People v. Perfecto, G.R. No.

L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following
the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein respondent
Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto
was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and
can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the
SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However,
the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its
representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over
the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC
had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be
political in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the
Court emphasized that it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory,

the

previous

political

relations

of

the

ceded

region

are

totally

abrogated.Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be
applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for
lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in
an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant
Bernardita
R.
Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot
according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs
Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of
Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion
was
the
president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No.
4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging
that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article
1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec.
3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the
Canons
of
JudicialEthics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing
the
complaints
against
Judge
Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971
that
Judge
Asuncion
be
exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law
in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil
Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during
his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a
judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act

unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and

business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6,
1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period.
Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge
Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010
but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes
after
the
finality
of
the
decision
in
Civil
Case
No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from
the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce,
consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot
apply
to
the
respondent
Judge
Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because
the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no
relation
or
connection
with
his
judicial
office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their
interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

Javellana vs. Executive

Secretary
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended
byResolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to thePhilippine
Constitution. Said Resolution was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for theelection
of delegates of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional Convention beganto
perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire

Philippines under Martial Law.On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30,
1972, the President of the Philippines issuedPresidential Decree No. 73, which is
an order for setting and appropriating of funds for aplebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the proposed Constitution as drafted by the 1971Constitutional Convention.On
December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, theTreasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said respondents or their agentsfrom
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President does not
havethe legislative authority to call a plebiscite and the appropriation of public funds for
the purposeare lodged exclusively by the Constitution in Congress and there is no
proper submission to thepeople of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient
time to inform the people of thecontents thereof.On December 23, 1972, the President
announced the postponement of the plebiscite for theratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for thetime being, from deciding
the aforementioned case.In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R.
No. L-35948 filed an "urgentmotion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible,
preferably not later thanJanuary 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, the Court
issued a resolution requiring therespondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent
motion" not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being heard,
the Secretary of Justice called onand said that, upon instructions of the President, he
is delivering a copy of Proclamation No.1102, which had just been signed by the
President earlier that morning.Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies
referendum was conducted, and thatthe result shows that more than 95% of
the members of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and
majority also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite andthat the vote of the
Citizens Assemblies should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The thenPresident of
the Philippines, Marcos, hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposedby the
1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes
cast by the members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the Philippines, and
hasthereby come into effect.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive Secretary and
theSecretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents
"and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution notfound in the present Constitution" referring to that of
1935.Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate
implementation of the NewConstitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and
that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "thatthe President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is withoutauthority to create the Citizens
Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve theproposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification

by theFilipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify
the proposedConstitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable
or political question.2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been
ratified to said Art. XV of the1935 Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by
a majority of thepeople in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the
Philippines.4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.5.
Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when
thecrucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the
court(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to
dismiss thepetition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
voted to grant therelief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro,Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that
the issue of thevalidity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political
question. JusticesMakalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating
that "inasmuch asit is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may
inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval,
and, in the affirmative, the Courtshould keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court maydetermine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitutionbeen complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Courthold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that theConstitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified inaccordance
with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way
for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in onlyby qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the
1973 Constitution hasbeen validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in
the light of traditional conceptsregarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the
referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies,specially in the manner the votes therein
were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of therequirements thereof. In view,
however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognizeas a judge that factually
there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for consideringas approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followedin past
ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodoxlegal sense,
the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that indoing
so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in

itspolitical aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been
substantially
compliedwith,
and,
in
effect, the
1973 Constitution
has
been constitutionally ratified."Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three
(3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect
substantial compliance with the constitutional requirementsfor valid ratification.
Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned
proposedConstitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.Four (4) of its
members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that"the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."Two (2) members of the Court,
namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be nofree expression, and there
has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of
their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under MartialLaw.Justice
Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
Americandecisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitutiononce accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by
the Court, I am notat this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application
in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind
of the people in theabsence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to
rule onthe question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee
in their statementthat "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of
opinions through the usualmedia vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to
the point of judicial certainty,whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
Fourth Issue
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal,Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice
Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the
saidConstitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases toresolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the
competence of thisCourt, are relevant and unavoidable."Four (4) members of the
Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to
deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
Fifth Issue
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra holdthat it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;Four (4)
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankeecast
no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they
couldnot state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted
theConstitution; andTwo (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself
voted that the Constitutionproposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in
force; with the result that there are notenough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not
in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro,Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief
Justiceand Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
all the aforementioned cases are herebydismissed.
This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
newConstitution being considered in force and effect.

It is so ordered.
Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
GREGORIO
[G.R.

PERFECTO
No.
L-2348.

vs.

BIBIANO
February

L.
27,

MEER
1950.]

Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two
paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income
Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include
salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the
prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved
(in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal
principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes.
Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties.
Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial
salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary
and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be
resisted
as
an
infringement
of
the
fundamental
charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive
and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable
character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore
waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the
public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
ENDENCIA VS DAVID
Posted by kaye lee on 10:03 PM
93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]

FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and
Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the
constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries
and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation
from the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes
judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9
the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance
their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer
the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is
contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

in
of
of
of
in

NITAFAN VS CIR
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM
G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax Exemption]

FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with
stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986
Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices
and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting
service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September
1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but
which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to
the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar
to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then

become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In
the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters
involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a qualified
foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist
from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching
bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary
agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.