TAULE v SANTOS

200 SCRA 512, 519 (1991)

FACTS:
Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the
Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in
Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the
election of its officers.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out. The election nevertheless proceeded
Respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted
Petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the ABC denied the alleged irregularities
and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the
election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time
requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes
Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
Local Government
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary for being
null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of
Barangay Councils;
RULING:
Petition is GRANTED.
The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of
which are determined through the will of the electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote.
"Election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes which do not characterize the election of officers in
the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
"Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving
the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of
the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in

dispute and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to

proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation
controversies are allowed
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational setup of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the
COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of
the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a
particular level conducted by their own respective organization.
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the
power to assume jurisdiction over an election protest involving officers of
the katipunan ng mga barangay.
Respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will
give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him
control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy
may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be
presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the
limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to
merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To
monitor means "to watch, observe or check." This is compatible with the power of
supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local
Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing
circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be
enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not
control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance
with the DLG Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to
interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the
local government

JAVIER v COMELEC
GR No. L-68379-81 Sept. 22, 1986
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections.
Javier appeared to enjoy more popular support but Pacificador had the advantage
of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power.
On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
Pacificador 's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now
facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the
province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting
the candidate of the ruling party
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the
election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. Specifically, the
petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated
by the armed men of respondent Pacificador."
The petitioner complains that the proclamation made by the Second Division is
invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa
come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it
should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of
the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need
to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be in fact, should be
filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible
distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply
put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner
and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be
validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with
Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by
the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
However, Private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the
said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile,
on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by the SC when the petitioner was gunned
down in cold blood and in broad daylight
The petitioner had come to SC, asking for the annulment of the said decision.
ISSUE:

Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate

its decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
RULING:
No. Were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of
the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of
the Constitution
The word "contests" ,as employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be
understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be
given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section
2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality
as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.
"Election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy
The purpose of Section 3 ("The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be
decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.") in
requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and
decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of
such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission
could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be
too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delaythe-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the
election.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre-proclamation
question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the
Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the
greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also
allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of
the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as
distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the
Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other
tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission. A decision made on the
contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard
of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution.
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre-proclamation
controversies, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact,

the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections,

13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.
LINO LUNA v RODRIQUEZ
39 Phil 208, 1918
FACTS:
Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, was duly elected
governor of the province of Rizal
Against said proclamation Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the Court of First
Instance. Upon said protest issue was joined, hearing was had and a decision was
rendered which was, on appeal, set aside and a new trial ordered.
In the municipality of Taytay, Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50
ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and
ordered that number of votes deducted from his total. In the municipality of
Binangonan, Judge McMahon found that the inspectors did not close the polls at 6
o'clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed
that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such
votes, without ascertaining how many had been cast forRodriguez and how many
for Luna. By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast
after six o'clock p. m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded
that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election
and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly.
From that conclusion both parties to the contest appealed to this court and made
several assignments of error.
ISSUES:
What is the effect of holding the polls open after the hour fixed for closing the
election?
What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to
incapacitated persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the effect
that they are incapacitated to prepare their own ballots?
What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting
booths?
RULING:
It has been held, very generally, that the provisions of a statute as to the manner of
conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but directory merely, and
irregularities, in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from
any wrongful intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate an
election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a precinct.
The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of
their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in
deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters
should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot.When that is
done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the
election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their
participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of
the election officers, for which they ale in no way responsible. A different rule would

make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance
than the duty itself.
The polls should be opened and closed in strict accord with the provisions of the
law. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the
law should not be permitted to vote after the time for closing the polls has arrived.
Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting,
and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their
duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither sue votes nor the entire
vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after
the regular hour.
In the present case there seems to be no justification, under the facts, there being
no fraud committed, for annulling the votes of innocent voters who were permitted
by the election inspectors to cast their votes in a legal manner after the regular hour
for closing the polls. In this conclusion, however, we do not desire to be understood
to have decided that in no case should the courts not annul and set aside an
election, where fraud is clearly proved, for a violation of the section under
discussion. When the polls are kept open after the hour prescribed by the law for
the purpose of defeating the will of the people, such a violation of the law should
result in annulling and setting aside the election of that precinct. No such facts exist
in the present case.
Instead of depriving the innocent voters of their right to participate in the affairs of
their government for irregularities committed by the election inspectors, the latter
should be proceeded against in a criminal action for failure, on their part, to comply
with the law and be punished in accordance with the law
Ballots of incapacitated persons who voted without taking the oath or were assisted
by one inspector alone, or by two belonging to the same party, should not be
counted if such ballots could be identified. In the absence of fraud, all of the ballots
of the precinct should not be invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not
comply with their duty. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation
in an election for a violation of the law for which they were in no way responsible
and which they could not prevent.
Requirements of the Election Law providing for the location of polling stations and
the construction of booths and guard rails for the latter may be departed from in
some particulars and yet preserve, in substantial form, the secrecy which the law
requires. But the failure to provide doors and guard rails for the booths and the
placing of the writing shelf so that it faces the side instead of the rear of the booths
are, combined, a fatal disregard of the law, inasmuch as such an arrangement does
not offer, even in substantial form, the secrecy and seclusion which, according to
the purpose and spirit of the Election Law, is its most mandatory requirement.
In the present case, while there is some conflict in the evidence, and while the proof
clearly shows that the booths were not constructed in strict accordance with the
provisions of the law, we are of the opinion that a large preponderance of the
evidence shows that the booths were constructed (defectively perhaps) in a manner
which afforded each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy.

CONCLUSIONS:
(1) That the total votes cast in the municipality of Binangonan should be counted for
the respective candidates; that for the special reasons given, the board of
inspectors was justified in keeping the polls open after the hour for closing. But this
conclusion must not be interpreted to mean that under other circumstances and

other conditions, where the polls are kept open after the hour for fraudulent
purposes, that such act on the part of the inspectors might not nullify the entire
election (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. Rep., 521);
(2) That while it is irregular for the board of inspectors to permit incapacitated voters
to vote without taking the oath and for one inspector only to assist such voters, yet
the ballots of the innocent voters should not be nullified on that account; that the
ballots of such persons only should be annulled when identified;
(3) That inasmuch as the voting booths in the municipality of Antipolo were prepared
in a manner and form which permitted the voter to prepare his ballot in absolute
secrecy, the vote of that municipality should not be nullified;
Eulogio Rodriguez still proclaimed winner.
RULLODA v COMELEC
GR No. 154198, Jan.20, 2003
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July, 2002, Romeo Rulloda and Remegio Placido were
the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. Before elections were held, however, Romeo died and petitioner
Petronila Rulloda sought to run as candidate in lieu of her late husband.
Petronila won the election, but the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the
winner.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of
Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as
they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her
deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her
as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido argued that since the barangay election is
non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not
file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate
for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.
ISSUE:
Whether substitution of candidates is allowed in barangay elections
RULING:
Petition is GRANTED. Substitution is allowed.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan,
there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to
designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur,
ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate,
the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable
mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be
so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot.
Absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not

written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where
no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
It was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results/
The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it
denied due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and
VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman
of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of
Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman thereof.
CARLOS v ANGELES
G.R. No. 142907 November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor over that of respondent for
garnering the highest number of votes. Respondent then filed election protest
challenging the results with the RTC.
The RTC rendered a judgment ruling that the perpetuation of fraud had undoubtedly
suppressed the true will of the electorate of Valenzuela. Notwithstanding the
plurality of valid votes in favor of the petitioner, the trial court set aside the
proclamation of the petitioner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared
respondent as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
Commission on Elections and later on filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by petition
for certiorari as a special civil action, the decision of the regional trial
court in an election protest case involving an elective municipal official
considering that it has no appellate jurisdiction over such decision.
Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and
declared respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela
City despite its finding that petitioner garnered 83,609 valid votes while
respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007
votes.

Respondent's position: Comelec and not the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the present petition for certiorari

RULING:
I. The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the decision of the regional
trial court in the election protest case before it, regardless of whether it has
appellate jurisdiction over such decision.
The Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction over
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by
courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over
decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in
election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes
jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same
would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because
under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18 The exception is sparingly
allowed in situations where the abuse of discretion is not only grave and
whimsical but also palpable and patent, and the invalidity of the
assailed act is shown on its face.

II. Certiorari lies. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its decision is void.
"Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the
choice of their elective officials. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an
election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.
The Supreme Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules
that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results."
Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the
final tally of valid votes as per revision report may be set aside because
of the "significant badges of fraud," the same would be tantamount to a
ruling that there were no valid votes cast at all for the candidates, and,

thus, no winner could be declared in the election protest case. In short,

there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on
Elections en banc to declare a failure of election or to annul the election.
However, the case below was an election protest case involving an
elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election
Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate
regional trial court.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.It is the
Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.
We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision
proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of
Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor.
We have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions
must occur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on
the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast
would affect the result of the election." Neither of these conditions was
present in the case at bar.
Petition granted

FRIVALDO v COMELEC (1996)

G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential
Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based
on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had
proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the
newly electGovernor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative
nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the
application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the
decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the

application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore

qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996
FACTS:
A petition for petitioner's recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay. The COMELEC tried to set for a recall election three times
but failed due to petitioner's various oppositions.
Petitioner's argument: Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as theLocal Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and
every three years thereafter. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular
local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate
the SK election from the recall election.
ISSUE:
WoN SK election is a regular election
RULING: Negative
Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to
include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the
people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Petition dismissed.
LUCERO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 113107 July 20, 1994
FACTS:
The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May
1992. The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar
credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes,

or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the results of
Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election
returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of
Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and
of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns
were missing.
Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the
ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2
votes for Ong.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct No. 13
of Silvino Lobos:
(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las
Navas; and
(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1)
year and ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections.
RULING:
1. YES
It is an uncontroverted fact that an election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was
held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may be held in
Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of
the election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the
rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading
candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total
number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure
would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be
held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 can only be
determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been included in the
canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns
could be made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a
fabrication. A recount thereof, which presupposes a prior count, would obviously be
unwarranted.
Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order.
Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still
inapplicable. And, in the light of what we stated before in relation to the holding of a
special election, such a count of the votes of Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede
the special election in Precinct No. 13.
2. NO
The decision therein became final and entry of judgment was made, consequently,
Ong cannot now re-litigate the issue of the correction of the certificate of canvass of
Las Navas.

3. NO
There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election,
and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election.
According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13
is two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the
number of registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result
because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in
that precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of Ong.
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it
should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should
be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which
resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be
determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case,
the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of
the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was,
as stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal
skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has
brought to this Court. 22 Considering then that the petitioners themselves must
share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term of
the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special
election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered
"reasonably close to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should
then be rejected.
In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible
application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing
that no special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and
Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before
the date of the next presidential election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4
of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the
Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier
than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the
underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy
occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next
regular election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to
be incurred in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all,
less than a year away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid
constitutional and statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which
may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special
election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President,
Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the
special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election.
Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is

limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the
election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On
the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President,
and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide.
Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no
candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative
District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives
until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that
if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. under
the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials have
already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.
Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for
the holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so
in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.
LOONG v. COMELEC
216 SCRA 760, 1992
FACTS:
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in
the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the
election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition
seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as
to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the
COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond
the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.
HELD:
No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to
cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing
of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by
respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative
powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which
is a legislative enactment.

ORDILLO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054 December 4, 1990
FACTS:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
ISSUE:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
HELD:
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region
is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in
its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of
their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would
be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
PORMENTO v. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010
FACTS:
Estrada was elected President of the RP in the May 1998 elections
He sought the presidency again in the May 2010 elections
Pormento opposed Estradas candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. His
petition was denied by the COMELEC (Division), as well as his subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration (En Banc)
He filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court; however, since such
filing does not stay the execution of judgment or order of the COMELEC under the
Rules of Court, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the
May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes
ISSUE:
Whether Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from any
reelection
HELD: The petition was rendered moot by the failure of Estrada to be elected as
President in the 2010 elections
One of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a persons second election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case.
There is no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the
parties herein
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. When a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no
longer true today. Estada was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will
serve no useful or practical purpose.

 The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand,
the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have
served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of
Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
BORJA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998

FORNIER v COMELEC
G.R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

FACTS:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992.
On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja.
On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995.
On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for another term of three years ending
July 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for
three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to
serve for another term after that.
The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the
Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for
which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office
to which he was not elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja.

FACTS:
This is a disqualification case filed against Fernando Poe Jr. assailing that Poe
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he claimed
to be a natural born Filipino citizen. This case further raises the issue of
qualifications that a presidential candidate must possess to hold the highest office
of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of the three-term limit.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of Capco.
The term served must therefore be one for which the official concerned was
elected.
If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered
to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the
House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office.

RULING:
Denied the petition.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
With this, Poe should be considered as a natural born citizen and further qualified to
run for presidency.

 Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition," that cannot be taken lightly by anyone either by those who enjoy it
or by those who dispute it.

MARCOS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976 Sept. 18, 1995
FACTS:
A petition for disqualification was filed against Mrs. Imelda- Romualdez Marcos
upon her filing of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. Said petition was filed by the incumbent representative and was also running
for the same position, alleging that Mrs. Marcos did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency.
RULING:
Dismiss the complaint and further proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
representative of the said district
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the election."
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile"
Domicile = an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." It includes the twin elements:
1. "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and
2. animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence = the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
In the case at bar, Mrs. Marcos held various residences for different purposes
during the past four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. While she was born
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew

up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence

in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, she kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting
well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either
her influence or consent
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Here, the evidence adduced plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince the court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

DOMINO v COMELEC
310 SCRA 546 (1999)
FACTS:
This is a disqualification case to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Juan Domino for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Sarangani Province because, allegedly, he is neither a resident nor a registered
voter of the province of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 elections. That, Domino is a
not a resident much less a registered voter of the province of Sarangani
substantiated by his registration in the precinct of balara Quezon City and the
Certificate of Candidacy filed in the same city on 1995. That, he does not comply
with the one year residence requirement
ISSUE:
WON Domino was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for atleast one year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 election
RULING:
No.
The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage
and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile. The latter refers with the
(1) intention to reside in a fixed place (2) personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.
Definition of "Domicile"

- fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,

pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
- can be ascertained with the presence of the following rules, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have
but one residence or domicile at a time.
In the case at bar, petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at Balara, Quezon City, as
shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Moreover. a person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change
of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed
and permanent place of abode, one's home.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, (1) physical presence in the
locality involved and (2) intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to
establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these
elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the
locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention
to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15
January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in
Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a
strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered
in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate
public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance
in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence. The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual
presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time

prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him

ineligible and his election to office null and void.
TORAYNO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 137329 August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case against respondent, Emano on the ground that he was not
able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1 year when he ran for mayor in CDO.
Respondent previously served as governor in Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive
terms before he registered as a voter and ran for mayoralty post in CDO.

ISSUE:
WON respondent possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to vote
in CDO and be voted as a mayor thereof
RULING:
YES.
Respondent fulfilled the residency requirement because he bought a house in CDO
where he and his family actually resided in 1973 before he registered as a voter in
1997.
There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing
and/or registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not
given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing
such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements
prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
Residence requirement, rationale: The residence requirement is rooted in the desire
that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and
bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents
themselves their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period
would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications
and fitness for the offices they seek.
MAQUERA v BORRA
G.R. No. L-24761 September 7, 1965
FACTS:
Maquera seeks that, RA 4421 which requires a candidate to post a surety bond
equivalent to one-year salary of the position to which he is a candidate, be declared
unconstitutional.
Republic Act NO. 4421 requires a candidate to post a surety bond equivalent to
one-year salary of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be
forfeited in favor of the government, if the candidate, except when declared winner,
fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office, there being not more than
four candidates for the same office.

ISSUE:
WON RA 4421 is constitutional
HELD:
NO.
Property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for
shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that,
accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be
elected to public office; and
The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order
that a person could run for a public office, which property qualifications are
inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in the
Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same. Consequently,
Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

2. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

3. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
4. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:

1.

Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace. Totality
of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation. SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada
could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press
release containing his final statement:
He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them
as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
2. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts
as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
3. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not

acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any trespasser.
4. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge
so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of
the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

GR No. 161658 Nov. 3, 2008

The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
FACTS:
Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 provided that: (g) All candidates for public office . . .
both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office.
ISSUE:
WON Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 & Resolution No. 6486 are unconstitutional

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
GR No. 148344 Jan. 21, 2004
Despite the failure of notice, the special election is still valid because Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645 already charged voters with the knowledge of the time and place of the
special election.
FACTS:
When Arroyo became President, she appointed Guingona as VP, who then left a
seat in the Senate vacant. Senate enacted a law providing that the special election
for the vacancy will be held simultaneously with the regular election.
Petitioners assail that there was no valid special election for lack of notice.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid special election
RULING:
YES.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its
occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to
give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections
fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the
election failed to do so.
In determining whether there was a failure of election, it should be determined
whether the lack of notice misled a substantial number of voters to believe that
there was no special election. This did not happen in this case since more than 10
million voters already cast their votes for the winning candidate.
PIMENTEL V. COMELEC

RULING:
They are unconstitutional.
A candidate for senator only needs to meet the qualifications provided under the
Constitution.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
For violating the Constitution, such provision is null and void.
In the same way, COMELEC cannot promulgate rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165. If the Congress cant, all the more does the
COMELEC not have the authority to do so.
VETERANS FEDERAL PARTY V. COMELEC
342 SCRA 244
The 20% allocation in Congress for party list representatives provided by the
Constitution is only a ceiling, and the Congress has the authority to define the
mechanics that is consistent with the essence of representation.
FACTS:
Section 5 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution states that "the party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list."
Also, RA 7941 prescribed the requirements for a party list representative seat.
In the 1998 election, COMELEC proclaimed party list representatives who
garnered at least 2% of the number of votes.
38 party list reps, who obtained less than 2% of the votes, were then proclaimed
on the ground that the Constitution provides that at least 20% of the seats in
Congress should be filled up by party list reps.
ISSUE/S:
WON twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory (meaning it should be filled up all

the time, which is what COMELEC did here by proclaiming those other party list
reps) or a ceiling
WON the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 are constitutional
RULING:
The 20% is merely a ceiling, and Section 11(b) is constitutional.
If there is no sufficient number of participating parties or groups which can fill up
the 20%, then such allocation cannot be filled up completely. Comelec cannot be
faulted for incompleteness because it is the voters who determine who and how
many should represent them.
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics
of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only
the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved
for party-list representatives.
Congress deemed it necessary to require at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system to ensure that only those who have sufficient
constituents will then be represented in Congress. (If you want to represent, you
should have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.)
The three seat limit, on the other hand, was meant to ensure that Congress will not
be dominated by a specific sector or group of people no matter how large their
number is (like if they can block EDSA, joke).
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list
seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent
threshold and proportional representation.
BANAT v COMELEC GR No. 179271 July 8, 2009
BAYAN v COMELEC GR No. 179295 April 21, 2009
FACTS:
The COMELEC, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning
their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while
the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at
least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
Petitioner BANAT partylist, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula(2%
threshold) being used. Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-

list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it
would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the
HELD portion of this digest).
Petitioner BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated? (process was questioned by banat)
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD: by issue
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
1:4 ratio or one partylist representative for every 4 district representative.
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would
be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress
to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20
rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 party-list representatives
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be
filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.
Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 8020 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained (example sa supreme court why the
calculation is wrong):
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
III.Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

SC laid down the following rules for the distribution:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the twopercenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these
two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer below for
tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the
votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
by getting the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against
the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still
be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining
party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats
are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although
the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately
ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized
sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
LATASA v COMELEC
GR No. 154829 Dec. 10, 2003
FACTS:

 The Petitioner was disqualified by the Comelec to hold office upon winning the
election. Petitioner held 3 consecutve offices as mayor, and on his third term, the
Municipality of Digos was made into the City of Digos wherein all officials continued
their previous elected positions as mandated by the constitution.
Private respondent filed petition to deny due course, cancel COC and
Disqualification, for falsely representing his COC regarding his legibility to run as
Mayor of City of Digos. COMELEC cancelled his COC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of
mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
HELD:
No, As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to
choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an
exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. The term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same
local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the
same local government post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner
states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus
they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny
the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.
However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local
government post.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is
a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit
when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes
affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of
a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such
creation or conversion is based on verified indicators: Section 7. Creation and
Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a)
Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;
(b)
Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants
within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
[17]On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted
into a component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to
as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be
within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions
until such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall
have already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x. As seen in the
aforementioned provisions (Section 450 (Requisites for Creation), Sec 7
(Creation and Conversion) of the Local Government Code and Sections 2 and
53 of the Charter of the City of Digos), the Court noted that the delineation of
the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos.
The elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers
and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. Although, the new
city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. It does not mean, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city.
These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be
their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
year.
The law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
The framers of the Constitution included an exception to the peoples freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner to vie for the position of city

mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
MONTEBON v COMELEC
G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were municipal councilor candidates.
Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification against respondent alleging that
respondent had been elected and served three terms as municipal councilor.
That respondents assumption of office as vice mayor should not be considered an
interruption since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
Respondent alleged that a local elective official is not disqualified from running the
fourth consecutive time to the same office if there was an interruption.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is deemed to have fully served his second term in view
of his assumption of office as vice-mayor.

RULING:
No
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to
the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking
municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the
vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no
exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to
the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can
simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within
the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to
assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can
only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the
post vacated.
Succession by law to a vacated government office is involuntary since it involves
performance of a public duty, non-performance of which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the
performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary.
ALDOVINO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent was elected councilor for three consecutive terms.

During respondents third term Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him which

was subsequently lifted.
Petitioner sought to cancel respondents certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on
the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy
for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
COMELEC ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it
renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full
term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit
rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
RULING:
1. No.
i) Preventive suspension does not involve an effective interruption of a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
ii) A preventive suspension cannot be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best
indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
iii) Preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or
loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the
service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is
by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary
and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office.
iv)Recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can
serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
2. Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
LONZANIDA v COMELEC
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner was duly elected and served two terms. He run for the same office on the
third time and was proclaimed the winner.

 Petitioners opponent filed an election protest which in a decision declared null a

failure of election.
In the next election petitioner run for the same position.
Respondent timely filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that he had
served three consecutive terms in the same post. COMLEC disqualified petitioner.
Petitioner challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him
disqualified to run for mayor. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only
two consecutive terms and that his 3rd assumption shouldnt be counted because he
was not the duly elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner assumption of office as mayor may be considered as service of
one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.
RULING:
NO. Not duly elected and not holding office for the full term, his assumption of office
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.
The requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.
1.
First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the last election. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It
has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume
office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the
election protest.
2.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before its expiration. The respondents
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support
it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which he was elected.
ONG v ALEGRE
GR No. 163295 Jan. 23, 2006
FACTS:
A candidate was disqualified by the COMELEC en banc to run for mayor for he has
served for three-consecutive terms.
During his second term, the opposing party filed a protest and the RTC declared the
opposing party as the duly elected mayor. However, such decision came out three
years after and when the candidate has already started his third term.
Since the COMELEC disqualified the candidate, his political party nominated the
brother of the candidate as a substitute.

The COMELEC denied due course the certificate of candidacy in the same
mayoralty election as substitute for his brother.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive
three-term limit rule.
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
due course to the certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as
substitute for his brother.
RULING:
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, "service for the full term", and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
term for the same position.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due
course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as
that of the former.
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any
certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination,
be a candidate at all.
RIVERA v COMELEC
GR No. 167591 May 9, 2007
FACTS:
A petition to cancel the candidates Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he
was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor.
He responded that he was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the
RTC, declared in its Decision that his proclamation as mayor was void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term 1998 to 2001 should be counted when his proclamation as
mayor was declared void.
RULING:
Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit The
term of the office of elected local officials . . . shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms . . . .Upon the other hand,
Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides: No
local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position .
. ..

ADORMEO v COMELEC
426 Phil 472 (2002)
FACTS:
A petition was filed to disqualify the candidate from running for Mayor on the ground
that the candidate was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms.
The candidate was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he
was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998 he lost.
In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term
until June 30, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the candidate was elected for three (3) consecutive terms.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory
in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of
the Constitutionas "voluntary renunciation" for clearly it was not. Hence, he was not
disqualified to run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.

SOCRATES v COMELEC
440 Phil 106 (2002)
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three
consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001.
Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the
same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually
won.
However, due to the loss of confidence, members of the incumbent barangay
officials convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly, midway into his
term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn
run for the formers unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns
disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Recall Resolution is valid.
2. Whether or not one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.

RULING:
1. The Recall Resolution issued by the COMELEC is valid.
Despite the contention of Socrates that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution due to absence of notice to 130 PRA
members and the defective service of notice to the other PRA members, COMELEC
still upheld the validity of such Recall Resolution. It was verified by the City Election
Officer that the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Socrates sent
notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of
the Local Government Code. Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places
particularly at the Barangay Hall. Said officer likewise verified that the signatures
appearing in the PRA Resolution were authentic and the same was duly approved by
the majority of all members of the PRA concerned.
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is
factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings,
the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based
on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive
upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the
same.
2. Yes. Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution on the three-term limit rule for
elective local officials could be divided into two parts that could thoroughly cater the
issue. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition
for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer an
immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
ABUNDO v COMELEC
GR No. 201716 January 8, 2013
FACTS:
Abundo vied for the position of mayor of Viga, Catanduanes for 4 consecutive
elections ( 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010).
In both 2001 and 2007, he was proclaimed the winner and served his terms.
However, in the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner in the election.
Abundo unseated Tores after a successful election protest. Abundo served the
remaining 1 year and 1 month of the term. In the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres
again opposed each other.
Torres filed a petition to disqualify Abundo based on the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.
HELD:
No. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007
term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve
and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared
to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and
relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption
in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption
usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following
the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official
intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third
term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
SC ruled that the two-year period during which Torres was serving as mayor should
be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.
BAGONG BAYANI-OFW v COMELEC
GR No. 147589 June 26, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that
the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners
elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
HELD:

1. Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be

disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x.
Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.
2. The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise.
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and
underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The
party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.[36] Concurrently, the

persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens

belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
marginalized or underrepresented.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive,
it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented
under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are
associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC
G.R. No 203766, April 2, 2013
Topic: Sectors to be represented by Party-list, classified.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
Atong Paglaum and 51 other party list groups and organizations were disqualified
by the Comelec from the May 13, 2013 party-list elections in its assailed resolutions
issued in October, November and December of 2012 for various reasons but mainly
for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors of the so ciety .

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race.
ISSUE/S:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the party-list elections.
WON the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC
RULING:
all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.
NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation."
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Section 5, Article VI
(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the

labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies
only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,"
clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats
reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Parameters in qualifying Party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by
the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may
have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party
has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under

the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary
to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to
re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
G.R. No 190582, April 8, 2010
Topic: Nature of constitutional & statutory enumeration of sectors.
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006.

 The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
After admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.
ISSUE/S:
WON denial of the COMELEC to recognize Ang ladlad as a party-list violates the
constitution
RULING:
We grant the petition.
Comelec mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system.
As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality." We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment

clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad.
As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"
and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the
other. Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted
into the realm of law.
COMELEC has not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing immoral
acts."
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system.
Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our
equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
"nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we
declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges . . . have followed the 'rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential

attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless

there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."
No law in the Philippines exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions
or parties about homosexual behavior.
The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad
cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
We disagree with the OSG's position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out
homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We
have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to
make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by
the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Ang Ladlad established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and
the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law.
To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELEC's action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified
party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of
nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation.

Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for

discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation."
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
This Court's role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is
to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion,
and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.
BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC
G.R. No 177271, May 4, 2007
Topic/s: Nature of list of nominees
FACTS:
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify ,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be
disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees.
reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind 14 party-list
groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized
sectors.
An issue of the Manila Bulletin, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC
WON'T BARE PARTYLIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos
says party-list polls not personality oriented."
Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong
and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to
earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal
clarification, either confirming or denying . . . the banner headline and the alleged
statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. . . ."
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 virtually declaring the nominees' names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales' basic disclosure request.
Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of
party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00
p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to
the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees.
ISSUE/S:
WON Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and WON Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
RULING:

 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the
public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as
fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect
and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional
regime.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in
Legaspi, supra, the people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern "
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. There is the
need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such or those
affecting national security.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But
both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen.
At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis,
whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure
of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of
the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list " is certainly not a justifying card
for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on
the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it
extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in
the polling places on election day.
The Comelec's reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities
is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure
stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging,
as it does, on a fundamental right to information.
While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually
sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and
regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to
elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need
for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The
ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the
assailed resolution of the Comelec.
The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, has consistently made it
clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups
named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, COMELEC is ORDERED to immediately disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections.
DAVID v COMELEC
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997
Main Question: How long is the term of office of barangay chairmen and other
barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices on the second Monday
of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code)
or five years, as contained in RA 6679?
FACTS:
G.R. No. 127116
In his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of
the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment siding with petitioner and praying that "the
election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance."
Respondent Commission on Elections opposed the petition.
G.R. No. 128039
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter filed a petition "to seek a
judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang
kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election
of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No.
8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to
defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections: 2
Comelec Resolution 2880 adopted a "Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of
Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections." On the other
hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 moved certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880. 4

Petitioners Contention:
Petitioners 6 contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, "(t)he term of
office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ." This is reiterated in
Republic Act No. 6679 which reset the barangay elections from "the second
Monday of November 1988" to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that
such five-year term shall begin on the "first day of May 1989 and ending on the
thirty-first day of May 1994."
Petitioners further aver 7 that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of
office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to
barangay officials because:
(1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is
a general law which applies to all other local government units;
(2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the
term of barangay officials is concerned;
(3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective
local officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of
barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and
(4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay
officials any term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be no rhyme
or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials
from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution."
The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not
repealed by RA 7160 and thus "he believes that the holding of the barangay
elections (o)n the second Monday of May 1997 is without sufficient legal basis."
Respondents Contention:
COMELEC maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes "all laws,
whether general or special, inconsistent, with the provisions of the Local
Government Code," citing this Court's dictum in Paras vs. Comelec 8 that "the next
regular election involving the barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled in May 1997."
Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189
(providing for a general registration of voters) both "indicate that Congress
considered that the barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided
for in RA 7160, Sec. 43 (c)." 9
Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since they were
elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a
term of only three years.

ISSUES:
1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay official: RA 7160 or RA 6679?
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA
7160?.
The Court's Ruling

The petitions are devoid of merit.

The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
The legislative intent is to limit the term to 3 years.
First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is
basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails. 31
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at
"three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on
the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent with and
repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall be for five years."
Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected "on the second
Monday of May 1994."
Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong
barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the
punong barangay from among themselves. On the other hand, the Local Autonomy
Code mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay
electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters
elect eight barangay officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven
kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven kagawads, and
not for the barangay chairman.
Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the
voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If
we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were
elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected
barangay chairman, much less president of the national league, of barangays which
he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is
not the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily
dismissed.
Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, 33 Congress appropriated
the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections
this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general
registration of voters shall be held "immediately after the barangay elections in
1997." These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA
7160.
Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, 34 this Court said that "the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
having been scheduled in May, 1997." This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil
Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the Philippines."
Sixth. RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government
units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office
of barangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special provision that
applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second
Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a
general law. There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two
specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus
prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law

encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is
deemed repealed. 37
The Second Issue: Three-Year Term Not Repugnant, to Constitution
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any
term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to
the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to
the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of
public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39 To
strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. 40 The
petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
To the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay officials is, the
answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by
law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local
Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.
LABO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio
City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was
elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest
number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a
naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having
sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia.
Petitioners Argument:
Petitioner opposes and raises the issue of whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition
against him was not filed on time, for nonpayment of filing fee. This fee was finally
paid twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was
ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was
paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of
a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on

the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an
elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not
possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Respondents Argument:
Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it
was filed ahead of time. The private respondent argues further that during the
period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was
deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate,
he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after
publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44
thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his
petition with the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
1. Can a foreigner hold public office?
2. Whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor?
RULING:
1. The Court holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with
the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees
in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No.
1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3,
1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila
Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or
finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal
and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth
the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only
a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these

are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship;

and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia
was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That
is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact
that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may
have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he
has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial
decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship
upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing
that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his
application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also
the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the
Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January

18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible
as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on
election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a
resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens
of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the
Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
VALLES v COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the
age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen and since then, she
has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but
also as a candidate, Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental and later on as a Governor of Davao
Oriental.
Her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., contested on the ground of her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition.
Thereafter, respondent ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her
opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification case contesting
her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its prior decision. And again challenged
when she once more ran for re-election as governor. This was again
dismissed.
Petitioner went to the SC and questioned the citizenship of private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office
because
(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the
principle of jus sanguinisshe was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution;
(2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino
citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
(3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992
before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and

her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the

Australian Embassy in Manila; and
(4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54
and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to
run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen,
placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration
as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No.
404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
RULING:
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution
of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January
5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of
her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 [4] and
1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of
her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must
be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent
for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of
merit.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting
an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. [8] As held by this court, an application
for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that
for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.[11] This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein
private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on
May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport
of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated
by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the

alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation

was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the
whole process of repatriation holds no water.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby
adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement
as to costs.
MERCADO v MANZANO
G.R.No.135083 May 26,1999
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City.
Respondent was suspended because of a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
Second Div. of COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and it remained pending until after election. COMELEC
en banc reversed the decision and declared respondent qualified to run for the
position.
ISSUES:
WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualifying respondent
RULING:
The court held that the filing of COC of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, removed any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced
his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

ROSELLER DE GUZMAN v COMELEC

G.R.No.18004 June19, 2009
FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were candidates for Vice-Mayor. Respondent vice-mayor

aspirant, filed a disqualification on the ground that petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of US.
Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. He however he applied for
dual citizenship under RA 9225.
Upon approval of his application, he took allegiance of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor for having failed to
renounce his Americcan Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
RULING:
Petitioner is disqualied from running for public office. The law provides that they are
not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
Petitioner's oath of allegiance and COC did not comply with Sec. 5 of RA 9225
which requires those seeking public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation.
SOBEJANA-CONDON v COMELEC
G.R.No.198742 August 10,2012
FACTS:
Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She eventually became a naturalize
Australian citizen owing to her marriage. On 2005, she filed an application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA225.
The application was approved and she took allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Petitioner ran for mayor on 2010 and soon thereafter, respondents questioned the
eligibility of petitioner before the RTC.
Petioner denied being a dual citien. She contends the she ceased to be australian
citizen when she filed her COC.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of RA 9225.
RULING:
The oath is a process that restores one's Filipinio citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith subjecto conditions imposed in
Sec. 5 par. 2.
The law provides that, those seeking elective public office shall meet the qualifiction
for holding public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws if at the
time of the filing of COC, the candidate make personal and sworn renunciation of all
foreign citizenship before ANY PUBLIC OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER
AN OATH.

 Admittedly, she was not under oath to the exact mandate of Sec. 5 par. 2. Hence,
the renunciation was invalid due to it not being administered before any public office
authorized.
MACQUILING v COMELEC
G.R.No.195649 April 16, 2013, MR July 2, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the RP of the Philippines. Then, Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
Macquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.
ISSUE:
WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office.
RULING:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath..
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective position, and Macquiling is
declared the duly elected mayor.
Principle:
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the LGC which disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that
anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship
to continue using a foreign passportwhich indicates the recognition of a
foreign state of the individual as its nationaleven after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this
policy.

MARQUEZ v COMELEC
243 SCRA 538
FACTS:
Marquez, a defeated candidate for the position of Governor in the Province of
Quezon in the 1992 elections filed a petition praying for the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC which dismissed his petition against the winning
candidate, herein private respondent Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from
justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of LA, California. A
warrant issued by said court for his arrest has yet to be served on him on account
of his alleged flight from that country.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his COC, is said to be
facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest
comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the
LGC and therefore disqualified from being a candidate for and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
Ruling:
Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies
fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad from
seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General, taking the side of
petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase fugitive
from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
The questioned resolution of COMELEC has been reversed & set aside, and has
been remanded.
CAASI v CA
191 SCRA 229
FACTS:
These 2 cases were consolidated because they have the same objective, the
disqualification of private respondent Miguel for the position of mayor of Bolinao on
the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of USA, not
of Bolinao.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of USA. He allegedly
obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US
for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. COMELEC
dismissed petitions.
ISSUES:

 WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US
WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the
US prior to the local elections in 1988
RULING:
The election of respondent Miguel as mayo of Bolinao is annulled.
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguels immigration to the US in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go
to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the US with the
intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that application of his, he was
issued by the US government the requisite green card or authority to reside there
permanently.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881)
which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
Principle:
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of
itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
US. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective
office.