FACTS:

Lucia Chan was a fish dealer based in Manila and was expecting fish deliveries from her suppliers in the
province. On August 11, 1998, Theng Dilangalen and another person arrived at her house to inquire about a
certain passport allegedly misplaced in one of the fish delivery boxes. The passport was not found. The next
day, Dilangalen with another person, Tony Abao returned to the house. On the same evening, Dilangalen
returned to the house with an unidentified person and kidnapped Chan. Chan was forced to board a van and
taken to a certain house and was transferred to another house. The group demanded P400,000 as ransom
and instructed Chans son to deliver it at Chowking, Buendia Avenue. On August 14, 1998, the group took
the ransom money but were intercepted by the police. On October 16, 1998, the RTC held the group
including Perepenian who was 17 years old, for Kidnapping for Ransom. On June 28, 2005, the CA armed
the conviction but modified Perepenians conviction from penalty of death to penalty of reclusion perpetua
considering that she was only 17 years old at the time the oense was committed.
ISSUE:
w/n the criminal liability of Perpenian is proper pursuant to RA 9344?
HELD:
No. According to RA 9344, there is a need to determine whether Perenian acted with or without
discernment. The Court took note of the RTCs observation during Perenians trial that she lied about her real
name, age, address because she was scared of being identified with the group. The lying and the fear of
being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew,
therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent
that she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act. Her minority cannot be considered as an
exempting circumstance but a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68 of the RPC. Pursuant to
section 40, RA 9344, sentence cannot be suspended as the maximum age is 21 years old, where as Pernian
was 31 years old at the promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court held that the prosecution did not present sucient evidence to hold her liable as a
principal since Perpenian entered the room where Chan was being held and just conversed with the other
members of the group that was not related to the kidnapping. However, for being present and giving moral
support, she liable as an accomplice.
As an accomplice, the imposable penalty under the RPC is Reclusion Temporal and applying the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of Prision Mayor should be imposed. Under the
indeterminate sentence law, the Court imposed a minimum of 6 months and one day of Prision Correcional
to 6 years and one day of Prision Mayor as maximum. The Court held that while section 51 of RA 9344
would have been applicable in confining Pernian in an agricultural camp, Pernian had already served her
actual term and exceeded the imposable penalty for her oense and ordered her immediate release from
detention.

People vs Mantalaba
Facts:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from
an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu.
A team of police officers conducted a buy-bust operation. Using marked money, two poseur-buyers
approached Mantalaba and bought shabu from him.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from Mantalaba which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3)
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill.
The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange
ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Two separate Informations were filed (eventually consolidated) before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty. CA affirmed Ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: 1. Is he Guilty?
2. Can he avail automatic suspension of his sentence, following RA9344
HELD: Yes. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt proved through evidence procured from buy-bust operation and
testimony of witnesses, plus all the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been observed.
The appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of
Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is
highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005),
hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to
the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the
penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.

People vs Court of Appeals

February 25, 2015
Facts: AAA, a 16 year old from Lanao del Norte, graduated highschool in
March 25, 2004 and celebrated the night out with friends, including the
defendants: Carampatana, Alquizola (watcher of Alquizola Lodging House),
and Oporto (also a minor). They drank shots of Emperador Brandy with
Pepsi. AAA, refusing at first, consumed more or less five glasses of
Emperador Brandy.
AAA, laid her head on Oportos lap, after feeling dizzy. Oporto started
kissing her, which angered AAA, but her companions just laughed at this.
The accused continued to kiss and give her shots of liquor. Things
escalated and the next thing AAA knew was she found herself naked on a
bed, in Alquizola Lodging House, with Oporto on top of her, kissing her and
having intercourse with her. Carampatana and Alquizola were also in the
room. She cried and fell asleep. She woke up again and this time
Carampatana was having intercourse with her. When she went home that
morning, she told her parents she was raped. Her mother beat her but also
sent her to the hospital for an examination. Hospital noted that there were
old lacerations found in AAAs hymen (suggesting this was not her first time
for intercourse) and semen.
The RTC found Carampatana, Alquizola (as an accomplice by providing the
venue), and Oporto guilty of rape. The CA reversed the RTC decision and
based their reason entirely on the defendants testimonies (that AAA was
promiscuous and consented to the sexual acts by not showing physical
resistance, discounting the fact that they got her intoxicated deliberately).
CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her was
inconsistent with that of a parent who found out her daughter was raped.
Issue: WON the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion
Held: YES. The CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process. The
CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion when the prosecutions right to
due process was denied or that the trial conducted was a sham. It appears
that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution.
The CA easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made
its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the
whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance,
never cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents,
bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the
time of the assault. the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal

knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force
or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the
accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could
handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the
latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private
respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she
agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any
physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak
and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.
The defenses testimonies were seemingly unusual and incredible. The
defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The SC also noted the
defense having a rehearsed witness.
SC revered the CA decision but this time finding all three guilty of
conspiracy to rape AAA. Since Oporto was a minor during the time he raped
AAA, RA 9344 must apply to him. For this reason, the case is remanded to
the lower court for proper application.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities.A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Comments: CICL are entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51,

RA 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21
years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child. The case
took more than ten years to be resolved. This is an unfortunate speed, and
not uncommon in the country. Curiously, the Court of Appeals was quick to
reverse the findings and decision of the RTC (even though the investigation
and facts laid out were strong and clear.)

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 173822 (2010)

FACTS:
Petitioners Atizado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llona on April 1994. It was
said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder, where the victim was a guest and suddenly
shot at Llona. After the shooting, they fled. The whole incident was over in a 5 minutes.
For their defense, the petitioners interposed the alibi that they were at their family residence.
The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion
perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed the conviction in 2005.
It appears that Salvador Monreal was a minor of 17 years at the time of the commission of the crime, as
proved by his counter-affidavit, the police blotter, and the testimony of one of the defense witnesses, and also
the fact that the RTC minutes on the trial hearing on March 9, 1999 stated that Monreal was 22 years old
(thus making his age at the commission of the offense 17 years old), including the fact that the main
prosecution witness, Mirandilla, stated that Monreal was a teenager and young looking at the fateful day.
However no Birth Certificate was ever presented during trial.
RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to Monreal despite his
minority at the time of the offense.

HELD:
Yes, the penalty imposed on Monreal is incorrect in view of his minority.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age.
The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder
probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal
was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994 as attested to by the
numerous evidences in support thereof, though not expressly claimed in court.
His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the
commission. Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set
under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to
be eighteen (18) years old or older.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned
shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.


Per Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, when a minor commits an offense, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed. Hence, it should be reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the imposable penalty should be prision mayor in any of its periods, as a minimum period, up to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as the maximum.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the
present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence,
pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his immediate release
from the penitentiary.
This is in consonance with the retroactivity of the law (RA 9344) for children who have been convicted and
are currently serving their sentences pursuant of Section 68 thereof.

COMMENTS:
This case illustrates the application of retroactivity of the law insofar as it benefits the minor even though he
is already serving his sentence. This is but proper given the benevolent purpose of the law, which is to
express the application of restorative justice to children in conflict with the law. Restorative justice is a
system focusing on the rehabilitation of the offender and their reintegration into society.
Furthermore, this case illustrates the mandate of the courts, and the prosecution, in exerting all efforts to
ascertain the age of the accused. Even despite the failure of presenting a birth certificate, the fact of minority
can be established by other facts, and should be properly appreciated by the courts.
However, despite the express provision of the law, personally it seems more appropriate to limit the extent of
the application of this leniency to minors depending on the severity of the crime committed. In this case,
willingly committing and conspiring to commit murder, using treacherous tactics, without provocation
whatsoever, is a heinous crime that deserves the maximum extent of punishment of the law. However, such
matter is best left to the discretion and wisdom of the legislature.

G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Around seven in the evening of March 30, 2000, petitioner Rosal Hubilla stabbed the victim Jason
Espinola in front of Dalupaon Elementary School in Camarines Sur using a bladed weapon. The victim
was later brought to the Bicol Medical Center where he stayed for more than a month. Later, however,
when the victim went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that his stab wound had a
complication. The victim was subjected to another operation, but died the day after. According to the
testimony of a medico-legal expert, the cause of death of the victim was organ failure overwhelming
infection, and that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.

The petitioner was charged with homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, and after trial was
found guilty and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and
one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum;
and to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioners conviction
but modified the penalty and the civil liability. Thus, the petitioner has imputed grave error to the CA for
not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the
law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344.

I.
W/N Petitioner was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act
No. 9344?

No, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of probation. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable
penalty. The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years
and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to
apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968. The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal basis.
Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support
or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence
would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Republic
Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty
further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

The petitioner is also not entitled to the suspension of his sentence. As held in the case of People v. Sarcia
(G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009), although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the
suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension
is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No.
9344. Thus, even if the petitioner here was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime,
being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide, he was already well over
23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the
suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.

II.
W/N imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and
other international agreements?

No, the penalty of imprisonment did not violate the provisions of RA 9344 because the penalty was
imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of
his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.
International agreements on the administration of juvenile justice are also consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum
necessary period. Following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve
his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs best interest. Such
service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.