Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
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Present:
- versus -
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the
date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27,
QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson
1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as
TINGA, and
respondent.
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his
PROMULGATED:
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
(Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and
Filipino to Chinese, respectively.
DECISION
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city
civil registrar[5] stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed
corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no
objections to the other amendments.
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of
his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries
in their birth certificates.
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birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from
Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word
married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction
was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
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FIRST DIVISION
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4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet
nine (9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9,
1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such,
his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence
of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that
name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local
Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born
and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on
matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.
[Giovanni's pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx
xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and
he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother's
surname;
8. [Giovanni's] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in
the United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso,
the surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as
natural child; and
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the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition
and order.7
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation,
in which case they may bear the father's surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his
mother' surname, and does not have a middle name.The name
of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him
as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both
his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as
his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged child.
rbl r l l lbrr
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Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name
and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang20 is enlightening:
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained
that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not
justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child
who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of
Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the
change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for
a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the
reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45)6 arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance
not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not
dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 7 of
the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and
mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the
matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new
environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into
consideration the "best interest of the child."8 It is argued that
convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as
long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out
that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue
embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an
obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to
have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the
age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
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name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court
ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the
child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under
Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when
petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. 3
10
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Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother,21 while illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation,
in which case they may bear the father's surname.22
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001.]
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE,
HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and
TIU CHUAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and HON.
LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their
capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court
of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in
their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK,
MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE,
HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented
by RITA K. LEE, Respondents.
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 31786 2 . The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges
Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion 3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy 4 taking
cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents
before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same
man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are
allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
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she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old,
when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENGs age was then already
38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient
record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE
(2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded
under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
15
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motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein
petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of
the said motion. 10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion
issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:
16
SO ORDERED. 12
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
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17
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded
as that proper suit or appropriate action. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings
adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the
ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated
by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature. 24 The petitioners point to the case of
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 25 which is of a later date than Republic v.
Valencia, 26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in
earlier cases, 27 starting with Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 28 prohibiting
the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in
Go, Et. Al. v. Civil Registrar, 29 allowing substantial changes under
Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
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22 (Emphasis supplied.)
18
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from legitimate
to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation
that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the
petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules
of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
Thus:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
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19
On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any
entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the
mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as
simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or
corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not
material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing (Black v. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or
some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent (Ansalada v. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).
". . . . After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what
was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are
clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the
petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in
order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a
substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party,
the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random
in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will
naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise
affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the
theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in
nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues." 41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, Et. Al.
v. Republic 42 where the Court said that:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until
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Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil
status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial . . . .
20
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates
a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms
"corrected" and "changed." In its ordinary sense, to correct means to
make or set right" ; "to remove the faults or errors from" 44 while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 45 The provision
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor
does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the
civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are
the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles
407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
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in nature.
21
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name."
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It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or
corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from
that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048
now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that
appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar
cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has
prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding
treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause
of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code
allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the
legitimacy of his children only after his death. 48
Article 171 provides:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within
the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following
cases:
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"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
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"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
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desisted therefrom; or
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
". . . Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present
case. A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances
in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at
all. . . . 51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals 52 that:
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was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170
and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
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Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art.
170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to
an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action
of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of
their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor
an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased." 53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents cause of action had
already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the
registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the
filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993. 54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing
the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the
New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that
applies:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in
other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of
action accrues."
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The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the
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SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 120587 - January 20, 2004]
MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad
Litem of MARY JOY ANN GUSTILO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BR. 133-MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF MAKATI; and NADINA G. MARAVILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
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25
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition
on the ground that the RTC "had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and/or the nature of th[e] suit."14 They cited various
jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be
corrected under a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries, and that
the Petition seeks changes "are substantial and controversial in
character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of petitioners
daughter."15 On 23 February 1984, the Motion to Dismiss was denied
by the RTC, which also subsequently denied a Motion for
Reconsideration thereto filed by the Solicitor General.
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We shall first tackle the question of whether the RTC had acquired
jurisdiction over Barco and all other indispensable parties to the
petition for correction.
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Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms
"corrected" and "changed." In its ordinary sense, to correct means "to
make or set right;" "to remove the faults or errors from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute". The provision
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor
does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the
civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are
the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles
407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding
provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the
Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate
matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is
erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412
from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code,
in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a
statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the
context and the nature of the subject treated. 59
Lee also points out that Republic Act No. 9048, enacted in 2001, has
effectively changed the nature of a proceeding under Rule 108. Under
this new law, "clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname" may now be corrected or changed by the concerned city
or municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any judicial
order. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.
Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.60
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congresss
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or
corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from
that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
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It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had
prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which
led to the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC
granted the Order despite the existence of these two grounds only
characterizes the decision as erroneous. An erroneous judgment is one
though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is
contrary to law.66 It is not a void judgment.67
As for Barcos remaining arguments, they similarly fail, as the worst
they could establish is that the RTC Order is an erroneous judgment.
Barco correctly notes, however, that the RTC erred in directing that the
name of Nadinas daughter be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla"
to "June Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial courts determination
that Gustilo was the father of June, but prescinding from the
conclusive presumption of legitimacy for the nonce assuming it could
be done, the child would obviously be illegitimate. The applicable laws
mandate that June, as an illegitimate child, should bear the surname
of her mother, and not the father.68 From another perspective, the
RTCs error in ordering the change of name is merely an error in the
exercise of jurisdiction which neither affects the courts jurisdiction over
Nadinas petition nor constitutes a ground for the annulment of a final
judgment. As the seminal case of Herrera v. Barretto69 explains:
xxx Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision
rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter xxx the decision of all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction.70
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of the action.63 Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the
court from its power to decide the case. Jurisdiction cannot be
acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or
omission of the parties.64 Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue and
prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an action may generally be
rendered unavailing, if not raised within the proper period. 65
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 174689 : October 22, 2007]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,
does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a person's sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
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Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man's
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People's Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of
Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
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(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with
the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner's first name was not within that court's primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that
is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue
as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
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The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
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change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
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be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
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It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166676, September 12, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the
following changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the
name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2)
gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
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40
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date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
41
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base,
an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
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DECISION
VITUG, J.:
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45
"1. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial courts
decision holding that Catalino Gono was the acknowledged natural
child of Juan Casocot by his common law wife, and that the deceased
Juan Casocots declaration in his deed of donation to Eugenia
Gonzales, wife of Catalino Gono, that the deceased was giving the land
in donation to the surviving wife of my son is sufficient recognition.
"2. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial courts
decision holding that when the land in question was sold at public
auction or failure to pay taxes the same was brought by Anunciacion
Gono-Javier who is one of the petitioners herein, hence the questioned
land belongs to the petitioners.
"3. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial courts
decision holding that the alleged sale between the late Juan Casocot
and the private respondents herein were simulated hence null and
void.
"4. The appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the action for
recovery of possession and ownership filed by the herein petitioners
with the trial court is barred by the dismissal of the complaint for
nullification of the Deed of Sale filed by the deceased Juan Casocot
himself during his lifetime, which was dismissed, for his failure to
attend the hearing wherein he was not notified. 2
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46
Petitioners take issue, finally, with the Court of Appeals in holding that
petitioners action to nullify the deed of sale to private respondents is,
in any event, barred by the order of dismissal thereof by the then
Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 896, entitled "Juan
Casocot v. Restituta Casocot and Fermin Casocot." Suffice it to say that
an unconditional dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute under
Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court is with prejudice and has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits (Guanzon v. Mapa, 7 SCRA 457;
Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Plan, 73 SCRA 1).
All told, we find no valid justification for sustaining the petition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 46746. March 15, 1990.]
LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
PROSPERO PARCON,Respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for Petitioner.
Gil B. Parreno for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
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DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
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ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed
sufficiently establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of
Felisa Parcon, and that her appointment as regular administratrix is
justified by law and jurisprudence.
More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, a public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a
legal requirement therefor, and the latters application for life
insurance were in law indubitable recognition by her mother of her
status as an acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and were
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such.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76873. October 26, 1989.]
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO &
DOMINADOR, all surnamed UYGUANGCO, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PEARANDA and GRACIANO
BACJAO UYGUANGCO, Respondents.
Constantino G. Jaraulla, for Petitioners.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent,
who has been excluded from the family and inheritance of the
petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he should be
allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father,
who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence
required by the Civil Code.
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CRUZ, J.:
54
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent
Court of Appeals. 1 The latter court held that the trial judge had not
committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction
in allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the
proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for
prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these rulings on the
ground that they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea,
four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable
properties which they divided among themselves. 2 Claiming to be an
illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in
the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco
filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. 3
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco
and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his
fathers hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latters urging
and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support
from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School,
where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father,
without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the
Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. 4
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the
petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the
illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are "the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic
writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. 6
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library
We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they
invoke have been superseded, or at least modified, by the
corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on
August 3, 1988.
Under the Family Code, it is provided that:
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The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. (Emphasis supplied.)
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the
documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the
same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for
the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself"), he
insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also
admissible as evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973,
receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using
the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the
petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one
by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra
business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he
was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
petitioners he was given a share in his deceased fathers estate. 7
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
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Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
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cralawnad
FAMILY HOME
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
GANCAYCO, J.:
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jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where
they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated."
cralaw virtua1aw library
"Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law."
cralaw virtua1aw library
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only
under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
chanroble s law library : red
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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163604 : May 6, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA
MALINAO JOMOC, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the
Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September
29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's
Report2 and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left
his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona,
cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for
the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriageduring the
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(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
rllbrr
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the
trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
rl
lbrr
rllbrr
xxx
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that
purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following
provision, inter alia:
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Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
in this Title shall applyin all cases provided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings.Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
rllbrr
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is,
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for
the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order
sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as
follows:
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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138731. December 11, 2000.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA MANUEL Vda. DE
BIASCAN, Petitioner, v. ROSALINA C. BIASCAN, Respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Page
On October 10, 1975, Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of
Florencio Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor-Movant in SP.
Proc. No. 98037. 3 Simultaneous with her appearance, she filed a
pleading containing several motions including a motion for
intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private respondents
appointment as special administratrix and administratrix, and a motion
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio
Biascan. 4
65
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It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper
subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings,
such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of
With respect to the Order dated April 2, 1981 issued by the trial court,
petitioner admits that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, its predecessorin-interest, received a copy of the same of April 9, 1981. Applying
these rules, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days or until May 9
within which to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may
also file a motion for reconsideration, in which case the appeal period
is deemed interrupted.
Considering that it was only on June 6,1981, or a full fifty-eight (58)
days after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration was
filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the
said motion for reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal
period to interrupt as the Order had already become final.
Petitioner insists, however, that the order dated April 2, 1981 of the
trial court did not become final and executory as no opposition on its
timeliness was filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made.
Petitioner argues that although its motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Order dated April 30, 1985, the denial was made on
grounds other than its failure to ask for a reconsideration within the
period prescribed by law. As such, petitioner concludes, any procedural
defect attending the Motion for Reconsideration was deemed cured
when the trial court, in its Order dated April 30, 1985, took cognizance
of the same and rendered its ruling thereon.
There is no merit in this argument.
It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory
by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a
judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal if no appeal is perfected 27 or motion for reconsideration or
new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of
the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, the
trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration
filed after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal. 28 As such, it is
of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness
of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on
grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion
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appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30)
days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. 26 The
appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an
appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the
decision or order becomes final.
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that a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and
record of appeal may be granted, 32 no such motion was ever filed by
petitioner before the trial court. Consequently, the trial court
committed no error when it dismissed the appeal of petitioner.
68