Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Affirmative - 2015
The purpose of this file is to help you address the Negs Case hit versus the
various advantages from the Freedom Act 1AC.
Note to students
The next page presents a glossary. Glossaries are often important for topic
familiarization but especially so for this years topic. Heres why:
There are many different ways that the Aff could argue that the current Freedom Act
fails. In fact, there are arguably too many.
In some instances, the author of an article will rattle off four or five different reasons
that they feel the current Freedom Act will not work. Then, in another article, a
different author may rattle off a different laundry list of five items where three items
overlap with evidence youve already read but two items do not.
For debaters, this presents three concerns:
Third confusion.
Honestly, there are so many laws and investigative tools about privacy that this can
all turn into acronym soup. It might be enough for a familiarized Affirmative to
digest but it could be puzzling to an unfamiliar judge or to a new novice on the
team.
Glossary
If the F6 block header has one or more of the following acronyms, here is what it
referencing:
The USA FREEDOM ACT A recently passed bill that stands for "Uniting and
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnetcollection and Online Monitoring Act. The Act implemented many reforms but
most prominently it (arguably) ended the ability of federal intelligence agencies to
store certain phone data (phone metadata see below). Instead, it required
phone companies, not government agencies, to hold on to that data. Federal
intelligence agencies can search the phone company records if they granted a
warrant authorizing their request. The Affirmative in this packet will argue that
current Freedom Act is insufficient and that the original draft of the Freedom Act
provided better safeguards.
The PATRIOT ACT Its official title is the USA PATRIOT Act an acronym that
stands for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001". The Patriot Act is an act
of Congress that was signed into law by President George W. Bush in October of
2001. It is widely viewed as a reaction to the events of September 11 th, 2001. The
Patriot Act does many, many things but, on this topic, it is perhaps most relevant
because it increased the authority of intelligence agencies to engage in
surveillance.
EO 12333 This stands for Executive Order 12333. It was signed by President
Ronald Reagan and established broad new surveillance authorities for the
intelligence community, outside the scope of public law. It was amended three times
by President George W. Bush. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because EO 12333 creates a loophole permitting excessive surveillance.
FAA or FAA-Section 702 FAA stands for the FISA Amendments Act of
2008. This an acronym within an acronym. So, a little backstory:
o
o
o
The F.I.S.A. law itself passed in 1978 but it has often been amended
since then.
One reason that the FAA of 2008 comes up is Section 702 of the FAA.
Section 702 authorizes PRISM (explained below). Section 702 is
designed to gather intelligence on foreign citizens, but is often accused
of gathering intelligence on US citizens. Many argue that because
Section 702 is understood to permit gathering information about a
foreign person, it can be used to gather information regarding US
persons.
Language argues that the Status Quo fails because the language or definitions of
current laws are not strict enough. Here, the Affirmative would usually argue that
when language has wiggle room federal agencies will seek to gain as much
intelligence a possible often at the expense of privacy. The most common example
of insufficient language is SST which is explained below.
Minimization argues that the Status Quo fails because so-called superminimization procedures are not in place. Super-minimization requires intelligence
agencies to delete all information gathered on persons that are subsequently
determined to have not been relevant to the federal investigation at hand. Absent
these super-minimization protections, intelligence agencies could arguably retain
that information and use it in different investigations.
Multiple Authorities - argues that the Status Quo fails because of several different
programs that authorize surveillance. These cards are probably best run in
conjunction with an Affirmative plan that seeks to ban or eliminate many
surveillance programs.
NSLs - National Security Letters. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because the FBI currently has the authority to issue NSLs. These letters are served
on communications service providers (like phone or internet companies) by the FBI
to compel provision of communication or Internet activity. An NSL cannot demand
the content of a call, but can compel provision of metadata. Recipients of NSLs may
be subject to a gag order that forbids them from revealing the letters' existence to
the public. No approval from a judge is required for the FBI to issue an NSL, but the
recipient of the NSL can still challenge the nondisclosure requirement in federal
court.
Pen Register or Trap and Trace device - A device that decodes or records
electronic information like outgoing numbers from a telephone. A pen register
technically was a device that recorded data from telegraph machines. But the term
has survived and applies to modern communication. These cards will argue that the
Status Quo fails because the law provides insufficient protection against bulk
collection of data obtained from Pen Register or Trap and Trace devices.
Signal Args these cards speak to the image or perception of the law as seen by
the US public or foreign countries.
SST - Specific Selector Terms. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because the law allows searches to be conducted with broad selector terms like
a zip code, an area code, or the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts
thousands of web sites. These broad searches stumble onto much more data. Some
privacy advocates want to demand an SST which would require searches that are
much more narrow (i.e. an individuals name).
Congress should
leverage the opportunity presented by the scheduled sunset to enact a broad reform package. But
The more compelling argument against allowing Section 215 to sunset comes from those who believe that
while
the proposed bill the USA Freedom Act includes worthwhile elements, it doesnt
It would
allow the government to continue storing innocent peoples records in vast
intelligence databases. It would require the government to be more transparent about its use of some surveillance
authorities, but it would allow the FBI to keep secret some of the information the public needs most. And while it would
(The American Civil Liberties Union neither supports nor opposes it.)
end the bulk collection of call records under Section 215, it would leave the
championing the billSens. Patrick Leahy and Ron Wyden and Reps. John Conyers and Jim
had to
make deep concessions to the intelligence community in order to win its support. We cant help but worry that the
who are
Sensenbrenner, in particular, deserve credit for their tireless work in the service of surveillance reformbut they have
vague language in the bills key provisions will provide a new lease on life to
surveillance programs that havent yet beenand may never bedisclosed to the public. We cant afford to
squander the opportunity that the scheduled sunset of Section 215 affords. Thanks to Snowden, Americans now
know that the governments surveillance activities are far more extensive than is defensible in a free society. The current debate in
Congress reflects a growing bipartisan consensus that reform is urgently needed. Unless Congress can
coalesce around
much broader reforms than are on the table right now , the best way to
begin the reform effort is by letting Section 215 expire. Letting the provision die wouldnt itself accomplish all of the changes that
are necessarynot even close. But it would be a first step toward the kind of
systemic reform
would send an important and overdue message that the era of unchecked
government surveillancethe era of the Patriot Actis at long last coming to an end.
Act. The
National Security Agency ( NSA ) has been for years secretly collecting mass amounts of domestic
metadata from virtually all Americans as part of its goal of sniffing out terrorists. It has been doing so under the aegis of Section
215 of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the NSA and FBI to collect all sorts of data and records that are relevant to an ongoing
investigation. But the NSA and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court that oversaw approval of records collection requests took a very, very
wide view of what was "relevant," and that included, among other things, the phone records of every single American. There was an awareness among
privacy experts that this was happening, but because the entire process was classified, the ability for anybody, even members of Congress, to do much
about it was limited. Then Edward Snowden came around and released information showing how remarkably expansive the NSA surveillance actually was.
This all came as a surprise to Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), who introduced the PATRIOT Act in 2001. He said it was never his intent to authorize
modest compared to the amount of surveillance authority the NSA had claimed for
itself. It will end the bulk collection of phone metadata collection under Section 215, but
that's not the only avenue by which the federal government
claims authority to collect huge amounts of private
information. Furthermore, right now we're seeing the third attempt to get the act passed, and the strength of the reforms
fairly
has been watered down along the way. Indeed, some of the reforms called for in the act (storing the telecommunications data with the
companies rather than the government and requiring the government to request it) came from former NSA Director Keith Alexander. The support of the
Obama Administration has itself given some pause, due to its role in fighting lawsuits against the program and the blatant deception of current Director of
arguments that advance the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties," making the FISA court a slightly more adversarial place rather than the
apparent rubber stamp factory it had been. It will also mandate a declassification review process for FISA court decisions. But
hard to try to gauge the impact of the bill as written, and that's coloring
Making the situation more complicated is a federal court ruling that is actually friendly to
privacy reformers. On May 7, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Section 215 never actually authorized the NSA to engage in mass phone
metadata collection in the first place. The court ruled that the NSA had stretched the definition of "relevance" and "investigation" too far by scooping up
pretty much everything and storing it just in case it might be useful later. But the court also did not demand any immediate changes, partly because it
knew Congress was already working on legislation to deal with the pending sunsetting of Section 215, which expires June 1. This ruling prompted some
rethinking of the USA Freedom Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). The group had previously endorsed each iteration of the act, increasingly
reluctantly as it was watered down with each session. In response to the court ruling, though, EFF withdrew its support and went neutral, calling for
legislators to now strengthen the act. Mark Jaycox, a legislative analyst for EFF who has been writing about the USA Freedom Act, still has positive things
to say about it, but doesn't want Congress to settle for less than it has to. It's the first reform of NSA surveillance since the 1970s. There should be more to
The USA Freedom Act should be stronger," Jaycox says. "Congress should be
pushing for more control for themselves and more for the public." EFF would like Congress to return to the first
iteration of the act that called for a stronger adversarial position within the FISA court, not just an adviser. They
it. "
without any court authorization at all. Given that the court ruling determined that the NSA had been operating outside of the law's intent, should we be
term" is? The same people who determined that every single phone record of every American was "relevant" to investigating potential terrorist attacks on
hesitancy comes from." It's the FISA court that was supposed to stand in the way of the NSA abusing the language, but that clearly didn't happen.
Congress can legislate words to be as narrow as they like, Jaycox notes, "But at the end of the day it's going to be a judge that's reviewing these orders."
And thus, there's the push for more transparency and declassification of FISA court decisions, in the hopes of making it more clear how the judges
themselves are interpreting the law. The modest reforms weren't enough for some privacy-minded House members like Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.), Rep.
Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), and Rep. Jared Polis (D-Colo.). They all voted no. Amash later explained on Facebook that he feared passing the USA Freedom Act in
the wake of the court ruling would have the impact of authorizing bulk data collection rather than restricting it: "H.R. 2048 falls woefully short of reining in
the mass collection of Americans' data, and it takes us a step in the wrong direction by specifically authorizing such collection in violation of the Fourth
Section 215's relevance standard to end bulk collection , while still allowing
the government the flexibility it needs to pursue genuine threats against the United
States." And this morning Amash posted a letter signed by him and 58 others in the House who voted no, explaining that their opposition to the
USA Freedom Act was tha the surveillance reforms did not go far enough.
but the US security establishment. This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and
around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch. Until Congress passes
metadata. The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance programs revealed by the former National
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However,
as a first step,
the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on
members of Congress, and two independent review panels had all made public statements to the effect that bulk
collection of phone records was not essential to fighting terrorism and should be halted. However, House leadership
weakened the bill even further, partly at the request of the Obama administration in last minute, closed-door
negotiations.
The following are key problems with the bill: Ambiguous definitions
earlier version of the USA Freedom Act, the government would have
any
demand for
phone
selection term that uniquely describe[s] a person , entity, or account. Under the
House version, this definition was broadened to mean a discrete term , such as a term
specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the government to limit the scope of
safeguard the right to privacy of people outside the US. Surveillance practices under Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act potentially invade the privacy of millions of people outside the US. The
bill only superficially addresses Section 702 surveillance since proposed changes increase privacy protections for
only people in the US, and not people located abroad. For example, nothing in the bill would prevent the
government from intercepting all internet traffic flowing into the US over transatlantic cables, as long as information
on people in the US is minimized. Indirectly recognizes collection of communications about a surveillance target:
More problematically, the bill recognizes authority for the NSA to broadly collect
communications about a target,
practice. The Senate should restore the safeguards that the House
rejected when it takes up its own version of the USA Freedom Act, and go further to protect the
rights of the worlds Internet users, Human Rights Watch said. Instead of just acknowledging the practice,
up to the Senate to pursue much deeper, more genuine reform to end mass
surveillance .
But while
the act created much-needed transparency, it barely scratched the surface of the NSA's
F ISA A mendments A ct. The latter involves Upstream collection, the indiscriminate data
sweeps of undersea telecommunications cables that inevitably catch American data
in their nets. The NSA is instructed to remove or minimize this data, but it can nevertheless be kept and handed to law
enforcement agencies to prosecute crimes under a wide variety of circumstances all without a warrant. The agency can
also still perform backdoor searches to get data about American citizens by
exploiting a loophole in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, something civil liberties
advocates have been warning about for years. So, perhaps it was not that surprising that civil liberties groups like the ACLU and the
celebrating
privacy
community. And they might be right with so many overlapping and redundant surveillance authorities,
be foolish to think the Freedom Act has ended bulk collection in any significant
capacity.
the
it'd
Now that Congress has passed, and President Obama has signed, the U.S.A. Freedom Act, which
places some limits on the domestic-surveillance powers of the National Security
Agency, theres still unfinished business to deal with. The new legislation , while it is
contains some obvious shortcomings. Barring the N.S.A.
from collecting and holding the phone records of hundreds of millions of Americans was a necessary step,
but it wont make much difference if the result is that the phone companies hold on to
the data and secret courts enable the N.S.A. to access it virtually at will. The
legislation leaves on the books a law from 1986 that allows the government to read any e-mail that is more than six months
commendable as far as it goes,
doesnt change Section 702 of the 2008 F ISA A mendments A ct, which the N.S.A. has
used to justify collecting not just metadata, such as phone records, but the actual contents of
communications, such as e-mails and online chats.
old, and it
FAA distinction
Current Freedom Act is insufficient international surveillance
can still be used as a backdoor to spy on US citizens.
Baker 15
(et al; Peter Baker is an American political writer and newspaper reporter who is the White House
correspondent for The New York Times. He won the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Coverage of
the Presidency for his reporting on Bush, and the Aldo Beckman Memorial Award for his coverage of
Obama. Baker is a regular panelist on PBS's Washington Week and a frequent guest on other television
and radio programs. Why the N.S.A. Isnt Howling Over Restrictions New York Times - MAY 1, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/politics/giving-in-a-little-on-national-security-agency-datacollection.html)
first significant response to the spying revelations by Edward J. Snowden, a former N.S.A. contractor. In addition to new restrictions
on domestic data sweeps, the plan would require more transparency and introduce ostensibly independent voices into secret
But as one recently departed senior intelligence official put it on Friday, This is hardly
major change. The legislation would still leave an expansive surveillance apparatus
capable of tracking vast quantities of data. Some of the most sweeping programs
disclosed by Mr. Snowden, particularly those focused on international communications, would
remain unaffected. The N.S.A. could continue efforts to break private encryption systems, and information
about Americans could still be swept up if originating overseas.
intelligence court proceedings.
The initially promising USA Freedom Act could have ended the previously secret
government practices of
what else
collecting Americans
information
the guise of reform. The initial version of the bill would have reinforced
existing statutory language requiring a showing of relevance to an authorized
investigation before agents can get an order requiring production of business
records, dialing and routing information, and other data, and would have added other limits to ensure
massive collection would stop. It also would have implemented mild reforms to
content surveillance under section 702 of the F ISA A mendments A ct, stopping back door
searches for Americans communications. Last week, a Managers Amendment watered
those provisions down, substituting new language that would allow agents to use a
specific selection term as the basis for production. The bill defined specific selection term
as something that uniquely describe[s] a person, entity, or account. Given the intelligence
communitys success at getting FISA judges to reinterpret obvious languagee.g. relevancein counter-intuitive ways, people
wondered what this new language might mean. Theres deep public mistrust for the intelligence community and for the FISA court,
which conspired to allow bulk collection under spurious legal justifications for years. Worse, theres deep public mistrust for the law
itself, since the intelligence communitys nuanced definitions of normal words have made the public realize that they do not
understand the meaning of words like relevance, collection, bulk, or target.
SST distinction
USA Freedom allows ambiguous selector terms. Stricter
standards from the Original Bill are key.
Peterson 14
Internally quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee. Andrea
Peterson covers technology policy for The Washington Post, with an emphasis on cybersecurity,
consumer privacy, transparency, surveillance and open government, Washington Post, 5/22/14 NSA
reform bill passes House, despite loss of support from privacy advocates http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despiteloss-of-support-from-privacy-advocates/
as the USA Freedom Act, would shift responsibility for retaining telephonic
metadata from the government to telephone companies. Providers like AT&T and Verizon
would be required to maintain the records and let the NSA search them in terrorism
investigations when the agency obtains a judicial order or in certain emergency
The bill, known
situations.
warned
that
by the House
more narrow definition , but some privacy advocates fear the definition in the Freedom
Act passed Thursday could be used to collect broad swaths of
information. "If we leave any ambiguity at all, we have learned
that the intelligence community will drive a truck through that
ambiguity, " she said. Others, including Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.) and Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) also expressed their
concern with the legislation. Holt specifically attacked the bill for using a "weak and inferior standard that does not meet probable
cause" as the benchmark for judicial orders to search phone records.
Stephanie Condon is a political reporter for CBS News House passes watered down NSA reform bill CBS News- May 22, 2014 - http://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-passes-watered-down-nsa-reform-bill/
The House on Thursday passed a watered down version of the USA Freedom Act , even
though some privacy advocates say the amended version of the bill may no longer achieve its stated goal
of curbing the National Security Agency's bulk data collection. The new version of the Freedom
Act, passed by a vote of 303 to 121, does still prohibit the government's direct bulk collection of phone
metadata. Under the legislation, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) will have to approve any government
requests for phone records data from telecommunications firms. Still, even Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., the sponsor of the
Freedom Act, acknowledged on the House floor Thursday, "Perfect is rarely possible in politics, and this bill is no exception." "Let me
be clear, I wish this bill did more," the congressman continued. "To my colleagues who lament changes, I agree with you. To privacy
groups who are upset about lost provisions, I share your disappointment... But this bill still deserves support. Don't let the perfect be
operations of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. "The negotiations for this bill were intense, and we had to make
compromises," he said. The most controversial change to the legislation was the tweaked language defining who or what the NSA is
allowed to monitor. The bill was altered to greatly expand that definition, privacy advocates argue.
An earlier
version of the bill said that the government could compel telecoms to hand over
metadata found with search terms "used to uniquely describe a person ,
entity, or account." The amended bill leaves the list of potential search terms open-ended by
adding the phrase "such as" -- it says NSA searches must be tied to "a discrete
term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device." "Congress has
given the government's history of twisted legal
interpretations, this language can't be relied on to protect our freedoms," the nonpartisan
been clear that it wishes to end bulk collection, but
privacy group the Electronic Frontier Foundation said in a blog post. Other groups such as the ACLU and the Center for Democracy
and Technology warned against
legislation
the watered down language. Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., said on the House floor, "This
Bankston the policy director at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute
identified a number of areas where he says the bill had been weakened, including limiting
But in a blog post, Kevin
transparency reporting provisions for tech companies affected by government data requests and
the selector
term issue decried by Lofgren. In a statement to The Washington Post after the bill's passage, Bankston said
it was "still better than the Intelligence committee's competing bill, or no bill at all," but that privacy advocates would have to work
hard in the Senate to reverse the changes that weakened the bill. Julian
these issues,
says a lot will turn on how the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
a new version of the bill was released after, according to the National Journal, more than a week of
intense backdoor negotiations among House leadership, the White House, and the intelligence community. The latest
version gets rid of the uniquely describe language . Rather specific selection
Yesterday,
account, address, or device, used by the Government to limit the scope of the information or tangible things sought pursuant to the
statute authorizing the provision of such information or tangible things to the Government.
moved the needle from might to probably wont end bulk collection under Section
215 of the Patriot Act, the NSL statutes, and the intelligence pen/trap statute, as USA Freedom was proposed to do. The new
version also codifies a fishy interpretation of law that enables NSA collection of communications
about a target under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. These abouts, as the intelligence
community calls them, entail surveillance when Americans talk with friends overseas about
matters of foreign intelligence interest. Since the definition of foreign intelligence information is quite broad, and includes
information related to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; as well as (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of
the United States, this kind of collection can be quite invasive. Technologically, it also means collection of purely domestic about
communications. This is something that needs to end, not receive Congress blessing.
Language Distinction
Current Freedom Act doesnt solve language is not strict
enough
Timm 15
Trevor Timm is a co-founder and the executive director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. He is a
journalist, activist, and lawyer who writes a twice weekly column for The Guardian on privacy, free
speech, and national security. He has contributed to The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy, Harvard
Law and Policy Review, PBS MediaShift, and Politico. He received his J.D. from New York Law School.
NSA reform is unavoidable. But it can be undermined if we aren't careful The Guardian May 13 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/13/nsa-reform-is-unavoidable-but-it-can-beundermined-if-we-arent-careful
American Civil Liberties Union have both withdrawn support from the Houses version of USA Freedom for this very
reason.)
they are far from the only tools in the counterterror ism arsenal, and though
allows pen register/trap & trace, could be used to collect phone and
even email records. That would not only cover the gap from the expiring NSA program
that collects the phone records of Americans landline calls, but potentially
expand the governments collection. (No wonder the NSA largely views the bill that
would reform the Patriot Act as a major win.)
NSLs Distinction
Current Freedom Act fails authorities will just shift and
increase use of National Security Letters.
Harris 15
Shane Harris is a Senior Intelligence and National Security Correspondent for The Daily Beast. He is the
author of two books: @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex, and The Watchers: The Rise of
Americas Surveillance State, which won the New York Public Librarys Helen Bernstein Book Award for
Excellence in Journalism. Prior to joining The Daily Beast, Shane was a senior writer at Foreign Policy
magazine. He has also written for Washingtonian Magazine, the National Journal and Government
Executive Magazine. Shane is the 2010 winner of the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting
on National Defense. Zombie Patriot Act Will Keep U.S. SpyingEven if the Original Dies - - The Daily
Beast - 05.31.15 - http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/31/zombie-patriot-act-will-keep-u-sspying-even-if-the-original-dies.html
theres another powerful tool that the FBI and intelligence agencies have long had in
their arsenal and still willnational security letters. They make it relatively easy for investigators to
gather up all kinds of communications records. This authority can be used to collect phone, Internet,
and financial records. National security letters were actually around before the
Patriot Act became law in 2001, but the legislation lowered the standard that the
government must meet to obtain them. Theyll still be comparatively easy to get
now that portions of the Patriot Act are off the books.
Then
But the question for surveillance reform advocates is whether the result of that wrangling is worth supporting.
Greene of the Open Technology Institute,
Solvency options
The good bills being proposed are omnibus bills so-called because they change a
variety of different laws. They try to stop the mass collection of innocent Americans'
calling records (using Section 215 of the Patriot Act), phone calls and
emails (using Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)), and try to
introduce much needed transparency reforms to the court overseeing the spying, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA
Court). So far, only S. 1551, the Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Actsponsored by Senators Ron Wyden, Richard
Blumenthal, Mark Udall, and Rand Paulhas been released. The bill is a fantastic start. The other, by Senator Patrick Leahy and Rep.
Jim Sensenbrenner, is still being readied, but were hopeful based on what weve heard so far. In general, EFF believes that
There is a direct way to do this. Congress could unequivocally forbid the government
from the mass collection of phone records. Congress usually does this with the phrase
notwithstanding any other law. This is the path EFF strongly recommends. It looks
something like below and includes FISAs exceptions for wartime and other
emergencies. Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity shall engage
in the mass collection of records1, unless the collection is authorized pursuant to
sections 1802, 1811, 1843 or 1844 of this chapter.
cementing surveillance into law, it could further help to squash debate on the subject.
Perhaps thats why Obama is calling on Congress to pass these NSA reforms quickly. (And by quickly, he really means nearly a
year after Edward Snowden brought these misdeeds to our attention.)
(Note to students: the it referenced in this article is the USA Freedom Act)
Signal solvency
Current US Freedom Act does not solve original version sends
a better signal.
ThoughtWorks 14
ThoughtWorks is a software company and a community of passionate, purpose-led individuals. Our
mission is to better humanity through software and help drive the creation of a socially and
economically just world The organization is founded by Roy Singhmane who, with more than 20
years of technology and executive management experience, is a globally renowned information
technology thought leader. He has authored technology-related columns in various industry
publications, and is a frequent speaker at technology conferences worldwide. ThoughtWorks
Withdraws Support for Weakened USA FREEDOM Act -ThoughtWorks - 15 Sep 2014 http://www.thoughtworks.com/insights/blog/thoughtworks-withdraws-support-weakened-usa-freedomact
step towards reining in mass surveillance. Our support was grounded in recognition that the NSA's capricious spying undermined the
privacy of US and global citizens, their trust in the Internet, the capacity of governments to engage with each other, and was having
serious and adverse effect on our industry. Since the introduction of the original USA FREEDOM Act, the public has continued to learn
more details about NSA surveillance programs. We have seen a court rule that dragnet phone surveillance activities are likely
unconstitutional. We have received 46 sweeping reform recommendations from the Presidents special task force on NSA
surveillance. And we have heard the President himself echo the call for meaningful reforms. Given such momentum for change,
we
hoped that USA FREEDOM would be passed in its original form , or strengthened in
response to new revelations and to incorporate new reform proposals. We hoped new bills focused on surveillance authorities not
meaningful reform.
Some reformers claim that any progress, no matter how small, is worth supporting. We
USA FREEDOM not only fails to enact strong enough reforms , it codifies some
surveillance practices that currently lack statutory basis and it extends the US Patriot Act, the framework enabling
many surveillance and other objectionable activities to be undertaken in the name of US national security.
disagree.
The recent full-throated endorsement of the Senate version of the act by the Department of National Intelligence, formerly one of its
fiercest opponents, clearly indicates what interests this reform will actually serve. Finally, in the current political environment,
should USA FREEDOM pass, we see little chance of further , stronger reforms being
introduced to address the significant problems it does not. More than a year after Edward Snowden's initial
revelations, the US Congress is proving unwilling to govern the massive US surveillance
state, showing how out of step it is with the values and priorities of US citizens and companies, as well
as
The initially promising USA Freedom Act could have ended the previously secret
government practices of
what else
collecting Americans
information
the guise of reform. The initial version of the bill would have reinforced
existing statutory language requiring a showing of relevance to an authorized
investigation before agents can get an order requiring production of business
records, dialing and routing information, and other data, and would have added other limits to ensure massive
collection would stop. It also would have implemented mild reforms to content surveillance under section 702 of the FISA
a Managers
Amendment watered those provisions down, substituting new language that would
allow agents to use a specific selection term as the basis for production. The bill defined
specific selection term as something that uniquely describe[s] a person, entity,
or account. Given the intelligence communitys success at getting FISA judges to reinterpret obvious languagee.g.
Amendments Act, stopping back door searches for Americans communications. Last week,
relevancein counter-intuitive ways, people wondered what this new language might mean. Theres deep public mistrust for the
intelligence community and for the FISA court, which conspired to allow bulk collection under spurious legal justifications for years.
theres deep public mistrust for the law itself , since the intelligence
communitys nuanced definitions of normal words have made the public realize
that they do not understand the meaning of words like relevance, collection, bulk, or target.
Worse,
challenge is not limited to telephony metadata and goes much too far,
eliminating any Fourth Amendment claim for the bulk, routinized collection of
any records (including hospital and doctors records, or all credit card and checking account data)
that was collected, stored or seen by third party providers or billers, even if the statute
lacked any link to international terrorism at all. Congress did not intend and the
Fourth Amendment would in any event not permit such an overbroad claim of authority. Amici have previously warned that the governments authority
to collect information on law-abiding Americans is essentially limitless: the Patriot Acts surveillance authorities are not limited to phone records. . . . [and]
could be used to collect other types of records in bulk as well, including information on credit card purchases, medical records, library records, firearm
sales records, financial information and a range of other sensitive subjects. Press Release, Sens. Ron Wyden & Mark Udall, Wyden, Udall Statement on the
Disclosure of Bulk Email Records Collection Program (July 2, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1bs6wWa (Wyden-Udall Bulk Email Release); see Sen. Ron Wyden,
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery for the Center for American Progress Event on NSA Surveillance (July 23, 2013)
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/wyden-on-nsa-domestic-surveillance (Wyden CAP Speech).11 Amici have not issued these warnings lightly.
As disclosed in July 2013, two of amici were involved in bringing an NSA bulk-collection program focused on internet metadata to an end. See WydenUdall
Bulk Email Release, http://1.usa.gov/1bs6wWa ([W]e spent a significant portion of 2011 pressing intelligence officials to provide evidence of [the
programs] effectiveness. They were unable to do so, and the program was shut down that year.). Recent disclosures have produced even more reasons
to heed amicis words of caution. For example, one document released through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit publicly revealed that the executive
branch has interpreted its authority under section 215 to allow the collection of information about Americans locations. See Letter from [Redacted],
Attorney, Office of General Counsel, NSA, to SSCI at 1 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/1gWqiy0. And
refer to still-undisclosed secret law interpreting crucial statutory terms in FISA related to bulk collection as well
as addressing the compatibility of bulk collection with the Fourth Amendment. See In re Production of
Tangible Things, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6 (FISC has previously examined the issue of relevance for bulk collections. See [Redacted].). Amici have long
warned that Americans would be stunned, angry, and alarmed if they were to see the governments secret interpretation of section 215. 157 Cong.
Rec. S3386, 3389 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statements of Sen. Wyden & Sen. Udall). The disclosures to date about
have been significant, and they
claimed authorities are vast, and the Court should treat with skepticism the argument that the
unique characteristics of call records cabin the governments use of the statute. Moreover, seizing on section 215 to justify the collection of metadata on a
huge volume of phone calls made daily in the United States necessarily leads to results that Congress and the Supreme Court cannot possibly be thought
to have sanctioned. As a close reading demonstrates, the district courts rationale for dismissing plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim rests on a broad
reading of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and its Ninth Circuit progeny. Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-CV-257, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76344 (D. Idaho
June 3, 2014); ER1-8. Even as the district court relied on Smith, it correctly recognized the existence of a looming gulf between Smith and this case.
Smith, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76344, at *7; ER5. The Smith case involved the investigation of a single crime, and the collection of the phone records of a
suspected robber over a two-day time period. The district court quoted the Klayman v. Obama opinion to underscore the danger of expanding Smith so far
have an entirely
different relationship with phones than they did thirty-four
as to encompass telephone records collected in bulk over a much longer period of time:
people
in 2013
years ago . . . . Records that once would have revealed a few scattered tiles of
information about a person now reveal an entire mosaic a vibrant and constantly
updating picture of the persons life . Smith, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76344, at *11; ER7 (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013)). It is hard to imagine that this Court would agree that a congressional
statute requiring bulk submission to the government of hospital and medical records, or of credit
card billing and checking accounts, passed (or was not even subject to) Fourth Amendment review without a tie to
international terrorism, merely on the rationale that private records held by a third party are
categorically beyond Fourth Amendment protection . It would appear, then, that the reasonableness (and hence
the constitutionality) of such orders necessarily rests on the balance between harm to privacy interests and governmental need one informed by the
considerations and failures-of-evidence canvassed above in Point I and not simply on the Smith v. Maryland third-party rationale alone. As Justice
Sotomayor recently wrote concurring in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012), making secrecy (even from telephone providers, internet
providers, and entities such as pharmacies or hospitals) a sine qua non of Fourth Amendment protection is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers;
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. . . . I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. . . . I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment below and remand
for further proceedings.
No
one questions that national security sometimes requires governments to use targeted surveillance after making an evidentiary
the US governments mass surveillance without such limits has largely eradicated
the right to privacy in a modern world that virtually requires electronic
communication. To justify this conduct, the US government has invoked a series of legal assumptions that do not withstand
showing. But
serious scrutiny, even though most have been ratified by a secret and deferential Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that hears
long as it purports not watch the video until it comes up with some compelling reason.
The USA Freedom Act also compels the government to report on the number of times
it uses certain surveillance powers annually. But Congress unfortunately dropped a
requirement from last years version of the act, which would have required the
government to tell us how many Americans it collects information about under each
perhaps the most politically salient fact of all. Its a fair bet
that if the NSA had reported that it was collecting records on several hundred
million Americans, bulk collection would have ended long ago. Transparency and
sunsets are critical because, despite the important victory on Section 215, much of what the NSA
does continues to be unchanged and shrouded in secrecy. The USA Freedom Act says nothing, for example,
authority
about how the NSA should conduct itself overseas. We have learned, again courtesy of Snowden, that the NSA has been voracious in
its surveillance of innocent individuals outside the United States. For example, it has recorded the contents of every single phone
call in certain foreign countries. It has hacked into Internet trunk lines to sweep up billions of messages. It has collected location
data, address books, and texts from untold numbers of innocent foreign citizens. And notwithstanding Snowdens revelations, the
full scope of what the agency is empowered to do and is doing remains secret. Much of this surveillance does not affect Americans
in the same direct way that the Section 215 program did. But foreign nationals have privacy rights, too. Their rights are recognized
in legal treaties that we have signed, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Many foreign citizens are
understandably upset with the NSAs dragnet surveillance, just as wed be upset to learn that the Chinese were recording all of the
contents of our phone calls. Indeed, Silicon Valley companies report that they are feeling the effects, as foreign customers turn away
from American providers for fear that they will be more vulnerable to US surveillance if they use US services. And in an age when
international communication has become commonplace, much of this surveillance does affect Americans, if they happen to be on
one end of a monitored communication. (Or if the government cannot initially ascertain whether a particular electronic
communication involves an American citizen, as is frequently the case with Internet communications.) The age of digital surveillance
has arrived. Congress is only just beginning to catch on, and catch up. Most Americans have been kept in the dark. Many of the
governments surveillance tools may be necessary, and can be deployed in ways that respect privacy while also protecting us from
if we are to preserve
the privacy so essential to a free and democratic society, we must know what the government is
doing, and we must build in regular Congressional reconsideration. Otherwise, we are in danger of
forfeiting our liberties by default.
criminals and terrorists. But if we are going to ensure that the tools are appropriate to the task, and
The government argues that it would be more convenient for law enforcement if the
courts established a bright-line rule that extinguished all privacy in information
shared with others. See Govt Br. 40. The government is surely right about this. The Bill of Rights exists,
however, not to serve governmental efficiency but to safeguard individual liberty. Cf.
443, 481 (1971))). Notably, the government made the same appeal for a bright-line rule in Jones and Maynard, see, e.g., Brief for
the United States at 13, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, but the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit rejected it.
anything that other less intrusive surveillance authorities could not . Bulk
collection is not only a significant threat to the constitutional liberties of Americans,
but a needless one.9
Utilitarianism is bad
Reject utilitarianism. It shatters all ethics and justifies the
worst atrocities.
Holt 95
(Jim Holt is an American philosopher, author and essayist. He has contributed to The New York Times,
The New York Times Magazine, The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The American Scholar,
and Slate. He hosted a weekly radio spot on BBC for ten years and he writes frequently about politics
and philosophy. New York Times, Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic, August 5, p. Lexis)
Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945,
resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the
great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Trumans
decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman
claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians
have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion.
Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up
surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to
surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a fullscale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have
the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. According to utilitarianism, a form of
and boil that baby . There is, however, an older ethical tradition , one rooted in JudeoChristian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Pauls condemnation of those who say, Let us do evil, that good may
Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are
absolutely forbidden. It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved
thereby. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense
come.
permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists
made much of the indivisibility of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nations entire economic and social strength was deployed behind
its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. There are no civilians in Japan, declared an intelligence officer of the
Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary
between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime
killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed,
civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill
innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of
double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into
hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the
rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in
casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. What Hiroshima and Nagasaki
utilitarian thinking
did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of
in the conduct of war. The
conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an
international commission in the 1920s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be
used to end, in Churchills words, the vast indefinite butchery. It
offends
Data mining is one issue in a larger debate about security and privacy. Proponents of data
mining justify it as an essential tool to protect our security. For example, Judge Richard Posner argues that [i]n an era of global
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the government has a compelling need to gather, pool, sift, and search vast quantities of information, much of it personal.9
Moreover, proponents of security measures argue that we must provide the executive branch with the discretion it needs to protect us. We cannot second guess every decision made by
government officials, and excessive meddling into issues of national security by judges and oth-ers lacking expertise will prove detrimental. For example, William Stuntz contends that
effective, active governmentgovernment that innovates, that protects people who need protecting, that acts aggressively when action is neededis dying. Privacy and transparency
are the diseases. We need to find a vaccine, and soon.10 Stuntz concludes that [i]n an age of terrorism, privacy rules are not simply unaffordable. They are perverse.11 We live in an
age of balancing, and
the
prevailing
view
is that most rights and civil liberties are not absolute.12 Thus,
against security. But there are systematic problems with how the balancing occurs that
In this essay, I examine some common difficulties in the way that liberty is balanced
against security in the context of data mining. Countless discussions about the tradeoffs between security and liberty begin by taking a security proposal and then weighing it against
commentators defer to the governments assertions about the effectiveness of the security interest. In the context of data mining, the liberty interest is limited by narrow understandings
of privacy that neglect to account for many privacy problems.
as I will argue, important dimensions of data minings security benefits require more scrutiny, and the
have
ed the
begin with the assumption that it is an essential tool in protecting our security. Terrorists lurk among us, and ferreting them out can be quite difficult. Examining data for patterns will
greatly assist in this endeavor, the argument goes, because certain identifiable characteristics and behaviors are likely to be associated with terrorist activity. Often, little more is said,
and the debate pro-ceeds to examine whether privacy is important enough to refrain from using such an effective terrorism-fighting tool. Many discussions about security and liberty
proceed in this fashion. They commence by assuming that a particular security measure is effective, and the only remaining question is whether the liberty interest is strong enough to
curtail that measure. But given the gravity of the security concerns over terrorism, the liberty interest has all but lost before it is even placed on the scale. Judge Richard Posner argues
that judges should give the executive branch considerable deference when it comes to assessing the security measures it proposes. In his recent book, Not a Suicide Pact: The
Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,13 Posner contends that judicial restraint is wise because when in doubt about the actual or likely consequences of a measure, the
pragmatic, empiricist judge will be inclined to give the other branches of government their head.14 According to Posner, [j]udges arent supposed to know much about national
security.15 Likewise, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule declare in their new book, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts,16 that the executive branch, not Congress or
the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security and liberty.17 Moreover, Posner and Vermeule declare that during emergencies, [c]onstitutional rights should be relaxed
so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat.18 The problem with such deference is that, historically, the executive branch has not always made the wisest national
security decisions. Nonetheless, Posner and Vermeule contend that notwithstanding its mistakes, the executive branch is better than the judicial and legislative branches on institutional
competence grounds.19 Judges are generalists, they observe, and the political insulation that protects them from current politics also deprives them of information, especially
information about novel security threats and necessary responses to those threats.20 Posner and Vermeule argue that during emergencies, the novelty of the threats and of the
necessary responses makes judicial routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even obstructive.21 Judicial routines and legal rules, however, are the cornerstone of due
process and the rule of lawthe central building blocks of a free and democratic society. At many times, Posner, Vermeule, and other strong proponents of security seem to focus almost
exclusively on what would be best for security when the objective should be establishing an optimal balance between security and liberty. Although such a balance may not promote
security with maximum efficiency, it is one of the costs of living in a constitutional democracy as opposed to an authoritarian political regime. The executive branch may be the
appropriate branch for developing security measures, but this does not mean that it is the most adept branch at establishing a balance between security and liberty. In our constitutional
democracy, all branches have a role to play in making policy. Courts protect constitutional rights not as absolute restrictions on executive and legislative policymaking but as important
interests to be balanced against government interests. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff notes, balancing now dominates major areas of constitutional law.22 Balancing occurs through various
forms of judicial scrutiny, requiring courts to analyze the weight of the governments interest, a particular measures effectiveness in protecting that interest, and the extent to which the
government interest can be achieved without unduly infringing upon constitutional rights.23 For balancing to be meaningful, courts must scrutinize both the security and liberty
interests. With deference, however, courts fail to give adequate scrutiny to security interests. For example, after the subway bombings in London, the New York Police Department began
a program of random searches of peoples baggage on the subway. The searches were conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. In MacWade v
Kelly,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the program against a Fourth Amendment challenge. Under the special needs doctrine, when exceptional
circumstances make the warrant and probable cause requirements unnecessary, the search is analyzed in terms of whether it is reasonable.25 Reasonableness is determined by
balancing the government interest in security against the interests in privacy and civil liberties.26 The weight of the security interest should turn on the extent to which the program
effectively improves subway safety. The goals of the program may be quite laudable, but nobody questions the importance of subway safety. The critical issue is whether the search
program is a sufficiently effective way of achieving those goals that it is worth the tradeoff in civil liberties. On this question, unfortunately, the court deferred to the law enforcement
officials, stating that the issue is best left to those with a unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 27 In
determining whether the program was a reasonably effective means of addressing the government interest in deterring and detecting a terrorist attack on the subway system,28 the
court refused to examine the data to assess the programs effectiveness.29 The way the court analyzed the governments side of the balance would justify nearly any search, no matter
how ineffective. Although courts should not take a know-it-all attitude, they should not defer on such a critical question as a security measures effectiveness. The problem with many
security measures is that they are not wise expenditures of resources. A small number of random searches in a subway system of over four million riders a day seems more symbolic
than effective because the odds of the police finding the terrorist with a bomb are very low. The government also argued that the program would deter terrorists from bringing bombs on
subway trains, but nearly any kind of security measure can arguably produce some degree of deterrence. The key issue, which the court did not analyze, is whether the program would
lead to deterrence significant enough to outweigh the curtailment of civil liberties. If courts fail to question the efficacy of security measures, then the security interest will prevail nearly
all the time. Preventing terrorism has an immensely heavy weight, and any given security measure will provide a marginal advancement toward that goal. In the defer-ence equation, the
math then becomes easy. At this point, it is futile to even bother to look at the civil liberties side of the balance. The government side has already won. Proponents of deference argue
that if courts did not defer, then they would be substituting their judgment for that of executive officials, who have greater expertise in understanding security issues. Special expertise in
national security, however, is often not necessary for balancing security and liberty. Judges and legislators should require the experts to persuasively justify the security measures being
developed or used. Of course, in very complex areas of knowledge, such as advanced physics, nonexperts may find it difficult to understand the concepts and comprehend the
terminology. But it is not clear that security expertise involves such sophisticated knowledge that it would be incomprehensible to nonexperts. Moreover, the deference argument
conflates evaluating a particular security measure with creating such a measure. The point of judicial review is to subject the judgment of government officials to critical scrutiny rather
than blindly accept their authority. Critical inquiry into factual matters is not the imposition of the judges own judgment for that of the decisionmaker under review.30 Instead, it is
forcing government officials to explain and justify their policies. Few will quarrel with the principle that courts should not second guess the decisions of policy experts. But there is a
difference between not second guessing and failing to critically evaluate the factual and empirical evidence justifying the government programs. Nobody will contest the fact that
security is a compelling interest. The key issue in the balancing is the extent to which the security measure furthers the interest in security. As I have argued elsewhere, whenever courts
defer to the government on the effectiveness of a government security measure, they are actually deferring to the government on the ultimate question as to whether the measure
passes constitutional muster.31 Deference by the courts or legislature is an abdication of their function. Our constitutional system of government was created with three branches, a
design structured to establish checks and balances against abuses of power. Institutional competence arguments are often made as if they are ineluctable truths about the nature of
each governmental branch. But the branches have all evolved considerably throughout history. To the extent a branch lacks resources to carry out its function, the answer should not be
to diminish the power of that branch but to provide it with the necessary tools so it can more effectively carry out its function. Far too often, unfortunately, discussions of institutional
competence devolve into broad generalizations about each branch and unsubstantiated assertions about the inherent superiority of certain branches for making particular
determinations. It is true, as Posner and Vermeule observe, that historically courts have been deferential to the executive during emergencies.32 Proponents of security measures often
advance what I will refer to as the pendulum theorythat in times of crisis, the balance shifts more toward security and in times of peace, the balance shifts back toward liberty. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.33 Judge Posner contends that the
liberties curtailed during times of crisis are often restored during times of peace.34 Deference is inevitable, and we should accept it without being overly concerned, for the pendulum
will surely swing back. As I argue elsewhere, however, there have been many instances throughout US history of needless curtailments of liberty in the name of security, such as the
Palmer Raids, the Japanese Internment, and the McCarthy communist hearings.35 Too often, such curtailments did not stem from any real security need but because of the personal
agendas and prejudices of government officials.36 We should not simply accept these mistakes as inevitable; we should seek to prevent them from occurring. Hoping that the pendulum
will swing back offers little consolation to those whose liberties were infringed or chilled. The protection of liberty is most important in times of crisis, when it is under the greatest threat.
During times of peace, when our judgment is not clouded by fear, we are less likely to make unnecessary sacrifices of liberty. The threat to liberty is lower in peacetime, and the need to
protect it is not as dire. The greatest need for safeguarding liberty is during times when we least want to protect it. In order to balance security and liberty, we must assess the security
It is often merely
assumed without question that the secu-rity threat from terrorism is one of the gravest dangers
we face in the modern world. But this assumption might be wrong. Assessing the risk of harm from terrorism is very difficult because
terrorism is such an irregular occurrence and is constantly evolving. If we examine the data from previous terrorist attacks, however, the threat of terror ism
interest. This involves evaluating two componentsthe gravity of the security threat and the effectiveness of the security measures to address it.
For example, many people fear being killed in a terrorist attack, but based on statistics from
the risk of dying from terrorism is miniscule. According to political scientist John Mueller, [e]ven with
the September 11 attacks included in the count . . . the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s (which is when the State Department began its
Add up the
eight deadliest terrorist attacks in US history, and they amount to fewer than four
thousand fatalities.38 In contrast, flu and pneumonia deaths are estimated to be around sixty thousand per year.39 Another forty thousand die in auto accidents
each year.40 Based on our experience with terrorism thus far, the risk of dying from terrorism is very low on the
accounting) is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.37
assessment of risk.
The year 2001 was not just notable for the September 11 attacks. It was also the summer of the shark bite, when extensive
media coverage about shark bites led to the perception that such attacks were on the rise. But there were fewer shark attacks in 2001 than in 2000 and fewer deaths as well, with only
four in 2001 as compared to thirteen in 2000.41 And regardless of which year had more deaths, the number is so low that an attack is a freak occurrence. It is certainly true that our past
experience with terrorism might not be a good indicator of the future. More treacherous terrorism is possible, such as the use of nuclear or biological weapons. This complicates our
ability to assess the risk of harm from terrorism. Moreover, the intentional human conduct involved in terrorism creates a sense of outrage and fear that ordinary deaths do not engender.
Alleviating fear must be taken into account, even if such fear is irrationally high in relation to other riskier events such as dying in a car crash. But enlightened policy must not completely
give in to the panic and irrational fear of the moment. It should certainly attempt to quell the fear, but it must do so thoughtfully. Nevertheless,
most policymakers
find it quite difficult to assess the threat of terrorism modestly. In the face of widespread public panic, it is hard
for government officials to make only moderate changes. Something dramatic must be done, or political heads will roll. Given the difficulty in assessing the security threat in a more
sacrifice of civil liberties explain the corresponding security benefit, why such a benefit cannot be achieved in other ways, and why such a security measure is the best and most rational
one to take.
Little scrutiny is given to security measures. They are often just accepted as a given, no matter how illineffective they might be. Some ineffective security measures are largely symbolic, such as the New York City subway search program. The
conceived or
searches are unlikely to catch or deter terrorists because they involve only a miniscule fraction of the millions of daily passengers. Terrorists can just turn to other targets or simply
attempt the bombing on another day or at another train station where searches are not taking place. The vice of symbolic security programs is that they result in needless sacrifices of
liberty and drain resources from other, more effective security measures. Nevertheless, these programs have a virtuethey can ameliorate fear because they are highly visible.
Ironically, the subway search programs primary benefit was alleviating peoples fear (which was probably too high), albeit in a deceptive manner (as the program did not add much in
the way of security).
Data mining represents another kind of security measure, one that currently has little proven effectiveness and
little symbolic value. Data mining programs are often not visible enough to the public to quell much fear. Instead, their benefits come primarily from their actual effectiveness in reducing
terrorist threats, which remains highly speculative. Thus far,
it makes. For example, there are approximately 1.8 million airline passengers each day.42 A data mining program to identify terrorists with a false positive rate of 1 percent (which would
be exceedingly low for such a program) would flag eighteen thousand people as false positives. This is quite a large number of innocent people. Why is the government so interested in
data mining if it remains unclear whether it will ever be very accurate or workable? Part of the governments interest in data mining stems from the aggressive marketing efforts of
database companies. After September 11, database companies met with government officials and made a persuasive pitch about the virtues of data mining.43 The technology sounds
quite dazzling when presented by skillful marketers, and it can work quite well in the commercial setting. The problem, however, is that
mining might be effective for businesses trying to predict customer behavior does
not make it effective for the government trying to predict who will engage in
terrorism. A high level of accuracy is not necessary when data mining is used by businesses to target marketing to consumers, because the cost of error to individuals is
minimal. Amazon.com, for example, engages in data mining to determine which books its customers are likely to find of interest by comparing bookbuying patterns among its customers.
Although it is far from precise, it need not be because there are few bad consequences if it makes a wrong book recommendation. Conversely, the consequences are vastly greater for
I do not believe that the case has been made that data mining is a
wise expenditure of security resources. Those who advocate for security should be just as outraged as those on the liberty side of the
government data mining. Ultimately,
debate. Although courts should not micromanage which security measures the government chooses, they should examine the effectiveness of any given security measure to weigh it
against the liberty costs. Courts should not tell the executive branch to modify a security measure just because they are not convinced it is the best one, but they should tell the
Privacy backlines
concept.
It is
ability to exercise almost every other right, not least our freedom to speak and
associate with those we choose, make political choices, practice our religious beliefs, seek medical
help, access education, figure out whom we love, and create our family life. It is nothing less than the shelter in
which we work out what we think and who we are; a fulcrum of our autonomy as
individuals.
Some argue we must simply live with the reality of pervasive online surveillance, and
that public expectation of privacy has eroded. But this is neither accurate nor
dispositive. Our understanding of privacy has in fact grown far beyond a right to be left
alone into a right of personal self-determination , embracing the right to
choose whom we share our personal details with and what identity we project to
various communities. When applied to the digital world, privacy gives us some boundaries
against unwanted monitors, and with it the essential freedom for personal
development and independent thought.
A-to Counter-Bias
( ) Extend our 1AC Solove ev it proves that security risks are
inflated and bias. Prefer our ev Solove is a foremost expert
on privacy and security risks.
( ) The structural bias debate goes Aff. Bias against privacy
runs so deep that even hawks will hamper security in order to
squash privacy interests.
Dragu 11
Tiberiu Dragu is an Assistant Professor of Politics, Faculty of Department of Politics at NYU. He also
holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He wrote this piece while
at The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Is There a Tradeoff Between Security and Liberty?
Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tiberiu_Dragu/publication/231746561_Is_There_a_Tradeoff_between_Security_and_Liberty_Executive_Bias_Privacy_Protections_and_Terrorism_Prevention/links/
02e7e52c84ffd738fc000000.pdf
Judge Richard Posner (2006a) asserts that judges should give the executive branch considerable deference when it comes to
assessing the security measures it proposes. Likewise, Eric Posner and Adrian Ver- meule (2007) write, The executive branch, not
Congress or the judicial branch, should make the tradeo between security and liberty."
shows that
enforcement
from terrorism. The presence of this strategic bias suggests that judges should
perhaps be less deferential to the expertise of the executive on terrorism
matters.
( ) Bias goes our way. Security risk is unknowingly inflated
this starts with the media and seeps into scholarship.
Wong & Belair-Gagnon 13
Albert Wong and Valerie Belair-Gagnon are resident fellows at the Information Society Project at Yale
Law School On the NSA, the media may tilt right Columbia Journalism Review October 23 rd http://www.cjr.org/the_kicker/news_media_pro_surveillance_bi.php
Since June 6, the world has been roiled by an ongoing series of disclosures based on Edward Snowdens document leaks, with
coverage led by the Guardian and the Washington Post, about clandestine mass surveillance conducted, with little oversight, by the
spying programs. Previous studies have shown that the latter factor can have a profound
effect on public opinion. Given the importance of this issue, we decided to analyze major US
coverage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Foreign Intelligence
to determine if there was an overall bias in either a pro- (traditionally conservative)
or anti-surveillance (traditionally liberal) direction. The results were unexpected, and quite remarkable. Our analysis
newspapers post-Snowden
Surveillance Court (FISC)
of total press coverage of FISA and FISC between July 1 and July 31 (July was the first full calendar month after the initial disclosures
in June) revealed that the widely held assumption that major media outlets uniformly tilt to the left does not match reality. In fact, if
anything, the media appears to tilt to the right, at least on this issue. We did a LexisNexis search
of four of the largest US newspapers by circulation: The New York Times, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington
Post. Of the 30 traditionally pro- or anti-surveillance terms we examined (15 each, listed below) in all four newspapers,
key
terrorism , were used much more frequently than terms that tend to invoke
opposition to mass surveillance, such as privacy or liberty. USA Today led the pack, using pro-surveillance
terms 36 percent more frequently than anti-surveillance terms. The LA Times followed at 24 percent, while The New York Times was
at 14.1 percent. Even the Washington Post, where Barton Gellman was the first US journalist to break the news of the NSAs
surveillance, exhibited a net pro-surveillance bias in its coverage of 11.1 percent. Although keyword frequency analysis on its own is
not always conclusive, large, consistent discrepancies of the kind observed here strongly suggest a net media bias in favor of the US
and UK governments pro-surveillance position. The pro-surveillance media bias we found was not, in general, overt. In our opinion,
most of the New York Times FISA/FISC coverage was neutral in tone. But
its existence. A seemingly neutral article could leave a net pro-surveillance impression on readers if it contains an excess of
references to, say, foreign terrorists or national securityterms that tend to frame the issue as a question of patriotic willingness to
do what it takes to keep the country safe. Our findings indicate that the intense public concern about the NSAs activities is not
merely an artifact of biased coverage, since the media actually appears to be biased in the opposite direction. In a recent Associated
Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll, 54 percent of respondents disagreed with dragnet collection of internet metadata
soft on Communism. President George W. Bushs September 2001 admonition that either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists appears to have an enduring legacy in media bias.
The United States Government must protect, at once, two different forms of security: national
security and personal privacy. In the American tradition, the word security has
had multiple meanings. In contemporary parlance, it often refers to national security or
homeland security. One of the governments most fundamental responsibilities is to protect this form of security, broadly understood. At
the same time, the idea of security refers to a quite different and equally fundamental value, captured
in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . (emphasis added). Both forms of security must be protected. The
central task is one of risk management; multiple risks are involved, and all of them must be considered. When public officials acquire foreign intelligence
information, they seek to reduce risks, above all risks to national security. The challenge, of course, is that multiple risks are involved. Government must
consider all of those risks, not a subset, when it is creating sensible safeguards. In addition to reducing risks to national security, public officials must
consider four other risks: Risks to privacy; Risks to freedom and civil liberties, on the Internet and elsewhere; Risks to our relationships with other
criticism and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit
or
security will win out nearly all the time. In an age of consequentialist balancing of rights
against government interests, it is imperative that the balancing be done
appropriately. Security and liberty often clash, but there need not be a zerosum tradeoff. Liberty interests are generally not achieved by eliminating particular
security programs but by placing them under oversight , limiting future uses of personal data, and
ensuring that they are carried out in a balanced and controlled manner. Curtailing ineffective security
measures is often not just a victory for liberty but for security as well, since better
alternatives might be pursued. The government is currently seduced by data mining. It is not clear,
however, that data mining is an effective security measure. Its lack of transparency serves as a major
impediment to any meaningful balancing of its security benefits and liberty costs. By exposing security interests to sunlight and
heeding liberty interests, the government could ultimately be more accountable to the people. The result
might be not only better protection of liberty but also more thoughtful and effective
security.
Yes,
businesses and governments act in some pretty similar ways. They track your credit card purchases.
They mine your e-mail for information about you. They may even monitor your movements in the real world.
Last week, we asked you whether you'd changed your online behavior as a result of this year's extended national conversation
about privacy and if so, which form of snooping annoyed you more. Looking through the responses so far, this one caught my
created a system that respected individual privacy and to see it eroded by the federal government concerns me deeply. I am a
strong believer in the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th amendments. Putting aside the government's power to capture or kill, your
for instance, or disrupting your children's education, or leaving friends and family. Those costs can be high enough to outweigh the
benefits of recovering some hard-to-measure modicum of privacy. Besides, leaving the country would ironically expose you to even
greater risk of surveillance, since you'd no longer be covered by the legal protections granted to people (even foreign terror
suspects) that arrive to U.S. shores. There are still some ways to shield yourself from the NSA. To the best of our knowledge, the
government has yet to crack the encryption protocols behind Tor, the online traffic anonymizing service. But Tor's users are also
In the business
world, no single company owns a monopoly over your privacy. The same can't really
be said about the government.
inherently the object of greater suspicion precisely because they're making efforts to cover their tracks.
( ) Government violations are worse. Even if theyre now corporate privacy violations shouldnt condone government
violations.
Sklansky 2
David A. Sklansky is an Associate Dean and Professor of Law. UCLA School of Law. BACK TO THE
FUTURE: KYLLO, KATZ, AND COMMON LAW - University of California, Los Angeles School of Law
Research Paper Series. Mississippi Law Journal, Forthcoming Research Paper No. 02-17 - July 27. 2002 www.isrcl.org/Papers/sklansky.pdf
There are two relatively straightforward ways out of this dilemma, but both would require the Supreme Court to
rethink certain aspects of Fourth Amendment law.252 The first and simplest way out would be to recognize that
This was the approach one lower court took when it found that
government agents intruded on a reasonable expectation of privacy by using a telescope to peer into a suspect's
apartment. The court expressly rejected the government's claim that any expectation of privacy was rendered
unreasonable by the widespread use of telescopes by private citizens to spy on people living in high-rises.
Private
snooping, the court reasoned, had "no bearing" on the legality of government
surveillance, because the government spies " for different purposes than
private citizens." and sometimes " with more zeal." Accordingly, a person's
"lack of concern about intrusions from private sources has little to do with an
expectation of freedom from systematic governmental surveillance," and "[t]he fact
that Peeping Toms abound does not license the government to follow
suit." 253
The government argues that the privacy intrusion here is mitigated by the fact that
most of the collected data is never reviewed. See Govt Br. 65. The governments bulk collection
habits; health problems; and business plans. Id. at 2224. When the records of one individual are aggregated with the records of
many others, the records become even more revealing. See, e.g., Felten Decl. 64 (ERII 101); Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler,
MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata (Mar. 12, 2014), http://bit.ly/1CqOaPK (study demonstrating use of telephony
metadata to reveal who obtained an abortion, who sought medical treatment, or who owns particular kinds of firearms). The
government contends that this case is controlled by Smith v. Maryland, but while that case involved the collection of call records, it
did not involve the collection of call records over an extended period of time or in bulk. It held only that the Fourth Amendment is
The
Fourth Amendment analysis is not indifferent to the scale and intrusiveness of the
governments surveillance. Just four years after it decided Smith, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the
not implicated by the governments collection of a single criminal suspects call records over a period of a few days.
distinction between narrow surveillance and dragnet surveillance is a constitutionally significant one. See Pl. Br. 18 (discussing
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)). More recently, in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), five Justices concluded
that the longterm tracking of an individual in public amounted to a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Pl. Br. 1823; see also
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010), affd sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. They reached this conclusion even
though the Supreme Court had previously concluded that shorterterm tracking did not amount to a search. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at
28182.
metadata can reveal civil, political, or religious affiliations, Lynch wrote, as well
as personal behavior and intimate relationships. But that reading, the court ruled, is far beyond what
Congress ever intended. If the government is correct, it could use 215 to collect and store in bulk any
other existing metadata available anywhere in the private sector, including metadata associated
with financial records, medical records, and electronic communications (including email and social
media information) relating to all Americans, Lynch wrote. Such expansive development of government repositories of
While seemingly benign,
telephone
of this scope ; current case law relies on an opinion from an era before e-mail, cell
phones, and mobile apps, when most metadata was not available to the government because it was
never created. Modern communications technology generates a constant stream of
detailed information about our private lives, raising concerns about data breaches, identity theft, and the wrongful
disclosure of personal information. Legal scholars and technical experts affiliated with EPIC believe that changes in technology and the
Supreme Courts recent decision in Riley v. California
Reliance on
Smith v. Maryland is untenable today for three reasons: (1) communications systems have
changed dramatically since the era of the rotary dial phone ; (2) the vast amount of metadata generated
today was unavailable when Smith was decided ; and (3) the Supreme Courts recent decision in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014), recognized that the privacy interests of phone users today are far greater than the interests
the Court considered when phones were tethered to desks , email was for computer geeks, and
no one could take a picture by holding up a telephone receiver.
calls from a single phone line following the suspicious activity of an identified suspect. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
The government contends that its collection of call records does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment because call records consist of info rmation entrusted by Americans to
third-parties. See Govt Br. 3940, 5758. As Plaintiff has explained, however, Pl. Br. 2426, the third-party
not determinative. If it were, many previous cases would have come out the other way. See Pl. Br. 24 25 (citing
cases).
has endorsed legislation that would end bulk collection in favor of targeted requests to phone companies.5 See White House, Office
of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Administrations Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar.
27, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1gS2HK0; Letter from Atty Gen. Eric Holder and Dir. of Natl Intel. James Clapper to Sen. Patrick Leahy
(Sept. 2, 2014) http://bit.ly/1tum5r1 (supporting the USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, as an approach [that] will accommodate
operational needs while providing appropriate privacy protections).
windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.51 These
attitudes persisted after the emergence of elec-tronic eavesdropping. As early as 1862, California prohibited the intercep-tion of
telegraph communications.52 Soon after telephone wiretapping be-gan in the 1890s, several states prohibited it, such as California
in 1905.53 By 1928, over half the states had made wiretapping a crime.54 Justice Holmes referred to wiretapping as a dirty
1986 with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), expanding Title IIIs protections from wiretapping to additional forms of
electronic surveillance.62 What is the harm if people or the government watch or listen to us?
Certainly, we all watch or listen, even when others may not want us to, and we often do not view this as problematic. However,
the bus or subway, but persistent gawking can create feelings of anxiety and discom-fort. Not
only can direct awareness of surveillance make a person feel ex-tremely uncomfortable, but it can also cause that
person to alter her behav-ior. Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and inhibition.63 Because
of its inhibitory effects, surveillance is a tool of social control , enhancing the power of social norms, which work
more effectively when people are being observed by others in the community.64 John Gilliom observes: Surveil-lance of human
behavior is in place to control human behavior, whether by limiting access to programs or institutions, monitoring and affecting
behav-ior within those arenas, or otherwise enforcing rules and norms by observ-ing and recording acts of compliance and
deviance.65 This aspect of sur-veillance does not automatically make it harmful, though, since social control can be beneficial and
every society must exercise a sizeable degree of social control. For example, surveillance can serve as a deterrent to crime. Many
people desire the discipline and control surveillance can bring. Jeff Rosen observes that Britains closed circuit television (CCTV)a
net-work of over four million public surveillance camerasis widely perceived as a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a
kindly and watchful uncle or aunt.66
pervasive moni-
toring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the
mainstream.67 Monitoring constrains the ac-ceptable spectrum of belief and
behavior, and it results in a subtle yet fundamental shift in the content of our character ,
a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp lines.68
expression of
individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our aspirations to it.69 Similarly,
surveillance inhibits freedom of choice, impinging upon self-
eccentric
determination.70
My purpose in advancing the taxonomy is to shift away from the rather vague label of privacy in order to prevent
distinct harms and problems from being conflated or not recognized. Some might contend, however, that several of
the problems I discuss are not really privacy problems. But with no satisfactory set of necessary or sufficient
conditions to define privacy, there is no one specific criterion for inclusion or exclusion under the rubric of privacy.
Privacy violations consist of a web of related problems that are not connected by a common element, but
nevertheless bear some resemblances to each other. We can determine whether to classify something as falling in
the domain of privacy if it bears resemblance to other things we similarly classify. In other words, we use a form of
analogical reasoning in which [t]he key task, Cass Sunstein observes, is to decide when there are relevant
similarities and differences.59 Accordingly, there are no clear boundaries for what we should or should not refer to
as privacy. Some might object to the lack of clear boundaries, but this objection assumes that having definitive
boundaries matters.
fruitless
and unresolved
must be addressed , but they are either conflated or ignored because they do not fit
into various prefabricated conceptions of privacy. The law often neglects to see the problems and
instead ignores all things that do not fall into a particular conception of privacy. In this way, conceptions
of privacy can prevent the examination of problems. The problems still exist
regardless of whether we classify them as being privacy problems. A great deal of attention is
expended trying to elucidate the concept of privacy without looking at the problems
we are facing. My goal is to begin with the problems and understand them in detail. Trying to fit them into a
one-size-fits-all conception of privacy neglects to see the problems in their full dimensions or to understand them
completely. Conceptions should help us understand and illuminate experience; they should not detract from
experience and make us see and understand less.
A-to Etzioni
( ) Etzioni is wrong falsely assumes privacy trades-off with
communal rights.
Solove 7
Daniel Solove is an Associate Professor at George Washington University Law School and holds a J.D.
from Yale Law School. He is one of the worlds leading expert in information privacy law and is well
known for his academic work on privacy and for popular books on how privacy relates with information
technology. He has written 9 books and more than 50 law review articles From the Article Ive Got
Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy - San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 745 GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 289 available from download at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565
Communitarian scholars launch a formidable critique of traditional accounts of individual rights. Amitai
Etzioni, for example, contends that privacy is a societal license that exempts a category of acts
(including thoughts and emotions) from communal, public, and governmental scrutiny.64 For Etzioni, many
theories of privacy treat it as sacrosanct, even when it conflicts with the common
good.65 According to Etzioni, privacy is not an absolute value and does not trump all other rights or concerns for the common
good.66 He goes on to demonstrate how privacy interferes with greater social interests and often, though not always, contends
that privacy should lose out in the balance.67 Etzioni is right to critique those who argue that privacy is an individual right that
should trump social interests.
individual rights and the common good rarely favors individual rights
unless the interest advanced on the side of the common good is trivial. Society will generally win when its interests are balanced
against those of the individual.
The deeper problem with Etzionis view is that in his critique of liberal
theories of individual rights as absolutes, he views individual rights as being in tension with society. The
same dichotomy between individual and society that pervades liberal theories of individual rights also pervades Etzionis
communitarianism. Etzioni views the task of communitarians as balanc[ing] individual rights with social responsibilities, and
individuality with community.68 The problem with Etzionis communitarian view is that
It is reductive to carve the world of social practices into two spheres, public and private,
and then attempt to determine what matters belong in each sphere. First, the
matters
have
remained private but in different ways ; they have been understood as private but because of
different attributes; or they have been regarded as private for some people or groups but not for others. In other words, to say
long
the governments contention that its use of the statute is cabined by the supposedly unique characteristics of call
records.
involved the collection of a single criminal suspects call records over a period of several days; it did not involve dragnet
To
accept the governments view that the Constitution is indifferent to that distinction is to accept
surveillance, whichas the Supreme Court has recognizedraises constitutional questions of an entirely different order.
that the government may collect in bulk not just call records , but many other
records as well. It is to accept that the government may also create a permanent
record of every person Americans contact by email ; every website
they visit; every doctor or lawyer they consult ; and every financial transaction they conduct.
The Constitution does not condone that result.
(Sept. 28, 2013) (showing an internal NSA memo on new contact chaining procedures from 2011).17 The NSA has described contact chaining as the
process of building a network graph that models the communication (e-mail, telephony, etc.) patterns of targeted entities (people, organizations, etc) and
their associates from the communications sent or received by targets. Office of the Inspector Gen., Natl Sec. Agency, Cent. Sec. Serv., Working Draft ST09-0002 (Mar. 24, 2009) (discussing a proposed amendment to Department of Defense procedures for contact chaining).
begin
with a
seed number
The first hop includes the numbers that directly contact the
target; the second hop includes the numbers that directly contact first hop
numbers; and the third hop are those numbers that directly contact the second hop numbers. Id. at 3-4. The number of phone
records analyzed grows exponentially as the number of hops increases . The NSA has
emphasized that the number of seed numbers queried is low, but this ignores the
broad impact of the contact chaining process . For example, in 2012, the NSA queried
288 phone numbers (known as seeds). The contact chaining algorithms the NSA uses, though,
layer of analysis is referred to as a hop.
implicate a much larger set of phone numbers . A three-hop analysis would yield 2.5 million
numbers if each person contacted 40 unique people. Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The NSA Three-Hop n.3 (Dec. 9, 2013).19 The NSA
bulk telephone records collected by the NSA reveal a great deal more information
about social connections between citizens than any traditional pen register data could. But as the Court recognized in Riley, this
In fact, the
aggregation of millions of records heightens the privacy harm to each user . Riley,
134 S. Ct. at 2489. And due to the ubiquity of cell phones in the United States, the volume of call data is much higher now than in 1979 before the
analyze and extract sensitive personal information from that data implicates users
Elsewhere,
as if this mitigates or even eliminates the privacy intrusion. See Govt Br. 14. But phone
course of a year,
extent of NSAs warrantless data collection . What became clear was that the NSA
Less apparent was how this data was actually
used by the NSA and other national security agencies. Part of the answer came in July 2014 when Glenn
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain published an article that identified specific targets of NSA
surveillance and showed how individuals were being placed under surveillance
despite there being no reasonable suspicion of their involvement in criminal
was involved in the mass collection of online material.
activity.1 All of those named as targets were prominent Muslim Americans. The following
month, Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed that under the
Obama administration the number of people on the National Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list
had
increased tenfold
to 47,000. Leaked classified documents showed that the NCC maintains a database of terrorism
suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentwhich contained a million names by 2013, double the number
four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data.
Arab American Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement agencies to profile Arab
making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are
intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the history of national security surveillance in the United States
is inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire.
Surveillance = Racist
Surveillance is racist its the modern COINTELPRO. Reject the
security justifications that prop-up these forms of violence.
Kumar & Kundnani 15
Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University.
She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012). Arun Kundnani
is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. He is a writer and activist, and a
professor at NYU. Race, surveillance, and empire International Socialist Review - Issue #96 Spring
- http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire
As of 2008,
the FBI had a roster of 15,000 paid informants and, according to Senator Dianne Feinstein of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, the bureau had 10,000 counterterrorism intelligence analysts in 2013.63 The
proportion of these informants and analysts who are assigned to Muslim populations in the United States is unknown but is likely to
The kinds of infiltration and provocation tactics that had been practiced against Black
radicals in the 1960s are being repeated today. What has changed are the rationales
used to justify them: it is no longer the threat of Black nationalist subversion, but the
threat of Muslim radicalization that is invoked. With new provisions in the Clinton administrations 1996
be substantial.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the FBI can launch investigations of a suspected individual or organization simply for
providing material support to terrorisma vague term that could include ideological activity unrelated to any actual plot to carry
we turn our attention to the current conjuncture in which the politics of the
Wall Street and environmental rights activists, who represent a threat to the
neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of American history. For
instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed by the Federalist government against the Jeffersonian
sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American
State surveillance regimes have always sought to monitor and penalize a wide range
of dissenters, radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of these cases. Our
Revolution.
focus here is on the production of racialized others as security threats and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social
certain groups deemed as threats by the national security state the Brown
terrorist , the Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the
immigrant who threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has become one of
the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we
argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as
compensation for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation to homeland security.
A-to Counter-Bias
( ) The counter-bias cards work better against a privacy
advantage than a bigotry advantage. It may be overstated to
say everyone suffers from surveillance. But some groups suffer
far more than others our Stanfill ev proves thats bigotry.
( ) Bias goes our way. Security risk is unknowingly inflated
this starts with the media and seeps into scholarship.
Wong & Belair-Gagnon 13
Albert Wong and Valerie Belair-Gagnon are resident fellows at the Information Society Project at Yale
Law School On the NSA, the media may tilt right Columbia Journalism Review October 23 rd http://www.cjr.org/the_kicker/news_media_pro_surveillance_bi.php
Since June 6, the world has been roiled by an ongoing series of disclosures based on Edward Snowdens document leaks, with
coverage led by the Guardian and the Washington Post, about clandestine mass surveillance conducted, with little oversight, by the
spying programs. Previous studies have shown that the latter factor can have a profound
effect on public opinion. Given the importance of this issue, we decided to analyze major US
coverage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) to determine if there was an overall bias in either a pro- (traditionally conservative)
or anti-surveillance (traditionally liberal) direction. The results were unexpected, and quite remarkable. Our analysis
newspapers post-Snowden
of total press coverage of FISA and FISC between July 1 and July 31 (July was the first full calendar month after the initial disclosures
in June) revealed that the widely held assumption that major media outlets uniformly tilt to the left does not match reality. In fact, if
anything, the media appears to tilt to the right, at least on this issue. We did a LexisNexis search
of four of the largest US newspapers by circulation: The New York Times, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington
Post. Of the 30 traditionally pro- or anti-surveillance terms we examined (15 each, listed below) in all four newspapers,
key
terrorism , were used much more frequently than terms that tend to invoke
opposition to mass surveillance, such as privacy or liberty. USA Today led the pack, using pro-surveillance
terms 36 percent more frequently than anti-surveillance terms. The LA Times followed at 24 percent, while The New York Times was
at 14.1 percent. Even the Washington Post, where Barton Gellman was the first US journalist to break the news of the NSAs
surveillance, exhibited a net pro-surveillance bias in its coverage of 11.1 percent. Although keyword frequency analysis on its own is
not always conclusive, large, consistent discrepancies of the kind observed here strongly suggest a net media bias in favor of the US
and UK governments pro-surveillance position. The pro-surveillance media bias we found was not, in general, overt. In our opinion,
most of the New York Times FISA/FISC coverage was neutral in tone. But
its existence. A seemingly neutral article could leave a net pro-surveillance impression on readers if it contains an excess of
references to, say, foreign terrorists or national securityterms that tend to frame the issue as a question of patriotic willingness to
do what it takes to keep the country safe. Our findings indicate that the intense public concern about the NSAs activities is not
merely an artifact of biased coverage, since the media actually appears to be biased in the opposite direction. In a recent Associated
Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll, 54 percent of respondents disagreed with dragnet collection of internet metadata
soft on Communism. President George W. Bushs September 2001 admonition that either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists appears to have an enduring legacy in media bias.
Utilitarianism is bad
Reject utilitarianism. It shatters all ethics and justifies the
worst atrocities.
Holt 95
(Jim Holt is an American philosopher, author and essayist. He has contributed to The New York Times,
The New York Times Magazine, The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The American Scholar,
and Slate. He hosted a weekly radio spot on BBC for ten years and he writes frequently about politics
and philosophy. New York Times, Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic, August 5, p. Lexis)
Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945,
resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the
great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Trumans
decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman
claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians
have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion.
Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up
surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to
surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a fullscale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have
the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. According to utilitarianism, a form of
and boil that baby . There is, however, an older ethical tradition , one rooted in JudeoChristian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Pauls condemnation of those who say, Let us do evil, that good may
Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are
absolutely forbidden. It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved
thereby. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense
come.
permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists
made much of the indivisibility of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nations entire economic and social strength was deployed behind
its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. There are no civilians in Japan, declared an intelligence officer of the
Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary
between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime
killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed,
civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill
innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of
double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into
hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the
rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in
casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. What Hiroshima and Nagasaki
utilitarian thinking
did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of
in the conduct of war. The
conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an
international commission in the 1920s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be
used to end, in Churchills words, the vast indefinite butchery. It
offends
convenient
of citizens. One
grassroots possibility would be to pressure Congress to change the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
which, as written, requires telecommunications companies to build their networks in ways that make government surveillance of
Internet activity possible, including the interception of e-mail and web traffic.177 Many of the contributions to this Symposium
provide a range of other possibilities. 178
CONCLUSION
the Internet and inequality is not only that we are dealing with power perpetuating itself-and
power is a serious
thing -but also that we are dealing with notions of reality with which people have become comfortable or, at least, in which
they have largely surrendered in their protest. In this sense, technology itself is a panopticon. Its ubiquity is transforming society in
that meaning may be) makes decisions about governing itself and dealing with the rest of the world.
Any intelligent
a
determination to change the present situation for the better.
knowledge of history; a healthy skepticism regarding "national security" justifications for increasing governmental power; and
I leave you with an exhortation. In 1995, my heroine, the late Andrea Dworkin, gave a speech that she
what I am asking you to do with regard to the
technologization of oppression and the NSA Internet surveillance program as an extension of that historical
Beyond these,
process
( ) perm - do both
( ) Grassroots movements wont solve and bigotry will just
continue in the interim.
Gitlin 97
Todd formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University
of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a
professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He
was a long-time political activist( from the Left) The Anti-Political Populism of Cultural Studies Dissent
Magazine Spring 1997. Modified for potentially objectionable langauge http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?
article=1893
this view, to dwell on the centrality of popular culture is more than an academic's way of filling her hours; it is a useful certification of the people and their
the politics they knew. The contrast with the rest of the West is illuminating. In varying degrees, left-wing intellectuals in France, Italy, Scandinavia,
Germany, Spain and elsewhere retain energizing attachments to Social Democratic, Green, and other left-wing parties. There, the association of culture
with excellence and traditional elites remains strong. But in the Anglo-American world, including Australia, these conditions scarcely obtain. Here, in a
discouraging time, popular culture emerges as a consolation prize. (The same happened in Latin America, with the decline of left-wing hopes.) The sting
fades from the fragmentation of the organized left, the metastasis of murderous nationalism, the twilight of socialist dreams virtually everywhere.
Class inequality may have soared, ruthless individualism may have intensified, the conditions of life
for the poor may have worsened, racial tensions may have mounted, unions and
gravity has moved rightward--or rather, one can put this down to the iron grip of the established media institutions. One need not even be rigorous about
what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Is capitalism the trouble? Is it the particular form of capitalism practiced by multinational
corporations in a deregulatory era? Is it patriarchy (and is that the proper term for a society that has seen an upheaval in relations between women and
men in the course of a half-century)? Racism? Antidemocracy? Practitioners of cultural studies, like the rest of the academic left, are frequently elusive.
this is not simply because of cultural studies' default. The default is an effect
more than a cause. It has its reasons. The odds are indeed stacked against serious forward motion in conventional
politics. Political power is not only beyond reach, but functional majorities disdain it, finding the
government and all its works contemptible. Few of the central problems of contemporary civilization are
and across identity lines. One must underscore that
seriously contested within the narrow band of conventional discourse. Unconventional politics, such as it is, is mostly fragmented and self-contained along
linear. To the contrary: it embraces technological innovation as soon as the latest developments prove popular. It embraces the sufficiency of markets; its
changed. We would learn more about politics, economy, and society, and in the process, appreciate better what culture, and cultural study, do not
If we wish to do politics, let us organize groups, coalitions, demonstrations, lobbies, whatever; let us do
politics. Let us not think that our academic work is already that.
accomplish.
( ) The only way the Alt competes is if they refuse to use the
law even to reduce it. Thats violent because the Alt cant
wish away the State.
Eckersley 4
Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Melbourne, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books,
pp. 3-8
While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric
analyses of global ecological degradation,
have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty
years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive
economic in
the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the
state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or
subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it."" In any event, rejecting
the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the
emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global
ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major
sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green
transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or
not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek
to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into
the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to
necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local,
Nonetheless, while
the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially
significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoplesas expressed in the
national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change.
principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a
momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an
indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining
all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life
chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in
securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these
Given that
the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and
societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale
that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to
dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis.
deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart
Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and
nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels,
and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems
to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state
power. Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the
coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic
sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined
sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are
peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by
subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular
a
contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an
rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was
increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber,
my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the
democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and
associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that
seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states
possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily
exercised,
privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of
and protect the environment. In short, although the political autonomy of states is
there are still few social institution that can match the same
degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along
more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution,
corporate power,
the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. Statesparticularly when
they act collectivelyhave the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism.
They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the
neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green
political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system.
While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by
offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17
Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told an audience: Contrary to some of the stuff
thats been printed, we dont sit there and grind out metadata profiles of average people.
If youre not connected to one of those valid intelligence targets, you are not of interest
to us.72 In the national security world, connected to can be the basis for targeting
a whole racial or political community so, even assuming the accuracy of this
comment, it points to the ways that national security surveillance can draw entire
communities into its web, while reassuring average people (code for the normative white
middle class) that they are not to be troubled. In the eyes of the national security state, this average
In March 2014, Rick
person must also express no political views critical of the status quo.
authority to
spy and
guidance has explicitly disallowed the consideration of race or ethnicity, except to the extent permitted by the Constitution [*450]
and laws of the nation. n107 Although a constitutional analysis of the government's surveillance efforts will be conducted later in
this Comment, it is important to note that the Justice Department's past guidance stated that "in absolutely no event ... may Federal
officials assert a national security or border integrity rationale as a mere pretext for invidious discrimination." n108 This 2003
guidance explains what efforts regarding race or ethnicity are allowed and not allowed as a means to protect national security;
however, the DIOG has permitted measures that are contrary to the standards outlined in the 2003 Department of Justice Guidance.
n109 Although the DIOG prohibits the FBI from considering race or ethnicity as the sole factor in determining whether an individual
members of the same ethnic grouping as that individual. n111 Furthermore, the DIOG permits the FBI to identify areas of
concentrated ethnic communities if the locations will reasonably aid in threat analysis. n112 The locations of "ethnic-oriented"
businesses and facilities may be gathered if their locations will reasonably contribute to an awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and
intelligence collection opportunities. n113 Just as race or ethnicity is often closely correlated to religious affiliation, the FBI has been
granted the authority, although accompanied with many restrictions, to utilize religion as a basis for examination. n114
In
accordance with its surveillance and national security investigation power, the FBI has
conducted various undercover monitoring procedures that call into question their constitutional
permissibility. n115 In 2009, the FBI participated in a career day event conducted in San [*451] Jose, CA sponsored by an Assyrian
community organization. n116 The FBI's observations were placed in a mapping report. n117 In the report, the FBI recited
information about the organization's activities, the identities of several leaders within the organization, and the content of
conversations at the event. n118 This content included opinions, backgrounds, travel histories, educations, occupations, and
charitable activities. n119 Similarly, a memo submitted by the Sacramento Division of the FBI details a conversation in which an
undercover agent discusses the Saudi Student Association with an innocent California State University student. n120 The
conversation included the organization's size, purpose, and activities. n121 The memo, which included the student's social security
number, telephone number, and address, was submitted to the FBI in Washington, DC. n122 Additionally, in San Francisco, the FBI
submitted a 2007 and 2008 report that detailed FBI spy efforts at Ramadan Iftar dinners. n123 In the reports, the FBI documented
the names of attendees, the contents of various conversations and presentations, a photo of dinner participants, and other
There are
several other instances, similar to these, in which the FBI utilized individuals' race or ethnicity as a
basis for monitoring. n126 The American Civil Liberties Union and [*452] other
organizations have protested the wide-sweeping authority that has been granted to
the national government to monitor domestic individuals, especially those that are not
suspected of terrorism or criminal activity. n127
information. n124 Both of the reports indicate that the information was disseminated outside of the FBI. n125
(Note to students: DIOG an acronym in this piece of evidence stands for the
Federal Bureau of Investigations Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide.)
authority to
spy and
guidance has explicitly disallowed the consideration of race or ethnicity, except to the extent permitted by the Constitution [*450]
and laws of the nation. n107 Although a constitutional analysis of the government's surveillance efforts will be conducted later in
this Comment, it is important to note that the Justice Department's past guidance stated that "in absolutely no event ... may Federal
officials assert a national security or border integrity rationale as a mere pretext for invidious discrimination." n108 This 2003
guidance explains what efforts regarding race or ethnicity are allowed and not allowed as a means to protect national security;
however, the DIOG has permitted measures that are contrary to the standards outlined in the 2003 Department of Justice Guidance.
n109 Although the DIOG prohibits the FBI from considering race or ethnicity as the sole factor in determining whether an individual
members of the same ethnic grouping as that individual. n111 Furthermore, the DIOG permits the FBI to identify areas of
concentrated ethnic communities if the locations will reasonably aid in threat analysis. n112 The locations of "ethnic-oriented"
businesses and facilities may be gathered if their locations will reasonably contribute to an awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and
intelligence collection opportunities. n113 Just as race or ethnicity is often closely correlated to religious affiliation, the FBI has been
granted the authority, although accompanied with many restrictions, to utilize religion as a basis for examination. n114
In
accordance with its surveillance and national security investigation power, the FBI has
conducted various undercover monitoring procedures that call into question their constitutional
permissibility. n115 In 2009, the FBI participated in a career day event conducted in San [*451] Jose, CA sponsored by an Assyrian
community organization. n116 The FBI's observations were placed in a mapping report. n117 In the report, the FBI recited
information about the organization's activities, the identities of several leaders within the organization, and the content of
conversations at the event. n118 This content included opinions, backgrounds, travel histories, educations, occupations, and
charitable activities. n119 Similarly, a memo submitted by the Sacramento Division of the FBI details a conversation in which an
undercover agent discusses the Saudi Student Association with an innocent California State University student. n120 The
conversation included the organization's size, purpose, and activities. n121 The memo, which included the student's social security
number, telephone number, and address, was submitted to the FBI in Washington, DC. n122 Additionally, in San Francisco, the FBI
submitted a 2007 and 2008 report that detailed FBI spy efforts at Ramadan Iftar dinners. n123 In the reports, the FBI documented
the names of attendees, the contents of various conversations and presentations, a photo of dinner participants, and other
There are
several other instances, similar to these, in which the FBI utilized individuals' race or ethnicity as a
basis for monitoring. n126 The American Civil Liberties Union and [*452] other
organizations have protested the wide-sweeping authority that has been granted to
the national government to monitor domestic individuals, especially those that are not
suspected of terrorism or criminal activity. n127
information. n124 Both of the reports indicate that the information was disseminated outside of the FBI. n125
(Note to students: DIOG an acronym in this piece of evidence stands for the
Federal Bureau of Investigations Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide.)
The first brief moment when the federal government seemed ready to reevaluate its
position on marijuana occurred during Jimmy Carters presidency. President Carter called for its
decriminalization. Also during the Carter presidency, the government implemented a compassionate use program, allowing some seriously ill patients
those laws were enforced, often vigorously.61 Under federal drug laws, marijuana is categorized as a Schedule I drug, one for which there is no recognized
medical benefit.62
marijuana . It fought early efforts of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) to do so. As I summarized
elsewhere, Litigation dragged on between 1972 and 1992, with drug enforcement agencies using various procedural maneuvers to prevent a hearing on
the issue. Despite an administrative law judges recommendation, the DEA administrator ruled against
the
Attorney Generals office issued a memo randum seemingly implementing that promise.66 Almost certainly, the
governments softer approach led to rapid expansion of dispensaries in states with existing medical marijuana laws67
and to passage of medical marijuana statutes elsewhere.68 That was then. But what followed seems like
a U-turn in
administration policy. Notably, in California, marijuana providers opened hundreds of dispensaries, often in central
Obama administration reacted forcefully. Under his administration, there
have been more raids on marijuana dispensaries in California than there were under
the Bush administration.70 Federal government agents have threatened landlords with forfeiture of their drug laws that heighten penalties when drug
business locations.69 The
legitimate dispensaries.
The IRSs position is especially threatening to states hopes of raising tax revenues.
Reagan-era legislation makes it unlawful for drug dealers to deduct ordinary business expenses, including salaries paid to staff.73 At least according to
news reports, the IRS has targeted some of the most law-abiding dispensaries in California.74 That stance, if upheld by the courts,75 has a potentially
perverse effect: dispensary owners most interested in complying with the law would be forced out of business, while those who are interested in using
medical marijuana laws as a cover for drug trafficking may be able to remain in business. Some observers express little surprise in the Obama
administrations shift in its position.76 An outsider might conclude that the Obama administration discovered a reality of modern government:
wishful thinking . Using its full arsenal, the federal government can prevent Colorado and Washington from implementing their
laws. At least as drug laws are written, state officials who participate in the state-authorized drug tradefor example, as employees providing marijuana
would be violating federal law. As the federal government has done in California, it can invoke various laws, including forfeiture laws and tax laws, to drive
lower income communities, or will forces divert the money elsewhere? The California initiative created licensing
by all applicants to "reasonably cover the costs of assuring compliance with the regulations to be issued"; 142 2)
143 3)
appropriate security and security plans with "satisfactory proof of the financial ability of the licensee to provide for
that security"; 144 and 4) compliance with other employment, 145 inspection, 146 and recordkeeping 147
flowing into the minority communities from the illegal sale of marijuana would be diverted into the bank accounts
K of Security disads
The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have ushered in a new post-racial era, in which racial inequalities
were meant to be a thing of the past. African Americans and Muslim Americans placed their hopes in Obama, voting for him in large
decades, the progressive criminalization of undocumented immigrants has been achieved through the building of a militarized wall
between Mexico and the United States, hugely expanding the US border patrol, and programs such as Secure Communities, which
enables local police departments to access immigration databases. Secure Communities was introduced in 2008 and stepped up
under Obama. It has resulted in migrants being increasingly likely to be profiled, arrested, and imprisoned by local police officers,
before being passed to the federal authorities for deportation. Undocumented migrants can no longer have any contact with police
officers without risking such outcomes. There is an irony in the way that fears of illegal immigration threatening jobs and the
public purse have become stand-ins for real anxieties about the neoliberal collapse of the old social contract: the measures that
such fears lead toracialization and criminalization of migrantsthemselves serve to strengthen the neoliberal status quo by
encouraging a precarious labor market. Capital, after all, does not want to end immigration but to profit from a vast exploitable
labor pool that exists under precarious conditions, that does not enjoy the civil, political and labor rights of citizens and that is
disposable through deportation.66
In this sense, security has become the new psychological wage to aid the
reallocation of the welfare states social wage toward homeland security and to win
support for empire in the age of neoliberalism . Through the notion of
security, social and economic anxieties generated by the unraveling of the Keynesian social compact have
been channeled toward the Black or Brown street criminal , welfare recipient, or
terrorist. In addition, as Susan Faludi has argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of security has been symbolized, above all,
by the white domestic hearth of the prefeminist fifties, once again threatened by mythical frontier enemies, hidden subversives, and
racial aggressors. That this idea of the homeland coincides culturally with the denigration of capable women, the magnification of
manly men, the heightened call for domesticity, the search for and sanctification of helpless girls points to the ways it is gendered
as well as racialized.67
The National Security Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent
terrorist attacks to the point that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the
surveillance of prominent Muslim-Americans, revealing a culture of racial profiling
and broad latitude for spying on U.S. citizens. An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor
Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted among the approximately 7,485 email addresses
monitored between 2002 and 2008, Greenwalds news service The Intercept reports. To monitor Americans, government agencies
must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets are terrorist
agents, foreign spies or are or may be abetting sabotage, espionage or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five
Muslim-Americans with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and a political candidate. Racial profiling
of Muslims by security officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida trainees
preparing more attacks. The New York Police Department has disbanded its unit that mapped New Yorks Muslim communities that
designated surveillance of mosques as terrorism enterprise investigations after pressure from the Justice Department about
aggressive monitoring by police. A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name
Mohammed Raghead for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of successful Muslim-Americans is
akin to McCarthyism that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at the University
of California, Riverside. The
notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent
represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an
embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the constitution, Aslan says. There is a risk of
radicalization among citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia,
but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda FelbabBrown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have
been at least 70 mass shootings across the U.S. We have seen very little domestic terrorism in the
public individuals,
to the
willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law
enforcement to identify possible radical threats , out of gratitude that the U.S. is
a stable, secure country compared with the Middle East, she says. That could go sour if law
enforcement becomes too aggressive, too extreme , she says.
in part
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without
remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a
this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the
assault on and oppression of others is permissible . Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the
course,
strongest.
One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains
within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with
respect so that they treat you with respect. Recall. says the Bible, that you were once a stranger in Egypt, which
means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk
becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appealindeed, it is a contract, however implicit it
In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical
morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a
just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not
accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is
accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes
are irresistible.
might be.
collecting and banking mass personal data over time confers such power to
track, analyze, and expose peoples lives that it should be thought of as a form of effective control.
Some of us may not care about who sees our Facebook postings , but the security and
human dignity of many people all over the world depends on the ability to limit who
knows about their political preferences, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, and
more.
Arguably,
Backlines
debates in Congress and among relevant members of the Executive Branch have failed to
account for a variety of costs of large-scale surveillance programs, including not only the implications of
surveillance for individuals privacy rights, both inside and outside the US , but also the
More broadly, however, the
chilling or inhibiting effect surveillance can have on the exercise of freedoms of expression and
early research indicates that the revelations in 2013 and continuing to date have begun to have a
chilling effect on private individuals electronic communications practices and activities.47 And, as this report
association. Indeed,
documents,
surveillance is seriously hampering US- based journalists and lawyers in their work, Human
Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union said in a joint report released today. Surveillance is undermining media freedom and the right to counsel, and
Large-scale US
ultimately
account
, the groups said. The 120-page report, With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, is
based on extensive interviews with dozens of journalists, lawyers, and senior US government officials. It documents how national security journalists and lawyers are adopting elaborate
steps or otherwise modifying their practices to keep communications, sources, and other confidential information secure in light of revelations of unprecedented US government
surveillance of electronic communications and transactions. The report finds that
press freedom, the publics right to information, and the right to counsel, all human rights essential to a
healthy democracy.
The work of journalists and lawyers is central to our democracy, said report author Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier Fellow at Human
Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union. When their work suffers, so do we." The report is drawn from interviews with some 50 journalists covering intelligence, national
security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. The US has long held itself out as a global leader on media freedom.
However, journalists interviewed for the report are finding that
Surveillance has magnified existing concerns among journalists and their sources over
the administrations crackdown on leaks. The crackdown includes new restrictions on contact between intelligence officials and the media, an increase in leak prosecutions, and the
Insider Threat Program, which requires federal officials to report one another for suspicious behavior that might betray an intention to leak information. Journalists interviewed for the
Prize winner, including unclassified matters that are of legitimate public concern. Many journalists described adopting elaborate techniques in an environment of tremendous uncertainty
in an effort to protect evidence of their interaction with sources. The techniques ranged from using encryption and air-gapped computers (which stay completely isolated from unsecured
networks, including the Internet), to communicating with sources through disposable burner phones, to abandoning electronic communications altogether. Those cumbersome new
techniques are slowing down reporters in their pursuit of increasingly skittish sources, resulting in less information reaching the public.
publics ability to obtain important information about government activities, and on the ability of the media
to serve
Journalists expressed
concern that, rather than being treated as essential checks on government and
partners in ensuring a healthy democratic debate, they may be viewed as
suspect for doing their jobs. One prominent journalist summed up what many seemed to be feeling: I dont want the government to force me to act like a spy. Im not a spy; Im
a journalist.
most
telephone
calls placed or received by individuals in the U nited S tates with the approval of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://bit.ly/15ebL9k. Appellant argues that this practice violates her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and sought injunctive relief in the district court to prevent the
NSA from collecting and analyzing her telephone data. Mem. Decision. at 1. The district court denied that request and dismissed
Appellants action, holding that under the Supreme Courts 1979 decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Appellant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that she dialed. Id. at 8. She appealed.
Mass,
censorship . Amici write to emphasize the corrosive effect that this broad and indiscriminate
has on the ability of the media to gather and report information concerning
matters of public interest. Throughout Americas history, confidential communications between
journalists and sources have led to news stories of the greatest public importance. Yet
collection of call data
communications are being monitored has led both sources and reporters to self-censor, interfering with newsgathering and
diminishing the quality of reporting.
the government,
many reporters at major news outlets have said that this program and other NSA
have made sources less willing to talk with them, even about matters
not related to national security, resulting in a press that is less capable of keeping
the executive branch and Congress accountable and a public that is less informed on matters at the heart of
surveillance efforts
democratic governance.
In short, [t]he Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that
could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression, Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961), and for
undermining freedom of the press. While the government may now proffer different justifications than the search for the
nonconformist that led British officials to ransack private homes in 1765, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), mass call
tracking in 2014 poses the same threat to newsgathering and reporting that general warrants did. Indeed, as set forth in more detail below, constant,
chills the
exercise of
unlike subpoenas, which provide notice to the media, decisions about what call logs to review
are made in secret , leaving both reporters and sources vulnerable to government
surveillance at every turn, notwithstanding any promise of confidentiality.
and
foreign affairs. Many history-altering news stories would not have been reported without confidential
communications between journalists and sources. Anonymous sources were the foundation of the more than 150 articles
Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein wrote following the Watergate break-in. See David von Drehle, FBIs
No. 2 Was Deep Throat: Mark Felt Ends 30-Year Mystery of The Posts Watergate Source, Wash. Post (June 1, 2005),
http://wapo.st/JLlYvZ. Bernstein has said, Almost all of the articles I coauthored with Mr. Woodward on Watergate could not have
been reported or published without the assistance of our confidential sources and without the ability to grant them anonymity,
including the individual known as Deep Throat. In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, No. CR-0690225-JSW (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2006, affidavit in support of motion to quash subpoenas). Other major stories have similarly relied on
confidential sources. The New York Times used these contacts to break the story that long before the scope of the current
surveillance came to light the NSA had an illegal wiretapping program that monitored phone calls and e-mail messages involving
suspected terrorist operatives without the approval of federal courts. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. Times (Dec. 16, 2005), http://nyti.ms/neIMIB.2 The Times also used confidential sources to report on the harsh
interrogations that terrorism suspects in U.S. custody have faced. See, e.g., Scott Shane, David Johnston, James Risen, Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2007), http://nyti.ms/1dkyMgF. The Washington Post relied on confidential
government sources, among others, to break the story of the Central Intelligence Agencys use of black sites, a network of secret
prisons for terrorism suspects. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post (Nov. 2, 2005),
http://wapo.st/Ud8UD. These are just a few examples of the important contributions to public knowledge that come from anonymous
sources speaking to journalists. The mass call tracking at issue here compromises the ability of the news media to cultivate these
Recent developments highlight the link between mass call tracking and a chill
on reporter-source communications. The response to the Justice Departments recent seizure
sources.
of records from 20 A ssociated P ress telephone lines demonstrates the climate of fear that
develops when government investigation tactics are brought to bear directly on the news media. See Mark Sherman, Govt
Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, Associated Press (May 13, 2013), http://bit.ly/11zhUOg. These records, from phone
lines used by more than 100 AP reporters and editors, contained metadata i.e. the numbers, timing and duration of
calls. See id. This is the same type of information that the mass call-tracking program
collects. After learning about the secret subpoenas, AP President and CEO Gary Pruitt said in a speech at the
National Press Club that
reporters at his news outlet: Some of our longtime trusted sources have become nervous and anxious about talking to
us, even on stories that arent about national security. Jeff Zalesin, AP
Chief Points to Chilling Effect After Justice Investigation, The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press (June 19, 2013),
http://rcfp.org/x?CSPl.
The chilling effect, Pruitt said, is not limited to the AP: Journalists at other
exceptional cases involving subpoenas and search warrants targeting journalists and
media organizations cause serious harm to newsgathering , but mass call tracking has an equal, and
Controversial and
perhaps even
believe that logs of their phone contacts with reporters will always be on file with
the government. This chilling effect is not surprising. Awareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, __ (2012) (slip op., at 3) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Indeed, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) concluded that the refusal of sources to speak with journalists is entirely predictable
and rational in light of revelations regarding mass call tracking. PCLOB, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 164 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://bit.ly/1fjSbeJ. PCLOB added that this
CBS News (June 2, 2013), http://cbsn.ws/1aGmeyd; see also Dylan Byers, Reporters Say Theres a Chill in the Air, Politico (June 8, 2013),
http://politi.co/11znRrJ (
return phone calls, even on unclassified matters, and, when they do talk, prefer in-person conversations that leave no phone logs, no emails, and no
records of entering and leaving buildings[.]).
Chilling impact
Such chilling discourages suicide, abuse, and addiction
prevention.
EPIC 14
The Electronic Privacy Information Center or EPIC - is a public interest research center in Washington,
D.C EPIC routinely participates as amicus curiae before federal and state courts in cases concerning
the protection of privacy. Members of the EPIC Advisory Board are expert in issues of domestic
surveillance. The EPIC amicus brief is joined by 33 technical experts and legal scholars these include
several Law Professors, Distinguished Scientists, Computer Science experts, Professors with
specializations in Information Law. Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama before the United States Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals - BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC)
AND THIRTY-THREE TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND LEGAL SCHOLARS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT Sept
9th, 2014 This Amicus Brief was prepared by Attorney Marc Rotenberg, Counsel of Record. Amici
means friend of the court and in this context - is legal reference to EPIC and its technical experts.
This pdf can be obtained at: https://epic.org/amicus/fisa/215/smith/
The
Similarly,
calls to a physicians office, a gun store, a psychiatrist, a pharmacy, a medical marijuana dispensary, a church,
or an abortion clinic would all reveal information about the callers private activities . Many charities
and political groups also now accept donations via text message, so a record of a message sent to one number could reveal the
users political affiliation.
people not suspected of any wrongdoing clearly risks chilling freedom of speech,
If an American citizen lies to a federal investigator, even if not under oath, the citizen can be arrested, prosecuted, and sent to prison. Yet, these same
federal personnel can lie to Congress and to citizens with impunity.
Constitution is being ignored and domestic law violated. Why? Does the US government have an undeclared agenda for which the "terrorist threat" is a
cover? What is this agenda? Whose agenda is more important than the US Constitution and the accountability of government to law?
No citizen
keep the "terrorist threat" alive in the public's mind. At last count, there have been 150 "sting operations" in which the FBI recruits people, who are out of
touch with reality, to engage in a well-paid FBI designed plot. Once the dupes agree, they are arrested as terrorists and the plot revealed, always with the
accompanying statement that the public was never in any danger as the FBI was in control. When 99 percent of all terrorism is organized by the FBI, why
do we need NSA spying on every communication of every American and on people in the rest of the world? Terrorism seldom comes from outside. The
source almost always is the government in power. The Czarist secret police set off bombs in order to blame and arrest labor agitators. The Nazis burned
terrorist
threat is a way of using fear to block popular objection to the exercise of arbitrary
government power. In order to be "safe from terrorists," the US population, with few objections, has accepted the demise of their civil
down the Reichstag in order to decimate the communists and assume unaccountable power in the name of "public safety." An alleged
liberties, such as habeas corpus, which reaches back centuries to Magna Carta as a constraint on government power. How, then, are they safe from their
government? Americans today are in the same position as the English prior to the Great Charter of 1215. Americans are no longer protected by law and
the Constitution from government tyranny. The reason the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution was to make citizens safe from their government. If
citizens allow the government to take away the Constitution, they might be safe from foreign terrorists, but they are no longer safe from their government.
Who do you think has more power over you, foreign terrorists or "your" government? Washington defines all resistance to its imperialism and tyranny as
"terrorism." Thus, Americans who defend the environment, who defend wildlife, who defend civil liberties and human rights, who protest Washington's
wars and robbery of the people on behalf of special interests, all become "domestic extremists," the term Homeland Security has substituted for
"terrorist." Those who are out of step with Washington and the powerful private interests that exploit us, other peoples, and the earth for their profits and
aiding an undefined enemy, and as seeking to overthrow the government by casting aspersions on its motives and revealing its secret misdeeds. The
power-mad inhabitants of Washington have brought the US so close to Gestapo Germany and Stalinist Russia that it is no longer funny. Indeed, it is
sometimes difficult to see the difference. The neoconservatives have declared that Americans are the "exceptional" and "indispensable people." Yet, the
civil liberties of Americans have declined the more "exceptional" and "indispensable" that Americans become. We are now so exceptional and
indispensable that we no longer have any rights. And neither does the rest of the world. Neoconservatism has created a new dangerous American
Neoconservatives have given Washington a monopoly on right and endowed its military
aggressions with a morality that supersedes the Geneva Conventions and human rights. Washington,
nationalism.
justified by its "exceptionalism," has the right to attack populations in countries with which Washington is not at war, such as Pakistan and Yemen.
Washington is using the cover of its "exceptionalism" to murder people in many countries. Hitler tried to market the exceptionalism of the German people,
traitors who,
exceptional nation" have a diplomatic policy? How can a neoconized State Department be based on anything except coercion? It can't. That is why
Washington produces nothing but war and threats of war. Wherever a person looks, whatever a person hears, it is Washington's threat -- "we are going to
bomb you into the stone age" if you don't do what we want and agree to what we require. We are going to impose "sanctions," Washington's euphemism
for embargoes, and starve your women and children to death, permit no medical supplies, ban you from the international payments system unless you
relent and consent to being Washington's puppet, and ban you from posting your news broadcasts on the Internet. This is the face that Washington
presents to the world: the hard, mean face of a tyrant. Washington's power will survive a bit longer, because there are still politicians in Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, Asia, Latin America and in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the NGOs in Russia, who are paid off by the almighty dollar. In exchange for
Washington's money, they endorse Washington's immorality and murderous destruction of law and life. But the dollar is being destroyed by Quantitative
Easing, and the domestic US economy is being destroyed by jobs offshoring. Rome was powerful until the Germans ceased to believe it. Then the rotten
Journalists interviewed for this report described the difficulty of obtaining sources and
covering sensitive topics in an atmosphere of uncertainty about the range and effect of the
governments power over them. Both surveillance and leak investigations loomed large in this contextespecially to
the extent that there may be a relationship between the two. More specifically, many journalists see the governments power as
menacing because they know little about when various government agencies share among themselves information collected
through surveillance, and when they deploy that information in leak investigations.71 [Government officials have been] very
squishy about what they have and [what they] will do with it, observed James Asher, Washington Bureau Chief for McClatchy Co.,
the third largest newspaper group in the country.72 One Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for a newspaper noted that
[also]
even a
get clear
lines about what is collectable and usable. 73 Others agreed. Im pretty worried
that NSA information will make its way into leak investigations, said one investigative journalist for a major outlet.74 A reporter who
covers national defense expressed concern about the possibility of a porous wall between the NSA and the Department of Justice,
the latter of which receives referrals connected to leak investigations.75 Jonathan Landay wondered whether the government might
analyze metadata records to identify his contacts.76 A national security reporter summarized the situation as follows: Do we trust
[the intelligence] portion of the governments knowledge to be walled off from leak investigations? Thats not a good place to be.77
While most journalists said that their difficulties began a few years ago, particularly with the increase in leak prosecutions,
our
2011- 2020 as the Biodiversity Decade with the chief objective of enabling humans to live peaceably or harmoniously with nature
and its biodiversity. We should be happy that during October 1-19, 2012, XI Conference of Parties (CoP-11), a global mega event on
biodiversity, is taking place in Hyderabad, when delegates from 193 party countries are expected to meet. They will review the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was originally introduced at the Earth Summit or the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) is the nodal
agency for CoP-11. Today, India is one of the 17 mega-diverse (richest biodiversity) countries.
basic needs for our healthy survival oxygen , food , medicines , fibre, fuel, energy,
fertilizers, fodder and waste-disposal, etc. Fast vanishing honeybees, dragonflies, bats, frogs, house sparrows, filter
(suspension)-feeder oysters and all keystone species are causing great economic loss as well as posing an
imminent threat to human peace and survival. The three-fold biodiversity mission before us is to inventorise the
existing biodiversity, conserve it, and, above all, equitably share the sustainable benefits out of it.
Global changes, from habitat loss and invasive species to anthropogenic climate change, have initiated
the sixth great mass extinction event in Earths history. As species become
threatened and vanish, so too do the broader ecosystems and myriad benefits to
hotspots over the past two decades and present an analysis of their biodiversity, updated to the current set of 35
We then discuss past and future efforts needed to conserve them, sustaining their
fundamental role both as the home of a substantial fraction of global biodiversity and as
regions.
depends.
temperature and
thus reduce
MYTH Global warming and extra CO2 will actually be beneficial they reduce cold-related deaths and stimulate
crop growth. FACT
disruption. Even a warming in just the middle range of scientific projections would have devastating impacts
on many sectors of the economy. Rising seas would inundate coastal communities, contaminate water supplies with
salt and increase the risk of flooding by storm surge, affecting tens of millions of people globally. Moreover, extreme
weather events, including heat waves, droughts and floods, are predicted to increase in frequency and intensity,
causing loss of lives and property and throwing agriculture into turmoil. Even though higher levels of CO2 can act as
years as plants acclimate. Furthermore, increased CO2 may benefit undesirable, weedy species more than desirable
species. Higher levels of CO2 have already caused ocean acidification, and scientists are warning of potentially
devastating effects on marine life and fisheries. Moreover, higher levels of regional ozone (smog), a result of
warmer temperatures, could worsen respiratory illnesses. Less developed countries and natural ecosystems may
not have the capacity to adapt. The notion that there will be regional winners and losers in global warming is
based on a world-view from the 1950s. We live in a global community. Never mind the moral implications when
an environmental catastrophe creates millions of refugees half-way around the world, Americans are affected. MYTH
The global
warming we are experiencing is not natural. People are causing it. People are
causing global warming by burning fossil fuels (like oil, coal and natural gas) and cutting down
forests. Scientists have shown that these activities are pumping far more CO2 into the
atmosphere than was ever released in hundreds of thousands of years. This
buildup of CO2 is the biggest cause of global warming . Since 1895, scientists have
Global warming is just part of a natural cycle. The Arctic has warmed up in the past. FACT
known that CO2 and other greenhouse gases trap heat and warm the earth. As the warming has intensified over the
past three decades, scientific scrutiny has increased along with it. Scientists have considered and ruled out other,
natural explanations such as sunlight, volcanic eruptions and cosmic rays. (IPCC 2001) Though natural amounts of
CO2 have varied from 180 to 300 parts per million (ppm), today's CO2 levels are around 380 ppm. That's 25% more
than the highest natural levels over the past 650,000 years. Increased CO2 levels have contributed to periods of
higher average temperatures throughout that long record. (Boden, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center) As
for previous Arctic warming, it is true that there were stretches of warm periods over the Arctic earlier in the 20th
century. The limited records available for that time period indicate that the warmth did not affect as many areas or
persist from year to year as much as the current warmth. But that episode, however warm it was, is not relevant to
the issue at hand. Why? For one, a brief regional trend does not discount a longer global phenomenon. We know
that the planet has been warming over the past several decades and Arctic ice has been melting persistently. And
unlike the earlier periods of Arctic warmth, there is no expectation that the current upward trend in Arctic
temperatures will reverse; the rising concentrations of greenhouse gases will prevent that from happening. MYTH
We can adapt to climate change civilization has survived droughts and temperature shifts before. FACT Although
humans as a whole have survived the vagaries of drought, stretches of warmth and cold and more, entire societies
have collapsed from dramatic climatic shifts. The current warming of our climate will bring major hardships and
economic dislocations untold human suffering, especially for our children and grandchildren. We are already
seeing significant costs from today's global warming which is caused by greenhouse gas pollution. Climate has
changed in the past and human societies have survived, but today six billion people depend on interconnected
densely populated areas, such as low-lying coastal regions, are highly vulnerable to climate shifts. A middle-of-therange projection is that the homes of 13 to 88 million people around the world would be flooded by the sea each
year in the 2080s. Poorer countries and small island nations will have the hardest time adapting. (McLean et al.
2001) In what appears to be the first forced move resulting from climate change, 100 residents of Tegua island in
the Pacific Ocean were evacuated by the government because rising sea levels were flooding their island. Some
2,000 other islanders plan a similar move to escape rising waters. In the United States, the village of Shishmaref in
Alaska, which has been inhabited for 400 years, is collapsing from melting permafrost. Relocation plans are in the
works. <continues> Scarcity of water and food could lead to major conflicts with broad ripple effects throughout
the globe. Even if people find a way to adapt, the wildlife and plants on which we depend may be unable to adapt to
rapid climate change. While the world itself will not end, the world as we know it may disappear. MYTH Recent cold
winters and cool summers dont feel like global warming to me. FACT While different pockets of the country have
experienced some cold winters here and there, the overall trend is warmer winters. Measurements show that over
the last century the Earths climate has warmed overall, in all seasons, and in most regions. Climate skeptics
mislead the public when they claim that the winter of 20032004 was the coldest ever in the northeastern United
States. That winter was only the 33rd coldest in the region since records began in 1896. Furthermore, a single year
of cold weather in one region of the globe is not an indication of a trend in the global climate, which refers to a longterm average over the entire planet. MYTH Global warming cant be happening because some glaciers and ice
sheets are growing, not shrinking. FACT In most parts of the world, the retreat of glaciers has been dramatic. The
best available scientific data indicate that Greenland's massive ice sheet is shrinking. Between 1961 and 1997, the
worlds glaciers lost 890 cubic miles of ice. The consensus among scientists is that rising air temperatures are the
most important factor behind the retreat of glaciers on a global scale over long time periods. Some glaciers in
western Norway, Iceland and New Zealand have been expanding during the past few decades. That expansion is a
result of regional increases in storm frequency and snowfall rather than colder temperatures not at all
incompatible with a global warming trend. In Greenland, a NASA satellite that can measure the ice mass over the
whole continent has found that although there is variation from month to month, over the longer term, the ice is
disappearing. In fact, there are worrisome signs that melting is accelerating: glaciers are moving into the ocean
twice as fast as a decade ago, and, over time, more and more glaciers have started to accelerate. What is most
alarming is the prediction, based on model calculations and historical evidence, that an approximately 5.4 degree
Fahrenheit increase in local Greenland temperatures will lead to irreversible meltdown and a sea-level rise of over
20 feet. Since the Arctic is warming 2-3 times faster than the global average, this tipping point is not far away. The
only study that has shown increasing ice mass in Greenland only looked at the interior of the ice sheet, not at the
edges where melting occurs. This is actually in line with climate model predictions that global warming would lead
to a short-term accumulation of ice in the cold interior due to heavier snowfall. (Similarly, scientists have predicted
that Antarctica overall will gain ice in the near future due to heavier snowfall.) The scientists who published the
study were careful to point out that their results should not be used to conclude that Greenland's ice mass as a
whole is growing. In addition, their data suggested that the accumulation of snow in the middle of the continent is
likely to decrease over time as global warming continues. MYTH Accurate weather predictions a few days in
advance are hard to come by. Why on earth should we have confidence in climate projections decades from now?
FACT Climate prediction is fundamentally different from weather prediction, just as climate is different from weather.
It is often more difficult to make an accurate weather forecast than a climate prediction. The accuracy of weather
forecasting is critically dependent upon being able to exactly and comprehensively characterize the present state of
the global atmosphere. Climate prediction relies on other, longer ranging factors. For instance, we might not know if
it will be below freezing on a specific December day in New England, but we know from our understanding of the
region's climate that the temperatures during the month will generally be low. Similarly, climate tells us that Seattle
and London tend to be rainy, Florida and southern California are usually warm, and the Southwest is often dry and
hot. Todays climate models can now reproduce the observed global average climates over the past century and
beyond. Such findings have reinforced scientists confidence in the capacity of models to produce reliable
projections of future climate. Current climate assessments typically consider the results from a range of models and
scenarios for future heat-trapping emissions in order to identify the most likely range for future climatic change.
The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that
the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we
are to avoid climate chaos , crop failures , endless wars , melting of the
polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon
dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and
rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution,
or else
survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen,
business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying
capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario,
die
billions will
of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces
greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement
that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to
have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters
(including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no"
Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction
industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."
Observations of ecosystem impacts are difficult to use in future projections because of the complexities involved in
questions of how vulnerable populations will adapt to direct and indirect effects associated with climate change.
CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind,
half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and
diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming
of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus
statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial
sophisticated
statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to
determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied
issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone),
from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we
used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones)
and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and
part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used
hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased
our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the
emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions ; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for
beautiful sunsets and cool the earths surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El
Nio and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the flattening of the recent
temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual
FACT: There is no debate among scientists about the basic facts of global
warming. The most respected scientific bodies have stated unequivocally
that global warming is occurring, and people are causing it by burning fossil fuels (like
coal, oil and natural gas) and cutting down forests. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which in 2005 the White
House called "the gold standard of objective scientific assessment ," issued a
joint statement with 10 other National Academies of Science saying "the scientific
understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking
prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial
and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." (Joint Statement of Science Academies: Global Response to
The only debate in the science community about global warming is about
how much and how fast warming will continue as a result of heat-trapping
emissions. Scientists have given a clear warning about global warming,
and we have more than enough facts about causes and fixes to
implement solutions right now.
Climate Change [PDF], 2005)
The accuracy of computer models that predict climate change over the coming
decades has been the subject of debate among politicians, environmentalists and even scientists.
A new study by meteorologists at the University of Utah shows that
current climate models are quite accurate and can be valuable tools for those seeking
solutions on reversing global warming trends. Most of these models project a global warming trend that amounts to
about 7 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 100 years. Scientific opinion on climate change In the study, co-authors
Reichler and Junsu Kim from the Department of Meteorology at the University of Utah
investigate how well climate models actually do their job in simulating climate. To
this end, they compare the output of the models against observations for
present climate. The authors apply this method to about 50 different national and
international models that were developed over the past two decades at
major climate research centers in China, Russia, Australia, Canada, France,
Korea, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Of course, also included
is the very latest model generation that was used for the very recent (2007)
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). "Coupled models are
becoming increasingly reliable tools for understanding climate and climate change,
and the best models are now capable of simulating present-day climate with
accuracy approaching conventional atmospheric observations," said Reichler.
"We can now place a much higher level of confidence in model-based
projections of climate change than in the past." The many hours of studying models and
Thomas
comparing them with actual climate changes fulfills the increasing wish to know how much one can trust climate
Why are the same scientists and political forces that succeeded in controlling the threat to the ozone layer now
failing miserably to deal with the global warming crisis? Though we depend on fossil fuels far more than we ever did
on CFCs, there is plenty of blame to go around. Scientists present the facts about climate change clinically, failing
Supporters of public TV or
advertisers, with their own special interests, require "balance" as a price for their
continued financial support. Gore's book reveals that while more than half of the recent
newspaper articles on climate change have given equal weight to such contrarian
views, virtually none of the scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals
have questioned the consensus that emissions from human activities
cause global warming. As a result, even when the scientific evidence is clear,
technical nit-picking by contrarians leaves the public with the false
impression that there is still great scientific uncertainty about the reality
and causes of climate change.
The
surveillance and the knowledge that it is doing so on an unprecedented scalehas made their concerns
about how to protect sources much more acute and real. In fact, some believed that
surveillance may be a direct cause of the spike in leak
investigations. It used to be that leak investigations didnt get far because it
was too hard to uncover the source, but with digital tools it's just much easier, and sources
know that. observed Bart Gellman.98 Peter Maass, a senior writer at The Intercept, concurred: Leak
investigations are a lot easier because you leave a data trail calling, swiping in and out of
buildings, [and] walking down a street with cameras. Its a lot easier for people to know where youre going and how long youre
That
has made it realistic [to investigate leaks] in a way that it wasnt before .100 Peter Finn,
there.99 Charlie Savage raised a similar point: [E]lectronic trails mak[e] it easier to figure out whos talking to reporters.
the National Security Editor at the Washington Post, expressed concern that the governments ability to find the source will only get
better.
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
Adding to the challenge of developing sources that are already skittish is the fact that
surveillance makes it very difficult for journalists to communicate with them securely.
Calling or emailing can leave a trail between the journalist and the source ; and it can be
difficult to get casual contacts to take more elaborate security measures to communicate. [H]ow do you even get
going? asked Bart Gellman, referring to the challenge of making first contact with a
new would-be source without leaving a trace. By the time you're both ready to talk
about more delicate subjects, youve left such a trail that even if you start using burner phones or
anonymous email accounts
youre already linked. 116 A national security reporter noted, [Ideally,] you
bump into people. [Thats] tough to arrange, though, without [creating a] record. [You] find yourself using phone and email to set
up a chance to talk. If thats completely forbidden, then we are really in trouble.117 As a result, according to Peter Finn, both
approaching
sources in person from the outset can also be quite difficult. The time and effort
required physically to locate specific sources can be prohibitive. Moreover, some
sources simply do not want reporters to know their identities, so they wont necessarily
want to meet face to face initially.119 That can push journalists back toward more conventionaland traceablemethods
of making contact.120 This sort of situation can leave reporters feeling increasingly
frustrated.121
parties want to move faster toward a more direct relationship that requires less electronic contact.118 Yet
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
Even with rapidly evolving techniques for conducting research and contacting sources,
journalists expressed concern that widespread government surveillance constrains their
ability to investigate and report on matters of public concern, and ultimately
undermines democratic processes by hindering open, informed debate. One of the
most common concerns journalists expressed to us was that their sources were
drying up.78 According to James Asher, [Before] youd start pulling the curtain back and more people would come forward.
Many fewer people are coming forward now.79
Mass call tracking negates safeguards the government has pledged in response to
threats to journalism. As a consequence of the outcry over the AP and Fox News
seizures, the D epartment o f J ustice revisited its rules for issuing subpoenas and search
warrants to the media. See generally Department of Justice, Report on Review of News Media Policies (July 12, 2013),
http://1.usa.gov/12mkn9B. Among other things, the Justice Department
news media advance notice of a subpoena , except in rare cases where notice poses a clear and substantial threat
to the investigation, risks grave harm to national security, or presents an imminent risk of death or bodily harm. Id. at 2. Such notice
is given so that members of the news media [have] the opportunity to engage with the Department regarding the proposed use of
investigative tools to obtain communications or business records[.] Id. The report says the Justice Department also will create a
News Media Review Committee to provide oversight of media-related investigations, see id. at 4, and that journalists would not be
considered suspects for ordinary newsgathering activities, see id. at 3. In addition, the Obama administration has asked Congress
to adopt a federal shield law, which would give journalists a qualified privilege not to testify about information from confidential
sources. See Jack Komperda, White House, lawmakers push for federal reporter shield law in wake of AP phone records seizure, The
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press (May 15, 2013), http://rcfp.org/x?0lyA. President Obama also has pledged to reform the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which decides the constitutionality of many NSA programs. Transcript of President Obamas
Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/13pyCLa. In addition to ordering the declassification of some of the Courts
opinions, President Obama has said he would take steps to allow an adversary to argue before the Court, which now only hears from
a government official. Id. Further, the Presidential Review Group tasked with evaluating the call tracking program recognized that
the potential danger of leaks must be balanced against the responsibility of the press to ferret out and expose information that
government officials would prefer to keep secret when such secrecy is unwarranted. Presidential Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, 127 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1cBct0k.
By
the
concrete harms that flow from large-scale surveillance. I mean, weve been having
this debate in the country over the last year about what surveillance means for the society and what we
should do about it, but we focus a lot on abstract harms to privacy . And while those are important, as well, I
think its really helpful to have something to point to , to say, "Look, this is what were losing.
Journalists are losing sources , and so less information reaches the public.
Attorneys are losing the ability to be secure in their communications, and that undermines their ability to represent their clients."
AMY GOODMAN:
Give us examples. ALEX SINHA: So, I mean, I had many attorneys talk about how they feel
obligated to warn their clients that their communications are not actually confidential, that theres a chance that somebody could
pick up what theyre saying, and therefore that in order to build their case strategy or in order to exchange basic facts about their
Some
journalists independently spoke directly to this point. One suggested that a pair of sizable leaks in
chilling effect
in part, supplying two specific streams of classified information.406 Indeed, some of the journalists we
penalties
require, the use of a telephone. Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently recognized, cell phones are
such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might
conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, __ (2014)
(slip op., at 9).
Confidential relationships
reporting and an informed public , but constant call tracking requires journalists
sources to completely avoid one of the most (if not the most) commonly used
communications channels in order to attempt to guarantee confidentiality. As a result, government
monitoring via mass call tracking limits journalists ability to gather information in
the public interest. The result is self-censorship by sources and journalists and harm to the
public discourse.
and
General threads
For all its interest in promoting human rights around the world, youd think the
United States would be more sensitive to the ways its own surveillance policies
undermine those very rights. Over the last few years, U.S. officials say they have spent more
than $125 million to advance Internet freedom, which the State Department
describes as a foreign policy priority. The U.S. rightly links Internet freedom with the
freedoms of expression , peaceful assembly, and association , as well as with
the work of human rights defenders . It makes sense, therefore, that the U.S. also actively
Internet freedom,
questions raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some
international human rights and constitutional law set
limits on the states authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other
The
cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the same time,
rights. The
countries
global digital
freedom
, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.
As the internet has grown in usage and importance in our daily lives, so too has the
difficulty of keeping it free from censorship and control. This struggle was important
enough to 29-year-old former Booz Allen employee Edward Snowden for him to give up his life, career, and
freedom to leak a historic amount of classified information about the shocking size and depth of the American
surveillance state. The fallout is just beginning and as of now, there are far more questions than
the credibility of the idea that the internet can be
a positive, freedom-promoting global force is facing its largest challenge to date. And it
comes directly from one of its most outspoken supporters: the US government. Simply put,
our government has failed in its role as the caretaker of the internet. Although this
was never an official designation, America controls much of the infrastructure, and many
answers. One thing has become clear though:
of the most popular services online are provided by a handful of American companies. The world is starting to sober up to the fact
that much of what theyve done online in the last decade is now cataloged in a top-secret facility somewhere in the United States.
Reasonable minds can disagree over the necessity of these programs and how to
strike the proper balance between security and privacy. These matters aside, what has been the
most disturbing part of this entire scandal has to do with the lack of accountability and oversight. Not only were the American
people kept in the dark they were lied to by intelligence officials, misled about possible constitutional violations, and potentially
undermined by the very courts that were supposed to protect their rights. The government has used peculiar interpretations of laws
that they are not even willing to discuss to defend an invasive collection of personal data beyond anything even the paranoid
among us would have thought was possible. And while President Obama welcomes the debate over an issue he has worked hard
to keep secret, we are now starting to see the usual Washington tactics of political spin, feverish scapegoating, and patriotic
grandstanding in lieu of a real discussion. We should all be extremely concerned about the colossal surveillance infrastructure that is
being built in the name of our safety. In trying to reassure the public, our leaders have told us that these programs are not meant to
target us, but instead, foreigners who may pose a threat to our security. But this is merely a decision on how the data is being used
today we are getting into very dangerous territory by hoping for the best intentions of whoever is in power in the future. American
history holds many lessons for us here: circumstances can change, the perception of who is a threat can vary with whoever is in
In the court of
global public opinion, America may have tarnished its moral authority to question
the surveillance practices of other nations whether it be Russia on monitoring journalists, or China on
conducting cyber espionage. Declarations by the State Department that were once statements
of principle now ring hollow and hypocritical to some. No nation can rival the American surveillance state,
office, and we cannot predict what our political situation will look like decades, or even years, from now.
but they no longer need support to build their own massive systems of espionage and oppression. The costs of surveillance and data
but we may have also potentially created a blueprint for how authoritarian
governments can store, track, and mine their citizens digital lives.
The United States scored pretty high on the Internet freedom scale. Freedom
House considers a score of zero to 30 to represent a "free" Internet , 31-60 "partly
free", and 61-100 not free. Scores were determined by considering a set of "21 questions and nearly
100 accompanying subpoints" surrounding
(infrastructural
(et al; Eileen Donahoe, director of global affairs at Human Rights Watch, represents the organization
worldwide on human rights foreign policy, especially with respect to Internet freedom, security and
governance. Donahoe previously served as the first US Ambassador to the United Nations Human
Rights Council in Geneva. She has been a scholar at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Brazil as the
Global Guardian of Internet Freedom? HRW website - February 13, 2015 http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/brazil-global-guardian-internet-freedom)
Until fairly recently, Internet governance was a term that made peoples eyes glaze over. It has now become one of the most
dynamic and challenging topics on the global political agenda. Digitization has escalated exponentially in the past several years, but
It would be hard to overstate the extent to which Edward Snowdens disclosures about US mass surveillance techniques in the post9/11 period have shaken up geopolitical dynamics on Internet freedom, security and governance over the past year. Even before
Snowden, many governments had recognized the revolutionary, disintermediating and disruptive capacities of the Internet, and the
corresponding empowerment of their citizens. Unfortunately, though, some chose to respond to the blossoming of free expression
on the Internet by clamping down on social media, monitoring online activists, and imposing new restrictions on digital
communications. Others chose to place themselves at the forefront of international reform, creating new momentum for a more
moves have shaken up previous geopolitical alignments and challenged governments around the world to take a stand to ensure
The U.S. government should internationalize its Internet freedom efforts. The push for
online freedom,
States alone.
Promoting Internet freedom must not be merely an element of American foreign policy, but rather
Internet freedom in countries around the world has declined sharply in the past year
despite a pushback from activists that successfully blocked some governments repressive laws, according to a new
report. The study, by advocacy group Freedom House, looked at online trends in 60
countries, evaluating each nation them based on obstacles to access, limits to content and violations of user rights. It found
that in 35 of the countries monitored, governments had expanded their legal and technical
surveillance powers in regards to citizen's online activities. Broad
surveillance , new laws controlling web content and growing arrests of social media users drove a
worldwide decline in Internet freedom in the past year , the authors of
the report concluded. Of the countries included in the research, Iceland came top in terms of giving its citizens the highest level of
freedom. China, Cuba and Iran were listed as the most restrictive for a second consecutive year. The report noted that declines in
online freedom in three democracies Brazil, India and the United States were especially troubling.
former National Security Agency contractor Edward
Revelations by
the U.S. government's domestic surveillance activities, and the report says the
changes in U.S. online freedom are on a "significant" negative trajectory. Despite a 5point decline in its score as a result of its controversial domestic spying, the U.S. still made it to fourth in
Freedom Houses list. A growing fear of social media being used to organize national protests led
many governments to pass laws restricting freedom of expression online , the report notes.
Since May 2012, 24 countries have adopted some form of legislation restricting internet
freedom. Bangladesh imposed a prison sentence of 14 years on a group of
bloggers for writing posts criticizing Islam. At least 10 people were arrested in
Brazils civil society, as well as the multi-stakeholder entity CGI.br, deserve a great deal of credit for
But the
years ahead will require even greater commitment and
leadership , to ensure that Internet governance and regulation protect
and strengthen rights, rather than undermine them. Domestically, the
skillfully guiding the Brazilian government toward such positive outcomes on Marco Civil and NETmundial.
to challenge its BRICS partners on their performance on digital rights and security as well.
The news, Im afraid, is dire. The Internet is about to be destroyed by big media. It is about be
killed by two Congressional bills The ProtectIP and The Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA) that all-powerful big media lobbyists are now pushing through Congress. These bills will censor the Internet, turn it into
China, censor it, destroy its innovation and value. Big media is going nuclear against the DMCA, thus writes the
author and serial entrepreneur Ashkan Karbasfrooshan, arguing that ProtectIP and COPA will spell the end of the Internet as we
know it. Techcrunchs Devin Coldeway,
switch , says it is a desperate power grab by a diminishing elite. CNET columnist Molly Wood chimes in that SOPA is
brazen and nightmarish and warns that it will result in a copyright police state. The Obama administration is busy in bed with
Hollywood, she warns, cheerfully ceding your rights to the MPAA and RIAA. Even the VCs are worried. Union Square Ventures
Fred Wilson, argues that these bills were written by the content industry without any input from the technology industry. The
problem, Wilson explains, is that the content industry is not creating new jobs right now and thus, by establishing a destructive
legal environment for start-ups, SOPA and ProtectIP will supposedly kill the golden goose to protect industries in decline.
But
theres a problem with all this bad news. Its wrong . Almost entirely wrong.
No, the Internet isnt about to be destroyed by either ProtectIP or SOPA. The
technology industry has had input into the political process. Neither
ProtectIP nor SOPA are unconstitutional or nuclear options designed to kill the DMCA. The administration
isnt in bed, either literally or metaphorically, with big media and the US government isnt the villain in this story. The technology
industry notably Google, who were invited to the Congressional hearings on the legislation has had significant input into the
political process. Most importantly, this legislation by fighting the corrosive impact of counterfeiting and piracy on the American
marketplace is designed to make our domestic economy stronger, protect jobs both on and offline and encourage innovation in our
digital knowledge economy. So what, exactly, are ProtectIP and SOPA? Rather than being seen as a replacement for the U.S. Digital
Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), the genesis of these pieces of legislation ProtectIP being authored by the Senate and SOPA by the
House is the need for legal tools to fight primarily online criminals who operate outside of the U.S. jurisdiction and U.S. companies
who, often unwittingly, sustain them. Rogue sites legislation exists in parallel to the DMCA and is intended to stop criminal
enterprises from accessing US markets online in ways that they would never be able to do offline. Whatever one might think of some
of the details of these bills (no, they arent perfect, especially the sometimes sloppily written and occasionally misguided SOPA),
they are designed to address a serious problem of the online economy foreign criminals and companies which use the Internet to
sell or distribute illegal or counterfeit goods to American consumers. These companies extend from those that sell advertising off the
back of pirated movies to those selling fake drugs online. It is undeniable that rogue websites organizations which sell counterfeit
goods or peddle stolen intellectual property are a significant drain on the US economy. Borrowing numbers from various
government and private sector experts, it is estimated by one House committee that intellectual property theft alone costs the US
economy over $100 billion per year. And as The Guardian reported in September, in its investigation of the impact of fake drugs
sales on the UK marketplace, there are almost 13,000 fake pharmacy websites most facilitated by Chinese or Russian criminal
organizations, according to the UKs Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority (MHRA). Not only, therefore, are SOPA
and ProtectIP addressing a set of genuinely costly economic issues, but theyve also in the best Madisonian tradition of
representative democracy assembled a broad coalition of supporters for these bills. No, neither SOPA nor ProtectIP reflect the
Administration being in bed with Hollywood. I talked earlier this week to Steven Tepp, the US Chamber of Commerces online
piracy and anti-counterfeiting chief, who reminded me that the bipartisan Senate bill had just won its 40th co-sponsor and that 350
organizations including pharmaceutical giants like Eli Lilly and Johnson & Johnson as well as Nike, Caterpillar and Major League
of Mayors,
the AFL-CIO and The National Consumer League are also in favor. And so is
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who early this month, in defense of legislation that seeks to make it impossible for American
backers never expected an easy victory . But outrage at the five-day shutdown
of Egypt's once-flourishing internet
(used by 20m people there) and its mobile-phone network (used by 55m)
has
Laws that govern radio and television broadcasts already give the American authorities the right to shut bits of the internet, they
argue. The new bill merely clarifies and limits such powers. These would be needed, for example, if hackers took control of nuclear
facilities, or were about to open the Hoover dam. Critics call this scaremongering and fear that the White House will gain
unnecessarily sweeping powers. The people who run the networks are themselves best-placed to keep them safe, they argue. Either
way,
in America the size and complexity of the networks, coupled with the fierce protection
of laws guaranteeing free speech, make blackout or manipulation on an Egyptian scale almost
unthinkable.
A remote kill switch, even if authorised, would be hugely complex and expensive to build and run,
though some worry that the new cybersecurity agencies proposed by lawmakers are just the kind of bodies that would have a go.
Bush and Obama administrations have both sought to promote Internet freedom by
shaping international norms. Developing international norms is a long-term, global objective. Some
The
countries that currently repress that Internet access like China , Iran and
But promoting Internet freedom is not only a near-term effort, and current efforts
may pay off in the long run. Many countries have not yet fully developed their own
policies.
Internet
policies
of Internet freedom
in the
short run including states in Central Asia , the Middle East and
Africa . Shaping the behavior of those states should be an important goal of the
United States
Prior to these disclosures, the United States was considered a world leader in
promoting Internet freedom. It made it a signature part of American foreign
policy and spent millions of dollars supporting new tools to protect the digital privacy of human rights
activists globally. But the last year has deeply undermined global trust in U.S.
leadership in this area, not to mention its commitment to the rule of law and transparency in government. If this
trust continues to erode, it will have huge ramifications for U.S. business and foreign
policy interests. Technology companies are already losing billions of dollars and overseas customers who want their data
stored away from the snooping eyes of the U.S. government. Studies estimate a loss of between $35
billion and $180 billon to the U.S. cloud computer industry over the next three years. And U.S.
Internet freedom typically includes two dimensions. Freedom of the Internet denotes the
freedoms of online expression, assembly and association the extension to cyberspace of rights that
have been widely recognized to exist outside it. Promoting freedom of the Internet merely expands to
cyberspace a tradition of U.S. diplomatic and financial support for human rights abroad. Freedom via the Internet,
the notion that new communications technologies aid the establishment of democracy
and liberal society offline, is at once more alluring and hotly contested. Internet freedom in this sense has
captured the imagination of many policymakers and experts who see in these technologies a tool for individuals to help move their
societies away from authoritarianism and toward democracy. Though the links between democracy and Internet freedom are indirect
firewalls and communicate securely. But funding technology comprises just one
Global economic growth should increase over the next two years with continuing signs of
improvement, according to the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014 (WESP) report, launched today. The
global economy is expected to grow at a pace of 3.0 per cent in 2014 and 3.3 per cent in 2015, compared with an estimated growth
of 2.1 per cent for 2013. The world economy experienced subdued growth for a second year in 2013, but some
improvements in the last quarter have led to the UNs more positive forecast. The euro area
has finally ended a protracted recession. Growth in the United States strengthened somewhat. A few large emerging economies,
including China and India, managed to backstop the deceleration they experienced in the past two years and veered upwards
moderately. These factors point to increasing global growth. According to WESP, inflation will remain tame worldwide, but the
employment situation will continue to be challenging. While growth in international trade flows is expected to pick up moderately to
4.7 per cent in 2014, the prices of most primary commodities are projected to be flat, although any unexpected supply-side shocks,
including geo-political tensions, could push some of these prices higher. The report warns that international capital flows to
emerging economies are expected to become more volatile. Our
risk
factors, unfolding unexpectedly , could derail the world economy far beyond
the reports projections.
the ideal state of the world would be where the safety net is not
needed at all.
During the so called Great Moderation years, a sanguine view of the international monetary
system, expressed by Rose (2006) for example, was that advanced economies with floating exchange rates and
reignited debates about its role. This is very much a live debate, as continued
global
chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from
America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not
know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist
The threat of
instability is a pressing concern . China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just
reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced
upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year . A sustained downturn poses grave and
possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced
economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems.
with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's
Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its
Far East as well as in downtown Moscow . Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil
liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression
inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is
likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict.
neighbors.
As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency
economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this
decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010;
Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is
Europe as a whole
will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from
haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets.
poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five
million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2
million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe.
A prolonged
(Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, The Axis of Upheaval, Foreign Policy, February
16th, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/the_axis_of_upheaval)
The Bush years have of course revealed the perils of drawing facile parallels between the challenges of the present day and the
organized violence more or less predictable in the last century. The first factor was ethnic disintegration: Violence was worst in areas
structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody. In at least one of the worlds regionsthe greater
Middle Easttwo of these three factors have been present for some time: Ethnic conflict has been rife there for decades, and
following the difficulties and disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States already seems likely to begin winding down
its quasi-imperial presence in the region. It likely still will. Now the third variable, economic volatility, has returned with a vengeance.
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernankes Great Moderationthe supposed decline of economic volatility that he hailed in a
2004 lecturehas been obliterated by a financial chain reaction, beginning in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, spreading
through the banking system, reaching into the shadow system of credit based on securitization, and now triggering collapses in
asset prices and economic activity around the world. After nearly a decade of unprecedented growth, the global economy will almost
certainly sputter along in 2009, though probably not as much as it did in the early 1930s, because governments worldwide are
frantically trying to repress this new depression. But no matter how low interest rates go or how high deficits rise, there will be a
substantial increase in unemployment in most economies this year and a painful decline in incomes. Such
economic pain
nearly always has geopolitical consequences . Indeed, we can already see the first symptoms of the coming
upheaval. In the essays that follow, Jeffrey Gettleman describes Somalias endless anarchy , Arkady Ostrovsky
analyzes Russias new brand of aggression , and Sam Quinones explores Mexicos drug-war-fueled
misery. These, however, are just three case studies out of a possible nine or more. In Gaza, Israel has engaged in a
bloody effort to weaken Hamas. But whatever was achieved militarily must be set against the damage Israel did to
its international image by killing innocent civilians that Hamas fighters use as human shields. Perhaps more importantly, social and
economic conditions in Gaza, which were already bad enough, are now abysmal. This situation is hardly likely to strengthen the
forces of moderation among Palestinians. Worst of all,
radicalism throughout the regionnot least in Egypt. From Cairo to Riyadh, governments will now think twice before
committing themselves to any new Middle East peace initiative. Iran, meanwhile, continues to support both Hamas and its
Shiite counterpart in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and to pursue an alleged nuclear weapons program that Israelis legitimately
see as a threat to their very existence. No one can say for sure what will happen next within Tehrans complex political system, but it
Strategically, the country risks disaster by proceeding with its nuclear program, because even a purely Israeli air offensive would be
hugely disruptive. All this risk ought to point in the direction of conciliation, even accommodation, with the United States. But with
democratic governments in Kabul and Islamabad are two of the weakest anywhere. Among the biggest risks the world faces this
year is that one or both will break down amid escalating violence. Once again, the economic crisis is playing a crucial role. Pakistans
small but politically powerful middle class has been slammed by the collapse of the countrys stock market. Meanwhile, a rising
proportion of the countrys huge population of young men are staring unemployment in the face. It is not a recipe for political
the continuing violence in Sudans Darfur region, and the heart of darkness that is Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe. The
axis of upheaval has many members. And its a fairly safe bet that the roster will grow even longer this year. The problem is that, as
in the 1930s, most countries are looking inward, grappling with the domestic consequences of the economic crisis and paying little
attention to the wider world crisis. This is true even of the United States, which is now so preoccupied with its own economic
problems that countering global upheaval looks like an expensive luxury. With the U.S. rate of GDP growth set to contract between 2
and 3 percentage points this year, and with the official unemployment rate likely to approach 10 percent, all attention in Washington
will remain focused on a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package. Caution has been thrown to the wind by both the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury. The projected deficit for 2009 is already soaring above the trillion-dollar mark, more than 8 percent of GDP. Few
commentators are asking what all this means for U.S. foreign policy. The answer is obvious: The resources available for policing the
world are certain to be reduced for the foreseeable future. That will be especially true if foreign investors start demanding higher
yields on the bonds they buy from the United States or simply begin dumping dollars in exchange for other currencies.
the modern Guns versus Butter model, it first has to be noted that this
phrase was originally popularized in a time where securing economic prosperity was
a primary concern in nearly every nation. More importantly, when these nations did
experience economic collapse, nearly all of them chose Guns. There is no question that
Nazi aggression spawned World War II, however, what was happening in Europe
became a world war for a purpose as central to the heart of the capitalist as was the instantaneous end of
the holocaust to the heart of the compassionate; economic prosperity. Simply said, big wars are big
money; and to truly break from the embrace of the Great Depression, a big
commitment to the economy was necessary. And due to the leadership that guided
the balance between Guns and Butter in the US through World War II, the
economy was considerably improved; this was true for many western nations.
But before we look at
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world
launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal
response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks
Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other
nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under
such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then
compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of
economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level.
rhythms
in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power
and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative
power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances , increasing
the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain
redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a
rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996)
Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that
also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict
among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global
economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding
economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific
if the
expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as
energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to
use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased
benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,
trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,
others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed
conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between
internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic
downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing . Economic conflict lends to spawn
internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour . Moreover, the presence of a recession
tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts selfreinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked
with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which
has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore,
crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government . "Diversionary theory"
suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting
governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to
create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker
(2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated.
Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary
tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are
generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has
provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
economic
scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the
frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni
integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves
more attention.
The U nited S tates has set a dangerous precedent with its pervasive surveillance
apparatus and risks undermining global Internet freedom , Human Rights
Watch said on Tuesday in the groups annual world report, pressing the U.S. and other states that engage in mass surveillance and
espionage to commit to transparent and public review of their practices and laws. Since former intelligence contractor Edward
Snowden leaked that the N ational S ecurity A gency (NSA) was collecting domestic
communications in bulk and monitoring the personal calls and emails of world leaders, including heads of
countries allied with the U.S., rights groups have called on the U.S. to be more transparent about its mass surveillance, and to
extend privacy protections to foreign citizens. The U.S. now leads in ability for global data capture, but other nations and actors are
likely to catch up, Human Rights Watch said. In the end, there will be no safe haven if privacy is seen as a strictly domestic issue,
subject to many carve-outs and lax or nonexistent oversight.
online infrastructure within its borders. Brazil, a victim of NSA data collection, has
already called for the user data of its citizens on sites such as Facebook to be store
domestically. "An Internet that is violated by national sovereignty and territories is not going
to have the same promise in opening free expression as a global Internet ," Dinah
PoKempner, a legal expert with HRW, told Al Jazeera. Of principle concern, should the global Internet splinter , is
that oppressive governments would have greater control over how they censor their own
version of the Internet.
(Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant
movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. This evidence is
internally quoting Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier Fellow at Human Rights Watch and the American Civil
Liberties Union. This evidence is also internally quoting the report With Liberty to Monitor All: How
Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy,. That report is
based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists covering intelligence, national security, and
law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. US:
Surveillance Harming Journalism, Law, Democracy - July 28 - http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/28/ussurveillance-harming-journalism-law-democracy)
Large-scale US surveillance is seriously hampering US-based journalists and lawyers in their work, Human Rights Watch and the
American Civil Liberties Union said in a joint report released today.
to counsel, and ultimately
government to account , the groups said. The 120-page report, With Liberty to Monitor All: How LargeScale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, is based on extensive interviews with dozens of
journalists, lawyers, and senior US government officials. It documents how national security journalists and lawyers are adopting
elaborate steps or otherwise modifying their practices to keep communications, sources, and other confidential information secure
in light of revelations of unprecedented US government surveillance of electronic communications and transactions. The report finds
that
government surveillance and secrecy are undermining press freedom, the publics right to
information,
including unclassified matters that are of legitimate public concern. Many journalists described adopting elaborate techniques in an
environment of tremendous uncertainty in an effort to protect evidence of their interaction with sources. The techniques ranged
from using encryption and air-gapped computers (which stay completely isolated from unsecured networks, including the Internet),
to communicating with sources through disposable burner phones, to abandoning electronic communications altogether. Those
cumbersome new techniques are slowing down reporters in their pursuit of increasingly skittish sources, resulting in less information
reaching the public.
This situation has a direct effect on the publics ability to obtain important
to serve as a check on
government , Human Rights Watch and the ACLU found. Journalists expressed concern that, rather than being treated
as essential checks on government and partners in ensuring a healthy democratic debate, they may be viewed as suspect for doing
their jobs. One prominent journalist summed up what many seemed to be feeling: I dont want the government to force me to act
like a spy. Im not a spy; Im a journalist. The Impact of Surveillance on the Practice of Law For lawyers, large-scale surveillance has
created concerns about their ability to meet their professional responsibilities to maintain confidentiality of information related to
their clients. Failure to meet those responsibilities can result in discipline through professional organizations, or even lawsuits.
Lawyers also rely on the free exchange of information with their clients to build trust and develop legal strategy. Concerns over
government surveillance are making it harder for attorneys especially, but not exclusively, defense attorneys to build trust with
their clients or protect their legal strategies. Both problems corrode the ability of lawyers to represent their clients effectively. As
with the journalists, lawyers increasingly feel pressure to adopt strategies to avoid leaving a digital trail that could be monitored.
Some use burner phones, others seek out technologies designed to provide security, and still others reported traveling more for in-
person meetings. Like journalists, some feel frustrated, and even offended, that they are in this situation. Ill be damned if I have to
start acting like a drug dealer in order to protect my clients confidentiality, said one. The result of the anxieties over confidentiality
is the erosion of the right to counsel, a pillar of procedural justice under human rights law and the US Constitution, Human Rights
Watch and the ACLU found. The US has an obligation to protect national security, and under human rights standards, it may engage
in surveillance to that end, but only to the extent that surveillance is lawful, necessary, and proportionate, and the least intrusive
means to protect against tangible threats to national security. Many existing surveillance programs are indiscriminate or overbroad,
and threaten freedom of expression, the right to counsel, and the publics ability to hold its government to account. Programs
allowing surveillance of non-US persons offer even fewer protections. The US should reform its surveillance programs to ensure that
they are targeted and legitimate, increase transparency around national security and surveillance matters, and take steps for better
freedom,
democracy , and open, accountable government. Freedoms of expression and association, as well
US officials speak with pride of the freedom
of the media to report on matters of public concern and hold government to account
for its actions. Yet, as this report documents, today those freedoms are very much under threat
due to the governments own policies concerning secrecy, leak prevention, and officials contact with the media, combined with
as rights to a fair trial, are protected by the Constitution, and
large-scale
revelations of largescale surveillance. We also spoke to current and former senior government officials who have knowledge of the
surveillance programs to understand their perspective, seek additional information, and take their concerns into account in our
analysis.
those of Presidents
of U.S. policy. While the United States should be realistic and modest about what it
can achieve, to the extent that a freer online space facilitates a freer offline space,
the United States should support Internet freedom. At its heart, an American Internet
freedom agenda should actively aim to tilt the balance in favor of those who would
use the Internet to advance tolerance and free expression, and away from those who would
use it for repression or violence.
case studies do demonstrate the Internets profound potential: that access to an open
Internet can help countries slide away from authoritarianism and toward democracy.
Yet some
Events in Iran , Tunisia , Egypt and elsewhere suggest that the Internet and related
technologies (such as SMS) have indeed served as critical tools for organizing protests, spreading
information among dissident parties and transmitting images and information to the outside world some
of which moved onto satellite television channels, further boosting their influence. 64 And while experts
continue to argue about the precise effect, they tend to agree that social media
tools have made revolutions in the Middle East easier and speedier than they would have
otherwise been.65 Perhaps the most compelling link between a free Internet and democratization is also the simplest: Both
dissidents and dictatorships abroad seem to believe that the Internet can have a transformative role, and they act on that basis.
Dictatorships expend enormous time and resources to clamp down on online activity, and more than 40 countries actively censor
the Internet or engage in other forms of significant Internet repression.66 Meanwhile, millions of individuals use proxy servers and
other circumvention and anonymity tools to evade censorship and monitoring. During the 2009 presidential campaign in Iran, for
example, both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his opponent, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, cited the Internet as a tool through which
extinction. I would revise Michael Novak's term to read: democratic and liberal capitalism. For capitalism can be illiberal
protectionist and closely associated to the state. In this case, it is not as much of an obstacle to development and individual liberty
as is socialism, but it hinders them and creates incentives for the corruption of political leaders. Liberal democratic capitalism is not
the best system: it is the only one [that works]. The parrots who keep telling us about its imperfections are right, it is imperfect. But
what we know
about all the tested alternatives to liberal democratic capitalism is that they are
without qualities. It deserves plenty of criticism, but these should not lead to the
temptation of returning to collectivism or even milder forms of state control. Of course
the only prohibitive vice for a system, is not for it to be without vices, but to be without qualities. And
democratic capitalism has its share of sins; but as Robert Nozick put it, socialism does seem to be an excessively heavy punishment
for them. And anyway it has been tried already.
violence falling short of a thousand war deaths are more common between democracies, but still much less so than
between non-democratic dyads.7 Democracy and autocracy are best conceptualized not as a dichotomy, but as a
scale on which states may fall in the middle or at different various points toward either end. This point applies both
environmental indicators. We also find that the effect of democracy on environmental degradation varies in size across degradation
the long-run effect of democracy via the lagged-dependent variable. The sizes of effects are considerable for the rate of
deforestation, the size of forested land, NOx emissions per capita, and land degradation. The immediate (annual) effects of a rise in
democracy on organic pollution in water and CO2 emissions per capita appear to be small, but the cumulative effects of this rise in
democracy over time are much larger. Yet, these two effects are still smaller than the effects of democracy on NOx emissions, rate
of deforestation, forested land, and land degradation. Hence, democracy reduces some types of environmental degradation more
than other types. Our results also suggest that democratization could indirectly promote environmental degradation through its
effect on national income. This effect is subtle and works through the environmental Kuznets curve. Across the five aspects of
environmental degradation, we find evidence supporting the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions per
capita, NOx emissions per capita, the rate of deforestation, and the level of land degradation. When income per capita is low, a rise
in income per capita causes more degradation; once passing a threshold, a rise in income per capita reduces degradation. Although
existing evidence on the effect of democracy on economic growth is inconclusive, to the extent that a rise in democracy promotes
economic growth, the environmental Kuznets curves that we find suggest that democracy could indirectly cause more
environmental degradation for the above-mentioned indicators at the initial stage of development, and only later help to reduce it.
clearly
undemocratic countries exhibit even less environmental commitment than
countries in the middle group, and we can be more certain that their
commitment differs significantly from clear democracies than we can be
for the group in between . This was to be expected, of course. In conclusion, this study
provides a positive message: Democracies clearly show stronger
environmental commitment than non-democracies. All other things being equal, therefore,
significance than the coefficients for the FREE-mid, POLIT-mid and GOVmid countries. In other words,
a more democratic world will also be a world with stronger environmental commitment. This need not translate into better
environmental outcomes, however, at least not immediately. Theory predicts a stronger link of democracy with
environmental commitment than with outcomes. Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1996: 8) suspect this much when they write that
More environmental commitment will help preventing environmental scarcities from leading to extreme outcomes like
violent conflict. There is thus another avenue through which democracy can foster peace.
Internet freedom is essential to the Internet's diversity , and has enabled it to serve
Black people and other historically marginalized communities in unique and
powerful ways. Without it , the thousands of blogs, online businesses, news sites, and
advocacy organizations that cater to our communities would likely suffer and
some would not have a chance.
The Internet has become a key instrument for the exercise of the right to
freedom of speech today. n145 The Internet helps people interact and communicate with each other freely and
globally. As one court explained, "It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved ,
medium of worldwide human communication. n147 Many people depend on it daily to [*722]
Internet provides an
unprecedented volume of resources for information and knowledge and opens up
wholly new
communicate with others and to receive information they need. n148 "The
Despite its lofty rhetoric about promoting Internet freedom and associated human
rights, the U.S. needs a new general comment on privacy as much as anyone. It has
resisted modernizing international privacy protection standards in the same statements it uses to
reaffirm its commitments to privacy rights. It simultaneously funds secure communications technology and weakens the security of
such technology.
the exact rights it aims to promote around the world . Now its being sued
by major human rights defenders for hindering their work, even as it trumpets its commitment to their cause. Privacy
lies at the center of this tangle of contradictions. Of course, we believe
the U.S. should respect the human right to privacy because its legally obligated to
do so. But if thats not a good enough reason, there is another: Its the first
General threads
The first card is great if you didnt already read this card in the Global Internet
Freedom Advantage
Great card that the New Freedom Act fails + the Aff
solves modeling
New Freedom Act fails to restore USs global credibility on
Internet freedom. The original version solves by closing SST
loopholes.
Brinkerhoff 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Noel Brinkerhoff is a Political
reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. With Support of Obama
Administration, House NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes AllGov May 26 th http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obama-administration-house-nsa-surveillancereform-bill-includes-gaping-loopholes-140526?news=853242)
Lawmakers in the
practice contains huge loopholes that could allow the NSA to keep
vacuuming up large amounts of Americans communications records, all with the blessing of
the Obama administration. Dubbed the USA Freedom Act, the bill overwhelmingly approved by the House
was criticized for not going far enough to keep data out
of the hands of government. This so-called reform bill wont restore the
trust of Internet users in the U.S. and around the world, Cynthia Wong,
senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said.
Until Congress passes real reform , U.S. credibility and leadership on
Internet freedom will continue to fade. Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato Institute, a
(303 to 121)
libertarian think tank, warned that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name.
The
core problem is that this only ends bulk collection in the sense the intelligence
community uses that term, Sanchez told Wired. As long as theres some kind of target ,
they dont call that bulk collection, even if youre still collecting millions of
recordsIf they say give us the record of everyone who visited these thousand
websites, thats not bulk collection, because they have a list of targets. HRW says
the bill, which now goes to the Senate for consideration, contains ambiguous definitions about what can and
cannot be collected by the agency. For instance,
scope of what the NSA could grab under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which has formed the legal basis for
gathering the metadata of phone calls. Under
the government would have been required to base any demand for phone metadata
or other records on a specific selection term that uniquely describe[s] a
person, entity, or account. Under the House version, this definition was broadened to
mean a discrete term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the
government to limit the scope of information sought, according to Human Rights Watch. This definition is too openended and ambiguous to prevent the sort of creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to
justify overbroad collection practices in the past, the group claims. The New America Foundations Open
Technology Institute is similarly disappointed in the final House bill. Taken together, the Institute wrote, the changes to
this definition may still allow for massive collection of millions of Americans private
information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip code, an area
bringing in new measures against foreign cyber-snooping, including a plan to move internet traffic inside its borders and banning
was hoovering up billions of chunks of Indian data, making the country its fifth most important target worldwide. 'Not actually
snooping' But unlike other states that have discovered the US is siphoning off their secrets, India has conspicuously avoided joining
the chorus of criticism. That may be because it doesn't want to draw attention to its own activities. Its foreign minister Salman
Khurshid even appeared to excuse American monitoring, saying it "was not actually snooping". When the German chancellor Angela
Merkel erupted over reports the NSA had been bugging her mobile phone, the Indian prime minister's office was untroubled by the
possibility he too had been targeted. "There are no concerns", a spokesman for Manmohan Singh told the BBC, because "he does
not use a mobile phone or Gmail". Many Indian officials do. But from this December the government is planning to bar them from
using their private email accounts for any official business - in direct response to evidence of US prying. Instead, they will have to
use government email. The latest reports of even deeper NSA penetration of Google is likely to further spur such moves. It won't be
an easy change to make though, judging from the BBC's own experiences dealing with Indian officials. Many prefer to use Gmail or
Yahoo rather than their official accounts because the government email system so often crashes. More ambitious still is a plan to
bring all internal Indian internet traffic inside its borders. Currently, an email sent from say Delhi to Calcutta is more likely to travel
via the US or Europe, partly because of the way the internet is designed but also because of a lack of Indian capacity. But at a
summer meeting to assess Mr Snowden's leaks, one of India's security chiefs called for "100%" of emails and files sent between
Indians to stay in the country to limit snooping by "foreign elements". As other governments take similar measures, these changes
may not just mean a tougher job for spies but also a more fragmented internet under tighter state control. Critics say India was
already on the road to creating a Big Brother state, long before anyone had heard of Edward Snowden. Their biggest concern is a
secret mass-surveillance project the government has reportedly been building for the past few years. The Central Monitoring System
(CMS) is supposed to give security agencies the ability to listen or record all communications nationwide and track individuals, in
real time - like some of the US programmes that have been revealed. If the few details that have emerged are correct, Indian cyberspies would have even more freedom, bypassing internet and telecom companies and tapping straight into the cables and servers
carrying the traffic. Mirroring America's defence of its spying programmes, the government says the monitoring system is to protect
against terrorists and other national security threats. But a lack of concrete information has only heightened fears about its
intentions. A draft privacy bill which was supposed to allay some concerns has been watered down in the light of Mr Snowden's
Theres also another pressing question to consider when examining the CMS : who will
oversee the body to ensure that there are checks and balances? Intelligence agencies dont come under
parliamentary oversight as of yet in India. A bill entitled Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, introduced in parliament
in 2011 has been shelved by the Prime Minister, with the promise that a law would be formulated soon.
What seems to be
under the
the rupee did worse than other emerging-market currencies because of the
governments missteps. However, after Bernankes remarks on September 18, in which he reversed the
U.S. position on the tapering of its monetary stimulus, the rupee regained a lot of ground, as did other emerging-market currencies.
So I dont buy the line that the Reserve Bank of India made the right move in mounting an interest rate defense; the capital controls
Looking
ahead, Indias economy is vulnerable because there continues to be significant
volatility in global markets. The government should not overreact to this volatility; if it
does, it will make a bad situation even worse. Indias policy on interest rates, for instance,
should be driven by the domestic business cycle and economic factors, not by an attempt
to defend an artificial value for the rupee.
and sudden sharp interest rate hikes that were implemented made things worse for the rupee in the short run.
The worst-case scenario, a nuclear exchange, is by most estimates very unlikely, but hardly impossible.
Attacks by terrorists on Pakistani military bases, so far unsuccessful, have raised Indian concern about a seizure of nuclear
government, supported by Hindu revivalists and an angry and aggressive civil society.
government bodies like the R&AW, Central Bureau of Investigation, National Investigation Agency, Central
will have the right to look up
your data. Starting next year, all mobile telephony operators will also need to track and store the geographical location from
which subscribers make or receive calls. I see it as the rise of techno-determinism in our security apparatus. Previously, our
philosophy was to avoid infringing on individual privacy, and monitor a small set of
individuals directly suspected of engaging in illegal activities. Now, thanks to the Utopianism being offered
up by Big Data infrastructure, putting everybody under blanket surveillance seems like a better way
to serve our security and law enforcement agendas more effectively, says Abraham. There is a real risk
that CMS and the numerous other monitoring programmes that will subsequently
connect to it will end up harming more Indians than protecting them. The biggest risk is that
these programmes will turn into lucrative honey pots for hackers , criminals and rival
countries. Why bother hacking individuals and companies if you can attack the CMS? Weve seen
private corporations and government agencies in the US, Israel and the UK getting hacked. So lets not have
any illusions that India is going to fare much better. Another consequence is that sooner or later innocent
Meanwhile,
Board of Direct Taxes, Narcotics Control Bureau and the Enforcement Directorate
citizens will be wrongly accused of being criminals based on mistaken data patterns. While searching for matches in any database
with hundreds of millions of records, the risk of a false positive increases disproportionately because there are exponentially more
innocents than there are guilty. And in the near-Dystopian construct of the CMS, it will take months or years for such errors to be
rectified. As more Indians become aware of these programmes, they will adopt encryption and masking tools to hide their digital
selves. In the process, numerous unintended consequences of failing to differentiate law-abiding citizens from criminals will be
created. What answer will a normal citizen offer to a law enforcement official who wants to know why he or she has encrypted all
has to do to go one-up on you is to attack the CMS and other central databases. The
mass-scale
tracking the data of all citizens not just those who are deemed persons of
interest -enabled by the CMS has sparked a public furor. Sunil Abraham, executive director,
Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore, compared surveillance with salt in cooking. A
any excess is counterproductive, he said. Unlike target surveillance, blanket surveillance increases the probability
of false positives. Wrong data analysis will put more number of innocent civilians under suspicion as, by default, their number in the
going in one central pool, a competitor or a cyber criminal rival can easily tap into
private and sensitive information by hacking into the server. As vulnerabilities will be
introduced into Internet infrastructure in order to enable surveillance, it will
But, putting aside the shortcomings of its piece-meal provisions, the NCSP also fails to address high-level conceptual policy
quantity of information susceptible to damage is greater leading to higher insecurity. Simply put, if power transmission is centrally
if personal
data of citizens is centrally stored, a single leak could compromise the privacy of
millions of people instead of only hundreds. Therefore, a credible policy must, before it advocates
greater centralisation of information, examine the merits of diffused information storage to
protect national security. The NCSP utterly fails in this regard. Concerns short of national security, such as
controlled instead of zone wise, a single attack could black out the entire country instead of only a part of it. Or
the maintenance of law and order, are also in issue because crime is often planned and perpetrated using information technology.
prevention of crime before it is committed and its prosecution afterwards is a key policy
concern. While the specific context may vary depending on the nature of the crime - the facts of terrorism are different from
The
those of insurance fraud - the principles of constitutional and criminal law continue to apply. However, the NCSP neither examines
the present framework of cyber security-related offences nor suggests any changes in existing law. It merely calls for a "dynamic
legal framework and its periodic review to address the cyber security challenges" (sic). This is self-evident, there was no need for a
new national policy to make this discovery; and, ironically, it fails to conduct the very periodic review that it envisages. This is
worrying because the NCSP presented DeitY with an opportunity to review existing laws and learn from past mistakes. There are
concerns that cyber security laws, especially relevant provisions of the IT Act and its rules, betray a lack of understanding of India's
constitutional scheme. This is exemplified by the insertion, in 2008, of section 66A into the IT Act that criminalises the sending of
annoying, offensive and inconvenient electronic messages without regard for the fact that free speech that is annoying is
constitutionally protected.
In India, cyber security law and policy attempts to compensate for the state's inability to regulate
the internet by overreaching into and encroaching upon democratic freedoms. The Central Monitoring System (
CMS ) that is
being assembled by the Centre is a case in point. Alarmed at its inability to be privy to private communications,
the Centre proposes to build systems to intercept, in real time, all voice and data traffic in India. Whereas
liberal democracies around the world require such interceptions to be judicially sanctioned, warranted and supported by probable
standards set by most national policies that were issued in the years following Independence.
The similarities between Irhabi 007, later identified as Younis Tsouli, and Indias Mehdi Masoor
Biswas are uncanny. Neither participated in any terror attack. Their reputation stems from an alleged
involvement as cyber propagandists for proto-terror groups Irhabi was distributing manuals and
teaching online seminars on behalf of the emerging al-Qaeda faction in Iraq, while Mehdi is alleged to be an IS sympathiser. Both in
expertise
within terror groups is hardly surprising, says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society. Any
organisation engaged in a war for hearts and minds and oil fields will exploit contemporary
technology to its fullest potential, he says. Irhabi currently serves a 16-year jail term, while Mehdi awaits his trial.
What their cases highlight is that the phenomenon of young, tech-savvy armchair radicals is
nothing new. Research done at Israels Haifa University, which tracks the proliferation of terrorist websites, shows that the
their early 20s with cover identities during the day, and separated by a decade in technological evolution. Such
number of such sites went up from fewer than 100 in the late-1990s to more than 4,800 in just a decade. There is also credible
evidence that an al-Qaeda website posted a sketched-out proposal for the 2004 Madrid bombings three months before the attack.
Another macabre example is the crowd-sourcing effort launched in 2005 by the Victorious Army Group to build its website. By the
the mistakes made by the West over the previous decade. We should not get caught
up in big data surveillance, he says. Surveillance is like salt. It could be counterproductive even if slightly in excess. Ideally, surveillance must be targeted.
Indiscriminate surveillance just increases the size of the haystack, making it difficult
to find the needles, Mr. Abraham says.
the government has understood that an ostrich-like response to the digital threat
- which is to have as little digitisation as possible - is not a viable, long-term strategy.
The economic ministries are finding that volumes of data are becoming larger and larger.
And the compulsion for more open governance requires the Internet to be harnessed, mastered and
adequately secured. Although India's day-to-day governance and infrastructure
management is not heavily reliant on the Interne t, there is unease within the
But
According to figures that the government shared with Business Standard, India was the 10th most intensely cyberattacked country in 2010-11; today, it is second only to the US. With internet usage (including cellphones) rising
dramatically - from 202 million users in March 2010 to 412 million in March 2011 and 485 million in March 2012 India is now second only to China in the number of devices connected to the Internet.
Glyn
Moody covered the roll out of India's intrusive surveillance system a couple of months
ago,
but more information has come out , filling in the details of the country's
threatens to make our men and women at the NSA look as if they're just not
applying themselves.
The NSA, as revealed in media reports earlier this month, has been
monitoring phone-call metadata (such as phone numbers and call durations) on a widespread basis for years, but
has to get the approval of a (albeit secret) court to spy on the calls themselves or the content of emails.
The
formation of the CMS, "It's almost too easy. But is it too easy enough?" Moreover, with the CMS, security
agencies wont need to request users information from telcos. Theyll be able to get it
directly, using existing interception systems that are built into telecom and data-service networks. According to
the Hindu newspaper, the system will have dedicated servers and extensive data-mining capabilities that can be
used for surveillance. Much like the 9/11 attacks led to an unprecedented increase in domestic (and worldwide)
surveillance by US security agencies, the Mumbai attacks of 2008 resulted in changes to existing laws that allowed
the Indian government to increase the size (and depth) of its surveillance net. Additional attacks in 2011 prompted
another rewrite and expansion. Again, much like in the US, the terms "safety" and "security" are thrown around to
justify the existence and actions of the CMS. Finally, much like the US, government officials have taken care to point
out the supposed "oversight" CMS falls under, and it's every bit as weak as the arguments used by the NSA's
The government has so far played down fears of abuse. Senior government officials
told the Times of India that since CMS will involve an online system for filing and processing of all lawful
interception requests, an electronic audit trail will be in place for each phone number put under
surveillance. And who will audit the audit trail? The same ministry that authorizes the
surveillance requests. Hardly a reassuring safeguard. Oversight doesn't really mean
defenders.
anything if no one's interested in questioning actions or curbing excesses. Making sure the foxes
guarding the national hen house answer to a different fox does very little to improve the hens' existence, and even
less to deter the predatory nature of their "guardians."
need for stronger data privacy laws in India is apparent from even a brief account
of some key aspects of India's growing array of surveillance institutions and surveillance powers. The rapid
The
recent development of surveillance powers and institutions has also made the incomplete development of data privacy laws in India
a highly political topic. India has been a frequent target of terrorist attacks, so there is a constant temptation to extend every form
of surveillance. India's private sector has not yet embraced systemic data surveillance techniques for commercial purposes, except
in the credit industry. The Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act 2005 is a blueprint for a comprehensive credit surveillance
system, but on the other hand the information it collects will be largely restricted to the credit industry. However,
the Indian
state itself is not yet involved in pervasive surveillance of its population , or even major
segments of it. Furthermore the tendencies toward increased surveillance are tempered by the activism of the somewhat slowmoving Indian judiciary which administers the rule of law in ways that are sensitive to issues of civil liberties, including privacy.
Indian
society and
democracy. 15.
The United Nations' Human Development Report (HDR) 2000 acknowledged Indian
democracy as a role model for the developing world , and said that
New Delhi's track record on human rights promotion and development has sweeping significance
for a rights-based approach to progress. The report said the country was a powerful example of the
creative use of human rights instruments in social transformation. India's approach, the report
said,
significant progress in the participation of women in local politics, creative use of public interest litigation,
effectiveness of its vibrant civil society and mobilisation of its democratic institutions. Former United States
president Bill Clinton lauded India's success in developing a model civil society in the face of several constraints. In
a message to mark the 50th anniversary of the country's independence, Mr
Clinton
praised
India's
who are
still striving to build civil societies, to institutionalise democratic values of
and peoples
free expression and religion, and to find strength in diversity. 'I am honoured to congratulate India on 50 years of
independence and to extend to citizens of this great nation the best wishes of all Americans for lasting peace,
freedom and prosperity,' he said in a message commemorating the golden jubilee of India's freedom from the
colonial yoke.
extinction. I would revise Michael Novak's term to read: democratic and liberal capitalism. For capitalism can be illiberal
protectionist and closely associated to the state. In this case, it is not as much of an obstacle to development and individual liberty
as is socialism, but it hinders them and creates incentives for the corruption of political leaders. Liberal democratic capitalism is not
the best system: it is the only one [that works]. The parrots who keep telling us about its imperfections are right, it is imperfect. But
what we know
about all the tested alternatives to liberal democratic capitalism is that they are
without qualities. It deserves plenty of criticism, but these should not lead to the
temptation of returning to collectivism or even milder forms of state control. Of course
the only prohibitive vice for a system, is not for it to be without vices, but to be without qualities. And
democratic capitalism has its share of sins; but as Robert Nozick put it, socialism does seem to be an excessively heavy punishment
for them. And anyway it has been tried already.
violence falling short of a thousand war deaths are more common between democracies, but still much less so than
between non-democratic dyads.7 Democracy and autocracy are best conceptualized not as a dichotomy, but as a
scale on which states may fall in the middle or at different various points toward either end. This point applies both
environmental indicators. We also find that the effect of democracy on environmental degradation varies in size across degradation
the long-run effect of democracy via the lagged-dependent variable. The sizes of effects are considerable for the rate of
deforestation, the size of forested land, NOx emissions per capita, and land degradation. The immediate (annual) effects of a rise in
democracy on organic pollution in water and CO2 emissions per capita appear to be small, but the cumulative effects of this rise in
democracy over time are much larger. Yet, these two effects are still smaller than the effects of democracy on NOx emissions, rate
of deforestation, forested land, and land degradation. Hence, democracy reduces some types of environmental degradation more
than other types. Our results also suggest that democratization could indirectly promote environmental degradation through its
effect on national income. This effect is subtle and works through the environmental Kuznets curve. Across the five aspects of
environmental degradation, we find evidence supporting the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions per
capita, NOx emissions per capita, the rate of deforestation, and the level of land degradation. When income per capita is low, a rise
in income per capita causes more degradation; once passing a threshold, a rise in income per capita reduces degradation. Although
existing evidence on the effect of democracy on economic growth is inconclusive, to the extent that a rise in democracy promotes
economic growth, the environmental Kuznets curves that we find suggest that democracy could indirectly cause more
environmental degradation for the above-mentioned indicators at the initial stage of development, and only later help to reduce it.
clearly
undemocratic countries exhibit even less environmental commitment than
countries in the middle group, and we can be more certain that their
commitment differs significantly from clear democracies than we can be
for the group in between . This was to be expected, of course. In conclusion, this study
provides a positive message: Democracies clearly show stronger
environmental commitment than non-democracies. All other things being equal, therefore,
significance than the coefficients for the FREE-mid, POLIT-mid and GOVmid countries. In other words,
a more democratic world will also be a world with stronger environmental commitment. This need not translate into better
environmental outcomes, however, at least not immediately. Theory predicts a stronger link of democracy with
environmental commitment than with outcomes. Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1996: 8) suspect this much when they write that
More environmental commitment will help preventing environmental scarcities from leading to extreme outcomes like
violent conflict. There is thus another avenue through which democracy can foster peace.
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased
India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate
into a nuclear exchange . Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions.
India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in
nuclear war . Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan
would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early
on before a
routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistans only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict
unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from
bombs
like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike),
c ommand
professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global
repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in
1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the U nited States and the Soviet Union would
result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter , which could very well place the
survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a
nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic
rather than tactical, the likely
targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in
both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the
detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of
ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere . Owing to their small size (less than a
tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a
decade , during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these
particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the
earths ozone layer . The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead
to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought,
worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday
scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over
Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan , it might not take
much to set them off . Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Ladens compound, several members of Indias security apparatus along
with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either
preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to
all-out war
could quickly
escalate .
NARRATOR:
According to most
observers , the likeliest cause of a nuclear war in South Asia is the fight for
control of
Kashmir. The dispute over Kashmir predates Indian and Pakistani independence from British colonial rule in 1947. Even though
Kashmir had a largely Muslim population, its Hindu monarch chose to join India, rather than Pakistan. Pakistan felt cheated.
GANGULY: For Pakistan, as the homeland for Muslims, as the homeland for Muslims in South Asia, it was vitally important to
incorporate Kashmir, because otherwise Pakistan would not be complete... NARRATOR: Mushahid Husain, the Pakistani government's
Minister of Information, recalls that Pakistan's proposed solution, which calls for a popular vote in Kashmir to decide that territory's
fate, has been endorsed by the United Nations. But the Indian authorities have thus far resisted. HUSAIN: There are UN resolutions,
resolutions of the United Nations, which say there should be a plebescite in Kashmir, and let the people of Kashmir decide whether
they want to go with India or Pakistan. NARRATOR:
help in resolving the Kashmir dispute with India. HUSAIN: Let us focus on resolving Kashmir, because now, after the nuclear tests
between, the Indian and Pakistani tests, there is an inextricable linkage between Kashmir and the larger issue of peace, stability and
security in South Asia. KREPON: Pakistan is seeking to get that help by pointing to the Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flashpoint. And
to lend credence to that, Pakistan has heated up that line of control, with a lot of firing and a lot of violence. India has responded in
relations between
institutions like the intelligence agencies think they have much greater
leeway than they might actually have, thinking the envelope is that much further to
gore) KHELI:
push. Because if war is unthinkable, that gives greater latitude . So in all ways I
think it makes the potential for war more likely. NARRATOR: But could
escalation of the Kashmir conflict lead to a nuclear war? Unlike the more experienced nuclear
India and Pakistan do not have a clear, published doctrine
of when and how nuclear weapons would be used in a war. But
powers,
leaders in both countries do stress that their nuclear weapons are only a deterrent, and not an offensive weapon. CHANDRA: We
have said that we will never undertake a first use. NARRATOR: Naresh Chandra is India's Ambassador to the United States.
CHANDRA: We have clarified that we viewed our nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, not as a means of projecting aggressive designs
on any neighbor. NARRATOR: Pakistani officials have echoed India's claim that its nuclear arsenal is also for defensive purposes.
HUSAIN: Of course, we say Pakistan's bomb is meant only for security and self-defense. NARRATOR: But wherever there are nuclear
weapons, there is an implied willingness to use them. And both India and Pakistan are today developing and testing new medium-
Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands,
nuclear competition
disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars
as well as
numerous proxy conflicts. Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred
India from again using its conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory. As a result, Pakistans implicit nuclear
party, such as a terrorist group). Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear
programme as increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture
It is Gobind v. State of M.P.30, decided in 1975, that marks the watershed moment for Indian
privacy law in the Constitution. Like Kharak Singh31, Gobind32 also involved domiciliary visits to the house of a historysheeter. Unlike Kharak Singh33, however, in Gobind34 the Court found that the Regulations did have statutory backing Section
46(2)(c) of the Police Act35, which allowed State Government to make notifications giving effect to the provisions of the Act, one of
liberty and to autonomy, and ended by holding, somewhat confusingly: the right to privacy must encompass and protect the
personal intimacies of the home, the family marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the
question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical picture of that distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy.
Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed
right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty there are two possible theories for protecting privacy of
home. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought
that individuals might he engaging in such activities and that such harm is not Constitutionally protective by the state. The second
is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that
individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an
image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures the right to privacy in any event will
necessarily have to go through a process of case-bycase development.39 (emphasis supplied) But if no clear principle emerges out
of the Courts elucidation of the right, it was fairly unambiguous in stressing the importance of the right itself. Interestingly, it
grounded the right within the context of the freedom struggle. Our founding fathers, it observed, were thoroughly opposed to a
Police Raj even as our history of the struggle for freedom has borne eloquent testimony to it.40
The parallels to
the American Fourth Amendment are striking here: in his historical analysis Akhil
Amar tells us that the Fourth Amendment was meant precisely to avoid the various abuses of unreasonable searches and seizures
that were common in England at the time.41
pronounced, however, when the Court examined the grounds for limiting the
right to privacy . It held: Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral
the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to
restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. 42 (emphasis supplied) Compelling
zones and that
public interest is an interesting phrase , for two reasons. First, public interest is a ground for fundamental
rights restrictions under Article 19 (see, e.g., Article 19(6)), but the text of the Article 19 restrictions do not use and the Court, in
interpreting them, has not held that the public interest must be compelling. This suggests a stricter standard of review for an
Article 21 privacy right violation than Article 19 violations. This is buttressed by the fact that in the same paragraph, the Court
ended by observing: even if it be assumed that Article 19(5) [restrictions upon the freedom of movement] does not apply in terms,
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still constrained under equal protection clause in how
it may pursue that end: the means chosen to accomplish the governments asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly
framed to accomplish that purpose.45 To take an extremely trivial example that will illustrate the point: the State wants to ban hate
speech against Dalits. It passes legislation that bans all speech that disrespects Dalits. This is not narrowly tailored, because while
all hate speech against Dalits necessarily disrespects them, all speech that disrespects Dalits is not necessarily hate speech. It was
possible for the government to pass legislation banning only hate speech against Dalits, one that would have infringed upon free
speech more narrowly than the disrespect law, and still achieved its goals. The law is not narrowly tailored. Crucially, then, the
Court in Gobind46 seemed to implicitly accept the narrow- tailoring flip side of the compelling state interest coin. On the
constitutionality of the Police Regulations itself, it upheld their constitutionality by reading them narrowly. Here is what the Court
said: Regulation 855, in our view, empowers surveillance only of persons against whom reasonable materials exist to induce the
opinion that they show a determination, to lead a life of crime crime in this context being confined to such as involve public peace
or security only and if they are dangerous security risks. Mere convictions in criminal cases where nothing gravely imperiling safety
of society cannot be regarded as warranting surveillance under this Regulation. Similarly, domiciliary visits and picketing by the
police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security and not routine follow-up at the end of a conviction
or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer.47 (emphasis supplied) But Regulation 855 did not refer to the gravity of
the crime at all. Thus, the Court was able to uphold its constitutionality only by narrowing its scope in a manner that the States
for surveillance systems such as the CMS and Netra are obvious. Because with narrow
tailoring, the State must demonstrate that bulk surveillance of all individuals, whether guilty or
innocent, suspected of crimes or not suspected of crimes (whether reasonably or otherwise), possessing a past criminal record or
must be
collected to achieve the goal of maintaining public security, and that nothing
narrower will suffice. Can the State demonstrate this? Perhaps it can; but at the very least, it should be made to do so in
not, speaking to each other of breaking up the government or breaking up a relationship every bit of data
open Court.
Our enquiry has spanned fifty years and many different aspects of law that touch an
individuals personal life from criminal law practices (police surveillance, narco-analysis, self-incrimination) to phonetapping, from marital relations to the status of ones bank records. Despite the diversity of cases and the
differing reasoning employed by judges to reach differing results over time, we have
seen that a careful analysis reveals certain unifying strands of logic and argument
that can provide a coherent philosophical and constitutional grounding to the right to privacy in
Indian law, bases that the Court can and should draw upon in order to decide an
As far as the CMS , Netra and other dragnet surveillance mechanisms go, it is clear, then,
that they implicate a privacy interest; and to justify them, the government must
show that there is no other way in which it could achieve its goals (of combating terrorism etc)
without bulk surveillance on an industrial scale. But if recent judgments of our Supreme Court do not
exactly instill confidence in its role as the guarantor of our civil liberties 170, its long-term
record in national security cases is even worse. A.K. Gopalan171, Habeas Corpus172 and the 2004 Peoples Union for Civil Liberties
teaches us that totalitarianism always begins with pervasive governmental spying over individuals is to be ignored at our peril.