Claim No: HQ16X00661

Neutral Citation Number: [2016] EWHC 1534 (QB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Wednesday, 22 June 2016
BEFORE:
SIR DAVID EADY
Sitting as a High Court Judge
-----BETWEEN:
CAMILLE SASKIA RICHARDSON
Claimant
-and(1) GOOGLE UK LIMITED
(2) FACEBOOK UK LIMITED
Defendants
-----Daily Transcript by John Larking Verbatim Reporters
Suite 305 Temple Chambers, 3-7 Temple Avenue, London EC4Y 0HP
Tel: 020 7404 7464
-----CATRIN EVANS QC (Instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP, 30 Crown Place, Earl
Street, London EC2A 4ES)) appeared on behalf of the First Defendant
The Claimant, Miss Richardson, did not attend and was not represented
-----JUDGMENT

Wednesday, 22 June 2016

1.

SIR DAVID EADY: This is an application by the first defendant, Google UK

Ltd, for an extended civil restraint order against the claimant in these
proceedings, Camille Saskia Richardson. The courts powers to make an
extended civil restraint order (or ECRO) are now defined in CPR practice
direction 3C. Paragraph 3.1 provides that such an order may be made by a
judge of the Court of Appeal, a judge of the high court or a designated civil
judge in the county court, where a party has persistently issued claims or made
applications which are totally without merit. Paragraph 3.2 provides that, unless
the court otherwise orders, where the court makes an ECRO, the party against
whom the order is made will be restrained from issuing claims or making
applications in (a) any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court
of Appeal, (b) the high court or the county court if the order has been made by a
judge of the high court, or (c) the county court identified in the order if the order
has been made by a designated civil judge or their appointed deputy concerning
any matter involving, or relating to, or touching upon, or leading to the
proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of
a judge identified in the order.

2.

It is also provided that there may be an application for amendment or discharge

of the order provided that permission has been obtained; there may be an
application for permission to appeal the order; and, if permission is granted, the
appeal itself may be prosecuted. The specified maximum period, for the
moment at any rate, is not exceeding two years. In this case, the first
defendant seeks an ECRO for that maximum period of two years.

3.

As is well known, the formulation of the jurisdiction in the CPR is based upon,
and derives originally from, the inherent jurisdiction of the court. There were a
number of decisions and authoritative judgments on the inherent power before
the jurisdiction came to be embodied in the CPR. My attention was drawn in
particular to the case of Connah v Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2006] EWCA
Civ 1616 and, in particular, to the remarks of Dyson LJ (as he then was) at
paragraphs [22] and [23]. The threshold for granting such an order is that the
relevant person has persistently issued claims or made applications which are
totally without merit. As was explained by Dyson LJ at paragraph [23], an
ECRO does not merely restrain the applicant in the instant proceedings: it also
restrains the issue of claims or making of applications in other proceedings
which may loosely be said to be related to the instant proceedings. The vice at
which the ECRO is directed is the issuing and making of applications in more
than one set of proceedings. The inherent jurisdiction was also explained in the
very important case of Bhamjee v Forsdick (Practice Note) [2004] 1 WLR 88.

4.

Ms Evans QC, on this application, has drawn my attention particularly to a

number of features identified in the Forsdick case by the Court of Appeal, at
paragraphs [3] to [8], because, she says, they closely parallel the conduct of the
claimant in this particular case. That is borne out by the evidence before me.
She also highlights the proposition that it is an abuse of process to attempt to re-

litigate issues which have been decided against a party, or to mount a collateral
attack upon a final adverse decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Reference was made in that context also to CPR 3.4.3.2 and 3.4.3.3.
5.

The first defendant relies on the following matters which have emerged from
the evidence. First, the claimant has brought claims and applications against
this defendant which have been found by the court to be totally without merit.
Those findings have been made by Master Kay QC, Warby J, Dingemans J and
Sharp LJ. It has been emphasised by Ms Evans that the claimants conduct has
been persistently vexatious. (That is still a convenient term to use even though
it does not actually appear in the modern formulation of the rule.)

6.

She has issued three sets of proceedings and numerous applications concerning
or touching upon the same subject matter; namely, whether this defendant was
liable in law for publishing the content complained of on the Blogger and
Google Plus services. There is no need to go into that content. It is fully set out
in the evidence and has been drawn to my attention.

7.

The first proceedings, HQ15D00086, were dismissed by Master Kay QC on 26 th

June last year, having been commenced in January of that year. The claimants
appeal against the Masters decision was dismissed by Warby J on 26 th October
of last year. Yet again, there was a challenge by the claimant to those decisions
which was rejected on 13th January of this year by Dingemans J. On 22 nd March
of this year, Sharp LJ dismissed the claimants attempt to challenge those
decisions in the form of a costs appeal. She ruled that the claims were (to adopt
her word) fruitless, and she found that the application for permission to appeal
had been totally without merit. She also took the step of emphasising and
recording that her own decision was final.

8.

The second set of proceedings, which were issued on 17th July last year in the
Manchester District Registry, bore the reference number B90MA293. It is to be
noted that they were launched after Master Kay QC had struck out the first
claim against this defendant. The proceedings were then discontinued against
the first defendant on 23rd September of last year. The background, which I
need not go into, is fully set out in the evidence from the solicitor, Mr Barker.
That evidence includes reference to the material non-disclosure of Master Kays
judgment in those Manchester proceedings.

9.

The third set of proceedings was commenced on 23rd February of this year, the
reference number being HQ16X00661. They, too, were discontinued on 26 th
May. An application would have been made to strike them out, had this not
occurred, on the basis that they disclosed no cause of action. Reliance was
apparently placed on sections 1 to 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. Such a claim would
be totally without merit, and an abuse of the process, because the statute in
question did not give rise to the possibility of civil remedies. It was seen by the
first defendant, understandably in my judgment, as representing an abuse of
process because it was attempting in effect to re-litigate issues upon which
adverse decisions had already been made, and/or mounting a collateral attack on
Sharp LJs final decision.

10.

The persistence of the claimant is illustrated by the recent notification of her

intention to re-open the appeal dismissed by Sharp LJ. There was an email to
that effect to the Masters Support Unit on 17 th May. So far, apparently, the
solicitors for the first defendant have not seen the application itself, although
they had received an unsigned witness statement. Nevertheless, such an
application, Ms Evans, submits, would also be totally without merit and an
abuse of the process for the reasons already by now familiar.

11.

Another feature in common with the conduct described in the Bhamjee case is
that this claimant has threatened complaints to the relevant professional bodies
against the defendants legal representatives (and indeed has threatened to make
a complaint against Warby J as well). Ms Evans has characterised the persistent
behaviour of the claimant as obsessional. The evidence seems to me to plainly
bear that out. It causes inconvenience, and indeed a degree of harassment,
against those to whom her threats and remarks are directed; that is to say,
personnel employed by Google Inc, the legal representatives of the first
defendant and some court staff. Mr Barker has explained the nature of the
communications which have been directed towards his firm and the sheer
volume (received at all times of day and night). So far as Mr Barker himself is
concerned, there have been, I am told, more than 100 text messages to his
mobile phone. My attention was drawn to disturbing matters raised by the
claimant, not only to him but also to Ms Evans, and references to the Claimant's
own personal history. Whether they are accurate or not I do not know, but they
have no relevance to the claims against the first defendant.

12.

This correspondence inevitably takes up time and money in dealing with it: it
cannot simply be ignored. One of the factors which an ECRO is directed
towards is preventing those who are involved in the litigation, in whatever
capacity, from being harassed and troubled and vexed by such conduct.

13.

Criticisms have been made of the lawyers representing the first defendant in
respect of what are alleged to have been inappropriate and insensitive
statements made to her, or in her presence, during an adjournment at a hearing
in the Manchester District Registry on 10th March. There have been complaints
to the professional bodies and I am told that the complaint to the Bar Standards
Board has been already summarily dismissed. It is not only a question of
distress or embarrassment caused to the individuals concerned, or a question of
the cost which is incurred in dealing with such matters. The point has also been
made, particularly in relation to court staff, that when their time is taken up in
dealing with them, the time available for other court users and other duties is
correspondingly reduced.

14.

It is submitted by Ms Evans that the claimant is likely to continue to behave in

this obsessional and vexatious manner in the future unless an ECRO is made.
The claimant has declined to reduce the amount of correspondence and I have
already referred, in relation to this defendant, to how new claims and
applications have repeatedly been made.

15.

Relevant too, however, so far as judging her future conduct is concerned, are the
claims that she has made against others parties such as Google Inc and the

University of Glasgow. I need not go into the evidence in relation to those

matters for obvious reasons, but my attention has been drawn to them,
legitimately in my judgment, because, as I say, the conduct is relevant to
making an assessment of the claimants likely future behaviour towards this
defendant.
16.

Ms Evans has particularly highlighted what she calls the pattern of issuing and
discontinuance. The claimant has issued and then discontinued, or threatened
to discontinue, on four occasions so far. There were the Manchester District
Registry proceedings, which were discontinued on 23rd September last year; the
discontinuance against Google Inc of the same proceedings on 10 th March this
year; the first notice of discontinuance in relation to the claim based on fraud
against the first defendant on 26th February; and then the actual discontinuance
of the claim on 26th May. (In the interim there had been an instruction by the
claimant to the court to disregard her first notice of discontinuance.) This
pattern is also reflected in litigation against the other parties to whom I have
referred.

17.

Turning to the question of cost, it is clear that the claimants outstanding

liability to the first defendant and Google Inc so far is over 100,000. The total
of costs incurred of course exceeds that by some considerable margin, as Mr
Barker makes clear in his second witness statement. Because the claimant is
impecunious and able to claim dispensation in respect of the issuance of court
proceedings, there is currently no incentive for her to curtail her troublesome
and obsessional behaviour: that is why an ECRO is now sought. The claimant
has indicated in communications with the court, and with the first defendants
solicitors, that she is without funds, to all intents and purposes, and that she has
no intention of paying the costs which have already been ordered against her.
For these reasons, the defendant submits that the time is right for the making of
an ECRO to last for the maximum of two years.

18.

It is a sad story in many ways but the evidence is clear and, in my judgment, the
grant of an ECRO is amply justified. I will so order.