G.R. No.

L-23770

February 18, 1926

Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of
the line from which this property came.

MAGIN
RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE CALLEJA, defendantsappellees.
Domingo
Mariano Locsin for appellees.

Imperial

for

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral,
whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11.
Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she
refused to join as plaintiff.

appellant

AVANCEA, C.J.:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during
which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the
other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore
him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and
they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing
his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described
in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only
heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the
only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his
legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a
contract by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land
described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.
On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas for the sum of
P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3,
1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document
which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned
parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land
had been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.
The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court reversed the decision
of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement
of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas
submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which
was approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary
proceedings.
From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by Jose
Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they
passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are
reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria
Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose
and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of
parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of
reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of
reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria
Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the
reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable
property. The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:
For the foregoing reasons it is held:
1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the character of
reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to make the reservation, must
reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case
that either of these should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the
right, in case that Maria Corral should die before them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.
In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of Magin Riosa and
Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands described in the complaint,
which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands in the office of the register of deeds of
this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and
Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a
bond in the amount of P30,000, without express pronouncement as to costs.
The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.
Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor (reservista) and creates rights
in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost importance to determine the time when the land acquired
the character of reservable property.
It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into a contract of extrajudicial
partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land
here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the
testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina
Casas the provision of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person
dying without a will to make a partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the
deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes
testate estates like the one now before us.

When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance therewith. According to
section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot
pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of
the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions must be passed upon by the court.
For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicial partition made
by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations
arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannot be considered as having passed to
Maria Corral but from the date when the said partition was approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In
the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the following language:
The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of article 1003 and
others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of the inheritance of a deceased
person or that made with benefit of inventory and the consequences thereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only after the
liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue of the
estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims
against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent
court.
As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina
Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who
were absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by
them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina
Casas for the reason that she transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.
It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868 tending to assure the efficacy
of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in
article 811, which is the reservation now under consideration.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds
in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it
(article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of the General Regulation for
the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this
portion of the Civil Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been
indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the decision of
this court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this
obligation.
If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt that she could be compelled
to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold to
Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises whether the latter can be compelled to have
this reservation noted on his title. This acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to
make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria
Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period of ninety days

from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the reservees to
commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to Marcelina Casas and later
to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a
better title than that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the obligation to
note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha.
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition for the benefit of
the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the
registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the
reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note
only such reservation and the reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.
Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when they bought it. They
had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were
transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who
entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a
legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of
land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship
existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a
nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been
inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father
Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable
character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to
compel him to comply with this obligation.
The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the return of these parcels of
land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to
Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this security, the recording of the reservation in the
registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the
notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the
property is required by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving
spouse when the property has been sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is
not applicable to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the case of Dizon and Dizon vs.
Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:
* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by the
widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal provided for in article 811.
But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva
troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva
troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation
takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one
when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower
contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free
of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the transfer that may
be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is
absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the
second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to
the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law
provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts

another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon
contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those
for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is
made after the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the
Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the
property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of
the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal
where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva
troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case
of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out
the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in
form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament
of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is unfavorable to her. As
she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this
action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.

The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It
is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in
1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of
wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by
the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because
the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds the reservable
character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879,
referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:

G.R. No. L-7188

August 9, 1954

In
re:
Will
and
Testament
of
SEVERINA
A.
VDA.
DE
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.

Ladonga,

the

deceased
ENRIQUEZ,

Mariano A.

REVEREND
SANCHO
ABADIA.
ET
AL., petitioners-appellees,

. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on,
the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:

Zosa

and

B.

G. Advincula

for

appellants.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be
his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in
the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which
the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the
three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after
telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code

From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the
document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the
document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its
probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not
allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the
lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will
of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when
statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law
for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of
the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under

the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements
of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192193).

7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last
purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.

G.R. No. L-5064

Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:

February 27, 1953

BIENVENIDO
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico
del
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.

A.

IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,

Mar

for

The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance,
whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance
because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)

appellant.

TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the defendant, in
consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other
half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are thus
summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died
on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;

The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the
children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably
legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still
the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the plaintitff and/or the
Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such
damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.
[G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005]

2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate
of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner, vs. ALIPIO ABAJA
and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.

3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;

DECISION
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land
to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered
up to the date;

Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001
in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution [3] of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental, Branch 61 (RTC-Kabankalan), admitting to probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada
(Abada).

The Antecedent Facts

Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue discharging her duties as
such until further orders from this Court.

Abada died sometime in May 1940. [4] His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died sometime in September 1943. Both
died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja (Alipio) filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
(now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,[5] docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the last will and testament
(will) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja (Eulogio) and
Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.

SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition
for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan
further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.

Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in
1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following
reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator;
and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the
same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline,
Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada (Joel Abada, et al.), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and
Carmela Tronco (Levi Tronco, et al.), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and
grandchildren of Abada and Toray.

In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTCKabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the will of Abada.
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
The Issues

On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition[6] before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071
(312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et
al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).

The petition raises the following issues:

On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition[7] before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 069
(309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.

2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;[13]

In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the
oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Torays will became final and
executory.[8]
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble (CaponongNoble) Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray. [9]Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the
petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.[10]
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an Order
dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for decision. Thus, the
RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial compliance with the
formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of Felix
Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of
bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is
admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge
his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking his oath and filing
a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
[11]

1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;

3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is written
in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old
Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure [14] which governed the execution of wills before the
enactment of the New Civil Code.

The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, [15] governs the form of the attestation clause of Abadas will.
[16]
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.[19] Article 804 of the Old Civil Code
is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil
Code defines a legitime.

SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, [17] shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator
and signed by him, or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [20] Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old
Civil Code[21] which provides:

Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure

Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:

Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the testator, or,
should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known to the
notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the
testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700 and 701, are
also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure [22] repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution ofany will.[23] Therefore, Abadas will does not
require acknowledgment before a notary public.

(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and
the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She cites in
particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. xxx [18]

Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language.
She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals
held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal.
We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings. [24] In addition,
the language used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court
deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will
itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. [25] This is a matter that a party may establish by
proof aliunde.[26] Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that
Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified
that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language.[27] This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abadas will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros,
habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas
del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie
de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo,
las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS en la parte superior de la carrilla. [28]
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that
the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.

The allegation has no merit. The phrase en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que
esta compuesto el mismo which means in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the
same shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters ONE and TWO
as can be gleaned from the phrase las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS.
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the
will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the
present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code. [29]
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su
ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia
en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. The English translation is: Subscribed and
professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it
in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same. The
attestationclause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of
witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in
determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30] the Court recognized that there are two divergent tendencies in the law on
wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted
that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the
Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,[32] the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable laws,
enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending that the rule on strict
construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court, after examining the cases
invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to all
cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any
given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to
have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the
absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.

need for presentation of evidencealiunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction,
thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences.
The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the
will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning
or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation
eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase en presencia de nosotros or in our presence coupled with the signatures appearing on the will itself and
after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses
that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the
presence of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances that
the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. This
Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrotlike copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be
deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.[35]
The last part of the attestation clause states en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador. In English, this means in its witness, every one of us also signed in our
presence and of the testator. This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the
testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
47644.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may
still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation
clause serves the purpose of the law. x x x [33]

Ross,
Lawrence
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the
will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

G.

Brimo,

and

JUAN

MICIANO,

Selph

administrator, petitioner-appellee,

for

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

appellant.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires
to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not
having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such
a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
G.R. No. L-23678
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch
as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is
based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in

June 6, 1967

TESTATE
ESTATE
OF
AMOS
PEOPLE'S
BANK
and
MARIA
CRISTINA
BELLIS
and
MIRIAM
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

G.
TRUST
PALMA

BELLIS,

deceased.
COMPANY, executor.
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,

Vicente
R.
Macasaet
and
Jose
D.
Villena
for
oppositors
appellants.
Paredes,
Poblador,
Cruz
and
Nazareno
for
heirs-appellees
E.
A.
Bellis,
et
al.
Quijano
and
Arroyo
for
heirs-appellees
W.
S.
Bellis,
et
al.
J.
R.
Balonkita
for
appellee
People's
Bank
&
Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other
his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16749

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not
in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I
have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx

xxx

xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M.
R.
Sotelo
for
executor
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

and

heir-appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of
the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in
full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of
the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).

Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following
year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to
the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last
will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March
5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he
was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in
1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of
the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled
in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man
with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if
he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly
be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise
of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is
used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified
to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law
being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of
the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and
at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they
look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold
liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since
by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be
to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface
of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to
a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case,
the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also
to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few

instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the
main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner
of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted
in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article
are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by
the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal
law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one
for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce
the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule
in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it

does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical
with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY
CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance
of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters,
private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I
of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31,
1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix
made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating
Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as

executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need
for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in
the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other
things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will
are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will)
and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation
of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her
lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos
executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both
in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the
late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division
of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement
J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines
of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby
admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the
Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition,
acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside
on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to
him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two
Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in
the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions for
postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of
death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955).

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10,
1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the
morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this
Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on this
date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the
petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present
evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,
respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been
questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to
substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his
death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on
September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the
filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate
of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the
petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a
motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support
petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco
Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a
later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and
deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present
petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will exparte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have
denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of
her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under
Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to
support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to
prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Art. 1039.

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case ofBellis v.
Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear the fact that what
was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and
not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief
was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting
of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by
the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog
Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and
AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING,
FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR,
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO
ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movantappellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees Avelina A.
Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the
order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the
respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or
do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as
Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by
her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or
take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of
the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967
upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October
12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from
different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the
respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently
providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have
the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any
part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as
he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and
all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate
shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during
his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and
Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth,
above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of
this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other security be required of him
as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the
administration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will and to
return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June
28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special
Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE
THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE
HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is
attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed
to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime."
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the
business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which
petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent.

5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner
and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting
will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton
Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business
in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until
the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE
EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE
EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the
Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the
executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the
right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as
follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given
the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and
all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also,
the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the
lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the
properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy
and sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a
motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the
business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and
selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all
the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales
conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties
conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of
the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and approval of
the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders
the following account of his administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to
December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the individual income tax return
filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of
which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses
as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as
Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein
accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased,
in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in
the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is
approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were
submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above;
and the respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to
the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the following
assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications
discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-

half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto,
C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income
of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an
heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under
American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of
such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating
"renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the
surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying
debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the
surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property
and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and
paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit"
wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns
as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all
the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet
and then stated expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as executor
was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from
some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and
clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their
respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings
No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty.
Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's
estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION

FOR
THE
APPOINTMENT
OF
A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the
Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased),
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued
by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and
brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December
25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex
"A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death of her husband
Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs. That
there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be
administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton
Hodges, have not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the
appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to
the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of Section 2
of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament of
Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be
presented in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be
appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and
take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, Charles
Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last
will and testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and
in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix is
appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges,
who had been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno,
(should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same
time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss
Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most fit, competent,
trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special
Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court
believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA
A. MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers and duties
provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be
filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor
dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last

will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex
"P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno
herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased
Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of
the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such cospecial administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of
the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States
with instructions from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of
Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the
probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges,
albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be
appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding
order of probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to
her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in
like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband I give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike ". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his
wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the
eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly
distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made
official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests
passed to him as surviving spouse "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other
legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property
and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and
controversies now before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of
Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are
apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial court
proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of
valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one
with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon
by the parties under which the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since
no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such
agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in
the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to
the charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In
answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo,
filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened before September 3,
1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply
due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations between
the parties, the Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi
before September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and

their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta,
Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be
resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was
made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof
and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27,
1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral
damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued authorizing
it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes;
instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the opening of
all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru
counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the office for the
reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I.
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should remain in status
quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the
office of both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and
opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal
Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the
Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly
authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30
tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could operate for
business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is
hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie
Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the
estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers she may have in her possession in the same manner that
Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records
of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and
in like manner the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges
shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the
protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of
the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it without previous
consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.

As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the name of
Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-calledmodus
operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on
Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando
P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A.
Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this
Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be
paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the
extent they existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion,
namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred percent
(100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges
or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no
way changed its recognition of the afore-described basic demand by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are
not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues
herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal,
authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her
lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services
to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and the
same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers,
said fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July
11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the
estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or
unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp.
1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation
and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence
has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of
counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that expenses
of administration include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or
administrator. As a matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp.
1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order
dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like
manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the counsel
for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol.
V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to
the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that
Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge
Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support of their
respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965
asking that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments and
pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge
Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964
of the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement
annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or checks may be
necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13,
1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be
declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and
administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or
comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said
manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of
Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin
in his office when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge
Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol.
VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23,
1965 asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other
heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp.
1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to
submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10,
1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto
be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix
and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order
of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been filed with
deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed
the said order. However, the said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is
being treated and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated
January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada
and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for
actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between
the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer
fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers

have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp.
Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement
annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to
implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case may
be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval
of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal
herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 22442245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R.
Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the allegations and
reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by
the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno,
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should
take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of
sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges,
involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was not an isolated
instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale
pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46,
Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty.
Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court upon petition of
appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the
assets of the two estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was
a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of
Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant, thereto
annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed by
appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the
appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated
August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which
was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a
flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude
of deeds of sales and cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T.
Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both
appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 1 deed of
sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3,
1965 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds
of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute

special separate expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere
motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T.
Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered
Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 65706596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the
prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and complied with the
terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their
debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to
release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc.
No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor
Fernando
Cano,
Bacolod
City,
Occ.
Negros
Fe
Magbanua,
Iloilo
City
Policarpio
M.
Pareno,
La
Paz,
Iloilo
City
Rosario
T.
Libre,
Jaro,
Iloilo
City
Federico
B.
Torres,
Iloilo
City
Reynaldo
T.
Lataquin,
La
Paz,
Iloilo
City
Anatolio
T.
Viray,
Iloilo
City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Pablo
Manzano,
Oton,
Iloilo
Ricardo
M.
Diana,
Dao,
San
Jose,
Antique
Simplicio
Tingson,
Iloilo
City
Amado
Magbanua,
Pototan,
Iloilo
Roselia
M.
Baes,
Bolo,
Roxas
City
William
Bayani,
Rizal
Estanzuela,
Iloilo
City
Elpidio
Villarete,
Molo,
Iloilo
City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the
assets of the estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving
his full debt or diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court,
this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages."
(Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to
clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record
on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western Institute of
Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts
that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or
respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the
administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act alone.
For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the
respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped
in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay
dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper

charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the
said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate estate of the
late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton
Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said
overtime pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by
Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this
nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure
of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13,
1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of
said appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14,
1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958,
after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959,
after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961,
after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his
wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17,
1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18,
1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954,
before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of
appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after
the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico
to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges
on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one
in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and
November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26,
1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone
and without the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No
less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:

The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have
already been discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was
general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself,
superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular orders
approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any
party for that matter, and which are now therefore final.
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance
developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta,
Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following selfexplanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL
OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his
undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N.
Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in
a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C.
N. Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left
as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for
the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which
the court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted
by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged
among other things
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account"
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he
alleged among other things:

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place

of examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
in accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased,
already probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the
time and place of examining the herein account, as herein Executor
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
in accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased,
already probated by this Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in
Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties
of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is
appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno
pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said
deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property, said Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix having
filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21,
1963 issued Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P.
Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix
of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de
venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender,
firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez
que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado.
Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de
cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales
cada vez que la consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente
pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida
para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments

for those "contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his

lifetime, and the purchasers have been demanding the execution of
definite deeds of sale in their favor.
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale
executed by the Administratrix and by the co-administrator
(Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms
and conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the
parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered
in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the
newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina
A.
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying
sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before
this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was
claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein he
claimed and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the administration of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee
under her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of
C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%)
of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the
Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court,
after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has done with
them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to
stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized
representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-infact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
(Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol
were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an
agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had
not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET
FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN
ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE

Magno

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE

HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957
PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB),
the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672,
through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and
Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal
Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as Of May, 23,
1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S.
P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement
entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges
and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the
dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672)
and issuing letters of administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando
P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A.
Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforenamed parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this
Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be
paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates andthat the assets (to the extent
they existed)of both estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's
claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the
alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its
recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of
October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of
October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United
States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the
Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not
been able to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who
claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of
all of the assets in the Philippines of both estates including those
claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her
locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on
August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so
by this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide
how the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be
administered, who the PCIB shall employ and how much they may
be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks issued
by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their

fee agreement approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated

March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over
possession of the records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges
to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan,
as evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared
by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges
as evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's
advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported due
and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24
and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on
January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of all the
property of the deceased C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate
exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases,
bank accounts and other assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which
existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were
in his possession and registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the
Philippines registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All
of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N.
Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased,
succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of
C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this
Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously
as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on
May 28, 1957 was appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold
K. Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges
along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno,
Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22,
1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672)
along with Miss Magno who at that time was still acting as special
co-administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando
P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp.
76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25,
1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss
Magno could take possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone

only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the
appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to
take over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate
of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession
of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved
same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp.
16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs
of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the
Higdon family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
(pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of
January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special
administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the
accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss
Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of
both estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable
Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the
exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of
the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of the deceased
C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her
capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe
Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an
employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964
Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access
thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court
on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208
Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in
exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss Magno
continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her

own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and
continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the combinations to the doors of the vault and
safes situated within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her
legal counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and the
payment of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve
the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and
control of all of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by
this Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C.
N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and
exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable
court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to
all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of
the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she
has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her
possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A.
Magno and her representatives to stop interferring with the administration of the estate of C.
N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the
PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly
representing Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or
any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises.
(Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate"
alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the
estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges
that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges,
American citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and
Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in
its orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----;
Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had
lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile
of choice in said city, which they retained until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will
pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in
full hereunder.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated,
or located, to my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and
enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right
to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate by
sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying
in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he
may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for
oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in
such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell
or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide
any farmland and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town
lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges
designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she
used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by
more than five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir,
except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor
of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957,
this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by
Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to
govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of
Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see
paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions
and successional rights over movables (personal properties), and

the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to

properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real
properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and
applied by our Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The
Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should
apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional
rights to her estate insofar as her movable andimmovable assets in
the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss
what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in
Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this
motion are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the
two above-captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges
on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses
constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not by
way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership. The other onehalf (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is
the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot,
under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income,
earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of
Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the onehalf (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of
no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on
May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way
of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the
surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate
by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventyfive (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of
conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and
exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the
assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain properties "owned by us,
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws of
succession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary
designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are
transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the
convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the
conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with Philippine law
and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as abovestated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself
the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all
acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he

had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his
sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly
by various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is
allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to perform
acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged
in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the
executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter ." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein
he alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78;
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960
wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place
of examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased,
already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of
examining the herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by
law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate
the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C.
N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets as owner.

16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of
his wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole
heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets or
properties located in the Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the
death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least
to the extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this
proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges'
Will is without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine
assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to
the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane
Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary
right, but absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case
involving a very similar testamentary provision, the Supreme Court
held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the
property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights.
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G.
R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide
that no charge, condition or substitution whatsoever upon the
legitime can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of
Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the legitime of a
surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N.
Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of
the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the
deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for
and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely,
(1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four
of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C.
N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for
the substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs.
Manuel
Singson,
G.
R.
No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in
order that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three
alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first
designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not
wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do

so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore,

the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the
Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void.
Manresa, commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully
stated that: "... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que
estas segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a tener
efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que
el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa,
7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is designated
to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can
have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the
testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator.
Since C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the
provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis
void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the
Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate
appeared and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all
said assets constituted his estate. Therefore
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the
conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be
affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the
estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to full custody and
control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration,
where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to
object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this
Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2)
share in the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on
May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his
share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane
Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus
all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N.
Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive
custody, control and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as
the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N.
Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent
Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:

1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American
citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated extensive
properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the
original of this will now forms part of the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and
appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and
testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this
Honorable Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against
the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and posted (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such claims has
long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor
ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate
contains an institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated
or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and
enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the
right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and the
purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best;
to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or
leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so
conveyed in such property as he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell
or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any
farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated
or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters,
share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the
heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share
which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he
survived."

7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane
Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her
relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last
will and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles
Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred
upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate and later as
Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and
written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant
to her last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two being
the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and
Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas,
United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the coowner (together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest
in their conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are now
being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of
which are under the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and
wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation
up to the present, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income", the entire estate having been continually devoted to the business
of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was
earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to
be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in
nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of
their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton
Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined
conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same
amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other dispositions which
are purely personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on
December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly
entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly determined
by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined
conjugal estate as they existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges
on May 23, 1957 one-half of these assets belong to the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and
income" of all these assets again one-half of these belong to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made by Charles Newton
Hodges personally and for his own personal account from May 23,
1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges,

disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his

behalf since December 25, 1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from
the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this
Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline
Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs
under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to
her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the
system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and
its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the
heirs to whom they properly belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before,
petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion
on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this
Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of
documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles
Newton Hodges "through ... written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and
usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of
May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being
matters of record, and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily
threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only
results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as
those which she continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only
the estate but also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of
September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all
her collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;

4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing
motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator
PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to
turn over all her collections to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as
(a) the examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the
allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn
public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate
of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation
of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts
and only require the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is
alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for
the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that
executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the
executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated
that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts
submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada
on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all
the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the
prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno
has been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and
reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the
possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion)
dated September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and
reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the estate of

Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a
prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said
motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963
and September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are premised on the
assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs
in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8,
1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim
of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the administration proceedings
over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed
alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the
hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for administratrix Magno
to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966
has been filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of
all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent
conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957
only approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by
counsel never made any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion
to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than
five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder
that there can be no order of adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in
the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and
rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official declaration of
heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir
instituted insofar as her properties in the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles
Newton Hodges rights over said properties which, in sum, spell
ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable
Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and authorized.
This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the
aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by
the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
(Annex "X", Petition)

and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually,
although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all
the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18,
1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no
justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion
of respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to above,
was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to
pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate
proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime
pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9,
1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be
co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277)
denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in a
joint account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which
included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees,
fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying
reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of
Technology to make payments to either one or both of the administrators of the two estates
as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado,
Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together
with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309,
Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees
Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing
petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral,
Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands involved in the
approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly
different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are,
therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket
fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has
assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them
covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it
feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA

AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.

IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER
REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV

XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX

XVI to XVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON

HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS
TO SELL.
XIX to XXI

L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER
REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102),
SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX

LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE
PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
P2,337.50.
LII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL
WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI

XXX to XXXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF
SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER
APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER

REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL
AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED
BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY
COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.

XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY
WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.

LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965,
ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS FOR
NOVEMBER 20, 1965.

XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS
ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.

LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED

NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF

CONTAINED THEREIN.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT
ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE
AFORESAID ESTATE.

LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL
EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON
OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE
LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO
THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE
IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII

LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE STRANGER
TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may
also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as
administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent court did actually
order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction
of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973).
Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a
motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges
had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection,
in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint
manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to
the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already
stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as
administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION
OF
ISSUES
IN
THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As
to
the
Alleged
Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirtythree appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be
stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the
lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of
said appeals.
II
The
Propriety
Here
of
Certiorari
and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action of certiorariand
prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before
Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of
more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be involved in as
many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the
remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable
that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice.
Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant
to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more
expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the
conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize
the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of

them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition must be
overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for
short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On
Whether
or
Not
There
is
Still
Any
Part
of
the
Testate
Estate
Mrs.
Hodges
that
may
be
Adjudicated
to
her
brothers
and
sisters
as
her
estate,
of
which
respondent
Magno
is
the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that
by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his
rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to
be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB is that in view
of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the
consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special
Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever
angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by
PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the
probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage
judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no
other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees
and legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the
inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal
complications and consequent litigations similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases.
While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already
actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and
no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to
issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the
purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely
settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all
functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution
or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order
shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances,
taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is

usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the
court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the
court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano
vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v.
BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90)
what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing
delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any,
left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the
above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not
persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27,
1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all
aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon
by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the
death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot
amount to the order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the
motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray for any such
adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose
of the properties in the Philippines during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was
nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions of his
wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate,
pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in said motions and orders is in
the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial
implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or distribution when the rights of third
parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the
conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p.
887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former.
In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed
as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to
whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by
petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute
of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in
both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way
of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this
decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957
was already the order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when
Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters
of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave
him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the
condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect,
therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of
during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole

estate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any degree
or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no
one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate
to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his
motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in
the terms in which they have been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and sistersin-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the
motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted
in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said
motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final
distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in
accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of
Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the
trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but
also because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated
differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in the sense
contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial
digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the
order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn
between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and
express order of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their
motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that
respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la
condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de
que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del
Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido nombrados
comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los
bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para
la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta
ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad os
administradores que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado
fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la
administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon
Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio
Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon
Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela
Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla,
en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador,
declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos
los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a
cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a,
12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los
gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el
testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en
sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de
este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el
testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la
adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.

In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facieto be
of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance
do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs.
Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A
Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other) person
interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to
adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent
interests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible, much
less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of
his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the records of these
cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question,
Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and
ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", and even promised that "proper accounting will be had in all these transactions" which he had
submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-avis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly onehalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto,
C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual evenly between him and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93,id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an
heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal
partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole
estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could
have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he
would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her
expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And

assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being
sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without
purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view
that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges
had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her
other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11,
1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed
the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer
as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the situation, implicit in his
allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion
of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the
above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said
allegations read:
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
were enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the
hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted
the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age,
and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not
think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate
of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of
Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of
the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer Record, p.
260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the
testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed to
respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his
co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M,
(Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to
have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions
made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( )
No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower,
curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any
action described under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4,
Answer Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the
following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges.It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate
Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced
and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said

estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy
of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the
declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce
any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate
of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate
from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957.
(Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We cannot,
therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence
in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related
to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be
copies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve
to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis
the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard
to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her
whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and
sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the
following admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal
property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code
that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made
and this court in construing this provision in connection with section 685 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly
held that in the event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of
liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6
Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez
vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17
Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable
Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs.
Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the surviving
spouse in the administration of the community property. Attention was called to the fact that
the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the death of the
wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with
relation to the property while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the
high degree of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the
owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to
administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom
he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the
case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is
not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for
whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No
liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property which came into his
possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a
continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde
luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the
conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under
a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a
manifest fraud.

And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto
himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as
approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which
such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be
secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declared ineffective
either way they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations
based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some nonjurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties
interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and
since it is apparent here that none of such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the
unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor
impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is
definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the
deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will
not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties
who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half
of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"."
Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis
of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of
properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full
power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death, such
remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that
Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had
kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of
Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence
Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding.
There is no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito
Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8,
1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said
respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection
thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal
partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled
pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it
is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent
Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have
been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an
administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the
proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action
should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the
estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on
the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be
compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present
cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties of
the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the trial
court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is
something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis,
the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends
on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why

should it not be within its authority to declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know
whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in
his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the
parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the
time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the
closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early
settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had
intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his
death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the
conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a
situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his
co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination
and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the
properties in question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership,
thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit
equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are
deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and
from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue
disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority
among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator
is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one
assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into
account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife,
practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical
that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other.
Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the
administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not
the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such,
administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of
an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence
of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that
the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made.
After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done
away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement
proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will
who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not
difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not
being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude
could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of any
remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that
there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem
would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not
permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties
in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a
substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or

vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof.
There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and
neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to
preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default is
contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they
are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to
his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime,
which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other
than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would
cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the
inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in
Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof,
although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the
legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no
surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may
be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be
applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the
time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi,
what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore,
her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already
explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with
any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of
the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas,
United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the
laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of
one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the
will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the
genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to
what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be
best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets,
however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court
below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the
pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render
an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the
possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent Magno
is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but
which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant
matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the
purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with
her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1)
that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for

granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of
whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is
easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that
there are properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed
among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the
question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and,
considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the
supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims
the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the
provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the
conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the
position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later
to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of
the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there
having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that respondent
Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to
resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges
had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming
there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of
what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth
declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of properties constituting the estate of
Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from
reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records on appeal,
and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific evidence
which the parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal
and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation
to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not
yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to
whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable
evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are
controlling in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases
should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to
make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the
considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more
apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of
Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters
herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the
rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when
they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer
vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by
Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was
submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E.,
vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance
with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract

from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the
extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the
contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding
the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain
provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the present
ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or
changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of
the State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of
the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the
law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied
that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p.
426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That
section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of
the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts
of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can,
under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American
States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language,
used in the same section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters
of public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to
require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions
are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of
the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner,
first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of
Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error
and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed
error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in
the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within
six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to
appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general
terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in
the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition
is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of
the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in
a given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the
purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need
of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant
cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were
known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed
above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no
longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the
amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming,
on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary
successions both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found",

while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs
the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal properties,
while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges
properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and
applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in
the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no
question that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to
her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the
Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an
American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State of Texas,
U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of choice in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the
lower court, pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39,
Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law
rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables or personal property, while the law of the situs governs
with respect to immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as well
as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the
Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there
can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to
her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of
the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter,
is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own
property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership
property immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by
virtue of any successional rights. There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be
entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse,
and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was
solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three
months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving
spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and wife for more

than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving
spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution
(Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is
clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own
conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half of the half
conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal
property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition).
This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the
successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21,
petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the
respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited
one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death
of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges
properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact
assumed such ownership and such was the status of the properties as of the time of his
death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime,
hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil
Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should
control. On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth
of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of
disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of
PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's
position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that the
provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2)
that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally
and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and
sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB
maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything
under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact
which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them
or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the
court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1)
whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided
therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize
further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to
elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of
the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to
dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made
by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such

dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall
be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from
the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other
disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was
not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such
sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical
changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever
of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and
sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the
properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could
not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as
involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs.
Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also
automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's
administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its
final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all
of them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all
the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per
its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not
in accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be untenable in
fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be
administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of
error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the
respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance, some
of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said
orders, PCIB further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial
court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately
with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of
Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification,
that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though
they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indivisoof the two estates that
should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as,
for the same reason, the latter should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that the lower
court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently
of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the
attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set
aside or they may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent
procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and
unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words,
We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is need to
be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already
being exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with
the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might result later
from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of
the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of
regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued
pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was
completely barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the September 8
resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and
that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly none of them to act singly and independently of each other
for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the

said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an
unduly advantageous position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other
parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution,
the same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed
in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that
its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then
proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of
error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments
of
error
numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale
(therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator
of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could
sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965
enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the account of
either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers she may have in her possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also
directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its
possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant
or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of
February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last
referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned
resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly,
with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be
followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is
precisely what We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated from
each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are
hereby overruled.
Assignments
of
error
Numbers
LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee
Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit
additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided for
in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the
court and three other persons for services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to
be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses
of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration
thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February
15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the
trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and
James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul
Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had
agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo , more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement
the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
to countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of
approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the

lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign
the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of
Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the
estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect
expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the
parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the
estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the
right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as
administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due
appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for
attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness
of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in
determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate in question
and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that
the fees agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels'
services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature
distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically
and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges
and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix
thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are segregated
from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that
would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's
fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly
represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as
ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the
determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the
controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to
maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed
to retain but one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The
possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote
and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the
future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the independent
proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive
any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common
counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature
partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have
any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate
and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, 11 no
prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this
connection, it may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in
the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the
situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire
whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.

For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby
overruled.
Assignments
of
error
I
to
IV,
XIII
to
XV,
XXII
to
XXV,
XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties
registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges
during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on
pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18,
1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero,
executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on
October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his
death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by the
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference to five
other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before the
death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western
Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife,
those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention
cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 1* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by
Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject to
the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such
proceeds, whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to
any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his
death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question
involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be
considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs
specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a
different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility.
Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and
would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of
innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of
the legal situation involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which
would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties
concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they
should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more,
the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already known and
recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as

administratrix of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were
executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned
expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with
or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyersappellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders
approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what
should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only onefourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate
as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and
voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case,
to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale executed
by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have
been actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal
partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed
orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to
question them would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had
acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the
provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for
the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and
December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which
according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December
14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these
blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the
terms of the order itself for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as
heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were
based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already
stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked
only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly
jurisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in
favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments
of
error
V
to
VIII,
XVI
to
XVIII,
XXVI
to
XXIX,
XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees
herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just
discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to
sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman,
the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses
contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again
premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties,
much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid
unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of
view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the
cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the
rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only
by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of
the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties
or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly
merit any consideration.

Assignments
of
error
IX
to
XII,
XIX
to
XXI,
XXX
to
XXIV,
XXXIX
to
XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in
approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its
functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such
cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate
court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property,"
since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective contracts to sell
executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in
the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as
determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the
cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive.
Since We have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to be portions
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents.
Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the
right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who are
precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must
accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender
the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise
directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor
of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to
so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the
corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of
Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of
P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4,
1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their
respective capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB
it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due account", on the other
hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account upto-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the
Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue
installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid
amount with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this motion, on
November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that
payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant can pay to both estates or
either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is
claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and
resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the
order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the
matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a
person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to
the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other
hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for hearing the
same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was
denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief
granted is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere reiterations of
contentions We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to
erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all

these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property executed by a
deceased person raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor or administrator of the
decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a
separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested
parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give
its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic
rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of
said clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is
not controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to
sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the automatic rescission
provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand
by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in connection with the
transactions herein involved.
Consequently,
We
find
no
merit
in
the
assignments
of
error
Number LXII to LXVII.
S U M MARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are
rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than
thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our
rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with
our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane
Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on
different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) during (his/her)
natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of
what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the
latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of
her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which
he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing
while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and
Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was
"not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11,
1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left
by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his administration, with
the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines
of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All
said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to
be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said
husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which
provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest,
residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and
identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission,
although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the
combined income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally

between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as
consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns for each calendar year for each
resulting half of such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its
own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of
Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges
lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the
estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers
and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from
the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States
inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in
favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an
alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he even
purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his
wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income
taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her
death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and appellee,
Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter
case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is
appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a
certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672,
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time
appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies,
only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting
together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and
signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their
joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of
them began acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus,
PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate
independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton
Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own
lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties,
appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All
of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court
upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone
else about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and
intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator separately
from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the
court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges,
and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has
come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing
respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in
the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the
provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a

testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any
event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in
Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than onehalf of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary
injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee
Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and
incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees
covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts
to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to the
estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957
were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the
court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of
administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her
husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the
naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she
claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system
of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership
properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his
inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the
latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's
contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the
estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties,
which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges
in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share
still existing and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share
and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the
conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of
said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the
proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the
interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said
orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is
implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs.
Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the assumption
that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever
Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December
25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period,
the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate,
unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the
estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in
regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free
portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to
the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of
said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever
might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no
longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws,
which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and
sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose
that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her
brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete
rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the
remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default
of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential
elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional
simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the
operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers
and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from
his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the
Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage,
Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband
could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties,
as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have beengratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges
in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the
Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the
Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the
assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers
and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels however, that
pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties constituting her
estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 and as
further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of
expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the
assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and
value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees
and administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix,
covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must
be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one
hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that
inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said payments
continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on
the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the
total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be
deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there
would be prejudice to anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural
technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be
affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and
jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the
government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said
orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R.
Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder
ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared
that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles
Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall
continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be
made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondentappellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is
reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their
respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the
partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges
may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the onefourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her
exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672,
whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and
renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and
partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but
this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the
respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with
the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing
thelifting of the Court's writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6,
1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 2 which directed that petitionerappellantPCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondentappellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act
always conjointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in
force and made part of the judgment.

It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar belatedly filedby it
with this Court on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and (over
five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 during which time both estates have
been pending settlement and distribution to the decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the
probate court per its order of December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N.
Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and
real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages" made and to be made by him as such
executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wife's estate and
nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was thereby
merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs after him, 4 is wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that
there no longer exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14,
1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently
recognized the separate existence and identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his
own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
exclusively to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his own
death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N.
Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with
its previous admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely
an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights
and interests therein of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate
subsequent to its order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must
therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of
Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's
estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts
executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the
petition as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail a result of the Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such
an estate and that the twoestates (husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective
administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37
and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the
corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail
on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina
A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
said estate consists of one-fourthof the community properties of the said spouses, as of the
time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall
continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed ofgratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared
legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitionerappellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the

Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated,
and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in
force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates; provided, that
upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the onehalf share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein
adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent
for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall
remain under the joint administrative of said respondent and petitioner under a joint
proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably
pertaining to Hodges shall be administered bypetitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings
1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its
removal as administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi andrenunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that
may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere
henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views
passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion. 8
Minimum
estimate
of
Mrs.
Hodges'
estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her
brothers and sisters with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her estate
consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving
husband was entitled to one-half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legallyrenounced his
inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death
of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerativedispositions or sales for
valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to be part of her
estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if he
is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wife's will,no deductions of any dispositions
made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her
brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband
C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to
have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..." 9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of
any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to
what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the
right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of
any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute
ownership" and "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N.
Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges
as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with
a suspensive term whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive term of
the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges
after his wife's death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters, I submit
that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate "completely

and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main
opinion, supra and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion,
Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis
causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making such
dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the
probate court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community
properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17)
years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to
now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable
estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions
of renvoi andrenunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N.
Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the
will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth
of said. properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary
dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the pressing question
of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute
between the heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue
complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to
have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole
end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious
closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is
based on two assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate court
must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the
Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would
govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national
law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate would
consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth
of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then be disposed of
nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix,
who avers that the law of the State of Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence,
her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is onehalf thereof and that in any event, Hodges had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best,
indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this
cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties'
discussion, viz, "there is no clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the
genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting claims and issues
which
it
deems
"are
not
properly
before
the
Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such
as, when there is nolegitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance
from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of
our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance considering that the estates have been long pending
settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the

guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings
below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of
this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two questions
ofrenvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the
inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the
conflicting claims here and now in this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out
fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the
estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and consequences of
Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of properties
with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be
formally received by the probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim
a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his
inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving the only remaining
question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein
finally determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in the
main opinion have not gained a consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless
to state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as
executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
haveequal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed
upon Hodges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or community
property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he
sought and obtained authorization from the probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying
and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges
thusconsistently reported the considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as consistently
filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he
adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by
Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
nogratuitous dispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should be deducted from
herseparate estate as held in the main opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged
to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of
Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not
to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14,
1957 was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of their
unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to make anyfree dispositions of Linnie's
estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily
to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or coownership, share and share alike since the conjugal partnership remained unliquidated which is another way of
saying that such transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made
for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an
equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only leftunliquidated but continued as a coownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he survived
his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's
administrator be "signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order

authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration
of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by the administrators
of the two estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,"23 since "it is but
logical that both estates should be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from
each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both, pending
their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more than the
minimum of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges'
estate depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that "a joint hearing of the
two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order
to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive formally in
evidence the various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate
Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that
he wasrenouncing his inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with
him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and
interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962
by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and
all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of
this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments
and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my
estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in evidence duly
authenticated copies of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her
husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23, 1957 andDecember
25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of
her other named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiteratedexpressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later for the avowed purpose of not being held
liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid
and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established by the probate
court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore
acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties since he removed himself as an heir by
virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30and by virtue of
the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir" 31by force of
his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are
called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to
their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and
inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like expenses and the net remainder to be
adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in
their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and our
lawspermit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and effective) by C.
N. Hodges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the
domiciliary law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate
would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of
(her) death on May 23, 1957" would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist ofthree-fourths of
the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges'

estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil Code) which could
not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is
correct that the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the surviving
spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the community
properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal
properties would then pertain share and share alike to their respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own
expenses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
institutedsimultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ...
that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also
during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over
Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to
C.N. Hodges "full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and sole heir"
by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during his lifetime nullifyher
institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his
own estate but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because
she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion
concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and
in law since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would be
called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as
the heir originally instituted he does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter
into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of
our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ...manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She
further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate,"
such principal notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or
exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass infull dominion to her brothers
and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
bysale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and incomefrom said estate shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land
and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton,
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to
be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n case of the death of
any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such deceased brother or
sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all transactions and sales
made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his ownacknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25,
and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership business of buying and selling

real estate even after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have had any
authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had called her brothers
and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of
our Civil Code dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a term."41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir
shallcommence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival
of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the
property until after having given sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the instituted heir
ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers' and
sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive
term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although the exact date
thereof may be uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day
when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The designation of
the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A
legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is not a condition but aterm. If the arrival of the term
would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is
resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is entitled to the
succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably protracted period (of
seventeen years counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the onlyremaining
issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates
and finally effect distribution to the deceased spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly
instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in
turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated
community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership)
rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates proceedings
would thus be closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of
segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them which can be done
then on their own without further need of intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them
meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be
agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of
them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of the share
or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain
heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with
Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges'
estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle between the
administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to guide the
probate court as well as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the distribution
of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all
effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's
admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve
months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."46
Timeliness
of
appeals
and
imposition
of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and
the other with a yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue raised in
the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue
to be administered by respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate
and that of her husband (since they jointly comprise unliquidated community properties) must be

administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno), the said appeals (involving thirty-three
different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and
performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision
at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on appeal to show
on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as
required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement
that it is "not necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the
same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus
proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's
records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits
the writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of
substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to derogate and detract from the primary
intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to
a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding
denials of substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice has likewise
overruled respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy of certiorari and
prohibition" "despite the conceded availability of appeal" on the ground that "there is a common thread among
the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that
can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the
dismissal of the petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning
respondent Magno's sales contracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the
main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further
enhanced by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by requiring
the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the resolution of all such
incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a separate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action"
(for which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main opinion. 51Considering the importance of the basic
issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the
assessment of the said thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees.
[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]
NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia
District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU
MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO
MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the
effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, P.D. 1083 or Muslim Code). The
question is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons
named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji

Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a
parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato.Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second
time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji
Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji
Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they
had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula
engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji
Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang,
his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji
Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by
tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving
a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement
of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three
children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of
which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition. [1] After such
publication[2] or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad, for brevity), the eldest son
of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are
as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving
spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also
known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son, (g) Fatima Malang,
also known as Kueng Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor
Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped
their father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate. [3]
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay
Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written
opposition of Hadji Mohammad.[4]
On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator of his
fathers properties outside Cotabato City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as
joint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required to post a bond in the amount of
P100,000.00.[5] On April 13, 1994, letters of administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the
required bond. He took his oath on the same day. [6] The following day, Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their
respective bonds and hence, they were allowed to take their oath as administrators. [7]

On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had
outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks. [8] Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of those banks be
ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula. [9] The Sharia District Court having
granted the motions,[10] Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed
the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred
twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48).[11] The Senior Manager of the
Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993, Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang
had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and
32/100 centavos (P378,493.32).[12] PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight
hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994.[13]
During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate
medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to
withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance
share in the estate of Hadji Abdula.[14]After due hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the
sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00).[15]
On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael as joint administrators to
submit an inventory and appraisal of all properties of Hadji Abdula. [16] In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted
an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with assessed value ranging
from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential
buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential building. [17] All these properties were declared for taxation purposes in
Hadji Abdulas name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula married to Neng Malang had seven
(7) residential lots with a total assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at
P30,000.00 and bank deposits.[18]
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all the properties
located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article
160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located outside of Cotabato City were
exclusive properties of the decedent.[19]
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji
Abdula were his exclusive properties for various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with
petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil
Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a
bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent adopted a complete separation of property
regime
in
his
marital
relations;
while
his
wives
Jubaida
Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents properties, there is no evidence
that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the presumption that properties
acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties,
the decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that
some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is
not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified petition
that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of
evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas
name married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should have
been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent.[20]

In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that
there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married
eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife
because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship.
The court further found that the decedent was the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner
did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description married
to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the description of the relationship between
petitioner and the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in question. To sustain the
contention of the petitioner that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the
provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were
already three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the
property regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null
and void for it is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any
stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no
evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question,
both real and personal, are not conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.[21]
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of
Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the
amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and
in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as follows:

h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do Total------------------------ 64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be
charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not
later than three (3) months from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors objected to
that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[22]
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. [23] However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a manifestation
withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit
Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action of certiorari with the Supreme
Court.[24]
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. She contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula
Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap
Malang and therefore the properties acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding
that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of
property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract. [25]

a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate

b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -

As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code,
under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court,
meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is
permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D.
1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression --- this is a
singular situation where the issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to
the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for the Courts resolution --- the Court decided
to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno[26] and former Congressman Michael O.
Mastura[27]. The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written
memoranda[28] and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.

Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth,
death, marriage and divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts,
events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. [29] It also explains why the evidence in the instant case consisted
substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three which
terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the
enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all
divorces of which took place before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18,
1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng)
and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in
force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30,
1950; Republic Act No. 394 (R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June
13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for
purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense
with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this
case, as well as cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties
herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Masturas words, missing links, that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent
court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain
guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property regime
applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the
enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus
convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely presented and identify such collateral
issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it,
the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion
of the watershed of collateral issues that this case presents.[30]
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1) What
law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim Code?
(2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Courts
pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect
Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property
relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession
to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the
dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved
(by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected before the
enactment of the Muslim Code valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are
hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of the
Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code[31] recognized the right of Muslims to
contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that --Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other nonChristians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code.But the President of the Philippines,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said
period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any
of the non-Christian provinces.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their
marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of
the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which
provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in
accordance with said Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo

Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages.
It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and nonMuslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
[32]

The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification [33] of Muslim personal laws,[34] also provides in
respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the
laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect
their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; [35] accordingly, every case of doubt
will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws.[36] Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the
Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing
body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code
contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages are considered void and
inexistent from the time of their performance.[37] The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on
marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior
marriage void shall likewise be void. [38] These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code
is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is
subsisting is by no means countenanced.

Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was
touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage
can exist at any given time.

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.

In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since --Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives
and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom
among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law [39], which merely
recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant
and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan,
she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was
not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to
the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent
to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not
for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all the
essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered. [40]
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the
marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and
governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the
marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between
spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil
Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from
and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived
together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.

The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to
require that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. [41] Situating these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the
co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated
subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not
capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired
during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively.[42] Absent such proof, however, the
presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can
only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage. [43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are
pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.

Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property,
or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in
accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in

proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties live together as husband and wife the
Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. Also, in contrast to
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in
cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest
therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases
are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party validly married to
another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes

Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the
identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and
every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception
or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code,
the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in
point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access
was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from
February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage
between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. --(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims
illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the
dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no
evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents
at or about the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another
marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage
shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by
her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former
husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation
of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on
legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance
include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-eighth of
the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. [44] The respective
shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.

Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code

R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance with
Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.
[45]
Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further situate the
points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court.Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession
of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was
celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by
death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules
of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the
applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and
void if it took place from June 14, 1969. [46]
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children
begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The
children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are
legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the
time frame and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993? The
estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:

As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main,
collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence
should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance with
Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in
accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under
the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods
of actual cohabitation (common life under a common roof) of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived
together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in
paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the
asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or
illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.
Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place in
1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, [47] but espouses that customs or
established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law to the instant case.
[48]
Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which
Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly the interconnectedness of law and religion for
Muslims[49] and the impracticability of a strict application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under Muslim
law.[50] Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are in
existence at the time the pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with
customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083
concerning the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death. 51
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City in
Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional
evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are
conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the
law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.

[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August
30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under
the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may
submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.

DECISION

c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the
period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

The Case

d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the
exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji
Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as
determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji
Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their respective shares.

PARDO, J.:

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City [2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia),
as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo)
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. [4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. [6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave
by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. [8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was
left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary
and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed
by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. [11]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito
Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente
and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my
real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz
F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.
[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.[18]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of
the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. [14]

[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]

[15]

Their twenty-five (25) year union

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star. [26]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.

Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary
is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled
to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname
(sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] the issue is
simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on
the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let
the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount ( sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:

On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier
decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.[30]

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law
of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory
hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. [38]

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in
a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring
ours)

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions
in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second,
there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown
in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property
she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. [45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID
the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was
no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088
July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.

In
re:
Intestate
Estate
of
the
deceased
JOSE
B.
SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro
M.
Recto
for
appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and testament
executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China,
on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien
province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion,
Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had
with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the
surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This
petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of
the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the
probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of the
fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh,
an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing
sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War
supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a
will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same
was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition
in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit
B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are
estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their
share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo
Gutierrez and Victoria Goo and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by
the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this
proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been
probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar to the filing of
this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is
shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his
knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.
When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge,
under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and
recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and
Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of
twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting
witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories,
Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the
contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd
interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was revealed to
him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-

interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit
B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto
in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto
Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the
81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had
the original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs.
Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers
to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that
her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain
document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go
Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in
her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit: onethird to his children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose,
Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document to
Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will
on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that
she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948), before the
last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes Building
and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he
checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.);
that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by the latter to the
former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight from the
boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery
took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her
brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948),
must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still the fact
remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only
the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But
her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony
in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went
away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was
signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You
had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket
and had the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will,
because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been
inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft
(Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's
testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned
to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into
Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed will or the
alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p.
229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of
the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her
deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the
original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all
the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second marriage in the estate
of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds of
the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According
to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio,
Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it
was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls
short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B.
Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the
final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the
final draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n.,
hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the former
asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the second
will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness
the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten
insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of
the first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months after
Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the
China Banking Building on Dasmarias street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come
from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following
words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was
placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope
was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that
he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh
and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to
his law office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would
charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A)
either in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion
did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the complaint for estafa
filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of
Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto
Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before
the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He
said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was
signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78.
Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it,
and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which
shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the
same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The
unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of
China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese
law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that
all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two
attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the

will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of
procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in
the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure
same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in
the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of
such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that there are
no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the Republic of
China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
HUANG
Clerk of Court
CHIANG
Judge

KUANG
TENG

CHENG
HWA

(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
As a preliminary statement we may well refer to the case of Maria Natividad Lim Billian, petitioner and
appellant,vs. Apolonio Suntay, Angel Suntay, Manuel Suntay, and Jose Suntay, oppositors and appellees, 63 Phil.,
793-797, in which the following decision was rendered by this Court on November 25, 1936, holding that the will
executed by Jose B. Suntay who died in the City of Amoy, China, on May 14, 1934, was lost under the circumstances
pointed out therein, and ordering the return of the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for further
proceedings:
On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, China. He married twice, the first time to
Manuela T. Cruz with whom he had several children now residing in the Philippines, and the second time
to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.
On the same date, May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first marriage, filed
the latter's intestate in the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 4892).
On October 15, 1934, and in the same court, Maria Natividad Lim Billian also instituted the present
proceedings for the probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased.
According to the petitioner, before the deceased died in China he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit
A) containing his will and, also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a true copy of the
original contained in the envelope. The will in the envelope was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs.
Go Toh, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as
attorney-in-fact of the petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its copy Exhibit
B. While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first
marriage of the deceased, they snatched and opened it and, after getting its contents and throwing away
the envelope, they fled.

Upon this allegation, the petitioner asks in this case that the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose
Suntay, children by the first marriage of the deceased, who allegedly have the document contained in the
envelope which is the will of the deceased, be ordered to present it in court, that a day be set for the
reception of evidence on the will, and that the petitioner be appointed executrix pursuant to the
designation made by the deceased in the will.
In answer to the court's order to present the alleged will, the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose
Suntay stated that they did not have the said will and denied having snatched it from Go Toh.
In view of the allegations of the petition and the answer of the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose
Suntay, the questions raised herein are: The loss of the alleged will of the deceased, whether Exhibit B
accompanying the petition is an authentic copy thereof, and whether it has been executed with all the
essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
At the trial of the case on March 26, 1934, the petitioner put two witnesses upon the stand, Go Toh and
Tan Boon Chong, who corroborated the allegation that the brothers Apolonio and Angel appropriated the
envelope in the circumstances above-mentioned. The oppositors have not adduced any evidence
counter to the testimony of these two witnesses. The court, while making no express finding on this fact,
took it for granted in its decision; but it dismissed the petition believing that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that the envelope seized from Go Toh contained the will of the deceased, and that the said will
was executed with all the essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the envelope.
Oppositors' answer admits that, according to Barretto, he prepared a will of the deceased to which he
later become a witness together with Go Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an
envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court there was
presented and attached to the case an open and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto
Barretto, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is thus undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one
that contained the will executed by the deceased-drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh and
Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss of the will of the
deceased, a circumstance justifying the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of
whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities.
The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and from what has taken place we deduce
that it was not petitioner's intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, the other points involved
herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated, whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether
the latter was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate. The testimony of Alberto
Barretto bears importantly in this connection.
Wherefore, the loss of the will executed by the deceased having been sufficiently established, it is
ordered that this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in obedience to this
decision, without any pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered
On June 18, 1947, Silvino Suntay, the herein petitioner, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
praying "that an order be issued (a) either directing the continuation of the proceedings in the case remanded by the
Supreme Court by virtue of its decision in G. R. No. 44276 and fixing a date for the reception of evidence of the
contents of the will declared lost, or the allowance, filing and recording of the will of the deceased which had been
duly probated in China, upon the presentation of the certificates and authentications required by Section 41, Rule 123
(Yu Chengco vs. Tiaoqui supra), or both proceedings concurrently and simultaneously; (b) that letters of
administration be issued to herein petitioner as co-administrator of the estate of the deceased together with Federico
Suntay; and (c) that such other necessary and proper orders be issued which this Honorable Court deems
appropriate in the premises." While this petition was opposed by Federico C. Suntay, son of the deceased Jose B.
Suntay with his first wife, Manuela T. Cruz, the other children of the first marriage, namely, Ana Suntay, Aurora Suntay,
Concepcion Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, Manuel Suntay and Emiliano Suntay, filed the following
answer stating that they had no opposition thereto; "Come now the heirs Concepcion Suntay, Ana Suntay, Aurora
Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, Manuel Suntay, and Emiliano Suntay, through their undersigned attorney,
and, in answer to the alternative petition filed in these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through counsel, dated June 18,
1947, to this Honorable Court respectfully state that, since said alternative petition seeks only to put into effect the
testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father, they have no opposition thereto."
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered on April 19, 1948, the following decision:
This action is for the legalization of the alleged will of Jose B. Suntay, deceased.
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of this case, it is necessary to state the background on
which the alternative petition of the herein petitioner Silvino Suntay has been based.
The decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O), in re will of the deceased Jose B. Suntay, 63 Phil., 793797, is hereunder produced:

(As quoted above)

The above quoted decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated on November 25, 1936 (Exhibit O).
The Clerk of the Court of Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified the parties of the decision on
December 15, 1936; and the case was set for hearing on February 12, 1937, but it was transferred to
March 29, 1937 (Exhibit O), on motion of the then petitioner Maria Natividad Lim Billian (Exhibit F). Again,
it was postponed until "further setting" in the order of court dated March 18, 1937, upon motion of the
petitioner (Exhibit H).
In the meantime, the deposition of Go Toh was being sought (Exhibit H).
The hearing of the case was again set for February 7, 1936, by order of the court dated January 5, 1938,
upon motion of Emiliano Suntay and Jose Suntay, Jr. On the same day of the hearing which had been
set, the petitioner, then, Maria Natividad Lim Billian, sent a telegram from Amoy, China, addressed to the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan moving for the postponement of the hearing on the ground that Atty.
Eriberto de Silva who was representing her died (Exhibit K). The court, instead of granting the telegraphic
motion for postponement, dismissed the case in the order dated February 7, 1938 (Exhibit L).
On July 3, 1947, the petitioner Silvino Suntay filed a motion for the consolidation of the intestate Estate of
the deceased Jose B. Suntay, Special Proceeding No. 4892 and the Testate Estate of Jose B. Suntay,
Special Proceeding No. 4952, which latter case is the subject of the said alternative petition. The motion
for the merger and consolidation of the two cases was granted on July 3, 1947.
That oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, in the Testate Proceeding filed a motion to dismiss the alternative
petition on November 14, 1947, which was denied by the court in its resolution of November 22, 1947.
The said oppositor not being satisfied with the ruling of this court denying the motion to dismiss, filed
before the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction, which was
dismissed for lack of merit on January 27, 1948.
In obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O) and upon the alternative petition of Silvino
Suntay, and, further, upon the dismissal of the petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction,
the court was constrained to proceed with the hearing of the probate of the lost will, the draft of which is
Exhibit B, or the admission and recording of the will which had been probated in Amoy, China.
The evidence for the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, shows that Jose B. Suntay married twice; first to Manuela
T. Cruz who died on June 15, 1920 and had begotten with her Apolonio, now deceased, Concepcion,
Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano and Jose, Jr., all surnamed Suntay, and second, to Maria
Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had as the only child Silvino Suntay, the petitioner herein.
Some time in November 1929, Jose B. Suntay executed his last will and testament in the office of Atty.
Alberto Barretto in Manila, which was witnessed by Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go Toh. The will
was prepared by said Alberto Barretto upon the instance of Jose B. Suntay, and it was written in the
Spanish language which was understood and spoken by said testator. After the due execution of the will,
that is signing every page and the attestation clause by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of
each other, the will was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A), sealed and on the said envelope the
testator and the three subscribing witnesses also signed, after which it was delivered to Jose B. Suntay.
A year or so after the execution of the will, Jose B. Suntay together with his second wife Maria Natividad
Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay who was then of tender age went to reside in Amoy, Fookien, China, where
he died on May 14, 1934. The will was entrusted to the widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian.
Upon the death of Jose B. Suntay on May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, the oldest son now deceased,
instituted the Intestate Proceedings No. 4892, upon the presumption that no will existed. Maria Natividad
Lim Billian who remained in Amoy, China, had with her the will and she engaged the services of the law
firm of Barretto and Teodoro for the probate of the will. Upon the request of the said attorneys the will was
brought to the Philippines by Go Toh who was one of the attesting witnesses, and it was taken to the law
office of Barretto and Teodoro. The law firm of Barretto and Teodoro was composed of Atty. Alberto
Barretto and Judge Anastacio Teodoro. The probate of the will was entrusted to the junior partner Judge
Anastacio Teodoro; and, upon the presentation of the sealed envelope to him, he opened it and
examined the said will preparatory to the filing of the petition for probate. There was a disagreement as to
the fees to be paid by Maria Natividad Lim Billian, and as she (through Go Toh) could not agree to pay,
P20,000 as fees, the will was returned to Go Toh by Judge Anastacio Teodoro after the latter had kept it
in his safe, in his office, for three days.
Subsequently, the will inside the envelope was snatched from Go Toh by Manuel Suntay and Jose, Jr.,
which fact has been established in the decision of the Supreme Court at the beginning of this decision.
Go Toh could recover the envelope (Exhibit A) and the piece of cloth with which the envelope was
wrapped (Exhibit C).

The Testate Proceeding was filed nevertheless and in lien of the lost will a draft of the will (Exhibit B) was
presented as secondary evidence for probate. It was disallowed by this court through Judge
Buenaventura Ocampo, but on appeal the Supreme Court remanded the case to this court for further
proceeding (Exhibit C).
In the meantime, a Chinese will which was executed in Amoy Fookien, China, on January 4, 1931, by
Jose B. Suntay, written in Chinese characters (Exhibit P) was discovered in Amoy, China, among the
papers left by Jose B. Suntay, and said will had been allowed to probate in the Amoy District Court,
China, which is being also presented by Silvino Suntay for allowance and recording in this court.
The said petition is opposed by Federico C. Suntay on the main ground that Maria Natividad Lim Billian
and Silvino Suntay have no more interest in the properties left by Jose B. Suntay, because they have
already sold their respective shares, interests and participations. But such a ground of opposition is not of
moment in the instant case, because the proposition involved herein in the legalization of the lost will or
the allowance and recording of the will which had been probated in Amoy, China.
It is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the evidence whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased,
left a will (the draft of which is Exhibit B) and another will which was executed and another will which was
executed and probated in Amoy, China.
There is no longer any doubt that Jose B. Suntay while he was still residing in the Philippines, had
executed a will; such is the conclusion of the Supreme Court in its decision (Exhibit O). That the will was
snatched and it has never been produced in court by those who snatched it, and consequently
considered lost, is also an established fact.
The contention of the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, is that the will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay
in the Philippines contained provisions which provided for equal distribution of the properties among the
heirs; hence, the draft (Exhibit B) cannot be considered as secondary evidence, because it does not
provide for equal distribution, but if favors Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay. He relies on the
testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto who declared that the first will which he drafted and reduced into a
plain copy was the will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay and placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A).
Granting that the first will which Atty. Alberto Barretto had drafted became the will of Jose B. Suntay and it
was snatched by, and, therefore, it had fallen into the hands of, Manuel Suntay and the brothers of the
first marriage, it stands to reason that said Manuel Suntay and brothers would have been primarily
interested in the production of said will in court, for obvious reasons, namely, that they would have been
favored. But it was suppressed and "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced"
(Section 69 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court). The contention, therefore, that the first will which was
drafted by Atty. Barretto was the one placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) is untenable.
It might be said in this connection that the draft of the will (Exhibit B) has been admitted by Atty. Alberto
Barretto as identical in substance and form to the second draft which he prepared in typewriting; it differs
only, according to him, in style. He denied that the insertions in long hand in the said draft are in his own
handwriting; however, Judge Anastacio Teodoro averred that the said insertions are the handwriting of
Atty. Alberto Barretto. But when Atty. Alberto Barretto was asked to show any manuscript of his for
purposes of comparison, he declined to do so alleging that he did not have any document in his
possession showing his handwriting notwithstanding the fact that he was testifying in his own house at
188 Sta. Mesa Boulevard, Manila. He further testified that the first will be drafted contained four or five
pages, but the second draft contained twenty-three pages; that he declared in one breath that he did not
read the will any more when it was signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses because it would
take up much time, and in the same breath he declared that he checked it before it was signed; and that
he destroyed the draft of the first will which was in his own handwriting, but he delivered the draft of the
second will which he prepared to Jose B. Suntay in the presence of Manuel Lopez, now deceased.
Whether or not the final plain copy of the draft of the will (Exhibit B) was executed by the testator, Jose B.
Suntay, and attested by the subscribing witnesses, Atty. Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go Toh, is
the pivotal point in this instant case. Judge Anastacio Teodoro testified that he opened the sealed
envelope when it was given to him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation of the petition for the
probate of the said will. As the lawyer entrusted with that task, he had to examine the will and have it
copied to be reproduced or appended to the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth salt as a
good lawyer; he could not perform the stunt of "blind flying" in the judicial firmament. Every step must be
taken with certainty and precision under any circumstances. He could not have talked about the
attorney's fees with Go Toh, unless he has not examined the will beforehand. And, declaring that it was
the exact draft of the will that was inside the envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto to
the contrary notwithstanding.

The testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is corroborated by Go Toh, one of the attesting witnesses, in
his deposition (Exhibit D-1).
Ana Suntay, one of the heirs and who would be affected adversely by the legalization of the will in
question, also testified on rebuttal that she saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay,
immediately after the snatching. She read it and she particularly remembers the manner in which the
properties were to be distributed. Exhibit B was shown to her on the witness stand and she declared that
the provision regarding the distribution of the properties in said Exhibit B is the same as that contained in
the original will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto.
With respect to the proof of lost or destroyed will, Section 6 of Rule 77 provides as follows:
"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or it
is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his
knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.
When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge,
under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and
recorded."
Section 8 of the same Rule provides as follows:
"If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that
none of them resides in the Philippines the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the
sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of the due execution of the will, it
may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses, or any of them."
Manuel Lopez as one of the subscribing witnesses is dead. Atty. Alberto Barretto and Go Toh are still
living. The former testified during the hearing, while Go Toh's deposition was introduced in evidence
which was admitted. In the absence of the testimony of Manuel Lopez, deceased, the testimony of Judge
Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay was received.
It is an established fact that the will, draft of which is Exhibit B, was lost or destroyed; that it was executed
and valid and that it existed at the time of the death of Jose B. Suntay. These circumstances also apply to
the will (Exhibit P) which was executed in Amoy, China.
The contents of the Chinese will is substantially the same as the draft (Exhibit B). Granting that the will
executed in the Philippines is non-existent as contended by the oppositor, although the findings of this
court is otherwise, the will executed and probated in China should be allowed and recorded in this court.
All the formalities of the law in China had been followed in its execution, on account of which it was duly
probated in the Amoy District Court. There is no cogent reason, therefore, why it should not be admitted
and recorded in this jurisdiction.
The said will (Exhibit P) in Chinese characters is presented as an alternate in case the will executed in
the Philippines would not be allowed to probate, or as a corroborative evidence that the will, the draft of
which is Exhibit B, has been duly executed in the Philippines by Jose B. Suntay.
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court covers the allowance of will proved outside of the Philippines and
administration of estate thereunder.
Section 1 of said rule provides:
"Wills proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or territory thereof, or in foreign country,
according to the laws of such state, territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines."
Section 2 of the same rule provides:
"When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance."
This court has delved deep into the evidence adduced during the hearing with that penetrating scrutiny in
order to discovery the real facts; it had used unsparingly the judicial scapel; and it has winnowed the
evidenced to separate the grain from the chaff. All the facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that Jose B.
Suntay, in his sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress or undue influence, executed the
will which is lost, the draft of which is Exhibit B, with all the necessary formalities prescribed by law. He,
likewise, executed the second will (Exhibit P) in Amoy, China, which has been duly probated in Amoy
District Court,-a corroborative evidence that the testator really executed the will. Copies of the said wills
duly certified and under the seal of the court are appended hereto, marked Exhibits B and P, and they
form part of this decision.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court is of the opinion and so declares that the draft of the will
(Exhibit B) is, to all legal intents and purposes, and testament of the deceased Jose B. Suntay. With
costs against the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay.
Oppositor Federico C. Suntay filed on May 20, 1948, a motion for new trial and to set aside the decision rendered on
April 19, 1948, to which the petitioner filed an opposition, followed by a reply filed by the oppositor and an answer on
the part of the petitioner. Without reopening the case and receiving any new or additional evidence, the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, on September 29, 1948, promulgated the following resolution setting aside his first decision and
disallowing the wills sought to be probated by the petitioner in his alternative petition filed on June 18, 1947:
This is a motion for new trial and to set aside the decision legalizing the will of Jose B. Suntay and
allowing and recording another will executed by him in Amoy, China.
By virtue of this motion, this court is constrained to go over the evidence and the law applicable thereto
with the view of ascertaining whether or not the motion is well founded. Both parties have presented
extensive memoranda in support of their respective contentions.
This court has gone over the evidence conscientiously, and it reiterates its findings of the same facts in
this resolution, whether or not the facts established by the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant the
legalization of the lost will and the allowance and recording of the will that was executed in Amoy, China,
is therefore, the subject of this instant motion.
A. As to the legalization of the Lost Will. There is no question in the mind of this court that the original
will which Jose B. Suntay, deceased executed in the Philippines in the year 1929 was lost (Exhibit O,
Decision of the Supreme Court). The evidence adduced by the petitioner during the hearing has
established through the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and that of Go Toh (an attesting witness)
that the will was executed by Jose B. Suntay, deceased, with all the formalities required by law. For the
purpose of legalizing an original and existing will, the evidence on record is sufficient as to the execution
and attesting in the manner required by law.
Section 8 of Rule 77 provides as follows:
"SEC. 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or do not reside in the Philippines. If it appears at the
time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them resides
in the Philippines, the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator,
and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of the execution of the will, may admit proof of the
handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses, or any of them."
Section 11 of said rule also provides as follows:
"SEC. 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where contest. If the will is contested, all
the subscribing witnesses present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined,
and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some
of the subscribing witnesses are present in the Philippines, but outside the province where the will has
been filed, their deposition must be taken. If all or some of the subscribing witnesses produced and
examined testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are
otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law."
The three attesting witnesses were Manuel Lopez, deceased Alberto Barretto and Go Toh. The last two
witnesses are still living; the former testified against and the latter in favor. In other words, the attesting
witness, Go Toh, only, testified in his deposition in favor of the due execution of the will. Hence, the
petitioner presented another witness, Judge Anastacio Teodoro, to establish and prove the due execution
of the said will. Ana Suntay was also presented as a witness in rebuttal evidence. The testimony of Go
Toh in his deposition as an attesting witness, coupled with the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro who
was able to examine the original will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay, deceased, when it was given
to him by Go Toh for the purpose of filing the petition in court for its legalization, and could recognize the
signatures of the testator as well as of the three attesting witnesses on the said original will is sufficient to
convince the court that the original will was executed by the deceased Jose B. Suntay with all the
formalities required by law. The original will, therefore, if it was presented in court to probate would be
allowed to all legal intents and purposes. But it was not the original will that was presented, because it
was lost, but an alleged draft (Exhibit B) of the said original will which does not bear the signature of the
testator and any of the attesting witness. The original will was duly executed with all the formalities
required by law, but it was unfortunately lost; and the curtain falls for the next setting.
The Court is now confronted with the legalization of the lost will whether or not the draft (Exhibit B)
should be admitted as secondary evidence in lieu of the lost will and allowed to probate.
Section 6. Rule 77 provides as follows:

"SEC. 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will Certificate thereupon. No will shall be proved as a lost will or
destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or
accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions
thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the Judge, under the seal of the court and the certificate
must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded." (Emphasis Court's)
From the above quoted provision of the law, it is clear that the petitioner should not only establish the
execution and validity of the will, its existence at the time of the death of the testator or its fraudulent and
accidental destruction in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, but also must prove its
provisions clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses. The exact language of the clause in
the above quoted provision of the law is "nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses." The legalization of a lost will is not so easy, therefore, as that of an original
will. The question, therefore, is boiled down to, and projected on the screen, in a very sharp focus;
namely, the execution and validity must be established and the provisions must be clearly and distinctly
proved by at least credible witnesses.
Granting that the execution and validity of the lost will have been established through the testimony of
Judge Anastacio Teodoro and Go Toh, and perhaps superficially by the rebuttal witness, Ana Suntay,
does it follow that the provisions of the lost will have been clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses? A careful review of the evidence has revealed that at most the only credible witness
who testified as to the provisions of the will was Judge Anastacio Teodoro, and yet he testified on the
provisions of the lost will with the draft (Exhibit B) in his hands while testifying. It may be granted,
however, that with or without the draft of the will (Exhibit B) in his hands, he could have testified clearly
and distinctly on the provisions of the said lost will, because he had kept the will in his safe, in his office,
for three days, after opening it, and he is well versed in Spanish language in which the will as written. But
did the attesting witness Go Toh, testify in his deposition and prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of
the lost will? He did not, and he could not have done so even if he tried because the original will was not
read to him nor by him before or at the signing of the same. It was written in Spanish and he did not and
does not understand the Spanish language. Neither was there any occasion for him to have the contents
of the said will, after its execution and sealing inside the envelope (Exhibit A), read to him because it was
opened only when Judge Teodoro had examined it and then subsequently snatched from Go Toh. Ana
Suntay on rebuttal did not, likewise, prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost will
because she has not had enough schooling and she does possess adequate knowledge of the Spanish
language as shown by the fact that she had to testify in Tagalog on the witness standing.
It is evident, therefore, that although the petitioner has established the execution and validity of the lost
will, yet he had not proved clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will by at least two credible
witnesses.
B. As to the Allowance and Recording of the will Executed in Amoy, China. Jose B. Suntay, while he
was residing in China during the remaining years of his life, executed also a will, written in Chinese
characters, the translation of which is marked Exhibit P. It was allowed to probate in the District Court of
Amoy, China. The question is whether or not the said will should be allowed and recorded in this
jurisdiction.
Section 1 of Rule 78 provides as follows:
"SEC. 1. Will proved outside Philippines any be allowed here. Will proved and allowed in the United
States, or any state or territory thereof, or in a foreign country, according to the laws of such state,
territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper court of First Instance in the
Philippines."
Section 2 of the same Rule also provides:
"SEC. 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines by the executor or other persons
interested, in the Court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and
cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance."
Sections 41 and 42 of Rule 123 provides as follows:
"SEC. 41. Proof of Public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
within the United States or its territory, the certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the

district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may
be made by any public officer having a seal of the office and having official duties in the district or political
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United
States stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office."
F. "SEC. 42. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of writing is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court."
In the case of Yu Changco vs. Tiaoqui, 11 Phil. 598, 599, 600, our Supreme Court said:
"Section 637 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that will proved and allowed in a foreign country,
according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded in the Court of First Instance
of the province in which the testator has real or personal estate on which such will may operate; but
section 638 requires that the proof of the authenticity of a will executed in a foreign country must be
duly"authenticated". Such authentication, considered as a foreign judicial record, is prescribed by section
304, which requires the attestation of the clerk or of the legal keeper of the records with the seal of the
court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate that
the signature of either of the functionaries attesting the will is genuine, and, finally, the certification of the
authenticity of the signature of such judge or presiding magistrate, by the ambassador, minister, consul,
vice consul or consular agent of the United States in such foreign country. And, should the will be
considered, from an administrative point of view, as a mere official document 'of a foreign country', it may
be proved, 'by the original, or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate, under the
seal of the country or sovereign, that the document is a valid and subsisting document of such country,
and that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal custody of the original. (Sec. 313, par.
8)."
In the case of Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, 611, 612, and 613, our Supreme Court said:
"It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November
3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To
this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code,
Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., Vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National
Library. But this was far from compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson (1918), 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was not showing
that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original under the seal of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
"It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and
not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals
in the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner.
"While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an
unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the
petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and
testament of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Vansley
and Joseph L. Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was
shown by another document that in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph County,
West Virginia, appointed Claude E. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of
Edward Randolph Hix, deceased ... However this may be no attempt has been made to comply with the
provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of
the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. ... ."
Granting that the will of Jose B. Suntay which was executed in Amoy, China, was validly done in
accordance with the law of the Republic of China on the matter, is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction

the existence of such law in China as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will? The
answer is in the affirmative as enunciated in Fluemer vs. Hix, supra, and in Yanez de
Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606. In the latter case, the Supreme Court said:
"A foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having in charge of the original, under the
seal of the state or country. It may also be proved by an official copy of the same published under the
authority of the particular state and purporting to contain such law. (Secs. 300 and 301, Act No. 190.),
(Syllabus.)
The provisions of section 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) are as follows:
"SEC. 300. Printed laws of the State or Country. Books printed or published under the authority of the
United States, or one of the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain
statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or country or proved to be commonly admitted in the
tribunals of such State or country an evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine
Islands are evidence of such law."
"SEC. 301. Attested copy of foreign laws. A copy of the written law or other public writing of any state
or country, attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the
state or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or writing."
The petitioner has presented in evidence the certification of the Chinese Consul General, Tsutseng T.
Shen, of the existence of the law in China (Exhibit B-3), relative to the execution and probate of the will
executed by Jose B. Suntay in Amoy, China (Exhibit P). Is that evidence admissible, in view of the
provisions of Sections 41 and 42 of the Rules of the Rules of Court. Is the said certification of the
Chinese Consul General in the Philippines a substantial compliance with the provisions of the above
mentioned section 41 and 42 of our Rules of Court?
This court has its doubts as to the admissibility in evidence of the Chinese Consul General in the
Philippines of the existence of the laws of Republic of China relative to the execution and probate of a will
executed in China. Such law may exist in China, but
"An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidence by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. ... If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office." (Sec. 41 of Rule 123.)
The law of the Republic of China is a public or official record and it must be proved in this jurisdiction
through the means prescribed by our Rules of Court. It is, therefore, obvious that the Chinese Counsel
General in the Philippines who certified as to the existence of such law is not the officer having the legal
custody of the record, nor is he a deputy of such officer. And, if the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
It is clear, therefore, that the above provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 123, sec. 41) not having been
complied with, the doubt of this court has been dissipated, and it is of the opinion and so holds that the
certification of the Chinese Consul General alone is not admissible as evidence in the jurisdiction.
The evidence of record is not clear as to whether Jose B. Suntay, who was born in China, but resided in
the Philippines for a long time, has become a Filipino citizen by naturalization, or he remained a citizen of
the Republic of China. The record does not, likewise, show with certainty whether or not he had changed
his permanent domicile from the Philippines to Amoy, China. His change of permanent domicile could
only be inferred. But the question of his permanent domicile pales into insignificance in view of the
overtowering fact that the law of China pertinent to the allowance and recording of the said will in this
jurisdiction has been satisfactorily established by the petitioner.
Both the petitioner and the oppositor have extensively urged in their respective memorandum and in the
oral argument in behalf of the oppositor the question of estoppel. The consideration of the points raised
by them would open the door to the appreciation of the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will which
is not of moment at the present stage of the proceeding. While the probate of a will is conclusive as to the
compliance with all formal requisites necessary to the lawful execution of the will, such probate does not
affect the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. With respect to the latter the will in governed by the
substantive law relative to descent and distribution. (In re Johnson, 39 Phil., 157).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and upon reconsideration, the previous decision rendered in this case
allowing the will (Exhibit B) and allowing and recording the foreign will (Exhibit P) is set aside; and this

court is of the opinion and so holds that the said two wills should be, as they are hereby disallowed.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is very significant that in the foregoing resolution, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan "reiterates its finding of the
same facts in this resolution," and merely proceeds to pose the sole question "whether or not the facts established by
the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant the legalization of the lost will and allowance and recording of the will that was
executed in Amoy, China." The somersault executed by the trial court is premised on the ground that "although the
petitioner has established the execution and validity of the lost will, yet he has not proved clearly and distinctly the
provisions of the will by the least two credible witnesses"; and that, assuming that the will of Jose B. Suntay executed
in Amoy, China, was in accordance with the law of the Republic of China, the certification of the Chinese Consul
General in the Philippines as the existence of such law is not admissible evidence in this jurisdiction. In effect the
resolution on the motion for reconsideration promulgated by the trial court, and the decision of the majority herein,
adopt the position that the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro as to the provisions of the lost will, while credible
and perhaps sufficient in extent, is not corroborated by the witnesses Go Toh and Ana Suntay and, therefore, falls
short of the requirement in section 6, Rule 77, of the Rules of Court that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly
and distinctly proved by at least two witnesses." That this requirement was obviously construed, to mean that the
exact provisions are to be established, may be deduced from the following dialogue between his Honor, Judge
Potenciano Pecson, and attorney Teofilo Sison, new counsel for oppositor Federico C. Suntay, who appeared for the
first time at the ex parte hearing of the oppositor's motion for new trial on September 1, 1949:
COURT: However, Rule 77, Section 6, provides in proving a lost will, the provisions of the lost will must
be distinctly stated and certified by the Judge.
ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: That presupposes that the judge could only certify to the exact provisions of the will from the
evidence presented.
ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: That is our contention, provided that provision is clearly established by two
credible witnesses so that the Court could state that in the decision, we agree, that is the very point.
(t. s. n. 75, Session of Sept. 1, 1948)
The sound rule, however, as we have found it to be, as to the degree of proof required to establish the contents of a
lost or destroyed will, is that there is sufficient compliance if two witnesses have substantiated the provisions affecting
the disposition of the testator's properties; and this is especially necessary to prevent the "perpetration of fraud by
permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof," to keep a wrong-doer from utilizing the rule as his "most
effective weapon," or to avoid the enjoyment of a "premium from the rascality of one whose interests might suggest
the destruction of a will."
Section 1865 of the Code requires that the provisions of a lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved
by at least two credible witnesses before it can be admitted to probate; but this section must receive a
liberal construction (Hook vs. Pratt, 8 Hun. 102-109) and its spirit is complied with by holding that it
applies only to those provisions which affect the disposition of the testator's property and which are of the
substance of the will.
The allegations of the contents of the will are general, and under ordinary circumstances, would be in
sufficient; but the fact alleged, if proven as alleged, would certainly authorize the establishment of the will
so far as its bequests are concerned. To require that a copy of the will or the language of the bequests, in
detail, should be pleaded, where no copy has been preserved, and where the memory of the witnesses
does not hold the exact words, would not only deny the substance for mere form, but would offer a
premium upon the rascality of one whose interests might suggest the destruction of a will. As said in
Anderson vs. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411: "The instrument in controversy having been destroyed without the fault of
the defendant in error ... and there not appearing to be any copy of it in existence, it would be equivalent
to denying the complainant relief altogether to require her to prove the very terms in which it was
conceived. All that could reasonably be required of her under the circumstances could be to show in
general terms the disposition which the testator made of his property by the instruments; that it purported
to be his will and was duly attested by the requisite number of witnesses." In Allison vs. Allison, 7 Dana
91, it was said in speaking of the character and extent of proof required in such a case:" nor is there any
just ground to object to the proof because the witnesses have not given the language of the will or the
substance thereof.They have given the substance of the different devises as to the property or interest
devised, and to whom devised and we would not stop, in the case of a destroyed will, to scan with rigid
scrutiny the form of the proof, provided we are satisfied of the substance of its provisions."
(Jose vs. Casler 139 Ind. 392, 38 N. E. 812).
The evidence in the case falls short of establishing the existence of such a writing, except as it may be
presumed, under the maxim Omnia preasumuntur in odium spoliateris." There was evidence tending to
show that the second will of Anne Lambie was in the possession of Francis Lambie, and that it came to

the hands of the proponents, warranting the inference that it has been suppressed or destroyed. If from
this evidence the jury found such paper destroyed the law permits the presumption that it was legally
drawn and executed, notwithstanding the terms of the statute, which requires the revoking instrument to
be formally executed. If a will be lost, secondary evidence may be given of its contents; if suppressed or
destroyed, the same is true; and, if necessary the law will prevent the perpetration of a fraud by
permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof. We cannot assent to the proposition that the
statute is so right as to be the wrongdoer's most effective weapons. The misconduct once established to
the satisfaction of the jury, it is no hardship to the wrongdoer to say. "Produce the evidence in your
possession, or we will presume that your opponent's contention is true." When one deliberately destroys,
or purposely induces another to destroy, a written instrument subsequently become a matter of judicial
inquiry between the spoliator and an innocent party, the latter will not be required to make strict proof of
the contents of such instrument in order to establish a right founded thereon. Brook, Leg. Max. 576,
Preston vs. Preston, 132, Atl. 55, 61. (Re Lambie's Estate, 97 Mich, 55,56 N. W. 225)
Judged from the standard set forth in the foregoing authorities, and bearing in mind that the circumstances of this
case lead to the only conclusion that the loss of the will in question is of course imputable to those whose interests
are adverse to the petitioner and the widow Lim Billian, we have no hesitancy in holding the view that the dispositions
of the properties left by the deceased Jose B. Suntay is provided in his will which was lost or snatched in the manner
recited in the decision of this Court in the case of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, 63 Phil., 798-797, had been more than
sufficiently proved by the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro, Go Toh, and Ana Suntay, supported conclusively by
the draft of the lost will presented in evidence as Exhibit "B", and even by the testimony of oppositor Federico C.
Suntay himself.
It is to be recalled that the trial Judge, in his first decision of April 19, 1948, made the following express findings with
respect to the testimony of Judge Teodoro: "Judge Anastacio Teodoro testified that he opened the sealed envelope
when it was given to him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation of the petition for the probate of the said will. As
the lawyer entrusted with that task, he had to examine the will and have it copied to be reproduced or appended to
the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth his salt as a good lawyer. He could not perform the stunt of "blind
flying" in the judicial firmament. Every step must be taken with certainty and precision under any circumstances. He
could not have talked about the attorney's fees with Go Toh, unless he has not examined the will beforehand. And,
when he was shown Exhibit B, he did not hesitate in declaring that it was the exact draft of the will that was inside the
envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto to the contrary notwithstanding."
We should not forget, in this connection, that in the resolution on the motion for reconsideration the trial Judge
reiterated the findings in his decision, although as regards the testimony of Judge Teodoro admittedly "the only
credible witness who testified as to the provisions of the will," he observed that Judge Teodoro had the draft Exhibit
"B" in his hands while testifying. We cannot see any justifying for the observation, assuming that Judge Teodoro
consulted the draft, since even the trial Judge granted that he "could have testified clearly and distinctly on the
provisions of the said lost will, because he had kept the will in his safe, in his office, for three days, after opening it,
and he is well versed in Spanish language in which the will was written." As a matter of fact, however, it is not true that
Judge Teodoro had the draft in question before him while testifying as may be seen from the following passages of
the transcript:
Q. And, have you read that will which was inside this envelope, Exhibit A? "A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember more or less the contents of the will?
ATTY. FERRIN: With our objection, the best evidence is original will itself, Your Honor.
ATTY. RECTO: We are precisely proving by means of secondary evidence, the contents of the will,
because according to the Supreme Court, and that is a fact already decided, that the will of Jose B.
Suntay was lost and that is res adjudicata.
COURT: Witness may answer.
WITNESS: I remember the main features of the will because as I said I was the one fighting for the
postponement of the hearing of the intestate case because I was asked by Don Alberto Barretto to
secure the postponement until the will that was executed by the deceased is sent here by the widow from
China, with whom we communicated with several letters, and when the will arrived. I had to check the
facts as appearing in the will, and examined fully in connection with the facts alleged in the intestate, and
there was a striking fact in the intestate that Apolonio Suntay has..
ATTY. FERRIN: (Interrupting) May we ask that the witness answer categorically the questions of Atty.
Recto, it seems that the answers of the witness are kilometric ...
ATTY. RECTO: Sometimes the question cannot be answered fully unless the witness would relate and
give all the facts.
COURT: The Attorney for the Administrator may move for the striking out of any testimony that is not
responsive to the question.

ATTY. FERRIN: That is why, our objection, the answer is out of the question.
COURT: Atty. Recto may propound another question.
ATTY. RECTO: I heard the witness was saying something and he has not finished the sentence, and I
want to ask the Court just to allow the witness to finish his sentence.
COURT: You may finish.
WITNESS: "A. There was a sentence, the point I was trying to check first was whether the value of the
estate left by the deceased was SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) as Apolonio Suntay made it
appear in his petition, and when I looked at the original will, I found out that it was several hundred
thousand pesos, several thousands of pesos, hundreds of pesos, that was very striking fact to me
because the petition for intestate was for SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00), and I came to know
that it was worth more than SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P700,000.00) PESOS.
Q. Do you remember, Judge, the disposition of the will, the main disposition of the will? "A. Yes,
because our client were the widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian, and his son, Silvino, the only son in the
second marriage, that was very important for me to know.
Q. How were the properties distributed according to that will?- "A. The properties were distributed into
three (3) parts, one part which we call legitima corta, were equally distributed to the ten (10) children,
nine (9) in the first marriage, and one (1) in the second marriage with Maria Natividad Lim Billian. The
other third, the betterment was given to four (4) children, Concepcion, and Apolonio getting a quiet
substantial share in the betterment, around SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) for Concepcion, Apolonio
the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND (70,000,00) PESOS or little over, and then about ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS of the betterment in favor of Silvino, the minor of the second
marriage, and to Jose equal to Concepcion.
Q. So the betterment, as I understand from you went to four (4) children?-"A. Yes.
Q. Silvino in the second marriage, Concepcion, Apolonio and Jose in the first marriage? " A. Yes.
Q. What about the free disposal?-" A. The free disposal was disposed in favor of the widow, Maria
Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino, his minor son in equal parts..
Q. What about, if you remember, if there was something in the will in connection with that particular of the
usufruct of the widow? "A. It was somewhat incorporated into the assets of the estate left by the
deceased.
Q. Do you remember the number of pages of which that will consisted? "A. Twenty-three (23) pages.
Q. Do you remember if the pages were signed by the testator? "A. Yes, sir, it was signed.
Q. And the foot of the testament or the end of the testament, was it signed by the testator? "A. Yes, sir,
and the attestation clause was the last page signed by the three instrumental witnesses, Alberto Barretto,
one Chinaman Go Toh, and Manuel Lopez, my former Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy.
Q. Do you remember if there witnesses signed on the different pages of the will? "A. Yes, sir, they
signed with their name signatures.
Q. Showing you this document consisting of twenty-three (23) pages in Spanish and which document
appears already attached to this same testamentary proceedings and already marked as EXHIBIT B, will
you please tell the Court if and for instance on page eight (8) of this document, pagina octavo, it says,
there are handwritings in pencil, some of which read as follows: "Los cinco-octavos (5/8) partes
corresponds a mi hijo Emiliano", can you recognize whose handwriting is that? "A. From my best
estimate it is the handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto.
Q. About the end of the same page eight (8) pagina octavo, of the same document Exhibit B, there is also
the handwriting in pencil which reads: "La otra sexta parte (6.a) corresponde a Bonifacio Lopez", can you
recognize that handwriting? "A. Yes, sir, this is the handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto, and I wish to
call the attention of the Court to compare letter "B" which is in capital letter with the signature of Don
Alberto Barretto in the envelope, "Alberto Barretto" and stroke identifies one hand as having written those
words.
Q. Will you please go over cursorily this document, Exhibit B composed of twenty-three (23) pages and
please tell the Court if this document had anything to do with the will which according to you was
contained in the envelope, Exhibit A? "A. This is exactly the contents of the original will which I
received and kept in my office inside the safe for three (3) days, and I precisely took special case in the
credits left by the deceased, and I remember among them, were the De Leon family, and Sandiko, well
known to me, and then the disposition of the estate, divided into three (3) equal parts, and I noticed that
they are the contents of the will read.
His Honor, Judge Pecson, was positive in his first decision that "the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is
corroborated by Go Toh, one of the attesting witnesses, in his deposition (Exhibit D-1)." Yet in setting aside his first
decision, he remarked that Go Toh's testimony did not prove clearly and distinctly the provision of the lost will,

because: "He did not, and he could not have done so even if he tried because the original will was not read to him nor
by him before or at the signing of the same. It was written in Spanish and he did not and does not understand the
Spanish language. Neither was there any occasion for him to have the contents of the said will, after its execution and
sealing inside the envelope (Exhibit A), read to him, because it was opened only when Judge Teodoro had examined
it and then subsequently snatched from Go Toh."
The later position thus taken by Judge Pecson is palpably inconsistent with the following unequivocal statements of
Go Toh contained in hid disposition taken in Amoy, China, on April 17, 1938, and in oppositor's Exhibit "6":
26. State what you know of the contents of that will.
. . . . Regarding (1) expenditures (2) Philippine citizenship; (3) Distribution of estates among children (4)
Taking care of grave lot; (5) guardianship of Silvino Suntay and (6) after paying his debts he will have
approximately 720,000 pesos left. This amount will be divided into three equal parts of 240,000 pesos
each. The first part is to be divided equally among the ten children born by the first and second wives and
the second part among the three sons Silvino Suntay, 75,000 approximately; Apolonio Suntay, 50,000
pesos approximately; Jose Suntay and Concepcion Suntay, 36,000 each approximately. The third part is
to be divided between Maria Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay; each will get approximately 110,000 pesos.
Silvino Suntay will get a total of 210,000 pesos approximately, Maria Natividad Lim Billian a total of
290,000 approximately, and Apolonio Suntay a total of 80,000 approximately, Concepcion Suntay and
Jose Suntay will get 60,000 pesos each approximately. The rest of the children will get approximately
29,000 each. The way of distribution of the property of Jose B. Suntay, movable and immovable, and the
outstanding debts to be collected was arranged by Jose B. Suntay.
xxx
xxx
xxx
78. On the occasion of the execution of the testament of Jose B. Suntay, state whether or not you say
Exhibit B ... Yes.
79. In the affirmative case, state if you know who had the possession of Exhibit B and the testament the
first time you saw them on that occasion. ... Yes, I know who had possession of them.
80. Can you say whether or not Jose B. Suntay happened to get those documents later on, on that same
occasion? ... He got them after the execution.
81. Please name the person who gave those documents to Mr. Suntay. ... Alberto Barretto gave the
documents to Jose B. Suntay.
82. Did the person who gave those documents to Suntay say anything to him (Suntay) at the time of
giving them? ... Yes.
83. If so what was it that he said, if he said any? ... He said, "You had better see if you want any
correction."
84. What did Mr. Suntay do after those documents were given to him? ... Jose B. Suntay looked at
them and then gave one copy to Manuel Lopez for checking.
85. State whether or not Mr. Suntay gave one of those documents to another man. ... Yes.
86. In the affirmative case, can you say which of the two documents was given and who the man was?
... Yes he gave Exhibit B to Manuel Lopez.
87. State whether or not Mr. Suntay said something to the man to whom he gave one of those
documents. ... Yes.
88. In the affirmative case can you repeat more or less what Mr. Suntay said to that man? ... He told
him to read it for checking.
89. State if you know what did the man do with one of those documents given to him. ... He took it and
read it for checking.
90. What did in turn Mr. Suntay do with the other one left with him? ... Jose B. Suntay looked at the
original and checked them.
91. What was done with those documents later on if there was anything done with them? ... After
checking, Jose B. Suntay put Exhibit B in his pocket and had the original signed and executed.
92. What was done with the testament of Jose B. Suntay after it was signed by the testator and its
witnesses? ... It was taken away by Jose B. Suntay. (Exhibit D, D-1.)
Q. Did you know the contents of this envelope? "A. I knew that it was a will.
Q. But did you know the provisions of the will? "A. It is about the distribution of the property to the
heirs.
Q. Did you know how the property was distributed according to the will? "A. I know that more than
P500,000 was for the widow and her son, more than P100,000 for the heirs that are in the family. (Exhibit
"6", p. 28).
Q. You stated that you were one of the witnesses to the will and that the will was written in Spanish. Was
it written in typewriting or in handwriting of somebody? "A. That will was written in typewriting.

Q. Did you read the contents of that will, or do you know the contents of that will? A. No, sir, because I
do not know Spanish.
Q. How do you know that it was the will of Jose B. Suntay ? "A. Because I was one of the signers and
I saw it." (Exhibit "6", p. 19.)
22. Do you understand the language in which that will was written? ... I know a little Spanish.
23. Do you talk or write that language? I can write and talk a little Spanish. (Exhibits D, D-1.)
As to Ana Suntay's corroborating testimony, Judge Pecson aptly made the following findings: "Ana Suntay, one of the
heirs and who would be affected adversely by the legalization of the will in question, also testified on rebuttal that she
saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay immediately after the snatching. She read it and she
particularly remembers the manner in which the properties were to be distributed. Exhibit B was shown to her on the
witness stand and she declared that the provision regarding the distribution of the properties in said Exhibit B is the
same as that contained in the original will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the testimony of Atty.
Alberto Barretto." And yet in the resolution on the motion for new trial, the trial Judge had to state that "Ana Suntay on
rebuttal did not, likewise, prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost will, because she has not had
enough schooling and she does not possess adequate knowledge of the Spanish language as shown by the fact that
she had to testify in Tagalog on the witness stand." The potent error committed by Judge Pecson in reversing his
views as regards Ana's testimony, is revealed readily in the following portions of the transcript:
P. Cuantas paginas tenia aquel documento a que usted se refiere? "R. Probablemente seria mas de
veinte (20) paginas.
P. No serian treinta (30) paginas? "Abogado Recto: La testigo ha contestado ya que mas de veinte
(20).
Juzgado: Se estima
Abogado Mejia:
P. Usted personalmente leyo el documento" "R. Yo leyo mi hermano en presencia mia.
P. La pregunta es, si usted personalmente ha leido el documento? " R. Si, lo he visto.
P. No solamente le pregunto a usted si Vd. ha visto el testamento sino si usted ha leido personalmente el
testamento? "R. Si la parte de la adjudicacion lo he leido para asegurarme a que porcion corresponde
a cada uno de nosotros.
P. Puede usted repetir poco mas o menos esa porcion a que se hacia la distribucion del alegado
testamento? "R. Como ya he declarado, que las propiedades de mi difunto padre se habian dividido
en tres partes, una tercera parte se nos adjudica a nosotros diez (1) hijos en primeros nupcias y segunda
nupcia, la segunda tercera parte los adjudica a la viuda y a Silvino, y la otra tercera parte se lo adjudica a
sus hijos como mejora a Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion y Jose.
P. Eso, tal como usted personalmente lo leyo en el documento? "R. Si Seor.
P. Quiere usted tener la bondad, seora, de repetir poco mas o menos las palabras en ese documento
que se distribuia las propiedades del defundo padre usted como usted relata aqui? "Abogado Recto:
Objetamos a la pregunta por falta de base, porque elle solamente se fijo en la parte como se distribuian
las propiedades pero no ha dicho la testigo que ella lo ha puesto de memoria, ni Vd. ha preguntado en
que lenguaje estaba escrito el testamento ...
Juzgado: Se estima.
Abogado Mejia:
P. Sabe usted en que lenguaje estaba redactado el documento que usted leyo personalmente? "R. En
Castellano.
P. Puede usted repetirnos ahora en Castellano algunas frases o palabras como se hizo la distribucion en
aquel supuesto testamento?
Abogado Recto: Objecion, por falta de base, uno puede entender el espaol y sin embargo no podra
repetir lo que ha leido, y no se sabe todavia si ha estudiado el espaol bastante hasta el punto de poder
hablarlo.
Juzgado: Se estima.
Abogado Mejia
P. Usted dijo que estaba puesto en castellano el supuesto testamento que Vda. leyo, usted poso el
castellano? "R. Yo entiendo el castellano, pero no puedo hablar bien.
P. Usted estudio el castellano en algun colegio? "Rj. Si, seor, En Sta. Catalina.
P. Cuantos aos? "R. Nuestros estudios no han sido continuous porque mi padre nos ingresaba en el
colegio y despues nos sacaba para estar afuera, y no era continuo nuestro estudio.
P. Pero en total, como cuantos meses o aos estaba usted en el colegio aprendiendo el castelano?
"R. Unos cuatro o cinco aos.

P. Entonces usted puede leer el castellano con facilidad, seora? "R. Si, castellano sencillo puedo
entender y lo puedo leer.
P. Usted entiende las preguntas que se le dirigian aqui en castellano sin interpretacion o sin el
interprete? "R. Si, Seor.
P. Puede usted contestar en castellano? "R. Bueno, pero como de contestar, por eso quiero que la
pregunta se me traduzca antes. asi puedo contestar debidamente. (t.s.n. pp. 533-534.)
We are really at a loss to understand why, without any change whatsoever in the evidence, the trial Judge reversed
his first decision, particularly when he announced therein that "it is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the
evidence whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased, left a will (the draft of which is Exhibit B) and another will which
was executed and probated in Amoy, China." His action is indeed surprising when we take into account the various
circumstancial features presently to be stated, that clearly confirm the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro, G. Toh
and Ana Suntay, or otherwise constitute visible indicia of oppositor's desire to frustrate the wishes of his father, Jose
B. Suntay.
In our opinion the most important piece of evidence in favor of the petitioner's case is the draft of the lost will, Exhibit
"B." Its authenticity cannot be seriously questioned, because according to the trial Judge himself, oppositor's own
witness, Atty. Alberto Barretto, admitted it to be "identical in substance and form to the second draft which he
prepared in typewriting." Indeed, all the "A's" and "B's" in the handwritten insertions of the draft are very similar to
those in Barretto's admittedly genuine signature on the envelope, Exhibit "A." The finding of Judge Pecson on the
point in his first decision (reiterated expressly in the resolution on the motion for new trial), should control, not only
because it is in accordance with the evidence but because the oppositor had failed and did not even attempt to have
the trial Judge reconsider or reverse his factual conclusions. The draft, Exhibit "B," having been positively identified by
the witnesses for the petitioner to be an exact copy of the lost will of Jose B. Suntay, is therefore conclusive.
Oppositor's effort to show that said draft was never signed in final form, and was thought of merely to deceive
petitioner's mother, Lim Billian, and that the will actually executed and put in the envelope, Exhibit "A", provided that
the testator's estate would be divided equally among his heirs, as in the case of intestacy, was necessarily futile
because, if this allegation is true, the will would not have been "snatched" from Go Toh and the loss certainly
cannot be imputed to the widow Lim Billian or the petitioner; the snatched will would have been produced to put an
end to petitioner's and his mother's claim for greater inheritance or participation under the lost will; and the envelope
containing the first will providing for equal shares, would not have been entrusted to the care and custody of the
widow Lim Billian.
It is very noteworthy that out of the nine children of the first marriage, only Angel, Jose and Federico Suntay had
opposed the probate of the will in question; the rest, namely, Ana, Aurora, Concepcion, Lourdes, Manuel and Emiliano
Suntay, having expressly manifested in their answer that they had no opposition thereto, since the petitioner's
alternative petition "seeks only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father." This
attitude is significantly an indication of the justness of petitioner's claim, because it would have been to their greater
advantage if they had sided with oppositor Federico Suntay in his theory of equal inheritance for all the children of
Jose B. Suntay. Under the lost will or its draft Exhibit "B", each of the Suntay children would receive only some P
25,000.00, whereas in case of intestacy or under the alleged will providing for equal shares, each of them would
receive some P100,000.00. And yet the Suntay children other than Angel, Jose and Federico had chosen to give their
conformity to the alternative petition in this case.
Another unequivocal confirmation of the lost will is the will which Jose B. Suntay executed in Amoy, Fookien, China,
on January 4, 1931, and probated in Amoy District Court, China, containing virtually the same provisions as those in
the draft Exhibit "B". What better evidence is there of an man's desire or insistence to express his last wishes than the
execution of a will reiterating the same provisions contained in an earlier will. Assuming that the Chinese will cannot
be probated in the jurisdiction, its probative value as corroborating evidence cannot be ignored.
Oppositor himself had admitted having read the will in question under which the widow Lim Billian was favored; and
this again in a way goes to corroborate the evidence for the petitioner as to the contents of the will sought to be
probated.
COURT:
Q. Have you read the supposed will or the alleged will of your father? "A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q. Can you tell the court the share or participation in the inheritance of Maria Natividad Lim Billian
according to the will?
A. Yes sir, she will inherit, I think, two-thirds (2/3) of the estate, in other words she is the most favored in
the will, so when they sold that, they sold everything, they are selling everything even the conjugal
property. (t. s. n. 228-229.)
The decision of the majority leans heavily on the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto, forgetful perhaps of the fact that
the trial Judge gave no credence to said witness. It should be repeated that Judge Pecson reiterated in the resolution

on the motion for new trial all his findings in the first decision. If as Atty. Barretto testified, Lim Billian was entitled
under the will actually signed by Jose Suntay only to P10,000.00, in addition to properties in China value at
P15,000.00, the fees of P25,000.00 admittedly asked by him would absorb her entire inheritance; and this would
normally not be done by any law practitioner. Upon the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that Atty. Barretto
might have become hostile to the petitioner and his mother Lim Billian in view of the latter's refusal to agree to the
amount of P25,000.00 and her offer to pay only P100.00. There is also evidence tending to show that as early as
1942, Atty. Barretto was paid by oppositor Federico Suntay the sum of P16,000.00 which, although allegedly for
services in the testate proceedings, was paid out of the personal funds of said oppositors to supply Atty. Barretto's
needs. This circumstances perhaps further explains why the latter had to support the side of Federico Suntay.
We have quoted in full the decision of this court in the "snatching" case and the first decision of Judge Pecson in this
case, both in the hope and in the belief (1) that the first would reveal the manner by which those adversely affected
had planned to prevent the last wishes of the deceased Jose B. Suntay from being carried on, and (2) that the
second, by the facts correctly recited therein and by the force and accuracy of its logic would amply show the
weakness and utter lack of foundation of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration. We have set forth at length
pertinent portions of the testimony of various witnesses to demonstrate more plainly the plausibility of the original
decision of Judge Pecson, and the latter's consequent bad judgment in having forced himself to accomplish a
somersault, a feat which the majority, in my opinion, have mistakenly commended. We have found this to be one of
the cases of this court in which we have had occasion to participate, where there can be absolutely no doubt as to the
result outright reversal for which, with due respect to the majority opinion, we vote without hesitancy.
Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION
5 November 1954
PADILLA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on 31 July 1954, affirming the decree of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan which disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and the
alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay, without
pronouncement as to costs, on grounds that will presently be taken up and discussed.
Appellant points to an alleged error in the decision where it states that
. . . This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof, . . .
because according to him the "will was lost before not after (the) filing of the petition." This slight error, if it is an error
at all, does not, and cannot, after the conclusions and pronouncements made in the judgment rendered in the case. In
his alternative petition the appellant alleges:
4. That on October 15, 1934, Marian Natividad Lim Billian, the mother of herein petitioner filed a petition
in this court for the allowance and probate of a last will and testament executed, and signed in the
Philippines in the year 1929 by said deceased Jose B. Suntay. (P. 3, amended record on appeal.)
If such will and testament was already lost or destroyed at the time of the filing of the petition by Maria Natividad Lim
Billian (15 October 1934), the appellant would have so stated and alleged. If Anastacio Teodoro, a witness for the
appellant, is to be believed when he testified
. . . that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948), ... Go Toh arrived at his
law office in the De Los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p.
32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 19470 . . .
and
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro and returned by the
latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, . . .
then on 15 October 1934, the date of the filing of the petition, the will was not yet lost. And if the facts alleged in
paragraph 5 of the appellant's alternative petition which states:
That this Honorable Court, after hearing, denied the aforesaid petition for probate filed by Maria Natividad
Lim Billian in view of the loss and/or destruction of said will subsequent to the filing of said petition
and priorto the hearing thereof, and the alleged insufficiency of the evidence adduced to established the
loss and/or destruction of the said will, (Emphasis supplied, P. 3, amended record on appeal.)
may be relied upon, then the alleged error pointed out by the appellant, if it is an error, is due to the allegation in said
paragraph of his alternative petition. Did the appellant allege the facts in said paragraph with reckless abandon? Or,
did the appellant make the allegation as erroneously as that which he made in paragraph 10 of the alternative petition
that "his will which was lost and ordered probated by our Supreme Court in G. R. No. 44276, above referred to?" (P.

7, amended record on appeal.) This Court did not order the probate of the will in said case because if it did, there
would have been no further and subsequent proceedings in the case after the decision of this Court referred to had
been rendered and had become final. Be that as it may, whether the loss of the will was before or subsequent to the
filing of the petition, as already stated, the fact would not affect in the slightest degree the conclusions and
pronouncements made by this Court.
The appellant advances the postulate that the decision of this Court in the case of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, G. R. No.
44276, 63 Phil., 793, constitutes res judicata on these points: (a) that only one will was prepared by attorney Barretto,
and (b) that the issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or draft of the
snatched will, and contends that these points already adjudged were overlooked in the majority opinion. The decision
of this Court in the case referred to does not constitute res judicata on the points adverted to by the appellant. The
only point decided in that case is that "the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the
envelope." In the opinion of this Court, this circumstance justified "the presentation of secondary evidence of its
contents and of whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities." That is all that was
decided. This Court further said:
The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and from what has taken place we deduce
that it was not petitioner's intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, and other points involved
herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated, whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether
the latter was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate. The testimony of Alberto
Barretto bears importantly in this connection. (P. 796, supra.)
Appellant's contention that the question before the probate court was whether the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or
draft of the snatched will is a mistaken interpretation and view of the decision of this Court in the case referred to, for
if this Court did make that pronouncement, which, of course, it did not, such pronouncement would be contrary to law
and would have been a grievous and irreparable mistake, because what the Court passed upon and decided in that
case, as already stated, is that there was sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the of the will and that the next step
was to prove by secondary evidence its due execution in accordance with the formalities of the law and its contents,
clearly and districtly, by the testimony of at least two credible witnesses. 1
The appellant invokes Rule 133 to argue that Rule 77 should not have been applied to the case but the provisions of
section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), for the reason that this case had been commenced before
the Rules of Court took effect. But Rule 133 cited by the appellant provides:
These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1940. They shall govern all cases brought after they take effect,
andalso all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court
their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall
apply.(Emphasis supplied.)
So, Rule 77 applies to this case because it was a further proceedings in a case then pending. But even if section 623
of the Code of Civil Procedure were to be applied, still the evidence to prove the contents and due execution of the
will and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration must be established "by full evidence to
the satisfaction of the Court." This requirement may even be more strict and exacting than the two-witness rule
provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The underlying reason for the exacting provisions found in section 623 of Act No.
190 and section 6, Rule 77, the product of experience and wisdom, is to prevent imposters from foisting, or at least to
make for them difficult to foist, upon probate courts alleged last wills or testaments that were never executed.
In commenting unfavorably upon the decree disallowing the lost will, both the appellant and the dissenting opinion
suffer from an infirmity born of a mistaken premise that all the conclusions and pronouncements made by the probate
court in the first decree which allowed the probate of the lost will of the late Jose B. Suntay must be accepted by this
Court. This is an error. It must be borne in mind that this is not a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of
the Court of Appeals on questions of law where the findings of fact by said Court are binding upon this Court. This is
an appeal from the probate court, because the amount involved in the controversy exceeds P50,000, and this Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction must review the evidence and the findings of fact and legal pronouncements
made by the probate court. If such conclusions and pronouncements are unjustified and erroneous this Court is in
duty bound to correct them. Not long after entering the first decree the probate court was convinced that it had
committed a mistake, so it set aside the decree and entered another. This Court affirmed the last decree not precisely
upon the facts found by the probate court but upon facts found by it after a careful review and scrutiny of the
evidence, parole and documentary. After such review this Court has found that the provisions of the will had not been
established clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses and that conclusion is unassailable because it is
solidly based on the established facts and in accordance with law.
The appellant and the dissent try to make much out of a pleading filed by five (5) children and the widow of Apolonio
Suntay, another child of the deceased by the first marriage, wherein they state that
. . . in answer to the alternative petition filed in these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through counsel,
dated June 18, 1947, to this Honorable Court respectfully state that, since said alternative petition seeks

only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father, they have no opposition
thereto. (Pp. 71-72, amended record on appeal.)
Does that mean that they were consenting to the probate of the lost will? Of course not. If the lost will sought to be
probated in the alternative petition was really the will of their late father, they, as good children, naturally had, could
have, no objection to its probate. That is all that their answer implies and means. But such lack of objection to the
probate of the lost will does not relieve the proponent thereof or the party interested in its probate from establishing its
due execution and proving clearly and distinctly the provisions thereof at least two credible witnesses. It does not
mean that they accept the draft Exhibit B as an exact and true copy of the lost will and consent to its probate. Far
from it. In the pleading copied in the dissent, which the appellant has owned and used as argument in the motion for
reconsideration, there is nothing that may bolster up his contention. Even if all the children were agreeable to the
probate of said lost will, still the due execution of the lost will must be established and the provisions thereof proved
clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The appellant's effort
failed to prove what is required by the rule. Even if the children of the deceased by the first marriage, out of
generosity, were willing to donate their shares in the estate of their deceased father or parts thereof to their step
mother and her only child, the herein appellant, still the donation, if validly made, would not dispense with the
proceedings for the probate of the will in accordance with section 6, Rule 77, because the former may convey by way
of donation their shares in the state of their deceased father or parts thereof to the latter only after the decree
disallowing the will shall have been rendered and shall have become final. If the lost will is allowed to probate there
would be no room for such donation except of their respective shares in the probated will.
The part of the deposition of Go Toh quoted in the motion for reconsideration which appellant underscores does not
refer to Go Toh but to Manuel Lopez. Even if Go Toh heard Manuel Lopez read the draft (Exhibit B) for the purpose of
checking it up with the original held and read by Jose B. Suntay, Go Toh should not have understood the provisions of
the will because he knew very little of the Spanish language in which the will was written (answer to 22nd and 23rd
interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory). In fact, he testifies in his deposition that all he knows about the
contents of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to 25th
interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the
same as those of the draft [Exhibit B] (answers to 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory); that Mrs. Suntay
had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answer to the 67th
interrogatory); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft [Exhibit B] (answers to X6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories). We repeat that
. . . all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because
he came to know or he learned of them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading
the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
This finding cannot be contested and assailed.
The appellant does not understand how the Court came to the conclusion that Ana Suntay, a witness for the appellant
could not have read the part of the will on adjudication. According to her testimony "she did not read the whole will but
only the adjudication," which, this Court found, "is inconsistent with her testimony in chief (to the effect) that "after
Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document of Manuel, and he went away." (P. 528, t. s. n., hearing
of 24 February 1948.) And appellant asks the question: "Who went away? Was it Manuel or Apolonio?" In answer to
his own question the appellant says: "The more obvious inference is that it was Apolonio and not Manuel who went
away." This inference made by the appellant not only is not obvious but it is also illogical, if it be borne in mind that
Manuel came to the house of Apolonio and it happened that Ana was there, according to her testimony. So the
sentence "he went away" in Ana's testimony must logically and reasonably refer to Manuel, who was a caller or visitor
in the house of his brother Apolonio and not to the latter who was in his house. If it was Apolonio who "went away,"
counsel for the appellant could have brought that out by a single question. As the evidence stands could it be said
that the one who went away was Apolonio and not Manuel? The obvious answer is that it was Manuel. That inference
is the result of a straight process of reasoning and clear thinking.
There is a veiled insinuation in the dissent that Alberto Barretto testified as he did because he had been paid by
Federico C. Suntay the sum of P16,000. Federico C. Suntay testifies on the point thus
Q. You mentioned in your direct testimony that you paid certain amount to Atty. Alberto Barretto for
services rendered, how much did you pay? A. Around SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00).
Q. When did you make the payment? A. During the Japanese time.
Q. Did you state that fact in any accounts you presented to the Court? A. I do not quite remember that.
. . . (P. 180, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947.)
Q. When you made that payment, was (it) your intention to charge it to the state or to collect it later from
the estate? A. Yes, sir.
Q. More or less when was such payment made, during the Japanese time, what particular month and
year, do you remember? A. I think in 1942.

Q. And you said you paid him because of services he rendered? A. Upon the order to the Court.
Q. And those services were precisely because he made a will and he made a will which was lost, the will
of Jose B. Suntay? ... (P. 181, t. s. n., supra.) A. I think I remember correctly according to exRepresentative Vera who is the administrator whom I followed at that time, that was paid according to the
services rendered by Don Alberto Barretto with regard to our case in the testamentaria but he also
rendered services to my father.
Q. At least your Counsel said that there was an order of the Court ordering you to pay that, do you have
that copy of the order? A. Yes, sir, I have, but I think that was burned. (P. 184, t. s. n., supra.).
So the sum of P16,000 was paid upon recommendation of the former administrator and order of the probate court for
services rendered by Alberto Barretto not only in the probate proceedings that also for services rendered to his father.
But if this sum of P16,000 paid to Alberto Barretto upon recommendation of the previous administrator and order of
the probate court for professional services rendered in the probate proceedings and to the deceased in his lifetime be
taken against his truthfulness and veracity as to affect adversely his testimony, what about the professional services
of Anastacio Teodoro who appeared in this case as one of the attorneys for the petitioner-appellant? (P. 2, t. s. n.,
hearing of 13 October 1947.)Would that not likewise or by the same token affect his credibility? It is the latter's
interest more compelling than the former's?
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 139868
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J. (Chairperson)
- versus - *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CANDELARIA GUERSEYDALAYGON, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey
died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. [1] The will
was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment. [2]The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner)
of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator. [3]
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. [4] As administrator of Audreys
estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal
share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued
at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3)
64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.[5]

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. [6] The will was also admitted
to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as
executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.[7] Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey in favor of the
estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City
Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.[18]

[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.[19]
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and
Kyle as heirs of Audrey. [9] Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with
Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.[10]
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.
[11]
The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No.
69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey
( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.[12]
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate
of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.[13]

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely
erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE
WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR, ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND
HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE
ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT
COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS. [20]

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were
allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State
ofMaryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy.[14] Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is conclusive upon the administration as to all
matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the
proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined, and the same has already been executed.[21]

The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property.The trial court also adjudicated Richards
entire undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.[15]

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant
laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also
imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating that as early as 1984,
he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.[22]

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 andApril 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[16] Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of
the State ofMaryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.,
to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that
it is to the best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares. Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be
set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. [17] The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubreys
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner
in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she
was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard
only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards
estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like
any other judgment in rem.[23] However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. [24] Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,[25] the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.[26]
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is BatasPambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a

judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. [27] For fraud to become a
basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, [28] and must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud.[29]
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners
failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The
CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that
petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit
Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will, [30]and the complaint was filed only in 1993.
Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to
question petitioners acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after
Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of
Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest. [31]
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of
Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the
time of respondents discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto,
and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.[32] Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for
annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court stated that
man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129,
where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining
to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.[34]
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[35]
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest
trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be

infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability
exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. [36]
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death,
she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18,
1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the
will was admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases
of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;[37] however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.[38]
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the
reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen,
domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm,
with a big legal staff and a large library. [39] He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was

incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge
the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their
rights.[42]

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders datedFebruary 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring
Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner.This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the
State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,[40] the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and
chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice
require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audreys
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle,
whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court
adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo
H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the
foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove
the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the
light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact
that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in
accordance with the will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established
under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the
avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also dutybound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of
Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of
good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the
defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his
direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey
ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas concern that the subject
realty equally benefit the plaintiffs adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject
estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud
under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as
well as the resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo
H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latters last
will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the
real issues involved in the case.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law
as a result of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to
which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded
from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was
beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it was
belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who
shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution, while Section 4-408 expressly
provides that unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the
legacy. Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that a personal
representative is a fiduciary and as such he is under the general duty to settle and distribute
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of
decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances.[43]
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audreys conjugal
share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares,
which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entireMakati property should have then passed on to
respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows a legacy to
pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy, was sufficiently
proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling
in Bohanan v. Bohanan.[44] Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the
same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we
have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905,
Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as
Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as
Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo
(see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the
trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project
of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not
dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the
entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,[45] wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the
same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life
making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special
purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament.
Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,

permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having
meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail over
Audreys and Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:[46]
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. [47]
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired
the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to
Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,[48] the Court clarified that the Parity Rights
Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of
lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against
acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the
exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former naturalborn citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.[49] In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a
Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in
1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner,
who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last
will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the
motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late
Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late
spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed
according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. [1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other.Upon denial of her motion
for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellants brief within the extended period granted. [2] This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989
and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of
execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the
TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory
Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that
the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the
said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before
the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no
jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will
that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain
the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. [3] Private respondents opposed the motion on the
ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become
final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:

The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened
no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial
court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts
and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.[4]

It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court,
the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question
determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different
motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata
and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever
closed.[5] Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due
execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated,[7] particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress,
fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, [10] that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will
has been authenticated.[12] Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, [13] the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in
a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been
declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must
at some point of time fixed by law[14]become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut
finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. [15] To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.
[16]
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence,[17] which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely
appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein
private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged
illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicatawith respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-

shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved
adversely by some other court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the
trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which
set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another
particularly when no project of partition has been filed. [19] The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that
petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and
at the same time it nullified the will.But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the
estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to
implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the
same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is
preferred to intestacy.[20] But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed
to give - Nemo praesumitur donare.[21] No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had
failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that
is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that
the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy
apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory
order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of
the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by
Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the
settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to
the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,

G.R. No. 174489

SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO,
NENITA A. PACHECO,

Present:

VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

and RAFAEL TITCO,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Petitioners,

BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

- versus -

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the
spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my
properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F.
LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R.
Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan],
Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal
age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

xxxx

LORENZO LAXA,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

April 11, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties
mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses
Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses
yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and
with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a
Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x[12]

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind
at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his
estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.[1]
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in
Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the
decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution[6] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the
notarial will of Paciencia.

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. [13] Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in
Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on
September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition [14] with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 2000 [15] allowing
Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981. [16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin)
home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.[19] Questioned by the
prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo
brain surgery.[20] The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father
can no longer testify in court.[21]
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition [22] to Lorenzos
petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-ininterest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.[23]

Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin
(Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 [8] and then on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R.
Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause [10] and on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, [11] in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his
wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr.,
Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or
titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. [25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of
Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and
resident of the USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.[27]
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of
Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be
genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the
properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed
administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USAwhile the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the
Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for crossexamination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31]
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino,
testified on his fathers condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical
certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. [32]
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan,
Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in
January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since
birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the
custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA
when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself
and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her transactions. [34] Further, Lorenzo belied
and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in
the Philippines when the same was executed.[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will
shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.[36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. [37] She claimed to have helped in the
household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of
her service in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were staying in the same house. [38] She served in the said household
from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.[39]
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for Paciencia to sign at the latters house.
Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that something was as same was placed inside an envelope. [41] However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them. [42] A few days after or on September 16, 1981,
Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and brought with her the said envelope. [43] Upon going home, however, the envelope
was no longer with Paciencia. [44]Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. [45] On cross examination, it was established that Rosie
was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,
[46]
and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.[47]
[40]

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. [48] He identified the Will and testified that he had seen
the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house and showed it to him along with another
document on September 16, 1981.[49] Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.
[50]
According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, [51] and it was he who explained
that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for
the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death. [52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia
allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of
God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia
not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away
or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them.[54] After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned
documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b)
disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the
Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. [58]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did
not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of
being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will. [59]Moreover, the
oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.[60]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution[62] dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE
OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION
11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS
FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law is apparent from the face of the
Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY.

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition thus:
[56]

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall

pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject
to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[65]These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code,
to wit:

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence,
medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand,
we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of
the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The
signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further,
the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the
presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In
fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind
when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the
will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or forgetful so much so that it effectively
stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was
not only magulyan but was actually suffering from paranoia.[67]
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.[68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of
the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less,
before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the
Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as
earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty
and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well
aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to
LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or
threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or
trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former
purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love
even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old
maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator
and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different
from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even
if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship
between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress,
influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not
supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if

not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. [71] Furthermore, a purported
will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude
of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced by the evidence
presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was
not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. If the
will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and
the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of
such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not
remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed
if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will
was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who
know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one
witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily
explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no
longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For
her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time,
Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed
any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public
to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her
sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be
disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it,
not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required
by law.[73]
Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be
before it that is controlling.[74] The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her]
estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby. [75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia,
the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from
their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6801

March 14, 1912

JULIANA
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas
and
Jose Santiago for appellee.

BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,

Kalaw

for

appellants.

TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting to probate a
document which was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have
been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th
of September, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded
by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a
former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed according to the formalities
and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his
mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death
suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired
and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva
ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the
medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto
Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney
have since died, and consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The
other three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was
executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following
manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property,
and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses
testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the
attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it
was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to
the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that
they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.

These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect accord with the
judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.

can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was
not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the
necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.

This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the testator's alleged mental
incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One
of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and
that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not,
because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing
witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or
not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced
age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and
he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.

The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the
authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established
the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this
court. The numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to
the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of
the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the
matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27;
Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)

Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his
testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the
testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the
decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and
after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity
on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor
Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the
latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was
propounded to Doctor Basa:

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar
never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is
therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they
have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly
held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making
a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and
mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of
wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement
that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of
mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.

Q.
Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think
he was in his right mind?

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person may
exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive
manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and
English Encyclopedia of Law, that

A.
I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because
when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis
and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time
of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to
make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had
noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question
as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as
the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had
heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the
testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost.
In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a
person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants.
Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with
paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them
attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There

Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary
capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and
still be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this
statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval
in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession
of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a
disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of
disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to

enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed
his will. (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The testator died at
the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to
his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became
very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the properties of life.
The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will,
if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it
be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
xxx

xxx

In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the
court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years
of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity
to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on
this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any
particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged.
The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of
this instance against the appellants.
September 18, 1909

CATALINA
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
Rodriguez
and
Fernando Salas for appellee.
CARSON, J.:

Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in the
manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that
the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of
making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, signed by him in
the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.

xxx

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and
mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his
life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent
events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for
sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when
he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he
was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.

G.R. No. 4445

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to probate a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his
widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are
brothers and sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate
were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.

Del

BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,

Rosario

for

appellants.

Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario, testified in support of the will, the latter being
the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all
important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was made. It does not
appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes
no comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason
therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because of death, sickness, absence, or for any
other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate,
the reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in
cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that the testator, at
the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his
last will and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each other, they as well as the third
subscribing witness. Despite the searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel
for appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which
occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction, however, which we think is more apparent
than real. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after
its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and
was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that his wife aided the sick
man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument, and that he was given nourishment while
he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately before or after, or both before and after
he attached his signature to the will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in
conflict with the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that
nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the will, and that one witness might
remember the former occasion and the other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both.
But, however this may have been, we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other
witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly
directed, is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their
recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of contradictions in the testimony of
alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or even a single
contradiction as to a particular incident, where the incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who
was present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and
explicit as to negative the possibility or probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the
witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it is alleged the will was executed; but the
apparent contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their

veracity, and on the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that
occurred, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them
testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time and on the occasion
when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the
testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for
him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at
or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this
being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other witnesses, one
is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative.
These witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time when
it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house,
and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make himself understood, and
that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy
of credence. In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and settled
purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear to any
fact which he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the
deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his
anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the
admittedly genuine signature was not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response
to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former answer
was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because his brother and his
brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and sisters had not
visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further, that,
although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit their dying
brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true, it
would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely
pretended to have joined in its execution on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness
happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would furnish
conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time
and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not think that the testimony of this
witness nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in
which it was executed.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence, and
upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the
opinion of the trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the presiding judge of
this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures;
nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures, and does not find that any material
differences exists between the same. It is true that the signature which appears in the document offered
for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his
movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other
fact, that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was
not in the habit of signing his name every day.

These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two signatures, but the
court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is
true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis
complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was
subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or
a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by
the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will
clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his
testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow,
and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will,
they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will.
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line;
that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations
with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter
that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or
attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow
and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends
to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise
corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the degree of mental capacity of
a particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental
capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is
probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental
capacity requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs. Newell,
62 III., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary
capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial
imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble
minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what
he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs.Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has not been understood that a
testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few
indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would,
according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the
derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J.
L.,680); and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of
degree" (Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that
"testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind.

Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or
from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really
disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in"
(Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary
capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has
already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the
elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently
announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity
has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the
absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements in sufficient to
establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the instrument
propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites
prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed
the instrument of his own free will and accord.
The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-25966

November 1, 1926

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ
LOPEZ
DE
BUENO,
heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida,
Capili
and
Ocampo
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

and

Camus,

Delgado

and

Recto

for

appellant.

STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant,
Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The
trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.

The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his
last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter
Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of
taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7,
1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented
his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat
Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has
been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares
that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward
in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted
application to the situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F.
Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian
and ward existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that
accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons
so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us
we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This
article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had
been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in
the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half
of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita
Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the
Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as
heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that
legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to
succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez
was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and
that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the
provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all;
and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more
specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it
does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions
under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be

considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true
that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of
the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this
interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the
Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is
impossible.

This is an appeal taken by the opponent Marciana Abella from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession
occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in
paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to
receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and
incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under
article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an
interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was
not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a
case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.

In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in the decision of the court a quo, to wit:

The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion
that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of
the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent
supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius
Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the
time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition
be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p.
225.)lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a
certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known,
partial testacy systems a presumption against it, a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the
testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-39033

November 13, 1933

In re will of the late Matea

vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.
Sotto
and
B. Quitoriano for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

Abella.

MONS.

Astilla

SANTIAGO

for

SANCHO, applicant-appellee,

appellant.

Wherefore, this court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the opposition filed by Marciana Abella is
without merit and, therefore, it is hereby denied. The application filed herein is granted and the document,
Exhibit A, is hereby ordered and decreed probated as the last will and testament of the late Matea Abella.
So ordered.

1. The lower court erred in holding that Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and
executed the document, Exhibit A, as a true expression of her last will.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the requirements of the law have been complied with in the
execution of the will, Exhibit A.
3. The lower court erred in holding that when the late Matea Abella affixed her alleged signatures to the
will, Exhibit A, she did not act under the illegal and undue influence of certain legatees.
4. The lower court erred in decreeing the probate of the will, Exhibit A.
The following facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence presented during the trial, to wit:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been informed that Dr. Antonio
Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a good physician. On April 13, 1932, she left her home situated in the said
municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said physician in his clinic in San
Fernando, La Union, stopping at the convent of the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of Father Cordero
with whom she was acquainted he having been the parish priest of Sinait. During her stay in the said convent, she
went to Dr. Antonio Querol's clinic twice within the period of one week accompanied by her aforesaid niece, Filomena
Inay, to consult the said physician who, after submitting her to a general medical examination, found that she was
suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton of the convent to call Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso to
whom she expressed her desire to make a will, in the presence of the Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda,
Macario Calug and the fiscal of the convent. Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to attend to other business, he
could not finish his interview with the testatrix on the first day and had to continue it the following day, also in the
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena Inay and some children who were then at the convent. Inasmuch as
he did not finish the interview on the second day, the said attorney returned again on the afternoon of the 28th and
continued it in the presence of the same persons who entered and left the sala. At the end of the interview, Matea
Abella ordered he niece, Filomena Inay, to bring her some papers which were in her trunk, which she delivered to the
said attorney. After the will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix, Macario Calug read it to her and
she approved it. When the will had been copied clean, it was again read to the testatrix and she express her approval
thereof, but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be postponed
to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was done. At about 7:30 o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1932, the
signing of the will took place in the corridor of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was the first to sign it on a table
in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other persons, including Father
Cordero. After the testatrix, each of the instrument witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each and
every one of the other witnesses. After the will had been signed, Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso delivered the original

and the copies thereof to the testatrix, retaining one for his file. On July 3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile
debility in the municipality of Sinait at the age of 88 years.
The opponent herein attempted to prove that the testatrix was deaf and that her eyesight was defective; that when
one moved away from her and again approached her she was unable to recognize him; that it was necessary to shout
into her ear to call her for meals; that she used to urinate on her clothes without being aware of it; that she had a very
poor memory inasmuch as she used to try to collect from her debtors in spite of the fact that they had already paid
their debts; that once, although she had sold a parcel of land for P60 she said she had sold it for P160; that she was
unable to go downstairs without assistance; that when she was called at mealtime she used to answer: "Why, I have
already eaten"; that she could not remember her properties nor the names of her tenants; that she could no longer
read; that she often repeated to her tenants the same questions regarding their crops; that she had been suffering
from the disabilities for more than two months previous to her death; that the deceased complained of headache and
of stomachache; that she already began to be dotty five years before, and particularly a few days previous to her
death; that in her will she bequeathed properties which she had already donated to other persons.
We are face to face with two divergent theories regarding the mental state of the testatrix Matea Abella at the time of
the execution of her will, Exhibit A. The opponent claims that, inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age when she
made her will, she was already suffering from senile debility and therefore her mental faculties were not functioning
normally anymore and that she was not fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to
prove that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection with her properties and interest; that she could not go
downstairs without assistance, and that she could not recall her recent acts.
On the other hand, as to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of the execution of her will, we have the
undisputed fact of her having left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13, 1932, in order to go to San Fernando, La
Union,
to
consult
Dr.
Antonio
Querol of whose ability she had heard so much regarding her headaches and stomach trouble, stopping at the
convent of the parish church; the fact of her having walked twice to the aforesaid doctor's clinic, accompanied by her
niece, Filomena Inay; the fact that she had personally furnished the aforesaid doctor with all the necessary data
regarding the history of her illness the fact of her having brought with her in her trunk the deeds to her properties; the
fact of her having called for Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso; the fact of her having personally furnished said attorney all
the data she wished to embody in her relative to her properties and the persons in whose favor she wished to
bequeath them; the fact of her not wishing to sign her will on the night of April 28, 1932, but the following day, in order
to be able to see it better, and the fact of her having affixed her signature, in her own handwriting, to the original as
well as to the copies of her will which consisted of nine pages. All these data show that the testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding
thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness, nor poor
memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making his ill (Avelino vs. De la Cruz, 21 Phil., 521;
Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227; Jocson vs. Jocson, 46 Phil., 701; Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485;
Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772; 28 R.C.L., p. 94, par. 44). The mere fact that in her will Matea
Abella disposed of properties, which she had already donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of
mental insanity. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of
certain donations.lawphil.net
It is insinuated that the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of her will. There is nothing in the records
establishing such claim either directly or indirectly. The fact of her having stopped at the convent of the parish church
of San Fernando, La Union, is not unusual in the Philippines where, due to lack of hotels, the town convents are
usually given preference by strangers because they are given better accommodations and allowed more freedom. In
the present case, the testatrix Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando, La Union. Inasmuch as Father Cordero,
the parish priest of the said town, was well known to her having served in the church of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, in the same
capacity, she did not have any difficulties in obtaining accommodations in his convent. The fact that Matea Abella

stopped at a convent and enjoyed the hospitality of a priest who gave her accommodations therein, nor the fact that
the will was executed in the convent in question in the presence of the parish priest and witnessed by another priest,
could certainly not be considered as an influence which placed her under the obligation to bequeath of her property to
the bishop of said diocese.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That neither senile ability, nor deafness,
nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom
is not in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of
the execution of the will; and (2) that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence sufficient to justify the
annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made in her will by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from
defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping at a convent within the aforestated diocese.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE
REGISTER
OF
DEEDS
FOR
ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA,
represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:1wph1.t
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in
Special Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the two deeds of sale
executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied the probate of the will, declared null and
void the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to pay damages to the
plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the
properties in their possession and to reimburse the latter the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the
properties from the date of the firing of the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are the following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all
their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson,
and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit

8), over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated in a
prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to
wit: t.hqw
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of the Alsua spouses,
which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by the spouses and all the above
named heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in the inventory
(Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five parcels of land Identified with the
figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock which are paraphernal
properties of the late Do;a Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children but five of them
died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code (old) to avoid
Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning the inheritance they are entitled
to in the event of death of one of them they have decided to effectuate an extrajudicial
partition of all the properties described in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and
conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land
area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the improvements
thereon specifically described from pages 12-20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of
5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
improvements thereon specifically described from pages 20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total
land area of 6,639,810 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real properties with the
improvements thereon specifically described from pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total
land area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. t.hqw
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit that the totality of
the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as described in the preceding paragraph,
constitute one half of the properties described in Annex "A", including any amount of cash
deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned to them as their
hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the conjugal properties but includes the
paraphernal properties waiving now and forever any complaint or claim they have or they
may have concerning the amount, value, extension and location of the properties that are

allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any claim they have or they may have over
the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the heirs acknowledge
that the properties which are left in the possession of the surviving spouse, including any
amount in cash, are even less than the one- half that should correspond in absolute
ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they
waive any claim that they have or may have over said portion of said properties or any
amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, including any right or claim they
have or they may have over the paraphernal properties of Do;a Tinay in the event the
surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the surviving spouse
waives any claim he or she may have over the properties assigned or adjudicated to the
heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The properties which were reserved for them (the
spouses) should be considered as his or her legitimate participation in the conjugal
properties and the fair compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the
surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be distributed in equal shares
among the heirs upon his or her death unless said properties of some of them have been
disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the provision contained
herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other heirs, in the concept of damages and
prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or adjudicated to
each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his share or participation in the estate
or as his inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the absolute owner of
the properties adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a Tinay separately executed their
respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of
the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the
other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to
constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared
that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would belong to the other
spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children. The holographic will of Do;a Tinay
written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus Alsua, resident
of and with postal address in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being
in the full possession of my mental and physical faculties freely and spontaneously execute
this my last will and testament in my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the

Spanish language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of January, 1955 in the
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I ordain and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still living and they are Francisco
Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during their
minority, single and without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during our conjugal
union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able to acquire conjugal properties
consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands and urban lands registered in the office of the
Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my spouse Don Jesus
Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal, and the other half, to my children
Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to
Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to
be understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as legitime to my above named
children have already been given to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25,
1949 and ratified on the same day, month and year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores
(Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of 1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to
respect and faithfully comply with each and every clause contained in the said document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the same
shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children mentioned
in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other
half to my children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without having to post any
bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this testament on this 5th day of
January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines. t.hqw
(SGD.
)
FLOR
ENTIN
A R.
DE
ALSU
A
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955
in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.

On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the Court of First Instance of Albay their
respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending
and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that
one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and
partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved
for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate
heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other
their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also
declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her,
would be divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of
the spouses, the surviving spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the
properties reserved for themselves.
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my spouse and I have
agreed to divide the properties which we have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would
correspond to me covers all the properties that I have partitioned among my children in the
Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr.
(Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties which
by reason of this testament I leave to my husband as his share and the other half that
corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that up to now have not been
disposed of, particularly the urban lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of
Albay and in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to my
husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus Alsua and my
children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my
aforecited children all the properties described in the above mentioned Document of Partition
dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits)
expressed in the same, and in the event that the properties granted to one or any of my
children should exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to another or others, I
hereby declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my children as their
inheritance from the free portion of my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance the part of the
free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property
of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those properties which we shall
acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will that
any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or would pertain to me, which have not been

disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned

heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August 14,1956. t.hqw
(SGD.
)
FLOR
ENTIN
A
RALL
A DE
ALSU
A
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate but similar codicil
in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956,
the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the probate of their
respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins
and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to serve without bond in an order
issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he
took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his
bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with
their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which
was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This
notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a) it
expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by
virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the
partition of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific
properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his
death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a Tinay had been paid, all her heirs including
Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q)
and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay.
On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the
proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will of November 14, 1959,
filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his

judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind
at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or
threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of
person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will
was not executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his
children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened
Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially confirming and
implementing the said partition of 1949 which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated November 14, 1959, the Probate Court
appointed her Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an
inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did
not include some properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached thereto as
Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus.
According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots with a total land
area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a
probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally
located in the business section of Legazpi City including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known
"Mayon Hotel" with an assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of
P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco
Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also
raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer,
Francisco claimed ownership over the same, alleging that she bought the properties from their father and presenting
the two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the sale of the 33 parcels
of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962
evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors filed
Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with damages, which upon agreement
of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay promulgated a decision on
January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which states: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS the Will
executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14, 1959, which had been
marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made the
basis for division and distribution of the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds that the sale on
August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid
sales and accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case
3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the
costs.

On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the appealed decision in a judgment
rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus t.hqw

above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions
be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set aside as it hereby
sets aside the decision appealed from in the following manner: (1) in Special Proceedings
699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and
W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void, ordering the
appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed
damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an accounting of properties in their
possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain, in the proportion that appertains to
them in the properties subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of
this complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties pertaining to (plaintiffs)
pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to
pay to the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.

The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S., 502: t.
hqw
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the
existence of the right of any living person, but to determine whether
or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the
pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal
direction of the mode of devolution of his property on death. There
is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to
attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and
frequently does receive no personal benefit from the performance of
the act.

Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four assigned errors, to wit: t.hqw
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the probate court
(Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will,
are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator Don Jesus Alsua
cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26, 1961 (Exh. U),
and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that the same is of no moment. The
controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by
acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner
Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their
mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently
petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which
petitioners claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private respondents from
questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the case of Testate Estate of
the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We
quote: t.hqw
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rile of
estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and

One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is

the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible
with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased
person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787;
Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672;
Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson,
S., Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581).
To that end, the court is, in effect, an additional party to every
litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of the deceased. Matter
of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of the
last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in
providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a wilt at the time of
its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be
his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the respondent court itself when it accepted
the findings of the trial court on the due execution of the questioned will and testament of Don Jesus, declaring: t.
hqw
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will and testament of
November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil
Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning accepts the findings of the inferior court
concerning the question, t.hqw
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About 2
weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to
make a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous
holographic will which he made on January 5, 1955 and also its
codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper
and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and
every page of said page he wrote on each page the word
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (Exh V-5, V-6,
consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed
Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio
Imperial, Sr. and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty.
Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his
lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly gave
more detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his four children. He handed to them a list and on
the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed
properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major
language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are always
in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will and
after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and
after making a few minor corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial to put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge
Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his home in Ligao,
in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses
should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay;
Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya
who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi
residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don

Jesus was requesting him to be one of the attesting witnesses to his

will. Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus,
considered it an honor to be so asked, and gladly went with the
Imperials. They arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;
Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they were ushered in
by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated at the
usual receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their
arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus
came down, carrying with him the will to be signed placed inside a
cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty.
Imperial and immediately joined them in conversation. Mr. Gaya
called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across the
road from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already
informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will that
morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials
had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don
Jesus, without much delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the
coming back of Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the
living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr.
Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who testified for the petitioner
declared that Don Jesus was in bright and lively conversation which
ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines.
At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about time
to do what they were there for, and this was followed by a more or
less statement from Jesus, who said: t.hqw
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a
ustedes que esten presentes para ser
testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y
testamento que ha sido preparado por el
abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis
instrucciones cuyo documento tengo aqui
conmigo y encuentro que, despues de lo
he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho
segun mis instrucciones, Como saben
ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.'
(pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of December 7,
1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table
on another part of the same sala for convenience in signing
because there were chairs all around this table. The will which
consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on
the round table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
assisting each person signing by indicating the proper place where
the signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first.
After signing the original and the two other sets, the three sets were
then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting witness.
After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as another

attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the
three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also
signed as the third attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don
Jesus signed ten times, one on the margin of each of the nine
pages, and at the end of the instrument proper. Each of the three
attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven
times on each set, one on the margin of each of the nine pages,
one at the end of the instrument proper and one below the
attestation clause. The original will was marked as Exh. A (or set A);
the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate of Don Jesus,
Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It was also
clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana,
Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed said
signing, and that when each of these three witnesses was signing,
Don Jesus and the two other attesting witnesses were present and
Witnessing said Signing. The signing by the testator and the
attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
as Notary Public with commission for the entire province of Albay,
notarized the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat which seal he
brought along that morning. After all the three sets were notarized,
they were all given back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the
same folder. At that moment, it was already about 12:30 P.M. and
Don Jesus invited all of them to lunch, which invitation was gladly
accepted by all of then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in
CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude that the same
had not complied with the requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA
Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the lower court declaring the
contested will as having been executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence.
This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence, there is no
further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the respondent appellate court have declared
that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in the
conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned
last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain details which were a little bit difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a
Tinay together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties of the spouses between the spouses
themselves and the children under the terms and conditions and dispositions herein before stated and to implement
its provisions, Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their respective holographic wigs both
dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced herein
earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don
Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in due time the partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay was
approved by the probate court on July 6, 1960.

The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 was an enforceable contract which
was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring
him from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956, and further barring him
from executing his new will and testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings
elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949
is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto. These
Articles provide as follows: t.hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of man,
may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances, except
those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with
Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may be deduced that the
privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will or
testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in the
exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new Civil Code, a person who
executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the
will, to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The court further added
that jurisprudence is to the effect that the partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates,
citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the
codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court
categorically declared the necessity of a prior will before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and
We quote the pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition made by Sabina
Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid
and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the
following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person
may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article is
found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the
authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in
a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments,
and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal consequences
of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children
the whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the
aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in
accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the
conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testamentary or legal
succession and should be made in conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the
order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given
a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during
the lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the
testator in order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and the
provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos
or by last will, must be understood in accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide
the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the
disposition of the properties to take effect after his death, and said act must necessarily
appear in the testament because it is the expression of the testator's last will and must be
surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part, to wit, the division in
conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make this division in the same will or in
another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words, the law, in article 1056 as well as in
article 1057, which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of
making the partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for purposes of partition
the formal solemnities which must accompany every testament or last will are not necessary.
Neither is it necessary to observe the special for. realities required in case of donations,
because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which
already have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could
not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks

of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that
property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter
vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently
desired to distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and one who
disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949
which under the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the
holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the
appellate court that a person who executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not
warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule,
therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it
erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the
provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will
with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and
inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only
be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained specific designation of
properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos
under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid donation to the children of
the other half reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be
divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties were not specifically
described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and in the amount of
the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it shall
produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be
given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which may be disposed of in such
manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the
provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or
her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid
donations of only one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and cannot
anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with
regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was distributed in accordance with
her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil, independently of the holographic will and
codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both

wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly
because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay and We find no
indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to
her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made
in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to wit: t.hqw
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado este mi
testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el
parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad
(1/2) para mis hijos en partes iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that "Should I acquire new properties after the
execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the
children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to
my children in equal parts." From the above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don Jesus
whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in the free portion of the conjugal
assets, and We quote that part of the codicil: t.hqw
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se sacara de ni cuenta
de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis
hijos en la escritura de reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la mitad de gananciales
que le corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos bienes que se
adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo declaro que es mi
voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran
pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis herederos
mencionados despues de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states: t.hqw
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance the part of the
free portion of my property which have not been allocated in favor of my children in the
Document of Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property
of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those properties which we shall
acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will that
any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have not been
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned
heirs after my death.

The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in the event that she
should be the surviving spouse. To stress the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally to the
children, upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on November 14, 1959 in view of Our
holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the
children, it follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her holographic win and
codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by any condition obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 and had in fact
conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of
Do;a Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for
his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil
Code is clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right
is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and
codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been
probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not
pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of
disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not
prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being
contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted to the remaining estate of Do;a
Tinay in her holographic will and codicil resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone,
and after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will and codicil, by making
another win expressly cancelling and revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of the
provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the extrinsic
validity of the will may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon
the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared inNuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA
499: t.hqw
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed to
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for ought that appears in the record, in the event
of probate or if the court rejects the will probability exists that the case win come up once
again before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a behalf that we might as well meet head-on the time of the validity of the provisions of the
will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 contained an express revocation of his
holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties
donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the
institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest

of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement
naming Francesca as executrix without bond.

The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility
from disease of body or from age-does not render a person incapable of making a will. t.hqw

Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties distributed to the children under the
Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the former had in fact
been included in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his last win was not
to revoke the donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion
of the conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which he received as his inheritance from Do;a Tinay.
The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated
otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free
portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity
and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a
weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and
memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is
disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been
held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).

If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot and
may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this
rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: t.hqw
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own Idea of a just
distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed
by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect what
the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased person. The only
functions of the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the deceased as
manifested in the wig. Once that intention has been determined through a careful reading of
the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the
place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or
bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of the
testatrix, first, because as already stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of
her property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate
means of ascertaining the inward process of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her
own attitude toward those who expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly benefited and favored the petitioner to
the prejudice of the other heirs who would have been entitled to an equal share under the extrajudicial partition of
1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not snow himself
to violate the previous agreement, and the other as one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had
been diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of age and in view of his
weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who,
for his part received instructions from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court, the better
explanation is the latter, which is not legally tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as
follows: t.hqw
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act,

The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is essential that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its execution, and under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the
absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the findings of fact of
the trial court on the due execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the
contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned
from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally
incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents. From these
accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he
wanted to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties should pertain; (b) the semifinal draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing
of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which ran
from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering, to
wit: t.hqw
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para ser testigos de
mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial
segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y encuentro que, despues de
lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes
tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other details which, in the words of the decision
"are a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus had
sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but insofar as
the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime, the
alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the properties under question to
petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been bequeathed to her in the will of
November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua
had regarded his other children with less favor, and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the
former depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the latter with disproportionate advantages or
benefits, to such an extreme as to violate his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition,
Exh. 8."

We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to reconcile with the ordinary
course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify
disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated
during his lifetime while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere
speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law does not require that a will
be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable
consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the
courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the
wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his daughter
Francisca when he had already assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don
Jesus desired to have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his
death may be a reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such
was actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as difficult to accept which
respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed
by and between Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents mainly contend that
the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no actual consideration paid. They further insist that the issue
raised is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. On the
other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the respondent court to set aside on appeal the factual
findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same principle applies even if
the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent
reversal of its findings of fact. But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle
that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute
correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the general rule, where
We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro,
93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);

In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion as to the nullity of the contested
sales was not supported by the evidence on record and adduced during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed of sale over agricultural lands
executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a forgery, and the signature of
Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or
threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also bears the signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery.
(3) Exhibit "F", a document dated August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness,
acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not
deny the genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated
November 26, 1962, in the amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit
"X-1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?
47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ", endorsements on the back of
the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment
case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging
the receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in payment of Balance of
Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary
evidence that in fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total consideration of
P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being without cause or consideration is
as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that there was no
need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that showed
what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children. The
two contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and "W", the
genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing.
That the consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don
Jesus were even signed by one of the private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the
payment of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his
allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus.
were in fact given to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the
annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate and
inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957); and

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of the given price.
Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there
was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so
inadequate to shock the court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value
of the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial
love must be taken into account.

6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos
vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The decision of the
Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with
costs against respondents.

3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6322

February 21, 1912

MEDIALDEA, J.:

DOLORES AVELINO, as administratrix of the estate of Pascual de la Cruz, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICTORIANA DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Buencamino,
Diokno,
Mapa,
Alfonso Mendoza for appellee.

Buencamino,

Jr.

Platon

&

Lontoc

for

appellant.

JOHNSON, J.:
The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, in which he had legalized the will of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the said Pascual de la Cruz was blind and
had been for a number of years, and was incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will were called as witnesses, and each
declared that the deceased was of sound mind at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and
signed the same in their presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other, as well as in the
presence of the deceased.
The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make his will because he was blind at the
time the same was executed and had been for several years theretofore. There is absolutely no proof to show that the
deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere
fact that he was blind. The only requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of
age and of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code
prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the
testamentary capacity, except age and soundness of mind.
In our opinion the record contains nothing which justifies the modification of the order made legalizing the will in the
present case. The order of the lower court admitting to probate and legalizing the will in question is therefore hereby
affirmed with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989
MOISES
JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.
Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA- G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus
AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-appellants," upholding the validity of three (3)
documents questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch I, which declared them as null and void; and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein
appellee's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra
Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio
Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner
Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject
matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson, as the party assailing its validity, but rather
by herein respondents, are the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13, Records) for the
defendant in the court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By this document Emilio Jocson sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of
ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On the same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged
receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) salaping Pilipino
na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang
inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si Agustina Jocson, na may
sapat na gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at naninirahan sa
Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at walang ano mang
pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong
ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon
din nais kong banggitin na kahit na may kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile ay dahilan
sa ang nakabile ay aking anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at ma-alalahanin, na
tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay
gagamitin ko sa aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang mahahalagang
pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano mang batas o
kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang
nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at iyon ay
dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)

2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14,

Records). On the face of this document, Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to Agustina JocsonVasquez, for the sum of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin
(camalig) located at Naic, Cavite. As in the first document, Moises Jocson acknowledged
receipt of the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino na aking
tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang
ibinayad sa akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa
kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi
malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale, "dated March 9,
1969, marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby Emilio Jocson and Agustina JocsonVasquez, without the participation and intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially
partitioned the unsettled estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, onethird (1/3) each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina JocsonVasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share
to Agustin for the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the preceding
documents, Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand (P8,000.00) pesos, which I,
the herein Emilio Jocson had received from my daughter Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell,
cede, convey and transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs and assigns,
administrators and successors in interests, in the nature of absolute and irrevocable sale, all
my rights, interest, shares and participation, which is equivalent to one third (1/3) share in the
properties herein mentioned and described the one third being adjudicated unto Agustina
Jocson and the other third (1/3) portion being the share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering the properties therein in the
name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the
name of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of
First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In his Second
Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the above documents, as
aforementioned, for being null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint for the reason that the nature of his causes
of action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants, through fraud, deceit, undue
pressure and influence and other illegal machinations, were able to induce, led, and
procured their father ... to sign [the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated price of P10,000.00,
which is a consideration that is shocking to the conscience of ordinary man and despite the
fact that said defendants have no work or livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null and
void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record
on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]

xxx xxx xxx

12. [With regards the second and third document, that they] are null and void because the
consent of the father, Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit, undue pressure,
misrepresentation and unlawful machinations and trickeries committed by the defendant on
him; and that the said contracts are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having been made
deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from participating and with the dishonest and selfish
motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him of his legitimate share on said properties
[subject matter thereof]; and that without any other business or employment or any other
source of income, defendants who were just employed in the management and
administration of the business of their parents, would not have the sufficient and ample
means to purchase the said properties except by getting the earnings of the business or by
simulated consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are living under the same
roof, especially so when the father has no need of money as the properties supposedly sold were all incomeproducing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record
on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his
father to Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the
considerations mentioned in the documents were merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing
that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to
lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties
were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of his parents. It further declared
the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because
they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties
subject matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of
the trial court's and ruled that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's complaint for annulment,
which is indisputably based on fraud, and undue influence, is now barred by prescription,
pursuant to the settled rule that an action for annulment of a contract based on fraud must be
filed within four (4) years, from the discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal contemplation is
deemed to be the date of the registration of said document with the Register of Deeds ... and
the records admittedly show that both Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968,
while on the other hand, the appellee's complaint was filed on June 20, 1973, clearly beyond
the aforesaid four-year prescriptive period provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively not simulated or fictitious
contracts, since Emilio Jocson actually and really intended them to be effective and binding
against him, as to divest him of the full dominion and ownership over the properties subject
of said assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles over the same were all cancelled and new
ones issued to appellant Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;

3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting, and the partition with sale
therein made by and between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, affecting the 2/3
portion of the subject properties described therein have all been made in accordance with
Article 996 of the New Civil Code on intestate succession, and the appellee's (herein
petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced (pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE
TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY
BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS
CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN
REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the
Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the
action for annulment must be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4,
Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is
deemed to have taken place at the time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De
Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but
Moises Jocson filed his complaint only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these documents
were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the questioned documents, We would have
sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of
conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in
fact merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale
with a simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the declaration of its nullity does
not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526).
Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of
simulated price, is imprescriptible.
II.

For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts
lack consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes more stringent where the documents
themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where the documents were
notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner
has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other source of income other than what she
derives from helping in the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and which was insufficient to
pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her
husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner
himself and his wife testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business (p.
40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and rice even
before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15,
1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil
Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was
no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina JocsonVasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint,
petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500;
and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for
the 1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference
between the market value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may not be so
shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken
into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code) and
there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father and his daughter is purely speculative which
has no relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter
therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the
properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were
enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and,
therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:

Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez
adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the
New Civil Code which provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes
this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes
vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it
is sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during the marriage in order that the
same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case ofMaramba vs. Lozano, et. al.
[L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated
that "the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during
the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative."
Similarly, in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication
that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA
391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present
proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that
the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to
the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio
Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27,
1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words,
the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of the property in the name of
only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26,
1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that
they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse
party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124
SCRA 154).

In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties
were acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties, though registered in the name
of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such
proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the
properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal
properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive
properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41947

January 16, 1936

In
re Will
of
the
deceased
VIVENCIO
vs.
FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON, oppositors-appellees.

Silvestra
Baron.
CUYUGAN, petitioner-appellant,

Pedro Abad Santos, Quirino Abad Santos, Francisco M. Ramos, and Aurelio Pineda for appellant.
Arturo
Joven
for
appellee
Guillermo
Baron.
Vicente J. Francisco and Jesus E. Blanco for appellee Faustina Baron.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga denying all the petition of Vivencio
Cuyugan for the probate of the will of Silvestra Baron.
The petition which was filed on February 1, 1933, recites among other things that Silvestra Baron died on January 30,
1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further
recites that she left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December
17, 1932, that she died single without forced heirs.
The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor and contains the following paragraphs which dispose
of her estate:
Que despues de pagados todos los gastos quese han de ocasioner desde que me caiga enferma hasta
el entiero de mi cadaver, los bienes y propiedades que he de dejar se repartiran buenamente y en partes
iguales mis hermanos Ilamados Guillermo Baron, con exception de todo el dinero en metalico y mi casa
de materiales fuertes construida en el barrio del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga que actualmente habita
mi hermano Guillermo Baron, porque estos los doy de una manera absoluta como herencia de mi
sobrino Vivencio Cuyugan.
Que a la muerte de mis hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, todos los terrenos que en virtud de este
test tamento les dejo en herencia, los doy herencia a mi so brino VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, por lo que,

encargo y prohibo a mis citados hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, que graven o pongan cualquiera
clase de obligacion sobre los bienes que les dejo en herencia.
The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" (t.s.n. pp. 170, 171). Both
copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David,
Valeriano Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator).
The petition for probate recites:
9. That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix
was about 80 years old, more or less, and was found and disposing mind, and not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.
The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased,
allege in substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and
physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will
was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
Upon the issues thus drawn by the pleadings of the judge of the Court of First Instance, after and extended trial and a
full consideration of the evidence, came to the following conclusion:
Opinamos que influyeron indebidamente e impropia mente en la voluntad ya debilitada de doa Silvestra
Baron por su avanzada edad la presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante
el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida de presenciarlo por algunos
soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino
Cuyugan a que ella firmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso declarando que no habia
otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su translado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hisciese
firmar documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y del algunos otros soldados, no solamente
cuando se otorgo el testamento, sino cuando ella fue transladada de casa contra su voluntad y cuando
se le hizo firmar el Exhibit 10, y por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una completa libertad para disponer de
sus bienes en testamento, o con pleno conocimiento del alcance de su contendido. Solo asi se explica el
que ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con quienes habia estado en
pleito, con pretericion de sus hermanos, especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia
conviviendo durante 40 aos . . . .
Sentadas las premisas de hecho y de derecho que an teceden, el Juzgado no puede menos de llegar a
la con ser legalizado como el testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Silvestra Baron. Cuando existen
pruebas suficien tes para concencer al Juzgado de que se ha ejercido in fluencia indebida en el animo
de la testadora y que como resultado de dicha influencia indebida esta ha otorgado el testamento de la
voluntad de la supuesta testadora sino de los que sobre ella ejercieron la influencia indebida.
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities required by the
statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the
oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary
capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the
will, for any other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was executed under due influence or by the fraud of
another presupposes testamentary capacity. In the present case the learned trial judge refused the probate of the
alleged will on the ground that it was executed under the due influence of other persons and we think the record

warrants his findings in this respect. The trial court also made findings of fact tending to show actual lack of
testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron and we have preferred to base our conclusion on that finding. The
testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron at the time she executed the said purported will.
The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical
collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced
age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Her grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who
reached the house about one hour or so after the old lady's collapse, telephoned a message to Vivencio Cuyugan at
San Fernando, some fourteen kilometers distant, that Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and
requested that a doctor be sent immediately, Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated the
patient with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a hypodermic injection in the
arm. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the
house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by
the proponent. Epifania Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron
and remained throughout the morning attended to her, testified that when she reached the house she found her
grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned;
that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a doctor but all the doctors in Magalang
were out whereupon she telephoned as stated to San Fernando for a doctor.
The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged will which she signed,
but all of them admitted that although they were in her house about two hours not one of them exchanged a single
word of conversation with Silvestra. The subscribing witness Zacarias Nuguid testified in part as follows:
P. Desde que los tres abogados Abad Santos, Silva y David y usted y Vivencio Cuyugan se acercaron a
la cama de la finada, hasta que tanto ella como usteded firmaron el testamento, ha pronunciado ella
alguna palabra? ha dicho ella algo o no? R. No recuerdo.
P. Pero, por lo que usted recuerda, ha dicho ella algo o no ha dicho nada? R. No recuerdo.
P. Usted ha dicho algo a ella? R. Nada.
P. El seor Quirino Abad Santos le ha dicho algo a ella? R. Nada. No he oido.
P. Los otros abogados Silva y David le han dicho algo ? R. No he oido.
P. Ella ha dicho algo a cualquiera de osos tres o a los abogados? R. No he oido que dijera algo.
P. Si ella hubiese dicho algo a los abogados, asi como los abogados hubieran hablado a ella, usted
hubiera oido porque usted estaba cerca, no es verdad? R. Si seor, hubiera podido oir.
P. Cuando el senor Silva termino de leer el testamento, dijo algo la vieja? R. No he oido que dijera
algo.
There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged will except that when
she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no
affirmative evidence that she understood the document when it was read to her. The person who read the will to her
testified as follows:

R. Despues de leido el testamento, tuve que entregarlo a doa Silvestra, y lo miro algun rato.
P. Y ella, efectivamente, cogio el testamento de manos de usted? R. Lo entregue a sus manos.
P. Y ella lo cogio con sus manos? R. Si seor.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J.:

P. Y lo tuvo en sus manos leyendo, mirando? R. Mirandolo asi.

It appears from the record that the plaintiff, upon the 17th of February, 1910, presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Pangasinan, praying for the probation of the last will and testament of Emigdio Zarate,
deceased, in conformity with section 630 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. The petition was accompanied by
the
original
will,
marked
"Exhibit
A,"
of
said
Emigdio
Zarate.

P. Pero, no lo leia? R. Lo estuvo mirando por mucho tiempo asi.

Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief beneficiary, Vivencio Cuyugan, and yet
so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't
know what drug the doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental
condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her name
to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he
suggested that they have her sign another copy (t.s.n. page 109) which was done.
She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days later. It was
immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it
secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons
that she made any will.
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in the forty-four
days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his
will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will
consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which
there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of
execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the
will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the
will in question.
In view of the premises, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

No.

6625.

October

24,

1911.]

JUANA CAGUIOA, administratrix of the estate of the deceased Emigdio Zarate, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MARIA
CALDERON,
opponent-appellant.
M.

"1. That the said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the time he authorized and signed his will.
"2. That he executed the said will under illegal and undue influence or persuasion on the part of some persons who
acted
in
behalf
of
the
beneficiaries
or
heirs.
"3. That the signature of the testator was obtained by deceit or fraud, for the reason that it was not his intention that all
that was recorded in the said instrument should be his will at the time he signed it; for the testator had informed the
opponent, Maria Calderon, before and after the said will had been signed, that he had not disposed of the one-half of
the house and lot now mentioned in the third clause, letter (a), of the said will, because the said testator recognized
that
the
house
and
lot
referred
to
belonged
to
the
said
Maria
Calderon.
"Therefore, the opponent prays the court to annul the will alleged to have been executed by Emigdio Zarate, and to
order that its probate be disallowed, with the costs against the petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library
After hearing the evidence adduced
conclusion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

pro

and

con,

the

lower

court

reached

the

following

"It having been proved completely on the part of the petitioner that the will in question was executed and signed in
entire conformity with all the requirements and solemnities set out in the Code of Civil Procedure, the court overrules
the opposition, sustains the petition, admits to probate Exhibit A, holding that the same is legal in all its parts as the
last
will
and
testament
of
the
deceased
Emigdio
Zarate."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
From that conclusion of the lower court, the oppositor appealed to this court and made the following assignments of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.

[G.R.

Due notice of said petition was given in accordance with law, and the hearing for the probation of said will was fixed
for the 9th of March, 1910. Later the said hearing was transferred to the 16th of July, 1910. On the latter date the said
Maria Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and opposed the probation of said will upon the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"II. The court erred in holding that the said Emigdio Zarate executed his last will and testament without illegal
persuasion or influence on the part of persons working in behalf of the heirs.

Florendo,

for Appellant.

Sison,

for Appellee.

"III. The court erred in holding that Emigdio Zarate executed and signed his last will without fraud and deceit being
brought
to
bear
upon
him.

SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; MENTAL CAPACITY; LAWFUL WILL. Held: under the facts stated in the opinion,
that the will in question, was duly and legally authorized by the deceased, he being of sound mind and memory, and
that the same was not executed under threats or fear.

"IV. The court erred in holding that the testator signed his will in the presence of four witnesses, Sabino Sandoval,
Esteban Sandoval, George Zarate and Eugenio Zarate, who, on their part, signed, each of them, in the presence of
the
others.

Pedro

Legazpi

"I. The court erred in holding that the deceased, Emigdio Zarate, was in the full possession of his mental faculties at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
his
will.

Ma.

"V. The court erred in holding that it was proved that the will in question was executed and signed in conformity with

the

requirements

and

solemnities

set

out

in

the

Code

of

Civil

Procedure.

the

"VI. The court erred in holding that the document Exhibit A, of the petitioner, is legal in all its parts, as the last will and
testament
of
the
deceased
Emigdio
Zarate.

The

"VII. The court erred in rendering judgment in this matter without waiting for the written argument of both sides.
"VIII. The court erred in not holding that all the proof taken together sustained the claim of the oppositor, Maria
Calderon.
"IX.

The

court

erred

in

imposing

the

costs

upon

the

oppositor."cralaw

virtua1aw

record
fourth,

fifth,

and

to
sixth

assignments

support
of

error

may

be

it.
considered

together.

During the trial of the cause two of the persons who signed the will as witnesses appeared and testified. They testified
that the deceased signed the will in their presence and in the presence of the other witnesses to the will; that they
each signed the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of the other witnesses; that the other two
witnesses who were not called also signed the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each of the
other witnesses. There is no sufficient proof in the record to overcome the declarations of these witnesses. We find no
reason, therefore, for modifying the conclusion of the lower court upon these assignments of error.

library

With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, it appears from the record that upon the 13th day of
January, 1910, Emigdio Zarate executed his last will and testament, the original of which appears in the record and is
marked
"Exhibit A."
Emigdio
Zarate
died
on
the
19th
day
of
January,
1910.
From an examination of said Exhibit A it appears to have been signed by Emigdio Zarate and by four witnesses,
Sabino M. Sandoval, Esteban Sandoval, George Zarate and Eugenio Zarate. From the record it appears that the
testator dictated his will in the Pangasinan dialect and it was then translated into Spanish. After the will had been
written in Spanish it was read to the deceased and translated to him in the Pangasinan dialect, and, according to the
allegations of the appellee, the said Exhibit A received his approval as his last will and testament.
The appellant alleges that at the time of the execution of the said alleged will of Emigdio Zarate, he was not in the full
possession of his mental faculties. This question was presented to the lower court. After hearing the evidence, the
lower court found that Emigdio Zarate, at the time of the execution of the said will, was in the possession of his
faculties. Two of the witnesses who signed the will, as well as others who were present in the house at the time the
said will was executed, testified that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of sound mind and memory at the time he
signed the said will. Practically the only testimony to the contrary adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower
court was the testimony given by two doctors, one of whom had not seen the deceased for many months before his
death,
whose
testimony
was
based
wholly
upon
hypothetical
questions.
The appellant attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some months prior to his death had been troubled with
insomnia, as well as some other physical infirmities. The hypothetical questions were based upon the question
whether or not a person who had been suffering with insomnia for some months would have sufficient mental capacity
to execute a will. The two doctors who appeared on behalf of the opponents testified that insomnia tended to destroy
the mental capacity, but that there were times, even during the period while they were suffering from insomnia, when
they would be perfectly rational. Even admitting that there was some foundation for the supposition that Emigdio
Zarate had suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not believe that the testimony was sufficiently direct and
positive, based upon the hypothetical questions, to overcome the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses who
were present at the time of the execution of the will in question. The evidence adduced during the trial of the case,
shows a large preponderance of proof in favor of the fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the full possession of his mental
faculties
at
the
time
he
executed
his
last
will
and
testament.
The second and third assignments of error may be considered together. Upon the question presented by the said
assignments of error, the lower court found from the evidence that Emigdio Zarate executed his last will and
testament without threats, force or pressure or illegal influence. The basis of the claim that undue influence had been
exercised over Emigdio Zarate is that a day or two before the said will was made, it is claimed by the opponent, Maria
Calderon, that the deceased promised to will to her a certain house (one-half of which seems to belong to her) upon
the payment by her to the deceased of the sum of P300. The P300 was never paid to the deceased and the said
property was not willed to the defendant herein. The agreement between Maria Calderon and the deceased, if there
was an agreement, seems to have been made between them privately, at least at the time the will was made the
deceased made no reference to it whatever. Those present at the time the will was made and the witnesses who
signed the same heard no statement or conversation relating to the said agreement, between the opponent herein
and the deceased. There is no proof in the record which shows that any person even spoke to the deceased with
reference to the willing of the said house to the opponent. There is nothing in the record to indicate in the slightest
degree that any person interested in the will, or who was present at the time of the making of the same, induced or
attempted to induce the deceased not to will the said house to the opponent herein. The theory of the opponent that
the deceased did not will to her the house in question is a mere presumption and there is not a scintilla of evidence in

With reference to the seventh assignment of error, to wit: that the court erred in rendering judgment without waiting for
the written arguments of both parties, it may be said that it is customary for courts to wait until the parties have
presented their arguments before deciding a cause, nevertheless, it is not reversible error for a court to decide a
cause without waiting for written arguments to be presented by the respective attorneys. It appears from the record
(p. 102) that the trial of the cause was closed on the 5th of August, 1910, and that the decision in the cause was not
rendered until the 5th of October, 1910, or until after two months had expired. There is nothing in the record which
shows that either of the attorneys during these two months asked for additional time in which to present their written
arguments. It also appears of record (p. 102) that the respective attorneys asked for fifteen days time within which to
present their written arguments. There is nothing in the record which shows whether they presented their written
arguments or not. If there was any fault for not having the written arguments presented before the decision was
rendered
in
the
cause,
it
was
clearly
not
the
fault
of
the
judge.
The arguments heretofore given seem to be sufficient also to answer the eighth and ninth assignments of error.
Upon a full consideration of the evidence and the assignments of error, we are of the opinion that the will of Emigdio
Zarate, deceased, was executed and signed in entire conformity with all the requirements and solemnities required by
law. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. 6845

September 1, 1914

YAP
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
Chicote
and
O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.

Miranda

TUA, petitioner-appellee,

for

appellants.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 23d day of August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap
Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that
the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said
petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the
deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.
Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing on the 18th day of September, 1909. Timoteo
Paez declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had
died on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was
present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that Anselmo Zacarias and

Severo Tabora had also signed said will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the
deceased.
Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong during her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death
she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there
were also present Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora and a person called Anselmo; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong signed the will in the presence of the witnesses; that he had seen her sign the will with his own eyes; that the
witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and in the presence of each
other; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will voluntarily, and in his judgment, she was in the
possession of her faculties; that there were no threats or intimidation used to induce her to sign the will; that she
signed it voluntarily.
No further witnesses were called and there was no further opposition presented to the legalization of the said will.

Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order of the 29th day of September,
1909, and to grant to said minors an opportunity to present new proof relating to the due execution of said will. Said
petition was based upon the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.
While it is not clear from the record, apparently the said minors in their petition for a new trial, attached to said petition
the alleged will of August 6, 1909, of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, and the affidavits of Severo Tabora,
Clotilde and Cornelia Serrano.
Upon the 10th day of March, 1910, upon the hearing of said motion for a rehearing, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield,
judge, granted said motion and ordered that the rehearing should take place upon the 18th day of March, 1910, and
directed that notice should be given to the petitioners of said rehearing and to all other persons interested in the will.
At the rehearing a number of witnesses were examined.

From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan
and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will
and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause.

It will be remembered that one of the grounds upon which the new trial was requested was that the deceased,
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, had not signed the will (Exhibit A) of the 11th of August, 1909; that in support of that
allegation, the protestants, during the rehearing, presented a witness called Tomas Puzon. Puzon testified that he
was a professor and an expert in handwriting, and upon being shown the will (of August 11, 1909) Exhibit A, testified
that the name and surname on Exhibit A, in his judgment were written by two different hands, though the given name
is the same as that upon Exhibit 1 (the will of August 6, 1909), because he found in the name "Tomasa" on Exhibit A a
similarity in the tracing to the "Tomasa" in Exhibit 1; that comparing the surname on Exhibit A with the surname on
Exhibit 1 he found that the character of the writing was thoroughly distinguished and different by the tracing and by
the direction of the letters in the said two exhibits; that from his experience and observation he believed that the name
"Tomasa" and "Yap Caong," appearing in the signature on Exhibit A were written by different person.

On the 1st day of March, 1910, the court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O
accepted said appointment, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad
litem of said parties. On the 2d day of March, 1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in court and presented a motion
in which he alleged, in substance:

Puzon, being cross-examined with reference to his capacity as an expert in handwriting, testified that while he was a
student in the Ateneo de Manila, he had studied penmanship; that he could not tell exactly when that was, except that
he had concluded his course in the year 1882; that since that time he had been a telegraph operator for seventeen
years and that he had acted as an expert in hand- writing in the courts in the provinces.

First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day
of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons:

Gabriel La O was called as a witness during the rehearing and testified that he had drawn the will of the 6th of August,
1909, at the request of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that it was drawn in accordance with her request and under her
directions; that she had signed it; that the same had been signed by three witnesses in her presence and in the
presence of each other; that the will was written in her house; that she was sick and was lying in her bed, but that she
sat up to sign the will; that she signed the will with great difficulty; that she was signed in her right mind.

After hearing the foregoing witnesses, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, on the 29th day of September, 1909,
ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. The will
was attached to the record and marked Exhibit A. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as
executor of the will, upon the giving of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later.

(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then
mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part
of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong had no intention of executing the same.
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
had executed another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909.
Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in
presenting their opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age.

The said Severo Tabora was also called as a witness again during the rehearing. He testified that he knew Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that she was dead; that his signature as a witness to Exhibit A (the will of
August 11, 1909) was placed there by him; that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, became familiar with the
contents of the will because she signed it before he (the witness) did; that he did not know whether anybody there told
her to sign the will or not; that he signed two bills; that he did not know La O; that he did not believe that Tomasa had
signed the will (Exhibit A) before he arrived at the house; that he was not sure that he had seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong sign Exhibit A because there were many people and there was a screen at the door and he could not see; that
he was called a a witness to sign the second will and was told by the people there that it was the same as the first;
that the will (Exhibit A) was on a table, far from the patient, in the house but outside the room where the patient was;
that the will was signed by Paez and himself; that Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he was not sure whether
Anselmo Zacarias signed the will or not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong could see the table
on which the will was written at the time it was signed or not; that there were many people in the house; that he
remembered the names of Pedro and Lorenzo; that he could not remember the names of any others; that the will
remained on the table after he signed it; that after he signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was lying;

that the will was left on the table outside; that Tomasa was very ill; that he heard the people asking Tomasa to sign the
will after he was (the witness) had signed it; that he saw Paez sign the will, that he could not remember whether
Anselmo Zacarias had signed the will, because immediately after he and Paez signed it, he left because he was
hungry; that the place where the table was located was in the same house, on the floor, about two steps down from
the floor on which Tomasa was.
Rufino R. Papa, was called as a witness for the purpose of supporting the allegation that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
was mentally incapacitated to make the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Papa declared that he was a
physician; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that he had treated her in the month of August; that he visited
her first on the 8th day of August; that he visited her again on the 9th and 10th days of August; that on the first visit he
found the sick woman completely weak very weak from her sickness, in the third stage of tuberculosis; that she
was lying in bed; that on the first visit he found her with but little sense, the second day also, and on the third day she
had lost all her intelligence; that she died on the 11th of August; tat he was requested to issue the death certificate;
that when he asked her (Tomasa) whether she was feeling any pain or anything of that kind, she did not answer at all;
that she was in a condition of stupor, induced, as he believed, by the stage of uraemia from which she was suffering.
Anselmo Zacarias, who had signed the will of August 11, 1909, was also called as a witnesses during the rehearing.
He testified that he had known Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong since he was a child; that Tomasa was dead; that he had
written the will exhibit A; that it was all in his writing except the last part, which was written by Carlos Sobaco; that he
had written the will Exhibit A at the request of the uncle of Tomasa; that Lorenzo, the brother of the deceased, was the
one who had instructed him as to the terms of the will ; that the deceased had not spoken to him concerning the terms
of the will; that the will was written in the dining room of the residence of the deceased; that Tomasa was in another
room different from that in which the will was written; that the will was not written in the presence of Tomasa; that he
signed the will as a witness in the room where Tomasa was lying; that the other witnesses signed the will in the same
room that when he went into the room where the sick woman was (Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong) Lorenzo had the will
in his hands; that when Lorenzo came to the bed he showed the will to his sister (Tomasa) and requested her to sign
it; that she was lying stretched out on the bed and two women, who were taking care of her, helped her to sit up,
supporting her by lacing their hands at her back; that when she started to write her name, he withdrew from the bed
on account of the best inside the room; when he came back again to the sick bed the will was signed and was again
in the hands of Lorenzo; that he did not see Tomasa sign the will because he withdrew from the room; that he did not
know whether Tomasa had been informed of the contents of the will or not; he supposed she must have read it
because Lorenzo turned the will over to her; that when Lorenzo asked her to sign the will, he did not know what she
said he could not hear her voice; that he did not know whether the sick woman was him sign the will or not; that he
believed that Tomasa died the next day after the will had been signed; that the other two witnesses, Timoteo Paez
and Severo Tabora, had signed the will in the room with the sick woman; that he saw them sign the will and that they
saw him sign it; that he was not sure whether the testatrix could have seen them at the time they signed the will or
not; that there was a screen before the bed; that he did not think that Lorenzo had been giving instructions as to the
contents of the will; that about ten or fifteen minutes elapsed from the time Lorenzo handed the will to Tomasa before
she started to sign it; that the pen with which she signed the will as given to her and she held it.
Clotilde Mariano testified that he was a cigarette maker; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and that she was
dead; that she had made two wills; that the first one was written by La O and the second by Zacarias; that he was
present at the time Zacarias wrote the second one; that he was present when the second will was taken to Tomasa
for signature; that Lorenzo had told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first; that Tomasa said she could
not sign it.
On cross examination he testified that there was a lot of visitors there; that Zacarias was not there; that Paez and
Tabora were there; that he had told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first.

During the rehearing Cornelia Serrano and Pedro Francisco were also examined as witnesses. There is nothing in
their testimony, however, which in our opinion is important.
In rebuttal Julia e la Cruz was called as a witness. She testified that she was 19 years of age; that she knew Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong during her lifetime; that she lived in the house of Tomasa during the last week of her illness; that
Tomasa had made two wills; that she was present when the second one was executed; that a lawyer had drawn the
will in the dining room and after it had been drawn and everything finished , it was taken to where Doa Tomasa was,
for her signature; that it was taken to her by Anselmo Zacarias; that she was present at the time Tomasa signed the
will that there were many other people present also; that she did not see Timoteo Paez there; that she saw Severo
Tabora; that Anselmo Zacarias was present; that she did not hear Clotilde Mariano ask Tomasa to sign the will; that
she did not hear Lorenzo say to Tomasa that the second will was the same sa the first; that Tomasa asked her to help
her to sit up and to put a pillow to her back when Zacarias gave her some paper or document and asked her to sign it;
that she saw Tomasa take hold of the pen and try to sign it but she did not see the place she signed the document, for
the reason that she left the room; that she saw Tomasa sign the document but did not see on what place on the
document she signed; and that a notary public came the next morning; that Tomasa was able to move about in the
bed; that she had seen Tomasa in the act of starting to write her signature when she told her to get her some water.
Yap Cao Quiang was also called as a witness in rebuttal. He testified that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and
knew that she had made a will; that he saw the will at the time it was written; that he saw Tomasa sign it on her head;
that he did not hear Lorenzo ask Tomasa to sign the will; that Lorenzo had handed the will to Tomasa to sign; that he
saw the witnesses sign the will on a table near the bed; that the table was outside the curtain or screen and near the
entrance to the room where Tomasa was lying.
Lorenzo Yap Caong testified as a witness on rebuttal. He said that he knew Anselmo Zacarias and that Zacarias
wrote the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that Tomasa had given him instructions; that Tomasa had said that she
sign the will; that the will was on a table near the bed of Tomasa; that Tomasa, from where she was lying in the bed,
could seethe table where the witnesses had signed the will.
During the rehearing certain other witnesses were also examined; in our opinion, however, it is necessary to quote
from them for the reason that their testimony in no way affects the preponderance of proof above quoted.
At the close of the rehearing the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, in an extended opinion, reached the conclusion
that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, which was attached to the record and marked Exhibit A
was the last will and testament of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and admitted it to probate and ordered that the
administrator therefore appointed should continue as such administrator. From that order the protestants appealed to
this court, and made the following assignments of error:
I. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed by the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong,
without the intervention of any external influence on the part of other persons.
II. The court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was doing at the
time of signing the will.
III. The court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong in the first will,
Exhibit 1, is identical with that which appears in the second will, Exhibit A.
IV. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed in accordance with the law.

With reference to the first assignment of error, to wit, that undue influence was brought to bear upon Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong in the execution of her will of August 11th, 1909 (Exhibit A), the lower court found that no undue influence
had been exercised over the mind of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. While it is true that some of the witnesses
testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he
will, upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the
execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and
to note the witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed
that no undue influence had been used. we find no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon that
question.
With reference to the second assignment of error to wit, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not of sound mind and
memory at the time of the execution of the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we
found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental
condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours
before the execution of the will in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was
presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will
in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and
memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony
of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do not feel justified in reversing his conclusions upon that
question.
With reference to the third assignment of error, to wit, that the lower court committed an error in declaring that the
signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is identical with that which
appears in the second will (August 11, 1909, Exhibit A), it may be said:
First. That whether or not Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the
question presented to the court. The question presented was whether or not she had duly executed the will of August
11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
Second. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute the will of August 6, 1909.
Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she
did not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the
provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any
and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all
former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong, in her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A)" the inference
that she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants relating to said third assignment of
error is based upon the alleged fact that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified
that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. We are
of the opinion, and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of
her name tot he will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and
time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If
writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then
certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to
execute the will. (Re Goods of Savory, 15 Jur., 1042; Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr., 504; Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El.,
94 Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400; Vernon vs. Kirk, 30 Penn., 218; Cozzen's Will, 61 Penn., 196; Re Goods of
Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443; Main vs. Ryder, 84 Penn., 217.)
We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A., 353), and cited by the appellees,
which was known as "Knox's Appeal." In this case one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October,
1888, at the residence of her father. After her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in her handwriting, written
with a lead pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature simply of
"Harriett." In this paper the deceased attempted to make certain disposition of her property. The will was presented for
probate. The probation was opposed upon the ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased.
That was the only question presented to the court, whether the signature, in the form above indicated, was a sufficient
signature to constitute said paper the last will and testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper
was in the handwriting of the deceased. In deciding that question, Justice Mitchell said:
The precise case of a signature by the first name only, does not appear to have arisen either in England
or the United States; but the principle on which the decisions already referred to were based, especially
those in regard to signing by initials only, are equally applicable to the present case, and additional force
is given to them by the decisions as to what constitutes a binding signature to a contract. (Palmer vs.
Stephens, 1 Denio, 478; Sanborne vs. Flager, 9 Alle, 474; Weston vs. Myers, 33 Ill., 424; Salmon Falls,
etc. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.), 446.)
The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to "sign" as
effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a
signature by the person making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In
the present case we think the proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not
sign her full name, did at least sign her given name "Tomasa," and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the argument which was preceded is sufficient to
answer it also.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign
her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the
presence of each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that
the will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the
will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was
one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon
the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to
see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign
the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as

in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not
necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they
desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

witnesses presented by the petitioner, five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear and
understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four of these witnesses state that he could
speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.

In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach
conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or
hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity.

That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is evident, but if the
witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no doubt that he was of sound mind and
capable of making his will. And we see no reason to discredit any of these witnesses; the discrepancies found
between their respective versions of what took place at the execution of the document are comparatively unimportant
and so far from weakening their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence of any conspiracy
among them.

Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11,
1909 (Exhibit A). Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. L-19142

March 5, 1923

In
the
matter
of
the
estate
of
FLAVIANA
vs.
VICENTE CORRALES TAN QUINTIN, oppositor-appellant.
Marcaida,
Capili
Epimaco Molina for appellee.

and

Mariano

Ocampo

Corrales
Tan,
deceased.
SAMSON, petitioner-appellee,

for

appellant.

OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate a document alleged to be
the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There is no direct evidence as to the interest of the
oppositor-appellant in the estate in question, though it may, perhaps, be inferred from the testimony of his wife
Maximina Ong that he is the son of the deceased.
In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will is incomplete and fraudulent and does
not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under duress and under undue influence, and that at
the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing mind.
We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations. There is no evidence whatever
showing that the testator acted under duress or undue influence and the only question of fact which we need consider
is whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind when the document in question was executed.
Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a witness for the opposition, is to the
effect that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days prior to
his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have
been executed in the forenoon of the same day. Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and
vigorously that coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore, could not at that time have
been in possession of his mental faculties and have executed a will. There are, however, varying degrees of coma
and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have lucid intervals. Such seems to have been the case here.
Doctor Tee Han Kee, the opponent's principal witness, who visited the deceased in the evening of December 25th,
says he then seemed to be in a state of coma and that in the forenoon of December 26th, when the doctor again
visited him, he was in "the same state of coma." Maximina Ong, the wife of the opponent, the only other witness for
the opposition, states that on December 26th the deceased could not talk and did not recognize anyone. But all the

As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The former is not a
disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that mere professional speculation cannot
prevail over the positive statements of five apparently credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem
unreasonable.
There is no direct evidence in the record showing that the publication of the time and place of the hearing of the
petition for probate has been made as provided for in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellant
argues that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate without proof of such publication. This question not
having been raised in the court below will not be considered here.
Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaking of hearings for the probate of wills, also provides that "At the
hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses" and the appellant
maintains that the transcript of the testimony of the witness Dr. N. M. Saleeby, not having been signed by the witness,
the testimony should have been excluded.
There is no merit in this contention. When, as in this case, the testimony is taken by the stenographer of the court and
certified to by him, the provision quoted can only be regarded as directory and a failure to observe the provision will
not render the testimony inadmissible. (Reese vs. Nolan, 99 Ala., 203.)
The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-6650 December 5, 1913
SANTIAGO GALVEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. CANUTA GALVEZ, opponent-appellee.
Eugenio
Antonio Constantino, for appellee.

Paguia,

for

appellant.

TORRES, J.:
This appeal was raised by counsel for Santiago Galvez from the judgment of October 25, 1910, whereby the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, denied the petition presented by the said Galvez for the probate of the will,
Exhibit B, and appointed as administratrix of the testator's estate, the latter's only legitimate daughter, Canuta Galvez,
under condition that she furnish bond in the sum of P2,000 for the faithful discharge of the duties of her
office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for Santiago Galvez petitioned the Court of First Intance of Bulacan for the probate of the will which it was
alleged Victor Galvez executed in the dialect of the province, on August 12, 1910, in presence of the witnesses Juan
Dimanlig, J. Leoquinco, and Nazaria Galvez. This instrument appears also to have been signed by the witness
Lorenzo Galvez, below the name and surname of the testator. (p. 3, B. of E., translated into Spanish on p.
5.) chanrobles virtual law library
Further on in the same record, pages 6 to 7, there appears another will written in Tagalog and executed on the same
date by Victor Galvez in presence of the witnesses Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan
Menodoza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the course of the proceedings various witnesses were examined by the petitioner and by the respondent, Canuta
Galvez, the only daughter of the alleged testator, and the attorney Antonio Constantino stated that he waived the right
to present evidence and acquiesced in the petition made by Santiago Galvez for the probate of the will, in view of a
transaction entered into by the parties; but the court did not accept the compromise, on the ground that it is improper
to hold that a will is the faithful expression of the last wishes of a decedent, upon the mere fact of the parties'
petitioning to that effect, when such will, as in the case at bar, was assailed at the commencement of the
suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After due trial the judgment aforementioned was rendered, from which an appeal was entered by counsel for the
petitioner, Santiago Galvez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez on August 12, 1910, and signed in his
presence by the witness Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez and J. Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no longer able to
sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed his own signature to the instrument, for him
and below his written name. This will, written in Tagalog and translated into Spanish, is marked as Exhibit B and is
found on pages 3 and 5 of the bill of exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The other will, written in Tagalog and marked Exhibit A, was presented during the proceedings; it was the first one the
testator executed on the same date, and, for the purpose of correcting an error contained in this first will, he executed
another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Notwithstanding the opposition by Canuta Galvez, the testator's daughter, who alleged that her father, owing to his
very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will, and
notwithstanding her testimony adduced in corroboration of her brief, the record sufficiently proved the contrary; the
subscribing witnesses to the will affirmed under oath that they were present when Victor Galvez, then sick in his
house, stated to them that the document read before them by Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will and testament,
and that, as the testator was no longer able to sign, he charged his nephew Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which he
latter did by affixing his own signature to the document, after having written at the foot of the same the name and
surname of the testator, Victor Galvez, who as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties; he talked intelligently and with perfect knowledge of what was taking place. They
further testified that they all, including the said Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the testator, Victor
Galvez, who was at the time lying on his bed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not then of sound mind and did not have full
knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the proceedings disclose
conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his
will in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at the foot thereof, for these witnesses capacity
positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual
faculties and was perfectly cognizant of his acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and results of cholera on a patient in
ordinary cases and in the regular course of this disease; but his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present
suit, served as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor
did he even see him between the hours of 12 in the morning and 3 in the afternoon of the 12th of August, 1910,
during which period the testator ordered his will drawn up and the attesting witnesses signed it, Galvez having died at
about 6 o'clock that same afternoon. It may be true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become
incapacitated in the manner described by the witness; but there may be exceptions to the general rule, and to judge
from the testimony of the witnesses who saw and communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the time he
executed his will, his physical and mental condition must have been an exception, since he demonstrated that he had
sufficient energy and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the requirements of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of the will and the testator's positive
determination to rectify the error he incurred in the execution of his first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound
mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir,
Canuta Galvez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will (Exhibit B), signed in the name of the testator by
Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testator's name appears written at the foot of the
will and under this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument was also
signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they heard and attested the dispositions made
by the testator and witnessed the reading of the will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the
will in the name of the testator and that they signed it in the presence of all the persons assembled in the latter's
house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use
of his mental faculties; therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
For the foregoing reasons, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from in so far as it denies the probate of the said
will, we hereby hold that the same was duly executed by Victor Galvez and expresses his last wishes, and we affirm
the rest of the said judgment, with respect to the appointment, as administratrix, of Canuta Galvez, the testator's
daughter and sole heir.
G.R. No. L-21015

March 24, 1924

MIGUELA CARRILLO, for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of ADRIANA CARRILLO,
deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.
Crispin
Oben
and
Salinas & Salinas for appellees.

Gibbs

&

McDonough

for

appellant.

AVANCEA, J.:
On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven parcels of land, with
one-half of the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, Province of
Cavite, containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000 which the
seller admitted having received. Nine days afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the
Court of First Instance and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for the administrator and settlement
of her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such
administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment of said contract of sale executed by Adriana
Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco. The
defendants were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially in the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo
performed acts which indicated that she was mentally deranged. We have made a thorough examination of the
character of those acts, and believe that they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane. The
same thing can be said as to her having entered the "Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San Jose," in the
absence of an affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions, for while it is true that insane persons
are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter persons who are not insane. Against the inference that from
said acts the plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo in that time, there is
in the record evidence of acts while more clearly and more convincingly show that she must not have been mentally
incapacitated before the execution of the document sought to be annulled in this action. In January, 1917, her
husband having died, she was appointed judicial administratrix of the latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath
of office, gave the proper bond discharged her functions in the same manner and with the same diligence as any
other person of knowingly sound mind would have done. Documents, were introduced which show complex and
numerous acts of administration performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such as the disposition of various and
considerable amounts of money in transactions made with different persons, the correctness of said acts never
having been, nor can it be, put in question. We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo having
executed contracts of lease, appeared in court in the testate proceeding in which she was administratrix, and in fact
continued acting as such administratrix of the estate of her husband until August, 1917, when for the purpose of
taking vacation, she requested to be relieved from the office. On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the
"Hospital de San Juan de Dios" by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and
there she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the same year very much better
off although not completely cured. Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor
Ocampo answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him were
responsive to the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only one-half of the body.
After leaving the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana Carrillo called at the office of the
notary public, Mr. Ramos Salinas, and there executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month. The
notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he has been for some time with Adriana
Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to the document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her
countenance, which on the contrary, appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the questions he made to her
without inconsistencies or failure of memory, for which reason, says this witness, he was surprised when afterwards
he learned that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question.

It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most interested party in the case, being the plaintiff
herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her
husband in 1917. It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela
Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety for her. It must likewise be noted that the other witnesses
of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time,
when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents and the
testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when
Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was mentally incapacitated.
The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the
trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by
saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently.
Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of
being mentally capable, and consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a specified time
is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, her capacity must be
presumed.
Attention is also called to the disproportion between the price of the sale and the real value of the land sold. The
evidence, however, rather shows that the price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an area of 33 hectares,
represents it real value, for its is little more than P100 per hectare, which is approximately the value of other lands of
the same nature in the vicinity. But even supposing that there is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to justify
the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for having made the sale under such conditions.
Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both defendants, who
are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her
during the time she was there, and for such acts they may have won her gratitude. Under these circumstances there
is nothing illegal, or even reprehensible, and much less strange in Adriana Carrillo's having taken into account those
services rendered her by the defendants and reciprocated thereof by a favorable transaction. Having no ascendants
and descendents, she could, in consideration of all the these circumstances, have even given as a donation, or left by
will, these lands to the defendants.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-10027

November 13, 1915

ROSENDO
HERNAEZ
y
vs.
MATEO HERNAEZ y ESPINOSA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ruperto
Enrique C. Locsin for defendants.

Montinola

ESPINOSA, plaintiff-appellant,

for

plaintiff.

TRENT, J.:
The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate descendants. Neither of their
estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this action, but were both under administration. Their son,

Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both his father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez
y Tuason, on November 6, 1901. Notwithstanding the fact that Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa had thus parted with all
his interest in the estates of his two parents, he executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y
Ramos on February 27, 1907, in which he purported to convey all his undivided interest in his mother's estate. On the
same date he executed another document of sale in which he purported to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana
four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of these sales were made with the connivance of his son,
Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Hence, although Vicente Hernaez y Tuason had actually purchased all of his father's
interests in the estates of Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa as early as November 6, 1901, and was, on February
27, 1907, the undoubted owner thereof, he is effectually estopped from asserting his title as against either of the
vendees mentioned in the documents of sale dated February 27, 1907, to which we have just referred. (Code Civ.
Pro., sec. 333, No. 1.) Bigelow on Estoppel (p. 607) says:
. . . it is now a well-established principle that where the true owner of property, for however short a time,
holds out another, or, with knowledge of his own right, allows another to appear as the owner of or as
having full power of disposition over the property, the same being in the latter's actual possession, and
innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected.
On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By
this transfer, the latter stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez,
and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y Espinosa.
It is admitted that Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, another son of the deceased spouses administrator of the estates,
was notified of Montelibano's purchases on January 8, 1913, when he received notice of Montelibano's motion,
entered in the administration proceedings, asking that he (Montelibano) be substituted as assignee of the interests of
various heirs of the estate which he had acquired by purchase. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Rosendo Hernaez y
Espinosa entered into a contract of sale with Vicente Hernaez y Tuason, whereby the latter purported to convey all
the interest, which he had acquired from his father, in the estate of the deceased spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana
Espinosa. It will be remembered that he purchased his father's share of the estate on November 6, 1901; that he is
estopped from asserting title to any interest in his grandfather's estate and in five-eighteenths of his grandmother's
estate. Rosendo Hernandez y Espinosa purchased with full knowledge of these facts. He, therefore, acquired
thirteen-eighteenths of the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of the latter's mother nothing
more. lawph!l.net
That rule is that the holder [Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos] of a prior equitable right has priority over the
purchaser [Rosendo Hernandez y Espinosa] of a subsequent estate (whether legal or equitable) without
value, or with notice of the equitable right, but not as against a subsequent purchaser for value and
without notice. (Ewart on Estoppel, p. 199.)
Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos has acquired in his interest in the estate of the deceased spouses for a valuable
consideration and in good faith, and there remains to the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, only the right of
subrogation allowed him by article 1067 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the coheirs may subrogate himself in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the purchase,
provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof.
On January 24, 1913, the plaintiff instituted this action seeking to subrogate himself in the rights acquired by
Montelibano in the estate. Unless the plaintiff can be charged with actual notice of the conveyance by which
Montelibano acquired these interests, prior to January 8, 1913, it is clear that he has opportunely asserted his right of

subrogation. This is purely a question of fact. As to the sales whereby Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa parted with that
portion of his interest in the estate which is now held by Alejandro Montelibano, as well as to those sales made by
other heirs to Montelibano, the trial court found that the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, was not chargeable
with notice prior to January 8, 1913. After a careful examination of the record we see no reason for disturbing this
finding of fact. As a consequence, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, is entitled to exercise his right of
subrogation in accordance with article 1067, above quoted. lawph!1.net
The interest which Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana purchased from Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa on February 27, 1907,
for the sum of P4,500, he afterwards transferred to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos for the sum of P10,000. In
rendering judgment, the trial court decreed that the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, should pay the latter sum
for the privilege of exercising the right of subrogation. This was error. Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the
co-heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, " el precio
de la compra" (the purchase price). Obviously, if the interest had not been resold, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y
Espinosa, would have had to pay only the price for which Uy-Cana acquired it. The purpose of the article cannot be
evaded by a reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a higher price. Subsequent purchasers of the interest
acquire it burdened with the right of subrogation of co-heirs at the price for which the heir who sold it parted with it.
It is urged that the prices in some of the deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos purchased the
interest of various heirs in the estates are fictitious. This is a question of fact upon which both parties adduced
evidence, and we concur in the opinion of the trial court that there is no basis to the charge. For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the court is modified by substituting, as the price of subrogation of the interest originally
purchased by Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana, the sum of P4,500, as set out in Exhibit 7, for the sum of P10,000, the
consideration expressed in Exhibit 10. As modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.
C.A. No. 4

March 21, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD NEYRA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. BLANCO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
Lucio
Javillonar
for
Alejandro M. Panis for applicants and appellees.

oppositors

and

appellants.

DE JOYA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila, on December 3, 1943, admitting to probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the deceased
Encarnacion Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a previous will dated September 14, 1939, alleged to
have been executed by the said testatrix.
Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942, filed, on November 10, 1942, a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the probate of said will.

On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, who had not been
named as beneficiaries in said will, filed on opposition to the probate of the said will dated November 3, 1942, alleging
(1) that at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed
testamentary capacity; (2) that her thumb marks on said instrument had been procured by means of fraud by
petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion Neyra never intended to consider said document as will; (3) that the
alleged will, dated November 3, 1942, had not been executed in the manner and form prescribed by law; and(4) that
Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had executed a will, naming as beneficiaries said oppositors and
others, and that said will had never been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.
On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the allegations in the opposition.
Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate of the first will executed by Encarnacion
Neyra, on September 14, 1939, marked as Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees Trinidad Neyra and
Eustaquio Mendoza filed their opposition to the probate on said will marked as Exhibit 16, and amended said
opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which Teodora Neyra and the others filed a reply, on September 20, 1943.
On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and the counter petition mentioned above,
said petitioner as well as the oppositors, presented evidence, testimonial and documentary. The witnesses presented
by the petitioner Trinidad Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez, Rev. Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr.
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio A. Aldecoa, Atty. Ricardo Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty. Alejandro M.
Panis, who had acted as scrivener in the preparation of said will dated November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses, the principal among whom were
Presentacion Blanco, Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical expert, and the
oppositors Teodora Neyra and Pilar de Guzman themselves.
After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting to probate the will dated November 3,
1942; at the same time denying the probate of the will dated September 14, 1939.
From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila,
assigning several errors, which may be reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court erred (1) in finding that
Encarnacion Neyra wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was reconciliation between Encarnacion
Neyra and her sister Trinidad; (3) in accepting as satisfactory the evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in ignoring
the evidence submitted by the oppositors; and (5) in not admitting to probate the will dated September 14, 1939.
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the case in the court below, has satisfactorily
and sufficiently established the following facts:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and two children, by
his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other relatives; that after the death of
Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious quarrels, in connection with the
properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had
two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties (Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first case,
filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra et al. the annulment of the
sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, and it was finally decided in favor of the defendants in the
Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162, Exhibit 9).

In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded from Encarnacion Neyra, one-half () of the
property described therein, and one-half () of the rents, and the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the
plaintiff, but at the same time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77, under her counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra
again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals for Manila (G.R. No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided, pursuant to
the document of compromise marked as Exhibit D; and the petition for reconsideration filed therein still remains
undecided.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will on
September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco,
making no provision whatsoever in said will in favor of her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter
enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due
deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and
said decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties
encountered by said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to
make a new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney
working in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that
Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express instructions given by Encarnacion
Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14,
1939, again naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also
forwarded to the authorities of the said religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on October 31,
1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make
confession, after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon Street,
City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion, in view of her condition; that following the request of
Encarnacion Neyra, Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made for the celebration of holy
mass in the house of Encarnacion Neyra, and, as a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized
in her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, officiating in said ceremony, on which occasion,
Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took holy communion; that after said religious ceremony had been
terminated, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters,
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion Neyra accepted said advice and at about noon of the same day
(November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad Neyra, who came at about 2:30 that same
afternoon; that on seeing one another, the two greeted each other in a most affectionate manner, and became
reconciled; that the two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which the two sisters also talked about
the properties left by their deceased father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of
Manila, and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein,
consisting of a small house and lot, should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, on the condition that the latter
should waive her claim for her share in the rents of said property, while under the administration of Encarnacion
Neyra, and that the two should renounce their mutual claims against one another. It was also agreed between the two
sisters to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but
Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him
instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions relative to the
disposition she wanted to make of her properties in her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said
document of compromise or agreement marked as Exhibit D, as well as the new will and testament marked as Exhibit
C, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express instructions given by
Encarnacion Neyra, and said instruments were ready for signature on November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that
day, November 3, 1942; Attorney Panis read said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to Encarnacion Neyra
slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, herein
petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if its terms were in accordance with her wishes, if she

had anything else to add, or anything to be changed in said will; and as Encarnacion Neyra stated that the terms of
said will were in accordance with her wishes and express instructions, she asked for the pad and the will Exhibit C
and, with the help of a son of herein petitioner, placed her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which the
attesting witnesses signed at the foot of the document, in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, and of
each and everyone of the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro Garcia and petitioner Trinidad Neyra and several
others were also present.

Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of oppositor
Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, practically corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the petitioner, with reference
to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for the oppositors, testified, however, that
when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed, as stated above, to the document of compromise in
question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were
not present, as they were in the caida.

On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart attack, unexpectedly died.
Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again decided not to accept the provision made in
its favor by the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty. Ricardo Sikat, said decision
could not be communicated to the testatrix, before her death.
Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request made on October 31, 1942, by
Encarnacion Neyra for the celebration of holy mass in her house, on November 1, 1942; that said mass was in fact
solemnized in her house, on that date, in the course of which the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra took holy communion;
that on the same day, after the mass, Encarnacion held a long conversation with Father Garcia, in the course of
which, said priest advised her to have reconciliation with her sister Trinidad; and that said advise was accepted by
Encarnacion.
But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her, and
that in fact she came to the house of Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon that same day, November 1,
1942, with said Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra greeted each other
most affectionately, forgiving one another, after which they talked about the property left by their deceased father and
the litigation pending between them; and the two sisters agreed to settle their case, which had been elevated to the
Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, concerning a certain house and lot, on the understanding that said property
should be given exclusively to Trinidad, and that the latter should renounce her claim against Encarnacion, for her
share in the rents collected on said property, and, at the same time, Encarnacion renounced her claim for P727.77
against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed between the two sisters that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to
prepare the necessary papers for the settlement of said case. Presentacion Blanco, a witness for the oppositors, also
testified substantially to the foregoing facts.
By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the other attesting witnesses, it has also been
shown that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, and received
instructions from Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said agreement, but also for the preparation of a
new will, and consequently Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise and the will, dated November 3,
1942, which were both thumb marked, in duplicate, in the afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who was then
of sound mind, as shown by her appearance and conversation, aided by a son of Trinidad Neyra, on her bed in
the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M.
Panis, who signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra, and so was
Trinidad Neyra.
On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's disease, perhaps, Encarnacion Neyra
expired, at about 3 o'clock in the morning.

But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the documents
thumb marked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and
Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's
thumb mark was affixed to the will, only in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del
Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature and effects of Addison's disease, is
absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping sickness, known as Addison's disease, are
not yet fully known: that persons attacked by said decease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first attack,
while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease, progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to
90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of
Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250, 1252, 1253; MaCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V. pp. 272-279).
And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48, died on
November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of witnesses, who
had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, who stated
that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties deemed
necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have
been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being
in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony
testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose for
several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive
statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what said to him and to
communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the testator is in
perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that
he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and
intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could
still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound
mental condition at the time of executing the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of the signing and execution of the
agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like
the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia
or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was of
sound mind and possessed testamentary capacity, at the time of the execution of the will, cannot be properly
disturbed.
The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time that the testatrix thumbed marked
the will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida. But it has been fully
shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in
question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each
other, at the time of the signing of the will, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do
so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark
placed by the testatrix on the will is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil.,
579.)
The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties, as said oppositors had been named
legatees in the will dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will dated November 3, 1942.
On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men, who had absolutely no interest in the final
outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are professional
men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and talked to the testatrix.
Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the effect that there could have been no
reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the document
embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that her thumb mark
was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view
is preposterous, to say the least. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. The
oppositors and their witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to brazen falsehoods; and they are,
therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the oppositors is completely applicable the rule falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)
In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to show the alleged improbability of the
reconciliation of the two sisters and the execution of the will, dated November 3, 1942, they have erroneously placed
great reliance on the facts that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter
enemies. They were banking evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Dreadful

indeed are the feuds of relatives, and difficult the reconciliation. But they had forgotten the fact that Encarnacion
Neyra was a religious and pious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of Christian faith and hope and charity, and
that it was godly to forgive and better still to forget.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad
Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent
death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of childhood. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs
had not always been fair to her sister who in fact, had had successively instituted two suits against her, to recover
what was her due, and for which Encarnacion believed she must atone, she finally decided upon reconciliation, so
that she might depart in peace.
The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence, and that Trinidad had been demanding
tenaciously her share; and as a Christian woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one has any right to enrich
himself unjustly, at the expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that Encarnacion should desire reconciliation
with her sister Trinidad, and provide for her in her last will and testament.
As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served Encarnacion Neyra for so many years and so
well, it was also natural that she should make some provision for him, as gratitude is the noblest sentiment that
springs from the human heart.
The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with new beneficiaries named therein, including
principally her bitterest enemy of late, which is completely incompatible with the will, dated September 14, 1939, may
really seem strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above the logic of the head is the feeling in the heart,
and the heart has reasons of its own which the head cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge
of eternal verity.
As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted to follow "the path of the just, which is as
the shining light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may be blessed. As a Christian
woman, she must have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow the law, for this is the whole duty of man.
In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter the conclusions set forth in the decree
appealed from. This court will not reverse any findings of fact by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony and
depending largely upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the presence of the trial judge, unless the court
below failed to take into consideration some material facts or circumstances, or to weigh accurately all of the material
facts and circumstances presented to it for consideration. (Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336; Melliza vs.Towle, 34
Phil., 345; Caragay vs. Urquiza, 53 Phil., 72, 79; Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil., 419.)
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it legally impossible to sustain any of the
errors assigned by the appellants. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO
YAP,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.

Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for
which reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and
crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.
8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision which
at the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.

RELOVA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an
independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by
Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato
Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje,
alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger
bus.
While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the
offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on
November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:
1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales,
at about 2:00 AM
2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant
driver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila,
without
3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. in
order to pass said truck;

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty
of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."
As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje
and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), which
reads:
SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as otherwise
provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may
be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private
respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:
(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
which defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and
convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;
(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused;
and
(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals
case.

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.
5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do
so, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.
6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as
to avoid a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of
the road going to Bataan;

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against
the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Paje in the
criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the
complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the
criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3,

paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal action
that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to
make and is to be completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any
way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence;
that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted,
conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje
and that it has been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence,
that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the negligence of private respondents is in the amount of
P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.
In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted a
separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged
reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay
jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed
by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28
SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant
Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil
action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of
which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."
Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held that the private
respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that
the collision was a case of pure accident.

III.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE
CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID
RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
IV.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY
BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF
THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.
V.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE
DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF
DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO
PETITIONERS.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM
NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177
OF THE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.
II.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER
OF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE
SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE
INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED
PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD
HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION
UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should
apply in the case at bar.
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting
for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the
finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on
the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that
"the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court
declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that
the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot
be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil
liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal
action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil
liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela 24 SCRA 582, this
Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the penal action does not

carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being the partyplaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the
same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly to this Court.1wph1.t The order appealed
from was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners
were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil
action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise
stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with
homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has
not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not
sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to nonexistence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court,
sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.
In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.

The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same defendants in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is now
before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.
Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the decision
of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje as accused-appellant,
suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of
respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the mishap
was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take judicial notice of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.
Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same are final and
cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar, upon substantial
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.