NATIVIDAD LIM vs.NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, SPOUSES ROBERTO LL.

ARCINUE and ARABELA ARCINUE

Facts: Lim owns the lots 2373 and 2374 located in Pangasinan. Said lots were needed by NPC for its Sual Coal-Fire Thermal Project. NPC filed an
expropriation suit against Lim. Lim was residing in US. Hence, the summons was served to her tenant Wilfredo Tabongbong on February 20, 1995. A deposit
of provisional value was made and a writ of possession was issued in favor of NPC. On April 24, 1995 Lim through her husband filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss the action and to suspend the writ of possession as RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Lim. RTC denied the motion. On Dec. 6,
1996, Spouses Arcinue filed a motion for leave to admit complaint in intervention alleging that they were the owner of the two lots. RTC granted the motion.
Lim and NPC were ordered to file their answer but they failed. Lim on its part sought to expunge the motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite
explanation why the Arcinues resorted to service by registered mail rather than to personal service. The NPC for its part manifested that it did not file an
answer since its interest lay in determining who was entitled to just compensation.
RTC issued default order against Lim and NPC. It pointed out that the Arcinues failure to explain their resort to service by registered mail had already been
cured by the manifestation of Lims counsel that he received a copy of the Arcinues motion on December 7, 1998 or 10 days before its scheduled hearing.
CA affirmed RTCs default order.
Issues: 1. WON answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer is only permissive?
2. WON Arcinues failure to explain why they resorted to service by registered mail rather than by personal service may caused the striking out of Arcinues
motion for judgment by default.
Ruling:
1. Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days
from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule
where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lims failure to file the required answer can give rise to default.
The trial court had been liberal with Lim. It considered her motion for reconsideration as a motion to lift the order of default and gave her an opportunity to
explain her side. The court set her motion for hearing but Lims counsel did not show up in court. She remained unable to show that her failure to file the
required answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. And, although she claimed that she had a meritorious defense, she was
unable to specify what constituted such defense.
2. Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation, why
the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
But the above does not provide for automatic sanction should a party fail to submit the required explanation. It merely provides for that possibility considering
its use of the term "may." The question is whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not going for the sanction of striking out the erring motion.
The Court finds no such grave abuse of discretion here. As the RTC pointed out, notwithstanding that the Arcinues' failed to explain their resort to service by
registered mail rather than by personal service, the fact is that Lim's counsel expressly admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment
by default on December 7, 1998 or I0 days before its scheduled hearing. This means that the Arcinues were diligent enough to file their motion by registered
mail long before the scheduled hearing.
Personal service is required precisely because it often happens that hearings do not push through because, while a copy of the motion may have been
served by registered mail before the date of the hearing, such is received by the adverse party already after the hearing. Thus, the rules prefer personal
service. But it does not altogether prohibit service by registered mail when such service, when adopted, ensures as in this case receipt by the adverse party.
Petition denied.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY(PTA) vs. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.

Facts: On April 3, 1996, PTA entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects
for a contract price of P57,954,647.94. AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with
PHILGOLF amounting to P27,000,000.00. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in
turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF. On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting P11,820,550.53 plus interest. Within
the period to file a responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer. RTC granted PTA motions for extension of time twice. PTA
failed to answer.On April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a judgment of default ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff.
PTA appealed to CA, but before the appeal of PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC. The
RTC, granted the motion and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued against PTA. A notice of garnishment was then issued against PTAs bank
account at the Land Bank of the Philippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully satisfy the judgment.
PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
The CA ruled in favor of PTA and set aside the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead, filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. It was premised on
the argument that the gross negligence of PTAs counsel prevented the presentation of evidence before the RTC. CA dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment for lack of merit.
Issues: 1. WON the negligence of PTAs counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment of judgment.
2. WON annulment of judgment is a proper remedy.
3. WON PTA can invoke state immunity.
4. WON petition for certiorari be dismissed.
Ruling:
1. The rule is that "a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique and unless such acts involve gross
negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the latters acts.
Gross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. This cannot be invoked in cases where the
counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.It is not disputed that the summons together with a
copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003. Thus, in
failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.
There was no extrinsic fraud. "Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent." We do not
see the acts of PTAs counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
The records reveal that the judgment of default was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel. However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift
the order of default. Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in
declaring PTA in default.
2. Annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy. PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. "Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner." In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no
extraordinary reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief
could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could
have merely raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.
3. PTA also erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to
the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a
proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
4. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. A special civil action under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where
other remedies are available under the law.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the
other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules. .
Petition for Certiorari was dismissed.
SALVADOR O. MOJAR, EDGAR B. BEGONIA, Heirs of the late JOSE M. CORTEZ, RESTITUTO GADDI, VIRGILIO M. MONANA, FREDDIE RANCES,
and EDSON D. TOMAS vs. AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC., et al.
Facts: Petitioners were employed as security guards by respondent and assigned to the various branches of the Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La
Union and Ilocos Sur.
In separate Office Orders petitioners were relieved from their respective posts and directed to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila. They,
however, failed to report for duty in their new assignments, prompting respondent to dismiss them from service.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and the Bank of Commerce, Dagupan Branch, before the NLRC. Allegedly, their
reassignment was a scheme to sever the employer-employee relationship and was done in retaliation for their pressing their claim for salary differential,
which they had earlier filed against respondent and the Bank of Commerce before the NLRC. They also contended that the transfer to Manila was
inconvenient and prejudicial, since they would incur additional expenses for board and lodging.
LA held that petitioners were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatements with full backwages. NLRC affirmed LA Ruling with the modification that the
Complaint against the Bank of Commerce was dismissed.
On 9 February 2008, respondent filed its Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court. CA found the orders transferring petitioners to Manila to be a valid
exercise of management prerogative. However, respondent failed to observe the due process requirements in terminating them. CA ordered the dismissal of
the illegal dismissal case but ordered to pay petitioners 10 k eachfor having violated the latters right to statutory due process.
Petitioner Mojar on August 2008 manifested before CA that they together with their counsel (Atty. Aglipay) had not been served a copy of the CA Petition as
their former counsel had been bedridden since December 2007 until his demise in February 2008. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Annul
Proceedings. They argued that the NLRC Decision had already attained finality, since the Petition before the CA was belatedly filed, and the signatory to the
Certification of non-forum shopping lacked the proper authority.
CA denied the Motion to Annul Proceedings.
Issues: Actual addresses, Affidavit of Service and Substitution of Counsel
Ruling:
1. Petitioners contend that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the Petition before it, as their actual addresses were not indicated therein as required
under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, and pursuant to Cendaa v. Avila.
The requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. The failure
to comply with that requirement is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of a petition. This rule, however, is not absolute. In Santos v. Litton Mills
Incorporated this Court ruled that where the petitioner clearly mentioned that the parties may be served with the courts notices or processes
through their respective counsels, whose addresses have been clearly specified as in this case, this act would constitute substantial compliance
with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The Court further observed that the notice required by law is notice to counsel if the party has already
appeared by counsel, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
In its Petition before the CA, respondent clearly indicated the following:
THE PARTIES

2.0. The petitioner AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC. (hereafter petitioner AGRO), is a corporation existing under Philippine laws,
and may be served with process thru counsel, at his address hereunder indicated; private respondents (1) SALVADOR O. MOJAR; (2) EDGAR B. BEGONIA;
(3) JOSE M. CORTEZ; (4) FREDDIE RANCES; (5) VIRGILIO MONANA; (6) RESTITUTU [sic] GADDI; and, (7) EDSON D. TOMAS, are all of age, and
during the material period, were in the employ of petitioner AGRO as security guards; said respondents may be served with process thru their common
counsel, ATTY. JOSE C. ESPINAS at No. 51 Scout Tuazon, Quezon City; on the other hand, respondent National Labor Relations Commission, 1st Division,
Quezon City, is the agency having jurisdiction over labor disputes in the Philippines and may be served with process at offices in Quezon City; 15
The foregoing may thus be considered as substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46. In any case, and as will be discussed further below, the CA had
sufficient reason to take cognizance of the Petition.
2. Section 3, Rule 46 provides that the petition for certiorari should be filed together with the proof of service thereof on the respondent. Under
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if service is made by registered mail, as in this case, proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Section 3, Rule 46 further provides that the failure to comply with any of the
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioners allege that no affidavit of service was attached to the CA Petition. There was no indication that they had been served a copy of the CA Petition. No
other proof was presented by respondent to show petitioners actual receipt of the CA Petition. In any case, this knowledge, even if presumed, would not
and could not take the place of actual service and proof of service by respondent.
In Ferrer v. Villanueva petitioner therein failed to append the proof of service to his Petition for Certiorari. Holding that this failure was a fatal defect. Indeed,
while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made on the other party, it is nonetheless essential to due process and the
orderly administration of justice.
Be that as it may, it does not escape the attention of this Court that in the CA Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the appellate court stated that their records
revealed that Atty. Espinas, petitioners counsel of record at the time, was duly served a copy of the following: CA Resolution dated 20 February 2008
granting respondents Motion for Extension of Time to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring petitioners to file their Comment on
the CA Petition; and CA Resolution dated 30 June 2008, submitting the case for resolution, as no comment was filed.
Such service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners counsel of record, was valid despite the fact he was already deceased at the time. If a party to a case has
appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party is specifically
ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the
litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. It is the duty of party-litigants
to be in contact with their counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of their case.
3. Petitioners were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known that Atty. Espinas was already bedridden as early as December 2007, they
should have already obtained new counsel who could adequately represent their interests. The excuse that Atty. Aglipay could not enter his appearance
before the CA "because [petitioners] failed to get [their] folder from the office of Atty. Espinas" is flimsy at best.
Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has the following requirements: (1) the filing
of a written application for substitution; (2) the client's written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case
such written consent cannot be procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the
Rules. Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the counsel, a verified proof of the death of such attorney (usually a death
certificate) must accompany the notice of appearance of the new counsel.25
The fact that petitioners were unable to obtain their folder from Atty. Espinas is immaterial. Proof of service upon the lawyer to be substituted will suffice
where the lawyers consent cannot be obtained. With respect to the records of the case, these may easily be reconstituted by obtaining copies thereof from
the various courts involved.
In this case, petitioners must bear the fruits of their negligence in the handling of their case. They may not decry the denial of due process, when they were
indeed afforded the right to be heard in the first place.
Petition is DENIED. Dismissal was valid.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, vs. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.,

Facts: Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking slot in the Optima Building for a period of
three years (2003-2006). On 9 March 2004, the parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months.
Renovations in the Optima Building commenced. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its
personnels productivity. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July and August 2005. Optima granted the request of
Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals for the months of August to December of 2005 and January to February 2006, or a total of seven
months. In addition, Hertz likewise failed to pay its utility bills for the months of November and December of 2005 and January and February of 2006, or a
total of four months.
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to Hertz, reminding the latter that the Contract of Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation
between the parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period. As no letter was received
from Hertz regarding its intention to seek negotiation and extension of the lease contract within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that the lease would
expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed. On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising Optima of the formers desire to
negotiate and extend the lease but petitioner no longer entertained respondents notice.
Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages and/or Sum of Money with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Complaint for Specific Performance) against Optima.
Optima demanded Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. It likewise
demanded payment of the sum of 420,967.28 in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges. Hertz refused.
Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.
On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer
with Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer).
MeTC ruled that petitioner Optima had established its right to evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration of the
period of lease. RTC affirmed MeTC decision.
On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons, the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. The
appellate court thereafter reversed the RTC and remanded the case to the MeTC to ensure the proper service of summons.
Issues: 1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz;
2. Whether the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia; and
3. Whether the ejectment of Hertz and the award of damages, attorneys fees and costs are proper.
Ruling:
1. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired
either by service of summons or by the defendants voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. (Emphases supplied)
In this case, the records show that respondents opted to file Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court and such never raised the defense of improper
service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action. IT
even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. These actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily appeared before the court a quo.
2. The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia. Hertz contends that the instant case is barred by litis pendentia because of the pendency
of its Complaint for Specific Performance against Optima before the RTC.
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements:
(1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, we find that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific Performance
and those under the present Unlawful Detainer Complaint are different. As aptly found by the trial court:
The Complaint for Specific Performance] seeks to compel plaintiff-appellee Optima to: (1) renegotiate the contract of lease; (2) reconnect the utilities at the
leased premises; and (3) pay damages. On the other hand, the unlawful detainer case sought the ejectment of defendant-appellant Hertz from the leased
premises and to collect arrears in rentals and utility bills.
3. The eviction of respondent and the award of damages, attorneys fees and costs were proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and
utility bills to Optima; and, second, the Contract of Lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days prior to its
expiration.
As the lease was set to expire on 28 February 2006, Hertz had until 30 November 2005 within which to express its interest in negotiating an extension of the
lease with Optima. However, Hertz failed to communicate its intention to negotiate for an extension of the lease within the time agreed upon by the parties.
Thus, by its own provisions, the Contract of Lease expired on 28 February 2006.
Petition for Review is GRANTED.
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
Facts: Manotoc is the defendant in Civil Case Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R. MarcosManotoc for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment
rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation
or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky
de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her
in default.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of

Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure
prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5)
whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.
Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also identified the
Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the Certification was issued, the
unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued by the
Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore.
Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs estate, presented Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who
testified that he participated in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioners residence
was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. In addition, the entries in the logbook of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the
name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriffs Return, were adduced in evidence.
Trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit
E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. CA affirmed the ruling.
Issue: Validity of the substituted service of summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
Ruling: Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void." In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of
service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons
within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character
and in derogation of the usual method of service." Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction."
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" - so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of
summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits
the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed.
To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants.
To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from
the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.

"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to
justify substituted service.
A narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
therein."
A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise
may be presupposed".
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must
have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the
place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president
or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
In the case at bar there was an Invalid Substituted Service of summons.
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner
Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has
become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x
personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or
premises." Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who
served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were
"informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an
effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or house is
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left
with a "person of suitable age and discretion" residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient
must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In
this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that
de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra
Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling.
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule
14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings
held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.

On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the
substituted service is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact
would not make an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
REMELITA M. ROBINSON vs CELITA B. MIRALLES
Facts: On August 25, 2000, Celita Miralles, respondent, filed with the said court a complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson. Respondent
alleged that petitioner borrowed from her US$20,054.00 as shown by a Memorandum of Agreement they both executed on January 12, 2000. Summons was
served on petitioner at her given address. However, per return of service of Sheriff Maximo Potente dated March 5, 2001, petitioner no longer resides at such
address.
On July 20, 2001, the trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19 Baguio St., Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City, petitioners new address. Again,
the summons could not be served on petitioner. Sheriff Potente explained that:
The Security Guard assigned at the gate of Alabang Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I could effect the service of the
summons to the defendant in this case. The security guard alleged that the defendant had given them instructions not to let anybody proceed to
her house if she is not around. I explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the summons to the defendant, and if the defendant is
not around, summons can be received by any person of suitable age and discretion living in the same house. Despite of all the explanation, the
security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche still refused to let me go inside the subdivision and served (sic) the summons to the defendant. The
same thing happened when I attempted to serve the summons previously.
Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H.
Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant.
Eventually, respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default for her failure to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons. RTC granted the
motion. A copy of the Order was sent to petitioner by registered mail at her new address. Subsequently a writ of execution was issued.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void but such was denied.
Issue: whether the trial court correctly ruled that a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected.
Ruling: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, service of summons is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and
void.5 Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service
in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.
Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in
character. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
Petitioner contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to
her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of
summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits
him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted
service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through
the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons
has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
Petition denied.
Barba vs Liceo De Cagayan University

Facts: Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba was the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of respondent Liceo de Cagayan University, Inc., a private
educational institution with school campus located at Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner started working for respondent on July 8, 1993 as medical
officer/school physician for a period of one school year or until March 31,1994. In July 1994, she was chosen by respondent to be the recipient of a
scholarship grant to pursue a three-year residency training in Rehabilitation Medicine at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
The Scholarship Contract provides:That the SCHOLAR after the duration of her study and training shall serve the SCHOOL in whatever position the
SCHOOL desires related to the SCHOLARs studies for a period of not less than ten (10) years;
After completing her residency training with VMMC in June 1997, petitioner returned to continue working for respondent. She was appointed as Acting Dean
of the College of Physical Therapy and at the same time designated as Doctor-In-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic of the Rodolfo N. Pelaez Hall, City
Memorial Hospital.
On June 19, 2002, petitioners appointment as Doctor-In-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic was renewed and she was appointed as Dean of the College of
Physical Therapy by respondents President, Dr. Jose Ma. R. Golez. Petitioner accepted her appointment and assumed the position of Dean of the College of
Physical Therapy. In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in the number of enrollees from a total of
1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only 29 students in the first semester of school year 2003 to 2004. This worsened in the next year or in
school year 2004 to 2005 where a total of only 20 students enrolled.
Due to the low number of enrollees, respondent decided to freeze the operation of the College of Physical Therapy indefinitely. Respondents President Dr.
Rafaelita Pelaez-Golez wrote petitioner a letter9 dated March 16, 2005 informing her that her services as dean of the said college will end at the close of the
school year. Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased operations on March 31, 2005, and petitioner went on leave without pay starting on April 9,
2005. Subsequently, respondents Executive Vice President, Dr. Mariano M. Lerin, through Dr. Glory S. Magdale, respondents Vice President for Academic
Affairs, sent petitioner a letter dated April 27, 2005 instructing petitioner to return to work on June 1, 2005 and report to Ma. Chona Palomares, the Acting
Dean of the College of Nursing, to receive her teaching load and assignment as a full-time faculty member in that department for the school year 2005-2006.
In reply, petitioner informed Dr. Lerin that she had not committed to teach in the College of Nursing and that as far as she can recall, her employment is not
dependent on any teaching load. She then requested for the processing of her separation benefits in view of the closure of the College of Physical
Therapy.11 She did not report to Palomares on June 1, 2005.
On June 8, 2005, petitioner followed up her request for separation pay and other benefits but Dr. Lerin insisted that she report to Palomares; otherwise,
sanctions will be imposed on her. Thus, petitioner through counsel wrote Dr. Golez directly, asking for her separation pay and other benefits.
On June 21, 2005, Dr. Magdale wrote petitioner a letter directing her to report for work and to teach her assigned subjects on or before June 23, 2005.
Otherwise, she will be dismissed from employment on the ground of abandonment. Petitioner, through counsel, replied that teaching in the College of
Nursing is in no way related to her scholarship and training in the field of rehabilitation medicine. Petitioner added that coercing her to become a faculty
member from her position as College Dean is a greatdemotion which amounts to constructive dismissal.
Dr. Magdale sent another letter14 to petitioner on June 24, 2005 ordering her to report for work as she was still bound by the Scholarship Contract to serve
respondent for two more years. But petitioner did not do so. Hence, on June 28, 2005, Dr. Magdale sent petitioner a notice terminating her services on the
ground of abandonment.
Meanwhile, on June 22, 2005, prior to the termination of her services, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, payment of
separation pay and retirement benefits against respondent, Dr. Magdale and Dr. Golez. She alleged that her transfer to the College of Nursing as a faculty
member is a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal.
Respondent claimed that petitioner was not terminated and that it was only petitioners appointment as College Dean in the College of Physical Therapy that
expired as a necessary consequence of the eventual closure of the said college. Respondent further averred that petitioners transfer as fulltime professor in
the College of Nursing does not amount to constructive dismissal since the transfer was without loss of seniority rights and without diminution of pay. Also,
respondent added that pursuant to the Scholarship Contract, petitioner was still duty bound to serve respondent until 2007 in whatever position related to her
studies the school desires.
LA - no constructive dismissal
NLRC- there was a constructive dismissal
CA - No constructive dismissal. CA observed that respondent never raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and respondent
even actively participated in the proceedings below. Hence, respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
Issues: Period to file an appeal, Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping

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Ruling:
1. Respondent claims that petitioners motion for reconsideration from the Amended Decision is a second motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited
pleading. Respondents assertion, however, is misplaced for it should be noted that the CAs Amended Decision totally reversed and set aside its previous
ruling. Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. This contemplates a situation where a second motion for reconsideration is filed by the same party
assailing the same judgment or final resolution. Here, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed after the appellate court rendered an Amended
Decision totally reversing and setting aside its previous ruling.
Hence, petitioner is not precluded from filing another motion for reconsideration from the Amended Decision which held that the labor tribunals lacked
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint for constructive dismissal. The period to file an appeal should be reckoned not from the denial of her motion for
reconsideration of the original decision, but from the date of petitioners receipt of the notice of denial of her motion for reconsideration from the Amended
Decision. And as petitioner received notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration from the Amended Decision on September 23, 2010 and filed her
petition on November 8, 2010, or within the extension period granted by the Court to file the petition, her petition was filed on time.
2. The Court agree with the CAs earlier pronouncement that since respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, it is already estopped from belatedly raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. In this case, respondent filed position papers and other supporting
documents to bolster its defense before the labor tribunals but in all these pleadings, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was never raised. It was only in its
Supplemental Petition filed before the CA that respondent first brought the issue of lack of jurisdiction. We have consistently held that while jurisdiction may
be assailed at any stage, a partys active participation in the proceedings will estop such party from assailing its jurisdiction. It is an undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.
Under Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing supplemental pleadings, the court may admit supplemental
pleadings, such as the supplemental petition filed by respondent before the appellate court, but the admission of these pleadings remains in the sound
discretion of the court. Nevertheless, we have already found no credence in respondents claim that petitioner is a corporate officer, consequently, the alleged
lack of jurisdiction asserted by respondent in the supplemental petition is bereft of merit.
3. Lastly, as to whether respondent was guilty of forum shopping when it failed to inform the appellate court of the pendency of Civil Case No. 2009-320, a
complaint for breach of contract filed by respondent against petitioner, we rule in the negative. Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
While there is identity of parties in the two cases, the causes of action and the reliefs sought are different. The issue raised in the present case is whether
there was constructive dismissal committed by respondent. On the other hand, the issue in the civil case pending before the RTC is whether petitioner was
guilty of breach of contract. Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.
Petition is granted.

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