CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Declaration of Principle and State Policies

Right to Information. Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its agencies to fully disclose all of
its transactions involving public interest. Thus, the government agencies, without need of
demand from anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract. Such information
must pertain to definite propositions of the government, meaning official recommendations or
final positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation. The government agency,
however, need not disclose intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
the exploratory stage. The limitation also covers privileged communication like information on
military and diplomatic secrets; information affecting national security; information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused;
information on foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Right to Information. It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth
of the 1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the
compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on government transactions.
Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if and when Congress decides
to approve the proposed Freedom of Access to Information Act. In the meantime, it would suffice
that government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the
information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and the agreements
themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on their respective websites for
easy access by interested parties. Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose
information, the NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able to
disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public in general. [Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Right to Information. The other aspect of the peoples right to know apart from the duty to
disclose is the duty to allow access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art.
III of the Constitution. The gateway to information opens to the public the following: (1) official
records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and (3)
government research data used as a basis for policy development. Thus, the duty to disclose
information should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to information. There is no
need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is mandatory
under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the
interested party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and
papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the government
office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such papers
and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public
interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not
only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications
and public documents of the government agency. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530
SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Separation of Powers. It is a basic legal precept that courts do not look into the wisdom of the
laws passed. The principle of separation of powers demands this hands-off attitude from the
judiciary. Saguiguit v. People, 484 SCRA 128 (2006) teaches why: What the petitioner asks is for
the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, which, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, it cannot do,. Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret
and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of
justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been
shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret
laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven

to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into
the law what is not written therein. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v.
Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Separation of Powers; Mandamus. The case is now in the execution phase of the final and
executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to
receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the
agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of
specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the
agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. This
view is misplaced. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the
power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the
alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are
required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. [Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, 643 SCRA 90, G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011]
Bill of Rights
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Fair market value. Fair market value, as an eminent
domain concept, is determined by, among other factors, the character of the property at the time
of the taking of the property. It is basic that the nature and character of the land at the time of
the taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation is to be given to
the lot owner, not the potential of the expropriated area. With these principles in mind, it is clear
that the fact that the subject lots would eventually be developed as an integral part of the BPZ
and consequently devoted to industrial use is of little moment for purposes of determining just
compensation. And the adaptability for conversion in the future of the lots found within the BPZ
is a factor, but not the ultimate in determining just compensation. [Curata v. Philippine Ports
Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Equal Protection Clause. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment
to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million
minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners challenge is not well
taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile
discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. [League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]
Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and
elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art.
III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination
or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due
process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. This constitutional
protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial
persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their
property is concerned. [League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA
636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]

Equal Protection Clause. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially
reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to
bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part
of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the
IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the
uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection.
For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a
political unit, but not its property as such. [League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]
Equal Protection Clause. As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal
protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or
obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing
and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent
in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class. [League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No.
176951, December 21, 2009]
Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining,
cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation
underpinning the classification. By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or
efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The
power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate,
neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. [League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December
21, 2009]
Right to Speedy Trial. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case
and the accuseds right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most
obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16
of the Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case: Section 16. All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a
peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be
tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. Thus, in Licaros the Court dismissed the
criminal case against the accused due to the palpable transgression of his right to a speedy trial.
[Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Commission on Audit
Commission on Audit. The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the
responsibility for State audit. As an independent supreme State auditor, its audit jurisdiction
cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in
any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit." Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing
provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public
funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased
using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds,
ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the

government, and consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly,
the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionallymandated function and undermine its constitutional independence. [Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January
24, 2012]
Constitutional question
Constitutional question. It is basic that courts will not delve into matters of constitutionality
unless unavoidable, when the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case,
meaning, that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional issue raised is
determined. This rule finds anchorage on the presumptive constitutionality of every enactment.
Withal, to justify the nullification of a statute, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution. A doubtful or speculative infringement would simply not suffice. Just as basic is
the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, subject only to review by this Court. [Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Ministerial Duty. It has not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in relation to the SMDRP and the agreements relative to it. Likewise, it has not been
shown what ministerial functions the NHA has with regard to the SMDRP. A ministerial duty is one
which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. It is a duty which an officer performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his/her
own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. Whatever is left to be done in relation to the
August 27, 2003 MOA, terminating the JVA and other related agreements, certainly does not
involve ministerial functions of the NHA but instead requires exercise of judgment. In fact, Item
No. 4 of the MOA terminating the JVAs provides for validation of the developers (RBIs) claims
arising from the termination of the SMDRP through the various government agencies. Such
validation requires the exercise of discretion. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA
235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Moot and Academic. A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening
events, so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general
rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,489 SCRA 161 (2006), We acknowledged and accepted certain
exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus: The moot and academic principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. [Funa v.
Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Executive Department
Power of Control; Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. The President is assigned the task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully
executed. Control, in administrative law, means the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. As such, the President can exercise executive
power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a subordinate with the Presidents
own. The DENR is a department in the executive branch under the President, and it is only an

alter ego of the latter. Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a
department like the DENR and then submitted to the President for approval. However, there is
nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President decides on the implementation of a certain
project or activity and requires said department to implement it. Such is a presidential
prerogative as long as it involves the department or office authorized by law to supervise or
execute the Project. Thus, as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a
member of the committee tasked to implement the project, the required authorization from the
DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It cannot be disputed that the ultimate power
over alienable and disposable public lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not
the DENR Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on the Smokey Mountain when the
President has already authorized and ordered the implementation of the Project would be a
derogation of the powers of the President as the head of the executive branch. Otherwise, any
department head can defy or oppose the implementation of a project approved by the head of
the executive branch, which is patently illegal and unconstitutional. [Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Power of Control; Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In Chavez v.
Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 (2004), we stated that when a statute imposes a specific duty on the
executive department, the President may act directly or order the said department to undertake
an activity, thus: At the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution specifies her power as Chief executive departments, bureaus and
offices. She shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo
holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her government. She lays down policies in
the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates
to implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the
performance of a duty x x x. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Power of Control; Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The power to
order the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President. The
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants authority to the President to reserve lands of public
domain for settlement for any specific purpose, thus: Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the
Public and Private Domain of the Government.(1) The President shall have the power to reserve
for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public
domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter
remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15,
2007]
Executive Act. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case
elaborates what executive act mean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the
President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code
and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have such specific definition under
existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found
that the term executive act is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act is
broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive
department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.
[Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No.
171101, November 22, 2011]
Environmental Law
Local Government Units; Forest Products. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample
authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged
forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been

faithfully complied with. While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality
charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality
clothed with such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to
protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the
exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the
word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither
the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall
exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs. On
the contrary, the claim of DENRs supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare
clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos.
186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Right to balance and healthful ecology. As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792
(1993), the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and
maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at
enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate
measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial
jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzols memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint
Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport
were issued by Ruzolto regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of
General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the
area. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Local Government Units; Forest Products. To our mind, the requirement of permits to
transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENRs authority but
rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENRs duty to regulate and
monitor forest resources within the LGUs territorial jurisdiction. This is consistent with the
"canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that
both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government." Hence,
if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations
issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold
one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.
Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily
precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of
salvaged forest products. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April
17, 2013]
Communal Forest; Requisites. It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a
communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and
location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR
Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696
SCRA 742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Local Government Units; Forest Products. But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not
the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the
permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit

issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his
authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR.
The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain,
the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos.
186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Legislative Department
Delegation of Powers. P.D. No. 755 involves an invalid delegation of legislative power, a
concept discussed in Soriano v. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79 (2009), citing the following excerpts
from Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970): It is a fundamental that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power. What cannot be delegated is the authority to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may
be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. Jurisprudence
is consistent as regards the two tests, which must be complied with to determine the existence
of a valid delegation of legislative power. In Abakada Guro Party List, et al. v. Purisima, 562 SCRA
251 (2008), We reiterated the discussion, to wit: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
[Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Legislative Intent. Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in
interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the
true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature. In fact, any
interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. [League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December
21, 2009]
Conflict with the Constitution. As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality
of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a
conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately for petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden. [League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]
Local Government Unit
Local Government Unit. By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle,
the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even
without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether
abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly

recent case, Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700 (2008). [League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]
Operative Fact Doctrine
Operative Fact Doctrine. Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine
does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies
to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have discussed in Our July 5, 2011
Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts in this case, the
approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution is well-settled in our jurisprudence. In
Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held: Petitioner postulates that the operative fact
doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine which could not be
used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office. On the other hand,
the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements
implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored,
citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines. The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious. The
operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that
a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
Operative Fact Doctrine. The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a
statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
Operative Fact Doctrine. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As a complement of
legal jurisdiction, equity seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed
by different courts. Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of statutory law and never in
contravention of said law. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
Operative Fact Doctrine; Coconut Levy Funds. It is highly inappropriate to apply the
operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost
safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that
are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the
recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said
benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also
serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether
willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their
Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public
purpose. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514,
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Operative Fact. The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 429, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus: As the new Civil Code
puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why
it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act
contrary to its terms cannot survive. Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the

declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its
invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be
had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R.
164527, August 15, 2007]
Operative Fact. In the instant case, RA 6957 was the prevailing law at the time that the joint
venture agreement was signed. RA 6957, entitled An Act Authorizing The Financing, Construction,
Operation And Maintenance Of Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector And For Other
Purposes, which was passed by Congress on July 24, 1989, allows repayment to the private
contractor of reclaimed lands. Such law was relied upon by respondents, along with the abovementioned executive issuances in pushing through with the Project. The existence of such law
and issuances is an operative fact to which legal consequences have attached. This Court is
constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in consonance with such executive and
legislative acts; to do otherwise would work patent injustice on respondents. [Chavez v. National
Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Operative Fact; Vested Right Doctrine. When the ruling in PEA was rendered by this Court on
July 9, 2002, the JVAs were all executed. Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case
against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA
between the NHA and RBI. The respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were
unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive
department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have
produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were
issued titles over said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project
or who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the
passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the
operative fact principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer
be invalidated. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15,
2007]
Operative Fact; Prohibition. Prohibition does not lie against the NHA in view of petitioners
failure to avail and exhaust all administrative remedies. Clear is the rule that prohibition is only
available when there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. More importantly,
prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait accompli. The operative fact
doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant of the writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It
should be remembered that petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was
formulated and implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the
agreements on it, but he did not. The moment to challenge the Project had passed. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
PD No. 1869. A reading of the aforequoted provisions does not point to any authority granted
to PAGCOR to license casinos within Subic, Clark, or any other economic zone. As a matter of
fact, Sec. 13 of RA 7227 simply shows that SBMA has no power to license or operate casinos.
Rather, said casinos shall continue to be licensed by PAGCOR. Hence, the source of PAGCORs
authority lies in its basic charter, PD 1869, as amended, and neither in RA 7227 nor its extension,

EO 80, for the latter merely recognizes PAGCORs power to license casinos. Indeed, PD 1869
empowers PAGCOR to regulate and control all games of chance within the Philippines, and
clearly, RA 7227 or EO 80 cannot be the source of its powers, but its basic charter, PD 1869.
[Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana Development Corporation, 622 SCRA
461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010] [S]
Contracts. In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is unequivocal that PAGCOR draws its
authority and power to operate and regulate casinos from PD 1869, and neither from Sec. 5 of
EO 80 nor from RA 7227. Hence, since PD 1869 remains unaffected by the unconstitutionality of
Sec. 5 of EO 80, then PAGCOR has no legal basis for nullifying or recalling the MOA with FDC and
replacing it with its new Standard Authority to Operate (SAO). There is no infirmity in the MOA, as
it was validly entered by PAGCOR under PD 1869 and remains valid until legally terminated in
accordance with the MOA. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana
Development Corporation, 622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Administrative Law
Public Officer; Terms of Office; Appointments. Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a
statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If
the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend
a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. There is no in between. He
or she cannot split terms. It is not within the power of the appointing authority to override the
positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of members of
constitutional bodies shall be seven (7) years. A contrary reasoning "would make the term of
office to depend upon the pleasure or caprice of the appointing authority and not upon the will of
the framers of the Constitution] of the legislature as expressed in plain and undoubted language
in the law." [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Public Officer; Commission on Audit. As earlier explained, the majority view springs from the
interplay of the following premises: The explicit command of the Constitution is that the
Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President x x x for a term of seven
years and appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. To repeat, the President has two and only two options on term appointments. Either
he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy results from the expiration of
term, or for a shorter period corresponding to the unexpired term of the predecessor when the
vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability, resignation or impeachment. If the
vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from extending a
promotional appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms of
office fixed by the Constitution. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Public Officer; Commission on Audit; Termination of Employment. A commissioner who
resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment
to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of
the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Labor Law and Social Legislation

Agrarian Reform Law; Expropriation; Just Compensation. The foregoing notwithstanding, it

bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final
and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting
as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review
with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. [Hacienda
Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011]
Assumption of Jurisdiction. It is clear that once the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction over
the labor dispute and certifies the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC, the parties
have to revert to the status quo ante (the state of things as it was before). [Toyota Motor Phils.
Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos.
158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands
may only be transferred or conveyed after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of
the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the
EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the
EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
[Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No.
171101, November 22, 2011]
Dismissal. Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in
an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful
strike. It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members.
They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in decision making on union
activities in accordance with the law, government rules and regulations, and established labor
practices. The leaders are expected to recommend actions that are arrived at with
circumspection and contemplation, and always keep paramount the best interests of the
members and union within the bounds of law. If the implementation of an illegal strike is
recommended, then they would mislead and deceive the membership and the supreme penalty
of dismissal is appropriate. On the other hand, if the strike is legal at the beginning and the
officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade personal
and individual liability for said acts. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Dismissal. Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly
participates in an illegal act during a strike. While the provision is silent on whether the strike is
legal or illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in
a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated. However, when union members merely
participate in an illegal strike without committing any illegal act, are they liable? This was
squarely answered in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627 (1995),
where it was held that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in
an illegal strike. This was an affirmation of the rulings in Bacus v. Ople, 132 SCRA 690 (1984),
and Progressive Workers Union v. Aguas, 150 SCRA 429 (1987), where it was held that though
the strike is illegal, the ordinary member who merely participates in the strike should not be
meted loss of employment on the considerations of compassion and good faith and in view of the
security of tenure provisions under the Constitution. In Esso Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang
Manggagawa sa Esso (MME), 75 SCRA 73 (1977), it was explained that a member is not
responsible for the unions illegal strike even if he voted for the holding of a strike which became
illegal. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission,
537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Due Process. It is entirely the Unions fault that its position paper was not considered by the
NLRC. Records readily reveal that the NLRC was even too generous in affording due process to

the Union. It issued no less than three (3) orders for the parties to submit its position papers,
which the Union ignored until the last minute. No sufficient justification was offered why the
Union belatedly filed its position paper. In Datu Eduardo Ampo v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 482
SCRA 562 (2006), it was explained that a party cannot complain of deprivation of due process if
he was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so. If he does
not avail himself of the chance to be heard, then it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee. Thus, there was no violation of the Unions right to due
process on the part of the NLRC. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Illegal Acts. What are considered illegal acts under Art. 264(a)? No precise meaning was given
to the phrase illegal acts. It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or
criminal laws, such as the following: (1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides
that no person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares; (2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out
the strike; and (3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary
or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of
the Labor Code. As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other
breaches of existing laws. In the cases at bench, the individual respondents participated in
several mass actions, viz: (1) The rallies held at the DOLE and BLR offices on February 21, 22,
and 23, 2001; (2) The strikes held on March 17 to April 12, 2001; and (3) The rallies and picketing
on May 23 and 28, 2001 in front of the Toyota Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. Did they commit
illegal acts during the illegal strikes on February 21 to 23, 2001, from March 17 to April 12, 2001,
and on May 23 and 28, 2001? The answer is in the affirmative. As we have ruled that the strikes
by the Union on the three different occasions were illegal, we now proceed to determine the
individual liabilities of the affected union members for acts committed during these forbidden
concerted actions. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Illegal Acts; Burden of Proof. Our ruling in Association of Independent Unions in the
Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219 (1999) lays down the rule on the liability of the union
members: Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provisions of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code
that: [x x x] any worker [x x x] who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. [x x x] It can be gleaned
unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking
employee can not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the
commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. Substantial evidence available under the circumstances, which may justify the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69
Phil 635, the court ruled Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion. Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof on the participation
of the striking employee in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes. [Toyota Motor Phils.
Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos.
158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Illegal Acts; Syndicated Illegal Recruitment; Elements. To commit syndicated illegal
recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity
within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. When illegal recruitment is committed by a

syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Under Art. 13(b) of the
Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. [People v.
Gallo, 622 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010]
Illegal Acts. In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of
R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in
consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of
Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning
the agencys purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the
process, collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment. [People v. Gallo, 622 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29,
2010]
Separation Pay. The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an
employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay.
The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers
should not benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to
whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or
collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice or
under the Labor Code and other existing laws. This means that the employee, despite the
dismissal for a valid cause, retains the right to receive from the employer benefits provided by
law, like accrued service incentive leaves. With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions
and voluntary management policy or practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the
benefits depends on the stipulations of the CBA or the company rules and policies. [Toyota Motor
Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R.
Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Separation Pay. As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is
given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in
applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In Phil. Long
Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, the Court elucidated why social justice
can validate the grant of separation pay, thus: The reason is that our Constitution is replete with
positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection of the
rights of the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the
present charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of
labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution contains a
separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate subtopic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with
management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in
general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the
workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even
if the dismissal be for cause. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Separation Pay. Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not
grant separation pay based on social justiceserious misconduct (which is the first ground for
dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee. What is
unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee
is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than
serious misconduct. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]

Separation Pay. It is high time that employer and employee cease to view each other as
adversaries and instead recognize that theirs is a symbiotic relationship, wherein they must rely
on each other to ensure the success of the business. When they consider only their own selfinterests, and when they act only with their own benefit in mind, both parties suffer from shortsightedness, failing to realize that they both have a stake in the business. The employer wants
the business to succeed, considering the investment that has been made. The employee in turn,
also wants the business to succeed, as continued employment means a living, and the chance to
better ones lot in life. It is clear then that they both have the same goal, even if the benefit that
results may be greater for one party than the other. If this becomes a source of conflict, there are
various, more amicable means of settling disputes and of balancing interests that do not add fuel
to the fire, and instead open avenues for understanding and cooperation between the employer
and the employee. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective
bargaining tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide
short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would
damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the
business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective means of
dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do not increase tension
but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere of trust and understanding has
much more to offer a business relationship than the traditional enmity that has long divided the
employer and the employee. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Strikes; Meaning. A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute, in turn, includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms
and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of the employer and the employee. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619
(1997), it was explained that [t]he fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation and not its appearance, will be deemed controlling. The term strike
has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns,
mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities,
and similar activities. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Strikes; Categories of Illegal Strikes. Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6)
categories of an illegal strike, viz: (1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as
strike by employees performing governmental functions; or (2) [when it] violates a specific
requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in
the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example,
prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an
existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and
the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement,
such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789,
October 19, 2007]
Commercial Law
Corporation Law
Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction. In the third place, by arguing that the companies
involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita have interlocking
directors and, thus, knowledge of one may already be imputed upon all the other companies,
AMBALA and Rene Galang, in effect, want this Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.

However, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted only in cases when the separate
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into
one. Absent any allegation or proof of fraud or other public policy considerations, the existence
of interlocking directors, officers and stockholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction as in the instant case. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, 660 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
Joint Ventures
Administrative Issuances. Deviation from the procedure outlined cannot be countenanced.
Well established is the rule that administrative issuancessuch as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly
promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statutehave the force and effect of
law. Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore,
has the same binding effect as if it were issued by the President himself. As such, no agency or
instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly stray from the mandatory procedures set
forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases
Conversion and Development Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Competitive Selection and Negotiated Agreements. Competitive selection involves a
selection process based on transparent criteria, which should not constrain or limit competition,
and is open to participation by any interested and qualified private entity. Selection by
negotiated agreements or negotiated projects, on the other hand, comes about as an end result
of an unsolicited proposal from a private sector proponent, or if the government has failed to
identify an eligible private sector partner for a desired activity after subjecting the same to a
competitive selection. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 733 SCRA
68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Negotiated Agreements; Swiss Challenge Method. Relevant to the case at bar is the
selection modality by negotiated agreement arising from the submission and acceptance of an
unsolicited proposal, known as the Swiss Challenge method, in esse a hybrid mechanism
between the direct negotiation approach and the competitive bidding route. With the availability
of the Swiss Challenge method for utilization by those in the private sector, PSEs have studied,
formulated, and submitted numerous suo moto or unsolicited proposals with the ultimate goal of
assisting the public sector in elevating the countrys place in the global economy, as in the case
herein. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No.
203655, August 13, 2014]
Criminal Law
Conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same
purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness
and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony. [People v.
Bautista, 622 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010]
Conspiracy. In People v. Gamboa, 341 SCRA 451 (2000), this Court discussed the nature of
conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment, viz: Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas
contract workers was evident from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and
after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in
its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the
acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of
illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. To reiterate, in
establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took

a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. [People v. Gallo, 622 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010]
Criminal Judicial System. Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the
unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting."
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject
permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate
and monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of
illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble
intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of
encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
conservation of our natural resources. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos.
186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Dangerous Drugs Acts; Illegal Sale of Shabu. The essential elements that must be
established in prosecuting a case of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction actually took place, along with
the presentation in court of the illegal substance which constitutes the corpus delicti of the
crime. [People v. Le, 622 SCRA 571, G.R. No. 188976, June 29, 2010]
Dangerous Drugs Acts; Buy-bust Operations. Accused-appellants argument on the failure to
present the marked money in court is not only without merit but baseless. Two (2) One hundred
peso (Php100) bills were presented as evidence as the buy-bust money used and marked as
Exhibits E and F. Moreover, the presentation of buy-bust money is not required by law or
jurisprudence. Its non-presentation is not fatal to the case for the prosecution. The marked
money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable but merely corroborative in nature.
[People v. Le, 622 SCRA 571, G.R. No. 188976, June 29, 2010]
Estafa; Elements. The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury. [People v. Gallo,
622 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010]
Exempting Circumstances; Insanity. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the
human condition. While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless that person has acted during a lucid interval, the
presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads
the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. [People v.
Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Exempting Circumstances; Insanity. The change in Tibons behavior was triggered by
jealousy. He acted out of jealous rage at the thought of his wife having an affair overseas.
Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity. Nor is being despondent, as Tibon
said he was when interviewed by the police. There is a vast difference between a genuinely
insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use
reason or good judgment in what he does. We reiterate jurisprudence which has established that
only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the

crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. [People v. Tibon, 622 SCRA
510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Murder; Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense, which the offended party might
make. For treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must concur: (1) The employment of
means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any
defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) The offenders deliberate or
conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution. In the case at bar, circumstances do
obtain to justify the finding of treachery in the killing of Jufer. Consider: Appellant surreptitiously
entered the De Leons residence at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of June 27, 2006 and snuck
up inside Jufers bedroom, while the other De Leon children were busy preparing for school and
their mother attending to their breakfast. The family was unaware that appellant went to the
second floor and stabbed Jufer, at that time merely 11 years old who most likely had no
opportunity, but surely without the needed heft and strength to ward off, much less overpower,
the appellant. The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. The trial
court correctly appreciated the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of
Jufer. [People v. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010]
Murder; Treachery. Jurisprudence teaches that there is treachery when an adult person attacks
and causes the death of a child of tender years. As the Court elucidated in People vs.
Cabarrubias,223 SCRA 363 (1993), the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the
manner of assault is not shown. For, the weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in
the absence of any danger to the accused. [People v. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 188610,
June 29, 2010]
Murder; Abuse of Superior Strength. Jeane was sufficiently forewarned of the aggression
against her and her family by the appellant. Appellant was on a killing frenzy when Jeane faced
him up close at Jufers room. An attack from appellant was then something not unexpected.
Hence, treachery cannot be appreciated against appellant, although his sex and weapon gave
him superiority of strength as against Jeane. An attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
armed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which
his sex and weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. [People v. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010]
Murder; Evident Premeditation; Requisites. For evident premeditation to be considered, the
following must be established: (1) the time when the accused determined (conceived) to commit
the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to commit the
crime (kill his victim); and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime
and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Premeditation presupposes a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it. The execution
of the criminal act, in other words, must be preceded by cool thought and reflection. As here,
there must be showing of a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and
reflected upon his decision to execute the crime. [People v. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548, G.R. No.
188610, June 29, 2010]
Parricide. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
[People v. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Presumption of Innocence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. It is settled that an accused
in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the

presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. As held by this Court in People v. Sitco, 620 SCRA 561 (2010), The imperative of
proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused, during
a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his
conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan,
696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Rape. Penile or organ rape is, in context, committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of
the victim by force, threat or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or when the victim is under 12 years of age. [People v. Llanas, Jr., 622 SCRA 602,
G.R. No. 190616, June 29, 2010]
Rape. Appellants attempt, in his bid for exculpation, to ride on AAAs inability to recall precisely
what time of the day the 2005 rape transpired is puerile. Victims of rape hardly retain in their
memories the dates and manner they were violated and it is for this reason that the exact date
of the commission of the rape is not an element of the crime. The gravamen of the offense is
carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. [People v. Llanas, Jr., 622 SCRA 602, G.R. No.
190616, June 29, 2010]
Usurpation of Official Functions; Good Faith. It bears stressing at this point that in People v.
Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation
of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."44
Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be
ascertained by relying not on ones self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his
conduct and outward acts. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA 742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April
17, 2013]
Civil Law
Persons
Publication. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above
in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is
well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable
condition for the effectivity of a law. Taada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), said as much:
Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x. x x x x We note at this point the
conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less
important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. x x x x We hold therefore that
all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic,
686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Publication. The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the law since
the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the

number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity
would not satisfy the publication requirement. In this case, while it incorporated the PCACojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact
terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when
published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently,
We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as
an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil
Code. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Statutory Construction. Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, laws
being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro,
judex de praeteri to the law provides for the future, the judge for the past which is articulated in
Art. 4 of the Civil Code thusly: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. The legislative intent as to the retroactive application of a law is made manifest either
by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The reason for the rule is the
tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to
unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. A well-settled exception to
the rule on prospectivity is when the law in question is remedial in nature. The rationale
underpinning the exception is that no person can claim any vested right in any particular remedy
or mode of procedure for the enforcement of a right. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590
SCRA 214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Statutory Construction. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by the maxim verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. The primary
source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.
If possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save where
technical terms are employed. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Statutory Construction. It may be argued that there is doubt or ambiguity on whether Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D), as couched, allows a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman.
Even if We concede the existence of an ambiguity, the outcome will remain the same. J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 413 (1970), teaches that in case of doubt as to the import and react of a
constitutional provision, resort should be made to extraneous aids of construction, such as
debates and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, to shed light on and ascertain the
intent of the framers or the purpose of the provision being construed. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA
579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Statutory Construction; Reappointment. Jurisprudence tells us that the word
"reappointment" means a second appointment to one and the same office. As Justice Arsenio
Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent in Visarra v. Miraflor, 8 Phil 1 (1963), the
constitutional prohibition against the reappointment of a commissioner refers to his second
appointment to the same office after holding it for nine years.[39] As Justice Dizon observed, The
occupant of an office obviously needs no such second appointment unless, for some valid cause,
such as the expiration of his term or resignation, he had ceased to be the legal occupant thereof.
The inevitable implication of Justice Dizons cogent observation is that a promotion from
commissioner to chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and,
hence, not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a reappointment. Stated a bit differently, reappointment
refers to a movement to one and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different
position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an
appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment. [Funa v. Villar, 670
SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Statutory Construction. It is elementary that the word "shall" underscores the mandatory
character of the rule. It is a word of command, one which always has or must be given a

compulsory meaning, and is generally imperative or mandatory. Considering the compulsory

tenor of the order, the rule could not be any clearerthat once the negotiations at Stage Two
shall have been successfully completed, it becomes mandatory for the GE to subject the JV
activity to a competitive challenge. By the Guidelines explicit order, proceeding to Stage Three
of the process is compulsory, conditioned only on the successful conclusion of Stage Two. The GE
is not given any discretion to decide whether it will proceed with the competitive challenge or
not. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No.
203655, August 13, 2014]
Statutory Construction. To anchor the real import of the clause on the basis only of a single
word may, however, result in a deviation from its true meaning by rendering all the other terms
unnecessary or insignificant. Such an interpretation would run afoul Article 1373 of the Civil
Code, which states that "if some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it
shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual." It is a
cardinal rule in statutory construction that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a
statute shall be considered surplus age or superfluous, meaningless, void and insignificant. For
this purpose, an interpretation which renders every word operative is preferred over that which
makes some words idle and nugatory. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Torts and Damages
Damages; Civil Liability. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. [People v.
Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Damages; Civil Indemnity. The Solicitor General recommended the reduction of civil indemnity
from PhP75,000 to PhP50,000. However, recent jurisprudence pegs civil indemnity in the amount
of PhP75,000, which is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the
formers death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of murder,
homicide, parricide and rape. People v. Regalario, 582 SCRa 738 (2009), has explained that the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. [People v. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Damages; Actual Damages. According to Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, one is entitled to
adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him that is duly proved. This
compensation is termed actual damages. The party seeking actual damages must produce
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.
[30] We note that the trial court failed to award actual damages in spite of the presentation of
receipts showing wake and funeral expenses amounting to PhP173,000. We therefore grant said
amount. [People v. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010]
Damages; Moral Damages. Moral damages are also in order. Even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering, it has been recognized that the loss of a
loved one to a violent death brings emotional pain and anguish, more so in this case where two
young children were brutally killed while their mother was away. The award of PhP75,000.00 is
proper pursuant to established jurisprudence holding that where the imposable penalty is death
but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346, the award of moral damages should be
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. [People v. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510, G.R. No. 188320, June
29, 2010]
Vicarious liability. Noted labor law expert, Professor Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., traced the history
relating to the liability of a union member in an illegal strike, starting with the rule of vicarious
liability, thus: Under the rule of vicarious liability, mere membership in a labor union serves as
basis of liability for acts of individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the union. The

union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general
conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of
the conspiracy. It has been said that in the absence of statute providing otherwise, the rule of
vicarious liability applies. Even the Industrial Peace Act, however, which was in effect from 1953
to 1974, did not adopt the vicarious liability concept. It expressly provided that: No officer or
member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or
interested in a labor dispute shall be held responsible or liable for the unlawful acts of individual
officers, members, or agents, except upon proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization
of, such acts or of ratifying of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. Replacing the Industrial
Peace Act, the Labor Code has not adopted the vicarious liability rule. Thus, the rule on vicarious
liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike that he will be penalized with
dismissal. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Contracts
Contracts. The Court has to point out that the issuance of the 10-year SAO by PAGCOR in lieu of
the MOA with FDC is a breach of the MOA. The MOA in question was validly entered into by
PAGCOR and FDC on December 23, 1999. It embodied the license and authority to operate a
casino, the nature and extent of PAGCORs regulatory powers over the casino, and the rights and
obligations of FDC. Thus, the MOA is a valid contract with all the essential elements required
under the Civil Code. The parties are then bound by the stipulations of the MOA subject to the
regulatory powers of PAGCOR. Well-settled is the rule that a contract voluntarily entered into by
the parties is the law between them and all issues or controversies shall be resolved mainly by
the provisions thereof. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana Development
Corporation, 622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Consideration. Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists
and is lawful unless the debtor proves the contrary. Moreover, under Section 3, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair
and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract. A presumption may operate against an adversary who has not
introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create
the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case
created thereby, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686
SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Inadequacy of consideration. Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a
contract void under Article 1355 of the Civil Code: Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law,
lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud,
mistake or undue influence. Alsua-Betts v. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 332 (1979), is instructive
that lack of ample consideration does not nullify the contract: Inadequacy of consideration does
not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud,
mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as
so inadequate to shock the courts conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher
than the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by
a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account. [Cojuanco, Jr. v.
Republic, 686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Government Agency. A government agency, like the PCA, stoops down to level of an ordinary
citizen when it enters into a private transaction with private individuals. In this setting, PCA is
bound by the law on contracts and is bound to comply with the terms of the PCA-Cojuangco

Agreement which is the law between the parties. With the silence of PCA not to challenge the
validity of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement and the inability of government to demonstrate the
lack of ample consideration in the transaction, the Court is left with no other choice but to uphold
the validity of said agreements. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705,
November 27, 2012]
Government Contracts; Procurement Process. To streamline the procurement process and
expedite the acquisition of goods and services, Executive Order No. (EO) 423 was issued on April
30, 2005, which prescribed the rules and procedures on the review and approval of government
contracts. The EO, in part, provides: Section 8. Joint Venture Agreements. The NEDA, in
consultation with the GPPB, shall issue guidelines regarding joint venture agreements with
private entities with the objective of promoting transparency, competitiveness, and
accountability in government transactions, and, where applicable, complying with the
requirements of an open and competitive public bidding. Taking its cue from the above-quoted
provision, the NEDA promulgated the NEDA JV Guidelines, which detailed two (2) modes of
selecting a private sector JV partner: by competitive selectionor through negotiated agreements.
[SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655,
August 13, 2014]
Government Contracts . Needless to say, allowing government agencies to retract their
commitments to the project proponents will essentially render inutile the incentives offered to
and have accrued in favor of the private sector entity. Without securing these rights, the business
community will be wary when it comes to forging contracts with the government. Simply put, the
failure of the government to abide by the rules it itself set would have detrimental effects on the
private sectors confidence that the government will comply with its statutory and contractual
obligations to the letter. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, 733
SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Land Titles and Deeds
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA). EO 525 reads: Section 1. The Public
Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects
shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by
the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter
shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President. The aforequoted
provision points to three (3) requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project, viz:(1) approval
by the President; (2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and (3) undertaken by any of the
following: a. by PEA; b. by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA; c. by
the National Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject
to consultation with PEA. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527,
August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA). Without doubt, PEA under EO 525
was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects. Primarily means mainly, principally, mostly, generally. Thus, not all
reclamation projects fall under PEAs authority of supervision, integration, and coordination. The
very charter of PEA, PD 1084, does not mention that PEA has the exclusive and sole power and
authority to reclaim lands of public domain. EO 525 even reveals the exceptionreclamation
projects by a national government agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land. One
example is EO 405 which authorized the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop
submerged areas for port related purposes. Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has the power to
reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands vested in it. Thus, while PEA under PD 1084
has the power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for integrating, directing
and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim

may be granted or delegated to another government agency or entity or may even be

undertaken by the National Government itself, PEA being only an agency and a part of the
National Government. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527,
August 15, 2007]]
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA); National Housing Authority.
Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has express and
implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those
powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express
provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit
in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Court clarified and stressed that when a
general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. It
was also explicated that when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed
or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has
the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on
the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA); National Housing Authority. Even
without an implied power to reclaim lands under NHAs charter, we rule that the authority granted
to NHA, a national government agency, by the President under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is
more than sufficient statutory basis for the reclamation of lands under the SMDRP. PD 3-A is a law
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under his martial law powers on September 23,
1972. It provided that [t]he provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas, underwater, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under the proper contract. It repealed, in effect, RA
1899 which previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to municipalities and chartered cities
and revested it to the National Government.[68] Under PD 3-A, national government can only
mean the Executive Branch headed by the President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was
dissolved and abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3-A on September 23, 1972. Moreover,
the Executive Branch is the only implementing arm in the government with the equipment,
manpower, expertise, and capability by the very nature of its assigned powers and functions to
undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3-A, the Executive Branch through the President
can implement reclamation of lands through any of its departments, agencies, or offices.
Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD 1084 creating the PEA, which
was granted, among others, the power to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas
by dredging, filling or other means or to acquire reclaimed lands. The PEAs power to reclaim is
not however exclusive as can be gleaned from its charter, as the President retained his power
under PD 3-A to designate another agency to reclaim lands. On February 14, 1979, EO 525 was
issued. It granted PEA primary responsibility for integrating, directing, and coordinating
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government although other national
government agencies can be designated by the President to reclaim lands in coordination with
the PEA. Despite the issuance of EO 525, PD 3-A remained valid and subsisting. Thus, the
National Government through the President still retained the power and control over all
reclamation projects in the country. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R.
164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands. It cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are
classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and
implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified
beneficiaries. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15,
2007]

Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands. The query is, when did the
declaration take effect? It did so only after the special patents covering the reclaimed areas were
issued. It is only on such date that the reclaimed lands became alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. This is in line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified and
stressed: PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. Thus, MO 415 and
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos.
3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that there must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235,
G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Law. Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or disposable, we find
that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample authority for the classification of reclaimed
land in the SMDRP for the repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides: For the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the
build-operate-and transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of
the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or
percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the
ownership of the land. While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare that the
reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project proponent have become alienable and
disposable lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is necessarily implied,
for how else can the land be used as the enabling component for the Project if such classification
is not deemed made? [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August
15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. It may
be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA, does not convert
alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial lands. We ruled in PEA that alienable
lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities
not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands. To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such
reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to
Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525
is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA
is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charterThe Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer
and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not
converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to
the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it
cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to
qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing
considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as

patrimonial property. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August
15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties.
Petitioners sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 without taking into consideration the
special patents issued by the DENR demonstrates the inherent weakness of his proposition. As
was ruled in PEA cited by petitioner himself, PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual
issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom islands as alienable or disposable lands of public domain.
In a similar vein, the combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official
declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. The
reclaimed lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, which evidence transfer
of ownership of reclaimed lands to the NHA, are official acts of the DENR Secretary in the
exercise of his power of supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands and
his exclusive jurisdiction over the management and disposition of all lands of public domain
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592 speaks of the transfer of
Lots 1 and 2, and RI-003901-000012-D with an area of 401,485 square meters based on the
survey and technical description approved by the Bureau of Lands. Lastly, Special Patent No.
3598 was issued in favor of the NHA transferring to said agency a tract of land described in Plan
RL-00-000013 with an area of 390,000 square meters based on the survey and technical
descriptions approved by the Bureau of Lands. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA
235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties.
Subsequently, the special patents in the name of the NHA were submitted to the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila for registration, and corresponding certificates of titles over the
reclaimed lots were issued based on said special patents. The issuance of certificates of titles in
NHAs name automatically converts the reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the NHA.
Otherwise, the lots would not be of use to the NHAs housing projects or as payment to the BOT
contractor as the enabling component of the BOT contract. The laws of the land have to be
applied and interpreted depending on the changing conditions and times. Tempora mutantur et
legis mutantur in illis (time changes and laws change with it). One such law that should be
treated differently is the BOT Law (RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of implementing
government contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or full payment to the contractor of a
government project to satisfy the huge financial requirements of the undertaking. The NHA holds
the lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely for the purpose of the SMDRP
undertaken by authority of the BOT Law and for disposition in accordance with said special law.
The lands become alienable and disposable lands of public domain upon issuance of the special
patents and become patrimonial properties of the Government from the time the titles are issued
to the NHA. As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic, 301 SCRA 450 (1999), laid down
the jurisprudence that: It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. The
ruling in PEA cannot even be applied retroactively to the lots covered by Special Patents Nos.
3592 (40 hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39-hectare reclaimed land). The reclamation of the
land under SMDRP was completed in August 1996 while the PEA decision was rendered on July 9,
2002. In the meantime, subdivided lots forming parts of the reclaimed land were already sold to
private corporations for value and separate titles issued to the buyers. The Project was
terminated through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 27, 2003. The PEA decision
became final through the November 11, 2003 Resolution. It is a settled precept that decisions of
the Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively as they may prejudice vested rights if

applied retroactively. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August
15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. Even if
it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for
public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the
reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when President
Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related
commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain
beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the
project. President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the
reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service,
thus: These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the administration and
disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified
beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide
employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for port related activities.
While numerical count of the persons to be benefited is not the determinant whether the
property is to be devoted to public use, the declaration in Proclamation No. 39 undeniably
identifies only particular individuals as beneficiaries to whom the reclaimed lands can be sold,
namelythe Smokey Mountain dwellers. The rest of the Filipinos are not qualified; hence, said
lands are no longer essential for the use of the public in general. [Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. MO 415
and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the
reclaimed areas for public use or service as the Project cannot be successfully implemented
without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service. Certainly, the devotion of the
reclaimed land to public use or service conflicts with the intended use of the Smokey Mountain
areas for housing and employment of the Smokey Mountain scavengers and for financing the
Project because the latter cannot be accomplished without abandoning the public use of the
subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations on SMDRP together with the issuance
of the special patents had effectively removed the reclaimed lands from public use. [Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties.
Reclaimed lands that are made the enabling components of a BOT infrastructure project are
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd
and illogical consequences would naturally result. Undoubtedly, the BOT contract will not be
accepted by the BOT contractor since there will be no consideration for its contractual
obligations. Since reclaimed land will be conveyed to the contractor pursuant to the BOT Law,
then there is an implied declaration that such land is no longer intended for public use or public
service and, hence, considered patrimonial property of the State. [Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties.
Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act (CA) 141 to support his view that the NHA is
not empowered by any law to sell reclaimed land, thus: Section 60. Any tract of land comprised
under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. The area of the
land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease if
requested and shall in no case exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however,
That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, transfers, made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said
entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted donated or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,

encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation, association or partnership disqualified
from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may lease
land included under this title suitable for industrial or residential purposes, but the lease granted
shall only be valid while such land is used for the purposes referred to. Reliance on said provision
is incorrect as the same applies only to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government. The NHA is not a government unit but a government corporation performing
governmental and proprietary functions. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235,
G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. PD 757
is clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer properties acquired by it under the law to
other parties, thus: Section 6. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall have the
following powers and functions to be exercised by the Boards in accordance with the established
national human settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements Commission: x x x x (k)
Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms and conditions as it may deem proper
and reasonable; (l) Acquire property rights and interests, and encumber or otherwise dispose the
same as it may deem appropriate. Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property rights
and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate. The
transfer of the reclaimed lands by the National Government to the NHA for housing, commercial,
and industrial purposes transformed them into patrimonial lands which are of course owned by
the State in its private or proprietary capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to
any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA
235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. Secs. 63
and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as they refer to government sale by the Director of
Lands of alienable and disposable lands of public domain. This is not present in the case at bar.
The lands reclaimed by and conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of public domain. These
lands became proprietary lands or patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles
over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of CA 141. The NHA can
therefore legally transfer patrimonial land to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer
without any bidding conducted by the Director of Lands because the NHA, unlike PEA, is a
government agency not tasked to sell lands of public domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial
lands and can dispose of such lands by sale without need of public bidding. [Chavez v. National
Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties.
Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable properties. The reclaimed lands in question
are very much needed by the NHA for the Smokey Mountain Project because without it, then the
projects will not be successfully implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are not unserviceable
properties and are very much needed by NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD 1445 does not apply. More
importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied to patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands
transferred to a government agency like the NHA which has entered into a BOT contract with a
private firm. The reason is obvious. If the patrimonial property will be subject to public bidding as
the only way of disposing of said property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is
almost impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering the uncertainty of a winning
bid during public auction. Moreover, the repayment scheme of a BOT contract may be in the form
of non-monetary payment like the grant of a portion or percentage of reclaimed land. Even if the
BOT partner participates in the public bidding, there is no assurance that he will win the bid and
therefore the payment in kind as agreed to by the parties cannot be performed or the winning
bid prize might be below the estimated valuation of the land. The only way to harmonize Sec. 79
of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA 6957 is to consider Sec. 79 of PD 1445 as inapplicable to BOT
contracts involving patrimonial lands. The law does not intend anything impossible (lex non
intendit aliquid impossibile). [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527,
August 15, 2007]

Reclamation Projects; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Patrimonial Properties. RA 6957

as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of
the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or
corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. It cannot be denied that RBI
is a private corporation, where Filipino citizens own at least 60% of the stocks. Thus, the transfer
to RBI is valid and constitutional. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R.
164527, August 15, 2007]
Taxation Law
Coconut Levy Funds. We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public
purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private
persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue
benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot
be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, the
petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of the shares
of stock of the Republic Planters Bank, alleging that they are the true beneficial owners thereof.
In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of the said bank, was funded by the deduction of
PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers pursuant to P.D. No. 388. In
ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would contravene the
general principle that revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies cannot be used for
purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Court amply reasoned
that the Stabilization Fund must be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry being of
vital importance to the countrys economy and to national interest. Similarly in this case, the
coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and
582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Clearly, to hold
therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be
used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and
for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
[Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. Plainly enough, the coconut levy funds are public funds. We have ruled in
Republic v. COCOFED, 372 SCRA 462 (2001), that the coconut levy funds are not only affected
with public interest; they are prima facie public funds.[124] In fact, this pronouncement that the
levies are government funds was admitted and recognized by respondents, COCOFED, et al., in
G.R. No. 147062-64. And more importantly, in the same decision, We clearly explained exactly
what kind of government fund the coconut levies are. We were categorical in saying that coconut
levies are treated as special funds by the very laws which created them. [Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January
24, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on
taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for
which it was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no
longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government, thus: Section
29(3). (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government. Correlatively, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 clearly states that: Section 2. Financial
Assistance. To enable the coconut farmers to comply with their contractual obligations under the
aforesaid Agreement, the [PCA] is hereby directed to draw and utilize the collections under the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund [CCSF] authorized to be levied by [P.D.] 232, as amended,
to pay for the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the said agreement. and the
Coconut Industry Development Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be

considered or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or fiduciary funds and do not
form part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of
Presidential Decree No. 711. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v.
Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 explicitly takes away the coconut levy
funds from the coffer of the public funds, or, to be precise, privatized revenues derived from the
coco levy. Particularly, the aforesaid Section 5 provides: Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development fund as well as all
disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not
be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as
part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711;
nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded investment, or government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898 the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as
herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned in their own private
capacity. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514,
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. It is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are special public
funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise
be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law
to such property[Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA
514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. Any property acquired by means of the coconut levy funds, such as the
subject UCPB shares, should be treated as public funds or public property, subject to the burdens
and restrictions attached by law to such property. COCOFED v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, delved
into such limitations, thusly: We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a
public purpose. "They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of
private persons." When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give
undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law
cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686 SCRA
472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Coconut Levy Funds. As the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be
used for public purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the
development, rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to
benefitwhether directly or indirectly private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as
the subject Agreement interestingly words it, compensation. Consequently, Cojuangco cannot
stand to benefit by receiving, in his private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB shares without violating
the constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used for public purpose. Accordingly, the
7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given to Cojuangco shall be returned to the Government, to
be used "only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry." [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Remedial Law
Civil Procedure
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Verification. The verification requirement is significant, as
it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. This requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance with the requirement does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal and not a jurisdictional
requirement. [Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 537 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Verification. In this case, the problem is not the absence
but the adequacy of the Unions verification, since only 159 out of the 227 petitioners executed
the verification. Undeniably, the petition meets the requirement on the verification with respect
to the 159 petitioners who executed the verification, attesting that they have sufficient
knowledge of the truth and correctness of the allegations of the petition. However, their
signatures cannot be considered as verification of the petition by the other 68 named petitioners
unless the latter gave written authorization to the 159 petitioners to sign the verification on their
behalf. Thus, in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, we ruled that the petition satisfies the
formal requirements only with regard to the petitioner who signed the petition but not his copetitioner who did not sign nor authorize the other petitioner to sign it on his behalf. The proper
ruling in this situation is to consider the petition as compliant with the formal requirements with
respect to the parties who signed it and, therefore, can be given due course only with regard to
them. The other petitioners who did not sign the verification and certificate against forum
shopping cannot be recognized as petitioners have no legal standing before the Court. The
petition should be dismissed outright with respect to the non-conforming petitioners. [Toyota
Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171,
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007]
Appeals; Payment of Docket Fees. In the recent case Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. HomenaValencia, 495 SCRA 252 (2007), we reiterated our consistent ruling that the payment of the
appellate docket fees is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal and held that the abovequoted Sec. 13 of Rule 41, as amended in 2000, gives the additional ground for the dismissal of
an appeal on the nonpayment of the required appellate docket fees, which gave force to the
ground provided under the above-quoted Secs. 4 and 9 of Rule 41. As with most rules of
procedure, however, exceptions are invariably recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules
on appeals has been effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice. This liberality stresses
the importance of an appeal in our judicial grievance structure to accord every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22,
2009]
Appeals; Circumstances which qualify the otherwise mandatory nature of the
requirement on payment of appellate docket fees. La Salette College v. Pilotin, 418 SCRA
380 (2003), teaches that the otherwise mandatory nature of the requirement on payment of
appellate docket fees is to be viewed as qualified, as follows: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection
in consideration of all attendant circumstances. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA
214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Appeals; Grounds Recognized as Justifying the Lossening Up to the Stringent
Requirement on Docket Fees. Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has
recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees
are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other
party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R.
Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]

Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. While it is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce, when said decisions and orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion, the Courts are duty-bound to entertain petitions
questioning the formers rulings or actions. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Certiorari; Final Order vs. Interlocutory Order. The concept of final judgment, as
distinguished from one which has become final is definite and settled. A final judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
in the right; x x x. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which, among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal)
and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use
the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. x x x x Conversely, an order that
does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the courts task of adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., x x x. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may be eventually taken from
the final judgment rendered in this case. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214,
G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Certiorari; Exceptions Proscribing appeal of an interlocutory order. While the general
rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to that
rule. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. This Court recognizes
that, under certain situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for
certiorari, is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other
interlocutory order) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; or to promote
public welfare and public policy; or when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making
it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof; or when the order was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. [Curata v.
Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Certiorari; Judicial Review. This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it
obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide
the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and
allow petitioner to institute the instant petition. Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there
is no serious disagreement as to the propriety of the availment of certiorari as a medium to
inquire on whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed the
constitution or was infected with grave abuse of discretion. For under the expanded concept of
judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, the corrective hand of certiorari may be invoked not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Contempt. The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. It is an effective
instrument of preserving and protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any act or
omission that degrades or demeans the integrity of the court must be sanctioned, lest it
prejudice the efficient administration of justice if left unpunished. Contempt of court applies to all
persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who
retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may
strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt
citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher
interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt
must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or
employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench. While there is still no definitive
ruling on this issue when the respondent charged with contempt has retired, we apply by
analogy the settled principle in administrative disciplinary cases that separation from service
does not render the case moot and academic. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA
214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Estoppel. The ensuing excerpts from Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit, 344 SCRA 838 (2000). are
instructive: We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision
prejudicial to her position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively
estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its
decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against
ones opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has induced
another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an
inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to the
latter. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R.
Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Estoppel. Respondents argue that the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or
errors of its agents, implying that when it issued the Certification, it committed a lapse of
judgment as it later discovered that the terms of the proposal allegedly turnedout to be
disadvantageous to the Government. Thus, according to them, it cannot be compelled to proceed
with the Competitive Challenge. We are very much aware of the time-honored rule that "the
government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents." Suffice it to state,
however, that this precept is not absolute. As jurisprudence teaches, this rule on estoppel cannot
be used to perpetrate an injustice. [SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, 733 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014]
Judicial Review; Hierarchy of Courts. While direct recourse to this Court is generally frowned
upon and discouraged, we have however ruled in Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993),
that such resort to us may be allowed in certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be filed
with us if the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Courts primary jurisdiction. The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and legality of
the SMDRP involving several hectares of government land and hundreds of millions of funds of
several government agencies. Moreover, serious constitutional challenges are made on the
different aspects of the Project which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos to the distribution of
natural resources in the country and the right to information of a citizenmatters which have been
considered to be of extraordinary significance and grave consequence to the public in general.
These concerns in the instant action compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure meant
to provide an orderly dispensation of justice and consider the instant petition as a justified
deviation from an established precept. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235,
G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]

Judgments; Stare Decisis. The Court finds that PEA is not a binding precedent to the instant
petition because the facts in said case are substantially different from the facts and
circumstances in the case at bar, thus: (1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken
through a JVA entered into between PEA and AMARI. The reclamation project in the instant NHA
case was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency in consultation with PEA and
with the approval of two Philippine Presidents; (2) In PEA, AMARI and PEA executed a JVA to
develop the Freedom Islands and reclaim submerged areas without public bidding on April 25,
1995. In the instant NHA case, the NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the
winning bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after compliance
with the requisite public bidding. (3) In PEA, there was no law or presidential proclamation
classifying the lands to be reclaimed as alienable and disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI
case, MO 415 of former President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos,
coupled with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable; (4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before the amended JVA was
executed by PEA and AMARI. In this NHA case, the JVA and subsequent amendments were
already substantially implemented. Subsequently, the Project was terminated through a MOA
signed on August 27, 2003. Almost one year later on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was
filed; (5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith as it signed the amended JVA after the
Chavez petition was filed with the Court and after Senate Committee Report No. 560 was issued
finding that the subject lands are inalienable lands of public domain. In the instant petition, RBI
and other respondents are considered to have signed the agreements in good faith as the Project
was terminated even before the Chavez petition was filed; (6) The PEA-AMARI JVA was executed
as a result of direct negotiation between the parties and not in accordance with the BOT Law. The
NHA-RBI JVA and subsequent amendments constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law;
and (7) In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were transferred to PEA, a
government entity tasked to dispose of public lands under Executive Order No. (EO) 525. In the
NHA case, the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a government entity NOT tasked to
dispose of public land and therefore said alienable lands were converted to patrimonial lands
upon their transfer to NHA. Thus the PEA Decision cannot be considered an authority or
precedent to the instant case. The principle of stare decisis has no application to the different
factual setting of the instant case. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, G.R.
164527, August 15, 2007]
Judgments; Eminent Domain; Discretionary executions pending appeal. The genuine
issue to be resolved is whether or not execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation
proceedings. The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under
Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. [Curata v. Philippine Ports
Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009]
Judgments; Rationale; Government funds and properties cannot be seized. In
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee explained the rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties
cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus: The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants
action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based
on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. PPAs monies, facilities and assets
are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final
judgment or pending appeal. [Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214, G.R. Nos.
154211-12, June 22, 2009]

Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and E.O. No. 14, Series
of 1986, vests the Sandiganbayan with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil and criminal
cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Correlatively, the
PCGG Rules and Regulations defines the term Ill-Gotten Wealth as any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of [E.O.] Nos. 1 and 2, acquired
by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) .; (3) By
the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5)
Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and (6) By taking undue advantage of
official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit. [Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
January 24, 2012]
Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan; Nominee; Words and Phrases. As may be noted, E.O. 1 and 2
advert to President Marcos, or his associates nominees. In its most common signification, the
term nominee refers to one who is designated to act for another usually in a limited way; a
person in whose name a stock or bond certificate is registered but who is not the actual owner
thereof is considered a nominee. Corpus Juris Secundum describes a nominee as one: designated
to act for another as his representative in a rather limited sense. It has no connotation, however,
other than that of acting for another, in representation of another or as the grantee of another. In
its commonly accepted meaning the term connoted the delegation of authority to the nominee in
a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to
the nominee of any property in, or ownership of, the rights of the person nominating him.
[Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter. The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
subdivided amended complaints has peremptorily been put to rest by the Court in its January 24,
2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 (2012). There, the Court, citing Regalado
and settled jurisprudence, stressed the following interlocking precepts: Subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In
turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor will be
entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted. [Cojuanco, Jr. v. Republic, 686 SCRA
472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012]
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts; Pleadings and Practice; Actions; Injunction.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and is conferred
only by the Constitution or by statute. It is settled that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or the petition irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims or reliefs asserted. A perusal of FDCs complaint in Civil Case No. 08-120338
easily reveals that it is an action for injunction based on an alleged violation of contractthe MOA
between the partieswhich granted FDC the right to operate a casino inside the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ). As such, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over FDCs complaint anchored
on Sec. 19, Chapter II of BP 129, which grants the RTCs original exclusive jurisdiction over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Evidently, a
complaint for injunction or breach of contract is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, the
RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of

their respective regions under Sec. 21 of BP 129. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Fontana Development Corporation, 622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts; Appeals. In view of the vestment to PAGCOR by PD 1869
of the powers, authority, and responsibilities of the SEC, PAGCOR concludes that any decision or
ruling it renders has to be brought to this Court via a petition for review based on Sec. 6 of SECs
Charter, PD 902-A, which reads: The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of
the Commission sitting en banc to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. This reasoning is flawed. A scrutiny of PD 1869
demonstrates that it has no procedure for the appeal or review of PAGCORs decisions or orders.
Neither does it make any express reference to an exclusive remedy that can be brought before
this Court. Even a review of PD 1869s predecessor laws PD 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399, and
1632, as well as its amendatory law, RA 9487do not confer original jurisdiction to this Court to
review PAGCORs actions and decisions. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Fontana Development Corporation, 622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts. In PAGCOR v. Viola, we ruled that PAGCOR, in the exercise
of its licensing and regulatory powers, has no quasi-judicial functions, as Secs. 8 and 9 of PD
1869 do not grant quasi-judicial powers to PAGCOR. As such, direct resort to this Court is not
allowed. While we allowed said recourse in Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 (2000), and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 419 SCRA 317 (2004), that is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of
courts on the grounds of expediency and the importance of the issues involved. More
importantly, we categorically ruled in PAGCOR v. Viola that cases involving revocation of a
license falls within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, thus: Having settled that PAGCORs
revocation of MONDRAGONs authority to operate a casino was not an exercise of quasi-judicial
powers then it follows that the case was properly filed before the Regional Trial Court. Hence, as
the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, petitioners contention
that the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction by the trial court are void
must fail. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana Development Corporation,
622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts; Hierarchy of Courts. It is settled that the normal rule is
to strictly follow the hierarchy of courts, thus: The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue
said writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policya policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket. [Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana Development Corporation,
622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010]
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; Remand of cases. While it is the trial court that has original jurisdiction over
FDCs complaint, PAGCOR nevertheless prays that this Court suspend the Rules and directly
decide the entire controversy in this proceeding instead of remanding the same to the trial court.
In the exercise of its broad discretionary power, we will resolve FDCs complaint on the merits,
instead of remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings. Moreover, the dispute between
the parties involves a purely question of law whether the license or MOA was issued pursuant to
PD 1869 or Sec. 5, EO 80, in relation to RA 7227, which does not necessitate a full blown trial.
Demands of substantial justice and equity require the relaxation of procedural rules. In Lianga
Bay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held: Remand of case to the lower court for further reception
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by

the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. [Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Fontana Development Corporation, 622 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 187972
June 29, 2010]
Jurisdiction; Mandamus. The submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases: Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to
perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs
as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall
require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the
judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government
agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment. Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports
submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in
partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. With the final
and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that
until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises
continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. [Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643 SCRA 90, G.R. Nos. 171947-48
February 15, 2011]
Law of the case. Yu v. Yu, 484 SCRA 485 (2006) as effectively reiterated in Vios v. Pantangco,
578 SCRA 129 (2009), defines and explains the ramifications of the law of the case principle as
follows: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a
term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes
the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Otherwise put, the principle means that
questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be
controlling in succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the
facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. Guided by this definition, the law of the case principle cannot provide petitioners any
comfort. We shall explain why. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v.
Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Summary Judgments. Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of
damages, there is, as shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine
issue, as distinguished from one that is fictitious, contrived and set up in bad faith, means an
issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence. Summary or accelerated judgment,
therefore, is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation. [Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663
SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012]
Parties; Locus Standi. To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of a government action, or have a material
interest in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not
otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to
sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is
after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases

involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. [Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579, G.R. 192791, April 24, 2012]
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Taxpayers Suit. Only a person who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint or
petition. Respondents claim that petitioner is not a proper party-in-interest as he was unable to
show that he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct and
personal injury as a result of the execution and enforcement of the assailed contracts or
agreements. Moreover, they assert that not all government contracts can justify a taxpayers suit
especially when no public funds were utilized in contravention of the Constitution or a law. We
explicated in Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), that in cases where issues of
transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is
assumed. We find our ruling in Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), as conclusive authority on
locus standi in the case at bar since the issues raised in this petition are averred to be in breach
of the fair diffusion of the countrys natural resources and the constitutional right of a citizen to
information which have been declared to be matters of transcendental public importance.
Moreover, the pleadings especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds have
been indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey Mountain Project Participation
Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies. Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is
a proper party to the instant petition before the court. [Chavez v. National Housing Authority,
530 SCRA 235, G.R. 164527, August 15, 2007]
Procedural Rules and Technicalities. Without belaboring in their smallest details the
arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the
Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.
In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would
result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be
prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a
case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. Time
and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. [League of Cities of the Philippines
v. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009]
Criminal Procedure
Appeals. This Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the
absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that
the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in
convicting the accused-appellant. [People v. Gallo, 622 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29,
2010]
Chain of Custody Rule. To summarize, we ruled in People v. Camad, 610 SCRA 295 (2010), that
there are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, viz: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. [People v. Le, 622 SCRA 571,
G.R. No. 188976, June 29, 2010]

Chain of Custody Rule. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The requirements under RA 9165 and its
IRR are not inflexible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The prosecution in this case was able to preserve the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the shabu seized from accused-appellants. The records show that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of RA 9165. We thus hold that the chain of custody
requirements were met in the instant case. [People v. Le, 622 SCRA 571, G.R. No. 188976, June
29, 2010]
Evidence
Alibi. Consistently, this Court has declared that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the defense
must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime
at the time of the commission thereof. The facts in this case illustrate that there was no physical
impossibility for the accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime, considering that Manila is
just a short ride away from Gumaca, Quezon. [People v. Bautista, 622 SCRA 524, G.R. No.
188601, June 29, 2010]
Alibi. What is more, alibi is considered as one of the weakest defenses not only due to its
inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because it is easy to fabricate. Nothing is more
settled in criminal law jurisprudence than the doctrine that alibi cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the complainant. [People v.
Bautista, 622 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010]
Denial. Accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the positive
identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor, 423 SCRA 260 (2004), positive
identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial. [People v. Gallo, 622
SCRA 439, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010]
Flight. It should be noted that accused-appellant fled to Bicol when he learned that Yap-Obeles
was arrested by the authorities. In People v. Deduyo, 414 SCRA 146 (2003), this Court said that
flight by the accused clearly evinces consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability.
Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion. [People v.
Bautista, 622 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010]
Murder; Dying Declaration. A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is
entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no one person who knows of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts of
concocting lies disappear. [People v. Sanchez, 622 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010]
Order of Presenting Evidence. Section 5, Rule 30 the Rules of Court clearly sets out the order
of presenting evidence: SEC. 5. Order of trial.Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31,
and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues
stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows: (a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence
in support of his complaint; (b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his
defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint; (g) Upon admission of the
evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to
argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings. If several defendants or
third-party defendants, and so forth. having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the
court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence. [Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED) v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January
24, 2012]

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or
her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. As explained by this Court in People v. Berroya, 283
SCRA 111 (1997), The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "in a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior
inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and therefore as speaking semijudicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of
position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt." Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. However,
contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events
surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing
the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR. [Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA
742, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013]
Rape. Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy involving only two persons and not generally
attempted save in secluded places far from prying eyes. By the intrinsic nature of rape cases, the
crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended girl herself and conviction
invariably turns upon her credibility, as the Peoples single witness of the actual occurrence.
Accordingly, certain guiding principles have been formulated in resolving rape cases. Foremost of
these: an offended womans testimony hurdling the exacting test of credibility would suffice to
convict. In fine, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in
prosecution for rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of the victim-witness, the highest
degree of respect must be afforded to the evaluation and findings of the trial court. [People v.
Llanas, Jr., 622 SCRA 602, G.R. No. 190616, June 29, 2010]
Rape. To start with, full penile penetration, which would ordinarily result in hymenal rupture or
laceration of the vagina of a girl of tender years, is not a consummating ingredient in the crime
of rape. The mere knocking at the door of the pudenda by the accuseds penis suffices to
constitute the crime of rape. And given AAAs unwavering testimony as to her harrowing ordeal in
the hands of appellant, the Court cannot accord merit to the latters argument that the lack of
patent physical manifestation of rape weakens the case against him. The medical report on AAA
is only corroborative of the finding of rape. The absence of fresh external signs or physical
injuries on the complainants body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal
laceration and like vaginal injuries not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. What is
more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the
findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is, to repeat,
sufficient to convict. [People v. Llanas, Jr., 622 SCRA 602, G.R. No. 190616, June 29, 2010]
Rape. Evidence. As the Court has often repeated, the issue of credibility is a matter best
addressed by the trial court which had the chance to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying. For this reason, the Court accords great weight and even finality to factual
findings of the trial court, especially its assessments of the witnesses and their credibility,
barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance.
Testimonies of rape-victims normally carry and are given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed
if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity. [People v. Llanas, Jr., 622 SCRA 602, G.R. No. 190616, June 29, 2010]

Witnesses. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses

and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grilling examination. The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the
yawn, the sign, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien. This rule admits of exceptions, however, such as when the trial courts
findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain
facts of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by
the lower court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. None of
these exceptions exists in this case. [People v. Bautista, 622 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June
29, 2010]
Witnesses; Testimonial Evidence; Affidavits. Therefor, such testimonies prevail over the
affidavits previously executed by the witnesses. It is settled that whenever there is inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the
former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. [People v. Bautista, 622
SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010]
Witnesses; Testimonial Evidence; Trivial inconsistencies. Additionally, accused-appellant
cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies, even if they do exist
because such minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the
credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was not contrived or rehearsed. Trivial
inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but
enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming. [People v. Bautista, 622
SCRA 524, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010]