvantages

87

2AC-Cyber Security DA

88

2AC-Risk
Complexity theory takes out the DA linear causal chains of A leads to B leads to C leads
to impact D ignores the myriad microinteractions that create the emergent properties of
systems there is not a single cause for any effect which makes their chain of internal links
inherently unpredictable
Kessler 8-[Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld,

From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics

Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232]

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is defined in
traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The
reason is that even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o The
mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual
risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of
nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor
breaks down*. Under the historical con- dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar
counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such
rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy
that emerges when the deter- rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to
risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing
uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncer- tainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In
particular, cata- strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli- cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the
impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has
consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap- pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no
political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe
points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility
to provide securityas long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro- phe in various
commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the
condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political
responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the
success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" currency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open
for the security paradox, the main prob- lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and
security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning"
addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will constitute the most serious future
threat, "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of
plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline
from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse.
They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk
assessment is, however, that even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct- ing a chain of potentialities,
improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the
scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been
effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the US government tried
to prove was disputed from the very begin- ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent
the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist
network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald
Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."* This sentence indicates that under the condition
of genuine uncer- tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

Specifically, the cyber realm is inevitably complexrisk assessment surrounding the cyber
debate is infused with faulty linear cause-effect thinking that fails when applied to the
cyber realm
Cavelty 13 (Myriam Dunn, Head of the New Risk Research Unit at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, 2013, From Cyber-Bombs to
Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in the Cyber- Security Discourse, International Studies Review, pp. 107-108 | aps)

89

At the heart of the third type of threat representation is the conceptualization of security threats as
problems of (system) vulnerabilities, the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope
with, adverse effects. For most parts, this discourse was shaped by actors in the civil defense environment (Collier and Lakoff 2008). In it,
particular systems and the functions they per- form are singled out by the authorities as critical (in the sense of vital,
crucial, essential) because their prolonged unavailability harbors the potential for major crisis, both
political and social. Nowadays, these systems are thoroughly cybered: information infrastructures are intermediaries between physical assets and physical
infrastructure, and the material dimension of infrastructures also expanded to encompass complex assemblages of knowledge. Bridged and inter- linked by
information pathways, the body of critical infrastructures is seen as interconnected, interdependent, nd highly complex (cf. PCCIP 1997; Duit and Galaz 2008). At the
same time, the image of modern critical infrastructures has become one in which it becomes futile to try and separate the human from the technological.

Technology is not simply a tool that makes life livable, technologies become constitutive of novel
forms of a complex subjectivity, which is characterized by an inseparable ensemble of material
and human elements (Coward 2009:414). From this ecological understanding of subjectivity, a specific image of society
emerges: Society becomes inseparable from critical infrastructure networks . In this way, systemic risksunderstood
as risks to critical infrastructure systemsare risks to the entire system of modern life and being. The main threat
representation in this cluster is centered on ones own vulnerability (stemming from complexity,
interdependency, and dependency). The very connectedness of infrastructures poses dangers in terms of the speed and ferocity with which
perturbations within them can cascade into major disasters (Dillon 2005:3). Advances in information and communication technology have thus augmented the
potential for major disaster (or systemic risk) in critical infrastructures by vastly increasing the possibility for local risks to mutate into systemic risks. Critical
infrastructure protection practitioners are particularly concerned about two types of system effects: cascades and surprise effects. Cascade effects are those that
produce a chain of events that cross geography, time, and various types of systems; surprise effects are unexpected events that arise out of interactions between agents
and the negative and positive feedback loops produced through this interaction. Technological

development is depicted as a force

out of control, and the combination of technology and complexity conveys a sense of
unmanageability, combining forces with an overall pessimistic perspective concerning accidents and
the limited possibilities of preventing them and coping with them (Perrow 1984). Furthermore, complexity
manifests as an epistemological breakdown. Because all of the interacting parts move between each
other at varying speeds, future system behavior becomes hard to determine and predict . However,
traditional risk assessment tools used to evaluate threat to critical infrastructures are grounded in
strict, measurable assessments and predictive modeling

(all of which is based on past behavior and experiences)

and

linear cause-effect thinking (cf. DHS 2009). They inevitably fail their purpose when applied to the truly
complex and the uncertain. Therefore, the threats to the system are depicted as unpredictable and in
essence unknowable, which adds to the feeling of vulnerability. This focus on vulnerabilities results
in two noteworthy characteristics of the threat representation: First, the protective capacity of
space is obliterated; there is no place that is safe from an attack. Second, the threat becomes quasi-universal, because it is
now everywhere, creating a sense of imminent but inexact catastrophe, lurking just beneath the surface of normal, technologised [...] everyday life (Graham
2006:258). Threats

or dangers are no longer perceived as coming exclusively from a certain direction

are system-inherent; the threat is a quasi-latent characteristic of the system,
which feeds a permanent sense of vulnerability and inevitable disaster.
traditionally, the outsidebut

AND self-fulfilling prophecywe become obsessed with risk assessment

Deibert and Rohozinski 10-*Professor of Political Science and Director of the Canada Centre for Global Securitty Studies and the
Citizen Lab @ the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, **Canadian expert and practitioner in the fields of security, cyber
warfare, and the globalization of armed violence, founder and principal investigator of several collaborative cyber research initiatives, consult
with Harvard Law School, University of Toronto, and various think tanks about cyber security politics [Ronald, Rafal, International Political
Sociology, Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security, 3/7/2010, Vol. 4 Issue 1, pg. 18, Wiley Online Library, DKP]
Third, like Beck, we

place a great deal of emphasis on unintended and often paradoxical consequences of risk
mitigation.2 For Beck, a central characteristic of reexive modernization is the tendency for risk mitigation to
beget further risk, and so on, until the mitigation of risk becomes the central element of politics and public policy.
Each risk mitigation strategy breeds new uncertainty and unpredictable consequences, which in turn require
further mitigation, often undermining risk mitigation strategies in other sectors of society. As the title of our paper
suggests, there is a paradox at the heart of some of the ways in which states are securing cyberspace, which leads
to an insecurity of a different sort.

90

Bad scholarship should be rejected independetnlydepoliticizes academic spaces and

turns their impacts
Randals, 9-[Samuel, Department of Geography at the University College London with Marieke de Goede, Department of European Studies
at the University of Amsterdam and Precaution, preemption: arts and technologies of the actionable future. Environment and Planning. 27: pp.
859-878]
Politics We have argued that preemption in contemporary security practice, and precaution in contemporary environmental practice display important affinities and historical entanglements, through the ways in which they imagine
apocalypse and deploy arts and technologies that render this imagination banal. We now turn to examine more explicitly the political implications of the importance of precautionary principles and the resulting quests for knowledge.
We argue that three broad political outcomes can be considered. First, terrorist and climate change policies may be performative, bringing into being the very realities they seek to avoid. Second, the imagination of apocalypse may
depoliticize debates, smuggling other policies in under their rubric; and, third, they may delegitimate positions in the debates. If apocalypse is also about the imagination of a paradise (Enzensberger, 1978; Kumar, 1995), an emergent

the irony of contemporary debates is that they fail to engage in significant political imagination. Thus, we suggest that
the banality of apocalypse in these debates fosters a disenchantment that is itself depoliticizing. Masco writes: ``What does it mean when the `state of

new order, then

emergency' has so explicitly become the rule when in order to prevent an apocalypse the governmental apparatus has prepared so meticulously to achieve it?'' (2006, page 12, emphasis in original). First, then, it is important to
emphasize that governments not only are anticipating the worst, but also, in trying to prevent that nightmare, act in ways that increase the possibility of its occurrence. This phantasmagoria is thus imagined and made real. Thus, with
regard to the politics of security preemption, Massumi (2007, 16) recounts its logic as follows: ``It is not safe for the enemy to make the first move. You have to move first, to make them move ... .You test and prod, you move as
randomly and unpredictably and ubiquitously as they do... .You move like the enemy, in order to make the enemy move.'' That such reasoning is not purely theory was demonstrated by the events surrounding the arrest of six New
Jersey men accused of plotting to kill soldiers at Fort Dix in 2007. Reports of the arrest uncovered that the `disrupted plot' was actively encouraged by a police informer, posing as an Egyptian radical. It was the informer who offered
to broker a planned weapons purchase, and who, according to New York Times journalist Kocieniewski (2007), ``seemed to be pushing the idea of buying the deadliest items, startling at least one of the suspects.'' In another example
of the performativity of security preemption, it is now widely acknowledged that the preemptive strike on Iraq fostered alliances between al Qaeda and Iraqi violent groups that did not exist before the war. Indeed, terrorism expert
Richardson (2006, page 166) calls the discursive conflation of the threats of Saddam Hussein and bin Laden a ``self-fulfilling prophecy''. Within climate change, there are two potentially performative aspects. The first relates to the
climate stabilization policy framework designed to reduce `dangerous anthropogenic interference' with the climate (such as the EU's 28 target). Although what is dangerous is clearly a political decision, it seems decidedly odd to
embark on a policy to get the world to just below the `danger point'. If there is any nonlinear or non-modelled factor, then the catastrophic images that are to be avoided could be brought about. Thus, precautionary action following
this policy logic may, ironically, bring about severe climatic consequences, rather than prevent them. More speculatively, a second performative element relates to the ways in which geoengineering solutions to climate change become
justified as precautionary measures in case emissions reductions do not result in a stabilized climate: a `Plan B' as The Independent newspaper called it (Connor and Green, 2009). In placing mirrors in space, or altering ocean
chemistry, or otherwise engaging in uncertain large-scale projects, the likelihood of precautionary action on climate change resulting in extensive climate change is likely to be highindeed, that is the very idea (to counteract climate
catastrophe). Whilst these remain largely speculative activities at present, they nonetheless represent alarmingly direct militarized technologies that have prompted some serious attention especially in the US (Fleming, 2007).
Secondly, contemporary climate change policies act to depoliticize the debate, because they focus narrowly on prescribed modes of thought of climate as an externality. As Swyngedouw (2007, page 23) puts it, the imagination of a
Nature that is under threat of apocalypse ``eradicates or evacuates the `political' from debates over what to do with natures''. What get lost here, according to Swyngedouw (2007, page 23), are the prior political questions that ask
``what kind of natures we wish to inhabit, what kind of natures we wish to preserve, to make, or, if need be, to wipe off the surface of the planet''. The larger point, moreover, is that the current debates on climate change may also
obscure a wide variety of already existing, or yet to be imagined, strategies to engage with climatic changes (Hulme, 2009). Depoliticizing the debate on climate change and

may

smuggl through

desensitizing the populace from a

policies

critical awareness
aid the
ing
of a number of
under its rubric, including political-economic policies masquerading as climate policies and the possible introduction of enforced
personal carbon trading cards. In the Netherlands, plans to tax drivers by actual kilometers driven from 2012 require detailed information of individual car movements to be made available to authorities, and thus set aside privacy
concerns for the sake of the environment. Such developments map onto debates about the registration of travel data and other personal transactions data in the fight against terrorism (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). Other implications
within terrorism include enforced immigration controls, the subjection of citizens to full monitoring, and the potential to hold `terrorists' without charges for extended periods of time, which are all examples of the political

apocalyptic fear (Ericson, 2007). The problem is that the discursive power of climate change and terrorism could obscure the political debates that should take place
by the precautionary action that must immediately be taken to ensure `our' global future

machinations derived from

on these subjects
. If we accept Luke's (2005)
observation that few people would choose to not `save the planet', much mischief might be done if we do not take Forsyth's (2004, page 212) comment seriously that not all `` `ecological values' are necessarily progressive''. Thirdly,
apocalyptic climate change announcements will become increasingly untenable if the expected climate catastrophe does not rapidly materialize (Hulme, 2006). The vitality of apocalypse may be maintained with a variety of extreme
weather events that can at least in a journalist's imagination, even if meteorologists are more cautious, be causally attributed to climate change. This parallels issues in terrorist debates where al Qaeda becomes the `organization'

to question these publicly would leave one

accused of diverting attention from the `real issue' or of simply being a sceptic). It is not just that debate is depoliticized, but that there appear no legitimate grounds to even question the
assumed to be at the heart of every terror subplot and fear. What this does, however, is delegitimate debate, by making these connections unquestionable (

overpowering assumptions delivering up these apocalyptic scenarios that must be managed globally through all-seeing means. The terms of the debate can become constrained, albeit that resistance can occur such as the nine `factual
errors' identified by the British courts of law in relation to Al Gore's movie An Inconvenient Truth.(9) Conclusion In this paper we do not wish to answer questions about whether climate change and terrorism are `really' the biggest
threats today. Rather, we have asked how these threats are made real, how they are imagined, and what combination of uncanny and fantasy is prescribed to make them targets of contemporary global governing. In analyzing climate

knowledge systems legitimated in their service, we suggest that at the

that depoliticize debate, that delegitimate certain kinds of questions, and that have the potential to bring about the
worst realities they seek to avoid. Deconstructing the notions of precaution and preemption is not simply about critiquing contemporary policies on climate change and terrorism, but, rather, about
opening up new spaces to critical political imaginaries and debates. It is imperative to go beyond debates that have apocalyptic but banal futures, to engage
change and terrorism debates in this way, through focusing on the connected discourses associated with precaution and preemption, and the
heart of these systems are politics

in the frequently absent politics of how to live in the world. We argue that these larger political questions do need to be raisedwith regard to security preemption, but also with regard to precautionary environmental politics. In fact,

apocalypse into banality, but fails to foster the

enchantment that, according to Bennett, may be required for ethical engagement with the world. As Bennett (2001, page 91) argues with respect to environmental discourse, ``a strange
it may be argued that a poverty of political imagination pervades the precautionary principle. This poverty of imagination turns

equivalence gets set up between environmentalist conviction and narrativistic despair: the more alarmed an author is about ecodecline, the more thoroughly nature is depicted as a disenchanted set of defeated and exhausted objects.

In order for tragedy and disaster to translate into meaningful political

action, Bennett (pages 159 ^ 160) argues , an enchanted attachment to life has to be cultivated that is all too often evacuated from media sensationalism.
How could such sickly objects inspire the kind of careful attentiveness that ecological living requires?''

91

2AC-Cybersecurity K
The construction of cyber apocalypse is driven entirely by our own imaginationssecurity
perpetually constructs phantom enemies to destroy
Stevens 13 (Tim, Department of War Studies, King's College London; Centre for Science & Security Studies; International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation, 4/25/13, Apocalyptic Visions: Cyber War and the Politics of Time, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2256370 | aps)
Viewed as an accident, strategic

cyber war appears immanent to our contemporary wired world. All cyber war discourses stress that the
dependence is not only practical, in terms of
delivering services and goods, but psychological and political. The hypothetical cascading failures catalysed by infrastructural subversion and
vulnerability of modern societies increases as their dependency on information technologies intensifies. This

destruction (Little, 2002) begin by revealing the materiality and functionality of invisible yet physical information infrastructures (Dodge and Kitchin, 2004).
Secondary failures

of contingent sociotechnical networks like water, energy, transport and emergency response follow, which
continue to cascade through the affective realm of corporeal and psychological stress, before
undermining completely the collective imaginary that is society. As in the global financial crisis, the
accident/apocalypse is characterised by the instant and simultaneous globalisation of affects and
fears (Virilio et al, 2008). There is little current evidence that cyber war will reach the level of global accident. There is no firm indication that a cyber attack of
any kind could cause physical damage on this scale, let alone human deaths (Rid, 2013a). This may, of course, change in time. One might object that the version of
cyber war presented here is constructed between human adversaries rather than between humankind and its technologies but this would be to forget the
interconnectedness and interdependence of the sociotechnical infrastructures of postmodernity. So unpredictable are their potential interactions, we cannot know if the
effects of cyber war would be restricted to the target systems alone, or would spread beyond them and potentially back across an aggressors borders. Such blowback
diminishes the strategic utility of these operations to high-tech societies, including most of those with the capacity to launch an attack in the first place (Feaver, 1998;
Rathmell, 2003). There is no guarantee an act of cyber war would not cause a global accident, which leads once again to imagining cyber war as potential apocalypse.
What, however, are the political implications of these apocalyptic visions :

what political work does the framing of cyber war as

apocalypse perform in the present? Chronopolitics of Cyber War Due to the lack of precedents, appeals are often made to
historical events to analogise future cyber warPearl Harbor, 9/11, Katrina, and so on. These historical analogies
serve as proxies for foundational events in other fields of security, as does Hiroshima in the nuclear case, for example (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1164). In this
context, nuclear and cyber are occasionally explicitly linked: Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war
(Gross, 2011). Commentators often draw attention to the shortcomings of these historical analogies but pay less attention to their actual political utility. The principal
outcome of Pearl Harbor, for instance, was to jolt the US into a global war: a threat that had been sketchy, abstract, and distant became personal and immediate and
its principal effects were in policy, law, and national commitment to respond to a recognizable threat (Cebrowski, 1998). This dynamic is transferred to cyber
security, in which a catastrophic eventan act of cyber waris required to spur government into appropriate action (Bliss, 2010; Goldsmith and Hathaway, 2010).
Critical scholars also invest in the catastrophic event the power to shock the private sector into accepting a greater role for government in cyber security (Bendrath,
2001). The maintenance of a low level of fear and concern may also desensitise audiences to the trauma of the catastrophe when and if it finally arrives (Grusin,
2010). Cyber

war is therefore both necessary and in some sense desired. Whether transformative cyber war can
be brought about by apocalyptic discourses alone is unknown but the potentially self- fulfilling
aspect of cyber war discourse is evident. Like the monsters in your imagination, writes former White House
cyber security advisor Howard Schmidt, these phantoms can take on a persona of an unrelenting danger that easily
surpasses their true capabilities (Schmidt, 2006: 174). As ominous as the dark side of cyberspace may be, our collective
reactions

to it

are just as ominous and can easily become the darkest driving force of all (Deibert, 2012:

261). In contrast to apocalyptic environmental discourses, however, in which there is quite literally no long-term future and therefore no hope (Swyngedouw, 2010),

cyber war apocalypses are not characterised by pure negativity: they still offer redemption through cyber security
measures congruent with capitalist logics and the desire of the national security state . Of course, it is
precisely those who nurture fear of apocalypse that promise salvation the most and will , ultimately, they
hope, be in a position to deliver it (Swyngedouw, 2013). Cyber war may be immanent to postmodernity but this does not tell us when cyber war will
occur, for which we require a more active intimation of tense than such vague futurity. Cyber war discourses, however, do not do this. Cyber war may be
immanent but it is also perpetually in abeyance. The existential aspects of cyber war are comparable in some respects to
environmental discourses, particularly in their emphasis on catastrophe rather than crisis (Aradau and van Munster, 2011) and in their irreversibility (Hansen and
Nissenbaum, 2009). Cyber

threats gain potency from cascading failures developing rapidly from originary
stimuli, in contrast to the gradual accumulation of environmental issues to a threshold beyond which the frequency of
significant events accelerates markedly. This difference establishes different modalities of urgency and hence
different spaces for political intervention (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1164). Cyber security presents a strong
sense of temporality in cyber-doom scenarios constructed as inevitable and imminent but
perpetually postponed, thus ignoring increasingly extensive and visible cyber security measures (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, 2012: 9). As strategic
cyber war is currently a speculative concept only, so narratives of cyber war fulfill precisely this political function ,
particularly in furthering the allocation of resources to companies and institutions charged with cyber security and the prevention and prosecution of cyber war (e.g.

92

BBC News, 2013), whilst also stressing the need for more security to postpone the inevitable. Michael Dillon identifies the centrality of eschatology to the politics of
security more generally. This is politics thought in the light of last things, which articulate both a sense of ending and of ends as in aims and desiresbut also
the beginning of a new politics (Dillon, 1996: 31). Cyber war read as apocalypse heralds a new cyber security future in which political order is transformed into one
taking full account of the exigencies of cyber security. But this future is not post-apocalypsethe catastrophic threat-event of the dissolution of the temporal order of
things (Dillon, 2011: 782) but pre-apocalypse. Indeed, the

central task of the politics of security is to constantly defer

the apocalypse so that the future becomes not the infinity of Christian heaven but a circumscribed
finitefuture of infinite possibilities for the workings of politics and security (Dillon, 2011). The temporal distance
between now and the apocalypse must be maintained, a project for which energy and resources are required. The constant deferral of
apocalyptic cyber war may be a product of this project and in the gap between present and
apocalypse the cyber security project can be reworked in perpetuity. Although the future constantly
threatens to irrupt into the present, the future never arrives.

The construction of the dangerous cyberwar results in bad policies and creates a selffulfilling prophecy
Stevens 13 (Tim, Department of War Studies, King's College London; Centre for Science & Security Studies; International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation, 4/25/13, Apocalyptic Visions: Cyber War and the Politics of Time, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2256370 | aps)

Apocalyptic thinking is inherently eschatological, interpreting history through the prism of

finitude: contemporary events are imbued with eschatological meaning and are interpreted as signs of impending apocalypse (Robbins and Palmer, 1997: 45). The roll-call of signs of cyber war will be familiar: Cuckoos Egg, Eligible Receiver, Morris Worm, ILOVEYOU, Code Red,
Estonia, Georgia, 7 Conficker, Operation Aurora, Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, and so on. This litany of signsalthough internally heterogeneous
imparts metonymic gravitas to cyber war narratives and fulfils a significant mnemonic function in reminding audiences
continually of the seriousness of cyber threats. They become signifiers of the no-longer-future-but-reality of cyberwar (Cavelty, 2013). Their historical specificity is elided in their construction as discrete events, the
frequency of which is always increasing (e.g. Herrera-Flanigan, 2013), and which lead inevitably to cyber war. Prophets who
read and pronounce upon these apocalyptic signsthe Cassandras of cyber warfare (Rid, 2012: 6)do not, like their religious
counterparts, restrict themselves to specific dates and times upon which terrible events will occur, so need not excuse
themselves from incorrect predictions; consequently, they can never be wrong. However, they do have in common talents
as masterful bricoleurs, skilfully recasting elements and themes within the constraints of their respective traditions and reconfiguring them to formulate new,
meaningful endtimes scenarios (Wojcik, 1997: 148). Specific

vectors of cyber insecurity may change, and timescales

expand and contract, but the certainty in apocalypse remains unwavering. Apocalyptic intensity
is maintained and heightened further by making continued imminent but indeterminate
predictions, legitimising a constant state of readiness in which adherents feel themselves to be
standing poised on the brink of time

(Bromley, 1997: 36). In fact, it is always only a matter of time before a cyber-apocalypse occurs

(Gable, 2010). This uncertainty is shared with other forms of security, which thrive on a denotative imprecision . simultaneous appeal to the hard and the vacuous,
the precise and the imprecise . vague generalities about everything and nothing (Walker, 1997: 63). This epistemic tension is partially resolved by reading the
signs of cyber war as corroboration of a deterministic script of the future (Robbins and Palmer, 1997: 5). When events and scenarios converge, the narrative of
cyber war gains explanatory power in its own right. In periods of thickened history like this, it becomes ever more difficult to comprehend these eventsto see the
wood for the trees, as 8 it wereand they become part of their own causal structure (Beissinger, 2002: 27). In this case, the impression is that if cyber war is not
already occurring, it very soon will be. The initiation of the apocalypse is frequently reduced to the familiar digital motif of a finger hovering above the button or
positioned in readiness for a final, decisive mouse-click or emphatic keystroke: There was a time when war was begun with a shot. Now it can begin with the simple
click of a mouse. A silent attack that you may never even know occurred until it all unfolds in front of you (Rudd, 2011). During the early Cold War, the image of
the US presidents finger poised above a nuclear button became the standard symbol of state military power (Strong, 2005: 34) but in an age of cyber war, the
power to foment societal chaos is available to all: as UK armed forces minister Nick Harvey warned, the finger hovering over the button could be anyone from a
state to a student (Hopkins, 2011). The difficulties of representing cyber threats visually (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1165) partially explain the popularity of
this imagery but like the nuclear casefor which substantial visual resources were availablethere is semantic power in this reduction of immense sociotechnical
complexity to a simple manual action (Plotnick, 2012). Like the informational bits mediating the human will to prosecute these actions, the decision to proceed is
also binary: on/off, yes or no. We

might never know who hit us or why but this single physical act brings the future
rushing catastrophically into the present, the moment of cosmic ecstasy (Chernus, 1982) in which all

apocalyptic predictions are validated. This suggests apocalypse is also an object of desire,
something to be welcomed and, perhaps, brought into being (e.g. Cook, 2004). Apocalypse is not merely the end but also a
beginning, a time of both revelation and transformation. An apocalyptic belief in the transformation of the human condition through catastrophe informs the rhetoric
of, for instance, the US-led war on terror as much as it does the jihadism of those who prompted it (McLaren, 2002; Jackson, 2005: 103-105), even if the utopian
ideal of achieving a terror-free world is as unlikely as Islamist dreams of global 9 caliphate (Gray, 2007). They remain visions no matter how hard one strives to
achieve them and are part of a catastrophic strand of apocalypticism, pitting good against evil and privileging dystopian and pessimistic views of human nature
(Wessinger, 1997). Cyber

war scenarios frequently express this catastrophic apocalypticism, yet these

eventualities are not entirely unwelcomed. Cyber war as apocalypse is an illumination unveiled

93

precisely at the very moment of the greatest darkness and danger (Aho, 1997: 65), a light to dispel the night of political
foot-dragging and insufficient cyber security. The catastrophic materialisation of the virtual threat is the necessary catalyst through which to achieve this
transformation. In this respect, apocalypse operates in its primary sense of revelation, a singular instant both revealing the meaning of the past and announcing the
future (Bousquet, 2006: 756), in this case the political errors of the past and the sunlit uplands of a cyber secure future. Understood not only as catastrophe but as
the revelatory wellspring of transformation, apocalypse need not be wholly negative. Millennial beliefs in better futures are by no means exclusive to religion,
amply demonstrated by scientific movements like eugenics, cryonics and space exploration, which share a conviction humankind can be transformed and improved
through technology (Bozeman, 1997). The posthumanist movement, specifically in its attention to the coming technological singularity is overtly apocalyptic but
also emphasises the positive social benefits an information-technological transformation will bring (DeLashmutt, 2006). The technological singularity may be a

Apocalypse need not be

catastrophic but can be progressive, affirming collective cooperation in bringing about earthly
salvation (progress) without the radical violence of divine retribution (Wessinger, 1997). These utopian
and transformative impulses are in a long lineage of technoscientific thought , expressing secular
rather than religious apocalypticism 2 This issue is also raised with respect to cyber war: what if we were at war and
didnt know it? (Brenner, 2009: 100).10 (Hughes, 2012). How else is apocalyptic cyber war located with respect to
this spirit of apocalyptic modernity and postmodernity.
violent rupture but not necessarily; it may, some argue, have happened alreadywe just didnt notice. 2

The language of cyber-security is not neutral, but the metaphor of the unruly cyber-world
that must be conquered and defended is an extension of frontier colonialism
Cavelty 13 (Myriam Dunn, Head of the New Risk Research Unit at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, 2013, From Cyber-Bombs to
Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in the Cyber- Security Discourse, International Studies Review, pp. 107-108 | aps)
Political Images of Cyberspace Cyber-security is a type of security that unfolds in and through cyberspace; the making and practice of cyber-security is both
constrained and enabled by this environment. Therefore, understanding

the basic language used to talk about the digital

realm is the first necessary step in this analysis, since cyber-security cannot be imagined without
drawing on language used to describe the environment in which it operates . Cyberspace is one of the debates
pertinent neologisms, a portmanteau word combining cybernetics and space. The term cyberspace was coined by a cyber-punk novelist (William Gibson, who
called it a consensual halluci- nation [1984:67]) and then imported (and in the process changed) into the political realm by John Perry Barlow, a prominent cyberlibertarian and activist. What is known today as Barlovian cyberspace is an inherently political con- cept: When Barlow announced the formation of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation in 1990 (Barlow 1990), the space metaphor made sense and was useful for his purposes. First, it supported, and at the same time added a hightech flavor to, the basic intuition that the interconnection of computers brings forth a sort of new place. Conceiving

of cyberspace as a place
allows different notions of control and domination over the virtual lands. Second, the place metaphor
was convenient to establish the image of the Western frontier together with the name Electronic
Frontier. It suggests an unexplored land, freedom from legal and social constraints associated with the
civilized East (Yen 2003), and opportunities in line with the cyber-libertarian agenda that supports minimal Internet regulation/state involvement (Barlow 1996).

The self-identification of the cyber-community as digital pioneers further helped to solidify the
image of good cowboys inhabiting the unchartered land (Mihalache 2002).4 There are two basic ways in which cyberspace as
place is conceptualized and defined: The first model excludes (physical and other) infrastructures from its definitions, whereas the second includes them to various
degrees. In the first, cyberspace

emerges as a space between the hardware components of computer

networks, where interaction happens (Sterling 1993), a place that is fundamentally different from reality,
as the new home of Mind, a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where our
bodies live (Barlow 1996). The second model takes into account different layers and abstractions of information riding on a physical layer of hardware (cf.
Libicki 2009:1213). Here, cyberspace is seen as comprising both a material and a virtual realm; it is a space
of things and ideas, structure and content (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010:16). As an example for a definition situated at the extreme end
of that spectrum, the cyber- space definition of the US Department of Defense refers almost exclusively to the (hardware) technology component, although software
and data may be inferred from the wording: a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology
infra- structures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (Department of Defense
2010:77). A

different metaphor for cyberspace, which is less widespread than the place/ frontier conception, uses the image of
the ecosystem to describe the cyber-realm as a set of network technologies and network technology customers. In contrast to the simple
spatiality found in the Western frontier metaphor, cyberspace as an ecosystem comes with images of
organic evolution, interconnectedness, and complexity (Lapointe 2011). Ecosystems are habitats for a
variety of different species that co-exist, influence each other, and are affected by a variety of
external forces. From this point of view, social and technological forces are symbiotic. The
ecosystem metaphor is also illuminating the ability to accommo- date change in some more or less
automatic way. Under this concept, cyberspace is defined as the fusion of all communication networks,
databases, and sources of information into a vast, tangled, and diverse blanket of electronic interchange, a bioelectronic environment that is literally universal (Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth and Toffler 1996) or one

94

that exists through the (symbiotic) interac- tion of different social actors (DHS 2011:2). The way
cyberspace is imagined and defined has consequences for the way any type of action or strategy is
conceptualized (Betz and Stevens 2011:36). Cyber- threat representations, too, are influenced by the different
place metaphors. As will be shown below, the frontier image in particular is influential in shaping the
conception of an unruly and lawless place in need of order. Cyber-Threat Representations: Creating and Changing the
Reservoir Cyber-security as understood in this paper is a combination of linguistic and non-linguistic discursive practices
from many different communities of actors. To systematize threat representations, this diversity
needs to be mapped.5

95

2AC-Impact Defense
No kinetic escalation actors have an incentive to keep cyber conflicts limited and thus will
stick to only small attacks also cant make predictions about cyber leading to kinetictoo
complex
Lin 12-chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council of the National Academies
where he has been study director of major projects on public policy and information technology and previously was a professional staff member
and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee and has a doctorate in physics from MIT [Herbert, Fall 2012, Escalation dynamics
and conflict termination in cyberspace
Strategic Studies Quarterly. 6.3: p46, http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/ps/retrieve.do?
sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANCE&inPS=true&prodId=AONE&userGroupName=txshracd2598&tabID=T002&searchId=R1&resultLi
stType=RESULT_LIST&contentSegment=&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&contentSet=GALE
%7CA302117114&&docId=GALE|A302117114&docType=GALE&role=]
For example, if

national command authorities decide to retaliate in response to a cyber attack, an important

question is whether retaliation must be based on a "tit-for-tat" response. Assuming the perpetrator of a cyber attack is
known to be a hostile nation, there is no reason in principle the retaliation could not be a kinetic attack against the interests of that hostile nation.
Allowing a kinetic response to a cyber attack expands the range of options available to the victim. An extreme case is, in the event of a cyber
attack of sufficient scale and duration that it threatens the nation's ability to function as a modern society, the attacked nation might choose to
respond with kinetic force. On the other hand, the use of kinetic operations during an ostensibly cyber-only conflict is an
important threshold. Nations involved in a cyber-only conflict may have an interest in refraining from a kinetic
response--for example, they may believe kinetic operations would be too provocative and might result in an
undesired escalation of the conflict. In addition, the logic of offensive cyber operations suggests that such

operations are likely to be most successful when the initiator of these operations has the time to gather
intelligence on likely targets--such intelligence gathering is obviously time-limited once overt kinetic conflict
breaks out. If understanding the dynamics of cyber-only conflict is difficult, understanding the dynamics of
cyber conflict when kinetic operations may be involved is doubly so. To the extent national decision makers have
incentives to refrain from conducting offensive operations that might induce a strong kinetic reaction , the
obvious approach would be to conduct cyber attacks that are in some sense smaller, modest in result, targeted
selectively against less-provocative targets, and perhaps more reversible. The similarity of such an approach to escalation
control in other kinds of conflict is not accidental, and it has all of the corresponding complexities and uncertainties.

Data collection doesnt prevent terrorismNSA director concedes

Lendman 13-Research Associate at the Center for Research on Globalizatio [Stephen, NSA Chief General Keith Alexander Lies to
Congress, Global Research, June 15, 2013]

In testimony before Senate Appropriations Committee members, NSA Director General Keith Alexander defended the
indefensible. He lied doing so. He falsely claimed NSA spying foiled dozens of terror plots. He didnt
elaborate on the attacks that were stopped, other than to tie them to two well-known foiled 2009
plots. More on them below. No such plots existed. They were invented. Innocent victims were falsely accused. No verifiable
evidence shows any plots were foiled on Alexanders watch. Hes been NSA chief since August 1, 2005. His claims dont wash.
He committed perjury. Hes guilty on multiple counts. Dont expect recrimination against him. Key Senate members are fully briefed. Theyre complicit in state
crimes. So are many other congressional members. Post 9/11, Washington declared war on Islam. Muslims became Americas enemy of choice. Theyve been

So-called terror plots are fake. None existed earlier. None exist now.
Dozens of innocent men and women were falsely charged, prosecuted, convicted and given long
prison terms. Expect more innocent victims persecuted ahead. Alexander referred to Najibullah Zazi and David
Coleman Headley. Justice Department officials claimed Zazi received bomb-making instructions
in Pakistan, purchased components of improvised explosive devices, and traveled to New York City
on September 10 (2009) in furtherance of his criminal plans. No evidence whatever supported
government accusations. Zazi got no bomb-making instructions. He planned no crimes. His socalled ingredients included hydrogen peroxide, acetone and hydrochloric acid. He bought them at a
beauty shop. He did so legally. Anyone can buy the same things. Hydrogen peroxides a common bleaching agent.
Its a mild disinfectant. Acetones an inflammable organic solvent. Its used in nail polish remover,
plastics and for cleaning purposes. Hydrochloric acids used in oil production, ore reduction, food
wrongfully vilified and dehumanized as terrorists.

96

processing, pickling, metal cleaning, and over-the-counter eye lubricants, among other applications.
Its found diluted in stomachs. Zazis alleged plot was fabricated. Authorities claimed he planned to attack New York commuter
trains and/or other high-profile New York targets. No motive was explained. None existed . No legitimate evidence
surfaced. None was presented. Innocence is no defense. Zazi was declared guilty by accusation .
According to Justice Department officials, Healy was guilty of a dozen federal terrorism crimes
relating to his role in planning the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and a
subsequent proposed attack on a newspaper in Denmark. No verifiable evidence links him to any crimes.
CIA, Mossad, Indias Research Analysis Wing (RAW, and perhaps Pakistans ISI were behind
twelve coordinated shooting and bombing Mumbai attacks. They were false flags. DOJ officials fabricated
charges against Healy and others. Hes innocent but guilty as charged. Thousands of political prisoners rot in Americas gulag. Media scoundrels
pronounce guilt before trial. They do so in the court of public opinion. They support the worst state
crimes. They violate core journalistic ethics. They [did] it unapologetically. They betray their
readers, viewers and listeners in the process. Post-9/11, dozens of Muslims were falsely convicted of terrorism and/or conspiracy to
commit it. Alexanders claims about NSA spying foiling plots and keeping America safe dont wash. On
June 12, Londons Guardian headlined Senators press NSA director for answers on secret
surveillance program. It was more show-and-tell than holding Alexander accountable. Congress is
fully briefed on whats ongoing. Key members know the worst of it. Permitting it makes them
complicit. FBI Director Robert Mueller lied like Alexander. In testimony before House Judiciary Committee members, he claimed spying could have foiled
9/11. It will prevent another Boston, he said. Both incidents were state-sponsored false flags. Mueller didnt explain. House members didnt ask.
Perhaps they know and dont need to. Maybe key House and Senate members are briefed in
advance of US-staged terror plots. Mueller claims watering down spying leaves America vulnerable. If you narrow (the scope of
surveillance), you narrow the dots and that might be the dot that prevents the next Boston, he said. America has no enemies except ones it
invents. Mueller lied to Congress. He committed perjury like Alexander. He remains unaccountable.

97

2AC-Elections DA

98

2AC-Clinton
Clinton will lose in 2016this evidence is future predictive
Morriessey, 2015 (Ed, WaPo: Gallup data shows Hillary favorability plummeting, Hot Air, March 13,
http://hotair.com/archives/2015/03/13/wapo-gallup-data-shows-hillary-favorability-plummeting/)
Plummeting from a great height to be sure, Philip Bump acknowledges, but definitely going in the wrong direction fast. The initial read off of yesterdays Gallup

her Republican competition

has lots of upside in their numbers, but Hillary has reached almost total name recognition
saturation not exactly surprising for someone who has spent the last 22 years in Washington. Accordingly, her favorability/unfavorability gap plus her name
poll shows Hillary Clinton in good shape against the rest of the field, albeit a field with low name recognition. Most of

recognition puts her almost literally in a class of her own in this survey: [Graph omitted.] Note that the Republicans who dont cross the 50% line on familiarity are
those with the early GOP buzz Scott Walker, for instance, and Marco Rubio and Bobby Jindal as well. They all have lots of upside, while more well-known
potential candidates like Jeb Bush and Chris Christie have less upside thanks to higher name recognition. Based on strictly personal observations, Id guess that Rick
Perry has the greatest chance to move up among the 50%+ crowd, based on his talent for retail politicking, but hes behind the eight-ball at the moment. Hillary looks
unassailable at the moment but this is just a moment, Bump reminds us. What happens when we look across almost a quarter of a century of Gallup data on Hillary
Clinton? Bump charted the data on Hillarys favorability since early 1992: [Graph omitted.] Three dynamics become apparent almost immediately, two of which
Bump points out. First, her

numbers are almost in a free fall over the last two years since leaving the State
Department, and probably since Benghazi. Until then, Hillary had excellent favorability numbers, the best sustained trend in her national
public life. Second, Bump points out the sudden jump among those who have no opinion on Hillarys
favorability in the last year. Its now higher than it was since Bill Clintons first year in office, and its still going up. Thats not a good trend
for a candidate who wants to argue for inevitability, which is really the only argument Hillary has to keep the Democratic process a
coronation rather than a competition. Thats usually a transition stage to opposition, as Bump notes. There is a third trend, more subtle, that Bump almost hints at but
never quite points out. Look

where the favorability lines trended negative. In every instance, that occurred
during electoral campaigns even in the second presidential campaign for Bill Clinton. In 1992, 1995-6, in her Senate race in 2000, and then when
she ran for the Democratic nomination in 2007-8, Hillary Clintons favorability tanked. In fact, her negative favorability ratings were more sustained in that national
election than at any other time. (The only exception was 2006, a Democratic wave election, when Hillary was mostly off the national radar in an easy re-election bid.)
The lesson? Hillary Clinton is a poor campaigner. She got away with it in 2000 because New York was a safe place for Hillary to run. Her
husband is one of the most naturally-gifted politicians of his generation, but Hillary is most decidedly not. Bill feels your pain; Hillary, as I wrote after her press
conference on Tuesday, feels her own entitlement and it shows: Americans have an affinity for brands, but the current populist trend in both parties makes dynastic
politics a risk in national elections. Now, though, the

family brand for establishment politicians may matter less than

the sense of entitlement that comes with it. Clinton could have defused the issue, or at least mitigated it somewhat, by offering a selfdeprecating apology for having imposed standards on others that she didnt follow for herself, and a pledge to allow an independent authority to vet her e-mail system.
Instead, Clinton offered a haughty and imperious sneer to legitimate questions about her actions as a public figure, along with a message that might be most politely
translated as pound sand. At least for the moment, though, the Clinton playbook from the 1990s isnt working. Her

performance in the presser

has been widely panned in the media, even with the attack dogs baying. The New York Daily News headline read YOUVE GOT FAIL,
while The New York Posts read DELETER OF THE FREE WORLD. USA Today declared itself troubled over Clintons penchant for secrecy. The Washington
Post quipped, The circus is back in town. Its not the circus. Its a pretender to American royalty, demanding her coronation, and this is exactly what we can expect

Thats why she lost the

nomination in 2008 to a one-term Senate backbencher even with Bill trying to pull her across the finish line, and thats when the
if Democrats are foolish enough to nominate her in 2016. As her book tour showed, Hillary is a political mediocrity at best.

Clintons were still culturally relevant. If a reasonably gifted Democrat challenged her, Hillary would likely lose the nomination again. If Democrats move forward
with the coronation, those

trend lines will have 20 months to develop into yet another electoral disaster for

Hillary.

Its way too early to predictand Nate Silver is never wrong

Silver, 2015 (Nate, Clinton Begins The 2016 Campaign, And Its A Toss-up, FiveThirtyEight, April 12,
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-begins-the-2016-campaign-and-its-a-toss-up/)

Theres already plenty of bad punditry regarding the chances of Hillary Clinton who officially announced her
candidacy on Sunday to become the 45th president. You can find Democrats boasting about their blue wall in the Electoral College and how hard this will make
it for any Republican to win. Or Republicans warning that the Democratic Party rarely wins three elections in a row. Most of this analysis is flimsy.
So is the commentary about the ups-and-downs in early swing state polls. And when you see some pundit declaring a minor misstep to be a game changer, find
someone else to follow on Twitter. The
nominee is

truth is that a general election win by Clinton shes very likely to become the Democratic

roughly a 50/50 proposition. And were not likely to learn a lot over the rest of 2015 to change that. Heres why: Incumbency and Obamas

Approval Rating. Start with the fact that theres no incumbent president running. There actually havent been a lot of cases that precisely
meet the circumstances voters will face next year: Barack Obama, assuming he serves out the rest of his term, will become just the fifth president limited by the 22nd
Amendment from seeking an additional term in office.1 Still, the evidence we have from

presidential elections and from other

contexts like gubernatorial elections is that these cases default to being toss-ups. Clintons chances will be
affected by Obamas popularity as he exits office. The relationship between the popularity of the previous president and the performance of the new nominee from his

99

party isnt perfect Al Gore (narrowly) lost in 2000 despite Bill Clintons popularity, for example but it certainly matters some, especially given that Clinton
served in Obamas cabinet. However, Obama currently has an approval rating of about 45 percent, and a favorability rating of 48 percent about average, in other
words. If those numbers decline into the low 40s or climb into the 50s, they could matter more, producing either a hangover effect or halo effect for Clinton. But
dont bet on this: Obamas approval ratings have been extraordinarily stubborn for most of his presidency, rarely deviating much from the mid-40s. The Economy. Id
warn against simplistic economic fundamentalism, the notion that the economy is pretty much the only thing that matters. Well save the technical discussion for
later, but because of a problem known as overfitting, statistical models that claim to make remarkably precise predictions about election outcomes from economic
variables alone (without looking at polls) have a mediocre track record. Still, the economy will matter a lot to voters, and a better
economy will help Clinton, the candidate from the incumbent party. As Byron York points out, you should be wary of claims that 2016 will be a foreign policy
election.2 Like Obamas approval ratings, however, the performance of the American economy has been about average recently. GDP grew by 2.4 percent in 2014,
adjusted for inflation, close to the historical average. Furthermore, we

know relatively little about what economic growth will

look like a year from now, when the general election campaign heats up. Historically, economists have shown almost
no ability to predict the rate of economic growth more than six months in advance. The Electoral College And The Emerging Democratic Majority. What about that
blue wall the supposed advantage that Democrats hold in the Electoral College? Mostly, the

blue wall was the effect of Obamas

success in 2008 and 2012, not the cause of it. If the economy had collapsed in the summer of 2012, Obama would probably have lost the election, and
most of those blue states would have turned red. Its true that in both elections, the tipping-point state (in both years it was Colorado) was slightly more Democratic
than the country as a whole. That implies Obama would have won if the popular vote had been very close. But it would have had to be very close indeed within a

If Clinton
has an ever-so-slightly different coalition say more working-class whites vote for her but fewer African-Americans this small
advantage could evaporate or reverse itself. (The Electoral College favored Republicans as recently as 2000, after all.) The same might be true if
she isnt as effective as Obama at mobilizing voters in swing states. Another theory the so-called Emerging Democratic Majority
holds that demographic trends favor the Democratic Party. Well have a lot more to say about this theory between now and next November, but its
probably dubious too.3 As Sean Trende has pointed out, it relies on a selective reading of the evidence emphasizing 2012,
percentage point or two. That advantage is small enough that it might have been the result of circumstances peculiar to Obama and his campaign.

2008 and 2006 but ignoring 2014, 2010, and 2004. Perhaps more important, predictions made on the premise of emerging majorities have a miserable track record:
Republicans were bragging about their permanent majority in 2004, for instance, only to get their butts kicked in 2006 and 2008.

Nobody cares about climate change, including Hillary Clinton

Baume, 06/03 (Matt, None of the 2016 Republican Presidential Candidates Care Much About Climate Change,
The Stranger, 2015, http://www.thestranger.com/features/feature/2015/06/03/22323229/none-of-the-2016republican-presidential-candidates-care-much-about-climate-change)
In contrast, if

you press Republican presidential candidates like Marco Rubio or Carly Fiorina on climate
change, they just scoff. "Our climate is always evolving , and natural disasters have always existed," says Rubio, which is a bit like
saying cigarettes aren't harmful because people have always died of cancer. "Companies shouldn't cave in to the demands of climate-change scientists," says Fiorina,
probably hoping that nobody will point out that she nearly destroyed the last company she led. None

of the other Republican candidates can

be bothered to worry about the gradual destruction of the planet, either. That may just be shrewd political calculation,
since it seems most voters simply don't want to hear about climate change. According to a March survey from Gallup, only about
2 percent of Americans say that the environment or pollution are the most important problems facing the country. Among voters who are concerned about the
environment, issues like smog and endangered species tend to elicit more concern than the broader problems of climate change itself. In other words, it's easier to feel
bummed out about African lions going extinct in our lifetime than the water wars that will take place after we're dead. News networks are complicit: According to
Media Matters for America, only MSNBC spent more than a few minutes talking about climate change during the 2012 election. Hey, the potential destruction of all
life on Earth is a big story, sure, but it's so complicated and it's kind of a bummer! Better devote another hour to whatever the hell the Duggars are! Worryingly,

Hillary Clinton's campaign hasn't made much noise about climate change, either. She's definitely saying more
than her Republican opponents, to be fair. She supports the reduction of power-plant emissions under the Clean Air Act; her campaign chairman, John Podesta, was
previously a climate-change adviser for President Obama; and she doesn't try to pretend that nobody could possibly understand the science. "Sea levels are rising; ice
caps are melting," she says. "If we act decisively now, we can still head off the most catastrophic consequences." Oh, but waitformer secretary of state Clinton
also supported

Gulf Coast oil drilling and gave a thumbs-up to fracking overseas. Under her
leadership, the US State Department colluded with energy companies to expand fracking
operations in other countries, the facts of which were disclosed later by WikiLeaks. It would be nice to believe that this was secretly a form of
clever espionage (we'll weaken hostile foreign powers by causing earthquakes in their countries and setting their tap water on fire!). But the Clinton
Foundation also raked in millions of dollars from oil conglomerates , so it's more likely just a case of millionaires doing
favors for millionaires. And when it comes to the Keystone XL pipeline, she's adopted a stance not unlike her Republican
adversaries: clamming up. "You won't get me to talk about Keystone because I have steadily made clear that I'm not going to express an opinion," she told an
audience a few months ago. Oh okay! That settles that! Guess we'll just talk about something else then! Here's why presidential rhetoric on climate change is so
important: Local jurisdictions depend on federal support to prevent and prepare for climate disasters. For the last seven years, cities all over the country have been
gobbling up millions of dollars in grants to prepare their infrastructure for floods, droughts, storms, and blackouts. Under the Obama administration, agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation have managed to cut a lot of red tape on projects ranging from reducing car dependency to
keeping seawater out of reservoirs. Seattle, for example, got $6.1 million from the Department of Energy that helped pay for various climate-related projects, such as
the distribution of water-saving showerheads and weatherization of low-income homes. Seattle's Center City protected bike lane project got $5 million from the
federal government. The Seattle Streetcar Broadway Extension project got $10 million. The city also received technical assistance with energy audits of Capitol Hill
Housing units. The city's also working on projects to increase storm-water storage, so we don't wind up having to kayak to work through downtown. Other ongoing
projects: modeling future energy needs to prevent blackouts, building storm-monitoring stations, creating a food distribution plan in the event of climate disaster. All

100

of these projects could benefit from federal help. But that help could go awayor at least be harder to come byif the next president's official position is "climate
shmimate." It's hard to predict exactly how that federal support to local jurisdictions would change under, say, President Jeb Bush. We know he's a denier
("It is not unanimous among scientists that it is disproportionately man-made," he said in 2011), but would he leave federal aid to communities intact? Or cut it a
little? Or copy Florida's insane policy and ban any mention of climate change? There's no way to know, in part because he simply hasn't indicated what his plans are.
And why would he, if voters don't care either way? Getting

the candidates to talk about climate change would require

either a complete reversal of voter priorities perhaps triggered by some catastrophic meteorological disaster, which sure would be fun
or pressure from special-interest groups. Of those two options, the latter involves far less loss of life and limb and is already under way: Last week, the California
State Parent Teacher Association adopted a resolution urging schools to add climate change to existing curricula.

101

2AC-Warming Impact-D
Warming inevarctic and feedback
Rignot 14-glaciologist at NASAs Jet Propulsion Laboratory, lead author of landmark scientific paper on West Antarctica [Eric, the Guardian, Global warming:
it's a point of no return in West Antarctica. What happens next? 5/17/24, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/climate-change-antarcticaglaciers-melting-global-warming-nasa] DKP
Last Monday, we hosted a

Nasa conference on the state of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which, it could be said, provoked something of a reaction. "This Is

What a Holy Shit Moment for Global Warming Looks Like," ran a headline in Mother Jones magazine. We announced that we had collected enough

observations to conclude that the retreat of ice in the Amundsen sea sector of West Antarctica was unstoppable,
with major consequences it will mean that sea levels will rise one metre worldwide. What's more, its
disappearance will likely trigger the collapse of the rest of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which comes with a
sea level rise of between three and five metres. Such an event will displace millions of people worldwide. Two
centuries if that is what it takes may seem like a long time, but there is no red button to stop this process. Reversing the climate system
to what it was in the 1970s seems unlikely; we can barely get a grip on emissions that have tripled since the Kyoto protocol , which was
designed to hit reduction targets. Slowing down climate warming remains a good idea, however the Antarctic system will at least take longer to get to this point. The
Amundsen sea sector is almost as big as France. Six glaciers drain it. The two largest ones are Pine Island glacier (30km wide) and Thwaites glacier (100km wide).
They stretch over 500km. Many impressive scientists have gone before us in this territory. The concept of West Antarctic instability goes back to the 1970s following
surveys by Charles Bentley in the 1960s that revealed an ice sheet resting on a bed grounded well below sea level and deepening inland. Hans Weertman had shown in
1974 that a marine-based ice sheet resting on a retrograde bed was unstable. Robert Thomas extended his work to pursue
the instability hypothesis. Terry Hughes suggested that the Pine Island sector of West Antarctica was its weak underbelly and that its retreat would collapse the West
Antarctic ice sheet. Considerable uncertainty remained about the timescale, however, due to a lack of observation of this very remote area. Things changed with the
launch of the ERS-1 satellite which allowed glaciers in this part of antartica to be observed from space. In 1997, I found that the grounding line (where the glacier
detaches from its bed and becomes afloat) of Pine Island glacier had retreated five kilometres in the space of four years, between 1992 and 1996. Stan Jacobs and
Adrian Jenkins had found a year earlier that the glacier was bathing in unusually warm waters, which suggested the ocean had a major influence on the glacier.
Duncan Wingham and others showed that the glacier was thinning. In 2001, I found that Thwaites glacier was retreating too . At that point, the scientific community
took a different look at the region. Work by the British Antarctic Survey, Nasa and Chile led to more detailed observations, a monitoring programme was initiated,
instruments were placed on the ice, in the ocean and scientific results started to pile up from a variety of research programmes. From that point, we all sought to find
out whether this was really happening. Now, two decades after this process started, we

have witnessed glacier grounding lines retreat

by kilometres every year, glaciers thinning by metres every year hundreds of kilometres inland, losing
billions of tons of water annually, and speeding up several percent every year to the flanks of topographic divides.
Thwaites glacier started to accelerate after 2006 and in 2011 we detected a huge retreat of the glacier grounding lines since 2000. Detailed reconstructions of the
glacier bed further confirmed that no mountain or hill in the back of these glaciers could act as a barrier and hold them up; and 40 years of glacier flow evolution
showed that the speed-up was a long story. All these results indicate a progressive collapse of this area. At the current rate, a large fraction of the basin will be gone in
200 years, but recent

modelling studies indicate that the retreat rate will increase in the future. How did this
heat is pushed by
the westerly winds and the westerlies have changed around Antarctica in response to climate
warming and the depletion of the ozone. The stronger winds are caused by a world warming faster than a cooling Antarctica. Stronger
happen? A clue is that all the glaciers reacted at the same time, which suggested a common force that can only be the ocean. Ocean

westerlies push more subsurface warm waters poleward to melt the glaciers, and push surface waters northward. Nerilie Abram and others have just confirmed that

the westerlies are stronger now than at any other time in the past 1,000 years and their strengthening has been
particularly prominent since the 1970s as a result of human-induced climate warming. Model predictions also show that the trend will
continue in a warming climate.

No terminal impact-paleoclimate data

Page 11-Article Cites Study Conducted by the US National Science Foundation, Quotes Anreas Schmitner, Professor @ the College of Earth,
Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences [Lewis, The Register, Free Whitepaper-IBM System Networking RackSwitch G8264, Global Warming Much
Less Serious than Thought-New Science, 11/25/2011, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/25/runaway_warming_unlikely/, DKP]

Climate scientists funded by the US government have announced new research in which they have established that
the various doomsday global warming scenarios are in fact extremely unlikely to occur, and that the scenarios considered
likeliest - and used for planning by the world's governments - are overly pessimistic. The new study improves upon previous results by including
data from the remote past, rather than only examining records from recent times. "Many previous climate sensitivity studies have looked at the past
only from 1850 through today, and not fully integrated paleoclimate data, especially on a global scale," says Andreas Schmittner, professor at the
College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State uni. " When you reconstruct sea and land surface temperatures from the peak of the
last Ice Age 21,000 years ago which is referred to as the Last Glacial Maximum and compare it with climate model simulations of that

102

period, you get a much different picture. "If these paleoclimatic constraints apply to the future, as predicted by our model, the
results imply less probability of extreme climatic change than previously thought," Schmittner adds. The baseline assumption of climate science at the
moment is that given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 compared to pre-industrial levels the most probable result is that the Earth would see a surface temperature rise average of 3C - and that

the planet's climate simply can't be this

sensitive to CO2 changes, however, or much more extreme events should have occurred at certain points in the past - and they did
not. For instance, if the climate were sensitive enough that doubled CO2 could mean catastrophic warming, the low
carbon levels seen 21,000 years ago should have resulted in an equally lifeless iceball planet. "Clearly, that didn't happen," Schmittner says.
there would be a significant chance of much bigger, perhaps fatal rises. Schmittner and his colleagues' analysis says that

"Though the Earth then was covered by much more ice and snow than it is today, the ice sheets didn't extend beyond latitudes of about 40 degrees, and the tropics and subtropics were largely icefree except at high altitudes. These high-sensitivity models overestimate cooling." According to the new improved analysis, the most probable result as and when double CO2 occurs is actually

there's no great need to fear a rise above 450

no likely prospect of getting near a 2C temperature rise for

a rise of just 2.3C - only just above the 2C limit which international climate efforts are seeking to stay within. Plainly

parts per million (ppm) CO2, as people currently do - in fact there's

a century or more at present rates of CO2 increase (rising about about 2 ppm/year at the moment from a level of 390-odd). And Schmittner and his colleagues' results show a much
tighter grouping of possible futures, too, so the scope for way-out doomsday scenarios is hugely reduced. The Australian quotes Schmittner as saying: "Now these very large changes
(predicted for the coming decades) can be ruled out, and we have some room to breathe and time to figure out solutions to the problem." The new study is
published in top-ranking boffinry journal Science. The research was funded by the US National Science Foundation.

103

2AC-Warming Securitization
Environmental securitization and the precautionary principle leads to serial policy failure, intervention, and
imperialism

Kastrati 14-Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, MA in international politics and security studies @ University of
Bradford [Bilbil Kastrati, SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES BE SECURITIZED? Volume 2, No: 1, 2014 EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES
UNION Academic Journal 66-68 http://www.euras-edu.org/dosyalar/39A_academic_journal.pdf#page=61
Levy agrees that the arguments of the proponents of a link between environment and security are worth considering, however, he argues, that this position has no basis except as a rhetorical
devise aimed at drumming up greater support for measures to protect the environment.25 He is well supported by Daniel Deudney who presents sound arguments against the inclusion of

Deudney is considered to be the leading challenger to the idea of environmental securitization. He cites four key
differences between the environmental degradation and established security concerns. First, they are different kinds
of threats. He points out that accidents, ageing and illness also kill human beings but they are not coming close to
being identified as security threats. For Deudney the term security would lose its meaning if everything that causes death
is to be identified as a security threat. Both violence and environmental degradation may kill people and may reduce human well-being, but not all threats to life are
threats to security. Second, there is no intention in environmental threats. Security threats of violence are planned; organized
and are clearly intentional, while, in contrast, natural threats are largely unintentional. They are only an unfortunate and unintended result
of human development and progress. Third, the organizations that protect the societies against violence differ significantly from
those that are responsible for environmental protection. Finally, and most importantly, environmental threats are not
usually purely national.26 Proponents of environmental security believe that a link to high politics would make
threats to the environment seem more pressing and important, however Deudney believes that securitizing the environment
will not increase the possibility of finding suitable political solutions to environ-mental problems. He also warns that if
environmental issues will be securitized, than environmental degradation from one country might be seen from
other countries as a national security threat which could trigger various types of intervention and imperialism. 27
environment within the realm of security politics.

Conclusion Environmental degradation poses a serious threat to human well-being. However, ways on how to deal with these threats; should environmental issues be securitized or not are part of

Traditional security concept which prevailed during the cold war and which
was concentrated in military dimension was criticized as ineffective to deal with new non-conventional threats as
e.g. environmental threats. Therefore, in 1990s security became a contested concept; many academics and scholars have argued that national security concept should be
redefined and widen to encompass other threats beside the military ones. However, there are concerns among traditional analysts that the strategy of expanding the
security concept to include environmental security will affect the analytical clarity; and that security will mean
everything and nothing. Supporters of the environmental security argue that securitizing the environmental issues is the most important step to safeguard the humankind. On the
lively debate between academics, scholars and state officials.

other side, critics argue that environmentalists use the slogan environment security only to grab the attention of the governments and funds. Supporters argue that, environmental threats can
have catastrophic outcomes for humankind and that these threats are not confined by national boundaries. Also they say that environmental degradation is far more threatening than the military
threats and may lead to collapse of the societies and collapse of states as well. On the other side, critics argue that environmental threats are different from traditional security threats and should
be addressed as public safety or health issues. Critics argue that environmental problems should not be seen as security problems because they are not generally national in character, are not

National security policies often reflect a

sense of urgency and crisis, and this may not be the most appropriate way to deal with kind of steady, long-term
commitment that is required for effective protection of the environment. Also securitizing environmental issues may
legitimatize military actions if some states consider environmental problems security threat to their national
interests.28 The supporters criticize this approach since this view is from the national narrow perspective and undermines global environmental threats. The environmental issues are
caused intentionally as military threats are, and are more reliably and effectively solved through the international cooperation.

accepted at the policy level by most states and key international organization; however, the case for securitizing the environment has not been universally accepted and remains controversial.

I would argue that environmental issues need to be treated seriously at national and international level, but
they should not be securitized since they are fundamentally different from national security threats, and they
might trigger interventions and imperialism.
Therefore,

104

Critiques

105

2AC-Cap K

106

2AC-Foucauldian Resistance
The aff is an affect of resistance that enables active questions of power relationsthis
advances a comportment necessary to affirm life
Proust 2k-Fall 2000. Franoise-agrege in Philosophy, was a program director at the Collge Internationale de Philosophie, in addition to her
post at the Universit de Paris I. Her work centered on the problem of how to think politics and political action today. She is the author of Kant et
le ton d'histoire (1991), L'Histoire contretemps: Le temps historique chez Walter Benjamin (1994), Point de Passage (1994), and De la
Resistance (1997).

every force, while it is affected by another force,

provokes a resistance which thwarts the action of the first force, while falling short of stopping it. Necessarily,
forces enter into relations not of opposition or contradiction (which are rare and precarious cases) but of dissymmetric contrariety. Each and every
force doubles and is doubled by another force. While it continually accompanies the exercizing of that force, it also counters it, and so destabilizes and deregulates it. Foucault
We are indebted to Michel Foucault for having generalized, while also displacing, the physical law of resistance:

concentrated his/her discovery on relations of power. In a remarkable way he established that relations of power develop and deploy around, about, and between themselves like a map, or a diagram of points, a complex and reversible

Relations of power are subject to a resistance and a counterresistance which are more heterogeneous than homogeneous, more unstable and multiple than stable and
delimited, more aleatory and singular than regulated and regular. Relations of power delineate variable configurations, where aggregations and agglomerations
of forces decompose under the effect of a force, or of forces which are subtle and entwined. They graft onto others, contaminate them, and find themselves in
turn affected. Elsewhere and otherwise they recompose [End Page 18] other blocks of relations (Deleuze 1988). Resistance is the name of this simultaneously
dense and fissured arrangement, this strategic apparatus where powers play, obscurely, freely, at once with
and against other powers. As an "a priorist positivist," Foucault established a cartography of power. As "transcendentalists" we might want to elaborate an analytic of resistance. This would
be the transcendental of every resistance, whatever kind it be: resistance to power, to the state of things, to history;
resistance to destruction, to death, to war; resistance to stupidity, to peace, to bare life. Resistance is not a
task or a necessity. It is a law of being. It is internal and immanent to its object. From the moment that being is given, takes form and figure,
battlefield of intensive forces which "play the role of . . . target, support, or handle" (Foucault 1980, 95).

consists of and insists in, from the moment there is being or a state, it incurs and bumps up against a resistance which irresistibly twists it and irreversibly fissures it. Say that a rule is a fragile stabilization and a heteroclite
conglomeration of relations of force, law, compromise, and justice. Accordingly, it is always on its way to being deregulated and altered. In the same way, life is not a substance, a given, or a value. It is a subtle disposition, plotting in
a fragile way with the power of destruction which constantly accompanies it and which forms a life-death complex that is precarious and reversible. Similarly, in a general way, every state is flanked by its double, which limits it and
pressures it from the interior. Resistance is internal and coextensive with the instance. Every being strikes against its counter-being. That counter-being is neither non-being, nor nothingness, nor another kind of being, nor a power of
annihilation, nor the least of beings. 2 It is being itself, which, in its deployment and its extension, turns against itself, and affects its "inside" with an "outside" that it has itself activated and incurred. One can calculate several essential
features of resistance from this logic of the double, this law of "countering." Immanent to its object, resistance is not created "in the name of" principles, values, ideals (truth, good, law, honor, dignity, etc). We are not presupposing
some heaven of ideas, nor confusing the transcendental with transcendence, nor contenting ourselves with tautology (resistance is good where it resists that which is bad, resistance is bad where it resists the good). So every principle is

Resistance is a fact, not an obligation. It is included within being, it is not the

"should-be." It is indeed that which signifies history. From the moment that power appears, resistance
immediately accompanies it. Principles evoked might have been variable, its modalities changeable, and its occasions multiple. While resistance against power and stupidity, against death and time has
deduced, every ideal is posed, and every value is valorized before being valorizing.

never ceased, neither has it ever been explicitly manifest, except in eclipses and brief flashes. In this regard, resistance is no more (and evidently no less) in question today than yesterday or tomorrow. It is simply that the forms
invented, at the same time as induced, by the apparatus of the era and of the contemporary situation are partially new. Perhaps, faced with the appearance [End Page 19] of capital and manufacture which devales working tools and
knowledge, one responds with sabotage and luddism. But faced with globalization and the extension over the whole planet of the laws of capital which render work and working conditions precarious, we respond by agitating for the
"thirty hour week, and an equal salary for all." Perhaps, confronted with expulsions to the country, inspections in the cities and neighborhoods, and the drive to put everybody to work, one resists with calls for "less work!" and for our

In a
general way, there is no just resistance, except as adjusted-to, and justice is not that which "in the name of"
one resists. It is an idea (and an affect) which wakens and awakens because one resists. And it disappears if, or to the extent that, nobody
resists. Eras vary and if one must evaluate and hierarchize them (one need not), it is in terms of their possible maneuvering margins for resistance and so of the possibilities they allow for turning around a situation. Every
resistance is a mixture of reactivity and activity, of conservation and invention, of negation and affirmation. If it
"right to leisure." But at the time when lawful states give themselves the mission of controlling population flows and singling out those with rights, one responds with calls for the "civil legalization of everybody!" etc.

is archaic, it is so necessarily. It responds to a situation, it reacts to an event, it is therefore posterior, secondary, and subordinated to that which it resists. However, one cannot deduce from this, contrary to what is sometimes supposed,
that it is passive or backwards looking, or that it constitutes an obstacle to be removed or a regression to be overcome for the responsible agent who might accept and assume this. Still less should we say that to speak of resistance is to
adopt the point of view of the "victim" (see Badiou 1993, 13), as if evil, misfortune, and universal suffering ruled over the world without exception and as if the sufferers must sacrifice themselves on the battlefield if not consenting or

in speaking of resistance we have to suppose that history turns always and "naturally"
towards the bad and only wins on the backs of the losers. But it is not a matter of idealizing the victors nor of deeming defeats heroic. For if the losers
resist, it is to gain space and time, to turn around and reroute the present look of things. History inevitably
takes bad turns, but good turns have inevitably responded to these, as played by certain vigilant, watchful
minoritarians, who are always ready to leap in, to intervene and to cry: "Enough! Something else now! Some
air! Some breathing space!" Such stances are declarative, affirmative. More precisely, resistance imperceptibly modifies its reactive position. The
response can turn into the active stance of reply, riposte, and retort. It can invent new game rules while occupying a place on the chess-board or playing the adversary's game. This kind of invention
requires strategy: the art of borrowing, of miming, and of understudying. To make a rejoinder is to steal and to fit out anew the adversary's arms, turn
being resigned to misfortune. True,

them inside out like a glove and offer them up in return. [End Page 20] In this way their impasses and dangers, concealed until now, are made clear--as are chances and new possibilities which might previously have been unthinkable

This is the immanent criteria of judgment and evaluation of resistance.

and impossible.
There are no good resistances to badness (ethics) or to regression
(individual or collective history), nor bad resistances to the good, or to progress. There are reactive resistances which deny, conserve, and restore the state of things and active resistances which activate reactivity and draw from this

If it is true that resistance is born from the thwarted affecting of one

force by another, then resistance is a matter of affect, passion, and heart. It issues neither from free choice nor from reasoning. At once wild and
strategic, resistance does not require a theory of the will--rather (to speak classically), some kind of "Treatise of the Passions," in other words, of liberty. Why does one resist? Because lived
life is not livable, because the state of things is not tolerable. A resistance is always punctual and local, always
precise and limited. Here, some forces respond, in that particular locale, and at that particular moment, to those particular forces in a complex and duplicit play where each resists the resistance of the other. The
forces of resistance are blind and obstinate, deaf and stubborn, and seem devoid of the least intelligence: the same forces are at work in death and life, in resistance and counter-resistance. However, as attested by
diversion the joy of invention and the affirmation of the something different.

107

the fact that one resists as much with and for others as alone and for oneself , these same forces search for air and the outside. They experiment with
the new, they are subject to aleatory variations and to contingent encounters; they make use of turns and deviations about which it is risky to decide if it is a matter of a ruse of the same or a complicated strategy to elude the same.

This is why resistance is an experience of subjectivization: it is the experimentation of freedom. Freedom is

not the faculty requisite to an explanation of why some resist and not others. It takes courage to draw on
one's anger at the unacceptable in order to glean the energy necessary to combat it. It takes courage to reroute the power of existing which
is unleashed by one's combative indignation in order to cultivate and multiply powers worthy of existence. All this takes a sense of risk and perseverance. 3 And resistance, like ethics, is
nothing other than the courage of freedom. Resistance is a particular combat. It doesn't confront the enemy in order to impose defeat. It struggles
with adversity, of which the adversary is only a stand-in to weaken it and make it weaken its hold. Resistance does not seek victory, it does not engage in battle,
still less war. But, through a lateral and duplicit strategy it disarms the enemy with the enemy's own arms. Deregulating the rules of war that it had imposed, resistance constrains it to displace its domain and its method of
play. [End Page 21] Combative, strategic, duplicit resistance is neither the naked power of triumphant life, be it in
failure or death, nor this "unnamable" "thing" 4 which would form like a bedrock, a residue, or an abyssal
remainder on which any enterprise of life, of any kind, would founder. If the same forces are at work in the resistance of death and in the resistance to
death, it is because death and life are complex and precarious combinations of identical elements which only differ in intensity, ingeniosity, complexity, and inventivity. There is, in today's era, a multiplication of examples of these lifedeath compositions where the living, thought of as a tactician, defies the death which constantly doubles it: grafts, long survivals, etc. Where death perseveres indefectibly in being, whether conserving or destroying, life

The being
of life is nourished by counter-being. What is to be done? How to divert from it the noxious and reactive
force? The resistance of life is nothing other than its capacity to play on and thwart irresistible resistances.
simultaneously rebounds, patiently and impatiently, on those obstacles it encounters, ties with them new knots of which one will only ever know after the fact whether they confine or release new possibilities.

108

2AC-Alt Fails
The alt is manifests like an elitist revolutionary vanguard that perpetuates state power and
leads to a fetishization of violence and terror
Newman 11-Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths College, University of London, PhD in Political Science @ the University of New
South Wales [Saul, Postanarchism and Radical Politics Today, Post-Anarchism: A Reader,
http://www.lboro.com/media/wwwlboroacuk/content/phir/documentsandpdfs/arg/LoughboroughPaper%20-%20Postanarchism%20and
%20Radical%20Politics%20Today%20-%20Saul%20Newman.pdf DKP]

There is an urgent need today for a new conceptualisation of radical politics, for the

invention of a new kind of radical political

horizonespecially as the existing political terrain is rapidly becoming consumed with various reactionary forces such as religious fundamentalism,
neoconservatism/neoliberalism and ethnic communitarianism. But what kind of politics can be imagined here in response to these challenges, defined by what goals
and by what forms of subjectivity? The

category of the worker, defined in the strict Marxian economic sense,

and politically constituted through the revolutionary vanguard whose goal was the dictatorship of the proletariat, no
longer seems viable. The collapse of the state socialist systems, the numerical decline of the
industrial working class (in the West at least) and the emergence, over the past four or so decades, of social movements
and struggles around demands that are no longer strictly economic (although they have often have economic implications),
have all led to a crisis in the Marxist and Marxist-Leninist imaginary. This does not mean, of course, that economic issues are no
longer central to radical politics, that the desire for economic and social equality no longer conditions radical political struggles and movements. On the contrary, as
we have seen in recent years with the anti-globalisation movement, capitalism is again on the radical political agenda. However, the

relationship
between the political and the economic is now conceived in a different way: global capitalism now
operates as the signifier through which diverse issuesautonomy, working conditions, indigenous identity, human rights, the
environment, etcare given a certain meaning.3The point is, though, that the Marxist and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
modelin which economic determinism met with a highly elitist political voluntarismhas been largely historically discredited.
This sort of authoritarian revolutionary vanguard politics has led not to the withering away of state
power, but rather to its perpetuation. ieks attempt to resurrect this form of politics does not
resolve this problem, and leads to a kind of fetishization of revolutionary violence and terror.4 Indeed,
one could say that there is a growing wariness about authoritarian and statist politics forms, particularly as state power today takes an increasingly and overtly
repressive form. The expansion of the modern neoliberal state under its present guise of securitisation represents a crisis of legitimacy for liberal democracy: in all
5 even the formal ideological and institutional trappings of liberal checks and balances and democratic accountability have started to fall away to reveal a form of
sovereignty which is articulated more and more through the state of exception. This is why radical political movements are increasingly suspicious of state power and
often resistant to formal channels of political representationthe state appears to activists as a hostile and unassailable force through which there can be no serious
hope of emancipation.

They essentialize capitalism as a singular ideology which crushes solvency a creates a selffulfilling prophecy that denies the materialism they claimed to be concerned about
Cleaver 2k-Professor of Economics @ The University of Texas, PhD in Economics @ Stanford [Harry, Reading Capital Politically
[http://www.eco.utexas.edu/~hmcleave/rcp1.html]
What we have here is a reading

of Capital that is not only limited to being a passive interpretation, but which also, by restricting itself to the
"economic" sphere or "base" effectively, makes of political economy the theory of the capitalist factory and its waged
workers alone. (49) This has the effect of excluding the rest of society from the analysis -- not only the state and party
politics but also the unemployed, the family, the school, health care, the media, art, and so on. As a result political economists
who would try to take these things into account find themselves rummaging through Marx's writings looking for suggestive tidbits of "other" theories. (50) Yet it is
precisely in these "other" social spheres that many of the major social conflicts of today are occurring . At the turn of the
century, when working-class struggle was located primarily (but not uniquely by any means) in the factory, there was perhaps some excuse for reading Capital as a
theoretical model of the capitalist factory. But

as a result of the extensive social engineering of the 1920s and 1930s through which
such
interpretations today are grossly inadequate. The New Left correctly sensed this and avoided orthodox interpretations. The inadequacy of
both orthodox and neo-Marxist theories became abundantly clear in the late 1960s. Both were unequipped to explain the revolts
of the unwaged and were forced to appeal to ad hoc solutions. Orthodoxy revived historical materialism and tried to shove peasant
revolts into the box of pre-capitalist modes of production. Student revolts were classified as either petty bourgeois or
lumpen. Women's revolts were within the framework of some "domestic" mode of production. All were thus set
aside as unimportant secondary phenomena because they were not truly working class. This of course set up the
Party once again as the mediating interpreter of the real working-class interests and justified the attempt to repress or
co-opt these struggles. Although the neo-Marxism of the New Left made these struggles central to its notion of revolution, it fared little better theoretically.
capitalist social planners sought to restructure virtually all of society, and as a result of the nature of recent social struggles against such planning,

109

Because it accepted orthodoxy's exclusion of these groups from the working class, all it could offer were vague evocations of "the
people's" interests. In as much as either they fell outside the "economic" sphere or their place within it was obscure, these
revolts had to be seen as byproducts of the general irrationality of the system. We can thus see that one great weakness of reading
Marx as political economy has been to isolate and reduce his analysis to that of the factory. But if this is a weakness which has made both orthodox and neo-Marxism
utterly incapable of accounting for the present crisis, it is not the only problem. Even more important is the

one-sidedness of all these analyses,

from those of the Second International right up through the contemporary debates on crisis theory. This onesidedness lies in the limited way in which the working class, however defined, makes an appearance in these
models. When it appears on the scene at all, it comes in from the outside and usually as a victim fighting defensive
battles. This is why I would label the Marxist or neo-Marxist categories employed in these models "reified." They are "reified" in that
instead of being understood as designating social relations between the classes they have been turned into
designations of things, things within capital separate from the social relation. In fact the concept of capital itself in these
models usually designates not the class relation (that is sometimes thrown in as an afterthought) but rather the means of production,
money capital, commodity capital, and labor power, all circulating as mindless entities through the ups and downs of
their circuits. Where does the impulse to movement, technological change, or expansion come from in these models? Why,
it comes from within capital, of course, usually the blind result of competition among capitalists. When competition breaks down in
monopoly capital, Marxists like Baran, Sweezy, and Josef Steindl deduce a necessary tendency to stagnation. In either case the working class is only a
spectator to the global waltz of capital's autonomous self-activating development. This was not Marx's view of the
world. Not only did he repeatedly insist that capital was a social relation of classes, but he also explicitly stated that at the level of the class the so-called economic
relations were in fact political relations: Every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and attempts to force them by
pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even a particular industry to force a shorter working day out of the
capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand the movement to force an eight hour day, etc., law is a political movement. And in this
way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say a movement of the class, with the object
of achieving its interests in a general form, in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion. (51) The point here is that as

the struggle for the

eight-hour day develops, as it becomes generalized, it moves beyond the particular demands of a narrowly defined
group of workers and becomes a demand of the whole class and thus political. This corresponds to a historical movement which
begins with the demands of a quantitatively small number of workers but which circulates to become a new qualitative focal point of the class struggle. Such demands
spread if they correspond to the underlying social conditions of the class generally. Marx sought out and analyzed several of these struggles -- over the length of the
working day, the intensity of work, productivity, mechanization, the social wage, and so on. In Capital he lays out both the specific history of their development in
England and their general place within capital, that is, within the overall class struggle. From the time when these areas of contention become generalized, they are
branded as class and hence political relations. At any given moment particular groups of workers may or may not be actively struggling for one or another demand, but
if they do, the individual struggle at each factory or industry can no longer be considered an isolated "purely economic" struggle but must be grasped as a part of the
whole, as a political struggle for power. Today we can see this even more clearly than in Marx's time because of the transformed role of the state. The rise of the
Keynesian state has meant the virtual merging of not only the state and the "economy" but of the state and "society" itself. This is a

second fundamental
danger of reading Marx as political economy and as ideology. We are presented with elaborately detailed critical
interpretations of this self-activating monster in a way that completely ignores the way actual working-class power
forces and checks capitalist development. Marx saw how the successful struggle for a shorter working day caused a
crisis for capital. These political economists do not: they see absolute surplus value as a reified abstract concept.
Marx saw how that struggle forced the development of productivity-raising innovations which raised the organic
composition of capital. He thus saw relative surplus value as a strategic capitalist response. These political economists do not: they see only
competition between capitalists. Marx saw how workers' wage struggles could help precipitate capitalist crises. These
political economists see only abstract "laws of motion." (52) These kinds of interpretations glorify the dynamic of
capital, however evil, and portray the working class as a hapless victim. Because of this, even if one wishes to see
ideological critique as a weapon in the class struggle, one must conclude that such theories which accord all power to capital can
only be in its interest. Such critiques are particularly well suited to the needs of Leninist parties or any other elitist groups
which would present themselves as the only solution for the class. If the class is powerless in the "economic"
struggle, as the theories say, then its only solution is obviously "to join the Party and smash the state." How this mass of
hapless victims is to achieve such a feat would seem to be a mystery understood only by the Party hierarchy, who will
provide the necessary leadership and wisdom. But the truth is that the class is not powerless at all and that the Party
leaders seek to mobilize its power as a prelude to taking control themselves and becoming the managers of a
rationalized, planned "socialist" economy in which the workers, they hope, will work even harder than before.
CARD CONTINUES The flaw that lies at the very heart of Critical Theory's concept of bourgeois cultural
hegemony (just as it lurks within political economy's theory of capitalist technological domination in the factory) is its total one-sidedness. The
positing of cultural hegemony, like that of an all-powerful technological rationality, reflects the inability to recognize
or theorize the growth of any working-class power capable of threatening the system. Although the theory may have accurately
reflected the new issues that accompanied the rise of Hitler, Stalin, and Roosevelt, its exaggerated pessimism became manifested in the 1960s. The logic of the
theory of absolute consumerist integration forced Marcuse, Baran, and Sweezy to interpret the upheavals of the time as falling "outside"
the class struggle and they built their hopes on what they saw as revolts against racial and sexual repression and against the general irrationality of the system.
This exteriorization of contradiction blinded [made them unaware of] them all to the effectiveness of the actual struggles of wage
workers as well as their interaction with the complementary struggles of the unwaged. As a result Marcuse could see only defeat
in the dissolution of the "movement" in the early 1970s and the rising danger of a new fascism. Unable to grasp how the cycle of struggles of the 1960s had thrown

110

capital into crisis, was forced back to the political economy of Baran and Sweezy for an explanation of the international economic crisis of the 1970s. (82) It is ironic
that, while

he has spoken of a capitalist "counterrevolution" that could lead to 1984, he cannot see the "revolution" to
which it is a counter and can only proclaim it a "preventive" action by capital. (83) He does see the revolt against work but interprets its
rampant absenteeism, falling productivity, industrial sabotage, wildcat strikes, and school dropouts as simply
"prepolitical" signs of discontent and of the possible crumbling of bourgeois cultural hegemony via managed consumerism. (84) As a result he has
begun, in Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972), to remodel his critical theory into one of how the consumerist logic of contemporary capitalism may be undermining
itself by the production of nonintegrable, transcendent needs. He postulates a growing divergence between the consumerist promises of capitalist ideology propagated
by the mass media and the willingness to deliver in a period of economic crisis: "a contradiction between that which is and that which is possible and ought to be."
(85) The political conclusions Marcuse draws from this analysis formulate the current political situation in terms of the ideological question of whether growing
popular dissatisfaction can be crafted by a revitalized New Left educational and organizational effort into a real threat to the system. Despite his affirmation that
consumerism has enlarged the base of exploitation and political revolt, and his calls for a New Left revival, it must be said that he repeatedly points to what sometimes
seems to be insurmountable difficulties in carrying out this program. Given his insistence on the isolation of radicals, his repeated affirmation of the "political
weakness and the non-revolutionary attitude of the majority of the working class," and his endorsement of the necessity of a "long march through the institutions"
(working within the system), one is not surprised to find in his final declaration the traditional Old Left evocation of the "long road": "the next revolution will be the
concern of generations and the 'final crisis of capitalism' may take all but a century." (86) Gone is his sense of optimism that rode the wave of struggles of the 1960s.
Marcuse seems to have rediscovered the inherent pessimism of the Frankfurt School's concept of hegemony as well as its limited political program for a long process
of "building consciousness" through the ideological critique of society. Blind

to the real power developed and held by workers today,

Marcuse cannot see either the extent and difficulties of current capitalist attempts at restructuring or how the
continuing struggles of workers are thwarting those efforts. Of this drama he can capture only the repressive side of
the capitalist offensive and falls back into a more or less traditional leftist program of defense against authoritarian state
capitalism via the ideological struggles of Critical Theory. To summarize: despite the originality and usefulness of their research into the
mechanisms of capitalist domination in both the economic and cultural spheres, and indeed precisely in the formulation of those mechanisms as onesidedly hegemonic, Critical Theorists have remained blind to the ability of working-class struggles to transform and
threaten the very existence of capital. Their concept of domination is so complete that the "dominated" virtually
disappears as an active historical subject. In consequence, these philosophers have failed to escape the framework of
mere ideological critique of capitalist society. To return to the military analogy used earlier in this introduction, we can pose the difficulty this way:
if one's attention is focused uniquely on the enemy's activities on the battlefield, the battle will assuredly be lost. In
the class war, as in conventional military encounters, one must begin with the closest study of one's own forces, that is, the structure of
working-class power. Without an understanding of one's own power, the ebb and flow of the battle lines can appear
as an endless process driven only by the enemy's unilateral self-activity. When the enemy regroups or restructures,
as capital is doing in the present crisis, its actions must be grasped in terms of the defeat of prior tactics or strategies by our
forces -- not simply as another clever move. That an analysis of enemy strategy is necessary is obvious. The essential point is
that an adequate understanding of that strategy can be obtained only by grasping it in relation to our own strengths
and weaknesses. In the movie Patton there is a highly instructive scene in which Patton sees that he will defeat Rommel's armor in North
Africa and cries, "Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book!" He is referring to a translation of Rommel's book on tank warfare. If Patton had read
that book of his declared opponent the way Critical Theorists read bourgeois authors, he would still have been sitting
in his quarters writing "critiques" of this point or that when Rommel rolled over him with his army. Instead, he read the
book as an enemy weapon, which it was, in order to develop better strategies to defeat him. It would also have done him little good if,
when he finally faced Rommel's army, he had had no understanding of the strengths of his own firepower. (87) It serves little purpose to study the
structures of capitalist domination unless they are recognized as strategies that capital must struggle to impose.
Revolutionary strategy cannot be created from an ideological critique; it develops within the actual ongoing growth
of working-class struggle. Blindness to this inevitably forces one back into the realm of "consciousness raising" as the
only way to bridge the perceived gap between working-class powerlessness (capitalist hegemony) and working-class victory (revolutionary defeat of capital).

111

The alt is overly simplisticeven if material forces shape some social relations, they ignore the
complex interaction of different identities with materiality
Scatamburlo-DAnnibale and McLaren 3 (Valerie, Associate professor in the Department of Communication, Media and Film
at the University of Windsor, Peter, Distinguished Professor in Critical Studies, College of Educational Studies, Chapman University, where he is
Co-Director of the Paulo Freire Democratic Project, The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of Race and Difference , 2003,
http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/mclaren/mclaren%20and%20valerie.pdf)

To suggest that culture is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces and social relations
linked to production does not reinscribe the sim- plistic and presumably deterministic
base/superstructure metaphor, which has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, such a formulation draws on
Marx's own writings from both the Grundrisse (Marx, 1858/1973) and Cap- ital (Marx, 1867/1967) in which he contended that there is a
consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex vari- ety of
its "empirical" reality.4 This emphasizes Marx's understanding of capital- ism and capital as a "social" relationone that stresses the interpenetration
of these categories and one that offers a unified and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics, and society (see Marx, 1863/1972,
1867/1976a, 1866/1976b, 1865/ 1977a, 1844/1977b). Moreover, fore-

grounding the limitations of "difference" and

"representational" politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or
discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation. We readily acknowledge the significance of theorizations
that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of difference that have historically been
denigrated. They have helped to uncover the geneal- ogy of terror hidden within the drama of
Western democratic life. This has been an important development that has enabled subordinated
groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities
(Bannerji, 1995; Scatamburlo-D'Annibale & Langman, 2002). Contemporary theorists have also contributed to our
understanding of issues Contemporary theorists have also contributed to our understanding of
issues of "otherness" and "race" as hegemonic articulations (Hall, 1980, 1987, 1988), the cultural politics of race and racism
and the implications of raciology (Gilroy, 1990, 2000), as well as the epistemological violence perpetrated by Western theories of knowledge (Goldberg, 1990, 1993).
Miron and Indas (2000) work, drawing on Judith Butlers theory of performativity, has been insightful in showing how race works to constitute the racial subject
through a reiterative discursive practice that achieves its effect through the act of naming and the practice of shaming.

The alt alone is coopted you need a multitude of standpoints means the perm solves
Carroll 10 founding director of the Social Justice Studies Program at the University of Victoria (William, Crisis, movements, counterhegemony: in search of the new, Interface 2:2, 168-198)

Just as hegemony has been increasingly organized on a transnational basis through the globalization of Americanism, the
construction of global governance institutions, the emergence of a transnational capitalist class and so on (Soederberg 2006; Carroll 2010) counterhegemony has also taken on transnational features that go beyond the classic organization of left parties into internationals.
What Sousa Santos (2006) terms the rise of a global left is evident in specific movement based campaigns , such as the successful
international effort in 1998 to defeat the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); in initiatives such as the World Social Forum, to contest the terrain of global
civil society; and in the growth of transnational movement organizations and of a democratic globalization network, counterpoised to neoliberalisms transnational

an incipient war
of position is at work here a bloc of oppositional forces to neoliberal globalization encompassing a wide range of
movements and identities and that is global in nature, transcending traditional national boundaries (Butko 2006: 101). These moments of
historical bloc, that address issues of North-South solidarity and coordination (Smith 2008:24). As I have suggested elsewhere (Carroll 2007),

resistance and transborder activism do not yet combine to form a coherent historical bloc around a counter-hegemonic project. Rather, as Marie-Jose Massicotte
suggests, we

are witnessing the emergence and re-making of political imaginaries , which often lead to valuable
localized actions as well as greater transborder solidarity (2009: 424). Indeed, Gramscis adage that while the line of development is international, the origin
point is national, still has currency. Much of the energy of anti-capitalist politics is centred within what Raymond Williams (1989) called
militant particularisms localized struggles that, left to themselves are easily dominated by the power of capital to coordinate
accumulation across universal but fragmented space (Harvey 1996: 32). Catharsis, in this context, takes on a spatial character. The scaling up of militant
particularisms requires alliances across interrelated scales to unite a diverse range of social groupings and thereby
spatialize a Gramscian war of position to the global scale (Karriem 2009: 324). Such alliances, however, must be grounded in local conditions and aspirations. Eli
Friedmans (2009) case study of two affiliated movement organizations in Hong Kong and mainland China, respectively, illustrates the limits of transnational activism
that radiates from advanced capitalism to exert external pressure on behalf of subalterns in the global South. Friedman recounts how a campaign by the Hong Kongbased group of Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior to empower Chinese mainland workers producing goods for Hong Kong Disneyland failed due
to the lack of local mobilization by workers themselves. Yet the same group, through its support for its ally, the mainland-based migrant workers association, has
helped facilitate self-organization on the shop floor. In the former case, well-intentioned practices of solidarity reproduced a paternalism that failed to inspire local
collective action; in the latter, workers taking direct action on their own behalf, with external support, led to psychological empowerment and movement

112

mobilization (Friedman 2009: 212). As a rule, the

more such solidarity work involves grassroots initiatives and participation, the
greater is the likelihood that workers from different countries will learn from each other, enabling transnational
counter-hegemony to gain a foothold (Rahmon and Langford 2010: 63).

113

2AC-Gibson-Graham
Alt fails-representing capitalism as a bounded, monistic entity precludes alternatives and fractures coalitions
Gibson-Graham 6 J.K., pen name shared by feminist economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson
(The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy, pg 43-45)

The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) problematizes "capitalism" as an economic and social descriptor.4 Scrutinizing what might be
seen as throwaway uses of the term - passing references, for example, to the capitalist system or to global capitalism - as well as systematic and deliberate attempts to

a widespread
understanding: that capitalism is the hegemonic, or even the only, present form of economy and that it will continue
to be so in the proximate future. It follows from this prevalent though not ubiquitous view that noncapitalist economic sites, if
they exist at all, must inhabit the social margins; and, as a corollary, that deliberate attempts to develop noncapitalist
economic practices and institutions must take place in the social interstices , in the realm of experiment, or in a visionary space of
revolutionary social replacement. Representations of capitalism are a potent constituent of the anticapitalist imagination,
providing images of what is to be resisted and changed as well as intimations of the strategies, techniques, and possibilities of changing it.
For this reason, depictions of "capitalist hegemony" deserve a particularly skeptical reading. For in the vicinity of
these representations, the very idea of a noncapitalist economy takes the shape of an unlikelihood or even an impossibility.
It becomes difficult to entertain a vision of the prevalence and vitality of noncapitalist economic forms, or of daily
or partial replacements of capitalism by noncapitalist economic practices, or of capitalist retreats and reversals . In this
sense, "capitalist hegemony" operates not only as a constituent of, but also as a brake upon, the anticapitalist
imagination.5 What difference might it make to release that brake and allow an anticapitalist economic imaginary to develop unrestricted?6 If we were to
dissolve the image that looms in the economic foreground, what shadowy economic forms might come forward? In these
represent capitalism as a central and organizing feature of modern social experience, the book selectively traces the discursive origins of

questions we can identify the broad outlines of our project: to discover or create a world of economic difference, and to populate that world with exotic creatures that
become, upon inspection, quite local and familiar (not to mention familiar beings that are not what they seem). The

discursive artifact we call

"capitalist hegemony" is a complex effect of a wide variety of discursive and nondiscursive conditions .7 In this book we
focus on the practices and preoccupations of discourse, tracing some of the different, even incompatible, representations of capitalism that can be collated within this
fictive summary representati n. These depictions have their origins in the diverse traditions of Marxism, classical and contemporary political economy, academic
social science, modern historiography, popular economic and social thought, western philosophy and metaphysics, indeed, in an endless array of texts, traditions and
infrastructures of meaning. In the chapters that follow, only a few of these are examined for the ways in which they have

sustained a vision of
capitalism as the dominant form of economy, or have contributed to the possibility or durability of such a vision. But the
point should emerge none the less clearly: the virtually unquestioned dominance of capitalism can be seen as a complex product of a
variety of discursive commitments, including but not limited to organicist social conceptions, heroic historical narratives, evolutionary scenarios of social
development, and essentialist, phallocentric, or binary patterns of thinking. It is through these discursive figurings and alignments that capitalism is constituted as
large, powerful, persistent, active, expansive, progressive, dynamic, transformative; embracing, penetrating, disciplining, colonizing, constraining; systemic, selfreproducing, rational, lawful, self-rectifying; organized and organizing, centered and centering; originating, creative, protean; victorious and ascendant; selfidentical,
self-expressive, full, definite, real, positive, and capable of conferring identity and meaning.8 The argument revisited :

it is the way capitalism has been

"thought" that has made it so difficult for people to imagine its supersession.9 It is therefore the ways in which capitalism is known
that we wish to delegitimize and displace. The process is one of unearthing, of bringing to light images and habits of understanding that constitute "hegemonic
capitalism" at the intersection of a set of representations. This we see as a first step toward theorizing capitalism without representing dominance as a natural and

If it
were possible to inhabit a heterogeneous and open-ended economic space whose identity was not fixed or singular
(the space potentially to be vacated by a capitalism that is necessarily and naturally hegemonic) then a vision of noncapitalist economic practices
as existing and widespread might be able to be born; and in the context of such a vision, a new anticapitalist politics
might emerge, a noncapitalist politics of class (whatever that may mean) might take root and flourish. A long shot perhaps but one worth pursuing.
inevitable feature of its being. At the same time, we hope to foster conditions under which the economy might become less subject to definitional closure.

114

2AC-No Root Cause

Cap not root cause
Aberdeen 3 activist and founder, Aberdeen Foundation (Richard, The Way, http://richardaberdeen.com/uncommonsense/theway.html)
A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of
the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the
modern world is being addressed. This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view, reminiscent of early
class struggle Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends. And like
these often brutal early Marxists, modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside
down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem. Violent revolution, including our own
American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading
to future violence. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group
investors. These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed. For example, a theorized need for offering salaries much higher than is
necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for
benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors. Likewise, major political and
corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation. More than just investor greed,

If one examines the course of

human events closely, it can correctly be surmised that the root cause of humanitys problems comes from
individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation. The Marx/Engles view of history being a class struggle does
not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more
corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it.

details). So-called classes of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own

nations engage in wars of

aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a
society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and
lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free
enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this.
individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent class struggle in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise,

115

2AC-Permutation-Generic
Perm-do boththe alt alone forecloses possibility to explore vulnerabilities within cap and
is a reductionist understanding on the way power manifestscollapses into ressentiment
Connolly 13-Professor of Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University [William, The Fragility of Things, pp. 36-42]
A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies, and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that we

do not know
with confidence, in advance of experimental action, just how far or fast changes in the systemic character of
neoliberal capitalism can be made. The structures often seem solid and intractable, and indeed such a semblance may turn out
to be true. Some may seem solid, infinitely absorptive, and intractable when theyre in fact punctuated by hidden
vulnerabilities, soft spots, uncertainties, and potential lines of flight that become apparent when they are
subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and strain. Indeed no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety of forces to which it is
connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements, de- pendencies, shocks, and threads, can specify with supreme confidence the solidity or potential
flexibility of the structures it seeks to change. The strength of structural

theory, at its best, was in identifying, institutional intersections that hold a

the claim to know in advance how resistant such intersections are to
potential change. Without adopting the opposite conceit, it seems important to pursue possible sites
of strategic action that might open up room for productive change. Today it seems important to attend to the relation between the need for structural change and identification of multiple sites of potential action . You do not know precisely what you are
system together; its conceit, at its worst, was

doing when you participate in such a venture. You combine an experimental temper with the appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably contain a
shifting quotient of uncertainty. The following tentative judgments and sites of action may be pertinent. 1) Neither neoliberal theory, nor socialist productivism, nor
deep ecology, nor social democracy in its classic form seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. This is so in part because the powers of market self-regulation
are both real and limited in relation to a larger multitude of heterogeneous force fields beyond the human estate with differential powers of self-regulation and
metamorphosis. A first task is to challenge neoliberal ideology through critique and by elaborating and publicizing positive alternatives that acknowledge the disparate
relations between market processes, other cultural systems, and nonhuman systems. Doing so to render the fragility of things more visible and palpable. Doing so, too,
to set the stage for a series of interceded shifts in citizen role performances, social movements, and state action. 2) Those who seek to reshape the ecology of late
capitalism might set an interim agenda of radical reform and then recoil back on the initiatives to see how they work. An

interim agenda is the best

focus on because in a world of becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage. We
must, for instance, become involved in experimental micropolitics on a variety of fronts, as we participate in role
experimentations, social movements, artistic displaces, erotic-political shows, electoral campaigns, and creative
interventions on the new media to help recode the ethos that now occupies investment practices, consumption desires, family savings, state priorities, church
thing to

assemblies, university curricula, and media reporting. It is important to bear in mind how extant ideologies, established role performances, social movements, and
commitments to state action intersect. To shift some of our own role performances in the zones of travel, church participation, home
energy use, investment, and consumption, for instance, that now implicate us deeply in foreign oil dependence and the huge military expenditures that secure it,

could make a minor difference on its own and also lift some of the burdens of institutional implications
from us to support participation in more adventurous interpretations, political strategies, demands upon the state, and
cross-state citizen actions. 3) Today perhaps the initial target, should be on reconstituting established patterns of consumption by a combination of direct citizen
actions in consumption choices, publicity of such actions, the organization of local collectives to modify consumption practices, and social movements to reconstitute
the current state- and market-supported infrastructure of consumption. By the infrastructure of consumption I mean publicly supported and subsidized market
subsystems such as a national highway system, a system of airports, medical care through private insurance, agribusiness pouring high sugar, salt, and fat content into
foods, corporate ownership of the public media, the prominence of corporate 403 accounts over retirement pensions, and so forth that enable some modes of
consumption in the zones of travel, education, diet, retirement, medical care, energy use, health, and education and render others much more difficult or expensive to
procure.22 To change the infrastructure is also to shift the types of work and investment available. Social movements that work upon the infrastructure and ethos of
consumption in tandem can thus make a real difference directly, encourage more people to heighten their critical perspectives, and thereby open more people to a more

cross-state citizen goal should construct a pluralist

assemblage by moving back and forth between experiments in role performances , the refinement of sensitive
modes of perception, revisions in political ideology, and adjustments in political sensibility; doing so to mobilize enough
collective energy to launch a general strike simultaneously in several countries in the near future. The
militant politics if and as the next disruptive event emerges. Perhaps a

aim of such an event would be to reverse the deadly future created by established patterns of climate change by fomenting significant shifts in patterns of
consumption, corporate policies, state law, and the priorities of interstate organizations. Again, the dilemma of today is that the fragility of things demands shifting and

The
existential forces of hubris (expressed above all in those confident drives to mastery conveyed by military elites, financial economists, financial
elites, and CEOs) and of ressentiment (expressed in some sectors of secularism and evangelicalism) now play roles of importance in
the shape of consumption practices, investment portfolios, worker routines, managerial demands,
and the uneven senses of entitlement that constitute neoliberalism. For that reason activism inside churches, schools,
slowing down intrusions into several aspects of nature as we speed up shifts in identity; role performance, cultural ethos, market regulation, and state policy. 4)

street life, and the media must become increasingly skilled and sensitive. As we proceed, some of us may present the themes of a world of becoming to larger
audiences, challenging thereby the complementary notions of a providential world and secular mastery that now infuse too many role performances, market practices,
and state priorities in capitalist life. For

existential dispositions do infuse the role priorities of late capitalism.

116

Today it is both difficult for people to perform the same roles with the same old innocence and
difficult to challenge those performances amid our own implication in them. Drives by evangelists,
the media, neoconservatives, and the neoliberal right to draw a veil of innocence across the
priorities of contemporary life make the situation much worse. 5) The emergence of a neofascist or mafia-type capitalism
slinks as a dangerous possibility on the horizon, partly because of the expansion and intensification of capital, partly because of the real fragility of things, partly
because the identity needs of many facing these pressures encourage them to cling more intensely to a neoliberal imaginary as its bankruptcy becomes increasingly
apparent, partly because so many in America insist upon retaining the special world entitlements the country achieved after World War II in a world decreasingly
favorable to them, partly because of the crisis tendencies inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and partly because so many resist living evidence around and in them that
challenges a couple of secular and theistic images of the cosmos now folded into the institutional life of capitalism. Indeed the danger is that those constituencies now
most disinclined to give close attention to public issues could oscillate between attraction to the mythic promises of neoliberal automaticity and attraction to a
neofascist movement when the next crisis unfolds. It has happened before. I am not saying that neoliberalism is itself a form of fascism, but that the failures and
meltdowns it periodically promotes could once again foment fascist or neofascist responses, as happened in several countries after the onset of the Great Depression.
6)

The democratic state , while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or re- constitute the ethos and infrastructure of consumption, must play a

significant role in reconstituting our lived relations

to climate, weather, resource use, ocean currents, bee survival, tectonic instability,

glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and investment, as

it also responds favorably to the public pressures we

must generate to forge a new ethos. A new, new left will thus experimentally enact new intersections be- tween role performance and
political activity,

outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can

pose . It will do- so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late ca. Most of those movemepital requires
state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to
neoliberal markets , either explicitly or by implication. Drives to fascism, remember , rose the last time in capitalist states
after market meltdownnts failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, the
state, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media, and pubs. You do not fight the danger of a new kind of
neofascism by withdrawing from either micropolitics or state politics. You do so through a multisited politics
designed to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life. Changes in ethos can in turn open doors to new
possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other . And vice versa.
A positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of state and
global capitalism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We dont know. That is one reason it is
important to focus on interim goals. Another is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising
shifts in the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period . Another yet is that activism needs to
project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support and propel itself forward. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me,
at least, that a positive interim future includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology. 7) To advance such an agenda it is
also imperative to negotiate new connections between nontheistic constituencies who care about the future of the Earth and numerous devotees of diverse religious
traditions who fold positive spiritualities into their creedal practices. The

new, multifaceted movement needed today, if it emerges, will

take the shape of a vibrant pluralist assemblage acting at multiple sites within and across states, rather than
either a centered movement with a series of fellow travelers attached to it or a mere electoral constellation. Electoral victories are important, but they
work best when they touch priorities already embedded in churches, universities, film, music, consumption practices, media reporting, investment priorities, and the
like. A related thing to keep in mind is that the capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fra- gility of things today also generate
pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace than heretofore. A new pluralist constellation will build upon the latter developments
as it works to reduce the former effects. I am sure that the

forgoing comments will appear to some as "optimistic" or "utopian." But

optimism and pessimism are both primarily spectatorial views. Neither seems sufficient to the contemporary condition.
Indeed pessimism, if you dwell on it long, easily slides into cynicism, and cynicism often plays into the hands of a right
wing that applies exclusively to any set of state activities not designed to protect or coddle the corporate
estate. That is one reason that "dysfunctional politics" redounds so readily to the advantage of cynics on the right who
work to promote it. They want to promote cynicism with respect to the state and innocence with respect to the market. Pure critique as already
suggested,

does not suffice

cynicism.

either.

Pure critique too readily carries critics and their followers to the edge of

It is also true that the above critique concentrates on neoliberal capital- ism, not capitalism writ large. That is because it seems to me that we need to

specify the terms of critique as closely as possible and think first of all about interim responses. If we lived under, say, Keynesian capitalism, a somewhat different set
of issues would be defined and other strategies identified.25 Capitalism writ

largewhile it sets a general context that neoliberalism inflects in specific

too large and generic a target. It can assume multiple forms, as the differences between Swedish and American capitalism
suggest; the times demand a set of interim agendas targeting the hegemonic form of today, pursued with heightened militancy at several sites. The point today
is not to wait for a revolution that overthrows the whole system . The "system," as we shall see further, is
replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges, dicey intersections with nonhuman forces , and uncertain trajectories to
make such a wholesale project plausible. Besides, things are too urgent and too many people on the ground are suffering too
wayssets

much now.

117

118

2AC-Permutation-Surveillance Specific
Perm-do bothsingular focus failswe need a coalition of resistance
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout,
February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

If the first task of resistance is to make dominant power clear by addressing critically and
meaningfully the abuses perpetrated by the corporate surveillance state and how such transgressions affect the daily
lives of people in different ways, the second step is to move from understanding and critique to the hard work of
building popular movements that integrate rather than get stuck and fixated in single-issue politics.
The left has been fragmented for too long, and the time has come to build national and
international movements capable of dismantling the political, economic and cultural architecture put
in place by the new authoritarianism and its post-Orwellian surveillance industries. This is not a call to reject identity and specialissue politics as much as it is a call to build broad-based alliances and movements, especially among
workers, labor unions, educators, youth groups, artists, intellectuals, students, the unemployed and
others relegated, marginalized and harassed by the political and financial elite . At best, such groups should form a
vigorous and broad-based third party for the defense of public goods and the establishment of a radical democracy. This is not a call for a party
based on traditional hierarchical structures but a party consisting of a set of alliances among
different groups that would democratically decide its tactics and strategies.
Perm do bothsurveillance processes and global capital are embedded within each other
Ball and Snider 13-*Professor of Organization @ the Open University Business School, director of the Surveillance Studies Network
**Professor of Sociology @ Queens University [Kirstie, Laureen, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: A political economy of surveillance,
Introduction: The surveillance-industrial complex: towards a political economy of surveillance? DKP]

The state and capital thus have a long shared history in the co- production of the surveillance society.
This is the first collection which explicitly examines the intersection with or to put it more accurately the embeddedness of
surveillance processes within the activities and agendas of global capital and the state. Indeed work in this
area benefits from a series of well- developed theoretical positions but lacks significant tranches of empirical data. This collection brings together work by scholars
from different countries which empirically examine this key phenomenon associated with the spread of surveillance in society. The volume was conceived following a
two- day workshop entitled The Political Economy of Surveillance held at the Open University, UK in September 2010. The workshop was
co- supported by The New Transparency3 a Major Collaborative Research Initiative funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and
Living in Surveillance Societies4 and EU- COST action (for more information on these projects see Appendix A and B). The former project is a research network
which spans Canada, North and Central America, Japan and the UK; the latter is a research network which spans 26 European countries. The basis of this collection is
truly international and representative of thought leadership in this new area. The book is split into three sections. Part I, International networks and global circuits of
surveillance, examines how

the surveillance- industrial complex spans international boundaries through the

workings of global capital and its interaction with agencies of the state. These five chapters examine issues of
governance and the production of events which are of global significance. They show how such issues and events are cemented
through contracts for service provision and driven by capitals unceasing search for competitive
advantage, particularly at the international level. In this section, Stephen Graham explores the war on terror, arguing that it has been defended, legitimated
and reinforced through a combination of highly urban discourses rooted in specific material realities and practices. David Lyon and zgn Topak directly examine the
surveillance industrial complex by looking at the

coalition of government and corporate players that promote its

growth through a case study of the growth of identification card systems. Adam Warren, Morag Bell and Lucy Budd discuss the use of event based
information systems by international health communities to track pandemics and assess disease risk, which reembed inequalities between the global south and the global north. Minas Samatas tells of the corruption and
controversy surrounding the story of the multi- million dollar surveillance system set up by two global
corporations, SAIC and Siemens, at the Athens Olympic Games in 2004. Stphane Leman- Langlois focuses on the objects that lie at the very
origins of the devices used for surveillance purposes, the governmentuniversityindustry complex
of R&D funding, management and governance of innovations in security surveillance technology.

119

2AC-Racism First
Modern capitalism is founded on racism and slaverytheir singular focus is bad history
Mills 97-Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy @ Northwestern University [Charles, The Racial Contract, pp. 31-40, 1997]
The classic social contract, as I have detailed, is primarily moral/political in nature. But it is also economic in the background sense that
the point of leaving the state of nature is in part to secure a stable environment for the industrious appropriation of
the world. (After all, one famous definition of politics is that it is about who gets what and why.) Thus even in Locke's moralized state of nature, where people
generally do obey natural law, he is concerned about the safety of private property, indeed proclaiming that "the great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property."42 And in Hobbes's famously amoral and unsafe state of nature, we
are told that "there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth."43 So

part of the point of

bringing society into existence, with its laws and enforcers of the law, is to protect what you have accumulated. / What,
then, is the nature of the economic system of the new society? The general contract does not itself prescribe a particular model or particular schedule of property
rights, requiring only that the "equality" in the prepolitical state be somehow preserved. This provision may be variously interpreted as a self-interested surrender to an
absolutist Hobbesian government that itself determines property rights, or a Lockean insistence that private property accumulated in the moralized state of nature be
respected by the constitutionalist government. Or more radical political theorists, such as socialists and feminists, might argue that state-of-nature equality actually
mandates class or gender economic egalitarianism in society. So, different

political interpretations of the initial moral egalitarianism can

be advanced, but the general background idea is that the equality of human beings in the state of nature is somehow
(whether as equality of opportunity or as equality of outcome) supposed to carry over into the economy of the created sociopolitical
order, leading to a system of voluntary human intercourse and exchange in which exploitation is precluded. / By
contrast, the economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, foreground rather than background,
since the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing a moral
hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those
individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons.
There are other benefits accruing from the Racial Contractfar greater political influence, cultural hegemony, the psychic payoff that comes from knowing one is a

Globally, the Racial

Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world; locally, within Europe and the other continents, it
designates Europeans as the privileged race. / The challenge of explaining what has been called "the European miracle"the rise
of Europe to global dominationhas long exercised both academic and lay opinion.45 How is it that a formerly
peripheral region on the outskirts of the Asian land mass, at the far edge of the trade routes, remote from the great
civilizations of Islam and the East, was able in a century or two to achieve global political and economic
dominance? The explanations historically given by Europeans themselves have varied tremendously, from the
straightforwardly racist and geographically determinist to the more subtly environmentalist and culturalist. But what
they have all had in common, even those influenced by Marxism, is their tendency to depict this development as
essentially autochthonous, their tendency to privilege some set of internal variables and correspondingly-downplay
or ignore altogether the role of colonial conquest and African slavery. Europe made it on its own, it is said, because of the peculiar
member of the Herrenvolk (what W. E. B. Du Bois once called "the wages of whiteness")44but the bottom line is material advantage.

characteristics of Europe and Europeans. / Thus whereas no reputable historian today would espouse the frankly biologistic theories of the past, which made
Europeans (in both pre- and post-Darwinian accounts) inherently the most advanced race, as contrasted with the backward/less-evolved races elsewhere, the thesis of
European specialness and exceptionalism is still presupposed. It is still assumed that rationalism and science, innovativeness and inventiveness found their special
home here, as against the intellectual stagnation and traditionalism of the rest of the world, so that Europe was therefore destined in advance to occupy the special
position in global history it has. James Blaut calls this the theory, or "super-theory" (an umbrella covering many different versions: theological, cultural, biologistic,
geographical, technological, etc.), of "Eurocentric diffusionism," according to which European progress is seen as "natural" and asymmetrically determinant of the fate
of non-Europe." Similarly, Sandra Harding, in her anthology on the "racial" economy of science, cites "the assumption that Europe functions autonomously from other
parts of the world; that Europe is its own origin, final end, and agent; and that Europe and people of European descent in the Americas and elsewhere owe nothing to
the rest of the world."47 / Unsurprisingly, black and Third

World theorists have traditionally dissented from this notion of happy

dispensation. They have claimed, quite to the contrary, that there is a crucial causal connection
between European advance and the unhappy fate of the rest of the world. One classic example of such scholarship from a half
century ago was the Caribbean historian Eric Williams's Capitalism and Slavery, which argued that the profits from
African slavery helped to make the industrial revolution possible, so that internalist accounts were fundamentally
mistaken.48 And in recent years, with decolonization, the rise of the New Left in the United States, and the entry of more alternative voices into the academy, this
divine or natural European

challenge has deepened and broadened. There are variations in the authors' positionsfor example, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Andre Guilder Frank, Immanuel
Wallerstein9but the basic theme is that the

exploitation of the empire (the bullion from the great gold and silver mines in
Mexico and Peru, the profits from plantation slavery, the fortunes made by the colonial companies, the general
social and economic stimulus provided by the opening up of the "New World") was to a greater or lesser extent crucial in
enabling and then consolidating the takeoff of what had previously been an economic backwater. It was far from the
case that Europe was specially destined to assume economic hegemony; there were a number of centers in Asia and
Africa of a comparable level of development which could potentially have evolved in the same way. But the
European ascent closed off this development path for others because it forcibly inserted them into a colonial network

120

whose exploitative relations and extractive mechanisms prevented autonomous growth. / Overall, then, colonialism
"lies at the heart" of the rise of Europe.50 The economic unit of analysis needs to be Europe as a whole, since it is not always the case that the
colonizing nations directly involved always benefited in the long term. Imperial Spain, for example, still feudal in character, suffered massive inflation from its bullion
imports. But through trade and financial exchange, others launched on the capitalist path, such as Holland, profited. Internal national rivalries continued, of course, but
this common identity based on the transcontinental exploitation of the non-European world would in many cases be politically crucial, generating a sense of Europe as
a cosmopolitan entity engaged in a common enterprise, underwritten by race. As Victor Kiernan puts it, "All countries within the European orbit benefited however, as
Adam Smith pointed out, from colonial contributions to a common stock of wealth, bitterly as they might wrangle over ownership of one territory or another... [T]here
was a sense in which all Europeans shared in a heightened sense of power engendered by the successes of any of them, as well as in the pool of material wealth... that
the colonies produced."51 / Today, correspondingly, though formal decolonization has taken place and in Africa and Asia black, brown, and yellow natives are in
office, ruling independent nations, the global economy is essentially dominated by the former colonial powers, their offshoots (Euro-United States, Euro-Canada), and
their international financial institutions, lending agencies, and corporations. (As previously observed, the notable exception, whose history confirms rather than
challenges the rule, is Japan, which escaped colonization and, after the Meiji Restoration, successfully embarked on its own industrialization.) Thus

one could
say that the world is essentially dominated by white capital. Global figures on income and property ownership are, of course, broken
down nationally rather than racially, but if

a transnational racial disaggregation were to be done, it would reveal that whites

control a percentage of the world's wealth grossly disproportionate to their numbers. Since there is no reason to think
that the chasm between First and Third Worlds (which largely coincides with this racial division) is going to be
bridgedvide the abject failure of various United Nations plans from the "development decade" of the 1960s onward it seems undeniable that for
years to come, the planet will be white dominated. With the collapse of communism and the defeat of Third World
attempts to seek alternative paths, the West reigns supreme, as celebrated in a London Financial Times headline: "The fall of the Soviet bloc
has left the IMF and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age."52 Economic structures have been set in place, causal processes
established, whose outcome is to pump wealth from one side of the globe to another, and which will continue to
work largely independently of the ill will/good will, racist/antiracist feelings of particular individuals. This globally
color-coded distribution of wealth and poverty has been produced by the Racial Contract and in turn reinforces
adherence to it in its signatories and beneficiaries. / Moreover, it is not merely that Europe and the former white settler
states are globally dominant but that within them, where there is a significant nonwhite presence (indigenous peoples,
descendants of imported slaves, voluntary nonwhite immigration), whites continue to be privileged vis-a-vis non-whites. The old structures of
formal, de jure exclusion have largely been dismantled, the old explicitly biologistic ideologies largely abandoned53the Racial Contract, as will be discussed later,
is continually being rewrittenbut opportunities

for nonwhites, though they have expanded, remain below those for whites.
The claim is not, of course, that all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but that, as a statistical generalization, the
objective life chances of whites are significantly better. / As an example, consider the United States. A series of books has recently documented
the decline of the integrationist hopes raised by the 1960s and the growing intransigence and hostility of whites who think they have "done enough,"
despite the fact that the country continues to be massively segregated, median black family incomes have begun
falling by comparison to white family incomes after some earlier closing of the gap, the so-called "black underclass" has basically
been written off, and reparations for slavery and post-Emancipation discrimination have never been paid, or, indeed,
even seriously considered.54 Recent work on racial inequality by Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro suggests that wealth is more important
than income in determining the likelihood of future racial equalization, since it has a cumulative effect that is passed
down through intergenerational transfer, affecting life chances and opportunities for one's children. Whereas in 1988 black
households earned sixty two cents for every dollar earned by white households, the comparative differential with regard to wealth is much greater and, arguably,
provides a more realistically negative picture of the prospects for closing the racial gap: "Whites

possess nearly twelve times as much median

net worth as blacks, or $43,800 versus $3,700. In an even starker contrast, perhaps, the average white household controls $6,999 in net financial assets while
the average black household retains no NFA nest egg whatsoever." Moreover, the analytic focus on wealth rather than income exposes how
illusory the much-trumpeted rise of a "black middle class" is: "Middle class blacks, for example, earn seventy cents
for every dollar earned by middle-class whites but they possess only fifteen cents for every dollar of wealth held by
middle-class whites." This huge disparity in white and black wealth is not remotely contingent, accidental,
fortuitous; it is the direct outcome of American state policy and the collusion with it of the white citizenry. In effect,
"materially, whites and blacks constitute two nations,"55 the white nation being constituted by the American Racial
Contract in a relationship of structured racial exploitation with the black (and, of course, historically also the red)
nation. / A collection of papers from panels organized in the 1980s by the National Economic Association, the professional organization of black economists,
provides some insight into the mechanics and the magnitude of such exploitative transfers and denials of opportunity to accumulate material and human capital. It
takes as its title The Wealth of Racesan ironic tribute to Adam Smith's famous book The Wealth of Nationsand analyzes the different varieties of discrimination to
which blacks have been subjected: slavery, employment discrimination, wage discrimination, promotion discrimination, white monopoly power discrimination against
black capital, racial price discrimination in consumer goods, housing, services, insurance, etc.56 Many of these, by their very nature, are difficult to quantify;
moreover, there are costs in anguish and suffering that can never really be compensated. Nonetheless, those that do lend themselves to calculation offer some
remarkable figures. (The figures are unfortunately dated; readers should multiply by a factor that takes fifteen years of inflation into account.) If one were to do a
calculation of the cumulative benefits (through compound interest) from labor market discrimination over the forty-year period from 1929 to 1969 and adjust for
inflation, then in 1983 dollars, the figure would be over $1.6 trillion.57 An estimate for the total of "diverted income" from slavery, 1790 to 1860, compounded and
translated into 1983 dollars, would yield the sum of $2.1 trillion to $4.7 trillion.58 And if

one were to try to work out the cumulative value,

with compound interest, of unpaid slave labor before 1863, underpayment since 1863, and denial of opportunity to
acquire land and natural resources available to white settlers, then the total amount required to compensate blacks
"could take more than the entire wealth of the United States"59 / So this gives an idea of the centrality of racial
exploitation to the U.S. economy and the dimensions of the payoff for its white beneficiaries from one nation's Racial Contract.

121

But this very centrality, these very dimensions render the topic taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice
of most white political theory. If there is such a backlash against affirmative action, what would the response be to the demand for the interest on the
unpaid forty acres and a mule? These issues cannot be raised because they go to the heart of the real nature of the polity and
its structuring by the Racial Contract. White moral theory's debates on justice in the state must therefore inevitably
have a somewhat farcical air, since they ignore the central injustice on which the state rests. (No wonder a hypothetical
contractarianism that evades the actual circumstances of the polity's founding is preferred!) / Both globally and within particular nations, then, white people,
Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favoring
their interests, an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites but sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed
consciously or unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated
further.

122

Cap good 2ac environment

A) Rejecting capitalism causes massive ecological disasters
Butters 07 (Roger B., Ph.D., President Nebraska Council on Economic Education, Assistant Professor of
Economics University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Teaching the Benefits of Capitalism,
http://www.hillsdale.edu/images/userImages/afolsom/Page_6281/Butters.pdf)

Property rights create the incentive needed to conserve scarce resources. Why is the air outside
polluted and the air in your car clean? The answer is property rights. You dont own the air outside your car so you gladly pollute it whereas the
air inside your car, over which you have a property right, is jealously maintained with airconditioning, filters and air fresheners. How

can
we solve the pollution problem? Simple, establish a property right and require that all exhaust fumes be
vented inside the vehicle that creates them. Suddenly the incentive to use better fuels, drive a more efficient vehicle and reduce emissions
would result in booming innovation in pollution abatement; all in response to a property right. Clearly this example pushes into the absurd, but
it illustrate the point nonetheless. For a more practical comparison consider why private bathrooms are clean, and public ones are not. Better
yet, why are Maine Lobsters plentiful and orange roughy arent? Property rights. Why

are cows thriving and tigers

vanishing? Property rights. For cows people have a direct incentive to preserve, protect
and improve. For tigers the only incentive is to use the resource before someone else does. Why are elephants and other
endangered species on the rebound in some African countries? Property rights. By letting villages
own the animals they have an incentive to preserve, protect and improve, and as a result the
animals are thriving. Rather than calling poachers when a rhinoceros decimates your corn field, you care for the animal, make sure
it has several young and then auction the right to shoot it to a wealthy game hunter. The animals are preserved, the population is maintained, the
village receives increased wealth and a private individual has a unique experience. By

defining the property right we

have gone from extinction and poverty to trade and wealth and at the end of the day there are
more, not fewer rhinoceroses. The tragedy of the commons is one of the most valuable and
pervasive examples of what happens when property rights are poorly defined and unenforced. What
is the benefit of capitalism? It provides us with property rights that create the incentives
to preserve, protect and improve. It is not surprising that the greatest ecological disasters have all occurred
in societies without strong social institutions that protect property.
B) Extinction
Kline 98 (Gary, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia Southwestern State University, Journal of Third
World Studies, 15(1), Spring)
Additionally, natural

ecosystems provide certain less obvious services that are crucial to life as we know it.6 The
atmosphere of our planet is the product largely of ecosystem operations. About twenty-one percent of our
atmosphere is made up of oxygen, the result of plant photosynthesis which releases the gas. Approximately seventy-eight percent of the
remaining air we breathe is nitrogen, which is regulated by the nitrogen cycle of plant production. Ecosystems then influence weather and
climate patterns by affecting the circulation of air in this atmosphere. Plants, and especially forests, are

instrumental in

retaining and conserving our soil and water. Destruction of forest areas results in soil erosion (deleterious to agriculture
and plant life in general), floods, and droughts. The rapid decertification of large tracts of land in places like north Africa are a direct
consequence of loss of such ecosystems. Each year an area equivalent in size to Belgium falls victim to decertification. Plant and animal life,
much of it not visible to the naked eye, helps create and maintain soil by breaking down rocks into finer and finer pieces and by adding organic
material to it, enriching it for agriculture. Except for some of the most troublesome products of Humankind, like DDT and plastics, these same
plants and animals work to dispose of wastes. Decomposed wastes are then recycled as nutrients into the food chain for the sustenance of new
life. Natural ecosystems also produce mechanisms in plants for the resistance of pests and diseases and for the pollination of flowering plants,
essential to their reproduction, including many of our food crops. It should be apparent that biodiversity and life are synonymous. The
organisms in an ecosystem are part of a "trophic pyramid," as labelled by scientists. That is, a large mass of plants supports a smaller number of
herbivores; these support a smaller number of primary carnivores and an even smaller number of second order carnivores. Due to their more
rapid rates of reproduction, the lower order life forms are generally better able to adapt to changes in their environment than the higher forms.
The latter are also disadvantaged by bioconcentration of harmful substances which make their way into the food chain. Every organism has
some niche and work to perform in the pyramid. Homo sapiens occupy a position at the top and are therefore vulnerable to instability at the
base. Human activity which threatens the pyramid is akin to playing Russian roulette. Of this,
Humankind is now more aware. As Garrison Wilkes of the University of Massachusetts put it, "We have been building our roof with stones
from the foundation."7 This problem is now manifesting itself especially in an area of human endeavor which is essential to our existence:
agriculture.

123

124

Cap good 2ac poverty

Cap solving povertywe control uniqueness
Johan Norberg 3 is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, In Defense of Global Capitalism p. 25

Between 1965 and 1998, the average world citizens income practically doubled, from $2,497 to $4,839,
adjusted for purchasing power and inflation. That increase has not come about through the industrialized nations multiplying their incomes.
During this period the richest

fifth of the worlds population increased their average income from

percent. For the poorest fifth of the worlds population, the increase has been faster still,
with average income more than doubling during the same period from $551 to $1,137.5 World consumption today is more than twice what
$8,315 to $14,623, or by roughly 75

it was in 1960. Thanks to material developments in the past half century, the world has over three billion more people living above the poverty
line. This is historically unique. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has observed that, all in all, world poverty has
fallen more during the past 50 years than during the preceding 500. In its Human Development Report
1997, the UNDP writes that humanity is in the midst of the second great ascent. The first began in the 19th century, with the industrialization
of the United States and Europe and the rapid spread of prosperity. The second began during the post-war era and is now in full swing, with
first Asia and then the other developing countries scoring ever-greater victories in the war against poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy. The
great success in reducing poverty in the 20th century shows that eradicating severe poverty in the first decades of
the 21st century is feasible.6 Poverty is still rapidly diminishing. Absolute poverty is usually defined as the condition of
having an income less than one dollar a day. In 1820 something like 85 percent of the worlds population were living on the equivalent of less
than a dollar a day. By 1950 that figure had fallen to about 50 percent and by 1980 to 31 percent. According to World Bank figures, absolute
poverty has fallen since 1980 from 31 to 20 percent (a figure of 24 percent is often mentioned, meaning 24 percent of the population of the
developing countries). The radical

reduction of the past 20 years is unique in that not only the

proportion but also the total number of people living in absolute poverty has declined
for the first time in world history. During these two decades the worlds population has grown by a billion and a half, and
yet the number of absolute poor has fallen by about 200 million. That decrease is connected with economic growth. In places where prosperity
has grown fastest, poverty has been most effectively combated. In East Asia (China excluded), absolute poverty has fallen from 15 to just over
9 percent, in China from 32 to 17 percent. Six Asians in 10 were absolutely poor in 1975. Todays figure, according to the World Bank, is fewer
than 2 out of 10. Even those encouraging findings, however, almost certainly overestimate world poverty significantly because the World Bank
uses notoriously unreliable survey data as the basis for its own assessments. Former World Bank economist Surjit S. Bhalla recently published
his own calculations, supplementing survey results with national accounts data. This method, he argues convincingly, is far more likely to
provide an accurate measurement. Bhalla found that poverty

had fallen precipitously, from a level of 44 percent

in 1980 to 13 percent at the end of 2002. If those figures are correct, then the last 20 years have seen
an extraordinary, unprecedented reduction of povertytwice that achieved in any other 20-year period on
record. The UNs goal of lowering world poverty to below 15 percent by 2015 has already been achieved and surpassed.7

Poverty outweighs nuke war

Abu-Jamal 1998 (Mumia, Peace Activist, A Quiet and Deadly Violence, FLASHPOINTS, September 19, 1998,
available online at http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html, accessed 6/30/07)
This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its
invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very

fifteen years, on the average, as many

people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths;
and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were
killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an
ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every
decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized,
turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if
something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing.. This vicious, circular, and invisible
violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who
suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and
must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor.

125

Cap Good-2ac War

Capitalism empirically deters war
Griswold 5 (Daniel, director of Center for Trade Policy Studies@CATO, December 28,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5344, accessed: 29 June 2011, JT)
As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,

the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in

decline for the past half-century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them
now civil conflicts within countries. As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the world are at war with each other. The death toll
from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to
its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking
missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the
1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the
spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding

trade and globalization appear to be playing a major

role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties
between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons.
First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy , and democracies
don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing
countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes
more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas.
Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national
economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose
should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but
also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy . In short,
globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows
nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory
and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets
that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire
them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.

Alternatives to capitalism make war inevitable

Nyquist
6
(JR.
Financial
Sense,
Anatomy

of

Delusion,

September

8,

http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2006/0908.html, Accessed 7-11-09, PAK)

The free market teaches men to love peace, while the miserable circumstances of socialist
decline teach men the necessity of predatory warfare. According to Mises, the markets love of
peace does not spring from philanthropic considerations but depends on a proper appreciation of economic
self-interest. Those who believe in profit and the free market reject war because war
signifies the destruction of property. Wars are not initiated by corporate greed. Wars are initiated by backward cults who
seek a return to medieval conditions. World revolution is the cry of the militant socialists, the Marxist-Leninists
of the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the KGB clique that presently governs the former Soviet Union. To
understand world events properly we must understand the distinction between socialist and free market economies. Dictatorship

and

war belong to the sphere of socialism and economic controls (or restrictions). Freedom means the freedom to
buy and sell, to build and create. Once you allow a mob of political activists to legislate against the free
market in accordance with moral or environmental pleas your economic decline is foreordained. Instead of a
society guided by environmental angels, you will have a society guided by distorted madmen who (in the words of Mises) do not approach the
study of economic matters with scientific disinterestedness. Most of them are driven by an envious resentment against those whose incomes are
larger than their own. This bias makes it impossible for them to see things as they really are. For them the main thing is not to improve the
conditions of the masses, but to harm the entrepreneurs and capitalists even if this policy victimizes the immense majority of the people.

126

Capitalism promotes democratic peace.

Fukuyama 95 Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corporation 1995 (Francis, TRUST, p. 360-1)
The role that a capitalist economy plays in channeling recognition struggles in a peaceful direction, and its
consequent importance to democratic stability, is evident in post-communist Eastern Europe. The totalitarian project
envisioned the destruction of an independent civil society and the creation of a new socialist community centered
exclusively around the state. When the latter, highly artificial community, there were virtually no alternative forms
of community beyond those of family and ethnic group, or else in the delinquent communities constituted by
criminal gangs. In the absence of a layer of voluntary associations, individuals clung to their ascriptive identities all
the more fiercely. Ethnicity provided an easy form of community by which they could avoid feeling atomized, weak,
and victimized by the larger historical forces swirling around them. In developed capitalist societies with strong civil
societies, by contrast, the economy itself is the locus of a substantial part of social life. When one works for
Motorola, Siemens, Toyota, or even a small family dry-cleaning business, one is part of a moral network that
absorbs a large part of ones energies and ambitions. The Eastern European countries that appear to have the greatest
chances for success as democracies are Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which retained nascent civil
societies throughout the communist period and were able to generate capitalist private sectors in relatively short
order. There is no lack of divisive ethnic conflicts in these places, whether over competing Polish and Lithuanian
claims to Vilnius or Hungarian irredenta vis--vis neighbors. But they have not flared up into violent conflicts yet
because the economy has been sufficiently vigorous to provide an alternative source of social identity and belonging. The
mutual dependence of economy and polity is not limited to democratizing states in the former communist world. In a way, the loss of social capital in the United States has more immediate
consequences for American democracy than for the American economy. Democratic political institutions no less than businesses depend on trust for effective operation, and the reduction of trust
in a society will require a more intrusive, rule-making government to regulate social relations.

127

Cap good 2ac space

Capitalism key to space
Charles Q. Choi 10 11-16 Space.com U.S. and Russia in race for private space stations
http://sys09.msnbc.msn.com/id/40225091/ns/technology_and_science-space/40538455
A new space race is beginning, but this time between private companies, not nations.
Businesses in the United States and Russia are vying to be the first to launch a private space station.

One project, an inflatable space habitat, already has six clients waiting for it, according to the company, Bigelow
Aerospace of Las Vegas. "We're

just beginning to see the tip of the iceberg with commercial

opportunities and pent-up demand," Mike Gold, Bigelow Aerospace's director of Washington, D.C. operations and business
growth, told SPACE.com. The other venture, led by two companies in Russia, is called the Commercial Space Station and aims to be
a combination laboratory and hotel. Both the CSS and the Bigelow station are looking to launch in the next five years or so. [Poll: Who Will
Win the Private Space Station Race?] The Russian project has received support from the official Russian space program. "We consider the
Commercial Space Station a very interesting project, encouraging private participation," said Vitaly Davydov, deputy head of Russia's Federal
Space Agency. "It will attract private investment for the Russian space industry." To date, space stations have been a
national or international affair. Russia achieved early success with its Salyut and Mir stations, and NASA brought the United States into the
game first with Skylab in 1973. The U.S. and Russia have since teamed up with 13 other countries to build the $100 billion International Space
Station, which celebrated a decade of continuous manned operations this month. But private space stations like those promised by
Bigelow Aerospace and the Moscow-based Orbital Technologies, which is backing the Commercial Space Station, hold the promise

of catering to a wider clientele a customer base

that includes scientists and governments,

as well as materials manufactures and thrill-seeking space tourists. An expandable station The
inflatable design developed by Bigelow Aerospace is based on discontinued research by NASA under the Transhab project on modules made
with Kevlar-like composites that expand in space. These offer far more room than comparable modules on the International Space Station,
while providing as much or more protection against radiation and impacts from debris, Bigelow officials said. "When traditional metallic
structures in space are struck by solar flares, they get a secondary radiation effect called scattering that can be deadly," Gold explained. "Our
structures are nonmetallic, substantially reducing that problem and offering enhanced protection against radiation." When it comes to impacts
from micrometeoroids and the like, the Bigelow modules' skins can not only absorb and disperse the energy from strikes, but can retain their
shape as well. "Expandable structures hold their integrity longer than physical structures, which can collapse," Gold said. "The additional
volume our structures have buys additional time to fix them as well." The first Bigelow station will consist of four components in low-Earth
orbit. First is the Sundancer module, which has 6,356 cubic feet (180 cubic meters) of usable space and can support a crew of three. Next is a
node-bus combination that adds docking capability, and then a second Sundancer. Last comes a BA330 module, which provides 11,653 cubic
feet (330 cubic meters) of space and can hold up to six crewmembers. "That's a crew capacity of 12, double that of the International Space
Station," Gold said. The BA330 boasts four large windows coated with a film that protects against ultraviolet rays, and contains an environment
control and life-support system, including lavatory and hygiene facilities. The station will be powered by solar arrays and batteries, similar to
the International Space Station. The Bigelow station will be geared toward astronautics and commercial and scientific microgravity research,
Gold said, not tourism. "First and foremost, we are not a space hotel," he stressed in an interview. Bigelow Aerospace already has six customers
lined up, in the form of memoranda of understanding with space agencies and government departments in Australia, the Netherlands, Japan,
Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The cost for customers to use the station remains uncertain, "as that's largely driven by the issue
of transportation there and back," Gold said. "Once we know what transportation vehicle we'll use and where we'll launch from, we'll have a
better idea on costs." Their station could launch by 2015 or so, Gold said, using United Launch Alliance's Atlas 5 rocket or
SpaceX's Falcon 9 rocket. They are partnered with Boeing to produce a crew capsule as part of NASA's Commercial Crew
Development(CCDev) initiative. "Customers and companies that have access to space will be the economic
giants of the future. We hope it happens here, and hope that all of humanity can enjoy its benefits," Gold said. Russian competition
Two Russian companies have also recently announced their intentions to build, launch and operate a private space habitat named the
Commercial Space Station, or CSS. [Illustration: Russia's Commercial Space Station] "The most exciting possibilities include flights from the
station to the moon or Mars," Sergey Kostenko, chief executive officer of Moscow-based Orbital Technologies, told SPACE.com. Orbital
Technologies said the station will have a crew of up to seven and will be serviced by Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft and potentially
other commercially available vehicles. The station would consist of one module about 10 feet (3 meters) in diameter powered by solar arrays,
with a usable volume of about 700 cubic feet (20 cubic meters), Kostenko said. The plan is to launch it in 2015 or 2016. The company added
that it already had several customers under contract from the commercial space industry and the scientific community interested in areas such
as medical research, protein crystallization, and materials processing, as well as from the geographic imaging and remote-sensing industry.
Media projects have also been proposed. "The biggest goal may be tourism," Kostenko said. The Commercial Space Station
could also serve as an emergency refuge for the International Space Station's crew. "If a required maintenance procedure or a real emergency
were to occur, without the return of the ISS crew to Earth, habitants could use the CSS as a safe haven," said Alexey Krasnov, head of manned
spaceflight at Russia's Federal Space Agency.

Space solves extinction

Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, Winter 08. 73 J. Air L. & Com. 37, SPACE SETTLEMENTS, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: COULD A LUNAR SETTLEMENT CLAIM THE LUNAR REAL

128

ESTATE IT NEEDS TO SURVIVE? Wasser is the Chairman of The Space Settlement Institute and a formerCEO of
the National Space Society. He is a former member of the AIAA SpaceColonization Technical Committee. Jobes is
the President of The Space Settlement Institute. Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law Page Lexis.

HUMANITY'S SURVIVAL depends on moving out into the cosmos while the window of
opportunity for doing so still exists. Besides helping to ensure the survival of humankind, the settling of space - including
the establishment of permanent human settlements on the Moon and Mars - will bring incalculable economic and
social benefits to all nations. The settlement of space would benefit all of humanity. It would open a new frontier, provide
resources and room for growth of the human race without despoiling the Earth, energize our
society, and as Dr. Stephen Hawking has pointed out, create a lifeboat for humanity that could survive even
a planet-wide catastrophe. n1 But, as Dr. Lawrence Risley pointed out, "Exploration is not suicidal and it is usually not altruistic,
rather it is a means to obtain wealth. There must be rewards for the risks being taken."

129

Cap good Tech/Innovation 2AC

Cap is key to tech innovations preventing extinction Sustainability on the brink
Atkisson 2k(Alan, President and CEO of an international sustainability consultancy to business and government, Sustainability is Dead Long Live Sustainability)
Globalization has become the signifier for a family of
transformations in communications, finance, trade, travel, ecological and cultural interaction that are drawing the
worlds people and natural systems into ever closer relationship with each other, regardless of national
boundaries.Many of these transformations contribute more to the likelihood of global collapse than to global
sustainability, because they are fueled by destructive technologies, they result in ever greater levels of environmental damage, they undermine national democracies,
and they have so far widened dramatically the gap between rich and poor.Yet there is nothing inherently unsustainable about globalization per se, if we
understand that word to mean the growing integration of global human society.Indeed,globalization of many kinds
from the spread of better technologies to the universal adoption of human rightsis essential to attaining global
sustainability.But the engines of globalization need to be harnessed to a more noble set of goals and aspirations. At the heart of most descriptions of globalization is
the market economy. It has often been fashionable to blame the market for the environmental crisis, and in particular to blame the
markets tendency to concentrate power within the large, independent capital structures we call corporations. But we need corporations, and the market, to accomplish the
change we seek. To develop and spread innovations for sustainability at transformation speed, we need corporatescale concentrations of research, production, and distribution capacity. We need the market's speed, freedom, and
incentive structures.Clearly, we also need governors on the spread of destructive development, and the enormous fleet of old and dangerous innovationsfrom the internal combustion engine to the idea that
cynical nihilism is coolthat are increasing our distance from the dream of sustainability at an accelerating rate. But if we can alter globalization so that it turns the
enormous power of the market and the corporation in a truly sustainable direction, we will watch in awe as our
world changes for the better with unimaginable speed. Envisioning the transformation of globalization will strike many as the ultimate in wishful thinking. Yet transformation
Transformation of many kinds is already happening all around us, mostly in the name of globalization.

begins precisely in wish and thought; and there are currently two powerful wishes adding considerable weight to global efforts to bring down the Berlin Wall between today's damaging capitalism-at-all-costs and tomorrows practice
of a more mindful capitalism conscious of all costs. One wish is the United Nations new Global Compact with the corporate sector. It calls on corporations to adopt greater levels of social and environmental responsibilitya
call that many are pledging to heed. The other wish is the non-governmental Global Reporting Initiative, which sets new criteria for measuring sustainable corporate performance and is fast becoming adopted as the international
standard, by corporations and activists alike. These promising developments, still in their relative infancy, did not appear suddenly out of nowhere. There are but the latest and most successful demonstration of the power of wishful
thinking, indulged in by hundreds of thousands of people, from the Seattle protesters of 1999 to the world government theorists of the 1930s. And these agreements are, themselves, wishful thinking of a kind, comprised as they are
of agreements on principle and criteria for measurements. But if this is what wishful thinking can do, consider what inspired action, multiplied throughout the global system, will accomplish when seriously embraced at the same scale.

When we witness the redirection of investment flows, the

adoption of new rules and ethics governing the production process, the true raising of global standards of
environmental, social, and economic performance, sustainability will then be written directly into the cultural genes ,
also known as memes, steering global development.These new sustainability memes will then be replicated in every walk of industrial life. The dream of sustainability will become business as usual.
Indeed, the transformation of globalization will, in many ways, signal the onset of transformation in general.

130

Cap Inevitable
Capitalism is inevitable-no alternative system
Stromberg 4, Resident Historian at the Von Mises Institute
(Joseph, Why Capitalism is Inevitable, Mises Daily, July 9, http://mises.org/article.aspx?Id=1562, AD: 6-21-9, PAK)
His conclusion must have sounded impossibly nave in 1973 but today we can see that he saw further than any other "futurists" of his time: "the
advent of industrialism and the Industrial Revolution has irreversibly changed the prognosis for freedom and statism. In the pre-industrial era,
statism and despotism could peg along indefinitely, content to keep the peasantry at subsistence levels and to live off their surplus. But
industrialism has broken the old tables; for it

has become evident that socialism cannot run an industrial

system, and it is gradually becoming evident that neomercantilism, interventionism, in the long run cannot run an industrial system either.
Free-market capitalism, the victory of social power and the economic means, is not only the only moral and by far the most
productive system; it has become the only viable system for mankind in the industrial era. Its eventual triumph
is therefore virtually inevitable." Rothbard's optimism about the prospects for liberty is legendary but less well understood is the
basis for it: markets work and government do not. Left and right can define terms however much they want, and they can rant and rave from

what must achieve victory in the end is the

remarkable influence of millions and billions of mutually beneficial exchanges putting
relentless pressure on the designs of central planners to thwart their will. To be optimistic
about the prospects for capitalism requires only that we understand Mises's argument concerning the
inability of socialist means to produce rational outcomes, and to be hopeful about the
triumph of choice over coercion.
the point of view of their own ideological convictions, but

Greed and capitalism are inevitable the concepts of property rights and free trade are
engrained in our psyche
Wilkinson 5 (Will, policy analyst@CATO, CATO Policy Report, XXVII(1), January/February,
http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html, accessed: 29 June 2011, JT)
Perhaps the

most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the
deep-seated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and
increases in productivitythe idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth. There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher
status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food
spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the
individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through
invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if
anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains,
acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally
adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass
power. Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are
thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system. These features of human naturethat we are coalitional, hierarchical, and
envious zero-sum thinkerswould seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the

benefits of a
liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social
organization in the EEA. Property Rights are Natural The problem of distributing scarce resources can be handled in
part by implicitly coercive allocative hierarchies. An alternative solution to the problem of distribution is the recognition and enforcement of
property rights. Property

rights are prefigured in nature by the way animals mark out

territories for their exclusive use in foraging, hunting, and mating. Recognition of such rudimentary claims to control and exclude
minimizes costly conflict, which by itself provides a strong evolutionary reason to look for innate tendencies to recognize and respect norms of
property. New scientific research provides even stronger evidence for the existence of such property "instincts." For example, recent
experimental work by Oliver Goodenough, a legal theorist, and Christine Prehn, a neuroscientist, suggests that the

human mind
evolved specialized modules for making judgments about moral transgressions, and
transgressions against property in particular. Evolutionary psychology can help us to understand that property
rights are not created simply by strokes of the legislator's pen. Mutually Beneficial
Exchange is Natural Trade and mutually beneficial exchange are human universals, as is the division of labor. In their
groundbreaking paper, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," Cosmides and Tooby point out that, contrary to widespread belief,

131

hunter-gatherer life is not "a kind of retro-utopia" of "indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation

and sharing." The archeological and ethnographic evidence shows that hunter-gatherers were involved in
numerous forms of trade and exchange. Some forms of hunter-gatherer trading can involve quite complex specialization
and the interaction of supply and demand. Most impressive, Cosmides and Tooby have shown through a series of experiments that human
beings are able easily to solve complex logical puzzles involving reciprocity, the
accounting of costs and benefits, and the detection of people who have cheated on agreements. However, we are
unable to solve formally identical puzzles that do not deal with questions of social
exchange. That, they argue, points to the existence of "functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social
exchange."

132

Cap good 2ac transition wars

Rejection of capitalism causes massive transition wars
Harris 03 (Lee, Analyst Hoover Institution and Author of The Suicide of Reason, The Intellectual Origins of
America-Bashing, Policy Review, January, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyre view/3458371.html)
This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it
also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it?
Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as
Marx insisted, the

capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the

state apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society
has ever willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in
order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this
means, in point of fact, a full-fledged civil war not just within one society, but across the globe. Without
this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all
socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

Extinction
Kothari 82 (Rajni, Professor of Political Science University of Delhi, Toward a Just Social Order, p. 571)

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing
turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further
tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression producing in their wake an intensification of the old
arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting
the stage for eventual global holocaust.
Turns their impact the transition magnifies every flaw of capitalism
Gurbud 97 (Mark Avrum, Graduate Research Assistant Center for Superconductivity Research at the University
of Maryland, Nanotechnology and International Security,
http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/)
With molecular manufacturing, international trade in both raw materials and finished goods can be replaced by decentralized production for
local consumption, using locally available materials. The decline of international trade will undermine a powerful source of common interest.
Further, artificial intelligence will displace skilled as well as unskilled labor. A world system based on wage labor, transnational capitalism and
global markets will necessarily give way. We imagine that a golden age is possible, but we dont know how to organize one. As

global
capitalism retreats, it will leave behind a world dominated by politics, and possibly feudal
concentrations of wealth and power. Economic insecurity, and fears for the material and moral future of
humankind may lead to the rise of demagogic and intemperate national leaders. With almost two hundred
sovereign nations, each struggling to create a new economic and social order, perhaps the most predictable outcome is
chaos: shifting alignments, displaced populations, power struggles, ethnic conflicts
inflamed by demagogues, class conflicts, land disputes, etc. Small and underdeveloped nations will be
more than ever dependent on the major powers for access to technology, and more than
ever vulnerable to sophisticated forms of control or subversion, or to outright domination. Competition
among the leading technological powers for the political loyalty of clients might imply reversion to some form of nationalistic imperialism .

133