MANUEL S. ISIP, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R.

No. 170298, June 26, 2007

Manuel and his wife Marrietta were charged with several counts of Estafa and BP 22
for allegedly defrauding Atty. Leonardo Jose and misappropriating several pieces of
jewellery. According to the complainant, all the transactions happened in his
ancestral house in Cavite City while he was on leave from his work at the Bureau of
Customs, hence the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City. In
their defense, Manuel and Marrietta alleged that the transactions if indeed there
was any, happened in Manila, where Atty. Leonardo was then living in his
condominium. After trial, the RTC convicted them for estafa, which they appealed to
the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Marrietta died. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC, and held that the transactions occurred in Cavite
City, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence.
In his petition to the Supreme Court, Manuel argues that the RTC and CA should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mere convenience suggests that all
the transactions occurred in Manila, since he and his late wife were residents of
Manila. It does not follow that since complainant have an ancestral house in Cavite
City, the transactions occurred there.
The Supreme Court:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently
shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his
ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence from the
Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now
petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved

was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegations applies.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent

evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he
and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests
that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact
that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the
transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person
from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he
can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible
for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite
City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late wife in all the
transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or
Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered
into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment

deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. It is to be pointed out
that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold
that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in
Cavite City.

Serag vs CA
G.R. No. 163818
October 20, 2005
Facts:
In the wee hours of May 11, 2001, Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin,
Iloilo during the 2001 elections, was shot to death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto
Salamat III, was also wounded. The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Iloilo City
filed a criminal complaint for murder and attempted murder against Lino Napao, then incumbent
mayor of San Joaquin, and Sebastian Serag. The private offended party also filed criminal
complaint against Serag and 14 others.
The Provincial then filed an information for Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder
with the use of unlicensed firearm against the accused. The accused-petitioners then filed a
petition for review of the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile, the trial court find a probable cause and
issued warrants of arrest directed against the accused.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said petition for review, the proceedings
were suspended. Subsequently, however, the arraignment of the accused was set on May 21,
2002. It was, thereafter, reset to June 6, 2002 which, by agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, was intransferrable in character.
Before the scheduled arraignment, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution stating that the
crime charged be downgraded to Homicide and Attempted Homicide. In compliance with the
said resolution the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases, and for the court to admit
the said second Amended Informations. On July 5, however, private offended parties filed a
motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice assailing the said resolution.
The RTC ordered the information to be amended and the arraignment pursued. The private
complainant forthwith assailed the orders of the trial court and the arraignment of the accused on
June 6, 2002 via a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining RTC from proceeding with the case. In the meantime,
the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution on November 18, 2002, granting the motion for
reconsideration of the private complainant, setting aside its first Resolution and ordering the
prosecutor to reinstate its original information. The petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice but was denied. They filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the resolution. But CA did not act on the same as it
lacked the necessary requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether of not, the prosecutor and the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion holding the
arraignment of the case.

Held:
Yes. In fine, the RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it granted the Provincial
Prosecutors motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide,
ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 926 for attempted homicide based on Resolution
No. 258 of the DOJ Secretary, and arraigned the accused therein for homicide. Therefore, the
pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any proceedings in
the trial court and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment
of the admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It
should be considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Intervention of the
offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
10th
Judicial Region Branch 69
Cagayan de Oro City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, CRIM. CASE NO. 08282NPS NO.X-06-INV-010A0037-Versus-For: ESTAFA THRUFALSIFICATIONOF PUBLIC DOCUMENTAPIPA G. GURO,
Accused,
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****
INFORMATION
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II accuses Apipa G. Guro of the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 and Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on October 31, 2007 in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused Apipa G. Guro [hereinafter Accused]
misrepresenting herself to be Doa Aiqa Macarambon-Bacsarpa, applied for a loan
with South Bank in the amount of PhP 5,000,000.00. A parcel of land located at
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-178439, in the
name of Don Mario Bacsarpa married to Doa Aiqa Macarambon-Bacsarpa was
then offered by the accused as collateral. The accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously falsify the deed of real estate mortgage and the
promissory note corresponding to the said loan by forging their signatures when in
truth and in fact they did not so participate, to the damage and prejudice of the
complaining bank and the Spouses Bacsarpas in the aforesaid sum of PhP
5,000,000.00.Contrary to law.