G.R. No.

110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA
LAKE
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge
RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR.,
City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CALOOCAN,respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A.
Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan
to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing
concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of
garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by
the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for
adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the
Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CAG.R.
SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January
29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin,

Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a lettercomplaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop
the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health
of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,
monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said
dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The
LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree
No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting
on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water
collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably
affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the
presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated
the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

Page 1 of 64

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of

Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was
resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA
at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U.
Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on
August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December
5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the
City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at
the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting
the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area
being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on
September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ
of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
s, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion
to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's
motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on
its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order
which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the
Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further
orders of the court.

empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA
from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the
time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding
judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the
ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control
Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of
the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by
the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order
consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an
earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John
Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained
during the trial that the foregoing case
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated
October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of
Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10,
1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and
at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court
of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court

Page 2 of 64

issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and

continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge
Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the
case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist
from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio,
Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to
quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that
would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of
garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the
issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the
respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the
Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose
of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by
the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it
is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or
converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at
10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court
of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December
8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City,
the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized
representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15,
1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with

respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of

respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will
submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the
merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the
dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding
that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear
and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the
exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section
9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
P.D.
No.
813
and
Executive
Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the
preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and
desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining
order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the
condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in
conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the
proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160
of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an
integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or
injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of
the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer
that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-

Page 3 of 64

issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the
proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its
enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and
containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the
need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of
the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to
which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains
highly open to question.

or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance

from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned
ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative
agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested
with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to
Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of
1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a

local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the
Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the
inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the
theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as
the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No.
927,
series
of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to
institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the

provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as
it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts
thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also
revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this

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Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate

pollution.

assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control

Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate

government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations and the orders and decisions of the
Authority.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to

the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special
law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that
the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all
plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and
totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to
LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are
applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of
government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue
of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a
determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have
the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage
in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality
of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by
such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the
environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a
business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and
functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created
under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its
letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter
was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay
Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required
under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation
that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the

Page 5 of 64

primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as
intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA
sometime
in
July
1992
to
discuss
the
possibility
of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows
down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority
to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot
be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers.
By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to
"make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes
the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue
and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the
City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927,
series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the
conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the

discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the

LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the
effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the
allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
Theponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters
of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
which of course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection

Page 6 of 64

of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police

power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those
here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting
vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied
in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the
correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the
declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be
borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which
recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a
proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the
first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of

conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently
broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake
region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with
cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued
pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna
Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned,
the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are
more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the
special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 64

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented

by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA

SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA
DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed
MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by
his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA
ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by
her
parents
FREDENIL
and
JANE
CASTRO,
JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA,
MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as

Page 8 of 64

the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical

forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the

country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis
of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt

Page 9 of 64

water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of

Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some

sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000

hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained

no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors
have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious

injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As
a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

Page 10 of 64

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to

cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially
plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see,
use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's

is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a

balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality

that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies

with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel

the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto

attached as Annex "B".

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,

income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the

existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel

the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and

resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

Page 11 of 64

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of

humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law
of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office

of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the

respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right
to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)
to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even
if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They
then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be

Page 12 of 64

permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly

addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would
ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident
to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can

only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as

the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as
hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,
the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are
seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete

Page 13 of 64

with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on

unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and involving
a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle
of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches
of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided

for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:

Page 14 of 64

Does this section mandate the State to

provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful
(sic) environment necessarily carries with it
the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things,
management and conservation of the country's forests.

the

development, management, renewal, and conservation of

the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural
resources,
including
the
protection
and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population
to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social
and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

judicious

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance

would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization
of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well
as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the

policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,

Page 15 of 64

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound

ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c)
to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of
the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot
on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

Page 16 of 64

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the

statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

22

Mr.

The first part of the authority represents the traditional

concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,

23

Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection

becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber

Page 17 of 64

license agreements in the country and to cease and desist

from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what

otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession
area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process
of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall
be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.

Page 18 of 64

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are

contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed
in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the

making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Page 19 of 64

action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"),
is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.
Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important
cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management of the environment, which
of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary
to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 1112). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the
legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the
country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit
from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to
take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative
agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in
the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly,
it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this
rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or
open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to
be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of
more "specific environment management policies" and "environment

Page 20 of 64

quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an

extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural
embracing:

resources

management

and

conservation

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground
water
(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of
guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in
other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private
persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on
a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show
a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly
lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the
Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the
Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting
the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One
is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded

Page 21 of 64

is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable

to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there
are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation
of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then
the policy making departments the legislative and executive
departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.

respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below.

It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements
(and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal
rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of
the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important
cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management of the environment, which
of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public

Page 22 of 64

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary
to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 1112). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the
legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the
country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit
from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to
take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative
agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in
the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of
action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"),
is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or

open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to
be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of
more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly,
it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this
rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,

(c) land use management;

(d) natural
embracing:

resources

management

and

conservation

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;

Page 23 of 64

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground

water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of
guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in
other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private
persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on
a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show
a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly
lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the
Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the
Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting
the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential

component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One
is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded
is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there
are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation
of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then
the policy making departments the legislative and executive
departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to

Page 24 of 64

fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to

implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below.
It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements
(and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal

[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]

ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO
TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO
TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN,
ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO
ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO,
CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA,
VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG,
RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN,
NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO,
ROLDAN
TABANG,
PANGANIBAN,
ADRIANO
TABANG,
FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT,
PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL,
BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON,
MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO,
EDGAR M. ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO
ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON
BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO

rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of
the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL

PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO
LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A.
VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA,
ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO
A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B.
BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE
ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC,
ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO
ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR
VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN,
RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR
SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS,
FRANCISCO
T.
ANTICANO,
PASTOR
SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN
JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON,
NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION
OF PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES,
MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA,
ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R.

Page 25 of 64

BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA,

CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C.
FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA,
NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR
EDWARD
HAGEDORN,
MEMBERS
OF
SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF
BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF
PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF
PALAWAN,
REGIONAL,
MUNICIPAL
AND
METROPOLITAN,respondents.

1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto

Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1,
1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993
TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows:
Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a)
Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993,
dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of
Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents
Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and
Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts [1] and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing
cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents
giving rise to the petition:

Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea
Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all
persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto
Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or shipment
of live fish and lobster outside the City.
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following
are hereby defined:
A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better
known as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as
HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better
known as DALAG
D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all
specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the
genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.

Page 26 of 64

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise

or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of
destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except
SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating
this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00
or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of
their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the
herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating
the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the
penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president
and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case
maybe [sic].
Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance
inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed.
Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER

OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being
shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at
any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic]
either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper
possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the
shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents
as stated herein must be held for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with
the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices
concerned for the needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual
courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of
the inspection.

SO ORDAINED.
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx
xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L.
Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993
which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No.
PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY
PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE,
OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO
OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN

3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial

Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A
RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING,
BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING
AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE
PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES
ALTIVELIS (PANTHER
OR
SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA
GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS,
GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-

Page 27 of 64

BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN

GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A
PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full
text of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that
only five (5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent
condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of
the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities
like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious
substances and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve
the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated
ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the
span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon
unanimous decision of all the members present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33,
Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance
No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION

ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance
Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family:
Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes
altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning),
4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl,
Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger
Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green
Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of
five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.
Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for [a] more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government
Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
the lower government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local
Government Unit concerned.

ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993

3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall
be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in

Page 28 of 64

accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for

the people in the community.

Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days
after its publication.

4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit

shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance; and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare.

SO ORDAINED.

Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the

policy of the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine
resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the
present generation but with [the] proper perspective and consideration of
[sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any
person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of
Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating
this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of
six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of
paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the
discretion of the Court;
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision
of this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not
affect the other provisions hereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of
any ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or
repealed.

xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C
hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of
Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood
and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other
marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de
Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged
criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal
complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox
copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were
charged by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as
Annex E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units,
prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners
contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution.

Page 29 of 64

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition

under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not
to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether
prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and
shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline
Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from
pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper,
necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null
and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and
the others have to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to
comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents
Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a
valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general
welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991
[hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under
Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1)
(vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain

healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were
enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine
aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was
for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow
those damaged to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no
violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of
the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed
reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed
between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it
live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of
selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does
not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one
class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the
Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that
despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano,
Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of
Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on
said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary restraining order
directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from
proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from
filing a comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its
Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by
counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.

Page 30 of 64

In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the

comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [2]
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the
Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on
their behalf. But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an
extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further
delay, we dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss
this petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to
the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is
composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano,
Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with
violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No.
2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C
of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; [3] and Robert Lim
and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 1592 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the
Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa.[4] All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe
Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise
the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No.
2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50
of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.[5]
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the
petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of

several marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be

fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to
prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until
the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated
shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that
they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely
affected by the ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail
on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action.
There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the
criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and
that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that
the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the
ordinances in question are unconstitutional. [6] It cannot then be said that
the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition.It must further be stressed that even if the
petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not
forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the
remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to
go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said
motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. [7] And , even where in
an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special
civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be
filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors,
unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing
exceptional circumstances.[8] Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration
has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable
absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. [9] For
obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged
any of such grounds.

Page 31 of 64

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously

one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in
question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. [10] As such, their
petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of
law are involved,[11] it being settled that the Court merely exercises
appellate jurisdiction over such petitions. [12]
II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause
of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason
or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct
recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction
with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs
ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:[13]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for
the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals,
passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,[14] this Court forcefully expressed that the
propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts
must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first
set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering
that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance
No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January
1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19
February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these
Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the
new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment
and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then
may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. [15] To
overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal

Page 32 of 64

breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative

contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.[16] Where doubt exists, even if well founded,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. [17]
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of
the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find
petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the
Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and selfreliance.
xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,

especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal
marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive
a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing
resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as
a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association
composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim,
as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen,
without any qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, [18] they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish
as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or
cover the cost of gathering the fish,[19] while a subsistence fisherman is
one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.
[20]
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or
fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing
which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner
falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right
to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes
is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority

Page 33 of 64

to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and

lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of
law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section
149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers

of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of
enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of
the preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the following exchange
between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session of the Constitutional
Commission:

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

MR. RODRIGO:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal
waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered
organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have
preferential right to such fishery privileges ....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of
the Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the
preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such
fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection,
development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in
question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine
resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be
guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen
to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with
the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection,

Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not

raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the
implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there be a
licensing or giving of permits so that government officials will
know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say
that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his
permit, to prove that indeed he is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is
concerned and this particular question could be tackled when we
discuss the Article on Local Governments -- whether we will leave
to the local governments or to Congress on how these things will
be implemented. But certainly, I think our Congressmen and our
local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this
mandate.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go
anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:

Page 34 of 64

Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may
be passed, may be existing or will be passed.[21] (underscoring
supplied for emphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in
the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.[22] On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran,
[23]
this Court declared:
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second , the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come - generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment ...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to
give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and
social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives,
noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other
deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws. [24] Further, the sangguniang bayan,
the sangguniang
panlungsod and
the sangguniang
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia,
ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes
or of ecological imbalance.[25]

Page 35 of 64

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization [26] as

expressly mandated by the Constitution. [27] Indispensable thereto
is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a
power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned, [28] Devolution refers to the
act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.[29]
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes,
and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private
ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest,
timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters
included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline
from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the
sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and
fifteen kilometers from it.[31] Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters
included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the
general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel
line.
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under
Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D.
No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed
season in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological
purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration,
exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No.

5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person,
association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to
sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie
called gobiidae or iponduring closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which
prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the
BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of
fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment
are concerned, must be added the following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal
waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal
waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal
waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within
municipal waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within
municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal
waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery
products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.

Page 36 of 64

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April

1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units
under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149,
447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support
under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan
(SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the
local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in
the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects
affecting said province.[32]
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation
between the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the
environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set
forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of
fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2)
to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved

power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015,
which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such
power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of
5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities
and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment.[33]
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable,
ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support
systems.[34] They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent
nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef
flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a
protective shelter for aquatic organisms. [35] It is said that [e]cologically,
the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter
and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear
without them.[36]
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the
modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of socalled exotic tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West,
but also for the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable
in ever more affluent Asia.[37] These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and
fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats
and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral
crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and
then scooped by hand.[38] The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch
into a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes later, the fish
can swim normally. Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and
within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from their system and are
ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or packaged
in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major

Page 37 of 64

markets for live food fish.[39] While the fish are meant to survive, the
opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts
the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish
feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its
function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates
that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its
skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion
from the pounding of the waves.[40] It has been found that cyanide fishing
kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated
application.[41]

conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all

fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First,
Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility
municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government
concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in
municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that all
municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries
and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full
force and effect only upon his approval.[42]

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92
of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand,
and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum,
the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be
controverted.

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer

under the Department of Natural Resources (now Department of
Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June
1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister
(formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof,
integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF.

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein
violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to
the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors
Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the
lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise
known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the
Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D.
No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and
responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management,

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the

MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under
the Administrative Code of 1987,[43] the BFAR is placed under the Title
concerning the Department of Agriculture.[44]
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the
City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not
approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should
be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
(not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in
municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following
reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or
amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 [45] insofar that they are
inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

Page 38 of 64

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC,
local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges
in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws.
[46]
Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact
ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.[47]

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of

Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan
for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological
destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be
roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle
against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time,
the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove
disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CLARENCE L.
BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of
DENR-Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity
as
the
Regional
Director
of
the
DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI, petitioners, vs.
THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,
City Mayor, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review [1] on certiorari assailing the

decision[2] dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of
respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic,
represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of
Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of
Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports
Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region
XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its
issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief
project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and

Page 39 of 64

Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally

critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding
that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and
ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise
known as the Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine
Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent
filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court
of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its
proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within
an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMBRegion XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the
required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the
writ of mandamus and injunction is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner City of Davao and against respondents Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and the other respondents by:
1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of
Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction by the City of
Davao of the Artica Sports Dome;
2) making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000
permanent.

SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to
PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for
compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government units
(LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of
the national government, including government owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are
mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which
have significant effect on the quality of the environment. A local
government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National
Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENRCommunity Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and
the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not
within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an
environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the
DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for
CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance. Accordingly,
petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it
refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was
denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a
comment, filed a manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner
that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It thus
rendered the instant petition moot and academic. However, for the
guidance of the implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to our symbolic
function to educate the bench and bar,[4] we are inclined to address the
issue raised in this petition.

Costs de oficio.

Page 40 of 64

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, [5] otherwise known as the Local

Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and
corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with
law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.[6]Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit.[7] When exercising governmental powers and
performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national
government.[8] When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of
the community in the administration of local affairs.[9]
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs
to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology. [10] Pursuant to this, an
LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of
PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU
has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very
same objective of PD 1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the enactment.[11] The trial court, in declaring local government
units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law, failed to relate Section
2 of PD 1586[12] to the following provisions of the same law:
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental
protection program necessitates the establishment and institutionalization
of a system whereby the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can
be reconciled with the requirements of environmental quality; x x x.
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and
maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth
and environmental protection.

xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and
Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or
upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council,
by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the
country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical
project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President
may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the realignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
[13]
The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state
and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units [14] are
juridical persons.[15] Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not
excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to
implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socioeconomic development and environmental protection, which are the twin
goals of sustainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of
the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection program where
all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and
the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery
of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of
the EIS system.[16]

Page 41 of 64

The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which

an Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally
critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar,
respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not
have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an
environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally
critical area. In support of this contention, respondent submitted the
following:
1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the
project is not located in an environmentally critical area;

when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and j)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.[19] None of these exceptions, however, obtain in this
case.

2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources

Office (CENRO-West) that the project area is within the 18-30% slope, is
outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared
watershed area; and

The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures

environmental protection and regulates certain government activities
affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No.
1586. Section 2 thereof states:

3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37)

kilometers southeast of the southernmost extension of the Davao River
Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault;
and is outside the required minimum buffer zone of five (5) meters from a
fault zone.

There is hereby established an Environmental Impact Statement System

founded and based on the environmental impact statement required
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms
and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking which
significantly affect the quality of the environment.

The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica
Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an
environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the
trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding
upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. [17] This Court is not a
trier of facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual
findings of the trial court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where
there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f)

Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:

Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated
policies and goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as
well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and
include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects
the quality of the environment a detailed statement on
(a) the environmental
undertaking

impact

of

the

proposed

action,

project

or

Page 42 of 64

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented

b. Iron and steel mills

c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas

(c) alternative to the proposed action

d. Smelting plants
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of
the long-term productivity of the same; and

II. Resource Extractive Industries

a. Major mining and quarrying projects

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable

resources, a finding must be made that such use and commitment are
warranted.

b. Forestry projects
1. Logging

Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all

agencies having jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject
matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental impact
statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the same.

2. Major wood processing projects

3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private
forests

Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD

1586, the declaration of certain projects or areas as environmentally
critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System, shall be by Presidential Proclamation, in accordance
with Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.

4. Forest occupancy

Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14,

1981, proclaiming the following areas and types of projects as
environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System established under PD 1586:

c. Fishery Projects

A. Environmentally Critical Projects

I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries

5. Extraction of mangrove products

6. Grazing

1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects

III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric
or geothermal)

Page 43 of 64

c. Major reclamation projects

c. which support wildlife and fishery activities

d. Major roads and bridges

11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the

following conditions:

B. Environmentally Critical Areas

a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves,
wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;

b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;

2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;

c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;

3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or

threatened species of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);

d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong

winds and storm floods;

4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;

e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.

5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or

tribes;

12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following

conditions:

6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities

(geologic hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);

a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;

b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;

7. Areas with critical slopes;

c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions;
a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by
appropriate authorities

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and

areas not declared by the President as environmentally critical shall be
considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an
environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection
Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require
non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental
safeguards as it may deem necessary.

Page 44 of 64

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of
them. It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as
environmentally critical,
or within an
environmentally critical
area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of
Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which
can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial
court in the case at bar.

G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33,
in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ of mandamus and
directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue
in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the
construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo

Gutierrez, Jr., Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor
Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.

SO ORDERED.

The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a

Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of
Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air
Pollution Control Commission."

DONALD
MEAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner.

VASQUEZ, J.:

On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas
were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9,
in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, under an information
reading as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for
some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Malabon, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the president and the general
manager, respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co.
(INSOIL) a corporation duly organized in accordance with
existing laws, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer
to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the

Page 45 of 64

industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the

operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed
and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such
waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to
the living plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to
health and property in the same vicinity.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was
subsequently assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Caloocan City) presided over by the respondent Judge.
On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the
criminal case, filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court
has no jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal
personality to file the above-quoted information. The motion to quash was
denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5, 1975. A
Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied by the
respondent Judge in his Order of November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the
respondent Judge who allegedly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction
in issuing the same.
In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were
required to comment on the petition and a temporary restraining order
was issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing his questioned
orders until otherwise directed by this Court.
It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and
Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
"Commission") as created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive
authority to determine the existence of "pollution" before a criminal case
can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive
authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further avers that
the Commission not having finally ruled that the petitioner has violated
Republic Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to
prosecute the petitioner for a violation of said law.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No.
3931 grants the power and duty to the Commission to investigate and
prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and
authority is not exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other public

prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute violations of

the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions.
Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to
resolve a procedural question raised by the respondents in support of
their prayer that the instant petition should not be entertained.
Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an
accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accusedmovant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition,
the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to
reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse
judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et al., 101
Phil. 599; Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.)
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the
respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations,
recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered
proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as
was so declared in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969, 105
Phil. 3007:
However, were we to require adherence to this pretense,
the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner
required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the
mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on
the merits in Case No. 16443, apart from the expenses
incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and
conviction therein would violate one of this constitutional
rights, and that, an appeal to this Court, we would,
therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of
the lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and
unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present
case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein
may be overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened
and substantial justice.
To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil
Manufacturing Co., vs. Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil., 930938, expressed as
follows:

Page 46 of 64

While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

was held not to be a proper basis for a petition for certiorari
[Nico vs. Blanco, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131,
or an appeal not certiorari is the proper remedy for
correcting an error which a lower court may commit in
denying a motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting
aside an order of dismissal, [Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off. Gaz.
(No. 3), 1265; 79 Phil. 243; Santos vs. Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz.
(No. 3), 1278; 79 Phil.754] however, in some instances, the
Supreme Court has departed from the general rule and has
entertained the writ notwithstanding the existence of an
appeal. Thus, in one case the Supreme Court took
cognizance of a petition for certiorari notwithstanding the
fact that the accused could have appealed in due time
when it found that the action was necessary to promote
public welfare and public policy (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil.
880). In another case, a petition for certiorari to annul an
order of the trial judge admitting an amended information
was entertained although the accused had an adequate
remedy by appeal "inasmuch as the Surplus Property cases
have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. (People
vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil.,
627.) And still in another case, the writ was entertained
where the appeal was found not to be adequate remedy, as
where the order which is sought to be reviewed is merely of
interlocutory or peremptory character, and the appeal
therefrom can be interposed only after final judgment and
may therefore be of no avail. (Rocha vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil.,
355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182. See also Mendoza
vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First Instance,
51 Phil., 36).
For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for
certiorari interposed by the accused against the order of the
court a quo denying the motion to quash may be
entertained, not only because it was rendered in a criminal
case, but because it was rendered, as claimed, with grave
abuse of discretion, as found by the Court of Appeals, it
would be indeed unfair and unjust, if not derogatory of their
constitutional right, to force the accused to go to trial under
an information which, in their opinion, as was found,

accuses them of multiple offenses in contravention of law.

And so, in our opinion, the respondent court did not err in
entertaining the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing
it, as claimed.
The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the
ground of double jeopardy. In Pineda vs. Bartolome, the ground invoked
was duplicity of offenses charged in the information. In the case at bar,
the petitioner assails the very jurisdiction of the court wherein the criminal
case was filed, Certainly, there is a more compelling reason that such
issue be resolved soonest, in order to avoid the court's spending precious
time and energy unnecessarily in trying and deciding the case, and to
spare the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety and embarrassment,
let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in undergoing trial for a
case the proceedings in which could possibly be annuled for want of
jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the
court's jurisdiction is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the
court to resolve the same as soon as possible in order to avoid the
unwholesome consequences mentioned above.
It is also advanced that the present petition is premature,
since respondent court has not definitely ruled on the
motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only
argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was
predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to
entertain the action, and the rulings of this Court are that
writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case
of a denial or deferment of action on such a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for
this petition for review by certiorari, it would be premature
because it seeks to have a review of an interlocutory order.
But as it would be useless and futile to go ahead with the
proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this
petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIA 51 O.G.
6636, 5638).
While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be
deferred until the trial and an order to that effect is
interlocutory, still where it clearly appears that the trial

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judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside of its

jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it
would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs.
Ibanez, et al,50 Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et all
47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51
Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, L13748, 30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA,
pp. 315-316.)
An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the
obvious merit We find in the same. Our reading of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3931 has convinced Us that the clear legislative intention
is to vest in the Commission the exclusive authority to determine the
existence of "pollution" penalized thereunder and to prosecute violations
of said law.
The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a
violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931.
More specifically, it alleges that the petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac
Arivas, "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into
the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to
seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters
discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so
managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such
waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the arriving
plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the
same vicinity."
Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed
to the petitioner, reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or
otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric
air of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown,
run, drain, allow to see or otherwise dispose into such
waters or atmospheric air, any organic or inorganic matter
or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause
pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.

It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is
to throw, run, drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or
atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or
substance "that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air."
Stated in simpler terms, the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner
was the act of causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal).
The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary
signification. In Section 2, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3931,
"pollution" is defined in these words:
(a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical,
chemical and/or biological properties of any water and/or
atmospheric air of the Philippines, or any such discharge of
any liquid, gaseous or solid substance into any of the
waters and/or atmospheric air of the country as will or is
likely to create or render such waters and/or atmospheric
air harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health,
safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial,
agricultural, recreational or other legitimate uses, or to
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or of her aquatic life.
The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in
the Commission. Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the
authority to "determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Section 6(a), No. 1); to "hold
public hearings, ... make findings of facts and determinations all with
respect to the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission."
(Ibid., No. 3); to "institute or cause to be instituted in the court of
competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Act" (Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice and hearing,
revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act whenever
modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8 contains
explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to determine the
existence of pollution and to take appropriate court actions to abate or
prevent the same. It provides:
SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . The
Commission may, on its own motion, or upon the request of
any person, investigate or may inquire, in a manner to be

Page 48 of 64

determined by it, as to any alleged act of pollution or the

omission or failure to comply with any provisions of this Act
or any order of this Commission.
Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation,
that there has been a violation of any of the provisions of
this Act or any order of the Commission, it may order
whoever causes such violation to show cause before said
Commission why such discharge of industrial wastes or any
waste should not be discontinued. A notice shall be served
on the offending party directing him or it to show cause
before the Commission, on a date specified in such notice,
why an order should not be made directing the
discontinuance of such violation. Such notice shall specify
the time and the place where a public hearing will be held
by the Commission or its authorized representatives, and
notice of such hearing shall be served personally or by
registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and in
the case of a municipality or corporation such notice shall
be served upon the major or president thereof. The
Commission shall take evidence with reference to said
matter and may issue an order to the party responsible for
such violation, directing that within a specified period of
time thereafter, such violation be discontinued unless
adequate sewage works or industrial wastes disposal
system be properly operated to prevent further damage or
pollution.
No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the
Commission shall prejudice any action which may be filed in
court by any person in accordance with the provisions of
the New Civil Code on nuisance. On matters, however, not
related to nuisance, no court action shall be initiated until
the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and no
order of the Commission discontinuing the discharge of
waste shall be stayed by the filing of said court action,
unless the court issues an injunction as provided for in the
Rules of Court.

of preventing or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air

of the Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority of the
Commission only the determination of and the filing of court actions
involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly
directed that on matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall be
initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon." This
provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action involving the
determination of the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and
unless the Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law
is considered pollution.
It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the
filing of civil actions, and not to criminal cases as is the one herein
involved, there being no basis either in the context in law nor from a
consideration of the purpose behind the enactment of the same upon
which such a distinction may be made. Indeed, respondents do not
seriously question that the court action contemplated in the last
paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal proceedings. Respondents merely
aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the Commission is not
exclusive of the power of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931.
We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give
concurrent authority to the Commission and Fiscals to prosecute violations
of Republic Act No. 3931. It is true that there is no provision expressly
declaring that the authority vested in the Commission to prosecute
violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same logic,
there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be concurrent or
may be exercised jointly with Fiscals. The absence of an explicit
declaration as to the exclusive authority of the Commission to prosecute
violations of the subject law does not detract from the clear intention to
make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law itself and as
gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible from
the provision of Section 8 expressly declaring that no court action shall be
initiated, except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall
have finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution; and also from Section
6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the Commission to "initiate or cause to be
instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel
compliance with the provisions of this Act."

The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority

to be exercised by the Commission and by the ordinary courts in respect

Page 49 of 64

As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of

pollution requires investigation, public hearings and the collection of
various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution. (Sections
6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in itself connotes that
the determination of its existence requires specialized knowledge of
technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the
competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice. It is
undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4 of the law, it is
provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and other
technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the
Commission shall be the Chairman of the National Science Development
Board, one of the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of the
Philippine Council of Science and Technology, and one of the two full-time
commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer.
The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to
institute a criminal action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for
administration or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecution
service of the government, is not new in this jurisdiction. It is recognized
in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the exclusive
authority of the Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate and impose
administrative fines upon violators of the provisions of Republic Act No.
751 for the reason that said official "has better facilities than the
prosecuting officials to carry out the provisions of the said Act, the former
official being the keeper of the records pertaining to aliens." The same
principle has been recognized with respect to the prosecutions of
violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic Act No. 1131.) In holding that
the City Fiscal of Manila has no authority to prosecute such violations
independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, it was said:

Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the
power or right to prosecute violations of all laws and
ordinances allowed to prosecute violations of the AntiDummy Board, there would be no order, concert,
cooperation, and coordination between the said agencies of
the government. The function of coordination which is
entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the
above-quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There
can be no coordination as envisioned in the law unless the
Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control
the city fiscal in the prosecutions of the violations of the
Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo, p. 118; 5 SCRA 428,433.)
In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365)
involving the authority of the Bureau of Forestry over the management
and use of public forests and the transfer of licenses for the taking of
forest products, this Court has made this pronouncement:
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in
an administrative office the power to determine particular
questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the
jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. (p.
124, Rollo.)
It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the
authority to file the information charging the petitioner with a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding or
determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had
caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is
not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not
file an information for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if the
Commission had made a finding or determination that the law or any of its
orders had been violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there
had been no prior determination by the Commission that the supposed
acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines.
The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is,
therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent
Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged
therein.

Page 50 of 64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of

the respondent Judge are hereby annuled and set aside. The respondent
Judge is ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of
jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

AND NATURAL RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its

Regional Executive Director and its Regional Director for
Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL
MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO
VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE
MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY,
CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO
CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN
MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO,
and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR
WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"), dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 131442

July 10, 2003

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY,

ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL
PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO
BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO
BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON
BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA
MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors,
represented by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL,
MARICAR MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her parents
CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor,
represented by his parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and
the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO
COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED
Principe") of Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor
of respondent National Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC
authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo
Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. 3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer
site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the
main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending
the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its
date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.4

Page 51 of 64

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto

Galera,5 sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe,
however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as
defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR
Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4)
Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is engaged in
the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials
of Puerto Galera.6 Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to
include as additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro
represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further
prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had
already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial
court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the
construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the
same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction
of the mooring facility.7
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and
the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint.
These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action.
They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the
construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside
the Manila RTC's territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the
ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26
and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160, 9 and the provisions of DENR Department
Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of
ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the
ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and
dismissed petitioners' complaint.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to
Dismiss tenable and meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before taking this legal action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional
Director may still be x x x elevated to the Office of the Secretary of
the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in our
jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the
Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting
or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be
exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786,
February 27, 1978). And petitioners' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia
vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action
(Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111
Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources,
L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827,
May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs. CFI of
Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly
untenable and bereft of merits that the controverted act in
question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need for
judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR
which has jurisdiction and authority over the same . . .. And

Page 52 of 64

corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is

within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera
bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which
the DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the]
Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial
jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a]
writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial
jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are being or about
to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus,
inPhilippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their
writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.
Furthermore, we find the issuance of the preliminary injunction
directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a
jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means
jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their
respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square
application in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818,
Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular
No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation
(NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation, engaged
in the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The
mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its
infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order
No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power
Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721,
courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the]
National Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective
mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main
action itself together with the Annulment of the Environmental

Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the

court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the same
against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was
impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together with
the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government
officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and
functions are being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
this court? x x x Indisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC
as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have
failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies and this
Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in
the Amended [Complaint].10
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners'
complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. 11
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners'
principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the
ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local
government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical
projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the
ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility.
The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in
the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes
of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC.

Page 53 of 64

Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance
of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners'
complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It
falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners should file
their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro
then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of
the parties.12
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal
respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building,
Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR
Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal
respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue
injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed
within their judicial region.13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD
No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from issuing injunctive writs against
government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present
case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26
November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the
coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs
exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC
can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975.
Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental
Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against
the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring
facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC
remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts,
he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available,
with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer
to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court's
intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible
on such ground.16
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1)
Presidential Decree No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules
establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 963717 and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 4 18 of PD No.
1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a
project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the
President, to secure an ECC prior to the project's operation. 19 NAPOCOR
thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while
not an environmentally critical project, is located within an
environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146,
issued on 14 December 1981.20
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional
Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of
DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party
aggrieved by the final decision of the RED may, within 15 days
from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the
Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately
executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall
be limited to grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the
findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to
the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any
stakeholder, including but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and
affected communities, may file an appeal.

Page 54 of 64

The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions
thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions
include those relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC,
and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the
decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the
ECC may also be appealed based on this provision.Resort to courts
prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellant's action
dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt
by the aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal
within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or
Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision,
unless the Secretary directs otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first
resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED,
to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision.
(Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the
DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila
RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision
of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 9637 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their
complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action. 21 Consequently, the
Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an
appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in
patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of

Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the
provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning
permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an
act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion Of
administrative remedies,22 this does not apply in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"), 23 as amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically
threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as
protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial
structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic];
commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera;
the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its
corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat
propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities
are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel,
restaurants and other commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall
be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon
the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis
supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay
as protected by Medio Island",24 PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case.
However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves
of Puerto Galera"25 and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a
question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any
event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for
its power barge that will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility

Page 55 of 64

is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a

basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
"commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605.
Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No. 1605 which
applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and
restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to
emphasize the legislative concern "for the maintenance of a sound
ecology and clean environment."26 These provisions require every national
government agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to
hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to
secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing "any
project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and
extinction of animal or plant species." Sections 26 and 27 respectively
provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorized or involved in the planning and implementation of any
project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland,
or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult
with the local government units, non-governmental organizations,
and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives
of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and
the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the
adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program
shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained:
Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation

sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the

Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section
26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should
be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are
among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3)
may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may
result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners
admit,28 the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence
does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law.
There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to
approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the
operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical
project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the
prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this
Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of
the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections
26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an
environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial Environment
Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental
setting and a documentation of the consultative process undertaken,
when appropriate.29 As part of the description of the environmental
setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance
or zoning certificate.

Page 56 of 64

Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not
submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of
consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning
certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of
the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the
submissions required from a project proponent, their mere absence does
not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify nonexhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the
ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without any]
semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the
pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction
or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of
discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of
authority."30
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized
under DAO 96-3731 to issue ECCs for projects located within
environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the
recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the Environmental
Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority
pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he
acted with the requisite authority.32 This clothes RED Principe's acts with
presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions are patently
illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may
present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper
administrative forum before resorting to judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking
judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of
the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of
the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual
local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the
municipal government of Puerto Galera.

justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO

96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director.
Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the
requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO
96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the
procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions laid down in DAO
96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address
complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37,
complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative
investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to the
EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his
decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary,
who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also
classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37, including
projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC.
This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on
NAPOCOR's alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in
court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard
and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes
the utmost importance of protecting the environment.33 Indeed, we have
called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental
laws.34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in
accordance with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the
first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is
subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not

Page 57 of 64

G.R. No. 93891

March 11, 1991

POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
SOLAR
CORPORATION, respondents.

BOARD, petitioner
TEXTILE

Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for

Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

FINISHING

petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the
Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990,
respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled
"Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that
Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287
dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar")
petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing
Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly
into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order
signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as
follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of
business at 999 General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved
in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm.
being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the
Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the
volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall outside of
the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted
on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment
Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated

from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the
wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20%
was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP).
Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that
the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and
Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of
directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease
and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation and
discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until
such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until
further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections
of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by
the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the
Board ;2 and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater
treatment plant was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30
gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly
discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's nonoperational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of
Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of
what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.

Page 58 of 64

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A

Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March
1989.

1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution
were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the
requirements of due process; and

Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for

stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this
motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to
operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and
evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the
Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct
the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects
of a petition for certiorari.

On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against
the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two
(2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of
the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that
the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had
rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the
Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same
time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the
appellee [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and
evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy
since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable
injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic,
"larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:

The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied
due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment
is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds
the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).
Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent
discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima
facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged
pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection
reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No.
984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders
under the following circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima
facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or
exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or
person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior

Page 59 of 64

public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and
shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates
the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a
competent court. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters
shall be maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their
best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the
following beneficial usages:

We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984,
an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a)
whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or
(b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards
set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove
that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of
wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission,
the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima
facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards.
Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject
matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may
act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the
wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the
applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may
well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste
discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

(a) Fresh Surface Water

Classification

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable
standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to
avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum
permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from
domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not
exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D,
SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The
waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D
under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part
provides that:

xxx

xxx

Best usage
xxx

Class D
For agriculture, irrigation, livestock
watering and industrial cooling
and processing.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the
following Identical finding:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No.
984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent
Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986 and
September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:

"Inland
Waters
(Class C & D7

November
1986
Report8
Station 1

September
1988
Report9
Station 1

Page 60 of 64

a)Color
platinum
cobalt
units
b)pH
c)Temperature in C
d)Phenols
mg.1
e)Suspended
solids
mg./1.
f)BOD
mg./1.
g)oil/Grease
in mg./1.
h)Detergents
mg./1."

in
100 a)Color
(Apparent
Color)

units
250

6-8.5b)pH
9.3
40 c)Temperature
(C)
in
0.1 d)Phenols
in
mg./1.
75 e)Suspended
340
in
solids
in
mg./1.
in
80 f)BOD
(5-day)
1,100
mg./1
10 g)Oil/Grease
mg./1.
5
h)Detergents
2.93
mg./1. MBAS
i) Dissolved
0
oxygen, mg./1.
j) Settleable
0.4
Matter, mg./1.
k)Total
Dis
800
solved
Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids
1,400
m)
Turbidity
NTU / ppm, SiO3

125

conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a reinspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate
legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.

8.7

80

Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously
violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation
without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of
results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from
the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended
that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. . . .

152

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

10

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations

during the inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said
operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the
wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was
channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
1.5
610
690
70

The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:

Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner,
Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20
December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing
operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed
and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the
Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic).
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based
on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test

2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not
yet installed.1wphi1 Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are
functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary
treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory
analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is
polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others.
(Please see attached laboratory resul .)11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at
least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating
from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and
chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was
adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by
the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility
Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20
December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing
operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational.

Page 61 of 64

Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on
March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October
1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8
August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and
desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 reinspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was
confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards visa-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its
continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the TullahanTinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its
Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently upheld the summary closure
ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing
establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry
of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized
that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury
to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of
petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive
odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the
residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation
until further orders and it was required to bring the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources AntiPollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition)

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8,
1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by

the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the
permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner
had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to
install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a
local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very
agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether
the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several
years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution
would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant

Page 62 of 64

operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis.
Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their
capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by
imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general
welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution
statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the
correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be
contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the
establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a
public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to
controvert the basis of suchex parte order. That such an opportunity is
subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's
decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by
an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No.
984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A
subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought
instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ
of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be

recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to

continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater
treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be
taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as
the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent
nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution
were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court
did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the
proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution
dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of
Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are
hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the
correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a
public hearing before the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 63 of 64