July 6, 2016

Kenya
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Kenya as a
strategic partner and key regional actor in East Africa, and
as critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region. The
United States has valued Kenyas role as a peacemaker
among its neighbors and as a historic host to refugees from
across the troubled region. Kenya is sub-Saharan Africas
fourth largest economy, a regional hub for transportation
and finance, and a top tourism destination. Its capital,
Nairobi, is home to one of four major United Nations
offices worldwide and serves as a base for regional
humanitarian relief efforts. It also hosts the largest U.S.
diplomatic mission in Africa. Kenya ranks among the top
U.S. foreign aid recipients globally and is one of the largest
African recipients of U.S. counterterrorism assistance.
Nonetheless, accountability for human rights abuses and
corruption has been a source of tension with some donors,
including the United States, as is Kenyas decision to close
its largest refugee complex, home to over 325,000 Somalis.
Attacks by the Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali insurgent group
Al Shabaab have increased significantly in Kenya since
2011, when Kenya launched military operations against the
group in Somalia. In April 2015, Al Shabaab killed 148
people in an attack on Garissa University College, marking
the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaedas
1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy. The group has
portrayed its attacks, in part, as retaliation for Kenyas role
in regional military operations in Somalia, and has sought
recruits from Kenyas minority Muslim population.
Kenyas government has struggled to balance its response
to security threats against pressure to protect civil liberties
and implement political reforms. Economic frustration and
abuses of power have fueled grievances among the diverse
population, and ethnic disputes, often stoked by politicians,
have marred Kenyas generally peaceful reputation.
Perceived impunity from justice remains a trigger for
violence and a hindrance to economic development. Some
warn that August 2017 elections could lead to violence if
opposition concerns, particularly over the independence of
the electoral commission, are not adequately addressed.

Background
Kenya was essentially a one-party state from 1964 to 1991.
Long-serving President Daniel arap Moi retained his partys
dominance, in part through electoral manipulation and
repression, until he retired under donor pressure in 2002.
The elections that year were hailed as marking a shift in
Kenyas democratic trajectory. For the first time, the
countrys fractious and primarily ethnically based
opposition parties came together to defeat Mois chosen
successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenyas first president,
Jomo Kenyatta. That coalition slowly unraveled, however,
and by 2007 a political storm fueled by ethnic grievances
was brewing as the next elections approached.

Figure 1. Kenya Facts

Source: CRS Graphics. Map data from State Department and Esri,
facts from CIA and IMF. 2015 figures unless otherwise indicated.

Kenya is home to more than 50 ethnic groups; no one group

constitutes a majority. The largest group, the Kikuyu, which
represents roughly 20% of the population, has been
perceived historically as dominating the political class and
business community. Under President Jomo Kenyatta, a
Kikuyu, the group was seen to benefit disproportionately
from the allocation of state resources, namely land and
government jobs and contracts. When Moi, Kenyattas vice
president, assumed office after Kenyattas death in 1978,
many of these benefits shifted to his people, a smaller group
of ethnicities collectively referred to as the Kalenjin.
For almost 40 years, the heartlands of these communities
the central highlands for the Kikuyu and the central Rift
Valley for the Kalenjinreceived the greatest state
investment in schools, roads, and health services. Other
areas were marginalized and remain comparatively
underdeveloped, such as the predominately Muslim
northeastern and coastal areas, and western Kenya, which is
home to the second and third largest ethnic groups, the
Luhya and Luo. Some Kenyans refer to the dynamic of
ethnic favoritism, which reinforced a focus on tribe, with
such colloquial phrases as Its our turn to eat.
No ethnic group constitutes a large enough voting block for
its political leaders to gain or maintain power alone; they
must form alliances, which periodically shift. Many of
todays politicians have moved in and out of government
and opposition since the Moi era. Realignments prior to the
December 2007 elections created a volatile ethnic dynamic,
and when then-incumbent President Mwai Kibaki (a
Kikuyu) was declared the winner of an extremely close
presidential race amid charges of rigging, opposition
protests turned violent. The violence largely followed
ethnic lines in urban areas and parts of the country where
Kikuyu had settled after independence. Some of the worst
violence was in the Rift Valley, where land grievances
fueled anti-Kikuyu attacks by Kalenjin, who had supported
opposition candidate Raila Odinga, a Luo. Kikuyu gangs
also organized retaliatory attacks against non-Kikuyu.

www.crs.gov | 7-5700

Kenya

Police were implicated in hundreds of deaths. In six weeks,

some 1,300 people were killed and 600,000 were displaced.
Kenya was effectively paralyzed for two months before
Kibaki and Odinga, under donor pressure, reached a powersharing deal mediated by former U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan. A coalition government was formed in April
2008, with Kibaki as president and Odinga in a new prime
minister position. The parties agreed to draft a new
constitution and address sensitive land rights issues. A
commission tasked with investigating the post-election
violence attributed the crisis to, among other factors, the
political manipulation of perceived ethnic marginalization
and a culture of impunity in the country. After the National
Assembly declined to create a special tribunal to prosecute
the worst crimes, the commission gave a list of key suspects
to Annan, who submitted them to the ICC in 2009.

The ICC and the 2013 Elections

In 2011, the ICC summoned five senior officials and a radio
journalist on allegations of crimes against humanity. The
Court confirmed charges against four, including thendeputy Prime Minister Kenyatta and a prominent Kalenjin
politician, William Ruto. The government objected to the
cases, despite being an ICC state party. The prosecutions
were a key issue in the 2013 elections, when Kenyatta and
Ruto, who were on opposing sides in 2007, successfully ran
together on a new Jubilee Coalition presidential ticket.
They portrayed the ICC cases as part on an international
conspiracy against Kenya and emblematic of racial bias by
the court. Voting in the 2013 elections largely followed
ethnic lines, but the combination of Kikuyu and Kalenjin on
the presidential ticket reduced the prospects for violence.
The ICC trials were plagued by allegations of witness
intimidation and political interference. The Court ultimately
withdrew the charges against Kenyatta and Ruto in
December 2014 and April 2016, respectively, citing
insufficient evidence. While neither Kenyatta nor Ruto was
acquittedleaving open the possibility of new charges
the rulings enable the pair to run for reelection in 2017.

Current Issues and the 2017 Elections

Kenyas 2013 elections heralded major changes in its

political system. They were the first held under the new
constitution, which established new checks and balances
and a more deliberate separation of powers, including the
devolution of authority to 47 new county governments. It
created a Supreme Court, an upper house in parliament, a
new anti-corruption authority, and a land commission.
While many have praised the reforms, skeptics have
questioned whether the rapid decentralization has not
merely created new opportunities for corruption.
Some observers warn that Kenyas forthcoming general
elections, to be held in August 2017, could trigger unrest
amid an increasingly polarized political landscape. The
opposition has challenged the independence and credibility
of the electoral commission, staging protests that have been
met with force by police. Tensions culminated in May-June
2016, when at least four protesters were killed by security
forces and eight legislators were detained on hate speech
charges. Parliament is now considering legislation to reform
the commission. Absent reforms, the opposition may

continue to question the commissions legitimacy and

accuse the ruling party of electoral manipulation, charges
that set off the 2007/08 violence.
In May 2016, citing security concerns, Kenyatta announced
that Kenya would no longer host refugees. (Officials later
clarified that the aim is to close the largest camp, Dadaab.)
Secretary of State John Kerry expressed deep concern with
the decision, noting longstanding, significant U.S.
assistance to support Kenyas refugee-hosting role, and has
sought to remind Kenya of its responsibilities with respect
to international law and its commitments to the voluntary
repatriation of refugees. Kenyas decision drew widespread
condemnation, particularly from human rights groups,
although some point to international funding shortfalls for
Kenyas refugee programs as a legitimate source of
grievance. Kenya hosts over 600,000 refugees, including
over 400,000 Somalis and over 100,000 South Sudanese.

The Economy
President Kenyatta is pursuing an ambitious economic
growth agenda, seeking to position Kenya as a global leader
in sustainable development by expanding electricity supply
through green energy. The government has taken significant
steps to attract foreign investment, including from China,
which is financing several major infrastructure projects.
Kenya revised the statistical measurement of its GDP in
2014 and is now classified as a lower middleincome
country. It is one of the worlds fastest growing economies.
Agriculture, manufacturing, and real estate are the primary
drivers of growth, but Kenya also has a vibrant telecom
industry that is a global pioneer in mobile banking
technology. Development challenges remain, however:
Kenya has made limited progress in reducing high rates of
extreme poverty, food insecurity, and maternal mortality.

U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance

Governance and human rights concerns sometimes
complicate the U.S.-Kenya relationship, despite close ties.
Allegations that Kenyan security forces have committed
serious abuses in the context of anti-terrorism efforts strain
the governments relationship with the countrys Muslim
minority and pose challenges for U.S. counterterrorism
cooperation. U.S. travel warnings, which may undercut the
tourism industry, are a source of friction. President Obama
made his first official visit to Kenya in July 2015.
Kenya is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in
Africa, receiving over $740 million in bilateral aid in
FY2015. The Administrations request for FY2017 includes
over $626 million for Kenya (not including anticipated food
aid, which totaled over $70 million in FY2015). Antiterrorism law enforcement assistance routinely totals over
$8 million annually, the largest such allocation in SubSaharan Africa. (Support for police and criminal justice
sector reforms has ranged from $1 million to $2 million per
year.) In addition to this aid, the Kenyan military has
received roughly $300 million in Department of Defense
counterterrorism train and equip assistance in the past
decade, including over $80 million in FY2015.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640

www.crs.gov | 7-5700

IF10168