Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHEM FISCHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 06-4121
James W. Stewart (Boyd L. Rogers with him on the briefs) Ballard Spahr
Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant.
Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, Utah (Rodney R. Parker, Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief) for
Appellee.
Before HARTZ, McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Shem Fischer sued Forestwood Company, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), for unlawful
The company had given cash donations to the FLDS in the past. Since at least
1999, the company refused to hire or interview anyone who was not a member of
the FLDS church. At the time Fischer filed his complaint with the EEOC, only
one employeeout of seventy total employeeswas not a member of the church.
From 1991 through 2000, Fischer worked closely with John Musser, who
prepared cabinet patterns for Forestwood. Musser, like Fischer, was a member of
the FLDS church during most of that time. In August or September 1999, Musser
and his wife decided to leave the FLDS and become members of the LDS church.
They moved 24 miles up the road from Hildale to Hurricane because they felt
uncomfortable continuing to live among FLDS members. For the next year,
Musser continued to work for Forestwood because he derived a substantial
portion of his income from this employment.
About the time Musser left the FLDS church, Fischer publicly criticized the
church and began skipping church functions. As a result, his co-workers
sometimes heckled him. Fischer also claimed anonymous notes expressing
concern about his faith were left on his cars windshield and in his message box
at work. He felt increasingly uncomfortable at Forestwood. In the spring of
2000, he was formally expelled from the FLDS church.
On July 16, 2000, Warren Jeffs (counselor, son, and heir to FLDS prophet
and leader Rulon Jeffs) delivered a sermon urging FLDS members to stop
supporting apostates through their business relationships. Jeffs believed funds
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from those relationships were being used to fight the church. He urged members
to [b]e kind to everyone, but leave apostates alone, and called upon the
membership to stop helping our enemies fight against us. R., Vol. I at 11520.
A short time later, Fischer met with his half-brothers Marvin and David.
At that meeting, Marvin informed Fischer that he planned to fire Musser. Fischer
objected to this termination, arguing firing Musser would constitute religious
discrimination and would be over the top of me. Marvin responded by saying
if thats the way its got to be. R., Vol. II at 372. Fischer interpreted Marvins
statement as indicating he was fired. Soon after this exchange, however, Marvin
asked Fischer to reconsider leaving the company. Fischer did not accept this
proposal. Instead, he asked if he could have time to finish up his current projects.
Marvin agreed and Fischer left the company a short time later.
In November 2000, Fischer sought reinstatement with the company. He
approached his father, Erwin, who was president of the company. Fischer
surreptitiously taped two of the conversations. In the first conversation, he
pushed hard for reinstatement, but his father held back, claiming someone else
had already taken over Fischers previous duties. Erwin ended the conversation
by saying he would discuss the issue with the company and others. In the second
conversation, Erwin indicated he wanted Fischer back at the company, but only if
Fischer rejoined the church.
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II. Discussion
Fischer sued Forestwood under Title VII for unlawful discharge, retaliation,
and failure to hire. 1 The district court granted Forestwood summary judgment on
all three claims. In reaching this decision, the court also decided the two
recorded conversations between Fischer and Erwin were inadmissible hearsay.
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Piercy v. Maketa, 480
F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is warranted only if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In conducting our analysis, we view all of the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record in the non-movants favor. Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243,
1249 (10th Cir. 2006).
While we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, that party must still identify sufficient evidence requiring submission to the
As a prerequisite to all three Title VII claims, Fischer must show that he
was an employee of Forestwood or was seeking to be rehired as an employee. See
Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1998). In evaluating
Forestwoods summary judgment motion, the district court assumed, without
deciding, that Fischer was an employee rather than an independent contractor.
We make the same assumption.
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jury to survive summary judgment. Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1197. When a party
relies on affidavit evidence, it may be insufficient to create a triable fact if it is
nonspecific or otherwise non-responsive, vague, conclusory, or self-serving. Id.
at 119798.
B. Unlawful Discharge and Retaliation
Fischer first argues he was fired because he dropped out of the FLDS
church and protested the treatment of his friend, Musser. The district court
concluded Fischer did not produce sufficient evidence demonstrating he was
subjected to an adverse employment action. We agree.
Under Title VII, an employer must not discharge any individual . . .
because of such individuals . . . religion. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). When the
plaintiff only puts forth circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we evaluate
such claims under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
framework. 2 Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1077 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing
Shapolia v. Los Alamos Natl Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 103738 (10th Cir. 1993)). To
Fischer did not argue to the district court that his claim was supported by
direct evidence of discrimination. Rosewood Servs., Inc. v. Sunflower Diversified
Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that arguments not
raised in the district court are waived on appeal). Fischer also did not raise this
issue on appeal. [A]rguments not set forth fully in the opening brief are
waived. Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir.
1998). Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether Fischer could
instead proceed under a mixed motive framework. See Fye v. Oklahoma Corp.
Commn, 516 F.3d 1217, 122627 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing the mixed motive
framework).
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establish a prima facie unlawful discharge case, the plaintiff must show the
following:
(1) that he was subjected to some adverse employment action;
(2) that, at the time the employment action was taken, the employees
job performance was satisfactory; and
(3) some additional evidence to support the inference that the
employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory motive
based upon the employees failure to hold or follow his or her
employers religious beliefs.
Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to
discharge the plaintiff. If the defendant meets its burden of production by
offering a legitimate rationale in support of its employment decision, the burden
shifts back again to the plaintiff to show that the defendants proffered reasons
were a pretext for discrimination. Exum v. United States Olympics Comm., 389
F.3d 1130, 113435 (10th Cir. 2004).
Fischer also alleges Forestwood retaliated against him because he objected
to the company firing Musser. 3 In particular, Fischer told Marvin that the
3
termination of Musser was unlawful because it was based solely on the fact that
Musser was no longer a member of the FLDS church. Title VII forbids retaliation
against an employee because he opposed any practice made unlawful by Title
VII, or because he participated . . . in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a).
Without direct evidence of discrimination, 4 we analyze retaliation claims
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1070. To establish
a prima facie case of retaliation, Fischer must show (1) he engaged in protected
opposition to discrimination; (2) Forestwood took an adverse employment action
against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and
the adverse action. Id. at 1071. As in an unlawful discharge claim, once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
produce evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for the conduct, and then the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating pretext.
In sum, to establish a prima facie case on both the unlawful discharge and
retaliations claims, Fischer must prove that the company subjected him to an
adverse employment action. An adverse employment action must be materially
3
(...continued)
Musser was an employee. We likewise make the same assumption.
4
shocked that Id just been fired for opposing the release of a fellow
worker, someone that did a lot of work for me, over religious beliefs.
And in my mind I just clearly had been fired. He said, okay, if thats
the way its got to be.
R., Vol. II at 371. Marvin then urged him to reconsider. Fischer refused to
change his mind, but requested eight weeks to wrap up my business here. Id. at
372. Marvin granted him this request.
This testimony does not support Fischers claim that he was actually
discharged. The record discloses the following facts. (1) Marvin told Fischer
that Musser was to be released. (2) Fischer disagreed with the decision and told
Marvin that it would not be acceptable. (3) Marvin never told him he was
discharged for this stance, only that Marvin would not change his position about
Musser. (4) Marvin, moreover, plainly told Fischer he had the option of
remaining with the company. (5) Fischer nonetheless chose not to remain with
Forestwood because he disapproved of the companys decision to release Musser.
(6) Finally, Fischer submitted a complaint to the EEOC where he noted he was
forced to quit by the company, not that he was fired. R., Vol. I at 128.
In sum, because Fischer chose to resign rather than work for a company he
believed had wronged Musser, we agree with the district court that he was not
actually discharged.
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2. Constructive discharge
Even if an employee resigns, the plaintiff may still satisfy the adverse
employment action requirement by demonstrating that he was constructively
discharged. The plaintiffs burden in establishing constructive discharge is
substantial. EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d 790, 805 (10th Cir. 2007); see also
Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining
[t]he bar is quite high in [constructive discharge] cases). A constructive
discharge occurs only when an employer, through unlawful acts, makes working
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employees position
would feel forced to resign. Exum, 389 F.3d at 1135. We evaluate the
voluntariness of an employees resignation under an objective, totality of the
circumstances standard. Id. at 1136.
Several cases show the type of evidence plaintiffs must produce to meet
their burden. For example, in Acrey v. American Sheep Industry Assn, 981 F.2d
1569, 1574 (10th Cir. 1992), we concluded a plaintiff alleging discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act produced sufficient evidence
establishing she was constructively discharged. On multiple occasions, her
supervisor asked her to quit, citing her age and her image. Furthermore, her
supervisor repeatedly confronted her with a litany of performance shortcomings.
The supervisor took away longstanding job responsibilities and gave the employee
inadequate information and training to perform her new responsibilities. The
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plaintiff, too tired to fight, finally resigned. Id. Because the supervisor made it
nearly impossible for the plaintiff to continue performing her job, we concluded
she was constructively discharged.
But an employee cannot survive summary judgment merely by producing
evidence showing that working conditions were difficult or unpleasant. Exum,
389 F.3d at 1135. For example, in PVNF, 487 F.3d at 794, the EEOC produced
evidence demonstrating that the defendant repeatedly subjected female employees
to sexually explicit and derogatory remarks. Even so, we concluded the EEOC
failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating working conditions were so
intolerable that a female employee who quit was constructively discharged. Id. at
806.
Likewise, in Daemi v. Churchs Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379 (10th
Cir. 1991), an Iranian supervisor sued his employer under Title VII for
constructive discharge. The plaintiff produced evidence showing that he resigned
because his employer (1) made derogatory remarks about the fact that he was
Iranian, (2) ordered him to take a polygraph examination because of his national
origin, (3) belittled and mistreated him at company seminars, and (4) ordered him
to fire or eliminate other Iranians employed by the company. Id. at 1384.
Despite this harassment, we concluded these conditions did not make the
workplace sufficiently intolerable that the plaintiff was constructively discharged.
Id. at 1386.
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case based on race or sex discrimination, a plaintiff must show the following to
establish a prima facie case:
(1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) plaintiff applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite being qualified, the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) after plaintiffs
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications.
Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 2005). An employer can
rebut the prima facie case by satisfying the familiar McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. In the context of a claim of religious discrimination, we
apply a modified version of McDonnell Douglas. See Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038
(applying a modified McDonnell Douglas test to a plaintiffs claim that he was
unlawfully discharged because he did not share his supervisors Mormon
beliefs). 5
To establish a prima facie failure-to-hire case in this context, the plaintiff
must show the following: (1) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (2) despite being qualified, the
plaintiff was rejected; and (3) some additional evidence to support the inference
that the plaintiff was not hired because of a discriminatory motive based upon the
5
The present case is similar to Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038. First, Fischer
alleges he was discriminated against because he did not share his supervisors
religious beliefs. Second, because the discrimination is targeted against nonFLDS members, and non-FLDS members constitute a majority of society, this
case resembles reverse discrimination cases. Therefore, for the same reasons we
applied a modified McDonnell Douglas framework in Shapolia, we must do so
here.
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employees failure to hold or follow his or her employers religious beliefs. Upon
such a showing, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting scheme and its presumptions. Exum, 389 F.3d at 113435.
Alternatively, a plaintiff alleging a failure-to-hire claim may survive
summary judgment if he produces sufficient direct evidence of discrimination.
Direct evidence would support an inference that religious discrimination
played a motivating factor in an employers decision not to hire the applicant. Cf.
Fye v. Oklahoma Corp. Commn, 516 F.3d 1217, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008)
(describing direct evidence in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim). When
direct evidence is presented, McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting scheme is
inapplicable. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
In such a case, we ask only whether the plaintiffs direct evidence is sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
In support of his failure-to-hire claim, Fischer proffered evidence of two
tape-recorded conversations between himself and Erwin. 6 Erwin is Fischers
father and, at the time, was also the President and Chairman of the Board of
Recording telephone calls is legal in Utah with the consent of at least one
party to the conversation. Utah Code Ann. 77-23a-4(7)(b) (A person not
acting under color of law may intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication
if that person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the interception, unless the
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortious act in violation of state or federal laws.).
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Forestwood. Fischer alleges these recordings reveal that Forestwood would only
rehire him if he returned to the FLDS church.
The district court refused to consider these recordings on summary
judgment, concluding that the conversations were impermissible hearsay. The
district court furthermore concluded that even if the conversations were
admissible, they were insufficient to establish a prima facie case. We disagree
with both conclusions.
1. Admissibility of telephone conversations
[W]e review a district courts evidentiary decisions for abuse of
discretion. Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1081
(10th Cir. 2006). In reviewing [such a decision], we will not disturb the
determination absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of
judgment. Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007).
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Such
evidence is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). A statement is not hearsay, however, if it is an admission of
a party-opponent. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). An admission of a party-opponent is,
among other things, a statement offered against a party and is . . . (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
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The district court also notes that the tape is, in certain places, not
audible. R., Vol. IV at 854. The district court does not explain why this fact
would make the entire tape inadmissible hearsay.
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a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage. Because the district court
concluded Fischer did not establish a prima facie case, it did not evaluate whether
Forestwood satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate rationale in support of
its employment decision or whether Fischer demonstrated that the defendants
proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. It is unnecessary for us to
reach these issues, however, because we conclude Fischer produced sufficient
direct evidence to survive summary judgment.
In evaluating direct evidence, we do not apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework. See Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121 (holding McDonnell
Douglas is inapplicable when direct evidence is presented). The recordings are
direct evidence because no inference is required to reach the conclusion
assertedthat Fischers non-membership in the FLDS church played a motivating
factor in Forestwoods decision not to rehire Fischer. Cf. Fye, 516 F.3d at 1226
(describing direct evidence in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim). In the
phone conversation, when Fischer asked Erwin whether he had a chance to check
with other board members about Fischer returning to the company, Erwin said,
[Erwin]: Yeah, Ive had a chance to talk it around a little bit, see whats
going One of the first questions I had was it just for a job or would
you like to come back and be part of the people in the group, trying to
kind of get back in where we were before or just what is your standing
on it, or whats your thinking on it? . . . .
[Erwin]: Drop this suit and let us get back on base and we could go
forward again.
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Taken together, we conclude the district court erred in excluding the taped
conversations and deciding Fischer lacked sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment on the failure-to-hire claim. On remand, the district court must still
determine whether Fischer was seeking to be rehired as an employee of
Forestwood for the purposes of Title VII. See supra note 1.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district courts grant of summary judgment on the
unlawful discharge and retaliation claims, and REVERSE and REMAND on the
failure-to-hire claim.
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