IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS

CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. L-32398 January 27, 1992
FACTS:
On 9 February 1957, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization.
Petitioner filed a motion to amend his petition on 15 January 1960.
Subsequently, on 19 June 1961, petitioner once again moved to amend
his petition, to which is in reality theSecondamended petition, was
attached to the motion. In none of the above petitions did petitioner
state that he is a person of good moral character. On 26 June 1961, the
trial court issued an Amended Notice of Petition for Philippine
Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to 26 February 1962and
directing the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in the
GUARDIAN, a newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of
Iloilo. This amended notice of petition was published in the 10, 17 and
24 July 1961issues of the Official Gazette and in the 1, 8 and 15 July
1961 issues of the GUARDIAN. The second Amended Petition itself was
not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province and city of Iloilo. There is, as well, no
evidence of its posting in a public and conspicuous place in the Office
of the Clerk of Court or in the building where such office is located.
After trial, the courta quo,handed down on 15 October 1963 its
decisiongranting the petition. On 30 October 1963, the Assistant City
Fiscal of Iloilo, Vicente P. Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor General,
filed a motion to reconsider the above decisioncontending therein that
petitioner is not exempt from filing his declaration of intention, has not
complied with Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law and that his
witnesses are not competent and credible persons within the
contemplation of law. However, on 11 December 1963, Assistant City
Fiscal Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion to
Withdrawthe motion for reconsideration alleging therein that after a
deliberate study of the grounds alleged, he believes that he cannot
substantially establish the same. Petitioner filed a motion on 1
December 1965 alleging therein that more than two (2) years had
elapsed since the rendition of the decision and that he has complied
with all the conditions and requisites imposed by Republic Act No. 530;
he then prays that after hearing, the decision be executed and he be

allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. On 5 January 1966,

Assistant City Fiscal Gengos filed an opposition to this
motion,reiterating therein the grounds he earlier alleged in the motion
to reconsider the decision. On 8 January 1966, the trial court handed
down the order quoted earlier, now challenged in this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the Petitioner meet the requirements laid down in the Revised
Naturalization Law in order for him to become a naturalized citizen of
the Philippines?
RULING:
As correctly pointed out by the Republic, the second amended petition
was not published. Neither were the original and the amended
petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and
issuenoticesof the petition. It was said notices alone which were
ordered to be published and posted. In respect to the second amended
petition, the notice was published in the 10, 17 and 24 July 1961 issues
of the Official Gazette and the 1, 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the
GUARDIAN. Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Lawrequires that
the petition itself must be published. It reads in part as follows: Sec. 9.
Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of
apetition,it shall be the duty of the clerk of courtto publish the
sameat petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive
weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general
circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have
copies ofsaid petitionand a general notice of hearing posted in a
public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said
office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and
residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes
to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of
the petition, which hearing shall not be held until after six months from
the date of the last publication of the notice. . . .This provision
demands compliance with the following requirements, namely: (1) the
publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3)
and these must be consecutive. The Court further ruled that the
publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Thus: In short, noncompliance with the requirements thereof,relativeto the publication
of the petition, affects the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal
defect,for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authorityto
decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the
clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel. Failure to raise this
question in the lower court would not cure such defect. That there was

in fact, in the instant case, a notice of petition which was published

once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and that the same made
references to some date in the petition and stated the date and place
of hearing, did not save the day for both the petitioner and the trial
court. The publication of the notice did not constitute substantial
compliance with the cited section.
Despite two (2) amendments to the original petition, petitioner did not
allege in any of his petitions that he is of good moral character. The
third of the six (6) qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines,
as provided for in Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, is: Third.
He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living; . . .In
the Twelfth paragraph of the second amended petition, petitioner
practically copied all the words in the section except for the opening
clause on good moral character. A reading of the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of petitioner's testimony on direct examination
reveals that he was not asked about his good moral character. Neither
did he refer to it in any manner in the answers he gave.
The third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law
explicitly provides the applicant must have such qualifications during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
the constituted government as well as with the community in which he
is living. That community is not confined to the Chinese community; it
applies to the community in general for the reason that he is required
to mingle socially with the Filipinos. One who fails to do so is
disqualified to be naturalized under Section 4 (f) of the law. It has been
held that to establish the qualifications that the applicant must be of
good moral character and must have conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence,
the character witnesses must be in a position to testify on the
character and good moral conduct of the applicant during the entire
period of the latter's stay in the Philippines as provided by law. In the
instant case, the witnesses utterly failed to do that.
Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a
certificate of naturalization is issued, the petitioner shall renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty. It is settled that a Chinese national
cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines unless he has
complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous
permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his

nationality.In the instant case, petitioner did not offer any evidence to
prove that he obtained such permission.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the decision of the court below of 15 October 1963 and
SETTING ASIDE its Order of 8 February 1966 in Naturalization Case No.
85. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046
(as amended by HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1968/ra_5446_1968.html"
RA 5446)
AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
The Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as
comprising all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December 10,
1898, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty,
together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at
Washington, between the United States and Spain on November 7,
1900, and in the treaty concluded between the United States and
Great Britain on January 2, 1930, and all the territory over which the
Government of the Philippine Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution. All the waters within the limits set
forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded as
part of the territory of the Philippine Islands. All the waters around,
between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines
archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been
considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming
part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines. All the waters
beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of
the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the
territorial sea of the Philippines. The baselines from which the
territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines
joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago.
The said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and
described for the information of all concerned. x x x Section 2.All
waters within the baselines provided for are considered inland or
internal waters of the Philippines.
Section 3.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 17, 1961.
Republic Act No. 5446

as amended by HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html"
R.A. 9522
September 18, 1968
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, ENTITLED AN ACT TO DEFINE THE
BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1599
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
An exclusive economic zone extending to a distance of two hundred
nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is
measured is vital to the economic survival and development of the
Republic of the Philippines. Such a zone is now a recognized principle
of international law.
Section 1.There is hereby established a zone to be known as the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The exclusive economic
zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond
and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured:
Provided, That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined
overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring
state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with
the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally
recognized principles of international law on delimitation.
Section 2.Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the
Philippines over its territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall have
and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the
following:
(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation,
conservation and management of the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed,
including the subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the

resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from the

water, currents and winds;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment
and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and
structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the
prevention and control of pollution, and scientific research;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state
practice.
Section 3.Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement
entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license
granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines, no
person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic zone:
explore or exploit any resources;
carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:
conduct any research;
(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore
terminal, installation or other structure or device; or
(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in
derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided.
xxx
Section 4.Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone
freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight, the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses
of the sea relating to navigation and communications.
Republic Act No. 9522
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1961/ra_3046_1961.html"
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1968/ra_5446_1968.html"
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
March 10, 2009
Section 2.The baseline in the following areas over which the
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree
No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3.This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has
dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national
territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable
laws including, without limitation, HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1991/ra_7160_1991.html"
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, as amended.

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, ET.AL. vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,

ET.AL.., G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011
FACTS:
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.ht
ml" \l "fnt1" 1(RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines
and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. In 1961,
Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth
of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void
during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II)
proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for
nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act
No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009,
Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA
3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984.Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippinesand sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones. Petitionersassail the

constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA

9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of
the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution,embodying the terms of the Treaty of Parisand
ancillary treaties,and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. In addition,
petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of
islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS III has nothing to do
with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous
zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States-parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Thus, baselines laws are nothing
but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States-parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which Statesparties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters, the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone, and the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf. Even under petitioners theory
that the Philippine territory embraces the islands andall the
waterswithin the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the

baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance

with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in
conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago." UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in
the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription,not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law.
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of
islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth
of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial
claim" over that area.Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough
Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in
the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters,"
prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.A comparison of
the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522
and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled
with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations,vis--visthe Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III,
belie this view. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA
3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522
skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of
one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact
takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a
statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming
that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact
and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints,increasedthe Philippines total maritime space (covering
its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by
145,216 square nautical miles.

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic
zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters
covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of
maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
INCLUDEPICTURE
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/187167.jpg" \*
MERGEFORMATINET
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the
KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text
the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two
provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
"[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second,
Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of
the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the
KIGand the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline
of the Philippine archipelago,such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded
UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition,
to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents: [T]he amendment of the
baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental
shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined
by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from
some technical deficiencies.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the

Philippines consistent with Article 121"of UNCLOS III manifests the

Philippine States responsible observance of itspacta sunt
servandaobligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to
textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah.
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners
contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of the Constitution.
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the
Constitutionor as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49
[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does
not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international
law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political
branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of
their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage
are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys
limitations and conditions for their exercise.Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law,thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage
that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are
subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passagedoes not place them in lesser footingvis--viscontinental
coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of
innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international
straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in
exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to theirterritorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to
the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)must also fail.
Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II
as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. AlthoughOposa v. Factorantreated the
right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II
as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate
the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners
cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7), are
not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to
delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since
the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will
of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates asui generismaritime space the exclusive
economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources
found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.UNCLOS III, however,

preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that

attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Petitioners hold the view that based on the permissive text of UNCLOS
III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.We have looked at the
relevant provision of UNCLOS IIIand we find petitioners reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs
to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this
option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth
of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe
for a two-fronted disaster:first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters
and submarine areas around our archipelago; andsecond, it weakens
the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore
a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.
WHEREFORE, weDISMISSthe petition.
SO ORDERED.
CO KIM CHAM vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945
FACTS:
This petition formandamusin which petitioner prays that the
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military

occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction

to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an
enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his
answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the
government established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation were node factogovernments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of
Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the
Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the
Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the
Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all
public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully
their duties as before." A civil government or central administration
organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942 in order to
proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central
administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed
therefore, with approval of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese
Forces in the Philippines, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial
courts. On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines
was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in
the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned
during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced. On October 23, 1944, General Douglas
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which
declared that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
is the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; and That all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control. On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila
was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur,
on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared
"the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to
the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."
ISSUES:

(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in
the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces;
(2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in
which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of
the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgments
and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and
(3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated
by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines,
may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the
Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and
Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were
reestablished in the Islands.
RULING:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and
proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
ade factogovernment are good and valid. The question to be
determined is whether or not the governments established in these
Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or
regime werede factogovernments. If they were, the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after
the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces.
There are several kinds ofde factogovernments. The first, or
governmentde factoin a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself
against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under
the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount

force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British

possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is
that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state such as the
government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, according to
the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant
has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and
safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of
ade factogovernment, and he can suspended the old laws and
promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see
fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws
in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order
and regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other
hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as,
among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the
freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory
occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the
military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of
justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is
militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary
tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges
and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the
authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in
their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities
appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. The municipal
laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights,
continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror.
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the same general form of
government, the same general laws for the administration of justice
and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to
the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far
as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy
of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the
Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding.
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected,
contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the

transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of

peace.Judicial and legislative acts should be respected by the courts if
they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of occupation and
therefore ade factogovernment of the second kind. The so-called
Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a
sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino
people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the
same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the
ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military
authority and government. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation beingde factogovernments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained
good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase
"processes of any other government" as used in the above-quoted
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 that
is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the
American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may
refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or
legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the
Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands
during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that,
as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of
international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not
of a political complexion, of thede factogovernments during the
Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained
so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the

titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not
have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers
to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory
construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of
General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which
are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines
that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation,
and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before
and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the
Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in
said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or
liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth
Government was restored.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take
the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the
ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which
he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the
above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character. If the proceedings pending in the
different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation

had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the

Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become reestablished and conceived of as havingin continued
existenceupon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in
cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. It is,
therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue,
to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion,
pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government. Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil
rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government,
pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said
Government; and that the respondent judge of the court, having
refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as
presiding judge of that court,mandamusis the speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into
consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved
does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now
pending in all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ
ofmandamusissue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of
said court. So ordered.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by
the SC.)
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely
a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis
of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are
the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., G.R. No. L14639, March 25, 1919
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918,
the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police. About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to
orders from the chief of police and Mayor Justo Lukban, descended

upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and
placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they
were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the
Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the
night of October 25. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpusto a member of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
questionBy authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of
Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila
to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands?
RULING:
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in
conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order
the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act
No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the
United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the
homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being
common prostitutes. Always a law! But one can search in vain for any
law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of
the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islandsand these women despite their being in a
sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizensto change their domicile from Manila to another locality.
When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official
who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who
ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements
for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of

the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of
the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the
city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
Section 1.The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA,G.R. No. L-409, January 30,
1947
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel was arrested in Camarines Sur in May 1945, by the
United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for
his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese
occupation," but in September 1945, he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the
custody of the respondent Director of Prisons, Eriberto Misa. The Court,
acting on the petition forhabeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and
based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized
by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
Was there a change or suspension of sovereignty during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines that Petitioner Laurel cannot be
prosecuted for treason following his acts of giving aid or comfort and
adhering to the enemy during the occupation?
RULING:
A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government
or sovereign and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should
not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein

he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he

receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of
the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereignde jureis not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is
not transferred to the occupant, it must necessarily remain vested in
the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant.
The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times". Sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing
as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of
the petitioner's contention rests.
The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally
intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by
authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of
the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides. The Commonwealth
of the Philippines was a sovereign government was recognized not only
by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States and
the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States. The question of sovereignty is "a
purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative
and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the
judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
The Court resolved to deny the petitioner's petition.
WILLIAM F. PERALTA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,G.R. No. L-49,
November 12, 1945
FACTS:

Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable

to the questions involved in the present case, it is necessary to bear in
mind the nature and status of the government established in these
Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of
Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner-defendant, a member of the
Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and
control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and
other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted
for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of
Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced
to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21,
1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction,
created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic.
The procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in
Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive
Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65
by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
The petition forhabeas corpusis based on the ground that the Court
of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No.
7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those
aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as
well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and
void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative
of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
"the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights".
Petitioner likewise contended that he is being punished by a law
created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in
the Philippines, and that the penalties provided for are more severe
than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that
court.
The validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese
military occupation.
If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the
reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the
Commonwealth Government.

RULING:
It is well established in International Law that The criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source
neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals,
whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the
occupied district. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had
therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. With respect to the Summary
procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, there is also no question as to
the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with
the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards
himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden
by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable;and he so far
suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the
summary punishmentof any one doing such acts. A belligerent
"occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the
ordinary courts; and in case, and insofar as he admits the
administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,
so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of
public order and safety,temporarily alter the laws, especially the
Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administeredas well as
the laws regarding procedure."
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon
the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the
crime of which said petitioner was convicted. It appears clear that it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the
crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from
the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these
crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and
penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as

new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a

state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of
occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its
operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered
by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the
petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was
good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime
of which petitioner was convicted.
The legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration
of the Commonwealth Government, by the principle of postliminy, is
"that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a
political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that
they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction
of municipal law, remain good. Political acts on the other hand fall
through as of course, whether they introduce any positive change into
the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the
working of that already in existence. The execution also of punitive
sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts
not criminal by the municipal law of the state, such for example as acts
directed against the security or control of the invader. All judgments of
political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased
to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the
principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present
case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a
political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be
validipso facto uponthe reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines
by General Douglas MacArthur. The punitive sentence under
consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation
of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and
validipso factoupon the reoccupation of these Islands and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ ofhabeas corpusprayed for is
hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL. vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., G.R. No. L-533, August
20, 1946
FACTS:

At the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the

Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and
Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison
stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese forces
landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and
led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant
colonel of the Philippine Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led
the operation of the 6th Military District. The 6th Military District sent
Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer of the Bolo
Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of Military
character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2,
1943, assigned Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area. A
change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel
Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as
Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was
put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain
allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the
petitioners seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder
which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being
contested.
ISSUE:
(1)By the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense
Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence
of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended
and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation.
(2)The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed.
RULING:
(1)The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to
military law as follows:
Art. 2.Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are
subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the
term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to
the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates
of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees

undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called,

drafted, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving
with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when
martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.
Petitioners come within the general application of the clause in subparagraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates
they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo
Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they
became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of
War. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the
petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly
appointed commanders of the United States Army.
(2)The 93d Article of War ordains "that any person subject to military
law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or
imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." It is argued that
since "no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme
Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment
or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the
Constitution of the Philippines which provides that "the National
Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction
over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment." Petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to
perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority
for their creation. Courts martial are agencies of executive character,
and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been
held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." Unlike courts of
law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. " "Not belonging to the
judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must
pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the
President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding
the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under
his orders or those of his authorized military representatives."
Therefore, the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969

FACTS:
Petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of Bendix
Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides
technical assistance to the United States Air Force, was assigned at
Clark Air Base, Philippines. Nine (9) months thereafter and before his
tour of duty expired, petitioner imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car
with accessories, including freight, insurance and other charges. More
than two (2) months after the 1960 Cadillac car was imported into the
Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander, Clark Air Base,
for a permit to sell the car, which was granted provided that the sale
was made to a member of the United States Armed Forces or a citizen
of the United States employed in the U.S. military bases in the
Philippines. Petitioner sold his car to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. (Private
first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite,
Philippines, as shown by a Bill of Sale executed at Clark Air Base. Pfc.
Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses as evidenced
by a deed of sale executed in Manila. As a result of the transaction thus
made, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after deducting
the landed cost of the car as well as the personal exemption to which
petitioner was entitled, fixed his net taxable income arising from such
transaction, rendering him liable for income tax. After paying the sum,
he sought a refund from respondent claiming that he was exempt, but
pending action on his request for refund, he filed the case with the
Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum plus the legal rate of
interest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not said income tax was legally collected by respondent for
petitioner and that the Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation, is a base
outside the Philippines the sale therefore having taken place on
"foreign soil".
RULING:
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is
a diminution of its sovereignty. It is to be admitted that any state may,
by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is

a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as

auto-limitation, which is the property of a state-force due to which it
has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and selfrestriction.A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some
persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the
matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of
its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the Court
of Tax Appeals to the effect that it should have held that the Clark Air
Force is foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation is
clearly without support in law. As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's
hope for the reversal of the decision completely fades away. There is
nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such an
assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. This country's
jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax,
have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate
exemption was provided for. Petitioner could not have been unaware
that to maintain the contrary would be to defy reality and would be an
affront to the law. We hold, as announced at the outset, that petitioner
was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his automobile in
the Clark Field Air Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other
than, within our territorial jurisdiction to tax. WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of the income tax paid
by petitioner is affirmed.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of

consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of
the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland. According
to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro
Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the
Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a
system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and AncestralLandsof the Bangasmoro. It was also
stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources
within its internal waters.The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process
of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between
the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began. Formal peace talks between the parties were held
in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which wasthe
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of
the negotiation:SecurityAspect,RehabilitationAspect, andAncestral
DomainAspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the
parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round
of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001
which ended with the signing of theImplementing Guidelines on the
Security Aspectof the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire
status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development
Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7,
2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. In 2005, several exploratory talks were
held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the
crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was
set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Petitioners thereafter, collectively
prayed in esse that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
RULING:
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently
worded. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed
those granted to any local government under present laws, and even
go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the
specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it
would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying

link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international

lawconcept ofassociation.
The nature of the "associative"relationshipmay have been intended
to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in
international law, and the MOA-AD placed itself in an international legal
context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed
whentwostatesof unequal power voluntarily establish durable links.
In the basic model,one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence. x x x For purposes of
illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands,are associated states of the U.S.
pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these
countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S.,
yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their
statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by
the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands
and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in
their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as
the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil
aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting
its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the
Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government)
regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of
attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S.
government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they
were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the
option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within
these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel
of any third country from having access to these territories for military
purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international
practice, free association is understood as an international association
between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which
is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and
each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of
independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the

American model of free association is actually based on an underlying

status of independence.
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has
usually been used as atransitional deviceof former colonies on their
way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through
the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All
have since become independent states.
Back to theMOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent
with the international legal concept of association, specifically the
following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations
with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and
the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the
Central Government over external defense. Moreover, theBJE's right
to participatein Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain,resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the
U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Partiesaimed to vest in the BJE the status of anassociated stateor, at
any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept ofassociationisnotrecognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government.It also implies the recognition of theassociated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions,
therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of
constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article
X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are theprovinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall beautonomous regionsin Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be

created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras

consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristicswithin the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only itsspecific provisionsbut the veryconcept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE,are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The
President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that
the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or
unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international
law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss isDENIED. The main and
intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, G.R.
No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines in thiscertiorariand prohibition
proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent
Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of
discretion. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming
an arbitration award. Respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor,
issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to
execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of
the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially on
the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of
Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank
and the Philippine National Bank are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the Order declaring the Decision dated July 3, 1961 as final
and executory and the alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are valid.

RULING:

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the

dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that
the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. A sovereign
is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935
Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein
expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent."A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept
is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives
its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Such a principle
applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued
in favor of an employee. A rule which has never been seriously
questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the
State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited
directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long
as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still
another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic
of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs ofcertiorariand prohibition are granted,
nullifying and setting aside both the Order declaring executory the

decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued

thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12,
1969 is hereby made permanent.

ELDEPIO LASCO vs. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL

RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE), G.R. Nos. 109095-109107,
February 23, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private
respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of
the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the
Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants in the NLRC for illegal
dismissal and damages. In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent
alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In
support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which
acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private
respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations,
was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an
original signatory. Respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing
the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by
diplomatic immunity. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaints.
ISSUE:
Whether the UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity despite the fact
that it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of
employment with petitioners.
RULING:
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation
are outside the official functions of an international agency protected
by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was
entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private

respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered

into a contract of employment with petitioners. Petitioners, likewise,
invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full
protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private
respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private
respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. As a matter
of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine
Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law. Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to
the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
The Court recognized the growth of international organizations
dedicated to specific universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture,
science and technology and environment. It is not surprising that their
existence has evolved into the concept of international immunities. The
reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international
organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and
practical independence in fulfilling their duties.
Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their
functions. The purpose is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political
pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance
of their functions.
There is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to
protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the
grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on
jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the
international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their
functions.
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently
established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance
with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations where the Philippine Government was a party.
The issue whether an international organization is entitled to
diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by

the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial

agencies.
Courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it
expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench.
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the
Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into
by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral
exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural
resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality
of life of the people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency
shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character
to which the specialized agency is a party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE
DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992
FACTS:
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an
agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967
by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam,
Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.
Private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research
Associate on a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs Officer. Thereafter, he was appointed
to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External
Affairs Office. Petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDECAQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him
that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the
department, his services shall be terminated and that he is entitled to
separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for
every year of service plus other benefits. Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-

AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter
filed a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation
benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC. Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim
alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as
the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private
respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments
for property or money accountability before any claim for separation
pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by
the private respondent. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor
of complainant Lazaga. The decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division
of the NLRC except as to the award of actual damages and attorney's
fees for being baseless. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC had jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent
Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to
its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against
the State which cannot be maintained without its consent.
RULING:
Petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It was established by the
Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia,
Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia. Republic of the Philippines, Republic
of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam. The
Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement
establishing SEAFDEC on January 16,1968. SEAFDEC-AQD was
organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7,
1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of
SEAFDEC to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in
aquaculture. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the
Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing
SEAFDEC Council and that its national laws and regulations shall apply
only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of
money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for
the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned. It
expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the
disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD.

Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of

jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of
the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a
tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine
government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC,
respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO L. CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE,G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995

FACTS:
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. While
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development
Department Manager.In view of the aforesaid findings, he was
charged with Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under
the influence of liquor; Serious misconduct, and;Gross and habitual
neglect of duties. Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations
and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent IRRI,
through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the
Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620 and that it invokes such diplomatic
immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant
case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. IRRI likewise
wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment.While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity,
the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to
the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its
immunity,"and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no
longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in
private respondent' s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its

immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside
and the complaint dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be
invoked inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum
on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to
P.D. 1620."
RULING:
IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620,
Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute
shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly
waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives. After the Court noted the letter of the Acting Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor, where the immunity of IRRI
from the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment was
sustained, the Court stated that this opinion constituted "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that . . . IRRI
enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon
the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of
Government.Further, theraison d'etrefor these immunities is the
assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only
way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on,
made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor
Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its
diplomatic immunity. In cases involving dismissed employees, the
Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.
The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a nowdefunct division of the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and not
as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees.
Moreover, the IRRI's letter to the Labor Arbiter declaring that it has no
intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least, supplants any
pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous cases.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition forcertiorariis DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA v CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS

ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. L-25916, April 30, 1970
FACTS:
Gaudencio A. Begosa was "an enlisted man in good standing of the
Philippine Commonwealth Army, inducted in the service of the USAFFE"
and having taken "active participation in the battle of Bataan" as well
as the "liberation drive against the enemy" thereafter having become
"permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in
line of duty." After having submitted all the supporting papers relative
to his complaint, there was a disapproval on the part of PVA on the
ground of his having been dishonorably discharged, although such an
event did not take place until almost five years after the end of the war
on November 7, 1950 and while he was in the service of a different
organization that such a penalty was imposed on him. There was an
approval on his claim on September 2, 1964 but effective only as of
October 5 of that year, and for amount much less than that to which he
was entitled under the law. The relief sought was the payment, as of
the date to which he believed his right to pension should have been
respected, of the sums, which he felt were legally due and owing to
him. PVA set up the following affirmative and special defenses:
inasmuch as the instant action pertains to money claim against the
Government, it must first be presented before the Auditor General as
provided by existing law on the matter (C.A. 327) and Begosas claim is
in reality a suit against the Government which cannot be entertained
by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not
given its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether Begosas claim is a suit against the Government which cannot
be entertained by the Court for lack of jurisdiction because the
Government has not given its consent.
RULING:
The assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of
the lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect

a suit against the State which has not given its consent thereto. The
Court recently had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the
doctrine of non-suability. It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the
suit were in fact against the State, the lower court should have
dismissed the complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly
an action may be against a public official, the defendant may in reality
be the government. As a result, it is equally well-settled that where a
litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury,
whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public
official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity,
then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has
no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had
to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed
by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or
petitioner. Such is the present case. Where the judgment in such a
case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property
in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability
to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against
the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be
validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said
Government.
However, when the trial court saw to it that there was strict
compliance with the amounts of pension required by the law to be
granted Begosa and disregarded the regulation promulgated under the
rule-making power of PVA, the effect of which would make Begosa
suffer the consequences of an error committed by PVA, it cannot be
truly said that lower courts decision may be assailed as being
offensive to authoritative doctrines. On the contrary, it can stand the
test of the utmost scrutiny. Precisely because the commands of the law
were duly carried out, it cannot be set aside. WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding in favor of Begosa is
affirmed.
QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. No. L-27299, June 27, 1973
FACTS:
Quirico del Mar filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition
formandamusthe PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him
monthly life pension from the date of its cancellation and thereafter, or
from his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act 1920, and
to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance for each of his
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age,pursuant to the
said Republic Act 1920. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral

and exemplary damages. Del Mar averred that he served during World
War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly
recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major. He
subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on a
certificate of permanent total physical disability. Upon proper claim
presented and after hearing and adjudication, PVA granted him a
monthly life pension. PVA then discontinued payment of his monthly
life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government. Del Mar wrote PVA twice demanding that it
continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation
thereof as illegal. His demands went unheeded. PVA reiterated its
contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United
States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving
from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him
as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five living
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also
asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the
pension sought by Del Mar. In addition, it alleged that the action of del
Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the courta
quowas without jurisdiction to try the case as Del Mar demand
partakes of a money claim against the PVA a mere agency of the
Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the
Government which is not suitable without its consent. After due trial,
the courta quorendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. For lack
of basis, the courta quoomitted to pass judgment on del Mar's claim
for moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the courta quowas without jurisdiction to try the civil case
because it involved money claim against PVA a mere agency of the
Government performing governmental functions with no juridical
personality of its own and, in reality, partakes of an action against
the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its
consent.
RULING:
PVA labors under a muddled and mistaken appreciation of the
aforecited observation. As a general proposition, the rule well-settled
in this jurisdiction on the immunity of the Government from suit
without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of
funds or loss of property."Needless to state, in such actions, which, in
effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no

option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an

exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action
against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to
release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated
by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.As clearly discernible
from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court adjudged Quirico del Mar entitled to his life
pension.
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v THE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA),G.R. No. 91359, September 25,
1992
FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for
eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro
Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. Odin Security Agency
(Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services
rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum
rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement. PADPAO found
VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee
on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PCSUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting him to set aside or disregard the
findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its
license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. As the
PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSIs license was expiring, VMPSI filed a
civil case in RTC-Makati against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The court
issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of
VMPSIs license". The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss,
Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion
to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the
case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that
VMPSIs license already expired, hence, the restraining order or
preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was
no more license to be cancelled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is
a suit against the State without its consent.
RULING:
The answer is yes. The State may not be sued without its consent
(Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments
consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not
only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but
worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages,
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees from said public respondents.
Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not
be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the
necessary funds for that purpose. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule
is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded. A public official may
sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being
called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. The
Memorandum of Agreement does not constitute an implied consent by
the State to be sued. It was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to
the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the
application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the
State but the legal nature of the act. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a

business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its functions.
In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the
PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and
to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current
rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. Waiver of
the States immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.
Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the public respondents.
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and
the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. It
is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the
instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the
government. Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience
that may be caused by private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to
go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic
principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well
be imagined. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the
judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and
GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy
sheriff, G.R. No. L-32667, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
The now defunct respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied for
lack of merit PNB's motion to quash a notice of garnishment. What was
sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to
satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and
executory.A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued.He was the counsel of the

prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers

Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order
assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of
respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the
writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of
the garnishment "may be public in character."In thus denying the
motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of
respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
May the funds of a government-owned and controlled corporation be
subject to levy or garnishment?
RULING:
After a careful consideration of the matter, it is the conclusion of this
Tribunal that while the authorization of respondent Lorenzo to act as
special deputy sheriff to serve the notice of garnishment may be open
to objection, the more basic ground that could have been relied upon
not even categorically raised, petitioner limiting itself to the assertion
that the funds "could be public" in character, thus giving rise to the
applicability of the fundamental concept of non-suability is hardly
persuasive. The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation had a
juridical existence enabling it sue and be sued.Whatever defect could
be attributed therefore to the order denying the motion to quash could
not be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, with the
lapse of time during which private respondent had been unable to
execute a judgment in his favor, the equities are on his side.
Accordingly, this petition must be dismissed. The plea for setting aside
the notice of garnishment was promised on the funds of the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited with petitioner being
"public in character." There was not even a categorical assertion to
that effect. It is only the possibility of its being "public in character."
The tone was thus irresolute, the approach difficult. The premise that
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in
the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were
exempt from garnishment.It is well settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a
particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as

to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private

corporations. When a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen.
Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its
prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates
itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to
the business which is to be transacted. As a member of a corporation,
a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a
corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the
affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the incorporating
act. One of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability
is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an
entirely different matter if the office or entity is "possessed of a
separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be
sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is
what happened in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis dismissed. No costs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID B. CRUZ,
SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ, and LORNA C. CRUZ, G.R. No. L-41299
February 21, 1983
FACTS:
Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were
granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located
at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral. From the
proceeds of the real estate loan the mortgagors constructed their
residential house on the mortgaged property and were furnished by
the SSS with a passbook to record the monthly payments of their
amortizations. The mortgagors, plaintiffs herein, complied with their
monthly payments although there were times when delays were
incurred in their monthly payments. SSS filed an application with the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the conditions
of the mortgage have been broken with the default on the part of the
mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the
principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly
installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date.
Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of the Sheriff's
Sale of the mortgaged property was published announcing the sale at
public auction of the said mortgaged property. After the first
publication of the notice, and before the second publication of the

notice, Spouses Cruz thru counsel formally wrote SSS, a letter

demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the
publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that Spouses
Cruz were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations.
Nothing came out of the communications between the parties and the
second and third publications of the notice of foreclosure were
published successively. The Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees
against SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging that they had
fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not
defaulted in any payment. In its Answer, with counterclaim, SSS
stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by
private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause
provided in the mortgage contract, even after private respondents had
paid their amortization installments. In its counterclaim, the SSS
prayed for actual and other damages, as well as attorney's fees, for
malicious and baseless statements made by private respondents. The
Trial Court rendered judgment against SSS and directed to pay
plaintiffs corresponding amount of actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and costs of litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SSS can be held liable for damages not being a
profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing
governmental functions petitions.

RULING:
There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a
juridical entity with a personality of its own.It has corporate powers
separate and distinct from the Government.SSS' own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court.These words
"sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action.
So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of
the explicit provision of the afore-cited enabling law, the Government
must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS,
although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has
given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any

lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary

functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a
private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as,
in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from
contractand even for tort. The proposition that SSS is not profitoriented was rejected. But even conceding that the SSS is not, in the
main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, insofar as
contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the
SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay
interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges.
In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would
be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members,
suffice it to say, that expenditures of the System are not confined to
the payment of social security benefits. Drawing a parallel with the
NASSCO and the Virginia Tobacco Administration, whose funds are in
the nature of public funds, it has been held that those funds may even
be made the object of a notice of garnishment. What is of paramount
importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated
and that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a
right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely private and
contractual relationship between said individual and the System.
However, that under the circumstances of the case, SSS cannot be
held liable for the damages as awarded. SSS was of the belief that it
was acting in the legitimate exercise of its right under the mortgage
contract. The filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a
ground for an award of moral damages.Moreover, no proof has been
submitted that the SSS had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner. However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts,
there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the
loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C.
Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to
acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal
damages. This type of damages is to vindicate or recognize their rights
which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS.The
circumstances of the case also justify the award of attorney's fees
considering that private respondents were compelled to litigate for the
prosecution of their interests. WHEREFORE, the judgment sought to be
reviewed is hereby modified in that petitioner SSS shall pay private
respondents nominal damages and attorney's fees. Costs against
petitioner Social Security System. SO ORDERED.
GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
BRANCH V, STA. MARIA, and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No.
L-55273-83 December 19, 1981

FACTS:
At about midnight on October 26, 1978, during the height of that
infamous typhoon "KADING", respondent corporation, acting through
its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or caused to be
opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam. And
as a direct and immediate result of the sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were
inundated. Hardest-hit was Norzagaray. About a hundred of its
residents died or were reported to have died and properties worth
millions of pesos destroyed or washed away. Petitioners, who were
among the many unfortunate victims of that man-caused flood, filed
with the respondent Court eleven complaints for damages against the
respondent corporation and the plant superintendent of Angat Dam,
Benjamin Chavez. Respondent corporation filed separate answers to
each of these eleven complaints. Apart from traversing the material
averments in the complaints and setting forth counterclaims for
damages respondent corporation invoked in each answer a special and
affirmative defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam," it is
"performing a purely governmental function", hence it "can not be
sued without the express consent of the State." On motion of the
respondent corporation a preliminary hearing was held on its
affirmative defense as though a motion to dismiss were filed.
Petitioners opposed the prayer for dismissal and contended that
respondent corporation is performing not governmental but
merelyproprietary functionsand that under its own organic act,
Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in any
court. Petitioners received a copy of the questioned order of the
respondent Court dismissing all their complaints as against the
respondent corporation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and operation
of the Angat Dam; and
2. Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue
and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued
for tort.
RULING:
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in
any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from

that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC
can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the
cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the
one instituted by the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
granted; the Orders of the respondent court are set aside; and said
court is ordered to reinstate the complaints of the petitioners. Costs
against the NPC. SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINO MALONGvs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PANGASINAN, Lingayen Branch 11,G.R. No. L-49930 August 7, 1985
FACTS:
This case is about the immunity from suit of the Philippine National
Railways. The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR
train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred
because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was
overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All
Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay
them damages. Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court
dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the
PNR, being agovernment instrumentality, the action was a suit against
the State. The Malong spouses appealed to the Court pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5440. The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's
predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under
Act No. 1510, its charter. The PNR charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741,
provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under
government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is
under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Republic Act No.
6366 provides that The Philippine National Railways shall have the
power to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the
Corporation Law. Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that
every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate
name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every
corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court.
ISSUE:
Did the State act in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity
when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in
transportation?
RULING:

In the instant case, the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity
when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor,
the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from
suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766
of the Civil Code on common carriers. The correct rule is that "not all
government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized." Suits against State
agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in
a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State.
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial
business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other private corporation. It would be unjust if the heirs of the
victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue
the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is
subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private
enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. It does not
exercise sovereign functions. It is an agency for the performance of
purely corporate, proprietary or business functions. WHEREFORE, the
order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
JESUS P. DISINI vs THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),G.R. No. 180564, June
22, 2010
FACTS:
In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this
case by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
wanted petitioner Jesus P. Disini to testify for his government in its case
against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States
District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that
Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against
the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini
(Herminio), as an executive in the latters companies from 1971 to
1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the
construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of
Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies.
On February 16, 1989 respondent Republic and petitioner Disini
entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to
testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the information,
affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two

cases.Acknowledging Disinis concern that the Republic could become

a party to yet other proceedings relating to the matters subject of his
testimony, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it
shall not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Petitioner Disini
complied with his undertaking but 18 years later or on February 27,
2007, upon application of respondent Republic, respondent
Sandiganbayan issued a subpoenaducestecumand ad testificandum
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents
before that court on in an action that the Republic filed against
Herminio.Disini filed a motion to quash the subpoena, invoking his
immunity agreement with the Republic, but respondent Sandiganbayan
ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena, directing him to testify
before it. On July 19, 2007 the PCGG issued Resolution 2007031,revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between
petitioner Disini and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the
latter from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. On August 16,
2007 respondent Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash
subpoena, prompting the latter to take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked
and nullified the Immunity Agreement between respondent Republic
and petitioner Disini.
RULING:
Respondent Republic contends that the power to grant immunity given
the PCGG covers only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. It
does not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The
Republic even believes that immunity from the need to testify in other
ill-gotten wealth cases would defeat the very purpose of Executive
Order 1 which charged the PCGG with the task of recovering all illgotten wealth of former President Marcos, his family, relatives,
subordinates, and close associates. The Court has ruled in a previous
case that the scope of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary.It has
discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending
on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this
case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce
cooperation. In petitioner Disinis case, respondent Republic, acting
through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunitybut
also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or
foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified

in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting

in the Governments honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his
part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the
essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. The
Republic of course points out that the immunity from criminal or civil
prosecution does not cover immunity from giving evidence in a case
before a court of law. But in reality the guarantee given to petitioner
Disini against being compelled to testify in other cases against
Herminio constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases he would
face indirect contempt, which is essentially a prosecution for willful
disobedience of a valid court order, a subpoena.Here, petitioner
Disinis refusal to testify as ordered by the Sandiganbayan is certain to
result in prosecution for criminal contempt. It constitutes criminal
contempt since guilt would draw a penalty of fine or imprisonment or
both. In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal
and the rules of criminal procedure apply. What is more, it is generally
held that the State or respondent Republic is the real prosecutor in
such a case.The grant, therefore, of immunity to petitioner Disini
against being compelled to testify is ultimately a grant of immunity
from being criminally prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify,
something that falls within the express coverage of the immunity given
him.
Petitioner Disini argues that respondent Republic, through the PCGG,
should not be allowed to revoke the guarantee it gave him against
being compelled to testify in other cases, the Republic being in
estoppel for making him believe that it had the authority to provide
such guarantee. The Republic rejects this argument, however, invoking
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides: "The
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel."
But,the estoppel that petitioner Disini invokes does not have the
effect, if recognized, of denying the state its right to recover whatever
ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have acquired under the Marcos
regime. The action against Herminio can continue, hampered only by
the exclusion of Disinis testimony. And there are other ways of proving
the existence of ill-gotten wealth.Although the government cannot be
barred by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public officers,such
principle cannot apply to this case since, as already pointed out,
respondent PCGG acted within its authority when it provided Disini with
a guarantee against having to testify in other cases. A contract is the
law between the parties. It cannot be withdrawn except by their
mutual consent.This applies with more reason in this case where
petitioner Disini had already complied with the terms and conditions of

the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the

Agreement at this late stage will run afoul of the rule that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its
benefits. The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it
bluntly, to double cross petitioner Disini. The Immunity Agreement was
the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party
trying to get the best concessions out of it.The Republic did not have
to enter that agreement. It was free not to. But when it did, it needs to
fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than any one, the
government should be fair. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition and ANNULS Resolution 2007-031 dated July 19, 2007 of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government. SO ORDERED.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et al.,G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the
latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the
monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also
made to apply to another contract between the same parties. Pursuant
to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the
various premises of the petitioner. Several guards of the Sultan
Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the
Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against the
Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. The Executive
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding herein
petitionerjointlyandseverally liable with Sultan Security Agency for
the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, commanding the City Sheriff
to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of
the petitioner.A petition for injunction, prohibition andmandamus,
with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner
with the NLRC, Cagayan de Oro, alleging that the writ issued was
effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be
deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would

hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the

prejudice of the public good. In its petition forcertiorari, the petitioner
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash
the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming
jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
RULING:
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may
not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a
recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As
has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative
to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability.We have had occasion, to explain in its defense, however,
that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be
deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in
severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if
such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the
state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as
correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be
sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at
times be sued.The States' consent may be given expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general lawor a
special law.In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity
of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could

serve as a basis of civil action between private parties."Implied

consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaimor when it
enters into a contract.In this situation, the government is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the
NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate
as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between
one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant case,
the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed
any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other
items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, afore-cited, gives the consent of the State to be
"sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.")
No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the
money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. We fail to
see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of
C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against
the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the
legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or
satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules
and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby
necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put,
when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the
other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a
liability.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed
against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and
the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing,
issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued
pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v THE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA), G.R. No. 91359, September 25,

1992
FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for
eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro
Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. Odin Security Agency
(Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services
rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum
rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement. PADPAO found
VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee
on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PCSUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting him to set aside or disregard the
findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its
license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. As the
PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSIs license was expiring, VMPSI filed a
civil case in RTC-Makati against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The court
issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of
VMPSIs license". The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss,
Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion
to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the
case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that
VMPSIs license already expired, hence, the restraining order or
preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was
no more license to be cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief will prosper.
RULING:
The PC Chief contended that PC-SUSIA, being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official may not be sued
without the Governments consent, especially in this case because
VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to

act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees from
said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such
as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. A public official may
sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being
called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

T/SGT ALDORA LARKINS vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

HON. IRINEO BERNARDO, DANIEL HERRERA, MARIETTA DE GUZMAN,
JOSELITO CATACUTAN, JOSEPH GALANG, ROBERTO HERRERA, DELPIN
PECSON, CARLOS CORTEZ, JAIME CORTEZ, ARSENIO DIAZ, ROBERTO
SAGAD and MARCELO LOZANO,G.R. No. 92432, February 23, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF)
assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the
contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the
De Guzman Custodial Services. The employees thereof, including
private respondents, were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS. It
was left to the new contractor, the JAC Maintenance Services owned by

Joselito Cunanan, to decide whether it would retain their services.

Joselito Cunanan, however, chose to bring in his own workers. As a
result, the workers of the De Guzman Custodial Services were
requested to surrender their base passes to Lt. Col. Frankhauser or to
petitioner. Private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against petitioner, Lt. Col. Frankhauser,
and Cunanan for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Private
respondents amended their complaint and added therein claims for
emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay, service
incentive leave pay and holiday premiums.
The Labor Arbiter, with the conformity of private respondents, ordered
Cunanan dropped as party respondent. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision granting all the claims of private respondents. He found both
Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and
ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back wages, or
if that is no longer possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never
acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of
the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. In
her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of Appeal,"
petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of
hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P. U.S.
Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether the suit against Lt. Col. William Frankhauser and T/Sgt.
Aldora Larkins of the 3 AGS under the USAF would prosper.
RULING:
The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known
as the R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights,
duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American
nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country. Summonses and
other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative
agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S.
base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his
permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the
process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate
court. Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He
instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the
Base Commander. Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that
no summons was ever issued and served on her. They contend,

however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. Notices of

hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing
jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC
proceedings. It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being
served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or a valid
waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor
Arbiter are null and void.
Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived
service of summons on her, still the case could not prosper. There is no
allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and
petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for tortuous
acts. However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the
respondents in their complaint. It is worth noting that NLRC admitted
that it is the Government of the United States of America which is
maintaining military facilities in the Philippines, one of which is located
inside Clark Air Base. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously
worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the
United States Armed Forces (USAF) inside the said military base. While
individual respondents, particularly Lt. Col. William Frankhauser and
T/Sgt. Aldora Larkins, are mere elements of the USAF assigned to the 3
AGS. Thus, whatever awards, monetary or otherwise, the appellees are
entitled to by virtue of this case are the primary liabilities of their real
employer, the United States Government. Private respondents were
dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for
and in behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer of private
respondents was not Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner. The employer
of private respondents, as found by NLRC, was the U.S. Government
which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the
dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the USAF. Assuming that
jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the
monetary claims of private respondents proved, such awards will have
to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner in their
personal capacities, but by the United States government. Under the
"Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America
Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States
Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor
Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the
United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled
under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein or by
the arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth
Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement
was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was
appealable by either party to a Joint Labor Committee established in

Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. Unquestionably therefore, no

jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and
the person of petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis GRANTED. SO ORDERED.
LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON
E. DETWILER and ANTHONY PERSI,G.R. No. 90314, November 27,
1990
FACTS:
Clark Air Base is one of the bases established and maintained by the
United States by authority of the agreement between the Philippines
and the United States concerning military bases which entered into
force on March 26, 1947. The Third Combat Support Group, a unit of
Clark Air Base, maintains a Central Civilian Personnel Office (CCPO)
charged with the responsibility for civilian personnel management and
administration. The Third Combat Support Group also maintains an
Education Branch, Personnel Division, which provides an education
program for military personnel, U.S. civilian employees, and adult
dependents, assigned or attached to Clark Air Base. During the time
material to the complaint, private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian
personnel officer, while private respondent Anthony Persi was
education director. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and
married to an American who is a member of the United States Air
Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently
qualified. By reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner
Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complaint
against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the
former by reason of her nationality and sex. Contrary to her
expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the
position. Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment
accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service
Commission. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base
Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her complaint
for discrimination. Before the Department of Air Force could render a
decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the
Regional Trial Court at Angeles City for the alleged discriminatory acts
of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for
the position. Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing
official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under
the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune

from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
Whether the action is a suit against the United States Government
which would require its consent.
Whether the acts sued upon is barred by the immunity of the United
States, as a foreign sovereign, being a governmental activity of
respondents.

RULING:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This
latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to
abide by the rules of the international community. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule
is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has been formally impleaded.It must be noted, however,
that the rule is not also all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is made
to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to
act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against

the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent.The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in
Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. The court below, in finding
that private respondents are guilty of discriminating against petitioner
Loida Q. Shauf on account of her sex, color and origin, categorically
emphasized that there is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs
complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as
Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and
origin. Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact
of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not
be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.Absent any
substantial proof, therefore, that the trial courts decision was
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures, the same
must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so
because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe
and correctly appreciate the respective parties evidence as they were
presented. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which
suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the
part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts
of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. His
conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence on
record. We are thus constrained to uphold his findings of fact.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioners moral damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit. SO
ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,G.R.
No. 84607 March 19, 1993
FACTS:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on

January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a
Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that
befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola
massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For
those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they
would not settle for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken
that will never be brought back to life again. Hence, the heirs of the
deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted this
petition seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Orders of
respondent Judge Sandoval dismissing the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner,
the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy seeks to set
aside the Order of respondent Judge in a civil case entitled "Erlinda
Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of
encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa
Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along
Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what
they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national
president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among
which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of
lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments. On
January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to
Malacaang to air their demands. In anticipation of a civil disturbance,
and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command
(CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break
through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM
Commander General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations
and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno
under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the
vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the
Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim
were also activated. Intelligence reports were also received that the
KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an
insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were
also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would
be forcibly occupied.
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000.
From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No

dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It
was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of
the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". After the clash, twelve
(12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to
Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the
name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by
gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot
wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as
abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Administrative Order No. 11,(A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January
22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. A.O. 11
stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of
conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that
took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and
Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987".
The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not later
than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the
deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No.
13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally,
on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987. From the
results of the probe, the Commission recommendedthe criminal
prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on
tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. The last and
the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be
compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners
(Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of
compensation was received by the victims. After almost a year,
petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the
military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident,
before the trial court. The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent.
Petitioners opposed said motion maintaining that the State has waived
its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is
contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human
Rights. Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against
the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver
by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent
judge. Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant

petition. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together

with the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the
court below, filed its petition forcertiorari.

ISSUE:
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of
whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit.
RULING:
This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the
recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification
of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the
government does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly
states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body
that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and
casualties that took place."In effect, whatever may be the findings of
the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in
the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore,
the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not
the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any
way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having
become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being
afact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may
have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having
waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the
marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an
admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of
petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the
government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President
Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the
grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the
State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has
consented to the suit. Although consent to be sued may be given
impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given
considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. Some
instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the
Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an

unincorporated government agency; (3) When the, suit is on its face

against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability
will belong not to the officer but to the government. While the Republic
in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to
the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then
party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the
incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment
they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there
was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd
dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880as there
was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. While it is
true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a
sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the
courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by
both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the
heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The
principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case,
when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official
action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity,even
though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold
or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and
servants.This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position
in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly
injure another."
The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly
liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability
should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the
ruling of this court inShauf vs. Court of Appeals,herein public officials,
having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority,
may be held liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned
orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.