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Contention _ is Human Intelligence
Information overload drains resources and trades off with targeted
surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston
Marathon Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding
traditional intelligence-gathering effortsand allowing terrorists to succeed, October 20, 2014,
ak.)
Snowden on Monday suggested that if the National Security Agency focused more on
traditional intelligence gatheringand less on its mass-surveillance programsit could
have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class,
said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led to
resource constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more traditional,
targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and
investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it all,' where
we're watching everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is
impossible to keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom
Edward
activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and
Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to

the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable
intelligence was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known
extremists and diligent pursuit of intelligence leads provides for better
counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really watch these guys and the
question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite resources and
the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance
programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional
[targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has
no record of successfully thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges
reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestionthat such mass
surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but actually makes the
U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from
performing their jobstakes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody
that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of
being able to watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for
investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully at how to
balance," Snowden said.
Tamerlan
The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass

surveillance tactics in favor of targeted surveillance
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University, The Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually
making us worse at fighting terrorism?,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_stat
e_terrorist_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the
Financial Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly
aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor
online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we
will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping
citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen
by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal
freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us
significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over
The fear of being tracked also forces

terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures , but it
doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless . The fear of being
whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy.
tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them
What would the United

States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't
have these vast surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones,
cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it remarkably
easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a
terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states
do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on
tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations
and flipping existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they occurred,
and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns
before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their
vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown art . If we couldn't spy on them from the
safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more of this. Second, if we
didn't have all these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might spend a lot more
time thinking about how to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message,
instead of repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new
followers. Every time the United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -or sends a drone to conduct a "signature strike" -- it reinforces the jihadis' claim that the West
has an insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic world and no respect
for Muslim life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of intentions, if they
genuinely want to help these societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate
threat; the crude message that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send
from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder:
is rather different. If we didn't have all these cool high-tech hammers, in short, we'd
have to stop treating places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if they
were nails that just needed another pounding, and we might work harder at
marginalizing our enemies within their own societies. To do that, we would have to be
building more effective partnerships with authoritative sources of legitimacy
within these societies, including religious leaders. Our failure to do more to
discredit these movements is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the entire
war on terror, and until that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will
never end. Third, and somewhat paradoxically, if we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd
have to think more seriously about boots on the ground, at least in some places. But having
to think harder about such decisions might be a good thing , because it would force
the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really serious and which
countries really mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is
counterproductive. As we've seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special
Ops Command do is in some ways too easy: It just doesn't cost that much to add a
few more names to the kill list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to
launch a few more drones in some new country, and all the more so when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm not
saying that our current policy is costless or that special operations aren't risky; my point is that such activities are still
a lot easier to contemplate and authorize than a true "boots on the ground"
operation. By making it easier, however, the capabilities make it easier for our leaders to skirt the
more fundamental questions about interests and strategy. It allows them to "do something," even when what
is being done won't necessarily help. Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder about
where to deploy more expensive resources, they might finally start thinking about
the broader set of U.S. and Western policies that have inspired some of these
movements in the first place. Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the Taliban
are in some ways indigenous movements arising from local circumstances, but they
did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some (though not all) blame for their emergence
and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor justify violent extremism, nor to assert that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to
there is a causal connection between some of what we do and some of

the enemies we face. But if some of the things the United States (or its allies) is doing are
making it unpopular in certain parts of the world, and if some of that unpopularity
gets translated into violent extremism that forces us to spend hundreds of billions
of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every
single one of those policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not,
acknowledge that
then maybe we ought to change some of them, if only to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise. What I'm suggesting, in
the "surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the

counterterrorism effort (and which is clearly reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the NSA
and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our communications) is popular with government officials because it's
relatively easy, plays to our technological strengths, and doesn't force us to make any
significant foreign-policy changes or engage in any sort of self-criticism at all. If we can solve the terrorist problem by
short, is that
throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials in the process, what's not to like? If
we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials
in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all our cryptographers, and revert to
until we see more

convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly
kept a significant number of people safer from foreign dangers, I'm going to wonder
if we aren't overemphasizing these activities because they are relatively easy for us, and
because they have a powerful but hard-to-monitor constituency in Washington and
London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally, instead of doing what might be more effective .
Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's mail." But
2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to

overall US intel.
Margolis 13
Gabriel Margolis the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal
Global Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic
issues involving international security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS)
undergo a rigorous, peer-reviewed process. From the article: The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence
Problem - Global Security Studies - Spring 2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis
%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological
advances of the 20th century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine
operations around the world including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and
measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation with technological methods of
intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often leaving the age
old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of
the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of
human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to
become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still
being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make the United States
susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly
integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical
espionage is a thing of the past.
1ac - Civilian Casualties

Contention _ is Human Intelligence
Information overload drains resources and trades off with targeted
surveillance
Volz, 14
ak.)
Edward

Tamerlan
The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass

surveillance tactics in favor of targeted surveillance
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the (real papa Walt) and Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University, The Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually
making us worse at fighting terrorism?,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_stat
e_terrorist_cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the
Financial Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly
aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor
online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we
will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping
citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen
by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal
freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us
significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over
The fear of being tracked also forces

terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures , but it
doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless . The fear of being
whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy.
tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them
What would the United

States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't
have these vast surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones,
cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it remarkably
easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a
terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states
do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on
tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations
and flipping existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they occurred,
and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism campaigns
before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their
vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown art . If we couldn't spy on them from the
safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot more of this. Second, if we
didn't have all these expensive high-tech capabilities, we might spend a lot more
time thinking about how to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists' message,
instead of repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new
followers. Every time the United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -or sends a drone to conduct a "signature strike" -- it reinforces the jihadis' claim that the West
has an insatiable desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic world and no respect
for Muslim life. It doesn't matter if U.S. leaders have the best of intentions, if they
genuinely want to help these societies, or if they are responding to a legitimate
threat; the crude message that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send
from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder:
is rather different. If we didn't have all these cool high-tech hammers, in short, we'd
have to stop treating places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if they
were nails that just needed another pounding, and we might work harder at
marginalizing our enemies within their own societies. To do that, we would have to be
building more effective partnerships with authoritative sources of legitimacy
within these societies, including religious leaders. Our failure to do more to
discredit these movements is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the entire
war on terror, and until that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will
never end. Third, and somewhat paradoxically, if we didn't have drones and the NSA, we'd
have to think more seriously about boots on the ground, at least in some places. But having
to think harder about such decisions might be a good thing , because it would force
the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really serious and which
countries really mattered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military intervention is
counterproductive. As we've seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special
Ops Command do is in some ways too easy: It just doesn't cost that much to add a
few more names to the kill list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to
launch a few more drones in some new country, and all the more so when it's done under the veil of secrecy. I'm not
saying that our current policy is costless or that special operations aren't risky; my point is that such activities are still
a lot easier to contemplate and authorize than a true "boots on the ground"
operation. By making it easier, however, the capabilities make it easier for our leaders to skirt the
more fundamental questions about interests and strategy. It allows them to "do something," even when what
is being done won't necessarily help. Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder about
where to deploy more expensive resources, they might finally start thinking about
the broader set of U.S. and Western policies that have inspired some of these
movements in the first place. Movements like IS, al Qaeda, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the Taliban
are in some ways indigenous movements arising from local circumstances, but they
did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some (though not all) blame for their emergence
and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor justify violent extremism, nor to assert that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to
there is a causal connection between some of what we do and some of

the enemies we face. But if some of the things the United States (or its allies) is doing are
making it unpopular in certain parts of the world, and if some of that unpopularity
gets translated into violent extremism that forces us to spend hundreds of billions
of dollars trying to protect ourselves, then maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every
single one of those policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not,
acknowledge that
then maybe we ought to change some of them, if only to take some steam out of the extremist enterprise. What I'm suggesting, in
the "surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the

counterterrorism effort (and which is clearly reflected in Hannigan's plea to let Big Brother -- oops, I mean the NSA
and GCHQ -- keep its eyes on our communications) is popular with government officials because it's
relatively easy, plays to our technological strengths, and doesn't force us to make any
significant foreign-policy changes or engage in any sort of self-criticism at all. If we can solve the terrorist problem by
short, is that
throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials in the process, what's not to like? If
we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government officials
in the process, what's not to like? To be clear: I'm not suggesting we dismantle the NSA, fire all our cryptographers, and revert to
until we see more

convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly
kept a significant number of people safer from foreign dangers, I'm going to wonder
if we aren't overemphasizing these activities because they are relatively easy for us, and
because they have a powerful but hard-to-monitor constituency in Washington and
London. In short, we're just doing what comes naturally, instead of doing what might be more effective .
Cordell Hull's quaint belief that "gentlemen [or ladies] do not read each other's mail." But
2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to

overall US intel.
Margolis 13
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological
advances of the 20th century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine
operations around the world including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and
measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation with technological methods of
intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often leaving the age
old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of
the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of
human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to
become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still
being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make the United States
susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly
integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical
espionage is a thing of the past.
Scenario _ is Intelligence
Insert Intelligence Impacts
Scenario _ is Civilian Casualties
Independently, signature strikes are inevitable but lack of human

intel boosts civilian death tolls.
Margolis 13
UAVs are the ultimate intelligence platform. "One of the most significant military developments in the last 10 to 15 years has been that of the unmanned aerial
vehicle, which has evolved from the simple drone with limited capability to today's sophisticated aircraft, which, for some roles, particularly
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), is now the platform of choice."68 UAVs have replaced satellites and manned
aircraft as the favored platform for intelligence collection. UAVs can be outfitted with equipment that allows them to collect SIGINT, MASINT, and GEOINT. They have also
been armed with missiles to allow them to collect intelligence, fly around while it is being analyzed, and then conduct strikes based upon the decisions of policy makers. This
The President, the CIA, and the entire intelligence

community have become infatuated with the capabilities of these constantly evolving tools of war.69 The main idea behind the
nexus of intelligence and technology is like a new toy for a small child.
development of UAV technology was to reduce the number of lives risked to collect intelligence and to deliver strikes with accuracy. However, it is the relatively low cost of
drones compared to that of modern combat aircraft that will drive the proliferation of drones over the next decade. More basic drones cost less than 1/20th as much as the latest
combat aircraft and even the more advanced drones that feature jet propulsion and employ some stealth technology are less than 1/10th the cost.70 While military budgets
around the World are cut, UAVs will be viewed as a viable alternative to manned aircraft for many missions. UAVs have several major advantages over traditional aircraft that
make them valuable assets in modern conflicts. A UAVs greatest advantage is their very long endurance. Some versions of the Predator UAVs can maintain flight for over thirty
hours. This advantage means that UAVs have more flight time than that of traditional aircraft, which enables them to observe and track a target for many hours at a time before
deciding whether to strike. This makes drones an ideal surveillance and striking weapon in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations, where the targets are usually
individuals rather than objects.71 UAVs have several vulnerabilities to go along with their advantages. UAVs are susceptible to air defense systems because they are very slow.
Even the jet-powered Avenger recently purchased by the Air Force only has a top speed of around 460 miles per hour, meaning that it cannot escape from any manned fighter
aircraft, not even the outmoded 1970s-era fighters that are still used by a number of nations.72 UAVs are also vulnerable to manned fighter aircraft and jamming. Manned
aircraft are much faster than UAVs and the pilots can respond more rapidly to air combat situations than the current technology allows the operators of UAVs to do. Remotely
piloted aircraft are dependent upon a continuous signal from their operators to keep them flying, and this signal is vulnerable to disruption and jamming.73 This cyber
vulnerability has been exploited by insurgents and governments in several instances. Several years ago the Iranians downed a RQ-170 sentinel UAV and essentially pilfered it for
UAVs have been used in targeted strikes and signature strikes against insurgents
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. The primary focus of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone
intelligence information and technology.74
strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. operations are continuing to expand
in countries such as Somalia and Yemen.75 Targeted, or personality, strikes utilize all forms of intelligence available, including HUMINT. Targeted strikes utilize HUMINT
because they are used to target top tier leadership of terrorist organizations; a specific person. As terrorist organization leadership tends to shy away from communications and
Signature strikes
are based on MASINT. They do not usually rely on HUMINT, but instead use signatures ascribed by
analysts to determine whether or not a strike is permissible. Based upon information collected by MASINT, signature strikes are the
type of drone strike in which no specific individual is identified, but rather a
target is chosen based on the observed behavior, or signature, of people on the ground.76
However there has been some dissent amongst the state department and administration pertaining to signature strikes. Some State Department officials have
complained to the White House that the criteria used by the C.I.A. for identifying a terrorist signature were
too lax. The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees three guys doing jumping jacks, the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp, said one senior official. Men
loading a truck with fertilizer could be bombmakers but they might also be
farmers, skeptics argued.77 What these skeptics are alluding to is that unlike personality strikes, signature strikes have
no corroborating HUMINT to support the operation. The absence of HUMINT
has been a consistent factor in the absence of intelligence failures throughout the history of the CIA. The absence of
HUMINT has resulted in an increase of unintentional civilian casualties, which
will turn the tide of public support against UAV strikes in time. TBIJ reports that from June 2004
may conceal themselves from detection by GEOINT methods, HUMINT is the remaining discipline which must be used to identify targets.
through mid-September 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children. TBIJ
reports that these strikes also injured an additional 1,228-1,362 individual. Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely is any information provided about the
The bulk of CIA's drone strikes are signature strikes.79 Due to the fact that a
the CIA and U.S. intelligence community appear to
be falling into the same pattern that has plagued intelligence operations for over sixty years. They are putting
technical means of intelligence ahead of HUMINT, and if history is indicative of any kind of pattern will
victims or the communities they leave behind.78
majority of UAV strikes are signature strikes which rely solely on MASINT,
eventually suffer a massive intelligence failure due to this choice.
The pattern that emerges when
no single form of intelligence collection does well

by itself. HUMINT is especially detrimental to overlook or ignore because covert actions are often subject to bad
information, CI, and mismanagement from policy-makers. The U.S. fascination and focus on technical methods of intelligence has
made some operations especially susceptible to CI and other forms of failure when areas of
HUMINT are not addressed. This problem has come to an apex in the form of
UAV technology and the implementation of signature strikes. UAVs can contain GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT capabilities and can therefore immediately operate
based upon technical intelligence. The United States has focused on the technical methods of
intelligence gathering, and once again HUMINT is missing. Signature strikes are
not based upon HUMINT, which brings to mind the various intelligence failures
that failed to incorporate HUMINT into their modus operandi.
reflecting upon intelligence failures of the 20th century shows that
***Funding HUMINT isnt enough data overload independently

hamstrings strike effectiveness
Harris, 11 Freelance business and technology writer. Also writes for Entrepreneur, InformationWeek, San Jose
Magazine, Government Technology, Public CIO, U.S. Banker, Digital Communities Magazine, Converge Magazine, and the San Jose
Business Journal. (Chandler, Data Overload Bogging Down Military, Clearance Jobs, 1/24/11,
http://news.clearancejobs.com/2011/01/24/data-overload-bogging-down-military/)//KTC
As the amount of data from drones and other surveillance technology has risen 1,600 percent since 9/11,
military personnel are becoming overwhelmed and making mistakes. A recent incident in Afghanistan
highlighted this problem, as a drone operator mistakenly attacked a gathering that killed 23 Afghan
civilians. The military cited information overload as the cause of the mistake and said
the incident couldve been prevented if we had just slowed things down and thought deliberately. The
mountains of data have created a new class of wired warrior that sifts through the information
sea and, at times, determine what targets to hit and avoid. At Langley Air Force Bases $5 billion global
surveillance network, military personnel review 1,000 hours of video, 1,000 high-altitude spy photos and hundreds of hours of
signals intelligence, which are usually cellphone calls. Yet the
sheer amount of data that needs to be

absorbed and used to make decisions has pushed many soldiers to their mental limit.
There is information overload at every level of the military from the general to the soldier on the
ground, said Art Kramer, a neuroscientist and director of the Beckman Institute, a research lab at the University of Illinois.
Insert Civilian Casualties Frontlines
Intelligence Scenarios
General
1ac Frontline
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson 13
Kevin R. Wilkinson United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence Company
Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by Professor Charles D. Allen of
the Department of Command Leadership and Management. This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools Unparalleled Need: Human
Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army - March 2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA590270
In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever. As
employed during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now
discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and GEOINT alone.
Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as weather or

terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF
was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of conventional conflict and on the
verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents, employed asymmetrical
warfare. The continuation of
created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when

countering a conventional threat that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However,
it becomes invaluable when presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a
smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of insurgents, which other
intelligence collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.
conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of these

risks.
Johnson 9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal
"Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served
as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his
Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign
Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION
"EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY,
USA, Feb 15, 2009 available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place, plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition
for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities
between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other reason, government officials leaders seek
information about the capabilities andan especially elusive topicthe intentions of those overseas (or
subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose of
espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the
homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest
the opportunity side of the security equation. Through the practice of espionage
spying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite termthe central task, stated baldly, is to steal
secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more thorough understanding of
threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is available in
the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite
metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there
will continue to be several missing piecesperhaps the most important ones. They may
be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through
the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying
careful research; but often discovery of

, if they can be found at all. Some
things "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionalsare unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the current leader of North Korea. Secrets,
in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skillsay, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking.
Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with machines, respectively known
inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical
intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the
Techint includes mechanical devises
Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations officers). -_

large and small, including satellites
the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously
the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted
through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic
communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts the most funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be
launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be
recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of
only human agents can provide insights into that

most vital of all national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals
especially those adversaries who are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the
international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that
value of humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is
organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its value; surveys more
broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Those impacts cause extinction.

Ochs 2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately, June
9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a

known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on
earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories.
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,
While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the
health of future generations, they are easier to control.
Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very
easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny
amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be
small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also
kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over.
With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never
end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing
cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure
could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a
small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN
EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
Ext. Yes Resource Wars

( ) Most probable conflict
Cairns 4
John Cairns Jr, Distinguished Professor of Environmental Biology Emeritus, Department of Biology and Director Emeritus,
University Center for Environmental and Hazardous Materials Studies @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University EcoEthics and Sustainability Ethics, Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics,
http://ottokinne.de/esepbooks/EB2Pt2.pdf#page=66
The most probable cause of this curious position is humankinds obsession with growth. On
a finite planet with finite resources,

induces scarcity. Then, scarcity leads to resource wars, mass migration, political instability
and, arguably most importantly, competition for increasingly scarce resources (e.g. oil). Equitable and fair sharing of
resources, including those needed to maintain the planets ecological life-support system, will require both sharing and
population control. Humankind is rapidly approaching the time when it will be attempting to manage the entire planet for
continued growth
sustainability. Half the worlds human population is living marginally or worse, and yet Renner (2003a) reports that military
expenditures are on the rise. In 2001, a conservative estimate of world military expenditures was US$839 billion, of which the
United States spends 36% and those states considered hostile to the United States spend 3% (Renner, 2003a). Even so, expenditures
for the military are expected to continue rising (Stevenson and Bumiller, 2002; Dao, 2002). Even 25% of these funds would provide
a much needed programme to develop alternative energy sources, which would also diminish the perceived need for resource wars.
Renner and Sheehan (2003) state that approximately 25%
of the 50 wars and armed conflicts of recent years

were triggered or exacerbated by resource exploitation. Hussein persisted as a political leader by using resource money (in
this case, oil) to maintain power by a variety of methods, including murder. The use of resource funds to maintain power is all too
common (e.g. Le Billon, 2001). Ending such misuse of power and the resultant conflicts has proven impossible because it is difficult
to displace the power elite (e.g. United Nations Security Council, 2002).
( ) Best studies prove

Heinberg 4
(Richard, journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar Living Institute
and the Post Carbon Institute Power Down, Published by New Society Publishers, pg. 55-58)
This is a persuasive line of reasoning on the face of it, but it ignores the realities of how markets
really work. If the global market were in fact able to prevent resource wars, the past half-century should
have been a period of near-perfect peace. But resource disputes have instead erupted repeatedly, and
continue to do so. Just in the past twenty years, resource disputes have erupted over oil in Nigeria, Algeria,
Colombia, Yemen, Iraq/Kuwait, and Sudan; over' timber and natural gas in Indonesia (Aceh); and over
copper in Bougainville/Papua New Guinea -and this is far from being an exhaustive list. In classical
economic theory, all actors within a market system act rationally in pursuit of their own interests, and
no one buys or sells without an expectation of benefit. In the real world, however, buyers and sellers
enter the marketplace with unequal levels of power. Some economic players have wealth and weapons, while
others don't; as a result, some have figurative -if not literal -guns to their heads persuading them to act in ways that are clearly not in
their own interest. Lest we forget: the essence of the European colonial system was the maintenance of unequal terms of trade
through military duress. While nearly all of the old colonial governments were overthrown after World War II in favor of indigenous
regimes, much of the essential structure of colonialism remains in place. Indeed, some would argue that the new institutions of
global trade (the World Trade Organization, together with lending agencies like the World Bank) are just as effective as the old
colonial networks at transferring wealth from resource-rich poor nations to militarily powerful rich consuming nations, and that the
failure of these institutions to enable the fair distribution of resources will ultimately result in a greater
likelihood of armed conflict within and between nations. The new post-colonial international system works to
maintain and deepen inequalities of wealth primarily through control (on the part of the wealthy, powerful nations) over the rules
and terms of trade, and over the currencies of trade.
Ext. Bulk Collection Tradeoff

Bulk collection causes data overload makes law enforcement less
effective.
Ward 15
Stan Ward writer for the publication Best VPM and has been involved in writing and teaching for 50 years. This
article internally quotes William Binney, a founder of Contrast Security and a former NSA official. NSA swamped
with data overload also trashes the Constitution From the publication: Best VPN - May 18 th, 2015 https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/19187/nsa-swamped-with-data-overload-also-trashes-the-constitution/
It has long been an argument of the civil liberties crowd that bulk data gathering was counterproductive, if not counter- intuitive. The argument was couched in language suggesting that to collect it all, as the then NSA
director James Clapper famously decried, was to, in effect, gather nothing, as the choking amounts of
information collected would be so great as to be unable to be analyzed effectively.
This assertion is supported by William Binney, a founder of Contrast Security and a former NSA
official, logging more than three decades at the agency. In alluding to what he termed bulk
data failure, Binney said that an analyst today can run one simple query across the NSAs various
databases, only to become immediately overloaded with information. With about four billion
people (around two-thirds of the worlds population) under the NSA and partner agencies watchful eyes, according to his estimates, there is
far too much data being collected. Thats why they couldnt stop the Boston
bombing, or the Paris shootings, because the data was all there The data was all there the NSA is great at going back over
it forensically for years to see what they were doing before that. But that doesnt stop it. Binney is in a position to know,
earning his stripes during the terrorism build up that culminated with the 9/11
World Trade Center bombing in 2001. He left just days after the draconian legislation known as the USA Patriot Act was
enacted by Congress on the heels of that attack. One of the reasons which prompted his leaving was the scrapping of a surveillance system on which he
long worked, only to be replaced by more intrusive systems.
AT: Accumulo
( ) Accumulos not responsive to our human intel internal link. Even
if NSA can process a large quantity of data, the qualitys low unless
HUMINTs involved.
( ) Accumulo fails Boston Marathon proves it doesnt find the
needle.
Konkel 13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology journalist for its
publications. He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy and other issues at the
intersection of government and technology. He began writing about technology at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a
graduate of Michigan State University. NSA shows how big 'big data' can be - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a
magazine covering technology - Jun 13, 2013 - http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
NSA relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel processing
key/value store capable of analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified version of Accumulo, based
on Google's BigTable data model, reportedly makes it possible for the agency to analyze data for
As reported by Information Week, the
patterns while protecting personally identifiable information names, Social Security numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials
revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a Carnegie Melon tech conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could
represent phone numbers, IP addresses, locations, or calls made and to whom; connecting those points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion
edges. For a human being, that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end computer system with the right big data tools and
mathematical algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, publicly stated
that the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few years," and other media reports
have cited anonymous intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled. Needles
in endless haystacks of data

are not easy to find, and the NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a
flawless system, as evidenced by the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and
The bombings were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was previously interviewed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in 2011 that he was a follower of radical
Islam. The brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well,
meaning several data points of suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a
pattern in time to prevent them from setting off bombs in a public place filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we
injured more than 200.
haven't even scratched the surface yet," said big data expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum Networks. " In
technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."
many ways, the
AT: Accumulo Solves Privacy

Accumulo doesnt solve privacy it cant keep info secure on its own
Pontius 14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana State
University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this piece is Mark Gondree, PhD.
Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School
INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO - September
2014 - http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1
databases are gaining popularity due to their ability to store and process large
heterogeneous data sets more efficiently than relational databases. Apache Accumulo is a NoSQL database
that introduced a unique information security featurecell-level access control. We study Accumulo to examine its
cell-level access control policy enforcement mechanism. We survey existing Accumulo applications, focusing on
Koverse as a case study to model the interaction between Accumulo and a client application. We conclude with a discussion of potential security
concerns for Accumulo applications. We argue that Accumulos cell-level access control can assist developers in creating a stronger
information security policy, but Accumulo cannot provide security particularly enforcement of
information flow policieson its own. Furthermore, popular patterns for interaction between Accumulo and its clients
require diligence on the part of developers, which may otherwise lead to unexpected behavior that undermines
system policy. We highlight some undesirable but reasonable confusions stemming from the semantic gap between cell-level and tableNoSQL
level policies, and between policies for end-users and Accumulo clients.
Accumulo wont solve privacy security features fail

Pontius 14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana State
University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this piece is Mark Gondree, PhD.
Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School
INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO - September
2014 - http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1
We commented on potential security threats facing developers that build applications

based on Accumulo. We used a hypothetical application to illustrate potential user management concerns. We identified
injection attacks that have been carried out against other NoSQL databases and may be relevant to some uses of Accumulo. We commented on
Accumulos inability to enforce information flow policies. These examples serve to

demonstrate that using Accumulo and its cell-level security feature is not a full solution
to access control problems unless Accumulo is paired with well-designed
enforcement mechanisms in the client application. We believe that the combination of our technical discussion of Accumulos
cell-level access control enforcement, illustration of Accumulo integration in a larger application, and identification of potential security concerns may
help future studies learn more about Accumulo information security and lead to development of more secure Accumulo based applications.
North Korea
1ac Frontline
North Korea prolif is accelerating now- recent submarine tests- also
leads to Iranian acquisition
Huessy 6/11 (Peter, 2015, Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, founded in 1981, and the senior defense
consultant at the Air Force Association and National Security Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, North Korea's Serious
New Nuclear Missile Threat, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5914/north-korea-nuclear-missile)//RTF
North Korea appears to have made significant progress in extending its capability
as a nuclear-armed rogue nation, to where its missiles may become capable of
hitting American cities with little or no warning. What new evidence makes such a threat compelling?
North Korea claims to have nuclear warheads small enough to fit on their ballistic
missiles and missiles capable of being launched from a submerged platform such as a submarine. Shortly after North Korea's
April 22, 2015 missile test, which heightened international concern about the military capabilities of North Korea, U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry urged China and our regional allies to restart the 2003 "six-party talks" aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons from
There are some "experts,"

however, who believe that North Korea's threat is highly exaggerated and poses
no immediate danger to the United States. Consequently, many believe that, given China's oft-repeated
the Korean peninsula and reining in North Korea's expanding nuclear missile program.
support for a "nuclear weapons free" Korean peninsula, time is on America's side to get an agreement that will guarantee just such a
But, if North Korea's technical advances are substantive, its

missiles, armed with small nuclear weapons, might soon be able to reach the
continental United States -- not just Hawaii and Alaska. Further, if such missile threats were to
come from submarines near the U.S., North Korea would be able to launch a
surprise nuclear-armed missile attack on an American city. In this view, time is not on the side
full de-nuclearization.
of the U.S. Submarine-launched missiles come without a "return address" to indicate what country or terrorist organization fired the
As North Korea is Iran's primary

missile-development partner, whatever North Korea can do with its missiles and
nuclear warheads, Iran will presumably be able to do as well. One can assume the
arrangement is reciprocal. Given recent warnings that North Korea may have upwards of 20 nuclear warheads, the
missile. The implications for American security do not stop there.
United States seems to be facing a critical new danger. Would renewed negotiations with China, Japan, South Korea and North
Korea really be able to address this threat? Two years ago, Andrew Tarantola and Brian Barrett said there was "no reason to panic;"
that North Korea was "a long way off" -- in fact "years" -- before its missiles and nuclear weapons could be "put together in any
meaningful way." At the same time, in April 2013, an official U.S. assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency stated the U.S. had
"moderate" confidence that "North Korea had indeed developed a nuclear device small enough to mount on a ballistic missile." That
was followed up two years later, on April 7, 2015, when the commander of Northcom, Admiral Bill Gortney, one of the nation's
leading homeland security defenders, said the threat was considerably more serious. He noted that, "North Korea has deployed its
new road-mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile and was capable of mounting a miniaturized nuclear warhead on it."[1] At
a Pentagon press briefing in April, Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of the US Strategic Command and America's senior military
expert on nuclear deterrence and missile defense, said it was important to take seriously reports that North Korea can now make
sure enough, in April, North Korea

launched a ballistic missile from a submerged platform. Media reaction to the North Korean test
small nuclear warheads and put them on their ballistic missiles.[2] And
has been confused. Reuters, citing the analysis of two German "experts," claimed the North Korean test was fake -- a not-too-clever
manipulation of video images. The Wall Street Journal, on May 21, 2015, echoed this view, noting: "[F]or evidence of North Korea's
bending of reality to drum up fears about its military prowess," one need look no further than a consensus that North Korea
"doctored" pictures of an alleged missile test from a submarine. This, they claimed, was proof that the "technology developments" by
Israeli missile defense expert Uzi

Rubin -- widely known as the "father" of Israel's successful Arrow missile defense
program -- explained to this author that previous North Korean missile
developments, which have often been dismissed as nothing more than mockedNorth Korea were nothing more than elaborately faked fairy tales. However,
up missiles made of plywood, actually turned out to be the real thing -- findings
confirmed by subsequent intelligence assessments. Rubin, as well as the South
Korean Defense Ministry, insist that on April 22, the North Korean military did,
in fact, launch a missile from a submerged platform.[3] Kim Jong Un, the "Supreme Leader" of
North Korea, supervises the April 22 test-launch of a missile from a submerged platform. (Image source: KCNA) What gave the
"faked" test story some prominence were the misunderstood remarks of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
James Winnefeld. He had said, on May 19, that the North Korean missile launch was "not all" that North Korea said it was. He also
mentioned that North Korea used clever video editors to "crop" the missile test-launch images. Apparently, that was exactly what the
editors did. The Admiral, however, never claimed in his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies there had been
Assistant Secretary
of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance -- told a Korean security
seminar on Capitol Hill that North Korea had successfully conducted a "missile
ejection" test, but from an underwater barge rather than a submarine .[5] To confuse
no successful missile test.[4] The same day, a high-ranking State Department official, Frank Rose --
matters further, additional pictures were released by the South Korean media to illustrate stories about the North Korean test. Those
pictures, however, were of American missiles, which use both solid and liquid propellant; as a result, one photo showed a U.S.
missile with a solid propellant smoke trail and one, from a liquid propellant, without a smoke trail. These photographs apparently
befuddled Reuters' "experts," who may have jumped to the conclusion that the photos of the North Korean test were "faked," when
they were simply of entirely different missile tests, and had been used only to "illustrate" ocean-going missile launches and not the
to achieve the capability to eject a missile from

an underwater platform is a significant technological advancement . The accomplishment
again illustrates "that rogue states such as North Korea can achieve military capabilities
which pose a notable threat to the United States and its allies." Rubin also stated that the
North Korean underwater launch test was closely related to the development of a
missile-firing submarine, "a first step in achieving a very serious and dangerous
new military capability."[7] Admiral Winnefeld and Secretary Rose, in their remarks, confirmed that the North Korean
test was not the "dog and pony show" some have claimed. In other words, the U.S. government has officially
confirmed that the North Koreans have made a serious step toward producing a
sea-launched ballistic missile capability. While such an operational capability may be "years away," Rubin
actual North Korean test.[6] According to Uzi Rubin,
warns that "even many years eventually pass, and it will also take many years to build up the missile defenses, so we had better use
the time wisely."[8] Will diplomacy succeed in stopping the North Korean threats? U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry seemed to
think it worth a try; so he began the push to restart the old 2003 "six-party" talks between the United States, North Korea, Russia,
China, South Korea and Japan, to bring North Korea's nuclear weapons under some kind of international control and eventual
elimination. After all, supporters of such talks claim, similar talks with Iran appear to be leading to some kind of "deal" with Tehran,
to corral its nuclear weapons program, so why not duplicate that effort and bring North Korea back into the non-nuclear fold? What
such a "deal," if any, with Iran, will contain, is at this point unknown. Celebrations definitely seem premature. If the "deal" with
North Korea is as "successful" as the P5+1's efforts to rein in Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program, the prognosis for the success of
diplomacy could scarcely be more troubling. Bloomberg's defense writer, Tony Carpaccio, reflecting Washington's conventional
wisdom, recently wrote that of course China will rein in North Korea's nuclear program: "What might be a bigger preventative will
be the protestations of China, North Korea's primary trade partner and only prominent international ally. Making China angry
would put an already deeply impoverished, isolated North Korea in even more dire straits." Unfortunately, no matter how attractive
a strategy of diplomatically ending North Korea's nuclear program might look on the surface, it is painfully at odds with China's
established and documented track record in supporting and carrying out nuclear proliferation with such collapsed or rogue states as
Iran, Syria, Pakistan, North Korea and Libya, as detailed by the 2009 book The Nuclear Express, by Tom C. Reed (former Secretary
of the Air Force under President Gerald Ford and Special Assistant to the President of National Security Affairs during the Ronald
Reagan administration) and Daniel Stillman (former Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Far from being a
potential partner in seeking a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, China, say the authors, has been and is actually actively pushing the
spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, as a means of asserting Chinese hegemony, complicating American security policy and
undermining American influence. The problem is not that China has little influence with North Korea, as China's leadership
repeatedly claims. The problem is that China has no interest in pushing North Korea away from its nuclear weapons path because
the North Korean nuclear program serves China's geostrategic purposes. As Reed and Stillman write, "China has been using North
Korea as the re-transfer point for the sale of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya and Yemen". They
explain, "Chinese and North Korean military officers were in close communication prior to North Korea's missile tests of 1998 and
2006". Thus, if China takes action to curtail North Korea's nuclear program, China will likely be under pressure from the United
States and its allies to take similar action against Iran and vice versa. China, however, seems to want to curry favor with Iran because
of its vast oil and gas supplies, as well as to use North Korea to sell and transfer nuclear technology to both North Korea and Iran, as
well as other states such as Pakistan. As Reed again explains, "China has catered to the nuclear ambitions of the Iranian ayatollahs in
a blatant attempt to secure an ongoing supply of oil". North Korea is a partner with Iran in the missile and nuclear weapons
development business, as Uzi Rubin has long documented. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that China may see any curtailment of
North Korea's nuclear program as also curtailing Iran's access to the same nuclear technology being supplied by North Korea. Any
curtailment would also harm the Chinese nuclear sales business to Iran and North Korea, especially if China continues to use the
"North Korea to Iran route" as an indirect means of selling its own nuclear expertise and technology to Iran. It is not as if Chinese
nuclear proliferation is a recent development or a "one of a kind" activity. As far back as 1982, China gave nuclear warhead
blueprints to Pakistan, according to Reed. These findings indicate that China's nuclear weapons proliferation activities are over three
decades old.[9] Reed and Stillman also note that nearly a decade later, China tested a nuclear bomb "for Pakistan" on May 26, 1990,
and that documents discovered in Libya when the George W. Bush administration shut down Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi's
nuclear program revealed that China gave Pakistan the CHIC-4 nuclear weapon design. Unfortunately, China's nuclear assistance to
Pakistan did not stay just in Pakistan. The nuclear technology made its way from Pakistan to North Korea. For example, high
explosive craters, construction of a 50 megawatt nuclear reactor (finished in 1986) and a secret reprocessing facility begun in 1987
all were done in North Korea with major Pakistani help from the A.Q. Khan "Nukes R Us" smuggling group, as Reed and Stillman
document in their book. Reed and Stillman write that when, amid disclosures in 2003 of a major Libyan nuclear weapons program,
the U.S. government sought help in shutting down the Khan nuclear smuggling ring, "Chinese authorities were totally unhelpful, to
the point of stonewalling any investigation into Libya's nuclear supply network." More recently, Chinese companies have now twice
-- in 2009 and 2011 -- been indicted by the Attorney for the City of New York for trying to provide Iran with nuclear weapons
technology. The indictments document that Chinese companies were selling Iran steel for nuclear centrifuges and other banned
technology. A leaked State Department cable, discussing the indictments at the time, revealed "details on China's role as a supplier
of materials for Iran's nuclear program," and that "China helped North Korea ship goods to Iran through Chinese airports." And
more recently, in April 2015, the Czech government interdicted additional nuclear technology destined for Iran -- the origin of which
remains unknown -- in violation of current sanctions against Iran. From 1982 through at least the first part of 2015, the
accumulation of documentary evidence on nuclear proliferation reveals two key facts: First, despite literally hundreds of denials by
Iran that it is seeking nuclear weapons, and amid current negotiations to end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, there is solid
evidence that Iran still seeks nuclear weapons technology; and that North Korea has nuclear weapons and is advancing their
capability. Second, China continues to transfer, through its own territory, nuclear weapons technology involving both North Korea
and Iran. Although the Chinese profess to be against nuclear proliferation, their track record from the documented evidence
it is obvious North Korea's nuclear weapons and

ballistic missiles are a serious threat to America and its allies. And China, from its
illustrates just the opposite. In summary,
proliferation record for the past three decades, is making such a threat more widespread. In this light, is dismissing North Korea's
advances in military technology and ignoring China's record of advancing its neighbors' nuclear weapons technology really best for
U.S. interests?
That causes miscalc- leads to global nuclear war

Metz 13 Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (Steven, 3/13/13,
Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-theunthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war)
North Korea is
dangerous
Today,
the most
country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime
in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this
offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official
North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be
dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently
tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger,
Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the
Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for
the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from
the North Korean government may prove true. No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many
American policymakers might

fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with
miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn
threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that
underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its
predecessors tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang
over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal
power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from
Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated
by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. The second
Korean War could begin with
missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion
of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons, but even if
they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself
would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to
tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South
Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and
its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could
potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and
Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy
occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The second Korean
War would force
military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would
probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial
This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit
reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the
global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. Eventually, though, the United States and its
base would have to grow.
allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante
bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a
permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious
challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South
Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War
would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to
remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a
multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a
unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this
might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at
the result could easily be heightened

hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep
economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily
any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly,
involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the
second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment.
Stranger things have happened in statecraft.
Humint key to verification of nuclear weaponization in North Korea.

Johnson 9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal
"Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served
as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his
Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign
Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION
"EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY,
USA, Feb 15, 2009 available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
Despite the many negative critiques of humint, former DCI Tenet emphasizes that intelligence is still
"primarily a human endeavor. He is obviously not referring to the government's intelligence budget priorities.
the United States devotes only a small percentage of its annual intelligence budget
to human spying. Spy machines are costly, while human agents are relatively inexpensive to hire and sustain on an
annual stipend. One of the ironies of American intelligence is that the vast percentage of its
spending goes into expensive intelligence hardware, especially surveillance satellites, even
though the value of these machines is questionable in helping the United States
Recall that
understand such contemporary global concerns as terrorism or China's economic might. Cameras
mounted on satellites or airplanes are unable to peer inside the canvas tents, mud huts, or mountain
caves in Afghanistan or Pakistan where terrorists plan their lethal operations, or into the deep underground caverns where
North Koreans construct atomic weapons. "Space cameras cannot see into factories where missiles are
made, or into the sheds of shipyards," writes an intelligence expert. " Photographs cannot tell whether stacks of
drums outside an assumed chemical-warfare plant contain nerve gas or oil, or whether they are
empty _As a U.S. intelligence officer has observed, we need "to know what's inside the building,
not what the building looks like.
Effective verification creates deals that stop prolif.
Hernandez 13 Research Associate, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Jason,
Proliferation Pathways to a North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, Nuclear Threat
Initiative, Dec. 20, 2013) RMT
United States and North Korea came extremely close to concluding a "Missile
Deal" that would have halted North Korean development, production, and testing of increasingly longer-range
missiles. However, the deal never came to fruition, and under the Bush Administration it was scrapped completely. One of the primary
issues for both the Clinton and Bush administrations was monitoring and verification The United States sought a
During the Clinton Administration, the
comprehensive monitoring and verification regime that would have permitted U.S. inspectors on-site access to rocket and missile facilities, while North
Korea believed that the United States could accomplish verification through imagery analysis and other national technical means . [20] It is therefore
future missile deal negotiations will focus heavily upon verification. Detection and Monitoring Any
advances in rocket technology using the three pathways described above will require numerous tests before the missile can be
accepted into service and deployed. Given North Korea's limited geographical size, all long-range missile tests will
result in debris falling into international waters. For the December 2012 Unha-3 launch, the rocket's first stage fell into the
likely that any
Yellow Sea, and the second fell off the coast of the Philippines. By recovering the first stage debris, South Korea was able to confirm some facts about
the Unha, while discovering new data that indicated progress in the Unha's design. The debris demonstrated continued areas of struggle and primitive
design elements, such as in the propellant, airframe, and welding, while also showing program advancements and new design elements, such as the use
of steering engines in place of jet vanes for orientation. [21] It is reasonable to assume that over the course of a testing program, debris will be recovered
New deployment methods, such as the use of

silos or road-mobile launchers in pathways two or will not necessarily be detected. While the
to enlighten the world on the progress of North Korea's missile program.
three
construction of silos could be detected by satellite imagery analysis, it is not guaranteed that the international community would detect every silo. Iran's
Shahab silos went unnoticed in the open source until displayed on Iranian media during the Great Prophet 6 military exercises. [22] A road-mobile TD2/Unha would seemingly go undetected unless paraded or displayed publically. The KN-08 was unknown in the open source until it was displayed at
the April 2012 military parade in Pyongyang. Deployments and launches of silo-based or road-mobile TD-2/Unha's would be very difficult to detect and
monitor. Verification The issue of verification is complex, and any
missile deal will undoubtedly cover the entirety of North
missile production
Korea's
, from battlefield and short-range ballistic missiles to space launch vehicles and ICBMs. However, this brief
will only address the relationship between a missile deal and the three pathways to an ICBM. For the purpose of this section, the author assumes that a
future missile deal will either aim to prevent or reverse a missile program in four key areas: development;
manufacturing and production; acquisition; and deployment. The question becomes for each of the three pathways to an ICBM, can the international
community verify that North Korea is abiding by a deal that prevents or reverses 1) development; 2) manufacturing and production; and 3) deployment
of an ICBM?
Verification efforts are a detterent and prevent tech development.

Walker 11--UK Foreign and Commonwealth Offices Arms Control and Disarmament
Research Unit (ACDRU) since March 1985.Published widely on aspects of CBW history in the
Harvard-Sussex Programs The CBW Conventions Bulletin[John R., The CTBT: Verification
and Deterrence, VERTIC BRIEF 16 OCTOBER 2011]RMT
any state contemplating a clandestine programme, or in this case one or

more underground nuclear tests, must make certain calculations about its ability to conceal
all of the evidence all of the time from a watchful international community. Balancing
risksmilitary and strategic gains against the political, diplomatic and economic costs
is not easy. A potential violator has to be sure that his preparations to test, as well as its conduct
and aftermath, can be concealed from the international community indefinitely. In the case of
We can however consider that
the CTBT, it will be a combination of national technical means (NTMs) and the treatys International Monitoring System (IMS) and on-site inspections
Tripping over just one can compromise his

plans and negate any conceivable military advantage that he might have been
hoping to derive from a clandestine test, or tests. It is worth recalling here that Sir William Penney, the leader of the
that place a series of high hurdles in the face of a would-be proliferator.
UKs nuclear weapons programme in the 1950s and early 1960s, advised Harold Macmillans government in 1962 that even though the Soviet Union
might be confident in avoiding the detection of one test under the then envisaged verification system, it could not be at all sure that a series of, say,
three tests would go unnoticed. Penneys view was that one test would not alter the strategic balance and so the risk of a test ban treaty was worth
taking as one would need a series of tests to obtain a strategically significant advantage. M ore than fifty years later we have the CTBTs IMS, which, as
of August 2011, has 86 per cent of its primary stations (including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations), 83 per cent of its
auxiliary seismic stations and 63 per cent of its radionuclide laboratories certified. Their detection capabilities are immeasurably superior to those
planned by the 1958 Geneva seismic experts meeting. Simulations of global detection thresholds today, measured in terms of equivalent nuclear-yield
in kilotons of TNT (kt), suggest that the IMS network is capable of detecting and identifying, worldwide, explosions fired close- coupled underground in
hard rock, in the atmosphere, and in the ocean, with a yield equal to or more than one kiloton. In many areas of the world, such as continental Eurasia,
the detection threshold is significantly less than one kiloton. In the 19771980 Tripartite Test Ban Treaty negotiations, UK and US scientists took the
view The CTBT: Verification and Deterrence2 that it would only be yields of around ten kilotons that would permit meaningful developments in new
Any state contemplating a clandestine test has to be sure that, even assuming its preparations go
undetected (it can take about a year to prepare for an underground test), it still must find the right geological
conditions on its territory in a reasonably remote area. It has to be sure, too, that it can stem a borehole
warhead design.
or tunnel effectively to guarantee no venting of radioactive particles or radioactive noble gases that could be picked up by IMS radionuclide stations.
Such a task would be challenging for a state with no prior experience of underground testing. Then there is the small matter of the seismic stations
primary and auxiliarydetecting the event and the strong likelihood that it will be subsequently correctly identified as an explosion from the Treatys
International Data Centre (IDC) Reviewed Events Bulletin. How convincing an explanation could a state provide when pressed for clarification under
the Treatys Article IV provisions? Could it be absolutely confident that it could conjure up a fool-proof cover story that would hoodwink all of the
This is where we first begin to see that the more effective the
verification system and the greater the integration of the elements that combine to
make it up, the greater the level of deterrence of non-compliance is. A regime that
can demonstrate a very high level of technical reliability, coverage and sensitivity
presents a formidable obstacle to anyone who wants to cheat. The IMS does that. A state might
treatys states parties?
hope that the CTBT Organisations Executive Council would fail to act on the compelling evidence presented by the IDC as well as any supporting
information from states parties NTMs and other sources (such as commercial satellite data) and vote against an on-site inspection. However, could any
the Provisional
Technical Secretariat (PTS) Executive Secretaryhas pointed out, the very nature
of the Treatys verification regime will be democratic in that the information
behind an inspection request is derived from an independent system whose
results are open to all states parties. There may, therefore, be very strong
pressures to respond to a well-substantiated compliance concern, which it would
be politically much more difficult to ignore or dismiss. Building an on-site inspection capability for the
state guarantee that this would indeed be the case? Just how confident ahead of time could it be? As Tibor Toth
CTBT is a demanding and lengthy processbut such a capability provides the one clear way of confirming that an event that triggered an inspection
was a nuclear test conducted in violation of the treatys Article I prohibitions. Effective inspections require a well-equipped, trained and experienced
cadre of inspectors and an ability to deploy to the field promptly. If the future Technical Secretariat cannot meet these criteria then the OSI regime is a
paper tiger. However, major strides have been taken by the PTS and some states signatories in recent years and efforts are continuing on building up an
initial capability that would be fit for purpose on entry-into-force of the treaty. There will be a large-scale OSI exercise Integrated Field Exercise in 2014
that will be a key milestone in the development of the Treatys OSI regime. OSIs present a violator with an array of techniques and technologies that will
make it immensely difficult to be sure that absolutely all incriminating traces of illegal activity can be concealed for up to the 130 days that an
inspection could last. Deployment of these techniques and technologies in an integrated and intelligent manner provides a potent tool for
detecting non-compliance. And, if the traces cannot be concealed, finding sustainable and
convincing technical explanations that will persuade not just the inspectors but the
Executive Council back in Vienna is no easy matter. The Council will review the final
inspection report and determine whether any non-compliance has occurred.
Knowing that the treatys OSI capability is effective and would stand a very good
chance of uncovering facts strongly suggestive of non-compliance, a cheating
state will have to obstruct the inspectors in the field . A systematic pattern of evasion, delay, obstruction,
obfuscation and down-right hostility tells its own story, especially since inspectors are allowed to comment on the co-operation (or lack thereof )
provided by an Inspected State Party in their final inspection report. Even a remote chance of detection is a difficult thing for a would-be violator to
guard against. Moreover, the greater the level of uncertainty in the mind of such a state, the greater the role that OSIs play in the deterrent effect of the
Ther e is no
known remote method of determining unambiguously whether an underground
event was man-made in origin and, if so, was due to a nuclear explosion . Such conclusive
evidence is only obtainable b y a n o n-the-spot i nvestigation i nto t he p resence of radioactive materials. Provision for OSI would
help deter clandestine testing by posing a threat that it would be identified as
such; OSI would also enhance the confidence of all parties to the treaty that its
provisions were being observed. This statement remains valid today. 1 The CTBT verification
regimecomprising the IMS stations (i.e. primary seismic, auxiliary seismic, hyrdoacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide, including stations with
treatys overall verification regime. During the 19771980 tripartite test ban treaty negotiations the UK noted that:
radioactive noble gas detection capabilities), the International Data Centre, National Data Centres, consultations and clarification procedures and onsite inspections armed with an array of detection techniques and technologies
presents a formidable set of obstacles
for a would-be violator to surmount. And in this equation we should not overlook the role that can be played by NTMs
remote sensing data such as multispectral and infrared images to give but one example. Nor should we forget that science and technology does not
stand still and we can confidently expect that the capabilities of all aspects of the verification regime will increase. In particular, as the June 2011
Science and Technology for the CTBT Conference in Vienna noted, progress in sensors, networks and observational technologies as well as in
We might still
not know exactly what deters in deterrence in the context of preventing noncompliance in arms control and disarmament agreements, but in the context of the CTBT the
negotiators designed an integrated system that will clearly complicate the plans of
any state thinking that it could evade that system successfully and derive a
meaningful political, military or strategic advantage from doing so. The overall regime must
inevitably impact on the calculations of a wouldbe evader, and the higher the
assurance of detection the more uncertain he must be that he can get away with cheating.
Deterrence of non-compliance is therefore strengthened.
computing and processing offer promising benefits for the efficacy of all components of the treatys verification regime.
Ext. Accelerating
Prolif is accelerating- err on the side of safety
Fifield 5/20 (Anna, 2015, Washington Post, North Korea says it has technology to make mini-nuclear weapons,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pyongyang-says-it-has-technology-to-make-small-submarined-mounted-nuclearwarheads/2015/05/20/0e96d0bc-fec0-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html)//RTF
North Korea claimed Wednesday that it has been able to make nuclear
warheads small enough to fit on a missile a development that, if verified, would
mark a major advance in the countrys military capabilities and the threat it can
pose to the world. Pyongyang has a habit of exaggerating its technical abilities , and
TOKYO
the latest assertion comes amid widespread doubts about its purported test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile this month.
But Kim Jong Uns regime is known to have been working simultaneously on a nuclear weapons program and missile technology,
and analysts widely believe that it is just a matter of time until North Korea puts the two together through miniaturization. The
Norths National Defense Commission, or NDC its top military authority, chaired by Kim said it was able to make a nuclear
warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile, designed to be fired at the mainland United States. It is long
since [North Koreas] nuclear striking means have entered the stage of producing smaller nukes and diversifying them, a
spokesman for the NDC said in a statement carried by the Norths official Korean Central News Agency. North Korea has reached
the stage of ensuring the highest precision and intelligence and best accuracy of not only medium- and short-range rockets, but longrange ones, the KCNA report continued, according to a translation by South Koreas Yonhap News Agency. The report added that
this months purported submarine missile test was part of the Norths byungjin policy, under which Pyongyang hopes to advance
its nuclear weapon capabilities and its economy. Pyongyang claimed it had sent a world-level strategic weapon soaring into the
State media ran photos of Kim aboard a boat holding binoculars as

the rocket blasted out of the sea. But that purported test has been widely
discredited. On Tuesday, Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said that the North Koreans have not gotten as far as their clever
video editors and spinmeisters would have us believe. They are years away from
developing this capability, he told a forum in Washington. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., an expert
on North Koreas weapons programs and chief analytical officer at AllSource Analysis, a consulting firm, wrote that the test
missile appeared to have been fired from a submerged barge rather than a
submarine. The commentary was in a report for 38 North, a Web site devoted to North Korea. North Korean television also
sky from underwater.
ran only photos, rather than video, of the test, leading analysts to speculate that the missile had flown for only a few seconds.
experts put
miniaturization of nuclear weapons as a distinct possibility for the North. It has
conducted three nuclear test blasts and regularly launches missiles of varying
ranges, advancing its capabilities with each test. [Top defense chief in North reportedly put to death]
In a separate report for 38 North in February, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia
Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
said it seemed very plausible that North Korea would be able to design nuclear
weapons small enough to fit on a missile. Ill be the first person to say that we
should not exaggerate the capabilities of North Koreas nuclear forces, but
underestimating them is every bit as bad, Lewis wrote. The North Koreans are
developing military capabilities that we will, sooner or later, have to deal with. A
2013 report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said the agency had
moderate confidence that Pyongyang had the ability to miniaturize its nuclear
weapons and mount them on long-range missiles. U.S. military officials have offered similar
assessments more recently, although the military does not consider weapons to be operational until they have been tested. Our
Notably, one of the photos was not cropped as it was in the newspapers and showed a ship towing a barge. Still,
assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and
shoot it at the homeland, Adm. Bill Gortney, commander of North American
Aerospace Defense Command, told reporters at the Pentagon last month,
referring to North Koreas intercontinental ballistic missile. This echoed an earlier statement
from Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea. [Photo gallery:
Inside North Korea] I believe they have the capability to miniaturize the device at this
point and they have the technology to potentially actually deliver what they say
they have, he said in October. But Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based expert on North Koreas nuclear weapons at the
International Crisis Group, spoke of the difference between rhetoric and reality when it comes to Pyongyangs claims. I think they
probably have a small device that they can put on a missile, but as far as actually using it goes, no one has been able to demonstrate
anything, he said. That Pyongyang was raving about its capabilities probably meant officials there were not yet certain, he said. I
think this shows a lack of confidence and a vulnerability, Pinkston said. Separately, Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary
general and a South Korean, said Wednesday that the North had retracted an invitation for him to visit an inter-Korean industrial
park Thursday. The Kaesong complex, where companies from the South employ workers from the North just over the northern side
of the border, has long been hailed as an example of inter-Korean cooperation. Ban, who is in Seoul for an education conference, had
said he would visit the complex on Thursday, but Wednesday he said that North Korea had decided against it. This decision by
Pyongyang is deeply regrettable, he said.
Noko prolif accelerating better intelligence k2 solve

Harper 4/7 (Jon, 2015, reporter for Stars and Stripes, NORAD commander: North Korean KN-08 missile operational,
NORAD commander: North Korean KN-08 missile operational)//RTF
North Korea has an operational road-mobile missile that could carry

nuclear weapons to the United States, according to the commander of North
American Aerospace Defense Command. The KN-08 intercontinental ballistic
missile was first paraded in North Korea in 2012. Many analysts suspected at the
time that the missiles on display were mock-ups and doubted that the country
had actually developed the weapon. But on Tuesday, Adm. Bill Gortney, the head of
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, told reporters at the Pentagon that he thinks Pyongyang
has achieved a breakthrough. We assess that its operational today, and so we
practice to go against that, he said. Gortney said North Korea has not yet tested the missile, and he declined to
WASHINGTON
explain why he thinks the missile is ready to go. The U.S. military does not consider its weapons to be operational until theyve been
The KN-08, if operationally deployed, would be more difficult to defeat than

fixed-site missiles because it could potentially be moved around secretly by the
North Korean regime to make it more difficult for the U.S. to locate and target
preemptively during a crisis. Its the relocatable target set that really impedes
our ability to find, fix and finish the threat, a problem which is compounded by
the fact that the U.S. military does not have persistent intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance assets over North Korea, Gortney said. North Korea also has the
ability to marry the missile with a nuclear warhead, according to the NORAD
chief. Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08
and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland, he said. The U.S. ballistic missile defense system has a spotty test record.
tested.
Gortney noted the fits and starts that its experienced, but expressed confidence that it would work in a crisis. The U.S. has 30
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. As the leader of NORAD and NORTHCOM,
Gortney would be responsible for launching the interceptors against North Korean missiles if they threatened the homeland. I own
the trigger on this, he said, and I have high confidence that it will work against North Korea.
Prolifs accelerating- theyll be a major threat by 2020

Wit 4/10 (Joel, 2015, founder and editor of 38 North, a program of the US-Korea Institute at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in an interview with Srinivas Mazumdaru for DW, 'North Korea could have up to
100 nuclear weapons by 2020', http://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-could-have-up-to-100-nuclear-weapons-by-2020/a18374679)//RTF
North Korea is on the verge of rapidly increasing its nuclear

arsenal over the next five years, adding to regional concerns, as Joel Wit, founder of US think
tank 38 North, tells DW. The delivery systems a country possesses determine its
ability to use its weapons - be it conventional, nuclear or biological - in the event
of a war. The systems range from hi-tech options such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and combat aircraft to lowtechnology ways of using artillery and ground-based vehicles. Despite efforts to curb the spread of these
systems, many countries around the world continue to acquire them. And those
already in possession of these technologies, such as North Korea, appear
steadfast to improve and expand their arsenals. Pyongyang's nuclear program has
been a key bone of contention the communist regime and the international
community, particularly after the isolated East Asian nation conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013. While the
country's current inventory is well-developed, the regime has "bigger ambitions and is seriously
pursuing the deployment of more capable, longer-range, more survivable
weapons," concludes a recently released report by 38 North, a program of the US-Korea Institute at the School of Advanced
Despite international sanctions,
International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. Titled "The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems," the report
dwells into North Korea's current missile program and offers various scenarios for the country's future nuclear delivery systems
capabilities. Nordkorea testet Schiff-Abwehrrakete North Korea is believed to have the world's most secretive regime In a DW
North Korea could be a

significant threat to the region by 2020 even without any new missile and nuclear
weapons tests. He stresses that international sanctions against North Korea have so far
been totally unsuccessful in terms of stopping the country from importing
nuclear technology. DW: According to your findings, how would you assess North Korea's present nuclear arms
capabilities? Joel Wit: We estimate that North Korea possesses anywhere between 10-16
nuclear weapons, and that they are able to put these weapons on top of at least
medium-range missiles, which are able to hit most targets in Japan and South
Korea. North Korea has a small nuclear arsenal, but the most important point we are trying to make in the report is that they
could be on the verge of rapid expansion of both their nuclear arsenal and their
delivery systems over the next five years. What are the main findings of your report? In terms of nuclear
weapons, North Korea would have a stockpile of between 20 and 100 bombs by 2020,
depending on several factors such as the amount of resources it pours into its
nuclear program and the country's ability to acquire foreign technology . Nordkorea
interview, Joel Wit, founder and editor of 38 North as well as the project lead, says that
Militrbung Raketen Wit: 'North Korea's missile program is still mainly based on old Soviet technology' But while North Korea has
developing the delivery systems has proved

to be more difficult and remains a significant engineering challenge. For instance, if you
look at North Korea's missile program, it is still mainly using old soviet technology. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
country has about 1,000 missiles that can reach targets in the region, and they
require no new testing. The bottom line therefore is that North Korea could be a significant
threat to the region by 2020 even without any new missile and nuclear weapons
mastered nuclear weapons technology over the past 25 years,
tests. Who is supporting North Korea in developing its nuclear delivery systems capabilities? Right now, we believe it's very much an
indigenous program. There is no more foreign assistance for North Korea's old liquid-fueled rockets. However, what we find is that
some of the newer systems that are appearing are also based on old Russian technology. And it's not quite clear whether North
Koreans are able to produce them by themselves or they acquired a these technologies somehow from Russia in the past. Although
there is a bit of uncertainty, we think the North has the capabilities to take care of their main basic missiles - the liquid-fuel ones - in
their arsenal. What challenges does North Korea's nuclear program currently face? One of the things we are not clear about North
Korea's nuclear capabilities is the size of their program to produce highly-enriched uranium. We know it exists but we are not sure
how advanced it is. So the issue is how many nuclear plants they have and how much uranium can they produce. And that's one of
the factors that influence our projections. In terms of the qualitative capabilities of their nuclear weapons, the main consideration is
of course whether they can mount their weapons on top of missiles or not. Although there has recently been some talk about North
Korea being able to put weapons on top of intercontinental missiles, we are skeptical about it and believe it requires more testing for
the country to acquire that capability. How successful have the current international sanctions been in curbing Pyongyang's nuclear
sanctions have been totally unsuccessful in terms of stopping North

Korea from importing nuclear technology. I don't think they have had any impact
on Pyongyang's ability to acquire more capabilities. North Koreans have been
evading sanctions for decades, and on top of that I would say that the
enforcement of these sanctions by the international community has been very lax.
activities? The
What level of threat does the North's nuclear capability pose to the countries in the region? If I was a South Korean or Japanese, I
wouldn't want a North Korea that could be armed with a 100 nuclear weapons in the next five years. I would be very concerned
about that development, particularly if the relationships in the region remain tense. Its certainly not a good scenario and could get
much worse. What should the international community do to stop or at least slow down North Korea's pursuit to develop more
advanced weapons and delivery systems? The problem right now is that everything we are doing is currently not working. We have
no diplomacy, and sanctions aren't working at all. I would even go further and say that the recognition of this growing threat is
lagging behind the speed at which it is growing. Yongbyon Atomanlage Nordkorea 2008 'It is unclear how many nuclear plants
we really do need to have a reassessment

of what's going on in North Korea, and based on that we need to find a new
approach to tackle the issue. The approach is going to require thinking about serious sanctions; making them
tougher and actually enforcing them. But it would also need thinking about serious diplomacy to
identify peaceful paths to move forward. Unfortunately, I don't believe any of that is going to happen. The
North Korea has and how much uranium they produce' I think
US is pretty much done in terms of dealing with North Korea and is consumed with Iran, and I don't think that's going to change.
Ext. Need Better Detection

Status quo detection and verification is insufficient- most intel is
guesswork
Thielmann 5/12 (Greg, 2015, Senior Fellow at Arms Control Association, Understanding the North Korean Nuclear
Threat, http://www.armscontrol.org/files/TAB_05_2015.pdf)//RTF
Making accurate political and

technical forecasts concerning North Korea has proven to be extremely
challenging. The actions of North Koreas leaders often appear erratic to those who do not
follow the arcane politics and history of the ruling Kim dynasty. Moreover, the weapons development track in
North Korea sometimes deviates from the course of development elsewhere.
Given the lack of U.S. diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contact with North
Korea, the hermetically sealed nature of North Korean society, and the
concentration of decision-making authority at the top of the Norths dictatorial
regime, continuing surprises from the government in Pyongyang should be
expected. An assessment of North Koreas nuclear capabilities starts with some solid information: the amount of plutoniumIntelligence Challenges Regarding North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs
239 known to have been extracted from the spent fuel of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessed. Based on this knowledge, experts
initially estimated that North Korea had sufficient fissile material for a handful of weapons using a rudimentary nuclear warhead
design. Over time, additional variables were added to the equation, including the unknown amount of enriched uranium from
recently revealed centrifuges at Yongbyon and possibly from other, covert facilities and the unknown sophistication of North Korean
On some key questions,

the U.S. intelligence community has been frank in describing the limits of its
understanding. For example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper conceded in this years
worldwide threat assessment statement to Congress that we do not know the
details of Pyongyangs nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.3 In other areas,
however, the intelligence community has been less forthcoming about its lack of
information and certainty, offering only predictions of what could happen
rather than what is most likely to happen. Such formulations provide ample
protection to the analysts against future accusations that they had provided no
warning, but inevitably lead to misleading contemporaneous headlines in the
press and erroneous interpretations by members of Congress. Open disagreements in
warhead designs, which would affect the amount of fissile material needed for each weapon.
characterizing the status of North Koreas long-range missile program among senior U.S. officials and between U.S. and South
Korean officials is revelatory. They could indicate either honest differences in assessing the meaning of commonly shared
information or the differing purposes of the intelligence assessment. Warning of what could happen uses different assumptions than
predicting what is likely to happen; each has a legitimate role. Some U.S. military commanders have stated confidently that North
Korea has been able to design miniaturized warheads that can be placed on medium- and short-range missiles. For example, Gen.
Curtis Scaparrotti, the top U.S. military commander in South Korea, said at a Pentagon news conference in October 2014, I believe
that [the North Koreans] have the capability to have miniaturized the [nuclear] device at this point.4 A Defense Intelligence Agency
report in 2013 had assessed with moderate confidence that the North had already mastered the technology of building a device
small enough to be used in a missile warhead.5 Such statements have been challenged by South Korean intelligence officials or
walked back by the leadership of the U.S. intelligence community and senior Pentagon officials.
There is, in fact, a
significant difference of opinion among experts in what Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia
Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, calls The Great
Miniaturization Debate. Lewis explains that determining whether North Korea
can arm a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead boils down to an assessment of
three questions: Can it make a nuclear weapon small enough? Can a compact
nuclear weapon survive the shock, vibration, and temperature change of ballistic
missile flight? Can the re-entry vehicle survive the heat of reentry? His answer
to each is yeah, probably, but he concedes that reasonable people may
disagree.6 Until an actual flight test occurs and perhaps even afterward, the
confidence level in such assessments will not be high. In recent months, nongovernmental analysts
have described an increasingly alarming situation with regard to North Koreas nuclear status, particularly concerning the numbers
of nuclear warheads that North Korea may be able to deploy. A prominent analysis by Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn of the US-Korea
Institute at SAIS laid out scenarios for minimal, moderate, and rapid growth in North Koreas nuclear forces (see Table 1). From an
existing estimated stockpile of 10 to 16 nuclear weapons (six to eight fashioned from plutonium) capable of being deployed on shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, the authors project growth by 2020 to 20, 50, or 100 warheads, with the latter two paths
including nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).7 Although Wit and
Ahn assessed that the moderate path was the most likely, most press coverage of their report headlined the high-end projection100
warheads deployed on a full range of battlefield, theater, and intercontinental weapons, with the longer-range systems carrying a
significantly higher yield than the North currently has in its inventory. Recent news reports suggested that Chinese estimates already
credit North Korea with 20 nuclear warheads and sufficient weapons-grade uranium-enrichment capacity for doubling the size of its
arsenal by next year8a pace of progress more in line with the rapid-growth scenario in the Wit and Ahn analysis than the majority
view among U.S. security experts. The closed-door discussions with U.S. nuclear specialists in February 2015 were reported to
include Chinese technical, political, and diplomatic experts on North Koreas nuclear program, as well as military representatives.
Although more-detailed information is needed to reach definitive conclusions about whether such assessments reflect the official
views of the Chinese government, the higher number cited is at least intriguing and more noteworthy coming from Chinas
reluctant witness perspective. Siegfried Hecker, who was the U.S. teams lead expert during the February conversations,
estimates of North Koreas nuclear stockpile by China and the United

States involved a great deal of guesswork. Additional evidence of the softness in
threat assessments regarding North Korea can be seen in the frequently cryptic or
confusing references to North Korean capabilities in unclassified statements of
the U.S. intelligence community. For example, Clapper straddled the ICBM deployment timing issue in
acknowledged that
congressional testimony by explaining that [w]e assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding [the KN-08
ICBM], although the system has not been flight-tested. He thereby left the impression, at least among non-experts, that a system
that has never flown is already being fielded, even though experts realize that, in all other historical examples of ICBM development,
operational status would only be achieved years after the systems first research and development flight test. Some argue in response
to such logic that North Korean weapons development timelines are sui generis, noting, for example, that the Nodong mediumrange ballistic missile was deployed after only one successful flight test. The weight of evidence, however, appears to be on the side
of those who are dubious about the operational capability of North Koreas road-mobile KN-08 ICBM.9 A prestigious U.S.
commission headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assessed in 1998 that North Korea (and other states of
proliferation concern) would be able to threaten the United States with an ICBM within five years that is, by 2003. More than a
dozen years have come and gone since then with no North Korean flighttest of an ICBM. Although the 1999 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on the foreign ballistic missile threat was more careful in its predictions than the Rumsfeld Commission, it judged as
most likely that the United States would face a North Korean ICBM threat by 2015.10 North Koreas recent announcement that it
had successfully test-fired a ballistic missile from a submerged submarine11 will add new concerns about the nuclear threat the
country poses. If confirmed, political reactions in the region and in the United States are likely to prove more dramatic than any
actual military gains by North Korea would warrant.
Korea is years away from nuclear capacity our detection

capabilities need to be upgraded for when it occurs.
Sang-hun 15 Choe Sang-hun, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, B.A. in Economics from
Yeungnam University, 2015 (North Korea Claims it Has Built Small Nuclear Warheads, New
York Times, May 20th, accessible online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/world/asia/north-korea-claims-it-has-built-smallnuclear-warheads.html?ref=topics&gwh=31AE2434E90C8F3D553433E9E11563E1&gwt=pay,
accessed on 6-23-15)
North Korea said the May 8 test involved successfully launching a strategic missile
from a submarine. But some analysts have since questioned the claim, saying that
some of the photographs of the episode that North Korea released may have been
altered and that the test launch may have been conducted from a submerged
barge, rather than a submarine.
Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on Tuesday, Adm.
James A. Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, voiced
similar misgivings.
They have not gotten as far as their clever video editors and spinmeisters would
have us believe, Admiral Winnefeld said. They are many years away from
developing this capability. But if they are eventually able to do so, it will present a
hard-to-detect danger for Japan and South Korea, as well as our service members
stationed in the region.
Civilian Casualties Scenario
Civilian Casualties
AT: Casualties Low

Drone strike casualties are huge and inevitable its a question of
reform
Hudson, 14- B.A. in International Relations and a minor in Middle Eastern Languages, Literatures and Cultures, focusing
on the Arabic language. Studied international humanitarian law and public policy at the University of Oxford (Adam, UN Human
Rights Committee Finds US in Violation on 25 Counts, Truth Out, 4/4/14, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/22887-un-humanrights-committee-finds-us-in-serious-violation)//KTC
drone strikes kill a significant number of civilians and inflict

serious human suffering. So far, US drone strikes and other covert operations have killed
between 2,700 and nearly 5,000 people, including 500 to more than 1,100 civilians in
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's figures. Many of those deaths
occurred under Obama's watch, with drone strikes killing at least 2,400 people during his five years in office.
Only 2 percent of those killed by drone strikes in Pakistan are high-level militants,
Despite claims to the contrary,
while most are low-level fighters and civilians. In addition to causing physical harm, drone strikes terrorize and traumatize
communities that constantly live under them. Drone strikes have lulled in Pakistan due to peace talks between the Pakistani
government and Pakistan Taliban, which collapsed on February 17. The last US drone strike in Pakistan happened on Christmas Day
In Yemen, drone strikes have continued. Several US drone strikes in Yemen

occurred during the first 12 days of March. Last November, six months after President
Obama laid out new rules for US drone strikes, a TBIJ analysis showed that "covert
drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have killed more people than in the six
months before the speech." It also was recently reported that the Obama administration is debating whether to kill
a US citizen in Pakistan who is suspected of "actively plotting terrorist attacks," according to The New York Times. It is very
likely these operations will continue. The Pentagon's 2015 budget proposal, taking sequestration into account,
2013.
spends $0.4 billion less than 2014 at $495.6 billion, shrinks the Army down to between 440,000 to 450,000 troops from the post9/11 peak of 570,000, and protects money for cyberwarfare and special operations forces. Cyber operations are allocated $5.1 billion
in the proposal, while US Special Operations Command gets $7.7 billion, which is 10 percent more than in 2014, and a force of
69,700 personnel. While President Obama promised to take the United States off a "permanent war footing," his administration's
The Obama administration is reconfiguring, rather than

halting, America's "permanent war footing."
policies tell a different story.
Yemen Scenario
1ac Yemen Long

First, signature strikes are inevitable but faulty intelligence creates
civilian casualties which destabilize and create anti-american
sentiment.
Greenfeild 13 Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle
East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International
Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations
from Tufts University, 2013 (The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like
Terrorists, The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-onpeople-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)
As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about
whether drone strikes should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all
the the arguments in favor, those those emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are
particularly dubious. The term "signature strike" is used to distinguish strikes
conducted against individuals who "match a pre-identified 'signature' of behavior that the
U.S. links to militant activity," rather than targeting a specific person. The United States
should not allow signature strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential
benefit. Leaving aside significant concerns about the legality of such strikes , there are serious
questions about the efficacy of this approach in undermining terrorist networks.
The problem with signature strikes is that they open the door to a much higher
incidence of civilian casualties--and this is where the danger lies. If the United
States is choosing targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other
known-terrorists, this falls short of the threshold for drone strikes set by the
Obama Administration, perpetuates a disastrous U.S. image in Yemen, and serves
to invigorate the ranks of those groups the United States aims to disable.
In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism policy in
May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will
only act against "terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the
American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively
addressing the threat." He did not, however, directly address the use of signature
strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could be used in the ongoing fight
against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, extensive
signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-American sentiment. After
years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from
64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll . The White House authorized
signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have not employed
this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties
in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame, which
is perhaps even more worrisome.
Second, this is specifically true of Yemen targeted strikes solve
blowback and AQAP recruitment its reverse causal.
In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the
wrong person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in
Yemen. Among the casualties, however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had
brought along for protection. The imam was working to dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately needs in a
place like Yemen. Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal
leaders in areas where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these
attacks drive more Yemenis to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the
eldest son of a man killed by a drone joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's
killer and wants revenge. As the deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American
sentiment grows. When drone strikes occur and non-combatants are killed,
Yemenis lash out with protests demanding justice and accountability from the
United States--which has not been forthcoming.
In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated,
many Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is
clear intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and
plotting a specific and imminent act of terror against Americans. The problem
with signature strikes is that they do not meet this threshold--not even remotely-and they open the door for the U.S. to make grievous targeting mistakes and be
seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency. Signature strikes target low-level
militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily planning an
imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.
Beyond signature strikes, there is a more fundamental question that we should be
asking--a question of overall strategy: is the current drone program achieving our
national security objectives? It is not just civil libertarians and human rights advocates that are
sounding the alarm; a group of 30 foreign policy experts sent a letter to President
Obama in March 2013 calling for an end to the current drone strategy. Even senior
retired members of the military, including General Stanley McChrystal, believe drone strikes
are counterproductive because of the blowback they foment among the local
population.
Targeted killings may eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders, but when civilians die
along with them, these strikes ensure that a generation of Yemenis, Pakistanis, or
Somalis will blame the U.S. for killing innocent community members,
exacerbating America's serious image problems abroad and creating a space for
extremist ideology to take root. In short, the U.S. drone program not only
undermines the long-term national security of the United States by fostering
widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, it also undermines the legitimacy of the host
country government, whose support the U.S. needs, and it provides fodder for
jihadi rhetoric that strengthens the very groups the U.S. seeks to destroy.
Third, Yemen is a test case success over AQAP prevents regional
terror and instability, but failure emboldens radical groups and
inflames regional rivalries.
Jarrell 14 Matthew Jarrell, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Brown
University, 2014 (Yemen: The Importance of Success in a Failed State, Brown Political
Review, October 30th, accessible online at
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/yemen-the-importance-of-success-in-a-failedstate/, accessed on 6-22-15)
Regional Reverberations
As Yemen deals with this latest round of domestic upheaval, the visible reciprocal
relationship between the nation and foreign interventionists remains. World and
regional powers have consistently had a negative impact on Yemeni internal
affairs, and in turn, Yemens problems are hardly confined within its borders.
There are numerous parallels between Yemen and other Middle Eastern nations
struggles: intense regionalism embodied by the north versus south dynamic is
reminiscent of Libyan civil strife, and the Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions harken
back to Syrian divides. The Islamic State, a powerful terrorist group with international
ambitions, has derailed a domestic political order in Iraq in a similar manner as
AQAP in Yemen. As a nation that is plagued by all of these different dilemmas, it
follows that a solution in Yemen could help immensely in shedding light on how
to counter terror in the region as a whole.
The first step to a more stable society is loosening the grip of destructive foreign
interests. The lessons that can be learned by examining repeated foreign missteps in Yemen
are many: Britains colonial division, Saudi Arabian and American unflinching backup of Saleh,
and Irans meddling in the Houthi issue should all have been avoided. Furthermore, if any
hope of a resolution exists in this war-weary republic, it will manifest itself

through domestic dialogue between the competing factions; perhaps the recent
entrance of the Houthis into mainstream political discussion will enable that. Ideally, all
Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP, eliminating one of the
worlds most active terrorist groups and serving as a model for national
integration to the entire Middle East.
Fourth, Yemen Instability destroys regional stability we have two

internal links.
A) Yemen instability ensures a steady flow of weapons and sectarian
divides causes regional draw-in and escalation.
Salmoni et al. 10 Barak Salmoni, Associate Professor of International Security Affairs at
the College of International Security Affairs, Ph.D. in Middle East Policy from Harvard
University, B.A. in Middle East Studies from Brandeis University Bryce Loidolt, Adjunct
Professor of Middle Eastern Affairs at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, M.A. in
Middle East Studies from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, B.A. in Middle East
Studies from Middleton College Madeline Wells, Research Assistant at RAND Corporation,
M.A. in Islamic Studies from Columbia University, B.A. in Government from Cornell University,
2010 (Concerns of Regional Powers, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, Published by
the RAND Corporation, ISBN: 978-0-8330-4933-9, pgs. 281-283)
Concerns of Regional Powers
Over the past three years, regional states have become increasingly involved in the
GoYHuthi conflict. While Sana has often referred to foreign (Libyan, Iranian) involvement
as a way to explain Huthi persistence, neighboring govenments are concerned that the
Huthi challenge aggravates the mounting threats to Yemens internal security. In
this respect, the lack of adequate security along Yemens land and maritime borders
increases the likelihood that terrorism, illicit trade, and weapons smuggling will
persist throughout the region, raising the possibility that combatants in
numerous substate conflicts will circulate transnationally, contributing to other
simmering conflicts, or may be an element of regime propaganda focusing on the Huthis
supposed foreign support. These issues pose a problem for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries as well as Iran, while increasing the dangers in the ungoverned spaces in the Horn of
Africa and the Red Sea littoral. The regional threat perception caused by the conflict may also
increase Sunni sentiment against alleged Iranian-Shia encroachment in the Gulf.
Huthi violence in northern Yemen directly increases the threat to Saudi Arabian
border regions. Although Yemen is not yet officially a part of the GCC, instability in a
region that shares borders and security concerns requires a regional focus on
boosting Yemeni security capabilities. Part of the security problem stems from
the fact that much of Yemens border has never been satisfactorily delineated ,
despite recently heightened security coordination. Without consistent border security, the
frequent frontier crossings by Yemeni tribesmen pose a concern to both states, in light of the
Huthi challenge to the GoY. Additionally, tribal populations in the Saudi provinces of Asir,
Jizzan, and Najran (which has a large Ismaili and a small Zaydi minority) may identify with
their Yemeni cousins. Specifically, although the Khawlan bin Amr subtribes of Jabal Fayfa, Bani
Ghazi, and Jabal Bani Malik have been on the Saudi side of the border since 1934, their
members often travel back and forth for purposes of commerce. Given the geographical extent of
GoY-Huthi clashes, these tribal sections may include some proHuthi members or may host
small numbers of refugees from the conflict in Sada. As we have seen, at different times the GoY
has alluded to cross-border tribal support for Huthi fighters, while Huthi sources have alleged
Saudi provision of funding and arms to the GoY, as well as cooperation in armed attacks on
Huthi supporters.7 In the 2009 2010 round of fighting, this became a regular theme of Huthi
statements. More basically, unmonitored movement of population permits the
proliferation of the enablers of regional strife, including weapons, funds,
contraband goods, and ideas.
As seen in Chapter Five, the sixth phase of the war in Sada has highlighted the
conflicts regional aspects and its potential for further transnationalization. Saudi
Arabia has become directly entangled in fighting with Huthi forces on both sides of
its border with Yemen and could persist in anti-Huthi operations. According to local
analysts, Saudi involvement reflects frustration with GoY failures as well as a fear that a
border open to Huthi movement could also permit the reinfiltration of al-Qaida
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) into Saudi territory, from which it had been mostly
eradicated in 20032006. Toward the end of 2009, regional Arab fora, such as the GCC and
Arab League, came out in support of Saudi actions to prevent encroachment on Saudi and
Yemeni sovereignty, considering Yemeni security integral to that of surrounding Arab Gulf
States. While Arab League and GCC states maintained the appearance of a united Arab front,
their support for Saudi Arabia and the GoY lessens their ability to act as impartial mediators in
any future conflict abatement process that might begin where the Qatar process ended.
B) Yemen instability ensures Saudi proliferation sectarian split

creates a regional arms race.
Ashraf 15 Maimuna Ashraf, Research Fellow at the Strategic Vision Institute, an
international security think-tank, 2015 (Muddle of Power Politics and Proliferation in Middle
East Analysis, Eurasia Review, May 8th, accessible online at
http://www.eurasiareview.com/08052015-muddle-of-power-politics-and-proliferation-inmiddle-east-analysis/, accessed on 6-21-15)
Likewise, the Saudi military action in Yemen cannot be observed in disconnection
to a US-Iranian nuclear deal. Evidently, the US is focusing on an approach to
ensure a Balance of Power and blow a sectarian divide in the region , as it previously
supported Iranian-led Shiite in Iraq and now reportedly is providing intelligence and mission
planning to Saudi Arabia against pro-Iranian al-Houthis. The US does not want Iran to acquire a
nuclear weapon because Iran holds the conventional capability to target US and allied troops
stationed in Middle Eastern region. Thus, the Iranian nuclear weapon developments would
increase the threat radically for US. Whereas, if the Iran-US nuclear deal finalizes, the
framework of the deal would probably lead to the lifting of sanctions from Iran, which may
invigorate the Iranian economy to assist their military or nuclear ambitions.
These advancements might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, by primarily
forcing Saudi Arabia to pursue such an option. The Saudis have already warned
that they would acquire the atomic bomb if Iran becomes a nuclear power.
Recently, Riyadh signed a memo of understanding with Seoul to build two nuclear power plants,
whereas similar projects have already been taken place with France, Argentina and China.
Recently the US lifted its ban on military aid to Egypt, while Egypt has also announced the plan
to build its first nuclear power plant with Russian help on the Mediterranean coast west of the
port city of Alexandria. Egypt is being considered as another Sunni state in region,
emerging as an atomic proliferate state. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) long ago
ahead started constructing its nuclear reactor. Whereas, Israels nuclear plans are
widely known, Israel is a non-party state to NPT, yet it already has a robust nuclear
weapons stockpile in the region and is reportedly in quest of second strike

capability. Now almost all the major powers of Middle East including Saudi
Arabia, Algeria, Turkey, Syria, Oman, UAE, Jordon, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait,
Qatar and Egypt have either announced plans to produce nuclear energy or have
signed nuclear cooperation accords. Yemen and Libya are the two states that have called
off their nuclear programs. The predominant fear in the region is that most of the states in the
region will join the nuclear arms race to secure themselves, following the Iran case or as result of
ongoing regional power politics.
Conversely, the Yemen issue is widely affecting the Middle East, and the possibility
of a South Asian state becoming embroiled in Yemens civil war is high because
Riyadh has been leaning on Pakistan to join its military coalition, whilst the reports of
secret Pak-Saudi nuclear cooperation are already being speculated . Thus, if the
Yemen conflict gets complicated and Houthi rebels extend their vigorous
aggression inside Saudi territory, then in such a worsening situation, Pakistan
will be standing at a crossroad to decide about the level of its involvement in the
conflict and scale of its cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Possibly, sighting the geopolitical
calculus, a flat refusal would not be possible for Islamabad, while a direct
involvement in Yemen would be taken as Saudi-led Sunni coalition arrayed
against Iran that might ignite Pakistan-Iranian tensions and broader Shiite-Sunni
conflict.
Fifth, Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear

war it escalates and draws in other powers.
Edelman et al. 11 Eric Edelman, visiting scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic
Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Distinguished
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in US Diplomatic History
from Yale University, B.A. in History from Cornell University Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,
President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. from Harvard
University in International Relations Evan Montgomery, Senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia,
2011 (The Dangers of a Nuclear Armed Iran, Foreign Affairs, January/February, accessible
online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nucleariran, accessed on 6-21-15)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support:
Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh
would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to
deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the
leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a
nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to
nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its
progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of
missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi
Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The
Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi
Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional
warheads effectively.
There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving
nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad
option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the
Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to
produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or
longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently
building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second
chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other
words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially
expanded arsenal of its own.
Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia
and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a
practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This
arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow
the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their
own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one
from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not
trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by
deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its
chief rival, India.
The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how
India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own
conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence
stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction,
any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would
be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to
pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the
remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons
weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only
circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.
N-Player Competition
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count
three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an
n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on
the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction
among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to

miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the
other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems
because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for
an attack.
More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the
costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange.
For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure
second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can
wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging
nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as
hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely
vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short
flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be
compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their
nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lowerlevel commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation.
Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-
control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase

further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack
might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership
of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which
nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to
respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the
wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons
from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety
measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can
be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing
or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their

governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that
nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate
threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case,
however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or
theft.
Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability .
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a
nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a
multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced
military technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition
within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors
lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead
miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers
could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more
survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for
example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or
gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the
technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase
its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of
existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape
the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great
Game, with unpredictable consequences.
Sixth, only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve the Middle
East could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.
London 10 Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, Professor Emeritus at
New York University, Ph.D. from New York University, 2010 (The Coming Crisis In The Middle
East, Gatestone Institute, June 28th, available online at
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east, Accessed 6-22-15)
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior
to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger.
Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission,
has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the
next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land
operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war]
Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and
rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-,
medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for
military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War.
Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for
Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained.
In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of

nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is
synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to
change course.
From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon"
in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces
incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order
to maintain internal stability.
For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a
combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting
to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition.
However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all
bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent"
must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite
a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an
escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war
against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment,
the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could
lead to a nuclear exchange.
The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States'
policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the
region.
Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done
nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow
a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted
President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel
that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration
treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible.
As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one dangerous to
ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those
individuals seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political
vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with
imperial exhilaration.
It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur,
and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but
not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi
Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or will this be a war in
which there aren't victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S.
do?
This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some
believe that it is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite
tend to believe in its veracity -- a truly bad sign.
Seventh, instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes

seizing of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.
Anzinger 14 Niklas Anzinger, Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Syracuse
University, 2014 (Jihad At Sea - Al Qaedas Maritime Front in Yemen, Maritime Executive,
February 25th, accessible online at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Jihad-At-Sea-Al-Qaedas-Maritime-Front-in-Yemen-2014-02-25, accessed on 6-22-15)
Yemens state weakness due to fragmentation and ongoing conflicts allowed Al

Qaeda and affiliates to take and hold territory, possibly enabling them to seize the
Port of Aden. If Al Qaeda establishes safe havens in the southern Abyan province,
supported by local Yemeni inhabitants, attacks at sea or in near by ports similar to the
USS Cole bombing in 2000 could become a threat, increasing the danger to Red Sea
shipping. Yet Al Qaeda is of secondary concern for the Yemeni government, with secessionist
insurgencies in the north and the south threatening the states unity. Only a stable Yemen
can effectively deny Al Qaeda a stable base in the long run.
In recent years, international shippers taking the Red Sea route have been
primarily concerned with attacks by Somali pirates. Those attacks went down
from 237 in 2011 to 15 in 2013 due to the Somali governments increased ability to fight and
deter piracy, among other causes. However, another threat to international shipping in
the Gulf of Aden looms. Yemens southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab elMandeb which links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke
point where roughly 8.2% of global oil supply passed through in 2009. Its oil exports,
accounting for 70% of Yemeni government revenue, make the country highly
dependent on its declining reserves. Yemen is an Al Qaeda stronghold, second
only to Pakistan (and possibly Syria more recently). It was a target of the U.S. drone
campaign, with 94 strikes between 2002 and 2013 (Pakistan: 368). Al Qaeda aims to
enforce rigid Islamic legislation in Muslim countries and establish a global
Islamic Caliphate. According to its 20-year plan, Al Qaeda aims to subdue
apostate Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It hosts a franchise in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), establishing safe havens in the governorates of Al Bayda,
Marib, Shabwah, Lahji and Abyan, where it exerts considerable influence.
Yemens weak central state
Yet the Yemeni government, headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi since February 2012 after
the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end, has to deal with more than Al
Qaeda. In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north united with the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen in the south. United in name, Yemen, however, remained a fragmented
entity rife with internal divisions. In 1994, a civil war between Salehs north and the secessionist
south broke out. In 1997, a group called Ansar Allah, emerging from a Zaidi Shia religious
organization, confronted the Yemeni government leading to armed uprisings and several rounds
of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin alAhmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest
that Ansar Allah seized to take control of Saada city where it continues fighting Sunni-Salafist
tribes. His defection may, however, only be a symptom of the Yemeni states retreat to Sanaa,
neglecting the north and the south. As a consequence, Hadi has to cope with internal
struggles and two rebel movements, constraining his ability to fight AQAP.
Al Qaedas terrorism at sea
Al Qaedas terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method .
Abu Musab al-Suri, an eminent jihadi strategist, defined several choke points as a target and
outlined methods for disruption: blocking the passages using mines or sinking ships in them,
threatening movement at sea through piracy, martyrdom operations and weapons.
On the Earth, there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries
of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal.
These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in
Egypt. 3. The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The
Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. Most of the Western worlds economy, in terms of trade and oil,
passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft
carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children It is necessary to shut
these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. []. Abu
Musab al-Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call.
Eighth, Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off
perception alone triggers the impact.
Rosen 15 Armin Rosen, Freelance journalist who has written in publications like The
Atlantic, US News & World Report, and The Wall Street Journal Internally citing an EIA
report on the Bab el-Mandeb Straight, 2015 (War In Yemen Could Threaten One Of The
World's Most Important Oil Chokepoints, Business Insider, March 26th, accessible online at
http://www.businessinsider.com/war-in-yemen-could-threaten-one-of-the-worlds-mostimportant-oil-choke-points-2015-3, accessed on 6-21-15)
Oil prices are surging after Saudi Arabia began a military operation against
Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen:
Yemen isn't a world-shaking oil producer, churning out a mere 133,000 barrels a day in
2013. Prices may have been jolted by the strong possibility that Saudi Arabia,
which produces 11.6 million barrels a day, is entering a risky military conflict.
The situation in Aden, a strategically decisive port city on Yemen's southern coast, was so bad
that President Adb Rabbu Mansur Hadi reportedly had to flee the city, and the country, by boat
rather than by air.
This means that Houthi rebels are contesting areas along the Bab el-Mandeb , the
straits at the opening of the Red Sea and one of the world's crucial oil
chokepoints.
According to the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) fact-sheet on global oil

chokepoints, 3.8 million barrels of oil and "refined petroleum products" passed
through the Bab el-Mandeb each day on its way to Europe, Asia, and the US, making it
the world's fourth-busiest chokepoint.
The strait controls access to multiple oil terminals and to a oil pipeline co-owned
by state companies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that
transits oil between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, called the Suez-Mediterranean or
SUMED pipeline.
The Bab el-Mandeb is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, "limiting tanker traffic
to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments," according to
the Energy Information Administration.
The closure of the straits or the perception of added risk of closure could
have huge consequences for the global oil market.
"Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from
reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern
tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost," the EIA fact-sheet explains. "In addition,
European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to
Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb."
Sudan and South Sudan would also have their only oil terminal cut off from Asiabound trade, as the countries' shared pipeline terminates in Port Sudan. And it would cut
off Indian Ocean access to the Mediterranean sea as well as the SUMED pipeline,
which can transit 2.24 million barrels of oil per day more than the daily output
of all but 13 of the world's countries.
Ninth, price shocks cause global economic collapse causes a
domino effect of economic decline.
Rentschler 13 Jun Rentschler, Analyst at the World Bank, Consultant at the European
Bank for Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University College, London, 2013 (Oil
Price volatility its risk on economic growth and development, World Bank, July 18th,
accessible online at http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/oil-price-volatility-its-riskeconomic-growth-and-development, accessed on 6-22-15)
Oil price shocks (i.e. sudden changes) can be transmitted into the macro-economy
via various channels. In the private sector, a positive oil price shock will increase
production costs and hence restrict output with price increases at least partially
passed on to consumers. Moreover, as prices for gasoline and electricity increase,
households face higher costs of living, with the poor being particularly
vulnerable. These impacts can have further significant knock-on effects and
repercussions throughout the economy, affecting macro-indicators such as
employment, trade balance, inflation and public accounts, as well as stock market
prices and exchange rates. Thereby, the nature and extent of such knock-on effects depend
on the structural characteristics of an economy; for instance, the more a country engages in oil
trade, the more it is exposed to price shocks on global commodity markets. Countries relying
on a high fossil fuel share in their energy mix, or on energy intensive industrial
production, are also more vulnerable. Furthermore, oil price shocks on the
international market might be amplified in specific countries, depending on the
respective Dollar exchange rate and prevailing inflationary pressures.
While a given oil price increase may be perceived positively by oil exporting
countries and negatively by importers, an increase in oil price volatility (i.e.
consecutive positive and negative oil price shocks) increases perceived price uncertainty
for all countries regardless of their trade balance. Such oil price volatility reduces
planning horizons, causes firms to postpone investments, and may require
expensive reallocation of resources. Formulating robust national budgets
becomes more difficult, as importing countries face uncertainty regarding import
costs and fuel subsidies levels, and exporters face volatile revenues. This may be a
particularly profound problem in budget constrained developing countries , which
rely on oil exports as a main source of public revenue. In order to protect firms and households
against price volatility on international markets, particularly in developing countries,
governments often allocate large parts of their budgets to subsidizing fuel. These subsidy
systems not only expose governments to significant budgetary risks, but result in
significant environmental costs, benefit mainly the wealthier, create disincentives
for energy efficiency, and crowd out resources from education, health and other
investments in development.
Finally, global economic decline risks nuclear war.
Merlini 11 Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States
and Europe at the Brookings Insitution, 2011 (A Post-Secular World?, Survival, Volume 53,
Issue 2, April, pgs. 117130, accessible online at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.571015, accessed on 6-22-15)
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of
possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature
crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent
today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even
involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse
of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just
experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for
peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited
exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside
interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of
multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts,
such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions.
Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar
issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational
approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging
with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.
1ac Yemen Oil Prices

sentiment.
population.

Fourth, instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes

seizing of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin alAhmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest
Fifth, Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off
perception alone triggers the impact.
rather than by air.
chokepoints.

SUMED pipeline.
Sixth, price shocks cause global economic collapse causes a domino
effect of economic decline.

Finally, global economic decline risks nuclear war.
1ac Yemen Instability

sentiment.
population.

Fourth, Yemen Instability destroys regional stability we have two

internal links.
C) Yemen instability ensures a steady flow of weapons and sectarian
D) Yemen instability ensures Saudi proliferation sectarian split


conflict.
Fifth, Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear

war it escalates and draws in other powers.
chief rival, India.

an attack.


theft.
Finally, only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve the Middle
East could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.

change course.
region.
do?
Internal Links
Signature strikes fail, creating anti-americanism and bolstering
terror groups only the aff improves strikes enough to solve.
should not allow signature strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs
the potential benefit. Leaving aside significant concerns about the legality of such
strikes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of this approach in
undermining terrorist networks.
against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan,
extensive signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-American
sentiment. After years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy
by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll . The White
House authorized signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they
have not employed this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and noncombatant casualties in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting
failures are to blame, which is perhaps even more worrisome.
This is specifically true of Yemen targeted strikes solve blowback

and AQAP recruitment its reverse causal.
population.
Regional Instability
Yemen is a test case success over AQAP prevents regional terror
and instability, but failure emboldens radical groups and inflames
regional rivalries.

Yemen Instability destroys regional stability we have two internal

links.
E) Yemen instability ensures a steady flow of weapons and sectarian


F) Yemen instability ensures Saudi proliferation sectarian split

conflict.
Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear war

it escalates and draws in other powers.
chief rival, India.

an attack.


theft.
Only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve the Middle East
could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.

change course.
region.
do?
Oil Price Spikes

Instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes seizing of
the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin al-
Ahmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest
Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off perception
alone triggers the impact.
rather than by air.
chokepoints.

SUMED pipeline.
Price shocks cause global economic collapse causes a domino effect
of economic decline.
Global economic decline risks nuclear war.
AT: AQAP Weak/Status Quo Intelligence Solves

AQAP is strong and our intelligence in the region is weak.
Knutsen 15 Alexis Knutsen, Analyst for the American Enterprise Institutes Critical
Threats Project, Publis Fellow at the Claremont Institute, 2015 (As America pulls out of Yemen,
ISIS and AQAP move in, American Enterprise Institute, March 24th, accessible online at
https://www.aei.org/publication/as-america-pulls-out-of-yemen-isis-and-aqap-move-in/,
The United States began withdrawing its remaining personnel from Yemen
Saturday, citing deteriorating security conditions. About 100 American troops,
including the special operations forces assisting the Yemeni military in the fight against al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), were evacuated. The move diminishes Americas
intelligence footprint in Yemen and abandons the country to AQAP, the Iranianbacked al Houthis, and, now, the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). What does the Obama
administration intend to do about the threat from Yemen? So far, not much.
Al Qaedas affiliate in Yemen, AQAP, is nowhere close to being defeated, and is, in
fact, benefiting from Yemens chaos. Yemen has slowly collapsed into two rival
governments one in northern Yemen controlled by the Zaydi Shia rebel group known as the
al Houthis, and the other in southern Yemen under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour
Hadi, whom the US still recognizes as Yemens president. As both the Hadi and al Houthi
governments are drawn further into armed conflict, both sides will likely be less
able to commit forces to fighting AQAP. AQAP, furthermore, has also been able
to embed its fighters within local populations opposed to the al Houthis, giving
AQAP more operating room throughout the country.
AT: Wahaishi Weakens AQAP

Recent death of Wahaishi doesnt weaken AQAP
Cook 6/16 (Joana, 2015, Doctoral Candidate in the Department of War Studies. She is also the current Editor-in-Chief of Strife
and a Research Affiliate with the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS,) Wahaishi is gone, but
AQAP will thrive in absence of political solution, http://strifeblog.org/2015/06/16/wahaishi-is-gone-but-aqap-will-thrive-inabsence-of-political-solution/)//RTF
the death of Nassir al-Wahaishi, the second in command of alQaeda, and the leader of its strongest affiliate group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Penninsula (AQAP). Wahaishi was reportedly killed in a drone strike, said to have taken place in the port city of
Mukallah, Yemen. While this strike is certainly significant, especially in its symbolic
value, it is unlikely to quell the threat AQAP poses as long as a political solution
in the country remains out of reach. Officially formed in January 2009 from
Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda, AQAP is often cited as the most lethal
branch of the organization, largely due to the bomb-making skills of Ibrahim al-Asiri. Al-Asiri has been the key
News broke this morning of
figure from AQAP linked with the many threats that have emanated from the country in recent years. These have included the 2009
underwear bomber who attempted to detonate a device on a commercial liner over Detroit on Christmas Day, as well as the 2010
cargo plane plot which saw explosives hidden in US-bound printers. Most recently, AQAP had claimed responsibility for the Charlie
The death of Wahaishi follows on from other significant blows for

the organization in recent years, such as the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, the USborn English-speaking cleric who was killed in a drone strike in September 2011 .
Hebdo attack in Paris.
Even post-mortem, Awlaki has continued to be one of the most influential figures in encouraging Westerners to travel abroad and
engage in violence through recordings of his speeches and his writing and is cited by many traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight
today. Drone strikes have also consistently cut down AQAP leaders like regional leader in the Baitha province Qaed al-Thahab in
such
deaths have not reduced the strength of the organization, which has only
continued to grow in capacity and membership. AQAP has proven its ability to
thrive in Yemen, where the central government has been unable to provide basic
governance and accountability to its citizens. In 2011, now ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh recalled
August 2013, and more recently this year Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi, who announced the Charlie Hebdo attack. However,
troops from areas such as Jaar and Zinjibar to secure his position in the capital against peaceful protestors when his position came
The removal of government forces in this period left a

power vacuum that AQAP filled, quickly installing their own version of law and
order when the government proved unable to do so. AQAP was able to hold these positions for just
under threat during the Arab Spring.
over a year, allowing it plenty of space to regroup and strengthen. In March 2015, the failing security situation in the country left an
open opportunity for AQAP to seize a significant foothold in the important port city of Mukallah, in Hadhramaut province. Here,
they released over 300 prisoners from the citys central prison, including other important members of AQAP such as Khalid Bartafi.
The advance into Mukallah was another case of the organization capitalizing on the unrest in the country, and the additional
Drone and air strikes targeted at the organization,

which are often used as band-aid solutions, have also severely impacted local
populations. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, hundreds of civilians have been
caught up in these strikes and killed, often perpetuating a cycle of resentment for
the government and its partners, and driving further recruitment for AQAP. AQAP
strength it has been able to gain in such situations.
has been shown to thrive in periods when the reach of the central government has been restricted, and in periods when discontent
with the government has risen. Whats more, local recruitment has not always been premised on individuals who aspire to attack the
West, but is often driven by grievances against the government; AQAP has been seen to step in at times of vulnerability and provide
services, law and order, and accountability for victims and frustrated parties that the central government has been unable to provide.
While the death of al-Wahaishi will certainly provide some short-term
interruption for the organization, they have already named Qassim al-Rimi as the
groups new leader. However, like the many strikes before it, Wahaishis death
will not provide a lasting solution to depleting AQAP in the country . To ensure lasting
stability in Yemen, current initiatives like those in Geneva that have brought the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to the table,
are the primary hope for peace and stability in the country. The countrys population is increasingly suffering from a desperate
humanitarian situation that has left upwards of 80% of the population reliant on humanitarian aid. Tens of thousands have been
internally displaced, while fighting and air strikes continue across the country, overshadowing the great hope that the National
To challenge groups like AQAP in Yemen, and

ensure others such as ISIL do not also try and gain a foothold in the country, only
national peace and unity in the form of an inclusive, political solution will provide
the necessary remedy.
Dialogue Conference once presented to the country.
AT: Yemen Stable/Not Key

Yemen instability is on the brink if the rebels take Aden, AQAP will
have a client state.
The Economist 15 The Economist, large magazine and news source, 2015 (On the
Run, The Economist, March 25th, accessible online at
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647159-defeat-presidents-forcesmay-lead-more-conflict-not-less-run, accessed on 6-22-15)
This week Mr Hadi, now president, found himself replaying the events of 1994 with roles
reversed. On March 26th the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group from Yemens
northern highlands, reportedly captured an airbase less than 40 miles from Aden,
a southern port city in which Mr Hadi had taken refuge . The base had only recently
been used in counterterror operations by American military forces, which evacuated a few days
before. Mr Hadi's whereabouts are not currently known. Though some reports suggest he left
the country bound for Riyadh ahead of the Houthi assault on Aden, other sources said he
remained in Yemen.
If ongoing chaos bears a resemblence to the events of 1994 there are nonetheless
key differences. Allegiances have shifted dramatically over the last two decades.
The few military units still loyal to Mr Hadi, mostly southerners, are augmented
by the same secessionists he helped suppress two decades ago along with some of the
men who fought jihad abroad before crushing the southern rebellion. Mr Saleh, who was booted
out of power just four years ago, is now backing the Houthis, a group he warred against as
president.
If the Houthis manage to push Mr Hadi out they will be able to impose their own
terms, much as they did in September of 2014 after seizing control of Sanaa, Yemens ancient
capital in the northern highlands. The miliants struck a peace deal with Mr Hadi after their
victory, and prepared plans to form a presidential council to replace him through a series of UN
mediated negotiations. But in February Mr Hadi fled Sanaa after a month under house arrest.
He denounced the earlier deal, prompting the Houthis to return to war. If Mr Hadi is in fact
gone, the presidential council may resume in coming days.
Even if the Houthis can complete their power grab they will not be in for an easy
ride. Mr Hadi is not popular in the south, and the coalition around him in Aden
owes more to Sunni distaste for the Houthis than faith in his leadership .
Southerners widely believe the Houthis have worse repression in store for the south than Mr
Saleh ever attempted. To back down, says Saadadeen bin Taleb, minister of trade under Mr
Hadi, would be suicidal for the south.
The Houthis and the president's men are not the only forces pulling at Yemen. It
is also home to a thriving al-Qaeda franchise that has vowed to defeat the
Houthis, and a nascent Islamic State offshoot that killed as many as 140 people in
the bombing of Zaydi mosques on March 20th. Neighbouring Saudi Arabia views the
Houthis as a noxious Iranian proxy and was willing to underwrite Mr Hadis campaign against
them. That strategy will remain unchanged with or without Mr Hadi in Aden, but Riyadh may
take additional action if the Houthi advance continues. Saudi military forces are now moving
toward the border with Yemen.
Should the Houthis secure Aden an end to the conflict is anything but assured .
They might then move on the oil rich province of Mareb in central Yemen, which
they see as being key to control of the country. With the end of the Houthi action
in sight the ties between the Houthis and Mr Saleh a wily and power-hungry figure
not long ago their enemycould fray. Mr Saleh, who famously described the job of governing
Yemen as like dancing on the heads of snakes, has long been among the nimblest of Yemeni
operators. It is hard to believe that he is not looking to manipulate the Houthi
advance into a new bid for power. Yemens troubles, it would appear, are only just
beginning.
Yemen instability undermines US strategy for the region its a vital

training ground and ally.
Shrinkman 15 Paul Shrinkman, Security writer for US News & World Report, M.A. in
Political Science and International Relations, 2015 (Yemen Instability Threatens U.S. Terror
Fight, U.S. News & World Report, February 11th, accessible online at
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/11/yemen-instability-threatens-us-dronecommando-campaign-against-aqap, accessed on 6-23-15)
Theres no question as a result of the political instability in Yemen that our
counterterror capabilities have been affected. I couldnt stand up here and tell
you that they havent been, he said. Of course they have been.
Such counterterrorism missions only work with the cooperation of the host
nation government as an effective and reliable partner, Kirby said.
Right now, that country, the Yemeni security forces and the government to
which they report is very much in flux right now, he said. We understand that. I
wouldnt say theres been no adjustments made.
The U.S. relies almost exclusively on regional alliances for its secretive work
hunting Islamic extremists in the region. It retains a covert drone base in Djibouti and
key military bases in Bahrain and Qatar, along with a critical alliance with the oil-rich Saudi
Arabia. All of these countries are predominantly Sunni and abhor the increasingly expeditionary
presence of Shiite Iran in and around their neighborhood.
On the ground, instability in Yemen means American shadow forces likely will
have more difficulty gathering the critical intelligence they need to keep flying drone
missions overhead.
And the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa signals an inability to help corral allied regional
powers into some sort of agreement that maintains a strong American influence there.
Yemen exemplifies why American diplomats need to take personal risks in our
national interest, four influential former ambassadors to the region Ryan Crocker, Robert
Ford, James F. Jeffrey and Ronald Neumann wrote in a column published in The Hill last
week. Yemen teeters on the edge of civil war. The fight there with Al-Qaeda is far
from successful but is not yet lost.

At this critical time engagement and judgment on the ground are essential to try
to stabilize the situation before Yemen slides into such complete chaos that
outsiders are helpless to influence the situation.
Still in question is who will maintain control of the tenuous situation. The Houthis have no
apparent plan for shared governance of the country, where Sunni Muslims are a slight majority.
But they also wont allow for a return of the U.S.-allied government that was key to fighting
terrorism there, despite a shared disdain for Sunni extremists.
That relationship has worked, and thats the relationship that the Houthi takeover endangers,
says Mike Lewis, a professor at Ohio Northern University who flew F-14 fighter jets during the
Gulf War.
The Houthis have tremendous work before them to establish a government that could lead to
the re-establishment of formal relations with the U.S. if they even desire to do so.
Theres no way the Houthis by force of arms are going to control most of the rest of Yemen,
Lewis says. Yemen is headed toward a failed-state scenario unless you can find some sort of
meaningful cooperation between a number of political entities there quite honestly, warlords
and tribal chiefs who are going to have to get along and back somebody.
Any chance of stability in Yemen, and hopes for a continued U.S. mission to
defeat AQAP where it operates, rests on finding some way around the current
chaos. And with so many other powerful forces looking at Sanaa, the U.S. can
only hope the situation doesnt get any worse.
AT: Drone Strikes Not Key

Civilian death tolls in Yemen make AQAP stronger and cause mass
instability
Wiener-Bronner 13 (Danielle, December 13th 2013, reporter for The Wire, Latest Drone
Strikes Shows How U.S. Strategy in Yemen Is Backfiring,
http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/12/yemen-drones/356111/)//RTF
Targeted drone killings are defended by the United States as means to combat alQaeda in the most effective way possible. If attacks are carried out correctly, they should
minimize civilian casualties, eliminate risk to our own forces, and remove
dangerous militant operatives, ideally dismantling terrorist groups from a safe
distance. But if the attacks are not carried out correctly, as they often aren't, the
results can backfire, which is exactly what's been happening in Yemen , according to
Reuters: Tribal leaders, who have a lot of influence within Yemen's complex social structure, warn of rising
sympathy for al Qaeda. Awad Ahmed Mohsen from Majallah, a southern village hit by a drone strike that killed dozens
in 2009, told Reuters that America had brought hatred with its drones. Asked if more
people joined al Qaeda in the wake of attacks that killed civilians, Mohsen said:
"Definitely. And even those who don't join, now sympathize with al Qaeda
because of these strikes, these violations. Any American they see, they exact
revenge, even if it's a civilian." On Thursday, 14 Yemeni civilians were killed by a U.S. drone strike that
mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy, according to Yemeni national security officials. Another official, however, said AQAP
militants may have been traveling with the wedding party, but in either case it seems that civilians were not the original targets have
been killed. The CIA didn't comment on the strike, per standard procedure. The attack threatens to undo the U.S.'s efforts to scale
al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has started traveling in smaller groups to avoid the
aerial strikes, which may actually make it more difficult to track their motions.
And the strikes are angering some Sunni Muslims upset about strikes that kill
their supporters, rather than anti-government Shi'ite rebels, fueling sectarian
tensions which are already high in the region. If those killed in this week's attack are confirmed to be
civilians, according to the Associated Press, it could mean a surge of anti-American sentiment in
Yemen: Civilian deaths have bred resentments on a local level, sometimes
undermining U.S. efforts to turn the public against the militants. The backlash in
Yemen is still not as large as in Pakistan, where there is heavy pressure on the
government to force limits on strikes but public calls for a halt to strikes are
starting to emerge. In May, President Obama promised to increase transparency on the drone strike program and
back its drone program, while making it more palatable to the countries it affects. Reuters reports that
enhance guidelines on their use. But the Bureau of Investigative Journalism found in November that the six months following
Obama's speech actually saw an increase of drone strike casualties in Yemen and Pakistan. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International reported in October that civilian casualties of drone strikes are higher than the U.S. admits. Around the same time, a
U.N. human rights investigator said 400-600 of the 2,200 people killed by drones in the past decade were noncombatants. And in
2012, reports emerged that the Yemeni government works to help the U.S. hide it deadly errors. Data on drone strikes, like all
But if drone strikes

continue to indiscriminately kill civilians, moderates in Yemen may be driven
towards more extremist positions. Even governments working with Washington
to coordinate the strikes could turn against the U.S. if drone casualties are not
counter-terrorism efforts, is necessarily shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to measure success.
scaled back or eliminated. Drone strikes may very well be an effective means of fighting terrorism, but for now they
remain a controversial experiment in warfare that could possibly be drastically, dangerously failing to keep people safe.
Credibility Scenario
1ac Credibility (Heg)

Dismissive nature of civilian casualties in strikes hurts human rights
credibility
Tirman, 12- Writer for the Washington Post (John, Why do we ignore the civilians killed in American wars?, Washington
Post, 1/6/12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-do-we-ignore-the-civilians-killed-in-americanwars/2011/12/05/gIQALCO4eP_story.html)//KTC
attitudes have consequences. Perhaps the most important one apart from the
tensions created with the host governments, which have been quite vocal in protesting civilian casualties
is that indifference provides permission to our military and political leaders to pursue more
interventions. There are costs to our global reputation as well: The United States, which
should be regarded as a principal advocate of human rights, undermines its
credibility when it is so dismissive of civilian casualties in its wars. Appealing for
international action on Sudan, Syria and other countries may sound hypocritical when
our own attitudes about civilians are so cold. Korean War historian Bruce Cumings calls this
neglect the hegemony of forgetting, in which almost everything to do with the
war is buried history. Will we ever stop burying memories of wars destruction? More attention to the
human costs may jolt the American public into a more compassionate
understanding. When we build the memorial for Operation Iraqi Freedom, lets mention that Iraqi civilians were part of
These
the carnage. Count them, and maybe we can start to recognize and remember the larger tolls of the wars we wage.
Lack of HR cred devastates US leadership- the aff reverses that

Shattuck 08 (John, Fall, CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and a lecturer on U.S. foreign policy at Tufts
University, Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol35_2008/human_rights_fall2008/
hr_fall08_shattuck.html)//RTF
Among the many challenges facing you from the time you take office will be how to restore U.S. credibility in the world. One way to
do this will be to change the global perception that the United States is a human rights violator. International
public
opinion of the recent U.S. record on human rights has been devastating. A poll conducted last year in
eighteen countries on all continents by the British Broadcasting Corporation revealed that 67 percent disapproved of U.S. detention
practices in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and India found that majorities or pluralities
condemned the United States for torture and other violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations showed that majorities in thirteen countries, including many traditional allies, believe the U.S. cannot be trusted to act
responsibly in the world. Less
than a decade ago, the situation was quite different. A 1999 survey
published by the U.S. State Departments Office of Research showed that the United States was
viewed favorably by large majorities in France, 62 percent; Germany, 78 percent; Indonesia, 75
percent; and Turkey, 52 percent; among others. This positive climate of opinion helped produce
the outpouring of international support immedi-ately following the 9/11 attacks that made it
possible for this country to quickly assemble a broad coalition with United Nations (UN)
approval to respond to the terrorist attacks by striking al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan .
Seven years later, global support for U.S. leadership has evaporated. In nearly all the
countries that registered strong support for the United States in 1999, a big downward shift of opinion had occurred by 2006. In
France it was down to 39 percent; in Germany, 37 percent; and in Indonesia, 30 percent. A separate survey conducted by the Pew
Research Center revealed extremely hostile attitudes toward the United States throughout the Arab and Muslim world: In Egypt, the
United States polled 70 percent negative; in Pakistan, 73 percent negative; in Jordan, 85 percent negative; and in Turkey, 88 percent
negative. The
gap between Americas values and actions revealed by this polling data has severely
eroded U.S. global influence. How can you and your administration gain it back? First, you should make it clear
that one of our countrys bedrock principles is the international rule of law. Human rights are
de-fined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratified and incorporated
into our domestic law. In flaunting basic rulessuch as habeas corpus, the Convention against
Torture, and the Geneva Conventionsthe previous administration created a series of law-free
zones. Within these zones, detainees were abused, thousands were held indefinitely without charges, and human rights were
trampled. Second, you should bring U.S. values and practices back into alignment. The United States in
recent years has lost credibility by charging others with the types of human rights violations that
it has committed itself. In recent annual country reports on human rights practices, the State Department has criticized
other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, warrantless electronic surveillance, and other abuses, even though
the U.S. record in these areas also has been abysmal. Fortunately, history
shows that U.S. credibility on human

rights can be restored when our governments policies reflect our na-tions values . A series of
bipartisan initiatives during five recent presidenciesthree Republican and two Democraticillustrates the point. President
Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki Accords, paving the way for international recognition of the cause of human rights inside the Soviet
bloc. President Jimmy Carter mobilized democratic governments to press for the release of political prisoners by repressive regimes.
President Ronald Reagan signed the Con-vention against Torture and persuaded a Republican-dominated Senate to ratify it.
President George H. W. Bush joined with other governments in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to nurture
new democracies and respect for human rights following the end of the Cold War. And President Bill Clinton worked with NATO and
the UN to implement the Genocide Conven-tion and bring an end to the human rights catastrophe in the Balkans. Mr. President, you
can restore U.S. influence by reconnecting the nations values and policies on human rights and the rule of law. Among the initiatives
that you might take are the following. Human Rights Law Enforcement. You should announce that the United States is bound by the
human rights treaties and con-ventions that it has ratified and adopted as domestic law, including the Geneva Conventions, the
Torture Convention, and the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. You should follow through with your
commitment to close the detention center at Guan-tanamo and transfer detainees to this country for determinations whether to try
them in U.S. courts or release them. Fully complying with the Geneva Conventions would not preclude the United States from trying
detainees in military commissions under constitutional standards of due process, nor would it restrict the governments authority to
conduct lawful interrogations to obtain intelligence in-formation about terrorist activities. Truth Commission. At times in our recent
history, the nation has created high-level commissions to probe national crises and recommend ways to prevent them in the future.
In the area of human rights, these bodies have included, most notably, the Kerner Commission on race in the 1960s and the
commission in the 1980s on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The recent commission on the events of
9/11 had a comparable scope and impact in addressing a complex and far-reaching national crisis. A similar commission could be
established to compile the record of human rights abuses in the War on Terror. U.S. Commission on Human Rights. A permanent
institution could be created to monitor the U.S. governments compliance with its legal obligations on human rights. I urge you to
endorse legislation pending in Congress that would establish a United States Commission on Human Rights with oversight authority
and subpoena power. The legislation would require the executive branch to provide regular reports to the commission on its
implementation of international human rights treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Geneva Conventions.
Counterterrorism Assistance. The United States could provide assistance to other countries for counterterrorism operations that
comply with basic standards on human rights. Fighting
terror has become a convenient excuse for

repressive regimes around the world to engage in further repression, often leading to more
terrorism in an increasing cycle of violence. To break this cycle, this country could provide assistance and training to
foreign military and law enforcement personnel in methods of fighting terrorism within the rule of law. Democracy and Human
Rights Assistance. The United States should find appropriate ways to support those seeking to promote the rule of law, democracy,
and human rights within their own countries. Democracy and human rights activists are the shock troops in the struggle against
terrorism. But democracy and human rights can never be delivered from the barrel of a gun. Assistance to those working to build
their own democratic societies must be carefully planned, sustained over time, and based on a thorough understand-ing of the
unique circumstances and profound differences among cultures, religions, and countries. The new administration should work
within a multilateral framework to assist those struggling around the world to bring democracy and human rights to their own
societies. Responsibility to Protect. The United States should join with other countries, alliances, and international organizations to
pre-vent or stop crimes against humanity and genocide. Mr. President, you could invoke the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect,
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, to work with other leaders to develop effective multilateral methods of preventing
human rights catastrophes such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur. Diplomatic and economic tools should be employed first to
head off im-pending genocides, but multilateral military intervention must remain available under international law if other means
have been ex-hausted. By
recommitting the United States to a foreign policy conducted within a

framework of human rights and the rule of law, Presi-dent Obama, you can restore Americas
moral leadership in the world, and, by doing so, strengthen U.S. national security.
US hegemony is the only option its inevitable, sustainable, deters

great power war, and is critical to cooperation over every global issue
Brooks et al. 13 STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth
College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International
Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.
WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College;
January/February 2013 Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-andwilliam-c-wohlforth/lean-forward
Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep
engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a
liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the
Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops
stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from
administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for
over
60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in
the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security
commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest
and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and
thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and
open international order. Now,
more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand

strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States'
preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and
two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to
assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of
international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas
military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international
order. Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by subsidizing the
defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they
contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission
the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States
in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make
the United States more secure. They
are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment

overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits . In fact, the budgetary
savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an
internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes
overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the
other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as
a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give
Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to
secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede
its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the
unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and
influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States'
assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher
Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its
strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of
switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the
amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees,
brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion
few advocates of
retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore
balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are
over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But
less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost
to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the
savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large
portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be
small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.
The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the
fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending
aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun
to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the
fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the
next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions
would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017 , from its current level
of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation
policies. Even
without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its
ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican
candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since
spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not
have kept pace with economic growth. Small
wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the
nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs . UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the
current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power
however they can." Yet there
is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American

alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do
so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true
counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means
that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of
balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military . Not
only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the
leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because
the United States dominates

the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not
to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has
convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point . If U.S. global
leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of
George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since
the Soviet Union collapsed,

no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military
might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have
resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to
constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from
everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global
leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any
other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely
reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States
itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the
South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms. Another argument for retrenchment holds
that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own
decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more
productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive.
Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The
historical
evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership
not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a
prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A
bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global
leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most
studies by economists find no clear relationship between

military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic
outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last
decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012 , even as it fought a war in Afghanistan
and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on
defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent
economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not
mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily
be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security
subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West
Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist
anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth
approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over
the past 20 years, the United

States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as
those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their
militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The
costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an
expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars .
Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower
sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the
country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History
shows,
however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements
to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring
a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of
entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical
research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of
a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance
entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict . In East Asia, the
regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor
Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap
the United States in an unwanted larger war." The
same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese

relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S.
officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk
of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not
only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves
toward independence. For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling
military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem
begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to
security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such
awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and
instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore,
they contend, the United

States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S.
interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin Powell, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military
you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If
the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country
would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely
moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment,
whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the
idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests
on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the
casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the
Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling
for the size of their economies and populations. Besides,
the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of

pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged
America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns
the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged
the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a
similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller
has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably
leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be
convincing. KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates
of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most
obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The
United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from
contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on
their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by
arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high
costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In
other words, major
powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American

pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South
Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a
destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and
Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States,
which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations . Similarly, were the
United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably,
Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security
dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military
competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher
military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing
itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and
vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given
how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions

could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another
argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States . To be sure, few doubt that the
United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what cost? Were states in
one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their
military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which
should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.
Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such
as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those
countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote
stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the
United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less
robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers,
irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States'
global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional
relations, Washington
dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the

emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities . For proof that this
strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have
kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States'
top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead
over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On
top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a
hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military
should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising
regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional
there
is already a potential contender for regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United
States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there .
hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet
The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to
Asia. Yet that
is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC

of the current grand strategy miss one of its most
important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United
States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy
whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic
leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military
commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that
allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the
task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with
PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics
which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world
needed to keep the seas open. A
global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in
ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its
overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S.
defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 freetrade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of
tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and
environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback
to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the
United States wields its security leverage to shape

the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more
of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and
prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support
the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the TransPacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic
interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security
ties with the United States. The
United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in
place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country , such as a
greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security
precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with
other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains.
Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What
goes for the global

economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership
benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational
threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective
action. But cooperation
does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge.
The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier
for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests.
After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where
leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also
provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary
issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for
Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia
spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military
alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans- Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use
bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The
benefits of these communication channels are
especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of
cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United
States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share
burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on
the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding
countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan,
since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in
the region. The
United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains
among governments that get cooperation going in the first place . As the scholar Joseph Nye has written,
"The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf,
means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it
is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should
America
come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes -- a view that
seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold
up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller
global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of
counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will
it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help
prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy
humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would
threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new
circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and
there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks .
That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional
partners to contain Soviet power, and it
is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq
war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged
America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security
and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the
past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we
know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose
retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world
would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.
1ac- Credibility (Soft Power)

Dismissive nature of civilian casualties in strikes hurts human rights
credibility
Tirman, 12- Writer for the Washington Post (John, Why do we ignore the civilians killed in American wars?, Washington
Post, 1/6/12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-do-we-ignore-the-civilians-killed-in-americanwars/2011/12/05/gIQALCO4eP_story.html)//KTC
attitudes have consequences. Perhaps the most important one apart from the
tensions created with the host governments, which have been quite vocal in protesting civilian casualties
is that indifference provides permission to our military and political leaders to pursue more
interventions. There are costs to our global reputation as well: The United States, which
should be regarded as a principal advocate of human rights, undermines its
credibility when it is so dismissive of civilian casualties in its wars. Appealing for
international action on Sudan, Syria and other countries may sound hypocritical when
our own attitudes about civilians are so cold. Korean War historian Bruce Cumings calls this
neglect the hegemony of forgetting, in which almost everything to do with the
war is buried history. Will we ever stop burying memories of wars destruction? More attention to the
human costs may jolt the American public into a more compassionate
understanding. When we build the memorial for Operation Iraqi Freedom, lets mention that Iraqi civilians were part of
These
the carnage. Count them, and maybe we can start to recognize and remember the larger tolls of the wars we wage.
U.S. human rights credibility is key to overall soft power.

Hooper et al. 15 Melissa Hooper, Director of the International Law Scholarship
Project/Pillar Project at Human Rights First, former Regional Director for Russia and
Azerbaijan for the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in Moscow, holds a J.D. from
the University of California-Berkeley School of Law, with Ignacio Mujica, Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights First, and Megan Corrarino, Robert L.
Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow with Human Rights First, 2015 (U.S. Must
Affirm Leadership Role on Human Rights, New York Law Journal, February 27th, Available
Online at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202719078471/US-Must-AffirmLeadership-Role-on-Human-Rights#ixzz3eZkOWa00, Accessed 06-30-2015)
The United States once positioned itself as a human rights leader, and that moral
authority gave it considerable soft power around the world. U.S. leadership was
instrumental in creating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United
Nations, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The significant due
process components of the U.S. justice system have been used as the basis for
rule-of-law reforms in numerous other countries. The United States still has among
the broadest frameworks for protection for free speech and freedom of religion in
the world.
But any claim that the United States might have to leadership in human rights is
undermined by the fact that, over the past decade and a half, it has failed to satisfy its
own international legal obligations . The most famous and egregious examples are
those that have come from the so-called "War on Terror," reliance on torture as outlined
in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report, and arbitrary detention of prisoners at
Guantnamo, often based on secret evidence without access to due process.
But there are many other areas where the United States has contributed to a culture of impunity
and indifference to international law: repatriating people to countries where they are likely to
face torture or death, in violation of the Convention Against Torture and the Refugee
Convention; imprisoning more of its population than any other country in the world in violation
of international law principles of proportionality, personal dignity and anti-discrimination; and
continuing to imprison individuals in conditions that are shocking to the conscience, in violation
of the obligation to refrain from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
This disconnect between the legal principles that the United States purports to uphold and its
actual practice is one reason why Human Rights First has been working with leading scholars,
practitioners and policymakers to urge the United States to reassume its leadership role in the
sphere of human rights by adhering to the international norms that it consistently urges other
countries to observe. For the United States to credibly address extrajudicial killings in Pakistan;
arbitrary detention in Belarus, China, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria; or global prison conditions,
it must ensure that its own practices adhere to international legal standards.
Human rights law, which places human dignity at its core, must be a central goal of
national and international legal regimes, and of efforts to promote rule of law at home
and abroad. While the United States may have limited power to create foreign
enforcement mechanisms, and must rely on soft power in the international
sphere, at home we have the power and obligation to enforce international
human rights law. The power of international norms increases with the number
of powerful states that comply and hold themselves accountable. In leading by
example, the United States gains the moral currency necessary to hold other states
to account.
We must make the U.S. judicial system a place where this country more consistently lives up to
its international obligations. This means giving detainees access to justice, prosecuting
torturers, granting asylum when a refugee has met the legal criteria, and ensuring that our
jurisprudence comports with our international treaty obligations, which are binding on U.S.
courts under article VI of the Constitution.
Human rights law is thriving around the world. Courts in Canada, Latin America, Europe, India
and South Africa, among others, are developing bodies of jurisprudence that incorporate human
rights law and citing international and comparative law in their decisions. International
tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights, hold states accountable to protect refugees, to adopt
mechanisms to prosecute torture, and to provide humane conditions for prisoners. As the rest of
the world is taking these steps forward, however gradual, the United States must not allow
itself to step backward and lose its moral credibility by backing down from its
international legal commitments.
Human rights law is only as irrelevant as we allow it to be. The United States is still a leader
on the world stage, and what it does matters. If we want to hold other states
accountable for human rights violations and promote the global legitimacy of
human rights, we must honor our own international legal obligations and
recognize that they are an integral part of the law of the land .
US soft power maintains peace and stability
Williams 14 (Trevor, editor of Global Atlanta, U.S. Soft Power key to Global Stability,
Global Atlanta, 9/29/14, http://www.globalatlanta.com/article/27191/isakson-us-soft-powerkey-to-global-security/)//kjz
America still has an unrivaled level of influence in the world, but the key to achieving long-term peace is marrying military strength
with moves to boost education, health and economic development in conflict areas, U.S. Sen. Johnny Isakson, R-Ga., said Monday.
American soft power portrayed through

trade and humanitarian outreach globally will help solidify stability won through power.
Strength will get you the peace originally but its good soft power that keeps the peace, Mr. Isakson said at the
While he sees peace through strength as a valid doctrine,
Grand Hyatt in Buckhead during a speech on foreign aid hosted by the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. Focusing heavily on Africa,
Mr. Isakson sought to debunk the idea that American influence in the world is waning, using travel tales to support the idea that the
American reputation is alive and well thanks to the work of the U.S. government
as well as corporations and nonprofits around the globe. Its about telling Americas story to the
American people themselves. I know sometimes we forget, the senator said. U.S. Visa Glitch Leaves Travelers in LimboMetro
Atlanta Chamber Supports 'Open Innovation' as Key to Regional GrowthCan Technology Fix the Air Travel Experience? Popeyes
Plans More International GrowthAfter Dispute, Atlanta Loses Nobel Summit From Coca-Colas clean water work in Ghana to
MANAs nutritional paste made from Georgia peanuts saving lives in Somalia to the decision to hand out U.S.-backed micro loans to
Iraqi merchants after the invasion,
America is still invested in using its strength for the good of
the world, he said, mentioning multiple times the PEPFAR program, which provides antiretroviral drugs to help stem motherto-child transmission of HIV in Africa. Formerly the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committees sub-committee
on Africa, he contrasted the U.S. approach in Africa to that of China, framing one of the U.S.s largest trade partners as a
competitor" on the continent that exploits African resources and builds infrastructure but not capacity. He was also unequivocal in
labeling the air strikes aimed at debilitating and destroying ISIS in Iraq constituted a dangerous war, the ultimate war between
good and evil. When the U.S.-led coalition has won, it will have to provide those affected by the war the same type of redevelopment
America doesnt
bomb and leave; America stays and builds, and thats the difference in us and any
other nation on the face of this earth, he said.
assistance it gave Germany, Korea and Japan after emerging victorious in conflicts with those nations.
2ac Drone Strikes Key

The international community condemns casualties from drone strikes
The Express Tribune, 14 (Targeting Pakistan: UN rights panel condemns
use of drones, The Express Tribune with the International New York Times,
9/24/14, http://tribune.com.pk/story/766427/targeting-pakistan-un-rightspanel-condemns-use-of-drones/)//KTC
The UN Human Rights Council has condemned arbitrary killings by the use of armed drones
in Pakistan. The condemnation by representatives from 21 countries was voiced at a panel discussion on drones in Geneva on
Monday. This is the first time that the Human Rights Council has formally discussed the issue
of armed drones in violation of international human rights law as well as the UN Charter.
All countries except the US, UK and France condemned the human rights
consequences of US drone strikes in Pakistan and other parts of the world. Speaking
on the occasion, Pakistans Ambassador Zamir Akram referred to serious concerns by the international community
over the use of drones outside the international legal framework; he said the use of armed drones must
comply with long-standing rules of international law, and the UN Charter. Deputy High
Commissioner for Human Rights Flavia Pansieri questioned whether the use of armed drones was compatible with the rules and
principles of international humanitarian law. In spite of precision claims, the use of armed drones created an atmosphere of fear in
United Nations
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions Christoph Heyns said the
issue with drones was not the legality of the weapon but the legality of their use. Meanwhile,
Legal Director of the Foundation for Fundamental Rights Shahzad Akbar noted that a state could not use deadly
force merely because capture was not feasible; the individual in question must
pose an imminent threat to human life. The experience in Pakistan showed that this simply was not the
case, he said. The obligation was not upon individuals to prove they posed no threat
but the obligation was upon the State firing armed drones to show that their use
of force was necessary, he added.
the affected communities, and had a negative effect in the everyday life of the affected population, she said.
US drone strikes are condemned by the UN as a human rights

violation
the Bush administration favored

large-scale, conventional land invasions and occupations, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Obama has moved away from such operations and embraced seemingly lighter tactics of irregular warfare to
continue the perpetual war, while making it less visible to Americans. Extrajudicial killing and drone strikes
Drone Strikes, Assassination To execute its perpetual global war on terrorism,
are the most notable methods, but others include air strikes, cruise missile attacks, cyberwarfare, special operations, and proxy wars.
These tactics have meant more use of the military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the paramilitary branch of the
Both the CIA and JSOC carry out drone strikes and sometimes collaborate in joint operations.
The CIA, not the military, is legally mandated to launch covert operations, which are classified
CIA.
and unacknowledged by the US government. However, JSOC performs essentially the same operations, particularly extrajudicial
The UN
report criticized the United States' assassination program and drone strikes. It
expressed concerned with the "lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone
strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks, and the lack of accountability for the loss of life
killings. Thus, transferring control of the drone program from the CIA to the military would make little difference.
resulting from such attacks." The United States' position for justifying its extrajudicial killing operations is that it is engaged in an
armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and "associated forces" - a term the Obama administration created to refer to cobelligerents with al-Qaeda - and that the war is in accordance with the nation's inherent right to self-defense against a terrorist
the committee took issue with the United States' position, particularly its
"very broad approach to the definition and the geographical scope of an armed
conflict, including the end of hostilities." A May 2010 report by Philip Alston, former UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial,
enemy. However,
summary or arbitrary executions, notes that, under international law, states cannot wage war against non-state actors, such as
The committee's
report also took issue with "the unclear interpretation of what constitutes an
'imminent threat' and who is a combatant or civilian taking a direct part in
hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should exist between any particular use
of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as the precautionary measures taken to
international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, because of their nebulous character and loose affiliations.
avoid civilian casualties in practice."
HUMINT alters foreign policy

Costanza, 14- William Costanza designed and implemented operational targeting and intelligence collection strategies in
the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, weapons of mass destruction, telecommunications and strategic technologies.
Assisted foreign governments in enhancing their indigenous counter-terrorism capabilities through training, target analysis and
program management. Conducted operations in high threat environments against high priority terrorist targets in Africa and
Central Asia in addition to serving in fast-paced operational environments in Latin America and Europe. He is an Assistant
Professor in the Department of Forensic and Legal Psychology at Marymount University. Doctorate in Liberal Studies from
Georgetown University, M.A. in International Studies from American University (William, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), The
Encyclopedia of U.S. Intelligence, August 2014, Taylor and Francis Publishers,
http://www.academia.edu/3995342/Human_Intelligence_HUMINT_)//KTC
CONCLUSION HUMINT plays a vital role in contributing to a broad range of

intelligence assessments used by U.S. policymakers to guide the formulation of U.S.
foreign policy. It often constitutes the only stream of intelligence on issues where
intelligence collection by other means is not possible. To maintain this key collection
capability, HUMINT programs require highly skilled intelligence ofcers to securely and
effectively recruit and manage the cadre of human sources who work with the U.S. often at great
personal risk to themselves and their families. The increasing global challenges and
potential threats facing the U.S. and its allies in the years ahead more than ever
underscore the urgent need for the U.S. to maintain a exible, high quality
intelligence capability necessary to support policymakers as they devise policies to
address a turbulent world. HUMINT will continue to play an indispensable role in
this effort by providing unique access to intelligence that provides the ground
truth analysts need to produce more accurate and timely intelligence
assessments critical to formulating a coherent foreign policy.
2ac Surveillance Key

NSA metadata surveillance is highly criticized internationally as a
human rights violation, the aff remedies that
the UN report denounced the NSA's mass surveillance "both within and
outside the United States through the bulk phone metadata program (Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act)
and, in particular, the surveillance under Section 702 of Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) conducted through PRISM (collection of the contents of communications from US-based
NSA Surveillance Notably,
companies) and UPSTREAM (tapping of fiber-optic cables in the country that carry internet traffic) programs and their adverse
The report also criticized the secrecy of "judicial interpretations

of FISA and rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)," which prevent the public from knowing
impact on the right to privacy. "
the laws and legal interpretations that impact them. Promises of "oversight" obviously did not persuade the committee, either, as it
the current system of oversight of the activities of the NSA fails to effectively
protect the rights of those affected," and "those affected have no access to effective
remedies in case of abuse." Continuing NSA leaks, provided by former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden last year, have
said "
revealed the depth of the United States' massive surveillance system. The bulk collection of phone metadata is probably the most
the
NSA's surveillance system extends far beyond phone metadata. In a program called
PRISM, the NSA collects user data, such as search history and message content, sent through internet
well-known program. Recently, President Obama proposed ending the bulk phone metadata collection program. But
communication services like Google, Yahoo!, Facebook and Skype. Major tech companies have denied knowledge of the program,
The NSA uses a back door in

surveillance law to monitor the communications of American citizens without a
warrant. As mentioned earlier, the NSA is also involved in the drone program through the
collection of signals intelligence. Additionally, much of NSA surveillance is used for economic espionage. With
but the NSA claims those companies knew and provided full assistance.
the help of Australian intelligence, the NSA spied on communications between the Indonesian government and an American law
firm representing it during trade talks. Indonesia and the United States have long been in trade disputes, such as over Indonesia's
shrimp exports and a US ban on the sale of Indonesian clove cigarettes. It is highly unlikely Obama's reforms will curb these abuses.
Ext. HR k2 soft power

U.S. human rights credibility is key to its global influence.
Griffey 11 Brian Griffey, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations,
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA and as an investigative journalist, 2011 (U.S.
leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad, The Hill, March 18th,
Available Online at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-usleadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad#ixzz2sB8JqAUc,
Accessed 02-02-2014)
Nonetheless, U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance
not only international peace and security a fundamental purpose of the U.N. but
also conjoined US political and economic interests at home and abroad.
The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an

elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations
on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the
Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade.
As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights
violations in Libya, joining the Council has proven to be a good decision, because weve been
able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking
in.
In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the
Councils peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and
encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights, but also to

address domestic human rights shortcomings.
By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will be in a better
position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new
treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the
vaulting principles we identify with our democracy.
Soft Power GoodTerrorism

Soft power key to solve terrorism
Nye 06 (Joseph S. Jr., University distinguished service professor at Harvard University and
author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Think Again: Soft Power,
Foreign Policy, 2/23/06, http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/)//kjz
Soft Power Is Irrelevant to the Current Terrorist Threat False . There is a small likelihood that the West
will ever attract such people as Mohammed Atta or Osama bin Laden. We need hard power to deal with people like them. But the current terrorist
threat is not Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilizations. It is a civil war within Islam between a majority of moderates and a small minority who want to
coerce others into an extremist and oversimplified version of their religion. The United States cannot win unless the
moderates win. We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists are recruiting is lower than the number we are killing and deterring.
Rumsfeld himself asked in a 2003 memo: Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading
more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting,
training, and deploying against us? That equation will be very hard to balance
without a strategy to win hearts and minds. Soft power is more relevant than ever.
[Insert terrorism impact]
Exts. Soft Power Solves Terrorism

Soft power key to effective hard power and fighting terrorism
Nye 04 (Joseph S.,University distinguished service professor at Harvard University , Soft
Power: The Means to Success in World PoliticsEdited Transcript,4/13/04,
https://www.academia.edu/2517747/Soft_power_The_means_to_success_in_world_politics)/
/kjz
New threats are arising from the bottom board of transnational relations. While
military power can be of some use occasionally on the bottom board, more often
you will need other forms of power, particularly soft power. The trouble is that a group of
people within the Administration, who came into power and looked at American military preeminence, devised the view that Charles
Krauthammer has called the new unilateralism: that the United States is so powerful that we can do as we wish and others have no
choice but to follow. They have used that view as a way of applying American military power to all sorts of problems. The problem is
that this is a one-dimensional view in a three-dimensional world. If you play one-dimensional chess on one board only and its a
three-dimensional game, in the long run you will lose. That is my great fear about the way in which we have implemented the
strategy. What about soft power? The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do what you want. There
are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract
them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you
much less in carrots and sticks. The Bush Administration has neglected using our American soft power. In this new world of
transnational threats and the information age, it is not just whose army wins, its whose story wins. They have not been very
attentive to the question of whose story wins. If you look at the results of their strategy, the polls are quite chilling. Not only do you
find situations like Europe, where the United States has lost on average thirty points of attractiveness in all European capitals,
including countries that supported us in the Iraq war, but if you go beyond that to the Islamic world, the decline of American
attraction is quite appalling. In 2000, in Indonesia, the largest Islamic country, three-quarters of the people said they were attracted
to the United States. By May 2003, that had dropped to 15 percent. And yet these are the people that we will need for cooperation
against organizations like al-Gamaa at-al-Islamiyya and other offshoots of al Qaeda in the region. If you look at trends in polls in
countries like Jordan or Pakistan, which are allegedly somewhat more friendly towards the United States, we see that larger
majorities are attracted to Osama bin Laden than to George Bush or Tony Blair. Again, this is a bit chastening when those are the
people whose cooperation we will need to deal with this new type of threat. The new unilateralists reaction is: Not to worry. You
should never base foreign policy on polls. Popularity is ephemeral. We have been unpopular in the past -- look how unpopular the
Americans were during the Vietnam War, and yet we recovered. We should keep on track and decide what we think is right, pursue
it, and then let the chips fall as they may. This skepticism about the role of soft power, quite frequent among neo-conservatives, is a
very powerful view. The great danger is that it sells short the importance of being able to attract others. And it ignores the fact that a
soft power can affect its hard power. If you take the example of Turkey a year ago, the
Americans wanted to persuade the Turkish government to send the Fourth
Infantry Division across Turkey to enter Iraq from the north . The Turkish government might
have been willing to concede, but the Turkish parliament said, No, because the United States
had become so unpopular, its policies perceived as so illegitimate, that they were
not willing to allow this transfer of troops across the country. The net effect was that the
countrys
Fourth Infantry Division had to go down through the Canal, up through the Gulf, and arrived late to the war, which made a
difference in the number of troops on the ground in areas like the Sunni Triangle
. Neglect of soft power had a
definite negative effect on hard power. The question is sometimes further rebutted by the skeptics who say:
Yes, that may all be well and good, and it may also be true that the Americans and the West used soft power to prevail in the Cold
War, but it has nothing to do with the current situation of terrorism. Terrorists are a new type of threat and are not attractable. The
idea that we will defeat bin Laden or al Qaeda by attracting them is sticking your head in the sand. To some extent that is true. If
you ask, Are we going to attract bin Laden or people like Mohamed Atta, who flew into the World Trade Towers? No. You do need
hard power to defeat these people who are irreconcilable. But the important role for soft power is to be found in the larger context. If
the war on terrorism as a clash between Islam and the West -- Huntingtons clash of civilizations -- you
are mischaracterizing the situation. Its a clash within Islamic civilization, between a group of people at the
extreme who are trying to use force to impose their view of a pure version of their religion on others, a majority who want
things that are similar to what we want: a better life, education, health care, opportunities, and a sense of
you think of
dignity. The key question is: how do you prevent those extremists from prevailing as they try to radicalize the majority, the
Soft power is essential to be able to attract the majorities to the values that I just
to better opportunities,
education, health care, and a sense of dignity. We can appeal to these values and try to inoculate them
against the appeal of the extremists. We will not prevail in this struggle against terrorism unless
the majority wins, unless the moderates win. And we will not prevail against
extremists unless we are able to attract that majority, those moderates . That is the
role of soft power. In addition, even when you need to use hard power against the
hard-core terrorist, you will need cooperation from other governments in a
civilian matter. You will not solve this by bombs alone. You will need close civilian cooperation -moderates?
described -- not necessarily to being Americans, but in a diverse and pluralistic world
intelligence sharing, policy work across borders, tracing financial flows. To some extent other governments will share information to
deal with terrorists out of their self-interest, but the degree of sharing you get depends upon the degree to which you are attractive to
other countries. For example, if being pro-American or sympathetic to the Americans or being seen to cooperate with the Americans
is the kiss of death in domestic politics, you will get less cooperation from those governments -- witness the Turkish example I just
gave. So for both reasons, both to attract the moderate majority and to reach a context or setting in which governments can
cooperate more fully with us to deal with the hard core, soft power is key to being able to wage this struggle against terrorism. How
are we doing? Not well. We are not doing well for several reasons. One is the style and substance of our policies. Soft power grows
out of a countrys culture; it grows out of our values -- democracy and human rights, when we live up to them; it grows out of our
When our policies are formulated in ways which are consultative, which
involve the views and interests of others, we are far more likely to be seen as
legitimate and to attract others. And certainly the style of the new unilateralists in the Bush Administration has
policies.
decreased the legitimacy of American policy. So to restore our soft power, we need to change both the substance and style of our
foreign policy. We also need to find better ways to present this policy. This country, the leader in the information age, supposedly the
greatest communicating country in the world, is being out-communicated by people in caves. This is a bizarre situation. With the
end of the Cold War in the 1990s, we wanted a peace dividend not only in military expenditures but also in our public diplomacy,
and so we cut back dramatically. The U.S. Information Agency had half the number of people that it had at the height of the Cold
War when it was folded into the State Department, itself a big mistake. International exchange programs were cut by a third. Look at
how poorly we do in broadcasting -- for example if you take Urdu, the lingua franca of Pakistan, the Voice of America broadcasts two
hours a day in Urdu, and yet Pakistan is allegedly a frontline country in this struggle against terrorism. Ambassador Djerejian, who
chaired a bipartisan panel on Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World, argued that the United States spent $150 million on public
diplomacy for the whole Islamic world last year, and that is about the equal of two hours of the defense budget, an extraordinary
imbalance. The United States spends 400 times more on its hard power than on its soft power, if you take all the exchange programs
and broadcasting programs and lump them together as a measure of soft power. If we were to spend just 1 percent of the military
budget on soft power, it would mean quadrupling our public diplomacy programs. There is something wrong with our approach. In
short, the challenge that we face in dealing with this new threat of terrorism, particularly the danger of their obtaining weapons of
mass destruction, is a challenge which is very new and real in American foreign policy. But beyond the United States, it is a challenge
for all of modern urban civilization. If this spreads, and we find that people will no longer live in cities because of fear, we will live in
a very different and less favorable world. At the same time, our approach to the problem has relied much too heavily on one
dimension of a three-dimensional world, one instrument between hard and soft power. The answer is not to pretend that hard power
doesnt matter -- it does and we will need to continue to use it -- but realise that to use hard power without combining it with soft
power, which has all too often been the practice in the last few years, is a serious mistake. The good news is that in the past the
United States has, as in the Cold War, combined hard and soft power. The bad news is that we are not doing it yet. But since we have
done it once, presumably we can do it again. When we learn how to better combine hard and soft power, then we will be what I call a
smart power.
Soft power fosters more positive opinions of the UShelps deter

suicide bombings
Chiozza 14 (Giacomo, associate professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, Does
U.S. Soft Power Have Consequences for U.S. Security? Evidence from Popular Support for
Suicide Bombing, The Korean Journal of International Studies, 9/3/14,
http://www.kjis.org/journal/view.html?uid=154&&vmd=Full)//kjz
In Figure 4, I present four CART models, a pooled model for all the three countries, and three disaggregate models for each
The major finding at the aggregate level, in the upper left panel of Figure 4, is that, positive
attitudes towards the United States was the most discriminating factor
country.
accounting for opposition to suicide bombing. The probability that someone who
had a good opinion of the United States would support suicide attacks was
between 4.3% and 9.1%, a large drop over the unconditional probability of
support which ranged from 41.5% to 46.2%. As a first result, therefore, the analysis in Figure 4 indicates
11 Theprobabilitythatagivenindividualwouldsupportsuicidebombing()canbemodeledasa binomial distribution where n is the
number of subjects in the sample and x is the number of subjects who hold such a belief. I use a non-informative reference prior
distribution to derive the posterior distribution and, from that, the probability that the parameter of interest lies in an interval
with 95% probability. I use Jeffreys reference prior distribution, which has the property of being invariant to scale transformations.
In the case of binomial likelihood functions, Jeffreys prior takes the form of a Beta distribution, ~ Beta(1/2,1/2). 12 I report the
logistic regression models in the on-line Appendix. 77). I use a validation set approach, by split- The Korean Journal of
International Studies 13-1 222 that U.S. soft power provided a disabling environment, as Nye (2011)s soft power theory
predicts. LEGEND: AMERICANS PRO.AL.QAEDA PRO.FRANCE PRO.US RELIGION.VERY.IMPORTANT
SAFER.SADDAM.CONE THREATS.TO.ISLAM Dslk=Respondent dislikes the American people; Like=Repondent likes the American
people Does respondent have any confidence, or no confidence at all, in Usama bin Laden? Does respondent have a favorable
opinion of France? Does respondent have a favorable opinion of the United States? Is religion very important in respondents life?
Does respondent believe that the world is safer anfter the removal of Saddam Hussein from power? Does respondent believe that
there are serious threats to Islam? Figure 4. Attitudinal Profile of the Support for Suicide Bombing against Americans and
Westerners Note: Data analysis is based on the 2005 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. The labels below the final branches
indicate the most common response: No indicates that the most common response was disap- proval of suicide bombing; Yes
indicates that the most common response was approval suicide bombing. The numbers underneath measure the 95% Bayesian
confidence intervals around the conditional probability of approval of suicide bombing. CI stands for Confidence Interval. After
that, the model splits the sample separating Turkey, on the one hand, and Jordan and Lebanon, on the other. This split indicates
that the patterns in Turkey Does U.S. Soft Power Have Consequences for U.S. Security? 223 differed from those found in Jordan
and Lebanon not just quantitatively, as illus- trated in Figures 2 and 3, but also qualitatively. The second substantive factor
accounting for patterns of opinion towards suicide attacks was another soft power indicator, i.e. attitudes towards the American
For the Jordanians and the Lebanese who disliked the United States, a
negative view of the American people increased the probability of approval of
suicide attacks against Americans and Westerners to a range between 74.5% and
81%. For the Jordanians and Lebanese who disliked the United States and liked
the Americans, the probability of support for suicide attacks dropped
substantially, but not enough to clear the baseline confidence interval. The country-by-country analysis further validates the
aggregate findings. In both the Jordanian and the Lebanese cases, U.S. soft power
emerges as the strongest predictor of support for suicide bombing against
Americans and Westerners. Overwhelmingly, the Jordanians who had a positive opinion
of Americans did not find suicide bombing against them legitima te; the probability interval
people.
for the support of suicide attacks ranges from 5.4% to 12.6%. Among the Lebanese, no one among those who liked the United States
was also willing to justify suicide attacks against them, which yields a probability of support between 0% and 2%. With such a
U.S. soft power emerged as a key factor in structuring opinion

towards suicide bombing. Importantly for the theory of soft power, however, its policy component i.e., the
discriminating power,
endorsement that foreign publics might give to specific U.S. policies, such as the U.S.-led war on terror does not emerge as a
relevant explanatory parameter. For the people of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, it was the (lack of) normative and personal
standing of the United States and its people that would mostly shape their views on anti-American violence.
Soft Power GoodDemocracy

Soft power is influenced by policies and uniquely promotes
democracy
Nye 09 (Joseph S., University distinguished service professor at Harvard University,
Obamas Soft Power, New Perspectives Quarterly, 2009,
https://onlinelibrarystatic.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2009.01057.x/asset/j.15405842.2009.01057.x.pdf?
v=1&t=ib5e5swr&s=278fd5621bdb8284abc7f132a1d586979bf9117b)//kjz
cambridge, massIn her confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, Hillary Clinton said: America cannot solve the most
pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. . . . We must use what has been called smart
Soft power is the

ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or
payments. Public opinion polls show a serious decline in American attractiveness
in Europe, Latin America and, most dramatically, across the entire Muslim
world. The resources that produce soft power for a country include its culture (where it is attractive to others), its values (where
power, the full range of tools at our disposal. Smart power is the combination of hard and soft power.
they are attractive and not undercut by inconsistent practices) and policies (where they are seen as inclusive and legitimate in the
When poll respondents are asked why they report a decline in American
soft power, they cite American policies more than American culture or values . Since
it is easier for a country to change its policies than its culture , this implies that President Barack Obama will
be able to choose policies that could help to recover some of Americas soft
power. Of course, soft power is not the solution to all problems. Even though North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il likes to
eyes of others).
watch Hollywood movies, that is unlikely to affect his nuclear weapons program. And soft power got nowhere in attracting the
. But
other goalssuch as the promotion of democracy and human rightsare better achieved
by soft power.
Taliban government away from its support for al-Qaida in the 1990s. It took hard military power in 2001 to end that
Soft power is a successful tool in democracy promotion

Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber 10 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International
Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at
Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International
Security at The Atlantic Council; Melissa, Visiting Scholar at George Washington Universitys
Elliott School, in the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies; Steven, Professor at the
Information School , University of California, Berkeley, Taking Soft Power Seriously,
Comparative Strategy, 12/13/10, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20)//kjz
The United States has also attempted to use soft power to promote the spread of
democracy around the globe. Unlike in the other two issue areas, the U.S. democracy
promotion campaigns met with some success as evidenced by a spate of electoral revolutions in the
postcommunist region. We argue that the successful influence of these U.S. democracy promotion efforts is due to the presence of
the necessary conditions for an effective soft power campaign. In the countries that experienced electoral revolutions, there was a
the United States identified and supported credible

messengers to transmit ideas about democratization, and ideas about the best
practices for bringing down authoritarian regimes could significantly impact the
outcome. In recent years, the United States has devoted a disproportionate amount of its democracy promotion attention to
functioning marketplace of ideas,
the postcommunist region. The proportion of countries receiving USAID democracy assistance, and the duration of time over which
the countries receive assistance, are higher in the postcommunist region than in other world regions. A survey of USAID funding
from 19902003 reveals that the postcommunist region stands out as a clear priority for USAID with respect to democracy
assistance.73 Other U.S. government-funded democracy promotion organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy
The U.S.s soft power strategies

aimed at promoting democracy in the postcommunist world since the end of the
Cold War have met with notable success. The rate of electoral revolutions in this region has been
staggering. According to a recent study, pivotal elections that have either enhanced or
introduced democracy have taken place in eight countries, or 40 percent of the
twenty postcommunist countries that remained eligible for such revolutions. 74 The
well-publicized color revolutions swept through Georgia (The Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine
(The Orange Revolution, 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (The Tulip Revolution, 2005). Downloaded by [Georgetown University]
have similarly concentrated their resources on the postcommunist region.
at 11:08 23 June 2015 Taking Soft Power Seriously 423
Soft Power GoodPeace/Proliferation

American soft power is crucial to a stable international orderslows
proliferation and bolsters trade
Nye 15 - Joseph Nye is university distinguished service professor and former dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served
as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, chair of the National Intelligence Council, and deputy under secretary of state for
security assistance, science, and technology. (Is the American Century Over? pp. 153-158 e-book, 2015) STRYKER
The problem of leadership in such a world is how to get everyone into the act and
still get action. And the American role in galvanizing institutions and organizing
informal networks remains crucial to answering that puzzle. As we saw earlier, there has often been
self-serving exaggeration about the American provision of public goods in the past, but a case can be made for Goliath. As Michael
Mandelbaum describes the American role, other countries will criticize it, but
they will miss it when it is gone.11 More important, it is not yet gone. Even in issues where its pre-eminence
in resources has diminished, American
leadership often remains critical to global collective
action. Take trade and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as two examples of
important economic and security issues where American dominance is not what
it once was. In trade, the United States was by far the largest trading nation when
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was created in 1947, and the United States
deliberately accepted trade discrimination by Europe and Japan as part of its Cold War strategy. After those
countries recovered, they joined the United States in a club of like-minded nations within the GATT.12 In the 1990s, as other states shares of global
Organization and the club model

became obsolete. The United States supported Chinese accession to the World
Trade Organization and China passed the United States as the worlds largest
trading nation. While global rounds of trade negotiations became more difficult to
accomplish and various free trade agreements proliferated, the rules of the World Trade Organization
trade increased, the United States supported the expansion of GATT into the World Trade
continued to provide a general structure wherein the norm of most favored nation status and reciprocity created a framework in which particular club
deals could be generalized to a larger number of countries. Moreover, new entrants like China found it in their interests to observe even adverse
Similarly with the non-proliferation

regime: in the 1940s, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, it proposed the
Baruch plan for UN control, which the Soviet Union rejected in order to pursue its own nuclear weapons program. In the
1950s, the United States used the Atoms for Peace program, coupled with
inspections by a new International Atomic Energy Agency, to try to separate the peaceful from the
weapons purposes of nuclear technology as it spread. In the 1960s, the five states with nuclear weapons
negotiated the non-proliferation treaty, which promised peaceful assistance to states that accepted a legal status of
non-weapons states. In the 1970s, after Indias explosion of a nuclear device and the
further spread of technology for enrichment and reprocessing of fissile materials,
the United States and like-minded states created a Nuclear Suppliers Group , which
agreed to exercise restraint in the export of sensitive technologies, as well as an International National Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which called into question the optimistic projections about the use of plutonium fuels. While none
of these institutional adaptations was perfect, and problems persist with North
judgments of the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process.
Korea and Iran today, the net effect of the normative structure and American
leadership was to slow the growth in the number of nuclear weapons states from the 25
expected in the 1960s to the 9 that exist today.13 In 2003, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, a loosely structured grouping of
countries that shares information and coordinates efforts to stop trafficking in nuclear proliferation related materials. Similar
questions
arise today about the governance of the internet and cyber activities. In its early
days, the internet was largely American, but today China has twice as many users
as the United States. Where once only Roman alphabet characters were used on the internet, now there are top-level domain names in
Chinese, Arabic, and Cyrillic scripts, with more alphabets expected. And in 2014, the United States announced that it would relax the Commerce
Departments supervision of the internets address book, the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Some observers
worried that this would open the way for authoritarian states to try to exert control and censor the addresses of opponents. Such fears seem exaggerated
both on technical grounds and in their underlying premises. Not only would such censorship be difficult, but there are self-interested grounds for states
to avoid such fragmentation of the internet. In addition, the descriptions in the decline in American power in the cyber issue are overstated. Not only
does the United States remain the second largest user of the internet, but it is the home of eight of the ten largest global information companies.14
Moreover, when one looks at the composition of important non-state voluntary communities (like the Internet Engineering Task Force), one sees a
disproportionate number of Americans participating because of their expertise. The loosening of US government influence over ICANN could be seen
Some
cyber stability now exists, but the fact that cyber insecurity creates inherent risks
for both the United States and its opponents provides a basis for possible
agreements.16 In short, projections based on theories of hegemonic decline can be
misleading about the realities of American leadership in international institutions
and networks. Even with diminishing power resources, American leadership
as a strategy for strengthening the institution and reinforcing the American multistakeholder philosophy rather than as a sign of defeat.15
remains essential in creating public goods.
Proliferation causes extinction

Kroenig 12 Matthew Kroenig is the Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations. ("The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, May 26, 2012, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)
The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war .
The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A
nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have
arguably resulted in human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as
Nuclear War.
India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a
parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that
nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be nave to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that
worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later
1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime.
Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period
in which they lack a secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or both
states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first . For example, if
Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to
have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with
a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear
threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could
the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first
strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Irans nuclear capabilities and
occur. First,
eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israels aggressive strategic culture that
emphasizes preemptive action. Second,
the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this
case Iran, might feel use em or loose em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a
preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued,
nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. If there are
advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that
war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second . In a future
Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating
first attack from an opponent. Even
in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational
deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders

that would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption
appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will
continue to hold in the future. For example, Irans theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly
pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power
one leader will

choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in selfdestruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a
nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean
the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest
and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the
credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a
suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this
question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war . This strategy might
and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread,
be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the
Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATOs conventional inferiority
in continental Europe. As Russias conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily
on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western
strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistans military plans for nuclear use in the event of an
invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in
Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a threat that leaves
something to chance. They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky
games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an
attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down . Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear
a possible East Asia contingency.
war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents
could have led to war.[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of
stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear
exchange.
Exts. Peace
Soft power resolves a laundry list of impactsreestablishing values is
specifically key to projection
Lagon 11 Mark P. Lagon is the International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown
University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking
in Persons at the US Department of State. The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-softpower-under-obama
What he hasnt accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign affairs
a full
assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a
critique of President Bushs overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these
excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks
in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to
change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach to the worldand that he would
Obamas conception of soft power has curiously lacked the

very quality that has made it most efficacious in the pastthe values dimension .
quickly remedy that defect. Yet President
This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto the audacity of hope and his deployment of soaring
rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral
consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives.
The excision of this values dimension
renders soft power a hollow concept. Related Essay Boxed In? The Women of Libyas Revolution Ann Marlowe | ESSAY
Libyas leading women are eager to join in forming a new, post-Qaddafi government, but thus far they have been given seats on the sidelines. The
Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countriesIran, Russia, and Egypt
where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries
have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but Americas moral standing to project it. Perhaps the most striking
example of a lost opportunity to use moral soft power was in Iran. In March 2009, President Obama made an appeal in a video to Iran for a new
beginning of diplomatic engagement. In April 2009, he said in an address in Prague that in trying to stem Irans nuclear arms efforts, his
administration would seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Two months later questions arose about President
Ahmadinejad claiming victory over Mir Hussein Moussavi in the presidential election on June 12th. Within three days, there were large demonstrations
in Tehran, Rasht, Orumiyeh, Zahedan, and Tabriz. As Iranians took to the streets, Obama had to choose whether to associate the US with the protestors
or preserve what he appeared to believe was a possible channel of dialogue with Ahmadinejad on Irans nuclear program. For several days, the
American president deliberately refused to embrace the Green Movement swelling in Irans streets to protest a stolen electionreaching up to three
million in Tehran alone. Temporizing, he said, It is up to Iranians to make decisions about who Irans leaders will be. We respect Iranian sovereignty
and want to avoid the United States being the issue inside of Iran. But it was inevitable that the US would be scapegoated by Iranian leaders for
meddling, even if it chose moral inaction. As Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass wrote in Newsweek seven months later: I am a
card-carrying realist on the grounds that ousting regimes and replacing them with something better is easier said than done. . . . Critics will say
promoting regime change will encourage Iranian authorities to tar the opposition as pawns of the West. But the regime is already doing so. Outsiders
should act to strengthen the opposition and to deepen rifts among the rulers. This process is underway . . . . Even a realist should recognize that its an
opportunity not to be missed. Eventually, probably as a result of the influence of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose opposition to Irans
leadership she established as a senator, administration policy became more forthright. A year after the protests began, the president signed into law
targeted sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard. Yet failing to clearly side with Ahmadinejads opponents in 2009 represented a serious loss of US
credibility. It also failed to encourage the moral change that Obama had appeared to invoke during his campaign. Soft power and its ability to
strengthen the protest movement was squandered. Early and active US backing for a more unified opposition might have buoyed and strengthened the
Green opposition and helped it to better take advantage of subsequent divisions in the regime: parliamentarians petitioning to investigate payoffs to
millions of people to vote for Ahmadinejad, friction between Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and efforts by the
Revolutionary Guard to assert prevalence over politics. By supporting the opposition in Iran through soft power, the administration would not only
have associated the US with the aspirations of the people in the streets of Tehran but also advanced the objective of dislodging a potentially nuclear
rogue state. I t is particularly ironic that Obama policy toward Russia should have eschewed the projection of soft power given that the NSCs senior
director for Russia and Eurasia, Michael McFaul, is the administration official most closely identified in his career with the cause of democracy
The American president must

continue to speak out in support of democracy and human rights . Shying away from the d word
promotion. In Advancing Democracy Abroad , published just last year, he writes,
. . . would send a terrible signal to the activists around the world fighting for human rights and democratic change. . . . American diplomats must not
check their values at the door. In the book, McFaul offers an ambitious vision linking values to stability for Russia and Eurasia: In Eurasia, a
democratic Russia could become a force for regional stability . . . not unlike the role that Russia played in the beginning of the 1990s. A democratic
Russia seeking once again to integrate into Western institutions also would cooperate more closely with the United States and Europe on international
security issues. But in its haste to hit the reset button on bilateral relations, the Obama White House ignored McFauls counsel. Instead of
approaching the Russians with a set of firm moral expectations, the administration has courted President Medvedev as a counterweight to Putinism
(missing the fact that rather than a countervailing force, Medvedev was, as noted in a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Robin to Putins
Batman). As events would show, Medvedev offered no real obstacle to Putins resumption of the presidency after a hiatus as prime minister to satisfy
term limit laws. Nor, for that matter, is there any significant difference in policy between the Medvedev era and that which preceded it in terms of
issues such as the occupation of Georgian territory, internal corruption, or silencing remaining independent media or business figures. Instead of
establishing a foundation of clear principles in his reset of relations with the Putin regime, President Obama has seen relations with Russia in terms of a
larger picture of strategic arms control. He believes proliferators like Iran and North Korea can be restrained if the major nuclear powers reduce their
stockpiles, in fealty to the premises of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hence, the New START Treaty was his singular focus with Russia and
the grounds for his appeasement of Putinism. He seems never to have considered asserting a soft power that would have signaled to Russian opposition
figures like Boris Nemtsovbadly beaten in December 2010 after flying home from speaking in the USthat the US places little trust in bargains with
leaders shredding the rule of law in their daily governance. The Russian security state has chosen to cooperate with the US in a few areas it has
concluded are in its own interest. It allowed passage of a watered-down UN Security Council resolution 1929, imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear
program, and cancelled plans to sell the S-300 air defense system to the Ahmadinejad regime. It has also cooperated on counterterrorism and US
military access to Afghanistan. Yet would the United States have been unable to secure this discrete cooperation without checking our values at the
door, in Michael McFauls phrase? The United States has achieved no cooperation from Russian leaders on issues such as the rule of law and an end to
systematic intimidation and the arrests of opposition, press, and business figures, and indeed threats to American businesses private property rights
and safety. Leaders of the Solidarity opposition movement continue to be detained, environmental nonprofits continue to be raided for trumped-up tax
and software piracy irregularities, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in detention, and journalist Oleg Kashin was, like Boris Nemtsov, beaten. There is no
evidence of concerted bilateral pressure by the Obama administration to protest Russian unwillingness to protect freedoms for its citizens. The lack of
linkage between realist hard-power issues (such as nonproliferation) and domestic values (such as the rule of law) has limited rather than increased
US influence with Russia. The Carnegie Endowments Matthew Rojansky and James Collins rightly conclude: If the United States erects an
impenetrable wall between bilateral cooperation and Russias domestic politics, the Kremlin will simply conclude Washington is willing to give ground
on transparency, democracy, and rule of law in order to gain Russian cooperation on nonproliferation, Afghanistan, and other challenges. Indeed, in
June 2011, the undeterred Russian regime barred Nemtsovs Peoples Freedom Party from running in the December 2011 parliamentary elections.
President Obama has selected Michael McFaul to be his ambassador to Russia. Sadly, dispatching the first non-diplomat in that role in three decades,
not to mention a man whose vision of a just Russian policy for the US is at odds with the administrations own practice, is unlikely to dislodge this
values-free approach. The underwriting of Hosni Mubarak long predates the Obama administration. The unconditional gift of massive annual aid for
the 1979 Camp David Accords lasted thirty-one years, spanning the administrations of six US presidents. It left Mubarak to squash democracy
initiatives at home and force a binary choice on American policymakers between the Egyptian ruler and Muslim Brotherhood Islamists. Yet both before
and after Egyptians took to the streets early this year to call for Mubaraks ouster, President Obama lost chances to exercise soft power in a way that
might have conditioned the eventual outcome in Egypt. The United States would have been much better poised to shape a transition and assist nonIslamist democrats in 2011 if the Obama administration had not cut democracy and governance aid in Egypt from $50 million in 2008 to $20 million
in 2009 (to which Congress later restored $5 million). The outgoing Bush administration had cut economic aid for Egypt in the 2009 budget, but
sustained democracy and governance programs. Urged by US ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey, the Obama administration cut those programs
too. Cuts for civil society and NGOs were sharpest, from $32 million to $7 million in 2009. These steps made a mockery of Obamas June 2009 Cairo
speech offering to turn a page in US-Muslim engagement. When the Egyptian people took to the streets to reject their leader as Tunisians just had,
President Obama picked former ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner as special crisis envoy. Reflecting what was actually the presidents position at the
outset, Wisner said to an annual conference in Munich, We need to get a national consensus around the pre-conditions for the next step forward. The
president [Mubarak] must stay in office to steer those changes. He also opined, I believe President Mubaraks continued leadership is criticalits his
chance to write his own legacy. This legacy was not a pretty thing as the Mubarak regime tried to resist the will of the Egyptian public with lethal force.
Echoing his response nineteen months earlier in Iran, President Obama asserted only that the United States was determined not to be central to the
Egyptian story, however it evolved. When he saw which way the truth was blowing on the streets of Cairo, the president recalibrated. Watching these
developments, which had far more to do with image than policy, Financial Times correspondent Daniel Dombey surmised: So when the
demonstrations began, the White House struggled to catch up, changing its message day by day until it eventually sided with the protesters against the
government of Hosni Mubarak . . . Now, US officials suggest, the president has finally embraced his inner Obama . . . The White House has also
indulged in a little spinning, depicting the president as a decisive leader who broke with the status quo view of state department Arabists. In the March
2011 referendum on amendments to the Egyptian Constitution, forty-one percent of the Egyptian public turned out and backed the amendments by a
seventy-seven percent tally. The leaders of the anti-Mubarak protests and leading presidential candidates Mohamed ElBaradei and Amr Moussa had
urged Egyptians to turn out and reject the amendments, drafted by lawyers and judges picked by Egypts military rulers, in favor of a whole new
constitution limiting expansive presidential powers. The Muslim Brotherhood backed the amendments, perhaps hoping to benefit from winning strong
executive power. The inner Obama failed to place America squarely behind the relatively weak non-Islamist forces in Egyptian civil society when it
Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military

expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other new players on the
international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront
would have counted.
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass

atrocity, or tyranny. Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright called it, the indispensible nation. Soft power is crucial to sustaining and
best leveraging this role as catalyst. That President Obama should have excluded
it from his vision of Americas foreign policy assetsparticularly in the key cases
of Iran, Russia, and Egyptsuggests that he feels the country has so declined, not
only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority
to project soft power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a
crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar
In the 1980s, however, soft power played a

crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy. Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a
world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality.
nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines)
to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be
torn downover Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the
demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft
power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on
1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further,
those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrains, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy
rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones. To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft
Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken

the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in
Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France
combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is
power is to be China.
seriously amiss.
Blocks
Counterplans
Fund HUMINT CP
The cplans just more data overload makes intel ops less successful
AND will re-create new resource tradeoffs.
Tufekci 15
Zeynep Tufekci is a fellow at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University, an assistant
professor at the School of Information and Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, and a faculty
associate at the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet and Society. Terror and the limits of mass surveillance
Financial Times The Exchange - Feb 3rd http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-andthe-limits-of-mass-surveillance/
The most common justification given by governments for mass surveillance is that these
tools are indispensable for fighting terrorism. The NSAs ex-director Keith Alexander says big data is
what its all about. Intelligence agencies routinely claim that they need massive amounts of data on all of us to catch the bad guys,
like the French brothers who assassinated the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo, or the murderers of Lee Rigby, the British soldier killed by two men who
But the assertion that big data is

what its all about when it comes to predicting rare events is not supported by what we know about how
these methods work, and more importantly, dont work. Analytics on massive datasets can be
powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or events that occur regularly and frequently, but
are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable, erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In
fact, the bigger the haystack the more massive the scale and the wider the scope of the surveillance the
claimed the act was revenge for the UKs involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
less suited these methods are to finding such exceptional events, and the more they may serve
to direct resources and attention away from appropriate tools and methods. After Rigby was killed,
GCHQ, Britains intelligence service, was criticised by many for failing to stop his killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy
parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page report that lists all the ways in which Adebolajo and Adebowale had brushes with data
surveillance, but were not flagged as two men who were about to kill a soldier on a London street. GCHQ defended itself by saying that some of the
crucial online exchanges had taken place on a platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not alerted the agency about these men, or the nature of
their postings. The men apparently had numerous exchanges that were extremist in nature, and their accounts were suspended repeatedly by the
platform for violating its terms of service. If only Facebook had turned over more data, the thinking goes. But that is misleading, and makes sense
only with the benefit of hindsight. Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies every time that it detects a post
containing violence, would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data quagmire, rather than clues to impending crimes.
For big data analytics to work, there needs to be a reliable connection between the
signal (posting of violent content) and the event (killing someone). Otherwise, the signal is worse than
useless. Millions of Facebooks billion-plus users post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent
Turning over the data from all such occurrences would merely flood the agencies with
false positives erroneous indications for events that actually will not happen. Such data overload is not without cost,
as it takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are, indeed, not needles especially when we dont
even know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no resolution, taking away
resources from any real investigation. Besides, account suspensions carried out by platforms like Facebooks are
rhetoric.
haphazard, semi-automated and unreliable indicators. The flagging system misses a lot more violent content than it flags, and it often flags content as
inappropriate even when it is not, and suffers from many biases. Relying on such a haphazard system is not a reasonable path at all. So is all the hype
around big data analytics unjustified? Yes and no. There are appropriate use cases for which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform much
better than any alternative we can imagine using conventional methods. Successful examples include using Google searches to figure out drug
interactions that would be too complex and too numerous to analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using social media to detect national-level swings in
our mood (we are indeed happier on Fridays than on Mondays). In contrast, consider the lone wolf attacker who took hostages at, of all things, a
Lindt Chocolat Caf in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence, and random, crazed men attacking them is not a pattern
on which we can base further identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology and brought a black flag with Islamic writing on it, but
given the rarity of such events, its not always possible to separate the jihadi rhetoric from issues of mental health every eras mentally ill are affected
by the cultural patterns around them. This isnt a job for big data analytics. (The fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges and was
known for sending hate letters to the families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for traditional policing). When confronted with
the NSA, should have said instead of

asking for increased surveillance capabilities: stop asking us to collect more and more data to perform an
their failures in predicting those rare acts of domestic terrorism, heres what GCHQ, and indeed
This glut of data is making our job harder, not easier , and the expectation that there will
impossible task.
never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.
Modest amounts of datas key. Cplan wont solve, doesnt cut back on
data overload.
Press 13
Gil - Managing Partner at gPress, a marketing, publishing, research and education consultancy. Previously held senior
marketing and research management positions at NORC, DEC and EMC. Most recently he was a Senior Director,
Thought Leadership Marketing at EMC, where he launched the Big Data conversation with the How Much
Information? study (2000 with UC Berkeley) and the Digital Universe study. He is also contributes on computing
technology issues as a guest writer at Forbes Magzzine The Effectiveness Of Small Vs. Big Data Is Where The NSA
Debate Should Start Forbes 6-12-13 - http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/06/12/the-effectiveness-ofsmall-vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start/
Most of the discussion around the revelations about the data collection activities of the NSA has been about the threat to our civil
little has been said, however,

about the wisdom of collecting all phone call records and lots of other data in the fight against
terrorism or other threats to the United States. Faith in the power (especially the predictive power) of more
data is of course a central tenet of the religion of big data and it looks like the NSA has been a willing convert. But not
everybody agrees its the most effective course of action. For example, business analytics expert
Meta Brown: The unspoken assumption here is that possessing massive quantities of data
guarantees that the government will be able to find criminals, and find them quickly, by tracing their
electronic tracks. That assumption is unrealistic. Massive quantities of data add cost and
complexity to every kind of analysis, often with no meaningful improvement in
the results. Indeed, data quality problems and slow data processing are almost certain to arise,
actually hindering the work of data analysts. It is far more productive to invest
resources into thoughtful analysis of modest quantities of good quality, relevant
data.
rights and the potential damage abroad to U.S. political and business interests. Relatively
No solvency focus on metadata will still exist theyll use metadata

before Humint data.
Funding alone is not enough divisional focus must be diverted for
Humint.
Gallington 06 Daniel Gallington, Adjunct Professor of National Security Law at the
University of Illinois, senior policy and program adviser at the George C. Marshall Institute,
LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School, J.D. from the University of Illinois, 2006
(What hope for HUMINT?, Washington Times, May 8th, accessible online at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508-091537-5575r/?page=all,
Assuming Mike Hayden is confirmed as the new director, basic CIA housecleaning should
continue happening at the same time will be significant budgetary shifts from hightech remote-sensing intelligence operations, to human-intelligence collection, the
traditional CIA mission. Because the entrenched CIA senior bureaucracy remains
resistant to change, its also fair to ask if the CIA can improve its humanintelligence collection even if we spend a lot more money on it. The answer in the
shorter term three to 10 years is probably no, and whether we can do it for the longer
term is not at all clear yet. Why such a negative assessment? Looking at how we have done in the
past with human intelligence provides at least an indicator of our probable success: Our
archenemy for 50 years, the Soviet Union, proved very hard to collect against using human
sources. And, for most of the Cold War we seemed oblivious to this: Many sources we used were
double agents and played us like an organ, as the expression goes. A primary way to get
human intelligence pay for it can too often become the only way, because it is
simply easier. And, we have probably paid a lot of money over the years for bad
information much of it planted with us by double agents. Traditionally, we have
been unable to develop long-term, well-placed sources in other countries . The
reason is that the time required sometimes 20 years seems beyond our comprehension and
the ability of our government to fund and keep secret for sustained periods. Too often, our
idea of cover for our agents was something your mother let alone the KGB
could have figured out in about 30 seconds. We have the wrong kind of people doing the
work: Despite being the most culturally diverse free nation in the world, we seem to send blondhaired, blue-eyed people to do intelligence field work. They simply cant do the mission in
todays world however, they seem to rise to leadership positions without difficulty. What
should we do? (1) We have to take a very critical look at ourselves. This cannot be done
objectively by the CIA and the other agencies because their primary focus is on the very short
term getting more money to spend. The president consulting with the Intelligence
Committees in Congress should call together a group of experts, including counterintelligence
experts, and chart out a long-term HUMINT collection strategy. We should get their guidance,
Congress should fund it and the president carry it out. (2) It isnt written in stone that the
traditional HUMINT roles, missions and collection authorities of the various intelligence
agencies should stay the same. In fact, everything should be on the table and no agency should
expect its traditional HUMINT mission will remain intact. On paper at least, the new director of
national intelligence (DNI) would seem empowered to direct this kind of reallocation of mission.
(3) Too often, our intelligence collections overseas are based on second- and third-hand reports,
and often obtained from host or other nations intelligence services. As these reports are
analyzed and similarities are seen and written about, its easy to see how we can be misled by
group speak reporting, mostly controlled by sources we have no way of assessing. Spying is
spying: We should do more of it on our own throughout the world and get our own, firsthand
information. (4) Most HUMINT collections should be controlled centrally: Local authorities
overseas including the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned and the regional military
commander should not, ordinarily, be in the loop for such activities. (5) There has been way
too much emphasis on open source reporting, and its become a crutch for a number of
agencies. Many so-called open sources are manipulated by those opposed to us, whether we
consider them our friends or not. And, way too often, open source reporting just means
someone reading a foreign newspaper then writing an intelligence report on it. Will these
recommendations work? We dont have any choice: We are simply not getting the critical
information we need to be responsive to the ever-broadening spectrum of threats

from terrorism. And, unless we can penetrate terrorist organizations, including
their planning and financing, well simply be unable to prevent more terrorist
attacks against us around the world and at home. Nevertheless, even if we do all these
things and do them right we may be 15 or 20 years away from developing a true world
class HUMINT collection capability: as good, for example as some of our key adversaries have
had against us for years. But lets make sure we stay on task and do it right not just
fling our money in a different direction for a few years.
A shift in intelligence gathering priority is key commanders still

prioritize drones post-counterplan.
BI 14 Business Insider, major US business journal Byline: Robert Caruso, 2014 (Here's
How the US Can Build the Intelligence Capabilities Needed to Defeat ISIS, Business Insider,
September 8th, accessible online at http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-needs-betterhumint-to-beat-isis-2014-9, accessed on 6-29-15)
The U.S. government has a large number of officers trained by the CIA that can
be deployed globally. Their efforts should focus on high-quality targets for hum an
source intelligence that can provide information on strategic intent . Sources that
only provide tactical and capability-based intelligence are insufficient.
Human source intelligence collection is as much a psychological and emotional
construct as it is a political, military, or national security one. Intelligence
collection is not an academic exercise that can be understood by rote formula or analyzed
by a linear thinking process.
Typical defense intelligence priorities must undergo a conceptual shift. The
practice of providing tactical intelligence to support military commanders is

extremely important. But only understanding our adversaries capabilities
without knowing their intentions means the U.S. is only winning half the battle.
There's a legal dimension to the problem that today's enemy combatants pose as well. In order
to expand the fight against groups like ISIS, a congressional Authorization for Use of Military
Force may be necessary. But that brings up questions of its own: Authorization for what? And,
more poignantly, against whom? The language could become rapidly outdated as the nature of
the enemy and the scope of the fight changes.
Today's enemy is embedded in local populations. Drones have no way of

distinguishing between enemy combatants and noncombatants without
actionable intelligence. Deep knowledge of today's enemies is vital to
understanding them and defeating them.
Humnit must consistently be our focus to solve.

Webster 08 William Webster, Chairman of the National Security Council, Former
director of both the CIA and FBI, J.D. from Washington University, St. Louis, 2008 (How can
the U.S. improve its human intelligence, Washinton Times, July 6th, accessible online at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/06/how-can-the-us-improve-its-humanintelligence/?page=all, accessed on 6-29-15)
Expansion of human intelligence (Humint).
These on-the-ground sources are the most reliable means of ascertaining the
intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. Whenever the threat seems lessened
these sources are the first to go and not be replaced. These sources are vital to our
security, they cannot be put on ice and immediately called up and put in place to
meet each new threat, whether officially assigned or as nonofficial cover agents (NOCs).
This takes time, and the time to do it is now. Complete the FBIs reorganization of its
data gathering and data mining electronic capability. Past efforts have failed to transform this
extremely valuable resource into a system that can supply needed intelligence to CIA and other
key agencies. Need to share is just as important as need to know. The cost is high, but well
worth it. Pre-emptive and preventive intelligence. The intelligence gathered by modern digital
technology on a rapid basis should be made available to all personnel charged with spotting
suspected terrorists at various points of entry as will those on the watch lists seeking to fly on
commercial aircraft. Any useful intelligence gathered abroad must be promptly conveyed to
security officers looking for suspected individuals and cargo so that the prompt and preventive
policy can be more effective. Improve National Estimates. The longer-view estimates have often
been neglected by consumers at the White House and elsewhere in favor of the current
intelligence that seems to be more readily actionable. The NIEs have real, though less apparent
value, in spotting trends and conditions that could result in hostile action against the United
States and should be elevated in quality and presentation. Retention of objectivity. We may
expect in a troubled world during this century that our leaders may want to
cherry-pick the intelligence to support a previously determined program for
action. Intelligence officers must not only be seen to be objective; they must
protect the work product from distortion by the consumers that can only
undermine its credibility. This can be a tough assignment, but it must be done. Our
satellites project important imagery and signals intelligence that expand our understanding of
potentially hostile activities and should be enhanced wherever possible. They do not, however,
replace the need for on-the-ground intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of our
adversaries. A well-placed human source can be of critical importance in explicating the purpose
of such activities detected by our electronic eyes and ears. Similarly, human intelligence can
also be an important factor in helping our electronic tools focus upon unusual
plans or activities on the ground. Each is important in early detection and analysis.
Together, they can make an important contribution to the safety of our nation by
avoiding surprise and miscalculation of the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries
and are thus indispensable to our policy-makers in reaching sound decisions in the best interest
of our country. Public source information must also be factored in. But if we want to
avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 we must have access to closely guarded
secrets. Humint cannot be an afterthought.
Disad
2AC Link Turn Terror

Info-overload big data floods the system with false positives and
stalls counter-terror ops
Schwartz, 15
(Mattathias Schwartz, a staff writer, began contributing to the magazine in 2011. A Massacre in
Jamaica, his investigation into the extradition of Christopher Coke, won the 2011 Livingston
Award for international reporting. He has reported for the magazine from the Mosquito Coast,
Tripoli, and Zuccotti Park. Between 2002 and 2005, he edited and published the twenty-oneissue run of the Philadelphia Independent, a broadsheet newspaper, The Whole Haystack,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack, January 26, 2015, ak.)
Its possible that Moalin would have been caught without Section 215 . His phone
number was a common link among pending F.B.I. investigations , according to a report
from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent agency created in 2004 at the suggestion of the 9/11
the
Department of Justice said that the Moalin case was part of a broader
investigation into Shabaab funding. Senator Ron Wyden, of Oregon, who, like Leahy, has pressured the
N.S.A. to justify bulk surveillance, said, To suggest that the government needed to spy on
millions of law-abiding people in order to catch this individual is simply not true .
He continued, I still havent seen any evidence that the dragnet surveillance of
Americans personal information has done a single thing to improve U.S. national
security. Representative James Sensenbrenner, of Wisconsin, who introduced the Patriot Act in the House,
agreed. The intelligence community has never made a compelling case that bulk
collection stops terrorism, he told me. Khalid al-Mihdhars phone calls to Yemen
months before he helped hijack American Airlines Flight 77, on 9/11 , led Obama,
Alexander, Feinstein, and others to suggest that Section 215 could have prevented the
attacks. We know that we didnt stop 9/11, Alexander told me last spring. People were trying, but they didnt have the tools.
This tool, we believed, would help them. But the PCLOB found that it was not necessary to collect
the entire nations calling records to find Mihdhar. I asked William Gore, who was running the F.B.I.s San
Commission, which Obama had tasked with assessing Section 215. Later, in a congressional budget request,
Diego office at the time, if the Patriot Act would have made a difference. Could we have prevented 9/11? I dont know, he said.
You cant find somebody if youre not looking for them
. Last year, as evidence of the fifty-four

disrupted plots came apart, many people in Washington shifted their rhetoric on Section 215 away from specific cases and toward
hypotheticals and analogies. I have a fire-insurance policy on my house, Robert Litt, the general counsel of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, said. I dont determine whether I want to keep that fire-insurance policy by the number of times
Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, has called this the

peace-of-mind metric. Michael Leiter, who led the National Counterterrorism Center
under George W. Bush and Obama, told me that Section 215 was useful but not indispensable : Could we
its paid off. James
live without Section 215? Yes. Its not the most essential piece. But it would increase risk and make some things harder. In addition
the N.S.A. has used Section 215 to collect records from hotels, carrental agencies, state D.M.V.s, landlords, credit-card companies, and the like ,
according to Justice Department reports. Once the N.S.A. has the phone metadata, it can
circulate them through a shared database called the corporate store. To some, this
to phone metadata,
sounds less like fire insurance and more like a live-in fire marshal, authorized to
root through the sock drawer in search of flammable material . The open abuse is
how they use that data, Mike German, a former F.B.I. agent and lobbyist for the
A.C.L.U., who is now a fellow at the Brennan Center, said. Its no longer about investigating a
particular suspect. In 2013, Le Monde published documents from Edward Snowdens archive showing that the
N.S.A. obtained seventy million French phone-metadata records in one month . It is
unknown whether any of these calls could be retrospectively associated with the Paris attacks. The interesting thing to know would
be whether these brothers made phone calls to Yemen in a way that would have been collected by a program like Section 215 or
another signals intelligence program, Leiter told me last week. I dont know the answer to that question. Philip Mudd, a former
C.I.A. and senior F.B.I. official, told me that tallying up individual cases did not capture the full value of Section 215. Try to imagine
a quicker way to understand a human being in 2015, he said. Take this woman in Paris. Who is she? How are you going to figure
that out? You need historical data on everything she ever touched, to accelerate the investigation. Now, do we want to do that in
Documents released by Snowden and published by

the Washington Post show that the N.S.A. accounted for $10.5 billion of the $52.6 billion
black budget, the top-secret budget for U.S. intelligence spending, in 2013. About
seventeen billion dollars of the black budget goes to counterterrorism each year ,
plus billions more through the unclassified budgets of the Pentagon , the State
Department, and other agencies, plus a special five-billion-dollar fund proposed
by Obama last year to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The maximalist approach to
intelligence is not limited to the N.S.A. or to Section 215. A central terrorist watch list is
called the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE. According to a classified report released by the Web site
the Intercept, TIDE, which is kept by the National Counterterrorism Center, lists more than a million people.
The C.I.A., the N.S.A., and the F.B.I. can all nominate new individuals . In the weeks
before the 2013 Chicago Marathon, analysts performed due diligence on all of
the records in TIDE of people who held a drivers license in Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin. This was based on the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon. In
retrospect, every terrorist attack leaves a data trail that appears to be dotted with missed
opportunities. In the case of 9/11, there was Mihdhars landlord, the airport clerk who sold Mihdhar his one-way ticket for
cash, and the state trooper who pulled over another hijacker on September 9th. In August, 2001, F.B.I.
headquarters failed to issue a search warrant for one of the conspirators laptops,
despite a warning from the Minneapolis field office that he was engaged in
preparing to seize a Boeing 747-400 in commission of a terrorist act. There was
plenty of material in the haystack. The government had adequate tools to collect
even more. The problem was the tendency of intelligence agencies to hoard
information, as well as the cognitive difficulty of anticipating a spectacular and unprecedented attack. The 9/11 Commission
America? Thats a different question, a political question.
called this a failure of the imagination. Finding needles, the commission wrote in its report, is easy when youre looking backward,
deceptively so. They quoted the historian Roberta Wohlstetter writing about Pearl Harbor:
It is much easier after the
event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals . After the event, of course, a signal is always
crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and
every bit of hay is potentially relevant
pregnant with conflicting meanings. Before the event,

. The most
dangerous adversaries will be the ones who most successfully disguise their individual transactions to appear normal, reasonable,
and legitimate, Ted Senator, a data scientist who worked on an early post-9/11 program called Total Information Awareness, said,
in 2002. Since then, intelligence officials have often referred to lone-wolf terrorists, cells, and, as Alexander has put it, the
terrorist who walks among us, as though Al Qaeda were a fifth column, capable of camouflaging itself within civil society. Patrick
Skinner, a former C.I.A. case officer who works with the Soufan Group, a security
company, told me that this image is wrong. We knew about these networks, he said,
Mass surveillance, he continued, gives a false sense of security.

It sounds great when you say youre monitoring every phone call in the United
States. You can put that in a PowerPoint. But, actually, you have no idea whats
going on. By flooding the system with false positives , big-data approaches to
counterterrorism might actually make it harder to identify real terrorists before they
act. Two years before the Boston Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of
the two brothers alleged to have committed the attack, was assessed by the citys Joint Terrorism Task
Force. They determined that he was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand
assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F. conducted that year, a number that had
nearly doubled in the previous two years, according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice
Department has trained nearly three hundred thousand law-enforcement officers
in how to file suspicious-activity reports. In 2010, a central database held about
three thousand of these reports; by 2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight
thousand. The bigger haystack makes it harder to find the needle, Sensenbrenner told me.
Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one of the agencys
most vocal critics, told me, If you target everything, theres no targe t. Drake favors what he calls
a traditional law-enforcement approach to terrorism, gathering more
intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said,
should be driven by human expertise, not by a database. One alternative to data-driven
speaking of the Charlie Hebdo attacks.
counterterrorism is already being used by the F.B.I. and other agencies. Known as countering violent extremism, this approach
bears some resemblance to the community-policing programs of the nineteennineties, in which law enforcement builds a listening relationship with local
leaders. The kinds of people you want to look for, someone in the community
might have seen them first, Mudd said. After the Moalin arrests, the U.S. Attorneys office in San Diego began
hosting a bimonthly Somali roundtable with representatives from the F.B.I., the
Department of Homeland Security, the sheriffs office, local police, and many Somali
organizations. Theyve done a lot of work to reach out and explain what theyre about, Abdi Mohamoud, the Somali
nonprofit director, who has attended the meetings, said. Does the Moalin case justify putting the phone records of hundreds of
millions of U.S. citizens into the hands of the federal government? Stopping the money is a big deal, Joel Brenner, the N.S.A.s
former inspector general, told me. Alexander called Moalins actions the seed of a future terrorist attack or set of attacks. But
Leahy contends that stopping a few thousand dollars, in one instance, over
thirteen years, is a weak track record. The program invades Americans privacy
and has not been proven to be effective, he said last week. The Moalin case, he continued, was not a
Senator
plot but, rather, a material-support prosecution for sending a few thousand dollars to Somalia. On June 1st, Section 215 and the
roving wiretap provision of the Patriot Act will expire. Sensenbrenner told me that he doesnt expect Congress to renew either
If Congress knew in 2001 how the FISA court was going to

interpret it, I dont think the Patriot Act would have passed , he told me.
unless Section 215 is revised.
Superfluous data prevents the government from stopping actual

terror plots
Greenwald, 14
(Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling
books on politics and law. His most recent book, No Place to Hide, is about the U.S. surveillance state and
his experiences reporting on the Snowden documents around the world. Prior to his collaboration with
Pierre Omidyar, Glenns column was featured at The Guardian and Salon. He was the debut winner, along
with Amy Goodman, of the Park Center I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism in 2008, and also
received the 2010 Online Journalism Award for his investigative work on the abusive detention conditions
of Chelsea Manning. For his 2013 NSA reporting, he received the George Polk award for National Security
Reporting; the Gannett Foundation award for investigative journalism and the Gannett Foundation
watchdog journalism award; the Esso Premio for Excellence in Investigative Reporting in Brazil (he was
the first non-Brazilian to win), and the Electronic Frontier Foundations Pioneer Award. Along with Laura
Poitras, Foreign Policy magazine named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers for 2013. The NSA
reporting he led for The Guardian was awarded the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for public service what a baller ,
No Place to Hide, http://www.simoleonsense.com/snowden-the-nsa-and-the-u-ssurveillance-state/ - some dude transcribed parts of the book here so swag, ak.)
Surveillance cheerleaders essentially offer only one argument in defense of mass

surveillance: it is only carried out to stop terrorism and keep people safe. Indeed, invoking an
external threat is a historical tactic of choice to keep the population submissive to
government powers. That same month, Obamas hand-picked advisory panel (composed of, among
others, a former CIA deputy director and a former White House aide, and convened to study the
NSA program through access to classified information) concluded that the metadata program was not
essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely
manner using conventional [court] orders. The record is indeed quite poor. The
collect-it-all system did nothing to detect, let alone disrupt, the 2012 Boston Marathon
bombing. It did not detect the attempted Christmas-day bombing of a jetliner over
Detroit, or the plan to blow up Times Square, or the plot to attack the New York City subway system
all of which were stopped by alert bystanders or traditional police powers . It certainly
did nothing to stop the string of mass shootings from Aurora to Newtown. Major
international attacks from London to Mumbai to Madrid proceeded without detection, despite
involving at least dozens of operatives. In fact, mass surveillance has had quite the
opposite effect: it makes detecting and stopping terror more difficult. Democratic
Congressman Rush Holt, a physicist and one of the few scientists in Congress, has made the point that
collecting everything about everyones communications only obscures actual plots

being discussed by actual terrorists. Directed rather than indiscriminate
surveillance would yield more specific and useful information. American dying
in a terrorist attack is infinitesimal, considerably less than the chance of being
struck by lightning. John Mueller, an Ohio State University professor who has written
extensively about the balance between threat and expenditures in fighting terrorism, explained in 2011: The number
of people worldwide who are killed by Muslim-type terrorists, Al Qaeda wannabes, is
maybe a few hundred outside of war zones. Its basically the same number of people
who die drowning in the bathtub each year. More American citizens have
undoubtedly died overseas from traffic accidents or intestinal illnesses , the news
agency McClatchy reported, than from terrorism. After the trouble-free Olympics, Stephen Walt noted in Foreign
Policy that the outcry was driven, as usual, by severe exaggeration of the threat. He cited an essay by John Mueller and Mark G.
Stewart in International Security for which the authors had analyzed fifty cases of purported Islamic terrorist plots against the
virtually all of the perpetrators were incompetent,

ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled,
amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish. Mueller and Stewart quoted
from Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats, who said, We must see
jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are ,
and they noted that al-Qaedas capabilities are far inferior to its desires .
United States, only to conclude that
Not enough resources to watch everyone undermines actual counter

surveillance
Volz, 14
ak.)
Edward

Tamerlan


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AFF

1ac Intelligence Only

Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to

The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass

The fear of being tracked also forces

What would the United

there is a causal connection between some of what we do and some of

the "surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the

until we see more

2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to

1ac - Civilian Casualties

Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to

The plan solves1) Leads to the abandonment of wasteful, inefficient mass

The fear of being tracked also forces

What would the United

there is a causal connection between some of what we do and some of

the "surveil and strike" mentality that has dominated the

until we see more

2) That prevents tradeoffs with human-intel which is critical to

Independently, signature strikes are inevitable but lack of human

The President, the CIA, and the entire intelligence

eventually suffer a massive intelligence failure due to this choice.

The pattern that emerges when

no single form of intelligence collection does well

***Funding HUMINT isnt enough data overload independently

sheer amount of data that needs to be

Insert Civilian Casualties Frontlines

Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as weather or

warfare. The continuation of

created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when

BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of these

the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying

careful research; but often discovery of

Techint includes mechanical devises

Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations officers). -_

only human agents can provide insights into that

Those impacts cause extinction.

the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a

EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Ext. Yes Resource Wars

a finite planet with finite resources,

of the 50 wars and armed conflicts of recent years

( ) Best studies prove

Ext. Bulk Collection Tradeoff

in endless haystacks of data

The bombings were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and

technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."

many ways, the

AT: Accumulo Solves Privacy

Accumulo wont solve privacy security features fail

We commented on potential security threats facing developers that build applications

Accumulos inability to enforce information flow policies. These examples serve to

There are some "experts,"

But, if North Korea's technical advances are substantive, its

As North Korea is Iran's primary

sure enough, in April, North Korea

Israeli missile defense expert Uzi

to achieve the capability to eject a missile from

it is obvious North Korea's nuclear weapons and

That causes miscalc- leads to global nuclear war

American policymakers might

Korean War could begin with

War would force

the result could easily be heightened