PEACE MONITOR

AN ISSUE DIGEST OF THE POLICY GROUP

Volume III, Issue No. 3

May 2016

SSR and Peacekeeping Mechanisms

Background
The peace process comprises a wide gamut of interventions to ensure
peace between conflicting parties, in most cases between the state and groups pushing for political legitimacy
and equality. Efforts towards warring factions are presumed to be acceptable to the citizenry, legal institutions
within a country, and even by the international community.
Delivering a comprehensive peace process requires the partnership of all stakeholders, foremost of which is
the security sector. It is in this regard that the 2011-2016 National Security Policy includes the promotion of
internal socio-political stability mainly through the promotion of the Peace Process as the centerpiece of our
internal security program. One of the identified strategies is the involvement of the security sector in creating
the enabling environment to win the hearts and minds of those with valid grievances and retain the allegiance
of the rest of the citizenry.
Vital to the creation of an environment supporting the peace process is the implementation of peacekeeping
mechanisms. For clarity and as used in this paper:
Peace-keeping, as liberally construed, involves activities that tend to create conditions that favor lasting

peace.
The principles governing peace-keeping missions are the consent of the parties, the non-use of force

unless in self-defense and the impartiality of the peacekeeping force.

In the Philippines, peacekeeping is not only limited to ensuring peace, order, and stability in conflict-affected
areas. It takes a multidimensional approach to ensure that political processes like disarmament and
demobilization of non-state armed groups or sub-groups are effectively facilitated.
A common feature of peace agreements in the country relative to peacekeeping are political accommodations
that, intentionally or not, have direct impact on the security sector.
Inventory of Peacekeeping Mechanisms brought about by Peace Agreements
GPH-MILF Peace Table
In 1997 and 2002 respectively, the following agreements were forged between the MILF and the GPH, the
primary objective is to prevent the resumption of, or the escalation of armed conflict between the parties.
a) Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)
This body is composed of representatives from both the government and the MILF to ensure compliance
with the ceasefire agreement and prevents potential outbreaks of conflicts and assures that accidental
incidents dont spin out of control.
b) Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG)
AHJAG is tasked with ensuring that government operations versus criminal elements, especially in areas
where there are MILF members, are unimpeded and occasionally with assistance from the MILF itself.
In 2014, when both parties signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, and the subsequent
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB-CAB), joint monitoring and implementing bodies were
created:
c) Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
This body, composed of members jointly selected by the government and the MILF and chaired by an
agreed upon representative from the international community is tasked to recommend measures to
correct historical injustices and address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people.

d) Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPST)

The JPST is composed of members of the AFP, PNP, and the MILF-BIAF organized for the maintenance
of peace and order and the stability of the areas mutually identified by the GPH and the MILF. Its main
tasks are: (1) tracking and document of private armies and other armed groups, and (2) the reduction and
control of weapons and material. The body also supports the observance of the existing ceasefire
agreement to address and prevent hostilities and dispute resolutions on the ground.
GPH-MNLF Peace Table
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) includes provisions on the integration of MNLF forces to the AFP and
PNP: five thousand seven hundred fifty (5,750) slots were opened for MNLF integrees in the AFP while one
thousand seven hundred fifty (1,750) were allotted in the PNP. In addition, the Tripartite Implementation
Monitoring Committee was created to oversee the implementation of consensus points in the Tripartite Review
Process (TRP) of the FPA.
GPH-CBA-CPLA
The Closure Agreement with the CBA-CPLA provides an integration package that includes integration in the
AFP and employment as forest guards with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). To
date, there are 168 CBA-CPLA AFP integrees and 511 forest guards.
Issues and Challenges
The outcomes of peace agreements, undoubtedly, have direct impact on the internal processes of the
respective security institutions. Below are some of the issues and challenges:
1. Integration to AFP and PNP of former combatants:
This can affect the morale of the AFP and PNP, considering that the ex-combatants were their armed

adversaries of the past.

The move can demoralize the CAFGUs, since the CAFGUs have fought side-by-side with the AFP and

PNP, yet the ex-combatants now get (plantilla) position in the security force, with guaranteed salary and
other benefits.
The level of trust that can be given to ex-combatants inside the security force is a challenge
2. Security mechanisms
The joint security efforts of state and non-state forces may have direct impact on the legal regime

concerning firearms (i.e., possession and carrying of FAs)

The human rights and IHL regime the state security forces are bound by law to abide by the HR-IHL;

what measure/s can be used to compel also the non-state armed groups to abide by the same regime?
3. When the state signs peace agreements with all armed threat groups, it may have direct impact on:
The table of organization and equipment of the AFP and PNP
The Rules of Engagement of the AFP and PNP
The military and law-enforcement campaign plans might need to be reframed
A general amnesty program usually follows the signing of peace agreements how will the civilian
population, especially those affected and/or victimized by armed groups regard such move?
The Strategic Communication and messaging of the national government vis--vis internal security
challenges will also be reframed

The hard realities of negotiations are that at some point there must be some realization that both factions have
legitimate reasons for their respective roles in the conflict and that these legitimacies may be negotiated in
peace agreements. The success of negotiations will eventually depend on how much power each party is
willing to cede and how seamlessly they are willing to work side-by-side, particularly in joint implementing
bodies, to attain peace.

For comments & suggestions, you may e-mail: peace.monitor.opapp@gmail.com