WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE

Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY
OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO,
respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO
HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,

Facts:

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising
for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo,
Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over
by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with
nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary
Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum
order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses
(OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000
hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a
memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to
grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
license was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR
praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of
ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to
Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)

RULING:
No.
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated
May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary
timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000
hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420
hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The
license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other
hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license was revoked on
December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer
any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is
therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still
respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the
sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual
cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result
in the government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being

the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives
its consent to be sued.