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AJihadismAntiPrimer|MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject

MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject
AJihadismAntiPrimer
byDarrylLi(/author/darrylli)
publishedinMER276(/mer/mer276)
TheUSnationalsecuritystatehasforthepastquartercenturybeenpreoccupiedwithsomethingithascalledjihadism.Fromthe
aftermathoftheSovietdefeatinAfghanistanthroughtheSeptember11,2001attackstotheriseoftheselfdeclaredIslamicStatein
SyriaandIraq,orISIS,thespecterofmobileMuslimmultitudeswreakingglobalhavochasgivenrisetoanequallyvastbodyof
commentary.
Nearlyallofthisworkisempiricallyorconceptuallyflawed.Therearemanyreasonsforsuchshortcomings,foremostbeingsheer
racismandIslamophobia,followedcloselybyaninabilitytothinkbeyondtheworldviewofthenationalsecuritystate.Butmanycritical
challengestodiscoursesonjihadism,howevernecessaryandsalutary,havealsounwittinglycontributedtothestultifyingnatureof
thesedebates.
Whatfollowsisanantiprimerofsortsonjihadism.Unlikeinnumerableworks,itdoesnotpurporttotellreaderseverythingtheyneed
toknowaboutthedifferentgroupswhoseexoticnamesandacronymsanimateexcitednationalsecuritydebates.Insteaditisan
attempttohelpreadersthinkthroughthisissuebeyondthefashionablethreatoftheday,toclarifywhatisandisnotknownsofar,and
tobetterweightheissuesatstake.

AnsweringtheWrongQuestions
Discussionsofjihadtodayarelikeasecularizedformofdemonology.Theystemfromaplaceofhorrorthatshutsdownserious
thinkingaboutpolitics.Perhapsthemoststrikingexampleofthisorientationisasummer2015analysisintheNewYorkReviewof
Bookslikemuchofitsilk,widelycirculatedbutquicklyforgottendeclaringISISsimplytoohorrifictobeanalyzed.[1](#_1_)Indeed,
themagazinesunexplaineddecisiontograntanonymitytotheauthor(describedonlyasaformerofficialofaNATOcountry),despite
thelackofanysensitiveinformationinthearticle,seemedonlytoreinforcethissenseofradicalcataclysmicdifference.
Theproblemwithalldemonologies,however,isthattheyalltooeasilygiverisetowitchhunts.Bypositingjihadismasaproblem
aboutIslam,thedebateisnearlyalwaysframedaroundquestionsofauthenticity:HowmuchdogroupslikealQaedaorISISrepresent
somethinginherenttoIslamandIslamonlyor,inotherwords,howafraidshouldwebeofMuslims?Inthisframing,ordinary
Muslimsareritualisticallycalledupontocondemntheactscommittedbyjihadis,somethingthatisneverdemandedofChristiansand
Jewsforactsofcoreligionistswhomayalsoseektojustifytheiractionsinscripturalterms.Butnomatterhowsincereorthorough
suchselfflagellationsmaybe,thedemandforcondemnationwillneverbecompletelysated.Forthesuspicionwillpersistthatas
infinitesimallysmallasgroupslikeISISmaybe,theyneverthelessmakeclaimstoIslamicauthoritythatarecompellingenoughto
somenumberofpeopletobothgiveandtakelifeinanorganizedfashion.Asaresult,Muslimsarepresentedwithabrutallogicin
whichtheonlywaytotrulydisassociatefromISISandescapesuspicionistorenounceIslamaltogether.[2](#_2_)
Asidefromitstendenciestowardracism,theproblemwithdemonologyasstartingpointisthatitsetsalowbarforanalysisandmakes
foralotofboringwriting.Asaresult,theengineofmuchcommentaryonjihadrunsontheshockofdiscoverythatjihadisare
organized,maynotbeveryreligious,careaboutmoney,havefun,knowhowtousecomputers,fallinlove,drinkalcohol,usedrugs
andsoon.Thesewritingsrevealfarmoreabouttheirpresumedaudiencesthanaboutthejihadigroupsthemselves.[3](#_3_)This
banalizingnarrativeservesboththestatewhichseekstodiscreditthejihadisselfpresentationassuperhumanidealistsandliberal
critics,whopointtoimpietyorlackofreligiouslearningasprovingthatIslamassuchisnottheissue.
Therediscoverythatinhumaneactsarecommittedbyhumanbeingsisoftenpairedwithsomekindofdisclaimerthatthewriterisnot
anapologistoraproponentofmoralequivalencebetweenstateviolenceandjihadbutsomeonewhoseekstounderstandtheenemy
inordertobettercombatit.Thisskittishnessabouthumanizingtheenemyisakindofboundarymaintenancereinforcingthefalse
ideathattheonlychoicesonhandareapologyforjihadorjoiningthefightagainstit.
Againstthisdiscourseonmonsterswhoareactuallyhumanbutwhosemonstrousnessmustneverthelessbereasserted,therearetwo
mainformsofpushback:ThefirstinsiststhatjihadigroupsdonotrepresentMuslimsorIslaminanymeaningfulsense.Thesecond
holdstheUSorothergovernmentsdirectlyorindirectlyresponsiblefortheemergenceofsuchgroups.Bothargumentsaregenerally
correct,necessaryandimportant.Butinsofarastheyengageindebatesoverwhoistherealenemy,theseargumentsdonotmove
debatesaboutjihadoutsidethecircleofdemonology.
ThereisanenormousbodyofscholarshipinMiddleEasternandIslamicstudiesdemolishingthemyththatMuslimsareinherentlyor
irrationallyviolent.SomeofitalsoshowsthatpoliticalgroupsfashioningthemselvesinIslamicterms,suchastheSocietyofMuslim
BrothersinEgyptortheJusticeandDevelopmentPartyinTurkey(usuallyknownbytheTurkishacronym,AKP),shouldnotbeconflated
withjihadis,whateverelsetheirflawsmaybe.Thereisalsoscholarshipshowingthatevengroupsengaginginviolenceunderthe
bannerofjihadcannotallbelumpedtogethernationalistorganizationssuchasHamasandHizballaharedistinguishedfrom
transnationalgroupslikealQaeda.Inotherwords,notallMuslimsarepious,notallpiousMuslimsareIslamists,notallIslamistsare
violentandnotallviolentIslamistsareatwarwiththeWest(orotherMuslimstheydislike).
Thereis,however,onesignificantlimitationtothisapproachwhenitcomestothequestionofjihadism:Tellinguswhoisnotajihadiis
notparticularlyhelpfulforunderstandingjihadismonitsownterms.Inasense,wearebackinthecondemnationtrap,exceptusing
moreanalyticallanguage.Moreover,thenotallMuslimsargumentcanalltooeasilyplayintothedistinctionbetweengoodand
badMuslimsthatstateshavelongemployedasaninstrumentofrule.ItismuchbetterattellingthestatewhichMuslimsnotto
tortureorbombthanitisatarguingagainstthosepracticesinthefirstplace.
Thereisacorollarytothispoliticalargument,namelynotallterroristsareMuslim,frequentlytrottedouttoaskwhyviolence
perpetratedbyrightwingorwhitesupremacistgroupsisnottreatedasterrorism.Ifthequestionisposedrhetoricallytodrawattention
tothecontinuitiesandcomplicitiesbetweenstateandextrastateformsofracialterror,itishelpful.Butwhencouchedinsteadasa
pleaforthestatetobesimplymorejudiciousinthedistributionofitsviolence,thenitisatnaveatbest.
TheothermostcommonpushbackagainstantiMuslimdemonizationistohighlighttherolethattheUnitedStatesplayedincreatingthe
conditionsthatgaverisetojihadism.Indeed,acriticalunderstandingofimperialpracticesandtheUSroleinparticularisabsolutely
indispensable.ButitisequallytruethatreducingjihadigroupstomereepiphenomenaofUSactionsisadeadendforanalysis.Such

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approachesgiverisetoakindofFrankensteintheoryofjihad,whichinsiststhattheUScanmanufacturesuchgroupsbutthen
somehowalwayslosescontroloverthemwithouteverreallyexplaininghow(anevenmoreconspiratorialargumentisthattheUS
continuestocontrolsuchgroups,whichatleastenjoysthevirtueofconsistency).Moreover,thepoliticallogicofthecomplicitycharge
canbealltooeasilyappropriatedbywarmongers,suchasthelatecolumnistChristopherHitchens,whomaintainedthatUSsupportfor
SaddamHusseininthe1980smadeWashingtonallthemoreobligatedtooverthrowhimin2003.
AmoresophisticatedvariantofthisargumentistohighlighttheroleofUSproxieslikeSaudiArabiaandPakistaninstirringupjihadi
energies.Again,thereismuchtruthtothisaccount:TheHouseofSaudsroleasaleadingexporterofcounterrevolutionandthe
Pakistanimilitaryestablishmentsruthlessnessinpursuitofdomesticandforeignpolicygoalsareamatterofwellestablishedrecord.
ButwhentheinfluencethattheseregimesexerciseoverjihadigroupsisoverplayedorcommentatorssuggestthatRiyadhand
IslamabadaresomehowdirectingoverseasattacksagainsttheirmostpowerfulpatroninWashington,theargumentlosesitsfooting.
Andpolitically,thisnarrativecanbizarrelyturnintoaredirectionofmilitarismratherthanarejectionofit.[4](#_4_)Onerespected
commentatorontheregion,PatrickCockburn,hasgonesofarastoargue,Thewaronterrorhasfailedbecauseitdidnottargetthe
jihadimovementasawholeand,aboveall,wasnotaimedatSaudiArabiaandPakistan.[5](#_5_)Moreextremeversionsofthe
argumentincludeconspiracytheoriesblamingtheHouseofSaudfortheSeptember11hijackings,whichconvenientlyignoreitslong
standingmutualenmitywithOsamabinLadenaswellasalQaedasbloodyattacksontheSaudiregime.
ArgumentsoverwhoistherealenemywhetheremphasizingthattheenemyisnotallMuslimsordeclaringthatthereisnoenemyas
such,onlytheblowbackfromimperialpoliciesultimatelydonotchallengejihadtalkasdemonology.Thefundamentalproblemisnot
onlyhowIslamisdiscusseditishowpoliticsisunderstoodingeneral.Thestatistdiscourseanditsliberaloppositionpresentachoice
betweendemonizingtheenemyandbanalizinghim.Butthereisathirdoption:takingradicalismseriouslyasapoliticalorientation,
whetheritsidiomisIslamic,communistoranarchist.Thechallengeishowtounderstandthedistinctivenessofjihadigroupswithout
lapsingintoanalltoooftenracializedexceptionalism.Lettingracistflatearthersandtheirmorerespectablecounterpartssettheterms
ofdebatewithquestionslikewhetherjihadisrepresentIslamorwhytheyaresohorribleonlyobscuresthisimportanttask.Jihadi
groupsmayhaveverydifferentideasofthegoodandmayoperateinformsunfamiliartothosewhocanonlythinkofpoliticsinterms
ofthestateanditscategories.Butthatdoesnotrenderanylessconcretetheideasandinterestsatstakeintheirantagonisms,nor
doesitmakethinkingclearlyaboutthemanylessurgent.

UnthinkingThroughJihadism
InthevacuumleftbyalloftheattemptstodistinguishjihadisfromotherMuslims,theworkofexplainingandinterpretingjihadismis
largelyabandonedtothecottageindustryofterrorismexperts.Asidefromitssordidlinkswithracistfearmongering,thisfields
intimaterelationshipwiththenationalsecuritystatehasleftitwithouttheautonomyneededtodevelopintoaseriousintellectual
project.[6](#_6_)Overthepastdecade,amoresophisticated,professionalizedgenerationofspecialistsinjihadismhasemerged.This
newercohortismorelikelytohaveatleastsomerelevantlinguisticexperienceandmayevendabbleincritiquesofIslamophobiato
bolsteritsowncredibility.Nevertheless,theoverwhelmingdemandtoprovideactionableinsightsrendersjihadstudiesunableor
unwillingtoengageanyofthegrandrecurringquestionsofsocialandpoliticaltheory.Jihadologistsmaydismissthisasivorytower
irrelevanceothersmightcallitintellectualautonomy.
Theterrorismstudiesfieldhascontinuedtohamperusefulconversationsinmanyways,startingwiththeconceptofjihadismitself.
ThiscategorylogicallypresupposesvariouspeopleidentifyingasMuslim,engaginginviolenceandlegitimizingthisviolenceintermsof
theIslamicconceptofjihad(putasidetheaccuratebutbanalpointthatthewordjihadcanbeusedtodescribenonviolentactionas
well).Thissetofcriteriaisfartoothintosupportameaningfulanalysis.Declaringjihad,afterall,isultimatelynothingmorethana
claimtoacertainkindoflegitimacy.Someclaimsmaybetreatedwithmorecredibilitythanothers,butthekindsofactorswhomay
makesuchclaims,thecontentofsuchclaimsandtheaudiencesforassessingthemvarysowidelythatonecanquestionwhetherthe
ideaofjihadismisevenausefulanalyticalcategory.Andwithoutanyclarityontheconcept,theideathatsuchgroupscansomehowbe
rankedonascaleofmoderatetoradicalisevenmorequestionable.
Muchoftheresearchonjihadism,however,barrelspastthisbasicproblem.Therearefourmajorapproachesinstudyingthejihadi
enemy:doctrine,tactics,propagandaandmembers.
WritingonjihadthattracesgenealogiesofIslamicscholarshipoftenseekstoexplainhowbadMuslimsbelongtooneparticular
doctrinalschoolorpietisticorientationbutnotothers.Butonedoesnothavetolearnalloftheinterestingandimportantdistinctions
andrelationshipsbetweenSufis,salafis,AhlalHadith,DeobandisandWahhabistoknowthatnodoctrinalpositionorschoolcanbe
identifiedascausingtheactionsofjihadigroups.Historically,thecorrelationbetweendoctrinalpositionandarmedjihadseemsweakat
best.Inthenineteenthcentury,Sufisfrequentlyledanticolonialjihads,Sufisfromthesameordersthattodayarecelebrated(oftenby
authoritarianregimes)aspacifist.Atthesametime,agreatmanysalafisworldwideareuninterestedinorganizedpoliticsofanykind,
letalonearmedaction.Thepointisnotthatthesedoctrinesareunimportantorideologicalsmokescreensforothersocialforces.
Instead,ideasmustbesituatedwithrespecttomovements,organizationsandstructurestoidentifytheelectiveaffinitiesthatmay
makeoneschooloranotherassociatedwithradicalismatspecificpointsintime.Itisimpossibletowritegoodintellectualhistory
withoutgoodhistoryingeneral,whichismissingforthetransregionalmigratoryworldsinwhichmanyofthesegroupsemerged.Asa
result,thistypeofwritingonjihadoftenstringstogethernameslikeIbnTaymiyya,SayyidQutb,AbdallahAzzamandOsamabin
LadentogettoSeptember11withallthesophisticationofexplainingtheHolocaustbyskippingfromHobbestoNietzschetoHitler.
Incontrasttofocusingontheideasofjihadigroups,othersattempttounderstandthemthroughtheirviolenttactics,especiallywhether
theytargetnoncombatants.Classifyinggroupsonthebasisofsomekindofatrocityscaleleadsonlytoconfusion,becausethe
relationshipbetweenmeansofviolence(suchassuicidebombingsandtorture)andpoliticalgoalsisatbestunderdetermined.
Extremeviolencesuchastortureordeliberatetargetingofcivilianscanbeundertakenformoderatepoliticalgoalssuchasseeking
ashareofstatepowerandviceversa.
Thisapproachoftenendsupconflatingnormativeandanalyticalapproaches:Groupsareclassifiedaccordingtohowbadwethinkthey
are.
Athirdmajorapproachistoanalyzemediaoutput,especiallyimageryofmartyrsorthegruesomesnufffilmsoftortureandmurder.
Thisstudycanyieldsomehelpfulinsights,butnopoliticalmovementshouldeverbeunderstoodprimarilythroughitsownpropaganda,
especiallywhentheanalystandthemovementinquestionhavedifferentculturalreferents.Withoutaclearersenseofhowpeopletake
up,interpret,modify,criticizeorparodythismediaproduction,thisbrandofanalysiswilltendtoplayupeverythingthatseemsexotic
orbizarre.Moreover,theseapproachesoftenhavelittleofinsighttosayaboutthevastamountofjihadimediaoutputthatappears
unrelatedtoarmedactivityorotherluridendsatmost,theyarenotedsimplyaswaystolurepotentialrecruits.
Fourth,andfinally,therearestudiesofwhyindividualsjoinjihadigroups,aprocessoftencalledradicalization.Thesestudiesare
oftenbasedoninterviewswithincarceratedindividualsoronmediareportsandprosecutorialdocuments.Thisworkhasoccasionally
yieldedsomesoundfindings,mostlyofanegativenature,liketheapparentlackofaclearcorrelationbetweensocioeconomicstatus

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andjihadiactivityorthediversityofmotivationsfromhumiliationanddisaffectiontopositivedesirestohelpothers.Theproblemwith
thesestudiesisthatthefactorsidentifiedareoftensharedacrossmuchbroaderswathesofthepopulation,sotheyhardlyexplainwhy
thosespecificindividualsjoinedjihadsasopposedtootherarmedgroupsorevenstatemilitaries.Moreover,focusingonrecruitment
tendstoleechoutthepoliticaldynamicsofthegroupsthemselvesonewouldneverwriteacogentanalysisoftheinvasionofIraqby
focusingonwhysoldiersvolunteertojointheUSmilitary.Radicalizationliteraturetendstoaskwhypeoplefightwithlittleifanyregard
towhattheymaybefightingfor.Theabsenceofpoliticsleavesaccountsratherempty.
Terrorismstudies,eveninamoreevolvedformclaimingtotranscendIslamophobia,remainstrappedinanunwillingnesstoraise
challengingquestions.Withoutrenderinglegiblethepoliticalnatureofjihadiprojects,itsfocusondoctrinebecomesdeterministicits
analysisofpropagandatendstowardvoyeurismitsstudyoftacticsredoundstoincoherentmoralismanditsfocusonindividual
motivationsisatomistic.Thisisnotamatterofthefailingsofindividualanalystsbutratherisafeatureofthisbodyofworkaslongas
itsraisondtreremainsraisondtat.

JihadinaWorldofSovereigns
Inordertostartwritingintelligibleaccountsaboutcontemporarygroupsinvokingjihad,oneneedstoengageandunderstandthe
politicalstrugglesatworkbyunderstandingthesocialforcesdrivingthem,theworldlygoalstheypursueandtheantagonismsthatthey
face.Animportantstartingpointistorecognizethatgroupsclaimingtowagejihadtodayoperateinaworldorganizedformallyalong
nationstatelines.Jihadigroupsmayinvokeanauthorityabovethisformallegalsystem(andtheyarehardlyaloneindoingso),but
suchuniversalistmessagesmustalwayscontendwithandoftenworkthroughactualinstitutionssuchasstates.
Thefirstthingtonoteisthatagreatmanyofthegroupsoperatingunderthebannerofjihadhavebeenlargelyorientedtoward
capturingstatepowerandrecruitprimarilyfromasinglenationalgroup,evenifgeographicallydispersed.Someofthesegroupshave
soughttooverthrowexistingregimes,suchastheGamaaIslamiyyainEgyptortheGroupeIslamiqueArminAlgeria.Others,suchas
HamasandHizballah,aroseinresponsetoforeignoccupations.Yetothersemergedinsituationswhereprolongedcivilwarledtoa
nearcollapseofstateinstitutions,suchastheTalibaninAfghanistanortheIslamicCourtsUnioninSomalia.Theirclaimstobeing
Islamicnotwithstanding,thereisnoobviousreasonwhythesegroupsshouldbeanalyticallyclusteredtogetherandsegregatedfrom
nonMusliminsurgenciesinotherpartsoftheworld.
Claimstojihadhavealsobeenraisedbygroupswhosegoals,areasofoperationormembershipsdonotfitintothenationalistmold.
Thesegroupsareoftenglossedasglobaljihad,afreefloating,rootlessandmoreradicalcounterpartofthenationallyorientedjihads.
Thisshorthandreflectsthetendencytotreatthegloballazilyasacatchallappellationforthingsthatarenotreadilyunderstoodin
localornationaltermsanditsunqualifieduseshouldraiseredflagsforanyattentivereader.Forevensocalledglobaljihad
movementsmustcontendwiththelocallygroundedpoliticsandthestateorder.
ThefirsttypeofsuchmovementsincludesthevariouspanIslamistjihadmobilizationsofthepastquartercentury(whatjihadologists
sometimesmisleadinglycallclassicaljihad).ThebestknownwastheAfghanjihadinthe1980s,followedbythoseinBosnia
Herzegovina,Chechnya,Iraqand,finally,Syria.ThesemobilizationswereattemptstoenactsomeideaofaglobalMuslimcommunity,
buttheyalwaysclaimedtosupportsomelocalorganizedmovement.RovingMarxistsandanarchistsofpreviousgenerationsfaced
similardilemmas.InsomesituationssuchasinBosniaorduringthe1994Yemenicivilwarforeignvolunteersfoughtonthesideof
recognizedgovernments.MoreoftenasinKashmir,thePhilippinesandChechnyatheysidedwithindependencemovements.Someof
thesesituationswereconventionalwarswithclearlydemarcatedfrontlines,otherswereguerrillaconflicts,andtherelationships
betweenforeignandlocalfightersvariedaccordingly.Thesemobilizationswerenotbasedonsolidpermanentorganizations:Fighters
wouldmoveontootherwars,settledownandmarryintheiradoptedcountries,orsimplyreturnhome.
AlQaedaemergedfromtheAfghanjihadbutwasdistinct.WhilepanIslamistjihadmobilizationswereamorphousanddecentralized
movements,alQaedaeventuallybecamearelativelysmall,selfcontainedorganization.AndunlikepanIslamistjihads,alQaeda
soughttomirrorWashingtonsabilitytostrikeanywhereintheworldatatimeofitschoosingEastAfrica,Yemen,Indonesia,Spain.
Yetdespitethisaspiration,alQaedasgoalswerelargelystateoriented.ItsoughttoendUSsupportforArabclients,inparticularSaudi
ArabiaandEgypt,andtherebyhelptotopplethoseregimes.Despiteoccasionaltalkofsupportingareturntothecaliphate,alQaedas
programwouldalsohavebeencompatiblewiththesestatessimplyassertingtheirindependencefromtheWestandimplementingsome
formofIslamicrule.AlQaedasprojectcouldbereadasashallowantiimperialism,employingspectacularactsofviolenceagainst
anoverstretchedhegemontoinduceregimechangewithoutanyinterestinmassmobilizationororganizingand,notunrelatedly,with
littleconcernfortheconsequencesbornebyitsAfghanhosts.[7](#_7_)
ThelatestchapterinthestoryofjihadismistheselfdeclaredIslamicStatethathasemergedinIraqandSyria.WhatmakesISIS
distinctisnotitsattemptatenactingIslamicgovernance,itsincorporationofforeignfightersoritsapparentwillingnesstosponsor
attacksoutsideitsterritory,althoughtheseaspectsareallimportantintheirownright.Instead,basedonwhatlittlesolidinformation
exists,onecansaythatthebasicpoliticaldynamicofISISonthegroundstemsfromitsemergenceinthewakeofnotonebuttwo
adjacentandprolongedprocessesofpartialstatecollapse,inregionsdeemedperipheralfrombothDamascusandBaghdad.Byopenly
exercisingauthorityonbothsidesoftheborder,ISIScanlayclaimtoakindofsupranationalauthoritythattheTalibanandIslamic
CourtsUnioncouldnot.(OthergroupssuchastheAfghanmujahideenwerealsoconstitutedbyacrossborderexistence,butinthe
moldofusingonesideasahavenagainsttheother.)YetdespiteboastingofhavingerasedtheSykesPicotbordersbetweenthetwo
countries,[8](#_8_)ISISinmanywaysremainsconstitutedbytheborderandthearbitrageopportunitiesitpresents.ISISauthorities
remainpartiallydependentonlocaladministrationinbothcountries,especiallyforinfrastructuralneeds.Foreignresourcesandfighters
comingthroughTurkeydestinedforSyriacanfindtheirwayintoIraqUSmadeweaponsandequipmentcapturedinIraqcanbetaken
toSyria.Ononesideoftheborder,theUSandIrancanbedefactoalliesontheothertheyareatloggerheads.ISISisthereforebest
thoughtofasasectariandoublesecessionistmovementthathasskillfullyseizedtheopportunitiesavailabletopositionitselfasan
enemytoallbutaprioritytonone,withthepossibleexceptionoftheSyrianKurdishrebelswhohavesimilarlyexploitedpower
vacuumstocarveoutanautonomouszone.ThisdynamicmakesISISdistinctandinteresting,butnotuniqueorapocalyptic.
NoneoftheforegoingistodenythenewnessoftheISISphenomenonorthegenuinedifficultyofunderstandingit.Rather,itistoinsist
thatthenewnessofISISspringsfromthehistoricalconjunctureatwhichitappeared.Thegroupsclaimstoreligiouslegitimacyhave
precedentsbutnonewithsuchrenewablefinancialresourcesand(thusfar)suchdiffidentmilitaryopponents.Itsstylizedkillingsare
familiarfromHollywoodproductionsbutrenderedgrotesquelynovelbytherealworldknowledgethatthisplothasnonecessary
beginning,middleandend.Itsrapidrisetoprominenceontheregionalstageisstunningbutquitecomprehensibleasaconsequenceof
theauthoritarianrule,maldistributionofwealthandpower,externalinterventionandothercrisesthathavebedeviledthispartofthe
worldforsoverylong.

Endnotes
[1]Anonymous,TheMysteryofISIS,NewYorkReviewofBooks,August13,2015.

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[2]CanerDagli,ThePhonyIslamofISIS,TheAtlantic,February27,2015.
[3]OneofthefewnonracistformsofsatirehereplaysonthethemeofterroristsasregularJoesploddingawayatmeaninglessoffice
jobs.AslightlysmarterversionofthisjokedepictsalQaedaleaderAymanalZawahiriasavapidSiliconValleyentrepreneur.The
Onion,March29,2013.
[4]CarlottaGall,TheWrongEnemy:AmericainAfghanistan,20012014(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,2014).
[5]PatrickCockburn,AlQaida,theSecondAct:WhytheGlobalWaronTerrorWentWrong,TheIndependent,March18,2014.
[6]LisaStampnitzky,DiscipliningTerror:HowExpertsInventedTerrorism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2013).
[7]AlexStrickvanLinschotenandFelixKuehn,AnEnemyWeCreated:TheMythoftheTalibanAlQaedaMergerinAfghanistan
(London:Hurst,2012).
[8]Onthemanyproblemswiththisargument,seethetwopartarticlebySaraPursley,LinesDrawnonanEmptyMap:IraqsBorders
andtheLegendoftheArtificialState,Jadaliyya,June2and3,2015.
Filedunder:

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