Eminent Domain

1.Noble vs City of Manila

Facts: Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of Manila, the former
constructed on a piece of land of the latter a school building, containing twenty compartments.
Clauses of the contract provide that Mr. Syquia shall lease the building to the City for a period of
not more than three years, at a monthly rental of P600. Meaning, the City shall buy the building
from Mr. Syquia within three years from the occupancy thereof for P46,600.After sometime, with
the conformity of the city, all the rights of Syquia flowing from their contract were fully
transferred to Noble.
The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent corresponding to the month of February,
1934, and following, whereupon Vicente Noble, filed the complaint which gave rise to this case,
wherein he asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of P46,600, with
legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, and to pay the rentals at the rate of P600 a
month, corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the purchase of the
building is effected and the price thereof paid. In this answer, the defendant City of Manila,
prayed by way of cross-complaint that the lease of the building by the city be rescinded and set
aside and that the same be expropriated.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila can exercise its power of expropriation after rescinding
its contract to the plaintiff.
Held: No. The City of Manila has no right to expropriate the building and that it should comply
with the terms of the contract, and to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, plus the
rentals thereof, corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the final and
absolute conveyance of the building is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid.
This being the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid
and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as
sought by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the
opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being
in the present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the owner of the building and the
city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation.
Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation
upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to
human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community.

2.Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs J. King and Sons Company, Inc.

Facts: Petitioner, as a government-owned and controlled corporation, wanted to acquire a five
square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of respondents property.
Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc. for the

voluntary sale of the latters property but did not acquiesce to petitioners proposal. After the
negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated expropriation proceedings
through a Board Resolution which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the five square meter portion of
respondents property. Moreover, the same filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession which was granted by the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the
motion was denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari. It sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was not able to
gain entry to the lot.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to exercise the power of expropriation.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that aside from the legislature, the power to expropriate,
as in fact it often does, delegated to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public
entities. Petitioner is one of the numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter,
Presidential Decree 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of eminent
domain. Moreover, for petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements
should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the
expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to
review by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In this case, petitioner's board of
directors approved a Board Resolution authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and
other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a
complaint for the expropriation of respondent's lot.

3.Yusay vs Court of Appeals

Facts:The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meterssituated
between Nueve de Febrero Street andFernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,Mandaluyong
City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest theyrented out to nine other
families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and onlysource of income.
SangguniangPanglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted ResolutionNo. 552, Series of 1997, to
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to takethe necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for thepurpose of developing it for low cost housing
for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants.
Issue:Whether or not the SangguniangPanlungsod abused its discretion in adoptingResolution
No. 552.
Held:No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is alaw
that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from aresolution,
which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to sayin the light of
attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from aresolution. An ordinance is a
law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of thesentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a specific matter. An ordinance possessesa general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature. Additionally,the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but notfor a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution,
therefore, theSangguniangPanglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for
itsexpression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.

4.City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming
that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such
for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should
not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of
land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
Held: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
that the courts have the right to inquire into.

5.National Housing Authority (NHA) vs. The Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication
Board (DARAB)
G.R. No. 175200; 4 May 2010
Facts:
In 1960, the estate of the late C.N. Hodges (Estate) asked Mateo Villaruz (Villaruz) to work as
tenant of the Estates 7 hectare rice field in Bacolod, to prevent squatters from occupying the
land. In 1976, squatters settled in 4 hectares of the land. In 1985, the NHA bought the land when
the bank foreclosed the Estates mortgage over the same. Villaruz asked the PARAD to
recognize him as tenant-beneficiary under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and to retain his
possession of the 3-hectare portion of the land. According to Villaruz, since the NHA stepped
into the shoes of the Estate, the NHA assumed responsibility for maintaining his tenancy over the

land by way of subrogation .The NHA, however, contended that it was not subject to subrogation
since the land was
Acquired for its housing and resettlement projects and was, thus, exempt from the operation of
agrarian laws. The NHA appealed the PARAD decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the PARAD decision. The NHA appealed to the
Court of Appeals. While holding that the exemption under P.D. 1472 also applied to properties
the NHA acquired after the decree took effect, the Court of Appeals nonetheless upheld the
PARAD and DARAB decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the land, which had been acquired by the NHA, was exempt from the coverage of
agrarian reform.
Held:
P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that the NHA acquired for its housing and
resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or afterwards.
The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers lands or property acquired x x x
or to be acquired by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land the
NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be
made. In addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that the NHA shall not be liable for
disturbance compensation.

6.PLDT vs NTC (to be followed by Faith)

PLDT was required to interconnect with a private communications
company. It should be observed that the property subject to
expropriation must by its nature or condition wholesom e, as it intended
to be devoted to public use.

7.Ayala de Roxas vs City of Manila

Facts: Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to
construct a terrace over the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main
wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto,
which strip of land belongs exclusively to her; but the defendant refused to
grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because, as the
plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is
because the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant

and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in
width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the
same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the
said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in
general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said
strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have
enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years. Additionally, it
was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not been
expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither
had the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.
Issue: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to
a taking that requires just compensation
Held: Yes.
What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from
continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as
they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct
a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of
establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their own which
they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil
Code in force.
Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the
object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is
one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, can not be
accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be
previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means
of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when
no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing
short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive
power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is not the
actual establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in
court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of

the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with

building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law,
real rights which are attached to the right of ownership.
The imposition of an easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiffs property
could not legally be done without payment to it of just compensation.

8.PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

Facts:
Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the
municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or
repair of any building without a written permit from the mayor prior to
construction or repairing.
Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated
from public plaza by a creek. However, the was request denied because it would
destroy the view of the public plaza.

Applicants appealed but were turned

down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because
they claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying
their previous place of residence. Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by
peace court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7. The CFI Affirmed and the
CA

forwarded

the

case

to

the

SC

because

the

appeal

attacks

the

constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
Ruling: NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality
could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
Ratio:

The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or

control the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY
LACKING IN THIS CASE.

Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny

construction/repair permits

Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare

Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not under the
guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.

IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the
fact that they are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance
appellants constrained would be constrained to leave their land to idle without
receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private land

Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative

Code Sec. 2243 C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise
discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits in populous centers
empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to
charge fees for such permits

IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal
council promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can
be safely constructed in the public plaza.

9.NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs PADERANGA

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to
implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.
The RTC issued an order granting NPCs motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to
determine just compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at
P516.66 per square meter. However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for
failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way
easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. NPC asserted that
Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject only to its easement. It added
that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines. The RTC rendered its decision

ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied
due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment
was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al.
which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation
HELD: In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports
placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of
Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P50
0 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the
valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the
ambit of the term expropriation.
From the Commissioners report it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of
mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from the
actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity
normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and
perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.
The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function,
the Court finds the commissioners recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was
approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and
her siblings.
10. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated Vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council GR
No. 171101
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking
HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there
are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus,
the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact
principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with
the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting,

their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may
be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
Issues:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Luisita cover the
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs
SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to
HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage
through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now
be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified
FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

Ruling:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al,
with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET
ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.
(1) YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
The court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid
or unconstitutional laws, but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or
recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts
and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favourable to the FWBs
because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received
under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been
rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling
in favour of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that were
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the
issue of constitutionality.
(3) NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this
should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these
may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB
the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the
area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs
decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita per qualified FWB, and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each
qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion o f Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have
been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be xcluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land
used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

(4) YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989.

Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory

acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice
of coverage (after PARCs revocation of the SDP), that is, January 2,2006, is
determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority
noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DARs land valuation is only preliminary and
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file
an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
(5) No, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has
NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to
sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance
of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their
interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendere
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not
entitled to land distribution under CARP.

11. Amigable Vs. Cuenca 43 SCRA 360

Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favour of the government of any right or
interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot.
It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court
a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.
According to the Defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the
Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any
amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and
that plaintiff had no cause of action against defendants.
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In
the case at bar, since no annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of the
certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot
to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used
for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation-price or
value of the lot at the time of the taking.

12. City Government of Quezon City Vs. Ericta 122 SCRA 759
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the appropriation of 6% of memorial parks
for charity burial of the paupers. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc (HPI), did not appropriate the 6%
requirement. Seven years after, the Quezon City council issued a resolution to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the required 6% space.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
(Thus, even if it is an eminent domain, it would not have been the proper measure to promote
general welfare in this case) Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of general health, morals, safety of
the people and more so, the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.

13. Denieter Land Co. Vs. Florida Public Service Co. 128 So. 402 (to be
follow by Gladys)
14. Association of Small Landowners Vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform 175 SCRA 343

Facts:
In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657,
P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power of the
State.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police power or
of the power of eminent domain.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid
exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of
the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform
Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method em

15. LBP vs DAR Metraco Tele-Hygienic Services Corporation (METRACO)

Facts:
Private respondent Metraco Tele-Hygienic Services Corporation (METRACO) is the registered
owner of three parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 33.5917 hectares located at
San Antonio, Ramon, Isabela. The lands are fully irrigated by the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) and planted with rice.
In July and December 2000, METRACO voluntarily offered to sell the aforesaid lands
under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988. Private respondents assessment was P300,000.00 per hectare. On
February 8, 2001, the landowners offer was referred to petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) for valuation.On June 6, 2001, petitioner fixed the just compensation for the subject
landholdings.
Since private respondent rejected the valuation made by petitioner, the latter deposited the
amount of compensation, which the former accepted without prejudice to reevaluation and
eventual payment of just compensation due for its property. Private respondent then went to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)-Region 02 at San Fermin,
Cauayan City, Isabela which held summary proceedings for determination of just compensation .

On December 3, 2001, DAR Provincial Adjudicator Pepito P. Planta issued the following Order
.The DAR found untenable petitioners position that the basis of valuation should be the
guidelines issued under DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 5, series of 1998 and findings of
the ocular inspection.

16. Republic of the Philippines Vs BPI

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: Republic

Of The Phils. V. BPI (1964)
Lessons Applicable: Forgery (Negotiable Instruments Law)

FACTS:
July to December 1952: Corporacion de los Padres Dominicos acquired the 24
treasury warrants by accommodating Jacinto Carranza who asked the Corporacion
to cash the warrants provided: deposited first with BPI Bank, and that actual
payment of the value of the warrants would be made only after the same had been
duly accepted and cleared by the Treasurer

BPI accepted them w/ "subject to collection only" each bore the indorsement of
the payees and that of the Corporation BPI Bank credited the proceeds December
23, 1952: 3 warrants returned - forged December 27, 1952: 2 warrants returned forged January 16, 1953: 19 warrants returned - forged January 15, 1958: Treasurer
notified the Equitable Bank of the 4 forged warrants deposited to it by and
demanded reimbursement Republic of the Philippines seeks to recover from the
Equitable Banking Corporation P17,100, representing 4 treasury warrants and BPI
Bank P342,767.63 24 paid to them by the Treasurer of the Philippines genuine
forms but signature of the drawing office and that of the representative of the
Auditor General in that office are forged CFI: dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N Republic has the right to recover from the banks

HELD: YES. Affirmed

All items cleared at 11:00 o'clock a.m. shall be returned not later than
2:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day and all items cleared at 3:00 o'clock p.m.
shall be returned not later than 8:30 a.m. of the following business day, except
for items cleared on Saturday which may be returned not later than 3:30 a.m.
of the following day irregularity of warrants was apparent the face from the
viewpoint of the Treasury each over P5,000 - beyond the authority of the
auditor of the Treasury it also did not advise the loss of genuine forms of its
warrants did not inform the irregularity until after December 23, 1952 - not
giving notice of forgery until December 5
Where a loss, which must be borne by one of two parties alike innocent of
forgery, can be traced to the neglect or fault of either, it is reasonable that it would
be borne by him, even if innocent of any intentional fraud, through whose means it
has succeeded

17. Commissioner of Public Highways vs.

Burgos
Commissioner of Public Highways, petitioner, vs. Hon. Francisco P. Burgos, in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch II, and Victor Amigable, respondents.
Facts:
On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way
purpose.
On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and
possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the
government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways and Republic of the Philippines).
Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by
its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of
said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of
the government was invoked.
In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was
P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price
was P6.775.
The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the
Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's
fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the
amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken.

Held:
Not applicable.

18. City Of Ilo-Ilo Vs. Contreras-Besana

FACTS: In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent
(Javellana), the plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by
Javellana for the purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. A writ of
possession was issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the
value of the said lots (Php 40,000). Such was issued by the trial court in an order dated
May 17, 1983. On April 2000, private respondent found out that the amount of Php
40,000 was not deposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount
(as proved by a certification issued by the PNB). When no amicable resolution and a
negotiated sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was
not compensated for the expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff
was illegal. This argument was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana can no
longer file an action for the recovery of the possession of the lots since the same was
already utilized for public use, therefore can only demand for the payment of just
compensation. The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order,
ordering the petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after
determining the value of the property at the time the complaint was filed. This was
amended six months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning point from the time of
the filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for its
issuance. This was denied by the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was made, the
reckoning point for the determination of the fair market value of the property should be

the date of the issuance of the order. On April 15, 2004, the commission created for this
case submitted a report determining estimates of the fair market value of the properties
in question in different reckoning points, as shown in the table below. Reckoning Point
Value per square meter Fair Market Value Basis 1981 - at the time the complaint was
filed P110.00/sqm P79,860.00 based on three or more recorded sales of similar types of
land in the vicinity in the same year 1981 at the time the complaint was filed
P686.81/sqm P498,625.22 Appraisal by Southern Negros Development Bank based on
market value, zonal value, appraised value of other banks, recent selling price of
neighboring lots 2002 P3,500.00/sqm P2,541,000.00 Appraisal by the City Appraisal
Committee, Office of the City Assessor 2004 P4,200.00/sqm PhP3,049,200.00 Private
Appraisal Report (Atty. Roberto Cal Catolico dated April 6, 2004)
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was already final and
executory, and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the
fair market value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of
the complaint. Private respondent argued that there was no error committed by the trial
court, and that the said orders were subject to amendment and nullification at the
courts discretion.
ISSUES: (1) W/N an expropriation order becomes final (W/N the trial court erred in
overturning the 1983 Order). (2) W/N the reckoning point of the determination of just
compensation is the time of the taking or the time of the filing of the complaint.
HELD: (1) YES. The Court, in its ruling, defined the two stages in an expropriation
proceeding. The first stage ends in an order of dismissal or a determination that the
property in question is to be acquired for public use. These orders are deemed final but
appealable by the aggrieved party. The second phase is the determination of just
compensation, which ends in an order fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner.
This order is also a final one, but appealable. In the case at bar, private respondent did
not file an appeal assailing the 1983 order. Therefore, the said order had become final,
and the petitioners right to expropriate is no longer subject to review. The trial
court therefore erred in issuing the orders which nullified the 1983 Order. (2) NO. As
established in a long line of cases, the Court constantly affirmed that: x x x just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the

action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint. It is also provided in Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Procedure that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. In the case at bar, no exception was found based on the
pertinent facts. The Court also held that since the expropriation proceedings are final,
and no appeal was made, the said legality of the petitioners possession of the lots
in question can no longer be subject to review, hence, private respondent cannot reclaim the said lots. However, he is still subject to just compensation. Additionally, since
he was not paid for just compensation by the petitioner, he is also entitled to exemplary
damages.

19. Sy vs. Local government of Quezon City (for digest)

20.NPC v. Heirs of Sangkay
Facts: In 1997, respondent claimed they had belatedly disovered the construction of tunnels
and sued NPC for recovery of damages and the claim for a just compensation, alleging that the
tunnels deprived them of the use and value of their land, also creating it unsafe for habitation.
RTC denied the request for removal or dismantling of the tunnel but instead ordered NPC to
pay respondents Php 113, 532,500. NPC appealed to CA and the latter renrered decision
affirming RTC decision.
Issue: WON the act constructing tunnels constituted taking of property as against a mere
easement entitling the landowners to just compensation.
HELD: YES, they are entitled to just compensation. It is settled that the taking of private
property for public use to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation.
Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession or
occupancy may still amount to a 'taking'. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownershipmor of the common and necessary use
and enjoyment of he property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither
necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether
theproperty is removed from the possession of the owner or in any respect changes hands.

21.REPUBLIC VS. LIM

Facts: In 1976, Lim acquired a lot title originally owned by Valdehueza and Panerio. Said lot was
already in possession of the Republic thru the institution of a special action for expropriation.

The ariginal owners were not able to claim for a just compensation amounting to 4,062.10 from
the Republic.
In 1992, Lim failed a complaint for guieting of title against the petitioners herein. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of Lim declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right of possession.
The CA sustained the decision
ISSUE: WON the expropriation made against the property of the respondent was valid and that
the owner of said property is the Republic
HELD: No, the expropriation was not valid because there was no payment of just compensation.
Hence, that the Republic does not own the property.
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. When the State weilds its power of eminent
domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner for a just
compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must he redressed. In the present
case, 57 years have elapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation
proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the Philippines has not compensated the
owner. To tolerate such is to encourage distrust and resentment among our people.

22.Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Jr.

Facts: There are two lots owned by petitioners that were taken by the government used for
widening of a road sometime in 1947, without the benefit of an action of eminent domain or
agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. Said owners made no move
whatever until 26 yrs later, claiming for a just compensation in pursuant to PD 76 on Jan. 22,
1973
Issue: WON just compensation should be fixed as of the time of the actual taking of possession
by the expropriating entity or only after conveyance of tittle to the expropriator pursuant to
expropriation proceedings duly instituted.
Held: In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a 'taking' when
the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed with his property. There is a 'taking' in this sense
when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a mere
permanent duration.
Thus, the value of the petitioner's property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it
was actually taken and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit.

23. Landbank vs. Montalvan (to be follow by Ms. Sabio)

Land Bank vs Montalvan

Fact: Respondents spouses Montalvan are the registered owners of parcel of land covered by
TCT's, T- 285 and T-294 with an area of approximately 162.9662 hec. DAR Region Office
selected only 72 hec as suitable for Agricultural and subject to the payment of just
compensation,without interest in acquiring under the CARP the 75.6913 hec.
The DAR caused the transfer of the entire title to the name of the Republic, without distinction
between the expropriated and the excluded portions.
Issue: WON petitioner LBP can be directed to pay just compensation for 75.6913 hectares
excluded portion, which is now titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, even if
these lands are not suitable for Agricultural purpose?
HELD: Clearly, it was a mistake on the part of the Republic to transfer the title of respondents
over the entire 147.6913 hectares of land. Hence, the DAR unjustly enriched itself when it
appropriated the entire real property of respondents, because the entire lot was decidedly
beyond the area it had intended to subject to Agrarian Reform.
The consequence of the finding of unjust and improper titling of the entire property of the
Republic is that the title over the excluded portion shall be returned or transferred back to
respondents Montalvan, with damages.

24.Export processing zone authority v. Dulay

Facts: Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation, the owner of registered
parcels of land in which the Mactan Export Zone Authority in Cebu was to be constructed,
claimed that the lands were expropriated without the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation.
SAn Antonio contended that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property, or by the assessor,
whichever is lower.
Issue: WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or Executive Order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings.