Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 357
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendants appeal the district court's order dismissing this civil action without
prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b), as a sanction for Plaintiff's failure to
comply with discovery orders. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing this action without prejudice,
rather than with prejudice. See Willner v. University of Kan., 848 F.2d 1023,
1030 (10th Cir.1988) (appellate court reviews district court's dismissal under
Rule 37 for failure to provide discovery for abuse of discretion), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1031 (1989). Upon review of the record and the parties' arguments on
appeal, we conclude that the district court did abuse its discretion in refusing to
dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.
3
7
[t]he
fact that the [April 11] order did not contain a deadline for plaintiff to submit
answers in place of its objections does not excuse plaintiff's interference with the
orderly progress of discovery. ... Plaintiff clearly had a duty to promptly provide full
and complete answers, but did not do so until defendant once again filed a motion.
Moreover, the answers filed June 28, 1989, over two months after the Magistrate's
order, were neither complete nor sworn and verified.
10
11
12
In response, Plaintiff asserted that the magistrate judge's order that Plaintiff
produce "[a]ll financial statements ... which cover the years 1987, 1988, and/or
1989," did not mean that Plaintiff was required "to produce every financial
statement prepared during the years 1987, 1988 and 1989." Id., doc. 26 at 4.
Plaintiff also argued that (1) the request for production specified only financial
statements "which cover the years" 1987, 1988, and 1989 and, therefore, did
not include the monthly statements; (2) Defendants possessed all the
information they needed from the statements already produced and, therefore,
did not need the monthly financial statements; and (3) even though Defendants
had not specifically requested the monthly statements, and production of those
statements would have been cumulative, Plaintiff had now offered to produce
those documents. Id. at 3-4.
13
14
Considering the Court's May 2, 1990, bench ruling, subsequent July 2, 1990,
written order compelling production under a confidentiality agreement, and
defendant's further request, plaintiff's attempt to place the burden on defendant
to seek a court order compelling production of the audited statements is
incredible. Equally offensive and self-serving is plaintiff's assertion that its
three-page statements, consisting of information selectively taken from the
audited reports, are a "reasonable interpretation" of "all financial statements."
Contrary to plaintiff's claims, defendant has been prejudiced by plaintiff's
failure to provide audited statements. Based on the limited information
provided, defendant's expert ... was unable to reach an opinion on a key issue in
the defense....
15
Id., doc. 28 at 3.
16
The district court, considering the motions to dismiss, agreed with the
magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the civil action on May 30,
1991:
17
[Plaintiff] had been warned about and even sanctioned for its noncompliance
with discovery orders. Yet, [Plaintiff] continued to ignore discovery orders
under the guise that it was interpreting those orders as a "reasonable
accountant" would interpret them. The Court cannot agree that [Plaintiff's]
interpretation of the numerous discovery requests and court orders was
reasonable. It is evident that [Plaintiff] acted in bad faith, that [Defendant] was
prejudiced by [Plaintiff's] actions, and that alternative sanctions have proven
ineffective. Considering the facts surrounding [Plaintiff's] lengthy record of
discovery violations in this case, the Court agrees with [the magistrate judge's]
Id., doc. 30 at 3.
19
Defendants, who had counterclaims pending against Plaintiff at the time the
district court dismissed the civil action, filed a motion to clarify that the order
did not preclude Defendants from reasserting those claims at a later date. In
response to that motion, the district court sua sponte amended its May 30 order
to indicate that the court had dismissed Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.
Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the district court's judgment,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), arguing dismissal should be with prejudice. The
district court denied that motion, and Defendants appealed.
20
The district court's initial order dismissed Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. See
4A Moore's Federal Practice p 37.03 (2d ed. 1991) ("Unless the court indicates
otherwise in the order, a dismissal under Rule 37 ... is an adjudication on the
merits."). Although dismissal with prejudice is "the most severe in the spectrum
of sanctions," National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639, 643 (1976), justified only by extreme circumstances, see Meade v.
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520 and n. 6 (10th Cir.1988) (addressing dismissal
with prejudice under local rule), the record in this case, considered as a whole,
see National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 641-42, clearly warrants dismissal
with prejudice. We agree with the magistrate judge that "Plaintiff's flagrant and
repeated failures to provide discovery have made a mockery of the discovery
process and represent an egregious offense against the court." Appellants' App.,
doc. 28 at 4.
21
22
Under the circumstances of this case, the district court abused its discretion in
amending its initial dismissal order to make the dismissal without prejudice. Cf.
Dellums, 566 F.2d at 236 (district court abused its discretion in reinstating
plaintiff's claims, dismissed for failure to provide discovery, "if for no other
reason than the prophylactic considerations identified in National Hockey
League ").
24
We, therefore, REVERSE the district court's order amending the original
dismissal order, and REMAND this cause to the district court with instructions
to enter an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In addition, in light of
the egregious and contumacious conduct of Plaintiff's counsel, we direct the
district court, on remand, to give the strongest consideration to referring its file
in this matter to the disciplinary arm of the Colorado bar, as well as considering
disciplinary action by the federal court itself. See People v. Haase, 781 P.2d 80
(Colo.1989) (attorney suspended from the practice of law for six months in
light of misconduct during discovery proceedings). "[T]he mandate of the Code
of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges ... direct[s] judicial officers to
'take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a ... lawyer for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge becomes aware.' Canon 3 B(3). This
includes, if warranted, bringing the matter to the attention of appropriate state
disciplinary authorities." Mylett v. Jeane, 910 F.2d 296, 301 (5th Cir.1990).
Honorable John E. Conway, District Judge, United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico, sitting by designation
**
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th
Cir.R. 36.3