United States vs Ah Chong

CRIME Homicide
ACCUSED Ah Chong
VICTIM Pascual
LOCATION Rizal Province
OUTCOME Acquitted
Facts:
One night, Ah Chong, a house boy at Fort McKinley, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up
in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer. Since,
the room was very dark, and Ah Chong, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee
by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. Seizing
a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
He died from the effects of the wound the following day. Ah Chong
alleged that there had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long
prior to the date of the incident, and, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
Also, being roommates, they had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity.
During trial, he insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent
to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
The trial court found him guilty of simple homicide.
Issue: Whether or not one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to
be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act.
Ruling:

Petition GRANTED. Defendant must be acquitted of the crime with

which he is charged. Since evil intent is in general an inseparable
element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always
there is no fault or negligence on his part. A careful examination of the
facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that Ah Chong struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from
whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all
the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.

DUNGO v. Pp
FACTS: Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as
testified by his roommate Joey Atienza.
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, [UPLB
student Gay Czarina] Sunga was staying at their tambayan, talking to
her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way from
her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while
she did not know the third man. The three men were wearing black
shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the
entomology wing arrived and approached the three men. Among the
men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the
men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity
neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He
later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as
appellant Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already
reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to him when he
was just at the, tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the victim
on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with
his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards
the Entomology wing.
The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at
7:00 in the evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the
shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic].Marlon told Joey that it was his
"finals" night.
On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
[nearby sari-sari store owner] Susan Ignacio saw more than twenty (20)
persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney. She
estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years
old. Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the
resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the
resort who looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. She did
not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she was
shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as
Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later
identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba
City, testified that around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14,
2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches
Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone inside
the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two
(2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he
touched the body of the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The
said man looked very weak like a vegetable.
Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at
the J.P. Rizal Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At
around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, he was
with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper
Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency
room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an
arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the
passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and
Glinda helped the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and
brought it to the emergency room.
Afterwards, Espina asked the two men for identification cards. The
latter replied that they did not bring with them any I.D. or
wallet. Instead of giving their true names, the appellants listed down
their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and
Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not
telling them that they secretly called the police to report the incident
which was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was
brought to the hospital.

Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Marlon was motionless, had no
heartbeat and already cyanotic.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20
minutes. However, the latter did not respond to resuscitation and was
pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on
the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large
contusion on both legs which extended from the upper portion of his
thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of the knee.
Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr.
Masilungan opined that he was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is
familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing when he was a
student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing
incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified
that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim on January 14
2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma. From
1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the
two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2)
persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of
their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower
extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these
two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo
attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to
those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and
contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazingrelated.
The RTC convicted Dungo and Sibal for violation of Section 4 of the
Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer Reclusion Perpetua.
Said Section 4 reads as follows:

Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation

rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers
and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The person or persons who participated in the hazing shall
suffer:
1.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death,
rape, sodomy or mutilation results there from.
xxx
The CA affirmed the RTCs judgment in toto. Sibal and Dungo, in their
appeal to the high court, argued that the prosecution failed to prove that
they actually participated in the hazing of Villanueva.
The two said the prosecution only proved during the trial that their
participation was only persuading Villanueva to join APO and go
through the initiation rites.
ISSUE: WON there was a sufficient evidence to convict the accused.
HELD: YES. The SC noted the complete wording of the information
which reads as follows:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at
Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers
andmembers of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose
identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON
VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.
The SC held that the information stated a planned initiation rite and a
planned event can be understood to have different phases [T]he
hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had different

roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One
of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce
Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva
to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They
fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the
death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished
were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be
present.
The SC said that [s]ecrecy and silence are common characterizations of
the dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate every step
of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the
criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil,
would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law does not
require the impossible.
In upholding that the information was sufficient to convict the accused
for violation of Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, the SC held that it
sufficiently stated every element of the crime of hazing, the offenders,
and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity
Aside from the doctors who testified on the injuries sustained and the
cause of death of the victim, the prosecution presented the security
guards on duty when Villanueva was brought to the hospital, the sarisari store owner in front of the resort where the initiation rite was held,
the tricycle driver who brought the three to the hospital, the policeman
who took Dungo and Sibal from the hospital for questioning, a UPLB
student who said she saw the victim being punched by Dungo in campus
and the caretaker of the resort.
The high court said while no witness or other evidence was presented to
prove the suspects direct participation, the sequence of circumstantial
evidence or the series of facts presented by the prosecution showed the
guilt of the accused.
In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are
usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all

circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous

crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible to
prove, the high court said.
The unbroken chain of events laid down leaves us no other conclusion
other than the petitioners participation in the hazingWith the fact of
hazing, the identity of the petitioners and their participation therein duly
proves, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind has been satisfied, the high court said.
The SC laid down the requisites and rules for sustaining a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence: (1) there [is] more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused Jurisprudence requires
that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.

Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)

Facts:
On Nov. 13,1995, Dante Andres and Randyven Pacheco invited Wilson
Quinto and Edison Garcia to go fishing with them inside a drainage
culvert. However, only Quinto joined the two, Garcia remain in a grassy
area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. After a
while, Pacheco came out, went back again, and emerged again carrying
Wilson who was already dead. He laid the boys lifeless body down in
the grassy area and went to the house of Wilsons mother and informed
her that her son had died. After more than three months, the cadaver of
Wilson was exhumed and the NBI performed an autopsy thereon. An
information was later filed with the RTC changing Andres and Pacheco
with homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the accused has criminal liability for the death of
the victim?
Decision:
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It failed to prove the guilt of the accused is criminality
liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts
that the proximate cause of the death of the victim was not cause by any
wrongful act of the accused. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove
the corps delicti which consists of criminal act and the defendants
agency in the commission of the act. This, the prosecution failed to do.

People of the Philippines vs. Orlito Villacorta

Facts:
Cristina Mendeja, witness of the prosecution recounted the incident as
follows;
On January 23, 2002, while Mendeja was tending to her sari-sari store,
Danilo Cruz was ordering bread at her store when Villacorta suddenly

appeared and stabbed Cruz on the latters left side using a sharpened
bamboo stick. The bamboo stick was left inside Cruzs body. Villacorta
fled while Mendeja chased Villacorta but failed to capture him. Cruz
was then brought to Tondo Medical Center where he was treated as an
out-patient.
On February 14, 2002, Cruz was then brought to San Lazaro Hospital.
He died the next day. The Head of the Tetanus Department in the said
hospital certified that Cruz died of Tetanus, Stage III. Villacorta on his
part, denied stabbing Cruz. He said that after arriving from work, he
went outside to buy cigarettes when suddenly Cruz suddenly put his
arms around Villacortas shoulder prompting Villacorta to box Cruz.
However, after such altercation, Villacorta readily went home. He did
not know of Cruzs death up until his arrest.
The RTC found Villacorta guilty of murder. The CA affirmed the
judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the tetanus infection was the proximate cause of Cruzs
death
Ruling:
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Tetanus infection was the
proximate cause of Cruzs death not the stabbing incident. Villacorta
only guilty of slight physical injuries.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that
in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be
held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz.
The proximate cause of Cruz's death is the tetanus infection, and not the
stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."
(The decision in Urbano vs People was copied due to the similarity of
circumstances )
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set
aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval
of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was
rushed to
San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If
Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.
Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz's stab wound was merely the
remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been
the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of
Cruz's stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is
guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised
Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the
charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the
latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential
ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of murder.

Jacinto vs. People

CRIME Impossible crime
VICTIM Mega Foam Int'l., Inc.
Metro Manila

ACCUSED Gemma T. Jacinto

LOCATION Kalookan City,

OUTCOME Convicted

Facts:
Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10, 000.00, as payment
for Baby the formers purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
Jacinto was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of Jacinto and the former
pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Meanwhile,
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone
call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle, to inform Capitle that the subject BDO
check deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca called
accused
Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter
to inform Jacqueline about the bounced check. Valencia instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash and it
will divided equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto
and Capitle. Ricablanca, reported the matter to the owner of Mega
Foam. Thereafter, the owner was able to confirm that the Baby indeed
handed Jacinto a BDO check and further testified that the latter also
called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.
Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said
that she had already paid Mega Foam cash in as replacement for the
dishonored check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco, the owner, filed a Complaint with the NBI and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of
P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to
Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with
Valencia's plan. Jacinto, her husband,

Ricablanca and Valencia boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby

Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered
the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from
Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the
premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the
jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, and was charged
with Qualified theft. Jacinto was convicted.

Issue:
Whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced considering
the fact
the check was worthless

Ruling: No. Jacinto is guilty of an impossible crime.

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the
act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing
the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the

offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means

employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person
already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime
of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil
intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was
only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a
fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored,
and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.

Intod vs People
CRIME Attempted Murder

ACCUSED Sulpicio Intod

VICTIM Bernardina Palangpangan

LOCATION Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
OUTCOME Modified; Convicted of an Impossible Crime

Facts:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, the four had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would
also be killed. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room
when the accused fired the shots.
No one was hit by the gun fire. After trial, the RTC and as affirmed by
the CA, convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this
Court a modification of the judgment by arguing that Palangpangan's
absence from her room on the nighthe and his companions riddled it
with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand,
Respondent argued that the crime was not impossible as there was intent
and pointed out that the crime of murder was not consummated, not
because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3. Ibid.)
Issue: Whether or not accused shall only be held liable for an impossible
crime.
Decision:

Petition GRANTED. Petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime as

defined and penalized in Articles 4(2) and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Hence, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
Under Art. 4(2), the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. There are two kinds
of impossibilities: 1) legal impossibility and factual impossibility. Legal
impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2)
there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance
of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime (e.g. impossibility of killing a
person already dead). On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime (e.g. the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty). The case at bar
belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the Philippines, not unlike in other jurisdictions, impossible crime is
expressly provided and punishable in the RPC. It is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) makes no distinction between
factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. To uphold
the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all

circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be

treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element
of attempted and frustrated felonies.

Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom
window, the one without iron grills that leads to Room 306 of the
Building.

Renato Baleros, Jr., vs. People of the Philippines,

Thereafter, an investigation was conducted by the CIS, the CIS asked

Christian and his roommates, Bernard, Lutgardo and Rommel to look
for anything not belonging to them in their unit. When Rommel went
inside their room, he found a grey bag. Christian knew right away that it
belonged to Chito. The bag contained white t-shirt with fraternity
symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief, 3 white T-shirts,
underwear and socks which was corroborated by S/G Ferolin who saw
Chito wearing such fraternity t-shirt when he arrived at the CMB. After
examination of the handkerchief found in Chitos bag and Malous night
dress, it was found out that both contained chloroform, a volatile poison.
Thus, Chito was charged of an attempted rape.

Crime Attemted Rape

Accused Renato Baleros Jr (a.ka. Chito)

Victim Martina Lourdes T. Albano (aka Malou)

Location Sampaloc, Manila
Outcome Not Guilty of Attempted rape but liable for Light Coercion
(Unjust Vexation)

Facts:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of UST, together
with her maid Marvilou, was the tenant of Unit 307 of Celestial Marie
Building (CMB), along AH Lacson St., Sampaloc, Manila. That early
morning of December 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by the smell of
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could
not move because somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding
her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, Malou
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right
hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was
able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed. The man let
her go and Malou went straight to the bedroom door and roused
Marvilou. Over the intercom, Malou told S/G Ferolin that: "may
pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako. Thereafter she went to Room
310 to seek help where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard
Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel
Montes were staying. It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsyturvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the window
with grills that she had originally left opened, another window inside her
bedroom was now open.

In his defense Chito averred that on December 12, 1991, he attended the
Christmas party of his fraternity at the house of one of its members.
Thereafter, Chito, riding on his friends, car proceeded to CMB where
he slept at Josephs unit, Room 306. That at around 6 am in the morning
of December 13, he only came to know through Joseph that something
had happened in the building. He also denied that when he left his grey
bag at room 310, he was not aware that his bag contained ever contained
any black Adidas shorts in it.
The trial court found him guilty of attempted rape which was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the accused, Chito, is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

Ruling: The accused is not guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

According to the Solicitor General, the act of Chito of pressing on
Malous face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her
body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the
performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the

victim. He added that if Chitos intention was otherwise, he would not

have lain on top of the victim.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a
man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any
of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2)
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under
Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape
is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking
thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang, stated that "the
attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning
of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes
to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of
a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act
of rape. Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity
or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than
a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be

too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked
cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt
act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative
of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason
petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the
petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next
step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered
unconscious. In other words, the appellate court (CA) indulges in plain
speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal
cases.
For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof
required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
Perez vs. Court of Appeals, the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the
crime of attempted rape, pointing out that: In the crime of rape,
penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the
act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is
innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The
information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he
forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against
her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after
petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not
determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust

vexation punishable as light coercion under Article 287 of the Revised

Penal Code.