PROPERTY Digestcompilation PDF

Title 1- Classification of Property
-------------------------(1)----------------------------Ladera v. Hodges
G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No.
12, Official Gazette 5374
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with
C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an
area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to
certain terms and conditions. The agreement called
for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly
installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per
month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. In case of failure of
the purchaser to make any monthly payment within
60 days after it fell due, the contract may be
considered as rescinded or annulled.
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she
defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly
installment. Hodges filed an action for the
ejectment of Ladera.
The court issued an alias writ of execution and
pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all
rights, interests, and participation over the house of
Ladera. At the auction sale, Laderas house was
sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on,
purchased the house from Magno.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the
judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered
in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for noncompliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding
judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges
contends that the house, being built on a lot
owned by another, should be regarded as
movable or personal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an
immovable property.
HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the
things declared by it as immovable property the
following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions
of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not
make any distinction whether or not the owner of
the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles
of accession regard buildings and constructions as
mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is
logical that said accessories should partake the
nature of the principal thing.
1|Property_digestscompilation
Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and

Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197
Labrador, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a
public utility solely engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its
authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao,
collecting rates approved by the Public Service
Commission. Respondent sought to assess the
following real properties of the petitioner; (a) Hobart
Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine;
(c) Lathe machine with motor; (d) Black and
Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f)
Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) and (g)
D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that
these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden
platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the
land where it maintains and operates a garage for
its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and
carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which
are placed therein. Respondent City Assessor of
Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400
petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner
appealed the assessment to the respondent Board
of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are
not realty. Respondents contend that said
equipments, though movable, are immobilized by
destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of
Article 415 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are
immovable or movable properties.
HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So
that movable equipments to be immobilized in
contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential
and principal elements" of an industry or works
without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial
purpose for which it was established." Thus, the
Court distinguished those movable which become
immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry from
those which may not be so considered immobilized
because they are merely incidental, not essential
and principal.
The tools and equipments in question in this instant
case are, by their nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner's business of
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as
movables and used only for expediency to

facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without
such tools and equipments, its business may be
carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without
such
equipments,
before
the
war.
The
transportation business could be carried on without
the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is
repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to
another.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 29
De Castro, J.
v.
FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from

the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the
Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several
receivables with them under a receivable
purchase agreement. To secure the collection of
receivables assigned, Wearever Textile executed a
chattel mortgage over certain raw materials
inventory, as well as machinery described as an
aero dryer stentering range. Upon default of
Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for
extrajudicial
foreclosure
of
the
properties
mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter
Wearever Textiles premises to seize the machinery,
Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever
Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of
replevin or a chattel mortgage because it is a real
property as it is attached to the ground by means
of bolts and that the only way to remove it is to
destroy the concrete floor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or
personal property.
HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The
Supreme Court explained that if a house of strong
materials may be considered as personal property
for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage,
there is absolutely no reason why a machinery,
which is movable in its nature and becomes
immobilized only by destination or purpose, may
not be likewise treated as such.
Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,

Inc.
G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401
Concepcion, J.
FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista
instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the
same date, he obtained a writ of attachment,
which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a
land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due
course, judgment was rendered in favor of
Evangelista, who bought the house at public
auction held in compliance with the writ of
execution issued in said case. When Evangelista
sought to take possession of the house, Rivera
refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he
had leased the property from the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the
true owner of said property. It appears that on May
10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house
had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest
bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista
instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo
Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over
said house, and securing possession thereof, apart
from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI
Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista,
sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the
house in question to Evangelista and to pay him,
jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October,
1952, until said delivery, plus costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the
lessee of the land on which it is built, should be
dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as
immovable property or as personal property.
HELD: The house is not personal property, much less
a debt, credit or other personal property not
capable of manual delivery, but immovable
property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges (48
OG 5374), "a true building (not merely
superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real
property, whether it is erected by the owner of the
land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that
the house of Rivera should have been attached in
accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7,
as "personal property capable of manual delivery,
by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it
declared that "Evangelista could not have validly
purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as
the latter was not in possession thereof at the time
he sold it at a public auction is untenable.
Tsai v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever
Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million
peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for
the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a
deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot
where its factory stands, and the chattels located
therein. On April 23, 1979, PBCom granted a second
loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel
mortgage over personal properties enumerated in
a list attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, the date
of the execution of the second mortgage
mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various
machines and equipments.
Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to
PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On
December 15, 1982, the first public auction was
held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the
highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued
in its favor on the same date. On March 7, 1984,
PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and
all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased
the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai.
On May 3, 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock,
stock, and barrel to Tsai, including the contested
machineries.
On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for
annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages
with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom.
EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been
transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent
EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such
assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the
questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is
proper.
HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned
properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the
contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed
by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the
case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the
owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties
in question are immovable by nature, nothing
detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to
secure an obligation under the principle of

estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may
be considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel
mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
Sergs Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc.
G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.
filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin. A writ of replevin was issued, directing the
sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after five days and upon
payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff
proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized one
machinery. Petitioner filed a motion for special
protective order invoking the power of the court to
control the conduct of its officers and amend and
control its processes, praying for a directive for the
sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that
the properties were personal and therefore still
subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply,
petitioners asserted that the properties were
immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil
Code, the parties' agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. Petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the subject machines
were personal property as provided by the
agreement of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were
personal, not real, property, which may be a proper
subject of a writ of replevin.
HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate
that a real property be considered as personal.
After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a
contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material fact found therein. In the
present case, the lease agreement clearly provides
that the machines in question are to be considered
as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners
were estopped from denying the characterization
of the subject machines as personal property.
Under the circumstances, they are proper subject
of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition was

denied and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP
G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800
Escolin, J.
FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants
where issued and the premises at 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers were searched. Office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants.
HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code,
"machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
present case, petitioners do not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. The machineries, while in
fact bolted to the ground, remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.
G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98
Felix, J.
FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the
name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached
Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment
in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza

Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest.
Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for
the construction of the theatre. Lopez further
agreed that that the payment therefore would be
on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex
delivered the lumber which was used for the
construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the
total cost of materials amounting to P62, 255.85,
Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a
balance of P 41, 771.35.
Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of
assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza
Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance,
Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre.
He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held
liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case
defendants failed to pay, the land and building
should be sold in public auction with the proceeds
to be applied to the balance, or that the shares of
stock be sold in public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the
materials used in the construction of the building
attaches to said structure alone and does not
extend to the land on which the building is adhered
to.
HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed
thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the
enumeration of what may constitute real properties
could only mean one thingthat a building is by
itself an immovable property. In view of the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a
building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which
it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien
so created attaches merely to the immovable
property for the construction or repair of which the
obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor
of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber
used in the construction of the building attaches
only to said structure and to no other property of
the obligors.
Yap v. Taada
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464
Narvasa, J.
FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed
a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking
recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of

the price and installation cost of a water pump in
the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex
parte and judgment by default was rendered by
Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the
unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him
and interest of 12% per annum.
Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied
by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4,
1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in
view of the pendency of Yap's motion for
reconsideration, suspension of the sale was
directed. It appears however that a copy of the
order suspending the sale was not transmitted to
the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went
ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold
the property levied on to Goulds as the highest
bidder.
Yap argues that "the sale was made without the
notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New
Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of
execution sale of real property, the pump and its
accessories being immovable because attached
to the ground with character of permanency (Art.
415, Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is
an immovable property.
HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil
Code considers as immovable property, among
others, anything "attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material
or deterioration of the object." The pump does not
fit this description. It could be, and was in fact
separated from Yap's premises without being
broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the
separation or removal of the pump involved
nothing more complicated than the loosening of
bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals
G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 70
Concepcion, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering
Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the
recovery of the machinery and equipment sold
and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co. An order was
issued to seize and take immediate possession of
the properties specified in the order. Upon carrying

out the courts order, Roco, the companys
President, along with a crew of technical men and
labourers, proceeded to the factory. The manager
of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres protested against
the seizure of the properties on the ground that
they are not personal properties. However, since
the sheriff contended that his duty is purely
ministerial, they all went to the factory and
dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the
equipment could not be dismantled without
causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames
attached to them. Consequently, they had to cut
some of the supports of the equipment which
rendered its use impracticable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and
equipment in question could be the subject of
replevin.
HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal
property. The machinery and equipment in
question appeared to be attached to the land,
particularly to the concrete foundation of said
premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the
former could not be separated from the latter
without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object. Hence, in order to remove the said
outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the
same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports.
Moreover, said machinery and equipment were
intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry carried on said immovable. For these
reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code.
FELS Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas
G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a
lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel
engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in
Calaca, Batangas. The contract staes that NPC
shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes
other levies imposed government to which POLAR
may be or become subject to in respect of the
Power Barges. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc.
assigned its rights under the agreement to FELS
Energy Inc.
On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of
real property taxes on the power barges from
Provincial Assessor of Batangas City. The assessed
tax amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS

referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its
obligation under the agreement to pay all real
estate taxes. NPC sought reconsideration of the
Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property
taxes on the power barges, alleging that barges
are non-taxable items. In its answer, the Provincial
Assessor averred that the barges were real property
for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether power barges, which are floating
and movable, are personal properties and
therefore, not subject to real property tax.
HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and
are thus subject to real property tax. Tax
assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct
and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having
the burden of proving otherwise. Besides, factual
findings of administrative bodies, which have
acquired expertise in their field, are generally
binding and conclusive upon the Court.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------Laurel v. Garcia
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement
between the Philippines and Japan, four properties
located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One
of these properties is the Roppongi property. The
said property was formerly the location of the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until it was
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The
Roppongi property has remained abandoned from
the time of the transfer due to lack of funds to
develop
the
said
property.
Consequently,
Administrative orders were issued by the President
authorizing the study of the condition of the
properties of the Philippines in Japan. Subsequently,
Executive Order 296 was issued by President Aquino
allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the
properties of the Philippines located in Japan,
including Roppongi.
Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi
property cannot be alienated as it is classified as
public dominion and not of private ownership
because it is a property intended for public service
under paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, respondents aver that it has
already become part of the patrimonial property of
the State which can be alienated because it has
not been used for public service for over 13 years.
They further contend that EO 296 converted the
subject property to patrimonial property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still
forms part of the public dominion hence cannot be
disposed nor alienated.
HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly
show that the property has already become
patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not
been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Under Art. 422 of the Civil
Code, there must be a definite and a formal
declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being public. Abandonment must
be a certain and a positive act based on correct
legal premises. The mere transfer of the embassy to
Nampeidai is not a relinquishment of the propertys
original purpose.
The Administrative orders authorizing the study of

the conditions of government properties in Japan
were merely directives for investigation but did not
in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the
properties. Likewise, EO 296 did not declare that the
properties lost their public character; it merely
made them available to foreigners in case of sale,
lease or other disposition. Thus, since there is no law
authorizing its conveyance, the Roppongi property
still remains part of the inalienable properties of the
State.
Rabuco v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658
Teehankee, J.
FACTS: The issue in this case involves the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby
the Congress converted the lots in question
together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that
are reserved as communal property into disposable
or alienable lands of the State. Such lands are to be
placed under the administration and disposal of the
Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small
lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale
on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide
occupants thereof and expressly prohibited
ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes
under Section 2 of the Act. Respondent contends
that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it
constitutes deprivation of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is
constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned
by the city in its public and governmental capacity
and are therefore public property over which
Congress had absolute control as distinguished
from patrimonial property owned by it in its private
or proprietary capacity of which it could not be
deprived without due process and without just
compensation. It is established doctrine that the
act of classifying State property calls for the
exercise of wide discretionary legislative power,
which will not be interfered with by the courts. The
Acts in question were intended to implement the
social justice policy of the Constitution and the
government program of land for the landless and
that they were not intended to expropriate the
property involved but merely to confirm its
character as communal land of the State and to
make it available for disposition by the National
Government. The subdivision of the land and

conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the
occupants by Congressional authorization does not
operate as an exercise of the power of eminent
domain without just compensation in violation of
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the
Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its
right and power to deal with state property.
Macasiano v. Diokno
G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an
ordinance that authorized the closure of J. Gabriel,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque
Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. Thereafter, the municipal council
of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing
Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a
contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment,
operation,
maintenance
and
management of flea markets and/or vending
areas. By virtue of this, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,
entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in
the aforementioned streets with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Paranaque. Consequently, market
stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets.
Petitioner Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the
Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered the
destruction and confiscation of the stalls along the
abovementioned streets. Hence, respondents filed
with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and
mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed
his opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the
validity of the ordinance in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution
which authorizes the lease and use of public streets
or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
HELD: No. The aforementioned streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides
that properties of public dominion devoted for
public use and made available to the public in
general are outside the commerce of man and

cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Properties of
the local government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs have no
authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use
of public properties unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land
located in Calauag, Quezon, which was approved,
provided that the land shall not be encumbered or
alienated within a period of five years from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the
land was established to be a portion of Calauag
Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high
tides and three feet deep on low tides. The water
level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides
from the bay and the storms that frequently passed
through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by
the Director of Lands from his investigation, that the
land of Morato was leased to Advincula for P100
per month and it was also mortgaged to Co for
P10,000. The Director of Lands filed a suit with the
contention that Morato violated the 5-year
prohibitory period and thus the patent should be
cancelled and the land should revert back to the
State.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the
prohibition of the patent, and thus, the subject land
should revert back to the ownership of the State.
HELD: Yes. The lease was an encumbrance
included in the prohibitions of the patent because it
impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. As for
the mortgage, it is a legal limit on the title and if
there will be foreclosure because Morato was not
able to pay her debts, the property will be
auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to
enjoy and possess the land for herself.
Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the
use or transfer of property, or a claim or lien on the
property where there is a burden on the title. Thus,
Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on
these points. Moreover, the property became a
foreshore land because it turned into a portion of
land which was covered most of the time with
water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is
defined as land between high and low waters

which is dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the
tides. In accordance with this land reclassification,
the land can no longer be subject to a pending
patent application and must be returned to the
State.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga
G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334
Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS: On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was
approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga
del Sur. Republic Act 3039 was approved providing
that all buildings, properties and assets belonging
to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City
of Zamboanga.
Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendantsappellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
It was prayed that Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of
property
without
due
process
and
just
compensation. Included in the properties were the
capital site and capitol building, certain school
sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school
playground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties mentioned are
properties for public use or patrimonial.
HELD: The subject properties are properties for
public use. The validity of the law ultimately
depends on the nature of the lots and buildings in
question. The principle itself is simple: If the property
is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress
has absolute control over it. But if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it
is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just
compensation.
Applying the norm obtaining under the principles
constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all
those of the 50 properties in question which are

devoted to public service are deemed public; the
rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be
held and, devoted for governmental purposes like
local administration, public education, public
health, etc.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots
above-mentioned, the records do not disclose
whether they were constructed at the expense of
the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering
however the fact that said buildings must have
been
erected
even
before
1936
when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the
further fact that provinces then had no power to
authorize construction of buildings such as those in
the case at bar at their own expense, it can be
assumed that said buildings were erected by the
National Government, using national funds. Hence,
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in
the same manner that it did with the lots in
question.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Carpio, J.
FACTS: In 1973, the Government through the
Commissioner of Public Highways and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.
PD 1084 was issued, creating Public Estates
Authority (PEA), and PD 1085, transferring the
reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to PEA.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation
to develop the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was
approved by President Ramos. However, PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding. A Legal Task Force was
created to look into the issue. The said task force
upheld the legality of the JVA.
In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its
negotiations with AMARI, invoking the constitutional
right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. He assails the sale to AMARI of
lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of
the constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and

AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was
approved by President Estrada. The Amended JVA
seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands.
ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire
the lands held by PEA.
HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private
corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire
alienable land of the public domain. Reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, which are
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands
to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Thus, the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA was null and void.
Villarico v. Sarmiento
G.R. No. 136438, [November 11, 2004], 484 PHIL 724729) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
Facts:
Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is
separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue
highway by a
strip of land belonging to thegovernment.
Vivencio
Sarmiento had
a
building
constructed
on
a
portion
of
the
saidgovernment land and a part thereof
was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of
Real Property,
Villaricoacquired a portion of the same area
owned by thegovernment
He then filed an accion publiciana alleging
that
respondents(Vivencio)
on
the
government land closed his right of way
tothe
Ninoy
Aquino
Avenue
and
encroached on a portion of hislot.
Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to
the NAA.
Ratio: No. It is not disputed in this case that the
alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state
or property of public dominion.
It is intended for public use meaning that it is

not confined toprivileged individuals but is
open to the indefinite public.Records show
that the lot on which the stairways were built
isfor the use of the people as passageway
hence, it is a property for public dominion.
Public dominion property is outside the
commerce of man and hence, it cannot be:
o Alienated or leased or otherwise be
the subject matterof contracts
o Acquired by prescription against the
state
o Cannot
be
the
subject
of
attachment and execution
o Be burdened by any voluntary
easement
o It cannot be burdened by a
voluntary easement of right of way in
favorof the petitioner and petitioner
cannot appropriate it for himself
andhe cannot claim any right of
possession over it
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved
granting authority to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their
own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling,
or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain
and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was
passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered
into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended,
among others, that the agreement between RREC
and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man, it being
a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in
question is within the commerce of man because
RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term
10 | P r o p e r t y _ d i g e s t s c o m p i l a t i o n
foreshore land than that in the definition provided

by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and
RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA
with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term foreshore land
includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not foreshore land and the
reclaimed area is within the commerce of
man.
HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and
unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term
"foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake
or stream); the part of a seashore between the lowwater line usually at the seaward margin of a lowtide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at
high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling
Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from
the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay
City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance
No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and
scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null
and void.
Chavez v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
President
Corazon
Aquino
issued
Memorandum Order No. 161 approving and
directing
the
implementation
of
the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. Respondent
National Housing Authority was ordered to
conduct feasibility studies and develop lowcost
housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb

scavengers in NHA resettlement/lowcost housing
projects, particularly in the Smokey Mountain. It
produced the Smokey Mountain Development
Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or
the
Smoke
Mountain
Development
and
Reclamation Project. The Project aimed to covert
Smokey mountain dumpsite into a habitable
housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the
area. President Aquino approved the said Project
through MO 415. After President Aquinos term,
President Fidel Ramos, through Proclamation No. 39,
authorized the NHA to enter into a Joint Venture
Agreement with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for the
implementation of the project. Afterwards,
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465
increasing the proposed area for reclamation
across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. The
petitioner Francisco Chavez contended that the
respondent NHA or respondent RBI has no authority
to reclaim foreshore and submerged land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NHA has the
authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land.
HELD: Yes. The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a
government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter it is an end-user agency
authorized by law to administer and dispose of
reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed
lands based on the special patents are transferred
to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the
Register of Deeds, they are automatically
converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.
The
combined
and
collective
effect
of
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents
Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be
considered to be an official declaration that the
reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. Even if it is conceded that there
was no explicit declaration that the lands are no
longer needed for public use or public service,
there was however an implicit executive
declaration that the reclaimed areas are not
necessary anymore for public use or public service
when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed
the same to the National Housing Authority (NHA)
partly
for
housing
project
and
related
commercial/industrial development intended for
disposition
to
and
enjoyment
of
certain
beneficiaries and not the public in general and
partly as enabling component to finance the

project.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate
Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax
delinquency was estimated at P624 million. Thus,
the City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer,
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay
the real estate tax delinquency. City of Paraaque
contends that Section 193 of the Local Government
Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of government-owned and-controlled
corporations upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. However, MIAA avers that
airport lands and buildings are owned by the State,
and thus, exempt from tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not airport lands and buildings of
MIAA are exempt from real estate tax.
HELD: Yes. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently
its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Unless
the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus,
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of
eminent domain, police authority and the levying
of fees and charges. The airport lands and buildings
of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Hence, the subject properties are not
subject to tax.
Title 2- Ownership
-------------------------(1)----------------------------Javier v. Veridiano II
G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a
complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging
that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of
said land. The case for forcibly entry was however
dismissed as it was found by the court that the
occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same
was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually
granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an
OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the
property he was occupying, including a portion of
200 square meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the
surrender of the same area from Rosete who
repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier
instituted a complaint for quieting of title and
recovery of possession with damages against Babol
and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the
argument of Rosete and granted his motion to
dismiss. Javier contends that res judicata cannot
apply in the instant case since there is no identity of
parties and causes of action between her
complaint for forcible entry, which had long
become final and executory, and her subsequent
petition for quieting of title. Javier maintains that
there is no identity of causes of action since the first
case was for forcible entry, which is merely
concerned with the possession of the property,
whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of
title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed
land.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different
causes of action between the forcible entry case
and the later quieting of title case.
HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order;
(2) The court rendering the judgment must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
There is between the first and second actions
identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and
(4c) of causes of action.
Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties
between the two actions is without merit. We have
repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what
is required is not absolute but only substantial

identity of parties. But, there is merit in Javier's
argument that there is no identity of causes of
action.
"The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the
physical or material possession of real property, that
is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
irrespective of the actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand,
violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case
for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not on the ownership. It
does not in any way bind the title or affects the
ownership of the land or building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality
an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and
should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926,
which is an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal,
which is the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) where the defendant's possession of
the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary
action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the
defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to
possess, both of which must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court;
accion publiciana which is a plenary action for
recovery of the right to possess and which should
be brought in the proper regional trial court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion
is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. It is different from accion interdictal or
accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of
title.
In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better
right or prior possession over the disputed area
without asserting title thereto. It should be
distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she

expressly alleged ownership.
Bustos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 155
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2,
1957. He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela,
Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.
On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an
extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino
Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share
to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed
of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was
no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later,
the cadastre was conducted and the property
involved in the partition case was specified as Lots
280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of
Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284
of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was
subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was
in physical possession of the land. She refused to
surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G.
Mendoza, despite several demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of
First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition
claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela
which was sold to him. During the pendency of the
case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On
December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of
Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray
and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court,
Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a
decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza.In the
meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses
Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of
Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol,
Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer against
spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza,
who were in actual possession as lessees of the
husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the
subject land. The municipal circuit trial court
decided the case in favor of spouses Viray.
Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of
execution and demolition, but stayed when
spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court,
Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On December

18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the case. On September 9, 1994,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration;
however, on June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected
from what is now their own land.
HELD: In this case, the issue of possession is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court as to
possession on the ground that the decision has
become final and executory. This means that the
petitioners may be evicted. In the accion
reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ownership of petitioners over the subject land.
Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful
owners of the land. In the present case, the stay of
execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners
are now legal owners of the land in question and
are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment
by ejecting petitioners from the land that they
owned would certainly result in grave injustice.
Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot
when the court adjudicated ownership to the
spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical consequence
of the decision declaring them as the rightful
owners is possession. It follows that as owners of the
subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. "An owner who cannot
exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of
ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to
abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or
alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is
a crippled owner.
Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 87
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: The land in dispute in this case is originally
owned by Adriano Soriano who died sometime in
1947. Adriano Soriano has 7 heirs whom leased the
subject parcel of land to David de Vera and
Consuelo Villasista for a term of 15 years starting
July 1, 1967. The lease contract states that Roman
Soriano will serve as the caretaker of the said
property during the period of lease. During the
effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano
Soriano entered into extrajudicial settlement of his

estate. As a result of the settlement, the property
was divided into two property, Lot No. 60052 which
was assigned to Lourdes and Candido, heirs of
Adriano and the heirs of Dionisia another heir of
Adriano. The other property, Lot No. 8459 was
assigned to Francisco, Librada, Elcociado and
Roman all heirs of Adriano. The owners of Lot No.
60052 sold the lot to spouses Braulio and Aquiliana
Abalos, and the owners of Lot No. 8459, except
Roman also sold their shares to spouses Briones.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted
Roman as caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza
and Vidal Versoza as his substitute. Roman filed a
case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the
de Vera spouses in CAR Case No. 1724-P-68. On
September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a
decision authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. The deicion became final and executor.
However, before it was executed, the parties
entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein
the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to
sub-lease the property until the termination of the
original lease on June 30, 1982. This agreement was
approved by the CAR court in an order dated
December 22, 1972.
On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses applied for
the registration of the disputed parcel of land.
Roman Soriano and the Director of Lands acted as
oppositors. On June 27, 1983, the Land Registration
Court granted the application for registration. On
April 13, 1983, after the expiration of the original
lease and sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano, the
Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer
against Roman Soriano, later, this case was
dismissed on motion of the Abalos spouses. On July
14, 1983, Elcociado, Librada, Roman, Francisco,
Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia filed a
complaint to annul the deeds of sale they
executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or should
the deeds be not annulled, to allow Roman,
Elcociado and Librada to redeem their shares in the
disputed land and to uphold Roman Sorianos
possession of the fishpond portion of the property as
a tenant-caretaker.
After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer,
the Abalos spouses filed on August 22, 1984, a
motion for execution of the post-decisional order
embodying the agreement of Roman Soriano and
the de Vera spouses allowing the former to
sublease the property. On October 25, 1984,

Roman filed a motion to suspend hearing on the
rental demanded by the Abalos spouses until after
the other issues raised in his opposition to the
motion for execution are resolved. The motion to
suspend hearing on the issue of the rentals was
denied and the trial court authorized the
substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos
spouses.
Roman
Soriano's
motion
for
reconsideration was denied on March 16, 1985.
Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals but the latter denied the
petition, pending the denial of this petition, Roman
Soriano died. Not satisfied with the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the heirs of Roman Soriano
brought this case in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a
land registration case can effectively eject the
possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of
tenure rights is still pending determination before
the DARAB.
HELD: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land
registration case cannot effectively used to oust the
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights
are still pending determination before the DARAB.
There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title over
the land under litigation has been confirmed with
finality. However, the declaration pertains only to
ownership and does not automatically include
possession, especially soin the instant case where
there is a third party occupying the said parcel of
land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security
of tenure and they have the right to work on their
respective landholdings once the leasehold
relationship is established. Security of tenure is a
legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself ad deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their
only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights
of an agricultural tenant. The Supreme Court
decided to refrain from ruling whether petitioners
may be dispossessed of the subject property while
petitioner's status as tenant has not yet been
declared by the DARAB.
Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 180
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Pedro Garcia, with the
consent of his wife Remedios Garcia, sold a parcel
of land situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati to his
daughter Maria Luisa Magpayo and her husband
Luisito Magpayo. The Magpayos mortgaged the
land to the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) to secure a loan. The Magpayos failed to
pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the
public auction sale in which PBCom bought the
land. The redemption period of the foreclosed
mortgage
expired
without
the
Magpayos
redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was
consolidated in favor of PBCom.
PBCom subsequently filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession over the land with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC
granted the petition. Upon service of the writ of
possession, Maria Luisa Magpayos brother, Jose
Ma. T. Garcia, who was in possession of the land,
refused to honor it. Jose Garcia thereupon filed
against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff
the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages
wherein he contended, inter alia, that at the time
of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, he
was in possession of the property; that, when his
mother Remedios Tablan Garcia died, sometime in
October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a
co-owner of the property; and that, Atty. Pedro V.
Garcia, at the time of the execution of the
instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not
in possession of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a coowner of the parcel of the land in dispute.
HELD: No. Possession and ownership are distinct
legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to
his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their
right to dispose of what they owned when they sold
the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On
the other hand, possession is defined as the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to
possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in

one of two ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in
the concept of an owner may be the owner himself
or one who claims to be so. On the other hand,
one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong. The records show that petitioner Jose
Garcia occupied the property not in the concept
of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his
parents. An owners act of allowing another to
occupy his house, rent-free does not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in
the latters favor. Consequently, it is of no moment
that petitioner was in possession of the property at
the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was
not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. All
said, the Magpayo spouses were already the
owners when they mortgaged the property to
PBCom.
Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of
the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959
which is a property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. In 1980, Rodil entered into a sublease
contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc,
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua
Huay Soon, members of the Ides ORacca Building
Tenants Association, Inc. On 12 September 1982 BP
233 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former
alien properties" classified as commercial and
industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified
as commercial property. RODIL and Ides ORacca
Building Tenants Association, Inc., offered to
purchase the subject property. Pending action on
the offer of RODIL to purchase the property,
Director Factora of the Building Services and Real
Property Management Office granted RODIL's
request for another renewal of the lease contract
on 23 September 1987 for another five (5) years
from 1 September 1987. The renewal contract was
forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of
Department of General Services and Real Estate
Property Management (DGSREPM) for approval.
Upon recommendation of DGSREPM Rufino Banas,
De Jesus disapproved the renewal contract in
favour of Rodil and recalled all papers signed by
him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus
likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax
delinquency and ordered the issuance of a

temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for
specific performance, damages and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against the REPUBLIC,
De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. De
Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
action for specific performance. On 31 May 1988
Factora issued Order No. 1 designating the Land
Management Bureau represented by Director
Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all "former alien
properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. Pending the
action for specific performance, RODIL signed a
renewal contract with Director Palad which was
approved by Secretary Factora. The renewal
contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years
from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the
renewal contract was subsequently entered into on
25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease
contract were increased. As a result, the action was
dismissed in favour of Rodil. Rodil then filed an
action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria
Footwear, Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Chua Huay
Soon. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared
the contracts null and void and dismissed the
actions for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy
the building by virtue of its lease contract with the
Republic.
HELD: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. Every owner has the
freedom of disposition over his property. It is an
attribute of ownership, and this rule has no
exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the
disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter
into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of
its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has
the right to eject usurpers of the leased property
where the factual elements required for relief in an
action for unlawful detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of
23 September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992
did not give rise to valid contracts.This is true only of
the Contract of Lease entered into on 23
September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not
approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that
such approval was made known to it. The so-called

approval of the lease contract was merely stated in
an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus
addressed to Director Factora. This is evident from
the fact that Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked
Factora to duly execute a lease contract and
forward it to his office for approval. The
consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code
provides that no contract shall arise unless
acceptance of the contract is communicated to
the offeror. Until that moment, there is no real
meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and
acceptance, hence, no contract.
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18
May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued by RODIL,
these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is
there a law prohibiting the execution of a contract
with provisions that are retroactive. Where there is
nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, the
validity of the contract must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts
because they were supposedly executed in
violation of a temporary restraining order issued by
the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court
however failed to note that the order restrains the
REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as
regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner
RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was
indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on
25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were
entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one
cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.
Private respondents argue that the "renewal
contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this
assertion. It would seem that respondents consider
the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier
lease contract of 23 September 1987. However,
novation is never presumed. Also, the title of a
contract does not determine its nature. On the
contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract
which dictate its nature. Furthermore, where a
contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations,
one that would make it valid and another that
would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to
be adopted. The assailed agreement of 18 May
1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states
that the term of the contract would be for ten (10)
years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly
conclusive of the existence of an intention by the
parties to novate the contract of 23 September
1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied

novation for the requisite incompatibility between
the original contract and the subsequent one is not
present. Based on this factual milieu, the
presumption of validity of contract cannot be said
to have been overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision
of the Office of the President declaring null and
void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25
May 1992 should be counted in its favor. We do not
agree. The contention does not hold water. It is
well-settled that a court's judgment in a case shall
not adversely affect persons who were not parties
thereto.
Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original
applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land with an area of
2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de
Lara was succeeded by his wife-respondent
Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands a
two-story
residential-commercial
apartment
declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondents sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara.
When Felicitas encountered financial difficulties,
she approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre.
On February 10, 1960, a document denominated as
Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre,
whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion
of the subject lot, together with the two-story
commercial and residential structure standing
thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and
Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner
for recovery of ownership and possession of the
two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales
application over the subject property and was
issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title,
petitioner filed an action for quieting of title.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the
respondents. When respondent filed a motion for
execution, petitioner opposed, and alleged that he
had a right of retention over the property until
payment of the value of the improvements he had
introduced on the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered
a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he made on the property.
HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith.

Based on the factual findings from this case, it is
evident that petitioner knew from the very
beginning that there was really no sale and that he
held respondents property as mere security for the
payment of the loan obligation. Therefore,
petitioner may claim reimbursement only for
necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to
reimbursement for any useful expenses which he
may have incurred.
Custodio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 483
Regalado, J.
FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with
a two-door apartment. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables
owned by petitioner Spouses Custodio, Spouses
Santos and Rosalina Morato. From the main street P.
Burgos, there are two possible passageways to
Mabasas property. One of the tenants of the
apartment vacated because an adobe fence was
constructed thereby making the first passageway
narrower in width. Ma. Cristina Santos testified that
she constructed said fence for security reasons.
Morato also constructed her fence and even
extended it in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. It was then that the
remaining tenants of the apartment left. Thereafter,
Mabasa filed a case for the grant of an easement
of right of way against petitioners. The RTC granted
the easement of right of way sought by private
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and furthermore, ordering
petitioners to pay private respondent a sum of
money for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the award of damages to private
respondent is proper.
HELD: No, the act of petitioners in constructing a
fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that every owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment
to servitudes constituted thereon. The proper
exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal
wrong for which an action will lie, although the act
may result in damage to another. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to

achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
Abejaron v. Nabasa
G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the
actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118square meter portion of a 175-square meter
residential lot in Silway, General Santos City.
Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied the
118-square meter land. At that time, the land had
not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and
built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a
small store. Petitioner later improved their abode to
become a two-storey house. This house, which
stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block
5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same
Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter,
Conchita. The small store was eventually destroyed
and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron another store.
He later planted five coconut trees on the property.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in
character, petitioner declared only his house, and
not the disputed land, for taxation purposes. The
last two declarations state that petitioners' house
stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5. Petitioner stated
that respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining
57-square meter portion of Lot 1. Nabasa built his
house about 4 meters away from petitioner
Abejaron's house. Employees of the Bureau of
Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did not apply
for title of the land on the belief that he could not
secure title over it as it was government property.
Without his knowledge and consent, Nabasa
applied for and caused the titling in his name the
entire Lot 1, including petitioner Abejaron's 118square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an
Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free Patent
covering Lot 1. As the title included petitioner
Abejarons portion of the lot, he filed a protest with
the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and
application. The protest was dismissed for failure of
the petitioner to attend the hearings. Petitioner
Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance
with damages against respondent Nabasa before
the RTC. The RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of petitioner in its reconveyance case
declaring the possession and occupancy of
Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good
faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said
portion in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa
erroneous. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for

reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case
was failed to be substantiated by Abejaron.
Without proof of irregularity neither in the issuance
of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a
claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the
title, the title would become indefeasible. The
petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired title
over the disputed land.
HELD: An action for reconveyance of a property is
the sole remedy of a landowner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's name after one year from the date of the
decree so long as the property has not passed to
an innocent purchaser for value. The action does
not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and
set aside the decree of registration but only
purports to show that the person who secured the
registration of the property in controversy is not the
real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for
reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the
party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and
the fact of fraud.
Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the
owner of the property alleged to be erroneously
titled in another's name. In the case at bench,
petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the
disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a
"preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by
virtue of his actual possession since January 1947.
Title to alienable public lands can be established
through open, continuous, and exclusive possession
for at least 30 years. Not being the owner, petitioner
cannot maintain the present suit. Persons who have
not obtained title to public lands could not question
the titles legally issued by the State.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177
SCRA 495
Fernan, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and
Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of
land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was

originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office
of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to
a Homestead Patent granted by the President of
the Philippines on 27 July 1948. On 26 February 1982,
the spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney
authorizing
German
Management
Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision.
Consequently,
the
German
Management obtained Development Permit 00424
from
the
Human
Settlements
Regulatory
Commission for said development. Finding that part
of the property was occupied by Gernale and
Villeza and 20 other persons, German Management
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but
the
latter
refused.
Nevertheless,
German
Management proceeded with the development of
the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al.
Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry
against German Management before the MTC
Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside
farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and
tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to
the promulgation of PD 27, and that they were
deprived of their property without due process of
law when German Management forcibly removed
and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing
the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops
that they planted by means of force, violence and
intimidation The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s
complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC
sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Said court gave due course to their petition and
reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The
Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were
in actual possession of the property at the time they
were forcibly ejected by German Management,
they have a right to commence an action for
forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. German Management moved to
reconsider but the same was denied by the
Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present
recourse.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be
availed of when respondents refused to vacate the
premises.
HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior
possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help
(enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing

because the such doctrine can only be exercised
at the time of actual or threatened dispossession,
which is absent in the present case. When
possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. This is clear from Article 536 New Civil
Code which provides that "in no case may
possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing."
Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17
Concepcion, C. J.
FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria
Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot
105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu,
Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted by
Cabalags father when he was still alive. Hacienda
Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by
Antonio Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer,
Felix Caisip. Prior to the incident involved, Guevarra
sought recognition as a lawful tenant of Royas y Cia
from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action
was dismissed. Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an
action against Guevarra for forcible entry with
prayer that Guevarra be ejected from the premises
of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace of Court of
Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on
June 6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and
Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of
sugarcane.
A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises
of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Caisip.
Due to Cabalags tenacious attitude, Caisip sought
the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The
Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his
request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon
without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the
Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales
and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo
Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen
weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which was a
ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to
leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to
Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them
to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding
but she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot.

While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed
by Rojales who twisted her right arm and wrested
the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left
hand and together Rojales forcibly dragged her
towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood
nearby, with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, Ina
ko po! Ina ko po! and was heard by some
neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant
organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went
with them on their way to the municipal building.
Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales
and Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who
interrogated her. But upon representations made
by Rivera, she was released and allowed to go
home. Cabagan then filed a complaint charging
Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of
grave coercion.
The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them
guilty as charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip
and others, in the exercise of his right granted by
Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right
granted by Article 429. This is totally inapplicable to
the case, for, having been given 20 days from June
6th within which to vacate the lot, Cabalag did not,
on June 17th and within said period, invades or
usurps the said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda
owner may have become its co-possessor by
reason of the prior order of the Justice of Peace
Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel
or prevent an actual or threatened physical
invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from
a property which she and her husband were in
possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had
explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay
in said property up to June 26th, and had
expressed the view that he could not oust them
without a judicial order. It is clear, therefore, that
Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of
violence, and without legal authority, had
prevented the complainant from doing something
not prohibited by law (weeding and being in Lot
105-A), and compelled her to do something against
her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot),
whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking the law
into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the

Revised Penal Code.
People of the Philippines v. Pletcha
G.R. No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977, 22 CA Rep. 807
Sison, J.
FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr., farmer, invoking self-help in
defense of the land he inherited from his father 19
years ago against the workers of Radeco
Corporation, who without court order, were
constructing a fence in a hacienda allegedly
leased by the corporation from a certain Lopinco.
Claiming actual possession and ownership and
believing that the land sought to be fenced was an
integral part of the land he inherited, Pletcha asked
the group to desist from fenicing pending a
resurvey he proposed, but he was totally ignored,
thus he fought off and prevented the workers. As a
result of such resistance he was prosecuted and
convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Trial
Court. Pletcha appealed the decision of the MTC
with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants action is a legitimate
exercise of a private citizens self-help.
HELD: Yes. In the instant case,the usurpers
possession has not yet become complete and the
complainants were in the act of building a fence.
Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of
the law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to
drive them away, even by means of bolo because
they refused to listen to his appeal which is
reasonable. The appellant need not rush to the
court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the
invasion of his property. The situation required
immediate action and Art. 429 gave him the self
executory mechanics of self-defense and selfreliance. The provision in Art 429 of the New Civil
Code confirms the right of the appellant, an owner
and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to
repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened
or physical of his property. The principle of selfdefense and the protective measures related
thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty
and property.
The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful
possessor to use force, not only to prevent a
threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof;
it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by
force. He who merely uses force to defend his
possession does not possess by force. The use of

such necessary force to protect propriety or
possessory
rights
constitutes
a
justifying
circumstance under the Penal Code.
-------------------------(3)----------------------------Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries
of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation. Within the land of respondent
corporation,
waterpaths
and
contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the
officers and directors of respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under Article
324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a civil action against respondent
corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed
the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal
case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed
the order of the trial court. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built
through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to
sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. It
must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that
each must use his own land in a reasonable

manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right
of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability
on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence. However,
responsibility for fault or negligence under the said
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant. The
decision is reversed and set aside.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228
Cruz, J.
FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of
land was filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la
Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots.
According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to
Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively,
in 1964. In support of the application, both Balbalio
and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation. Alberto said he received
Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She
was corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled
the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug
mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the
date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner. Atok alleged that a portion of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the

mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2,
1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed
its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature,
it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that
the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered. The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, which reversed the trial court
and affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the
sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok
appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking their
superior right of ownership. The Republic filed its
own petition for review and reiterated its argument
that neither the private respondents nor the two
mining companies had any valid claim to the land
because it was not alienable and registerable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a
better right over the property in question.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the
rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that
time. The perfection of the mining claim converted
the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. By
such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without
need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that
such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by
non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. The
Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no
conflict of interest" between the owners of the
surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is

classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on
the surface, subject to separate claims of title.
However, the rights over the land are indivisible and
that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and
half mineral. The classification must be categorical;
the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and
became mineral and completely mineral
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon,
or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying
the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land
does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired before
the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural
lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of
its adoption. The land was not and could not have
been transferred to the private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
The decision is set aside and that of the trial court is
reinstated.
-------------------------(3)----------------------------Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay Silay Milling
Co.
G.R. No. 35223, September 17, 1931, 56 Phil. 117
Romualdez, J.
FACTS: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the Philippine
National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom,
was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their
land to the creditor bank. And in order to
compensate those planters for the risk they were
running with their property under the mortgage, the
aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on that

same date, i.e., December 22, 1923, undertook to
credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged
every year with a sum equal to two per centum of
the debt secured according to yearly balance, the
payment of the bonus being made at once, or in
part from time to time, as soon as the central
became free of its obligations to the aforesaid
bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the
contract of supervision, and had funds which might
be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank
authority to make such payment.
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against
the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of
the amount P13,850 or promissory notes or other
instruments or credit for that sum payable on June
30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson
Ledesma.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim
alleging a preferential right to receive any amount
which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled
to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus,
because that would be civil fruits of the land
mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the
benefit of the central referred to, and by virtue of a
deed of assignment, and praying that said central
be ordered to delivered directly to the intervening
bank said sum on account of the latter's credit
against the aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil
fruits
HELD: No. The said bonus bears no immediate, but
only a remote accidental relation to the land
mentioned, having been granted as compensation
for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien
in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity
granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil
fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk,
or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
generosity in facing the danger for the protection
of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or
income from the mortgaged property. Hence, the
amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of
the central granting it, is not based upon the value,
importance or any other circumstance of the
mortgaged property, but upon the total value of
the debt thereby secured, according to the annual
balance, which is something quite distinct from and
independent of the property referred to.
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair

Theater, Inc.
G.R. No. 136221, May 12, 2000, 370 SCRA 56
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. use to own a
parcel of land, together with two 2-storey buildings
constructed thereon. Carmelo entered into a
Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. for a
period of 20 years. The lease covered a portion a
portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a 2storey building which respondent used as a movie
house known as Maxim Theater. Two years later,
Mayfair entered into a second Contract of Lease
with of Carmelo for the lease of another portion of
the latters property namely, part of the second
floor of the 2-storey building and two store spaces
on the ground floor and the mezzanine, on which
Mayfair put up another movie house known as
Miramar Theater. The contract was likewise for a
period of 20 years. Both leases contained a
provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to
purchase the subject properties. However, the
subject properties were sold by Carmelo to
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. without
offering it first to Mayfair. Mayfair filed a Complaint
before the RTC of Manila for the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and
Equatorial. The RTC rendered its decision in favour
of Carmelo and Equatorial. The Court of Appeals
completely reversed and set aside the judgment of
the lower court. The Supreme Court denied the
petition for review and rescinded the contract of
sale between Carmelo and Equatorial and ordered
Carmelo to allow Mayfair to buy the lots. However,
Carmelo could no longer be located. Thus,
following the order of execution of the trial court,
Mayfair deposited with the clerk of court a quo its
payment to Carmelo. The lower court issued a
Deed of Reconveyance in favour of Carmelo and
a Deed of Sale in favor of Mayfair. Later, Equatorial
filed with the trial court an action for the collection
of the sum of money against Mayfair, claiming
payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for
the defendants use of subject premises after its
lease contract had expired.
ISSUE: Whether or not Equatorial should be entitled
to back rentals.
HELD: No. Rescission creates the obligation to return
the things which were the object of the contract,
together with their fruits, and the price with its
interest. It is clear the Equatorial never took actual
control and possession of the property sold, in view

of Mayfairs timely objection to the sale and
continued actual possession of the property.
Furthermore, the fact that Mayfair paid rentals to
Equatorial during the litigation should not be
interpreted to mean actual delivery or ispo facto
recognition of Equatorials title. They were made
merely to avoid imminent eviction and should not
be construed as recognition of Equatorial as new
owner.
-------------------------(5)----------------------------Ignacio v. Hilario
G.R. No. L-175, August 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 605
Moran, C. J.
FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a
parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly
residential. The lower court rendered judgment
holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole
property but conceding to defendants the
ownership of the houses and granaries built by
them on the residential portion with the rights of a
possessor in good faith, in accordance with article
361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of
execution alleging that since they chose neither to
pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them
the residential lot, said defendants should be
ordered to remove the structure at their own
expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of
said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which,
after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad.
Hence, this petition by defendants praying for (a) a
restraint and annulment of the order of execution
issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel
plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the
buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or
(c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of
the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial
settlement.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Court erred in its
judgment.
HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing
or planting, after the payment of the indemnity
stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land,

and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until such expenses are made
good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor
in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession
having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or paying the increase in value which the
thing may have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on
a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of
his building, under article 453. The owner of the
land, upon the other hand, has the option, under
article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his
land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land and compel the owner
of the building to remove it from the land where it is
erected. He is entitled to another motion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.
The Court holds, therefore, that the order of Judge
Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to
plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose
neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land,
is null and void, for it amends substantially the
judgment sought to be executed and is,
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the
Civil Code.
Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 17
Fernan, C. J.
FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles
Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a
534sqm land located in Cavite. Pursuant to an
action for partition filed by petitioner, the CFI of
Cavite directed the partition of the said land. A
total of 133.5 sqm was allotted to the petitioners
uncles while the remaining 266.5 was allotted to the
petitioner. However, when Juan and Isidro built their
houses they encroached upon a portion of land
belonging to Florencio. A geodetic engineer
surveyed the land and it was found out that Juan
and Isidro occupied a total of 101sqm of Florencios

lot.
The trial court which based its decision on Article
448 of the Civil Code, ruled that Florencio should
have the choice to either appropriate to himself
that part of the house standing on his lot or to
require Juan and Isidro to pay the price of the land.
But since the first option seems to be impractical, it
ordered to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions
occupied by them because it is the workable
solution. Upon appeal petitioner contends that
Article 448 cannot be applied because they are
co-owners of he subject property. However, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code is
applicable in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. It is true that Article 448 cannot be
applied where a co-owner builds upon a land
owned in common. However, in the case at bar,
the co-ownership has already been terminated by
virtue of the partition, thus, Article 448 now applies
since the builder is not anymore considered as an
owner of the land where the house was built.
As to the workable solution applied by the lower
court, the same cannot be upheld because Article
448 clearly states that the right of choice belongs to
the land owner and not upon the builder and the
courts. Thus, whether it might seem impractical, the
landowner may choose to appropriate the
improvements.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia Timbang, et. al.,
Barrera, J.
FACTS: After appropriate proceedings, the Court of
Appeals held, among other things, that Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. are declared to have acquired the
rights of the spouses Timbang in the questioned lots,
they are ordered to pay the spouses Timbang in the
amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amount which
said spouses might have paid or had to pay. On the
other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was also declared
to be a builder in good faith of the school building
constructed in the lot in question and was entitled
to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same.
Also, in case that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to
deposit the value of the land, which after
liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34, within the 90-
day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges

would lose all its rights to the land and the spouses
Timbang would then become the owners thereof. If
that is the case, the Timbangs are ordered to make
known to the court their option under Article 448 of
the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the
building in question, in which even they would have
to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00,
or would compel the latter to acquire the land and
pay the price thereof. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed
to pay the sum of P32,859.34 so the spouses
Timbang made known to the court their decision
that they had chosen not to appropriate the
building but to compel Filipinas Colleges, Inc., for
the payment of the sum of P32,859,34 which was
granted by the Court. As a consequence of which,
a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile, Blas filed
a motion for execution of her judgment
representing the unpaid portion of the price of the
house sold to Filipinas which was granted. Levy was
made on the house in virtue of the writs of
execution. Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the
building in public auction in favor of the spouses
Timbang, as the highest bidders. Several motion
were the subsequently filed before the lower court
wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's
certificate of sale covering a school building sold at
public auction was null and void unless within 15
days from notice of said order spouses Timbang
shall pay to Blas the sum of P5,750.00 that the
spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the
Sheriff's sale;
b) that Filipinas is owner of
245.00/32,859.34 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on
which the building sold in the auction sale is
situated; and c) that the undivided interest of the
Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy the
unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and
against Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus
the sum of P5,750.00. The spouses Timbang
contends that because the builder in good faith
has failed to pay the price of the land after the
owners thereof exercised their option under Article
448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his right of
retention provided in Article 546 and that by
operation of Article 445, the spouses Timbang as
owners of the land automatically became the
owners ipso facto of the school building.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang
automatically become the owners of the building
upon failure of Filipinas to pay the value of the
land.
HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New

Civil Code, the owner of the land has the right to
choose between appropriating the building by
reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or
compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his
land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if
the value of the land is considerably more than
that of the building. In addition to the right of the
builder to be paid the value of his improvement,
Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention
of the property until he is indemnified by the owner
of the land. There is nothing in the language of
these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify
the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure
of the builder to pay the value of the land, when
such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter
becomes automatically the owner of the
improvement under Article 445. The case of
Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied in this
case in the sense that although it is true it was
declared therein that in the event of the failure of
the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof
has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of
retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless
there was nothing said that as a consequence
thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his
own building. Also, in the present case, the Court of
Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is
entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of the school building. Blas is
actually a lien on the school building are
concerned. The order of the lower court directing
the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay
in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of
P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
Manotok Realty v. Tecson
G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 287
Gutierrez Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manotok Realty filed a complaint
against Nilo Madlangawa for recovery of
possession with damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Said court rendered judgment
declaring Madlangawa as a builder-possessor in
good faith; ordering the company to recognize the
right of Madlangawa to remain in Lot 345, Block 1,
of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he
shall have been reimbursed by the company the
sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Not satisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon
affirming the trial courts decision, it elevated the

case to the Supreme Court. On July 13, 1977, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution denying
Manotoks petition for lack of merit. Petitioner then
filed with the trial court (Judge Jose H. Tecson), a
motion for the approval of the companys exercise
of option and for satisfaction of judgment.
However, Judge Tecson denied the motion for
approval. Hence, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Tecson
can deny petitioners (landowner) motion to avail
of its option.
HELD: No. There is, therefore, no basis for the
respondent judge to deny the petitioners motion to
avail of its option to appropriate the improvements
made on its property. Neither can the judge deny
the issuance of a writ of execution because the
private respondent was adjudged a builder in good
faith or on the ground of peculiar circumstances
which supervened after the institution of this case,
like, for instance, the introduction of certain major
repairs of and other substantial improvements
because the option given by law belongs to the
owner of the land. Under Article 448 of the Civil
Code, the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the proper price of the land belongs
to the owner of the land. The only right given to the
builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement of
necessary expenses for the preservation of the land;
the builder cannot compel the landowner to sell
such land to the former.
Bernardo v. Bataclan
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938, 66 Phil. 598
Laurel, J.
FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from
Samonte which was located in Cavite. In order that
he may take possession and occupy the said land,
he filed a case in the CFI for such purpose and the
court rendered a favorable decision for Bernardo.
However, when he was supposedly set in
occupying the said land, he found Bataclan. He
was within the premises because he was authorized
by the previous owners to clear the land and make
the necessary improvements he deems fit, further
claiming that such authorization was granted to
him ever since 1922. Since Bataclan was not a party
in the first case, Bernardo filed against him a
separate case. Bernardo was declared owner but
the defendant was held to be a possessor in good
faith for whom the work done and improvements

made by him should be reimbursed. An appeal to
the decision of the court was filed by both Bernardo
and Bataclan. The decision was modified by
lowering the price of the land from P300 to P200 per
hectare. Bernardo was given 30 days to exercise his
option, whether to sell the land to Bataclan or to
buy the improvements from him. Bernardo chose
the option which would require Bataclan to pay
him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per
hectare. However, Bataclan informed the court
that he will not be able to pay for the price of the
land. The court then gave Bataclan 30 days to pay
the price of the property and after the lapse of the
period, the land shall be sold in a public auction.
After 30 days, the land was sold to Teodoro at a
public auction, after failure of Bataclan to pay
within the period the purchase price.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of
retention over the parcel of land in question.
HELD: No. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of
retention. The option of the owner was already
exercised where he decided that he will just allow
the defendant to purchase the land such that
Bataclan was to comply with the option if he wants
to retain the land. From the moment that he told
the courts of his inability to pay for the price of the
land, he already lost his right to retain the land.
Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. v. Uy
G.R. No. 136456 October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 238
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Respondents stated that sometime in August
1970 and months thereafter they received
mimeographed notices dated August 2, 1970 and
signed by the late Ramon Durano, Sr., informing
them that the lands which they are tilling and
residing in, formerly owned by the Cebu Portland
Cement Company (hereafter, Cepoc), had been
purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. The notices also
declared that the lands were needed by Durano &
Co. for planting to sugar and for roads or
residences,
and
directed
respondents
to
immediately turn over the said lands to the
representatives of the company. Simultaneously, tall
bamboo poles with pennants at the tops thereof
were planted in some areas of the lands and metal
sheets bearing the initials RMD were nailed to
posts.
As early as the first week of August 1970, and even
before many of the respondents received notices

to vacate, men who identified themselves as
employees of Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze
the lands occupied by various respondents,
destroying in their wake the plantings and
improvements made by the respondents therein.
On September 15, 1970, Durano & Co. sold the
disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III,
who procured the registration of these lands in his
name under TCT No. T-103 and TCT No. T-104.
Respondents contended that the display of force
and the known power and prestige of petitioners
and their family restrained them from directly
resisting this wanton depredation upon their
property. Respondents urged the Department of
Justice to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
RTC found that the case preponderated in favor of
respondents, who all possessed their respective
portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. T-103
and T-104 thinking that they were the absolute
owners thereof. A number of these respondents
alleged that they inherited these properties from
their parents, who in turn inherited them from their
own parents. Some others came into the properties
by purchase from the former occupants thereof.
They and their predecessors were responsible for
the plantings and improvements on the property.
They were the ones who sought for the properties to
be tax-declared in their respective names, and
they
continually
paid
the
taxes
thereto.
Respondents maintained that they were unaware
of anyone claiming adverse possession or
ownership of these lands until the bulldozing
operations in 1970.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed the RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, affirmed the
said decision and ordered the return of the
property to all the respondents-claimants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
its decision ordering the petitioners to return the
properties to the respondents.
HELD: No. The evidence shows that respondents
successfully complied with all the requirements for
acquisitive prescription to set in. The properties were
conveyed to respondents by purchase or
inheritance, and in each case the respondents
were in actual, continuous, open and adverse
possession of the properties. They exercised rights of
ownership over the lands, including the regular
payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and
improvements. They were unaware of anyone

claiming to be the owner of these lands other than
themselves until the notices of demolition in 1970 --and at the time each of them had already
completed the ten-year prescriptive period either
by their own possession or by obtaining from the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Furthermore, a purchaser of a parcel of land
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the
property subject of the purchase is in the possession
of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could
not have failed to know or discover that the land
sold to him was in the adverse possession of
another is a buyer in bad faith. In the case,
respondents were in open possession and
occupancy of the properties when Durano & Co.
supposedly purchased the same from Cepoc.
Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the
nature of respondents possession before they
ordered demolition in August 1970.
In the same manner, the purchase of the property
by petitioner Ramon Durano III from Durano & Co.
could not be said to have been in good faith. It is
not disputed that Durano III acquired the property
with full knowledge of respondents occupancy
thereon. There even appears to be undue haste in
the conveyance of the property to Durano III, as
the bulldozing operations by Durano & Co. were still
underway when the deed of sale to Durano III was
executed on September 15, 1970. There is not even
an indication that Durano & Co. attempted to
transfer registration of the property in its name
before it conveyed the same to Durano III.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their
titles, they were correctly held by the Court of
Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of
the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles,
the landowner is entitled to damages from the
builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land
has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what
has been built without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the
builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel
the builder to pay the value of the land. In any
case, the landowner is entitled to damages under
Article 451.
The Court sustains the return of the properties to
respondents and the payment of indemnity as
being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil
Code.
Ballatan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34
Puno, J.
FACTS: Ballatan, Martinez and Ling are the owners
of adjacent lots in Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No.
24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in the
name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses
Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25
and 26 are registered in the name of respondent
Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston
Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house.
Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, registered in the
name of respondent Li Ching Yao. In 1985,
petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot
No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that
the concrete fence and side pathway of the
adjoining house of respondent Winston Go
encroached on the entire length of the eastern side
of her property. Her building contractor informed
her that the area of her lot was actually less than
that described in the title. Forthwith, Ballatan
informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his
encroachment on her property. Go, however,
claimed that his house, including its fence and
pathway, were built within the parameters of his
father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by
Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of
the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the ownerdeveloper of the subdivision project. So Ballatan
called the attention of the IAI and after another
survey of the land, Engineer Quedding found that
the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few
meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which
was three lots away, increased by two meters.

Engineer Quedding declared that he made a
verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of
respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the
boundaries to have been in their proper position.
He, however, could not explain the reduction in
Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time
respondents Go constructed their boundary walls.
On 10 June 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written
demand on respondents Go to remove and
dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24 but Go
refused. So Ballatan instituted against Go a civil
case for recovery of possession the RTC of Malabon
decided in favor of Ballatan, ordering the Go's to
vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, demolish
their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan
actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit. Go appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ballatan have a right of
remotion.
HELD: All the parties have acted in good faith so
Article 448 must apply. Petitioners are ordered to
exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of the
decision their option to either buy the portion of
respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24,
or sell to said respondents the portion of their land
on which the improvement stands. If petitioners
elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the
purchase price must be at the prevailing market
price at the time of payment. If buying the
improvement will render respondents Go's house
useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached
portion of their land to respondents Go. If
petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents
Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter
must vacate the subject portion and pay
reasonable rent from the time petitioners made
their choice up to the time they actually vacate the
premises. But if the value of the land is considerably
more than the value of the improvement, then
respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in
which case the parties shall agree upon the terms,
the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms,
the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the
lease.
-------------------------(6)----------------------------Spouses Del Ocampo v. Abesia

G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1998, 160 SCRA 379
Gancayco, J.
FACTS: Plaintiffs spouses Concepcion Fernandez
and Estanislao Del Campo and defendant
Bernarda Fernandez Abesia are co-owners of
parcel of land with an area of 45 square meters
and divided in the proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share
each, respectively. A commissioner, who is
appointed by the court, conducted a survey and
recommended that the property be divided into
two lots: Lot 1161 A with an area of 30 square
meters for the plaintiffs and Lot 1161 B with an
area of 15 square meters for the defendants.
However, it was shown in the sketch plan that the
house of the defendant occupied the portion with
an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161 A of
plaintiffs. The parties asked the court to finally settle
and adjudicate who among the parties should take
possession of the 5 square meters of land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code, the
rights of a builder in good faith, should be applied
to the plaintiff-spouses Del Campo.
2.) Whether or not the house of the defendant
Abesia should be removed and demolished at their
expense.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot
apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on
the land owned in common for then, he did not
build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.
The co-owner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by the
rules of co-ownership. However, when, as in this
case, the co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5
square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith,
then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil
Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi
agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may
apply even when there was co-ownership if good
faith has been established.
2.) It depends. Applying Article 448 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate
said portion of the house of defendants upon
payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the

plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the
price of the land occupied by their house.
However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the
house of defendants built thereon, then the latter
cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendant
shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs
upon such terms and conditions that they may
agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall
fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may
demolish or remove the said portion of their house,
at their own expense, if they so decide.
Pacific Farms Inc. v. Esguerra
Castro, J.
FACTS: On October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the
Company sold and delivered lumber and
construction materials to the Insular Farms Inc.
which the latter used in the construction of the si
buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan,
of the total procurement price of P15,000.00, the
sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid. Consequently,
the Company instituted a civil case to recover the
unpaid balance and the court sustained their
claim. The defendant sheriff levied th six buildings.
The Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a suit against the
Company and the sheriff asserting ownership over
the levied buildings which it had acquired from the
Insular Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on
March 21, 1958. Pacific prays that the judicial sale
of the six buildings be declared null and void. The
trial court rendered judgment annulling the levy
and the certificate of sale. However, it denied the
plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages
on the ground that it was not "prepared to find
there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part
of any defendants".
ISSUE: Whether or not the application by analogy of
the rules of accession would suffice for a just
adjudication.
HELD: Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a
principal and an accessory; the land being
considered the principal, and the plantings,
constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of
the land who in good faith - whether personally or
through another - makes constructions or works
thereon, using materials belonging to somebody
else, becomes the owner of the said materials with
the obligation however of paying for their value. On
the other hand, the owner of the materials is

entitled to remove them, provided no substantial
injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has
the right to reimbursement for the value of his
materials,
Applying article 447 by analogy, the Court consider
the buildings as the principal and the lumber and
construction materials that went into their
construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if
it does own the six buildings, must bear the
obligation to pay for the values of the said
materials; the appellant which apparently has no
desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were
minded to do so, cannot remove them without
necessarily damaging the buildings has the
corresponding right to recover the value of the
unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 407
Davide, Jr. J.
FACTS: Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot
situated in Kamias street, Quezon City, on which he
built a a four-door, two-storey apartment building.
But because of failure to pay realty taxes
amounting to P12,000.00, the commercial lot
owned was sold at a public auction. It was
purchased by Nepomuceno, which later sold the
same to the Nuguid spouses for P103,000 on
October 12, 1983. Pecson then challenged the sale,
alleging that the apartment building, contrary to
the claim of the Nuguid spouses, was not included
in the sale. The lower court judged in favor of
Pecson, declaring that the apartment building was
indeed not included in the subject sale. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the same. The Spouses Nuguid
then filed a motion for delivery of possession of the
lot and the apartment building. The lower court
ruled in favor of the private respondents, but
subject to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost
of constructing the apartment building minus the
rents due to the spouses (calculated at P21,000
from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993). With the
said decision at hand, the spouses then made a
move to eject Pecson and as well as the tenants
residing therein. However, the spouses have yet to
pay Pecson for the construction costs.
ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject
Pecson even if reimbursement hasnt been given
for the construction costs.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that since the spouses still
havent reimbursed Pecson for the cost of
construction of the building, the latter has the right
to retain the property, and along with it, the fruits of
which during such possession.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines
is a possessor in bad faith.
2.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines
has stepped into the shoes of the seller.
The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply

in the case at bar. By its clear language, Article 448
refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two
or more parties, one of whom has built some works,
or sown or planted something. The building, sowing
or planting may have been made in good faith or
in bad faith. As in this case, since the owner himself
was the one who constructed the improvement,
good faith and bad faith becomes irrelevant.
However, by analogy, the indemnity may be
applied, considering that the primary intent of
Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced coownership and that the parties agree that Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and
indemnity for the improvements may be paid,
although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Since the spouses have opted to appropriate the
apartment building, Pecson is thus entitled to the
possession and enjoyment of the apartment
building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as
well as of the portion of the lot where the building
has been constructed. This is so because the right to
retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built,
planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so
paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the
building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of

surveying, no one can determine the precise extent
or location of his property by merely examining his
paper title. There is no question in that when
Technogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries,
the buildings and other structures were already in
existence. Furthermore, it is not clear as to who
actually built these structures but it can be assumed
that the predecessor-in-interest of Technogas, Pariz
Industries, did so. An article 527 of the New Civil
Code presumes good faith. Since no proof exists to
show that the builder built the encroaching
structures in bad faith, the structures should be
presumed to have been built in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title.
Furthermore,
possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character except in case and from the moment
facts exist which show that the possessor is not
aware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.
The good faith ceases from the
moment the defects in the title are made known to
the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property of the true owner.
-------------------------(7)----------------------------Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation

v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108894, February, 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 5
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from
Pariz Industries, Inc. In the same year, Eduardo Uy
purchased the land adjacent to it. The following
year, Uy bought another lot adjoining the lot of
Technogas. Portions of the buildings and wall
bought by Technogas together with the land from
Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of Uys
adjoining land.
The knowledge of some
encroachment was only made known to both
parties after their parties of their respective parcels
of land.
2.) Yes. Has been shown, contrary as to the good

faith of Technogas has not been overthrown.
Similarly, upon delivery of the property to Pariz
Industries, as seller, to Technogas, as buyer, the
latter acquired ownership of the property.
Consequently, Technogas is deemed to have
stepped into the shoes of the seller with regard to
all the rights of ownership of the property over the
immovable sold, including the right to compel Uy to
exercise either of the two options under Article 448
of the New Civil Code. Thus, the landowners
exercise of his option can only take place after the
builder shall have to know the intrusion in short,
when both parties shall have become aware of it.
Only then will the occasion for exercising the option
arise, for it is only then that both parties will have
been aware that a problem exists with regard to
their property rights.
Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of

Appeals
G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996,
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee on
installment Lot 8 from C.T. Torres Enterprises Inc. the
exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the
Contract to Sell on installment. Kee can exercise
possession over the parcel of land even before the
completion of installment payments. On January
20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI relocation fee of Php 50.00
and another on January 27, 1975 for the
preparation of lot plan. These amounts were paid
by Kee before he took possession of Lot 8. After the
preparation of the lot plan and a copy was
presented to Kee, Zenaida Octaviano, employee
of CTTEI accompanied Donnabelle Kee the wife of
Wilson Kee to inspect Lot 8. Unfortuantely,
Octaviano pointed Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee
constructed his residence on the said Lot 9 together
a store, repair shop and other improvements.
Edith
Robillo
purchased
from
Pleasantville
Development Corporation Lot 9. Sometime in 1975,
she sold the said parcel of land, Lot 9, to Eldred
Jardinico which at that time is vacant. Upon paying
completely to Robillo, Jardinico secured from the
Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19,
1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his
name. It was only that time that he discovered that
Wilson Kee take possession of that lot and that the
same have introduced improvements to the same
lot. Jardinico confronted Kee and tried to reach for
an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico, through his lawyer,
demanded that Kee vacate Lot 9 and remove all
the improvements introduced by the latter. Kee
refused which made Jardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod
City a complaint for ejectment with damages
against Kee. Kee, in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Pleasantville Development
Corporation and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery was
attributable to CTTEI and the Kee has no rights to
Lot 9 because of the rescission made by CTTEI of
their contract due to Kees failure to pay the
installment. MTCC also held that Kee must pay
reasonable rental for the use of Lot 9 and
furthermore he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements introduced by him. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court held that Pleasantville and

CTTEI were not negligent and that Kee was in bad
faith.
Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court which
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The
Appellate Court overturned the ruling of the RTC
and held the Kee was a builder in good faith and
the erroneous delivery was attributable to the
negligence of CTTEI. Hence the instant petition filed
by Pleasantville.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not, Wilson Kee is a builder in good
faith.
2.) Whether or not petitioner is liable for the acts of
its agent CTTEI.
HELD: 1.) Petitioner fails to persuade the Court to
abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court
of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that
the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving
bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built
improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot
was what he bought from petitioner. He was not
aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove
otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to
Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the
Contract of Sale on Installment. It has no merit. Such
violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether
Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state
of mind at the time he built the improvements on
Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to
petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the
said contract (contractual breach), but may not be
the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a
builder in good faith.
2.) Yes. The rule is that the principal is responsible
for the acts of the agent done within the scope of
his authority, and should bear the damage caused
to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who
exceeds his authority is personally liable for the
damage. But CTTEI was acting within its authority as
the sole real estate representative of petitioner
when it made the delivery to Kee, only that in so
acting, it was negligent. It is this negligence that is
the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI,
per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. For

such negligence, the petitioner should be held
liable for damages. The rights of Kee and Jardinico
vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and
owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by
law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It
was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight
modification" in the application of such law [by
holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable], on the
ground of "equity".
Germiniano v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 344
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari which
has its origins in Civil Case No. 9214 of Branch 3 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and damages.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed
to confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an
implied renewal of the lease which expired in
November 1985; (2) whether the lessees were
builders in good faith and entitled to reimbursement
of the value of the house and improvements; and
(3) the value of the house.
On the first issue, the court held that since the
petitioners' mother was no longer the owner of the
lot in question at the time the lease contract was
executed in 1978, in view of its acquisition by Maria
Lee as early as 1972, there was no lease to speak
of, much less, a renewal thereof. And even if the
lease legally existed, its implied renewal was not for
the period stipulated in the original contract, but
only on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article
1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners'
mother to accept the rentals starting January 1986
was then a clear indication of her desire to
terminate the monthly lease. As regard the
petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to the
private respondents the lot occupied by the house,
the court held that such should be litigated in a
proper case before the proper forum, not an
ejectment case where the only issue was physical
possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative,
holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
which allow possessors in good faith to recover the
value of improvements and retain the premises until
reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private
respondents, because the latter knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only
during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the

private respondents were specifically governed by
Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of up to
one-half of the value of the useful improvements, or
removal of the improvements should the lessor
refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive
the private respondents' allegation that the value
of the house and improvements was P180,000.00,
there being no controverting evidence presented.
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of
Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of
the Civil Code should apply in the instant case.
HELD: In this case, both parties admit that the land
in question was originally owned by the petitioners'
mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by
one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never
sought a writ of possession in order that she gain
possession of the property in question. The
petitioners' mother therefore remained in possession
of the lot. It has been said that while the right to let
property is an incident of title and possession, a
person may be lessor and occupy the position of a
landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner
of the premises let. There is no need to apply by
analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity
as was done in Pecson vs. Court of Appeals,
because the situation sought to be avoided and
which would justify the application of that provision,
is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of
forced co-ownership" would not be created
between the petitioners and the private
respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the right of the private respondents as
lessees is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code
which allows reimbursement to the extent of onehalf of the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to
indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises
only if the lessor opts to appropriate the
improvements. Since the petitioners refused to
exercise that option the private respondents
cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half
value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is
made. The private respondents' sole right then is to
remove the improvements without causing any
more impairment upon the property leased than is

necessary.
-------------------------(8)----------------------------Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218
Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the towns of
Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in
the province of Cagayan. In 1919 the lands of the
east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao
Cadastre. In 1925, OCT 5472 was issued for land
east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio
Agustin. As the years went by, the Cagayan River
moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the
west bank. The shifting of the river and siltation
continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the
river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among
these occupying lands covered by Solana
Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands
of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank
among which was Agustins Lot 8457, depositing
the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by
Binayug on the western bank. However, 1968, after
a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course,
returned to its 1919 bed and in the process, cut
across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad,
and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern,
or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those
lots they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while
the Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were
planting corn on their lots located on the easter
side of Cagayan River, Agustin, the heirs of
Baldomero Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo
Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and some
policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands
as their own and drove away the Melads, Binayug
and Urbina from the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost
upon sudden and abrupt change of the river.
HELD: No. The ownership of the accretion to the
lands was not lost upon sudden and abrupt change
of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or
1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and
separated or transferred said accretions to the
other side (eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459
and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this
situation. Article 459 provides that whenever the
current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from
an estate on its bank a known portion of land and

transfer it to another estate, the owner of the land
to which the segregated portion belonged retains
the ownership of it, provided that he removes the
same within two years. Article 463 provides that,
whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: On November 5, 1982, private respondents
Domingo Apostol et al. filed a complaint for
quieting of title against petitioners Leonida Cureg et
al. The complaint alleged that private respondents,
except Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced
heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona
fide claim of ownership of a parcel of land (referred
to as their motherland). Subsequently, the heirs
verbally sold the motherland to Apostol. The
motherland showed signs of accretion caused by
the movement of the Cagayan River. When private
respondents were about to cultivate their
motherland together with its accretion, they were
prevented by the petitioners. Petitioners alleged
that the motherland claimed by the private
respondents is non-existent, that the subject land
is an accretion to their registered land, and that
petitioners have been in possession and cultivation
of the accretion for many years now.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the
better right of accretion.
HELD: Yes. The petitioners are entitled to the
accretion. The subject land is an alluvial deposit
left by the northward movement of the Cagayan
River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil
Code: To the owners of land adjoining the banks
of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the
waters. However, the increase in the area of the
petitioners land, being an accretion left by the
change of course or the northward movement of
the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such,
it must also be placed under the operation of the

Torrens system.
Viajar v. Court of Appeals
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido
were the owners of Lot 7511. Spouses Rosendo and
Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel
of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan. On 6 September 1973,
Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his wife, sold this
lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for
P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the latters
names. Later, Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340
relocated and found out that the property was in
the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently,
she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. The
piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in
barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that at the
time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and
Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that
Lot 7340 has been in the possession of Ladrido; that
the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the
river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey
of 1926, has also been in the possession of Ladrido;
and that the Viajars have never been in actual
physical possession of Lot 7340. On 15 February
1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil
action for recovery of possession and damages
against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. The trial court rendered
its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the
complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs
against them, declaring the Ladridos are entitled to
the possession thereof. Not satisfied with the
decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the court. The Viajars filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the
land on the ground of accretion.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides
that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the
waters." The presumption is that the change in the
course of the river was gradual and caused by
accretion and erosion. In the present case, the
lower court correctly found that the evidence
introduced by the Viajars to show that the change
in the course of the Suague River was sudden or

that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and
convincing.
The
Ladridos
have
sufficiently
established that for many years after 1926 a
gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511
took place by action of the current of the Suague
River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912
sq.ms. more or less, had been added to Lot 7511.
The established facts indicate that the eastern
boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based
on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40
years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the
defendant gradually received deposits of soil from
the effects of the current of the river. The
consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to
alluvion or accretion was possessed by the
defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the
same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river
bed had been filled by accretion through the
years. The land is already plain and there is no
indication on the ground of any abandoned river
bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or
rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters becomes the property of the
owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore,
the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A
and B belong to the Ladridos.
Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, 257 SCRA 589
Romeo, J.
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of
land formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the
dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of
the Cagayan river. Private respondents Salasalan
and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their
houses stood from Antonio Nazareno, petitioners
predessor-in-interest. Private respondents allegedly
stopped paying rentals. As a result, Nazareno and
petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC
of Cagayan de Oro City. The MTC rendered a
decision against private respondents which was
affirmed by the RTC. After several petitions for
annulmentof judgment by private respondents
which were all dismissed, the decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private
respondents being ejected from portions of the
subject lots they occupied. Before Nazareno died,
he caused the approval by the Bureau of lands of
the survey plan with a view to perfecting his title
over the accretion area being claimed by him. The
said petition was protested by private respondents.
After conducting a survey of the subject land, land

investigator Avelino labis recommended that the
survey plan be cancelled and that private
respondents be directed to file appropriate public
land application covering their respective portions.
Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural
Resources and OIC of the Bureau of lands Ignacio
who denied the Motion. Respondent Director of
lands Abelardo Palad ordered Nazareno to vacate
the portions adjudicated to private respondents
and remove whatever improvements they have
introduced; he also ordered that private
respondents be placed in possession thereof. A
petitioner filed a case for annulment of the previous
decisions with the RTC but was dismissed. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision contending that the
approved of the survey plan belongs exclusively to
the Director of lands and the same shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim
ownership of the subject land by virtue of Art 457 of
the Civil Code.
HELD: No, accretion as a mode of acquiring
property under Art 457 of the NCC requires the
concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the
Article. These are called rules on alluvion, which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any
accretion gradually received from the effects of
the current of waters. The word current indicates
the participation of the body of water in the flow of
waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners,
however, admit that the accretion was formed by
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and
the Cagayan River. The Bureau of lands classified
the subject land as an accretion area which was
formed by deposits of sawdust. Petitioners
submission not having met the first and second
requirements of the rules of alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner. The subject
being public land is under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to
exercise executive control over any form of
concession, disposition and management of the
lands of public dominion.
Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Hermosisima, J:
FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed
an application for foreshore lease covering a tract
of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan,
having an area of approximately seventeen (17)
hectares. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-ininterest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering
twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application
was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the
ground that the property formed part of the public
domain.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual flied an application to register and confirm
his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and
said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga,
Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the
Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay.
The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed
an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual
nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient
title to the subject property, the same being a
portion of the public domain and, therefore, it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land sought to be
registered is accretion or foreshore land, or,
whether or not said land was formed by the action
of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the
action of the Manila Bay.
HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. If

the accretion were to be attributed to the action of
either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the
alluvium should have been deposited on either or
both of the eastern and western boundaries of
petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited
on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent
to the river bank.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a
river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side.
Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to
convince the Court that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling down on his
registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as
to be rightfully be considered as an accretion
[caused by the action of the two rivers]. Article 457
finds no applicability where the accretion must
have been caused by action of the bay.
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the
basis of the aforegoing observation is that the
disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay
and therefore, part of the public domain. Thus, the
disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank,
Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as
such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public
domain.
Title 3: Co-Ownership
-------------------------(1)----------------------------Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Paras, J.
FACTS: In a document executed in the Municipality
of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three
brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola
and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena)
entered into an agreement which provided,
among others: (1) That they will purchase from the
Spanish Government the lands comprising the
Island of Cagbalite which is located within the
boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province
of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate
area of 1,600 hectares; (2) That the lands shall be
considered after the purchase as their common
property; (3) That the co-ownership includes
Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at
that time represented by their father, Manuel
Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for
them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite
Island; (4) That whatever benefits may be derived
from the Island shall be shared equally by the coowners in the following proportion: Benedicto
Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share;
and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4
shares which shall be placed under the care of their
father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). On
August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual
possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased
by them from the Spanish Government. On April 11,
1868 they agreed to modify the terms and
conditions of the agreement entered into by them
on February 11, 1859.
About one hundred years later, on November 18,
1968, private respondents brought a special action
for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court,
including as parties the heirs and successors-ininterest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in
the second contract of co-ownership dated April
11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants,
petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as
prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership,
estoppel and laches.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
decision dated November 6, 1981 dismissing the
complaint. The motion for reconsideration filed by
the plaintiffs, private respondents herein, was
denied by the trial court in an order dated February

25, 1982. On appeal, respondent Court reversed
and set aside the decision of the lower court .It also
denied the motion for reconsideration and the
supplement to motion for reconsideration filed by
private respondents, in its resolution dated October
15, 1983.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided
property owned in common by the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto,
Jose and Manuel Pansacola.
2.) Whether or not a prescription may run in favor of
a co-owner against his co- owners or co-heirs.
HELD: 1.) On the first issue, there is nothing in all four
agreements that suggests that actual or physical
partition of the Island had really been made by
either the original owners or their heirs or successorsin-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859
simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits
can be derived from the island. The agreement, in
fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be
considered as their common property. In the
second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners
agreed not only on the sharing proportion of the
benefits derived from the Island but also on the
distribution of the Island each of the brothers was
allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the
children of the deceased brother, Eustaquio
Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and the children
of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) also
allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island. With the
distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a
co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the
whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is
at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the
instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of coowners) of the Island which is truly abstract,
because until physical division is effected such
portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely
determined (3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed., page
486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la
Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs.
Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70
SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA
234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that
were represented agreed on how the Island was to
be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908
which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals
that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no
actual partition of the Island had as yet been done.

The second and fourth paragraphs of the
agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted
by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description
yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the
surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in the
contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to
whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island
pursuant to said agreement was entrusted,
however, testified that said contracts were never
implemented because nobody defrayed the
expenses for surveying the same.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to
subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which
they take actual and exclusive possession of their
respective portions in the plan and titles issued to
each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of
Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of
actual partition should follow the procedure laid
down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs.
Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment
of some portions of the Island by some of the
petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of
the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the
Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original coowners as a common property and it has not been
proven that the Island had been partitioned
among them or among their heirs. While there is coownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is
co-possession which is linked to the possession of
the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75
SCRA 234 [1977]).
2.) On the second issue, no prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71
[1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Coowners cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership clearly communicated to the
other co-owners. An action for partition does not
prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now
Article 497, provides that the assignees of the coowners may take part in the partition of the
common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code,
now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common
property, a provision which implies that the action
to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24

[1977]). An action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co- owner.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------Pardell v. Bartolome
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912, 23 Phil. 450
Torres, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and defendant Matilde
Ortiz are the duly recognized natural daughters of
the spouses Miguel and Calixta who died in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. Prior to the death of their mother, she
executed a will whereby Matilde and Vicenta
became the heirs of all her property. Subsequently,
defendants, without judicial authorization or
extrajudicial
agreement
took
over
the
administration and enjoyment of the properties as
well as collection of the rents, fruits and products
thereof. Moreover, Matilde and her husband
occupied the upper storey of the house and the
room of the lower floor as an office. With this,
Vicenta demanded that she be given rental
payments by Matilde in occupying the house since
she is a co-owner of the property not occupying
the same and as such is entitled to its enjoyment
and/or fruits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals
from Matilde who occupies and enjoy the property
alone as a co-owner.
HELD: No. The law grants each co-owner the right to
use the property for the purpose intended provided
that the interest of the co-ownership must not be
injured or prejudiced and the other co-owners must
not be prevented from using it according to their
rights.
Matilde occupied the property owned in common
in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended. Records show no proof that she neither
occasioned any detriment to the interest of the
community property nor prevented her sister from
utilizing the said property in accordance to her right
as a co-owner thereof. Matilde was excercising her
right as a co-owner without being prejudicial to
Vicenta who could have also occupied her
property had she wanted to.
Each co-owner of a property has the right proindiviso over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the

reason that until a division is made, the respective
part of each holder of a right as a co-owner cannot
be determined and every co-owner exercises joint
ownership over the pro-indiviso property in addition
to his use and enjoyment of the same.
-------------------------(3)----------------------------Caro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 10
Guerrero, J.
FACTS: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin
Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of
land somewhere in Sorsogon. Sometime in 1957,
Mario died. His wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father,
Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed as
joint administrators of Marios estate by the CFI of
Sorsogon.
On August 26, 1959, Benjamin executed a deed of
absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over
said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz
Caro for the sum of 10,000.
Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito
and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits, a
subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro
over the lot.
Sometime in May 1966, when private respondent
Basilia Lahorra learned from a pleading sent to her
that petitioner Luz Caro acquired from Benjamin
Benito the aforesaid one-third of the undivided
share of the subject lands. She sent to petitioner
thru counsel, a written offer to redeem the said
one-third share. However, this offer was ignored by
the petitioner. Hence, private respondent Basilia
Lahorra filed a case for legal redemption and
sought to prove that as joint administrator of the
estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of
the sale as required by articles 1620 and 1623 of the
Civil Code.
During the hearing of the case, petitioner presented
the following secondary evidence to prove the
service of notice of the intended sale to possible
redemptioners: (1) affidavit of Benjamin Benito
attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners
were formally notified in writing of his intention to sell
his undivided share; (2) deposition of Saturninos
widow that she received and showed the notice to
husband but the latter was not interested to buy
the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner.

However, the decision was reversed by the CA.
Hence, the case was brought to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership on the lots in
question still exist thereby allowing private
respondent Basilia Lahorra to exercise the right of
legal redemption.
HELD: The court held that as early as 1960, coownership of the parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo
Benito, Luz Caro and the intestate estate of Mario
Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino
Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of
Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property. It
added that an agreement of partition, though
oral, is valid and consequently binding upon the
parties.
A partition for subdivision was then filed for the
purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits of
Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito to the effect
that they agree to the segregation of the land
owned in common by the three amigos. A
subdivision plan was made and by common
agreement Lot 1-C, with an area of 163 hectares,
was ceded to petitioner, to wit, TCT no. T-4978.
In addition, notwithstanding the ruling in the Caram
case wherein the sale of the property took place
after the partition agreement, the court therein saw
no difference with respect to a conveyance which
took place before the partition agreement.
Regarding the contention of private respondent
that she was not notified of the sale, the court ruled
that since the right of legal redemption does not
exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a
subdivision title has already been issued in the
name of the petitioner on Lot 1-C sold to her, it
becomes moot and academic. It becomes
unnecessary to decide whether private respondent
complied with the requirements for the exercise of
legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New
Civil Code.
Bailon Casilao v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738
Cortes, J.
FACTS: The Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of
Manila was the owner of a parcel of land (Lot No.
1272, Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of

Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga, Bataan,
having an area of 3,368 sq. m., more or less
covered by OCT No. 14379 of de Registry of Deeds
for the province of Bataan. With respect to its rights
over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No.
1272), the said church was succeeded by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando,
Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by
Catholic Bishop of Balanga registered as a
corporation on 15 December 1975.Prior thereto, or
on 23 August 1936, by virtue of the authority given
him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to
donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish
priest and administrator of all the properties of the
said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan,
Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De
Donacion donating an area of 12.40 meters by
21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m (the subject property)
of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as
a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the
church. Her acceptance of the donation, as well as
her possession of the subject property, is indicated
in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown
reasons, was refused registration by the Register of
Deeds. Six (6) years later, or in 1939, Ana de los
Reyes died without issue. Nevertheless, before her
death, she had given the subject property to her
nephew who had been living with her, the herein
defendant-appellant [private respondent]. The
latter immediately took possession of the property in
the concept of owner, built his house thereon and,
through the years, declared the land for taxation
purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon. His
possession of the subject property was never
disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-appellee
[petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him
on 5 November 1985, or more than 49 years after
the deed of donation was executed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is barred to
recover the property by the doctrine of laches.
HELD: Yes. Laches means the failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it. It has also been defined as
such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity. The

following are the essential elements of laches: (1)
Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (2) Delay in asserting complainant's
right after he had knowledge of the defendant's
conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3)
Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) Injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant. 32 Under the present
circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are
attendant in this case.
Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of
Appeals that, while petitioner is admittedly still the
registered owner of the donated property, and
jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility
and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally
an abundance of cases in the annals of our
jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a
registered landowner may lose his right to recover
the possession of his registered property by reason
of laches.
Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-75886, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 118
Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6
December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with
Specific Performance" (docketed as Civil Case No.
5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First
Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto
Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In her
complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal
ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27
November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"
executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor
Roque.
In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an
undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa
Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng
Bahagui" said to have been signed by the
respondents in acknowledgment of the existence
and validity of the Bilihan in favor of petitioner.
Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot
No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the
property, that she could not be compelled to
remain in the co-ownership of the same.
Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of

Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge
petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot
No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled
to remain in the co-ownership.
HELD: No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
"no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership" and that "each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned." The
facts on record clearly show that petitioner
Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and
continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961.
The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in
December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years
later that respondents first questioned the
genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos
at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16)
years
did
respondents
contest
petitioner's
occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot
No. 1549.
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as
they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of
Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents
would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged
occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of
the land while they, upon the other hand,
contented themselves with occupation of only a
fourth thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled
with the passage of a very substantial length of
time during which petitioner all the while remained
undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation
and possession, places respondents here in laches:
respondents may no longer dispute the existence of
the
co-ownership
between
petitioner
and
themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a
threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they
are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction,
to have acquiesced in the co-ownership.
Delima v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. L-46296, September 24, 1991, 201 SCRA
641
Medialdea J.
FACTS: Lino Delima acquired a lot from the friar
lands. Later, he died, leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and sisters namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita

Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. Galileo
was the caretaker of the property. He was able to
execute an affidavit adjusting to himself the parcel
of land and was able to secure the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. This
prompted the heirs of his siblings to file a action for
reconveyance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is subject to
prescription.
HELD: Yes. From the moment one of the co-owners
claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner
of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of
partition but of ownership. In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no
longer be invoked or applied when one of the coowners has adversely possessed the property as
exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription. It is settled that
possession by the co-owner or co-heir is that of a
trutee. In order that such possession is considered
adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts amounting to an
ouster of cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts
of repudiation had been made known to the cestui
que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive.
When the co-owner of the property executed a
deed of partition and on the strength thereof,
obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in
his name as the owner, the statute of limitations
started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and their rights
thereafter. The issuance of a new title constituted a
clear act of repudiation of the trust and coownership.
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are
brothers, and were among the seven (7) children of
the late Maximiano Aguilar. In 1969, the two
brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque
where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.

Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in
the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen
was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum,
Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their
interests in the house and lot should be equal, with
Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation
of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for
his possession and enjoyment of the house together
with their father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified
from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed
that the deed of sale would be executed and the
title registered in the meantime in the name of
Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take
care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and
his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter
vacate the house and that the property be sold
and proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to
petitioner's demands, the latter filed an action to
compel the sale of the house and lot so that the
they could divide the proceeds between them. In
his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds
of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds
(2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent.
Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use
of the house by respondent after their father died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent
alleged that he had no objection to the sale as
long as the best selling price could be obtained;
that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds
thereof should be divided equally; and, that being
a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the property. Rendering judgment by
default against defendant, for failure to appear at
pre- trial, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be
co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on
the basis of their written agreement. However, it
ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his
participation in the property by defendant's
continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of
rent, despite demands for rentals and continued
maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The
trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as coowner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not
agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property
should be sold to a third person and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties. The CA set
aside the order of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may demand

partition of the property.
HELD: Yes. We uphold the trial court in ruling in
favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of
the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as
co-owner which we here declare to commence
only after the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate in accordance with its order. Article 494 of
the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that
each co-owner may demand at any time partition
of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially,
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it
be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the coowners but because of the nature of the property it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon proper reimbursement of the coowners. However, being a co-owner respondent
has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may
use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners. 9 Each co-owner of
property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over
the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason
being that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every
co-owner exercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of
the same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in
court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot
and respondent has not refuted the allegation that
he has been preventing the sale of the property by
his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family
vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner,
respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per
month, with legal interest; from the time the trial
court ordered him to vacate, for the use and

enjoyment of the other half of the property
appertaining to petitioner. When petitioner filed an
action to compel the sale of the property and the
trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the
continued stay of respondent and his family in the
house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and
from then on, respondent should be held liable for
monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
Tomas Claudio Memorial College v. Court of
Appeals
Quisimbing, J.
FACTS: Juan De Castro died intestate in 1993
leaving a parcel of land located in Morong, Rizal to
his heirs. Mariano De Castro one of the heirs sold the
said lot to petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial
College by representing that he is the sole owner of
the property. The other heirs filed an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
alleging that the sale made by Mariano affected
only his undivided share of the lot but not the shares
of the other co-owners. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the partition for the reason that it has
already been barred by prescription.
The Regional Trial Court of Rizal dismissed the
petitioners motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the sale affected only the
undivided share of Mariano
2.) Whether or not the action to file for partition has
already prescribed.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The Court has consistently ruled that
even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. The sale of the whole property by a co-owner
does not make the sale null and void but it only
transfers the rights to the undivided share of the coowner who made the sale. The proper action in a
case like this is not nullification nor recovery but a
division or partition of the entire property.
2.) No. As to the issue on prescription, the Civil Code

provides that no prescription shall lie in favor of a
co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Robles v. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 123509, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 97
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Leon Robles originally owned the land which
was inherited by his son Silvino Robles. The latter
then took possession of the land and declared it in
his name for taxation purposes. Upon his death, the
same was inherited by his widow Maria dela Cruz
and his children. The plaintiffs entrusted the
payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and halfbrother, Hilario Tobles. For unknown reasons, the tax
declaration of the parcel of land in the name of
Silvino Robles was cancelled and transferred to one
Exequiel Ballena, father of Andres Robles who is the
wife of the defendant Hilario Robles. He secured a
loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. which was
foreclosed for failure to pay the mortgage debt
wherein the defendant bank emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale. Defendant
Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Santos. A n
action for quieting of title was filed by respondent
Santos. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been in
possession of the land since 1942 and it was only in
1987 that they knew about the foreclosure of the
mortgage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
because of the plaintiffs inaction for more than 20
years, prescription had already set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed in
favour of Hilario Robles.
HELD: Yes. Hilario effected no clear and evident
repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental
principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a coowner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other coowners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the other co-owner; and (3)
the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. In the
present case, Hilario did not have possession of the
subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof,
as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise,
his act of entering into a mortgage contract with
the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation

of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his
undivided interest in the land, he had the right to
alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should
his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed
upon by the co-owners, be construed as a
repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that
the declaration of ownership was tantamount to
repudiation was belied by the continued
occupation and possession of the disputed
property by the petitioners as owners.
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006
Chico Nazario, J.
FACTS: Timotea F. Galvez died intestate and left a
parcel of land in La Union. She left behind her
children Ulpiano and petitioner Paz Galvez. Ulpiano
who died before Timotea was survived by his son,
private respondent, Porfirio Galvez. With regards to
the property of Timotea, it is supposed to pass to
Paz and Porfirio. However, Porifirio was surprised to
discover that Paz executed an affidavit of
adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful
owner of the said property. Moreover, without the
knowledge and consent of Porfirio, Paz sold the
property to petitioner Carlos Tam for P10,000.00.
Tam thereafter filed an application for registration
for said parcel of land. Subsequently, Tam sold the
property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. Having
knowledge of such sale, Porfirio filed a complaint
for Legal Redemption with Damages and
Cancellation of documents against petitioner
which was affirmed by the lower court and the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez
which is based on an implied trust has already
prescribed because the action was filed 24
years after Paz Galvez repudiated the said
trust?
2.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez
which is based on an implied trust is already
banned by laches because he failed to assert
his alleged right for almost 24 years?
3.) Whether or not Carlos Tam and Tycoon
Properties are buyers in good faith and for value
and has the right to rely on the face of the title?
HELD: 1.) No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides
that "a prescription shall not run in favor of a coowner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the

co-ownership." It is a fundamental principle that a
co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share
of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. Prescription, as a
mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the
co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required
by law. In this case, we find that Paz Galvez
effected no clear and evident repudiation of the
co-ownership. The execution of the affidavit of selfadjudication does not constitute such sufficient act
of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to
effectively exclude Porfirio Galvez from the
property. This Court has repeatedly expressed its
disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a co-heir
feigning sole ownership of the property to the
exclusion of the other heirs essentially stating that
one who acts in bad faith should not be permitted
to profit from it to the detriment of others.
2.) No. On the matter of laches, it is hornbook
doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its
application
is
controlled
by
equitable
considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat
justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither
should its application be used to prevent the rightful
owners of a property from recovering what has
been fraudulently registered in the name of
another. The equitable remedy of laches is,
therefore, unavailing in this case.
3.) No. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon
Properties, Inc.s claim that they are buyers in good
faith, same fails to persuade. A purchaser in good
faith and for value is one who buys the property
without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest in such property and pays its fair price
before he has notice of the adverse claims and
interest of another person in the same property. So
it is that the "honesty of intention" which constitutes
good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry. "Tam did not exert efforts to determine the
previous ownership of the property in question" and
relied only on the tax declarations in the name of
Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam
received a copy of the summons and the

complaint
on
22
September
1994.
This
notwithstanding, he sold the property to Tycoon
Properties, Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly,
Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon Properties,
Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of lis pendens
dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties,
Inc. mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust
Company for the sum of P11,172,600. All these
attendant circumstances negate petitioners claim
of good faith.
Adille vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-45546, January 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Felisa Alzul, who owned a parcel of lot in
Albay was married twice. The first was with Bernabe
Adille whom she had an only child, herein petitioner
Rustico Adille. The second was with Procopio Asejo
whom she had three children, herein the private
respondents. It was alleged that Felisa sold the
property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, for a
period of repurchase being 3 years. However, she
died without being able to redeem the lot. After her
death but during the period of redemption, petitioner
Rustico repurchased, by himself alone the said lot.
Afterwards, he executed a deed of extra-judicial
partition by himself. Efforts to compromise were made
but failed. Thus, his half-brothers and sisters, private
respondents filed a present case of partition with
accounting on the position that he was only a trustee
on an implied trust when he redeemed the lot.
Moreover, it turned out that one of the private
respondents, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a
portion. The lower court was in favor of the petitioner;
however, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not a co-owner can acquire an
exclusive ownership over the property held in
common.
2.) Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD: 1.) No. The right of repurchase may be
exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share
alone. While the records show that the petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering
the expenses therefore, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership. Necessary
expenses may be incurred by one co-owner,
subject to his right to collect reimbursement from

the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary
expense. Under Article 488 of the Civil Code, it
provides that each co-owner shall have a right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right
owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of
the latter may exempt himself from this obligation
by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and
taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership. The result is that the
property remains to be in a condition of coownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article
1613 of the Code, may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption, the redemption
by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its
totality does not vest him ownership over it. Failure
on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles
the vendee a retro to retain the property and
consolidate title thereto in his name. But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner
the right to the entire property. It does not provide
for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. Neither
does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in
securing title over the parcel in his name terminate
the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers
and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for
reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption
expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the
property owned in common. Registration of
property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It
operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if
there is one.
2.) We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode
of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must
have been preceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject
to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the
co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4)
he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law. The
instant case shows that the petitioner had not
complied with these requisites. We are not
convinced that he had repudiated the coownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately
kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning
sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He
cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his
efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of

the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is
occupying a portion of the land up to the present;
yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her
therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover
possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying
only as a counterclaim, and only after the private
respondents had first sought judicial relief.
Adlawan vs. Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner
Arnelito
Adlawan,
the
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador
Adlawan filed an ejejctment suit against the siblings
of his father, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio
Adlawan. Being the sole heir of Dominador, he
executed an affidavit adjudicating the house and
lot owned by his father. However, he alleged that
out of respect and generosity to respondents, he
granted their plea to occupy the subject property
provided they would vacate the same should his
need for the property arise. Later, when he verbally
requested respondents to vacate the house and
lot, they refused and filed instead an action for
quieting of title. He then also filed a complaint for
ejectment. In answer, the respondents, 70 and 59
years of age respectively denied that they begged
petitioner to allow them to say on the property
since they have been staying there since birth. They
claimed that the said lot was originally registered in
the name of their deceased parents, Ramon and
Oligia Adlawan. Spouses Ramon and Oligia
needed money to finance the renovation of their
house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a
loan, they transferred ownership of the lot to
Dominador who was the only one in the family who
had a college education. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana did not disturb respondents possession of
the property until they died. They also argued that
even if petitioner is indeed Dominadors
acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed
is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his
wife, Graciana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly
maintain the instant case of ejectment.
HELD: No. Petitioner averred that he is an
acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of
Dominador. However, the RTC lost sight of the fact
that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner
would end up proving that he is not the sole owner
of the subject lot. This so because Dominador was

survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the death
of Dominador. By intestate succession, Graciana
and petitioner became co-owners of the subject lot
and house. Petitioner then contended that even
granting that he is a co-owner, he can file the
instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. It includes forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of
ownership (accion de reinvindicacion). A co-owner
may bring such action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed to
benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed,
however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the
petitioner alone who claims to be the sole owner
and entitled to the possession of the litigated
property, the action should be dismissed.
According to the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo
M. Tolentino, he explained that a co-owner may
bring such an action, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will
not prosper. In this case, it is not disputed that
petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in
his name alone and for his own benefit to the
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
disputed property. It is clear therefore that
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action
considering that he does not recognize the coownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro
Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple
was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five
illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein.
Lauro executed a document denominated Deed
of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real
Properties in favor of the petitioners. On the
document, it appears that the signature of his wife,
Placida which indicates that she gave her marital
consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro

executed it when he was already very sick and
bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request,
their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing
his signature on the document. Lydia left but later
returned on the same day and requested Lauros
unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said
document. After Lauros death, his wife, Placida
and petitioners jointly administered the properties,
50% of the produce went to his wife. As wifes share
in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed
a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming
any partition in the execution of the subject
document.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-ownership was formed
from the said deed.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is
actually a gratuitous disposition of property a
donation although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon
the petitioners the condition that he and his wife,
Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the
fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their
subsistence and support. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where
the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the deed of donation and in
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the
donation is not manifested either in the deed itself
or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an
instrument of donation is patently void. The Court
declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein
are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio
as the supposed seller declared under oath that
she signed the deeds without knowing what they
were. The significant circumstance meant, the
Court added, that her consent was not merely
marred by vices of consent so as to make the
contracts voidable, but that she had not given her
consent at all.
Title 4: Some Special Propoerties

Title 5: Possession
-------------------------(1)----------------------------Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal
G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15
Cuevas, J.
Petitioners evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax

declaration and survey plan are not conclusive and
indisputable basis of ones ownership of the
property in question. Assessment alone is of little
value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does
not vest ownership of the property upon defendant.
FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the

registration of two agricultural lands located in Rizal.
They presented testimonial and documentary
evidence appearing that the property applied for,
designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662,
have a total area of 26,015 sq. m.; that these lots
originally belong to one Maria Certeza; that upon
her death, the property was involved in a litigation
between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza,
and that the lots were given by the latter to Justice
de Joya as the latters attorneys fees; that the lots
were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana,
who in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano
Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939; that
sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold
the lots to herein applicants as shown by a duly
notarized deed of sale. The spouses Cervo
declared the property for taxation purposes in the
name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for
the realty taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, the
spouses Cervo had the two lots surveyed first in 1950
and then in 1955. On the other hand, oppositor
(Rizal Cement Company) claims to be the owner of
the subject lots, having bought the same from
Maria Certeza, and to have been in continuous
and adverse possession of the property since 1911.
To substantiate this claim, petitioner submitted
documentary evidence, one of which is a tax
declaration of the said lots. The Court of First
Instance denied the application for registration of
respondents and ordered the issuance of a decree
of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co.,
after finality of said decision. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the CFI. The CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Wong v. Carpio
Bidin, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents had been in

actual possession of the land in question.
HELD: Yes. The CA gave credence to the testimony
of the witnesses for respondents. As a general rule, it
is provided in the Civil Code that possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right or by the fact that it is subject
to the action of our will, or by the proper acts or
legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a

pacto de recto sale to Manuel Mercado. Mercado
only began to harvest the coconut fruits but he
never placed anyone over the land to watch it.
Neither did he reside in the land nor was there any
hut constructed thereon to show possession.
Thereafter, Ignacio Wong inspected the land to see
if whether there was anyone claiming the land.
After finding there was none, he bought the land
from Giger. He placed workers on the land,
constructed a farmhouse, and fenced the
boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due to
some technicalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of the disputed
land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD: It should be stressed that "possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper
acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right."
And that the execution of a sale thru a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If,
however, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery
has not been effected. Applying the above
pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that
possession passed from vendor William Giger to
private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of
the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale
a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the
possession of the property because there is an
impediment the possession exercised by private
respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred;
if there are two possessions, the one longer in

possession, if the dates of possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if these conditions
are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
Somodio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82680, August 15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307
Quiason, J.
FACTS: Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio
bought a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda,
Bula, General Santos. Petitioner and Mabugat
partitioned the property into two portions, with
petitioner taking the western part. Immediately
after the partition, petitioner took possession of his
portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut
trees and other fruit-bearing trees. In 1976,
petitioner began construction of a structure with a
dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His
employment, however, took him to Kidapawan,
North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished structure
to the case of his uncle. He would visit the property
every three months or on weekened when he had
time. Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed
respondent Felomino Ayco, to transfer his hut to
petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner
demanded that Ayco vacate the premises but
such demand proved futile. Hence, on August 23,
1983, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer
with
damages
against
respondent
Ayco.
Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer
Purisima entered the land and constructed a house
thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed against
respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry
before the same court docketed as Civil Case No.
2013-I. Said case was later consolidated with Civil
Case No. 2032-II.
ISSUE: Whether or not
possession of the property.
Somodio
has
actual
HELD: Yes. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines provides that possession is acquired by
the material occupation of a thing or the exercise
of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the
action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Petitioner took possession of the property sometime
in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut
trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started
the construction of a building on the property. It is
immaterial that the building was unfinished and
that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons

and visited the property only intermittently.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175
[1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to
subject the property to the action of his will.
Maglucot Aw v. Maglucot
G.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78
Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By
virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was
only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No.
1639 was filed because two of the co-owners,
namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis,
refused to have said lot subdivided and have
separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the
1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-ininterest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan. Sometime in
1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the
subject lot. Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo,
both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each
paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built
houses on their corresponding leased lots. They
paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to
Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-ininterest. In December 1992, however, said
respondents stopped paying rentals claiming
ownership over the subject lot alleging they had a
right over the land because such was not
partitioned and they were co-owners. ManglucotAw thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against Manglucot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manglucot-Aw may recover
possession by virtue of a valid partition.
HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not
interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it
decides the rights of the parties upon the issue
submitted. In this case, both the order of partition
and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus,
interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not
object to the interlocutory decree, but show by
their conduct that they have assented thereto, they
cannot thereafter question the decree, especially,

where, by reason of their conduct, considerable
expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission. Respondents in this case have
occupied their respective lots in accordance with
the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after
acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40)
years be allowed to question the binding effect
thereof. Under the present rule, the proceedings of
the commissioners without being confirmed by the
court are not binding upon the parties. However,
this rule does not apply in case where the parties
themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed
sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court
approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision
plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest implemented the
sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for
partition by actually occupying specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the
present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose
of the court approval has been met. This statement
is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the
commissioners may be dispensed with but only that
the parties herein are estopped from raising this
question by their own acts of ratification of the
supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
Cequea v. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza
Cequea and Eduarda Apiado sought for the
ownership and possession of the land occupied by
the respondent Honorata Bolante. Prior to 1954, the
land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the
father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the
basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the
name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot
was cancelled and subsequently declared in the
name of Margarito Mendoza, the father of the
petitioners. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers.
During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is
the present occupant of the land together with
Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners.
The trial court rendered the petitioners as the lawful
owner and possessors of the land. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision because
the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to overcome
the denial of respondent and her mother.
Moreover, the probative value of petitioners tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with

respondents proof of ownership of the disputed
parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession by respondent since 1985
gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil
Code. The petitioners contended otherwise that
she came into possession through force and
violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual,
physical, exclusive and continuous possession of the
land.
2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are
conclusive evidence of ownership or possession.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before
1985 was not exclusive, as the respondent also
acquired it before 1985. The records show that the
petitioners father and brother, as well as the
respondent and her mother were simultaneously in
adverse possession of the land. Based on Article 538
of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred
possessor because, benefitting from her fathers tax
declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has
been in possession thereof for a longer period. On
the other hand, petitioners father acquired joint
possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for
tax purposes does not prove ownership. The
petitioners claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------Aragon v. Insular Government
G.R. No. L-6019, March 25, 1911, 19 Phil. 223
Carson, J.
FACTS: The Government of the Philippine Islands,
through its proper representatives, objected to the
application for registration pursuant to the Land
Registration Act of a small lot of parcel of land
being instituted by herein petitioner, Juan Aragon
on the ground that said land forms part of the
public domain applying the provisions of subsection
1 of Article 339 of the old Civil Code, now Article
420, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code which
provides that the following things are property of
public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use,

such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadstead, and others of similar character. It
appears, however, that possessory title over the
land in question was duly registered in favor of
petitioner, and that the applicant and their
predecessors in interest have been in possession of
the parcel of land in question, under an undisputed
claim of ownership. That there are strong reasons to
believe that the land in question was originally well
above the ebb and flow of the tide and only in
later years have the waters risen to such a height
along the shores of the Bay of Manila at this point as
to cover the land in question completely at high
tide, though, it cannot be ascertained definitely
whether it is due to changes in the current and flow
of the waters in the bay, or to the gradual sinking of
the land along the coast.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled ownership
over the land in question.
HELD: The Court affirmed the decree entered by
the lower court in favor of petitioner applying the
provisions of Article 446 of the old Civil Code, Article
539 of the New Civil Code which provides that
every possessor has a right to be protected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he
shall be protected in or restored to said possession
by the means established by the laws and the Rules
of Court. Corollary, a possessor may lose his
possession under the circumstances provided under
Article 555 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (1) By the
abandonment of the thing; (2) By an assignment
made to another either by onerous or gratuitous
title; (3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing,
or because it goes out of commerce; and (4) By the
possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer
than one year. But the real right of possession is not
lost till after the lapse of ten years. The Court held
that since the foregoing enumerations with respect
to the loss of possession was not conclusively
established by the representatives of the
government, and the fact that the owners of the
land in question have never intended to abandon
the same, then it is just and proper to register said
land in their name.
Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80294, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 639
Gancayco, J.
FACTS: CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was a land registration
case where petitioner and private respondents
were asking for confirmation of their alleged
imperfect titles to the lots in question under Section
49 (b) of the Public Land Act. In the said decision,
the appellate court found that the petitioner was
not entitled to confirmation of its imperfect title to
Lots 2 and 3. In separate motions for
reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs of
Octaviano and Heirs of Juan Valdez relating to the
same decision, they also asked that said two lots be
registered in their names. On August 12, 1977, the
Court of Appeals denied both motions. Effectively,
therefore, in the said decision the appellate court
ruled that neither the petitioner nor the private
respondents are entitled to the confirmation of
imperfect title over said two lots. Pursuant to the
said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the two lots in
question remained part of the public lands. This is
the only logical conclusion when the appellate
court found that neither the petitioner nor private
respondents are entitled to confirmation of
imperfect title over said lots. The present actions
that were instituted in the Regional Trial Court by
private respondents are actions for recovery of
possession (accion publiciana) and not for recovery
of ownership (accion reivindicatoria).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
possession of the subject lots.
HELD: Yes. Under Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code, it
is provided that a possessor may lose his possession
by the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner was
in possession of the said property as borrower in
commodatum from private respondents since 1906.
However, in 1951 petitioner repudiated the trust
when it declared the property for tax purposes
under its name. Thus, when petitioner filed its
application for registration of the said property in
1962, it had been in adverse possession of the same
for at least 11 years. Hence, the action for recover
of possession of said property filed by private
respondents against petitioner must fail. The Court,
therefore, finds that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents

to be entitled to the possession thereof. Much less
can they pretend to be owners thereof. Said lots
are part of the public domain.
-------------------------(3)----------------------------EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos,
G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990, 134 SCRA 614
Cruz, J.
FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books
from EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp.
(EDCA), payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as
ordered, for which Cruz issued a check.
Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor
Santos who paid him after verifying the seller's
ownership from the invoice he showed her.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over
a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the
De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a
dean and was informed that there was no such
person in its employ. Further, Cruz had no account
with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he
had drawn the check. EDCA went to the police,
which arrested Cruz whose real name was Tomas
de la Pea. EDCA sought the assistance of the
police, and forced their way into the store of the
Santos and threatened her with prosecution for
buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books.
Santos sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of
the books because the check issued by the
impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the
books that were sold to Santos.
HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of
the books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides
that the possession of movable property acquired
in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. If the possessor of
a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at
a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor. A
contract of sale is perfected once agreement is
reached between the parties on the subject matter
and the consideration. Ownership in the thing sold

shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect.
Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass
from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid. Nonpayment only creates a right to demand payment
or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the
buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been
made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books
which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title to the books
acquired by the Santos spouses. Therefore, EDCA
was not unlawfully deprived of the books and
Santos had rights over the books.
De Garcia v. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-20264, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 129
Fernando, J.
FACTS: On October 11, 1953, Angelina Guevarra,
while talking to Consuelo de Garcia, recognized
her ring in the finger of the latter which she lost
sometime in February 1952. Guevarra asked where
de Garcia bought the ring to which de Garcia
answered that she bought it from her comadre.
Guevarra explained to de Garcia that that ring was
the very same ring stolen from her. De Garcia
handed the ring to Guevarra and the ring fitted her
finger. Two or three days later, at the request of
Guevarra, she, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara,
Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, de Garcia and her
attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to
whom they showed the ring in question. Mr.
Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high
power lens and after consulting the stock card
thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that
plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was
returned to defendant who despite a written
request therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff.
In trial, de Garcia said that she bought the ring from
Mrs. Miranda who got it from Mrs. Angelita Hinahon
who in turn got it from, Aling Petring who was
boarding in her house.
ISSUE: Whether or not de Garcias possession of the

ring in good faith confers her title to the said ring.
HELD: No. The controlling provision is Article 559 of
the Civil Code which provides that possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession
of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of
which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price paid therefor. Respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it
from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was
found in possession of the same. The only exception
the law allows is when there is acquisition in good
faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case
the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price. The common law principle
that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to
be committed, cannot be applied in a case which
is covered by an express provision of the new Civil
Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common
law principle and statutory provision, the latter must
prevail in this jurisdiction. It is thus immediately
apparent that there is no merit to the contention
raised in the first assigned error that her possession in
good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat
respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases
demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner
can recover the same once she can show illegal
deprivation. Respondent Court of Appeals was so
convinced from the evidence submitted that the
owner of the ring in litigation is such respondent.
Dizon v. Suntay
Fernando, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat
diamond ring. She entered into a transaction with
Clarita Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the
latter for sale on commission. Upon receiving the
ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a
lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring
was not yet returned and so Suntay demanded for
its return from Sison but the latter could not comply
as she had already pledged it with Dizons
pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands,

Sison delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay.
Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon asking
for the delivery of the ring pledged but, the latter
refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500
as attorneys fees and costs. She asked for the
remedy of replevin upon filing the requisite bond
pending final determination of the action. The CFI
of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to
regain possession during the pendency of the
action. The lower court rendered a decision in favor
of Suntay. On appeal, Dizon sought the reversal of
the lower courts decision and invoking estoppel.
CA affirmed the lower courts decision. SC affirmed
CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may
recover its possession from the pawnshop owner.
HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover
the possession of the same from a pawnshop where
another person had pledged it without authority to
do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and the
defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of
the without notice of any defect in the title of the
pledgor is unavailing. Neither the promptings of
equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural
justice come to his rescue. Dizon is engaged in a
business where presumably ordinary prudence
would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an
individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a
pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken
he should be the last to complain if thereafter the
right of the true owner of such jewelry should be
recognized.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
Davide, J.
FACTS: Two motor vehiclesHonda Gemini and
Holden Premiere Modelwere purchased from
Citiwide Motors by a person who identified himself
as Jojo Consunji. He bought the vehicles
purportedly for his father. Upon delivery to him of
the vehicles, he paid a managers check drawn
against PCIB. The check though was dishonored by
the bank on the ground that the checks value has
been materially altered. This was reported to the
police authorities and it was found out that the
person misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez
who had a long line of criminal cases against him
for his modus operandi. The Holden car was
recovered after being abandoned somewhere in
Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was

discovered to be sold to Ledesma. Ledesma
averred he purchased the vehicle in good faith
from one Neyra, as evidenced by his certificate of
registration. Citiwide Motors was able to recover.
ISSUE: Whether or not CITIWIDE MOTORS has been
unlawfully deprived.
HELD: No. There was a perfected unconditional
contract of sale between Citiwide Motors and
Suarez. The subsequent dishonor of the check
merely amounted to failure of consideration which
doesn't render a contract of sale void, but merely
allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific
performance or rescission of the sale. This being the
case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of
the property. It is thus not entitled to the return of
the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property
in
good
faith
and
for
consideration.
-------------------------(4)----------------------------Azarcon and Abobo v. Eusebio
G.R. No. L-11977, April 29, 1959, 105 SCRA 569
Labrador, J.
FACTS: Victor Eusebio had a dispute over a parcel
of land with Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon
and Esteban Abobo. Eusebio filed a lease
application for a parcel of land, a portion thereof
was occupied by Azarcon et al. under a
homestead application. Before the dispute could
be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI of
Nueva Ecija, alleging that he had acquired a big
parcel of land by lease from the Bureau of Lands,
and that while he was in possession thereof,
Azarcon et al. occupied a portion. The trial court
ruled in favor of Eusebio, and a writ of execution
ordering Azarcon et al. to restore possession of the
land to Eusebio was issued on October 3, 1955.
However, in spite of the receipt of the notice of writ
of execution, Azarcon et al. nevertheless entered
the land to gather palay which was then pending
harvest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azarcon and Abobo are
entitled to the pending fruits of the land.
HELD: Yes. While the court order of October 3, 1955
ordered them to move out of the premises, it did
not prohibit them from gathering the crop then
existing thereon. Under the law, a person, who is in
possession and who is being ordered to leave a
parcel of land while products thereon are in
pending harvests, has the right to a part of the net

harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the
Civil Code. Hence, as the order of execution did
not expressly prohibit Azarcon et al. from gathering
the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of
their possession and cultivation of the land, it
cannot be said that they committed an act which
is clear violation of the courts order.
Cordero v. Cabral
G.R. No. L-36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, husband of the plaintiff Felipa Cordero
and father of the other plaintiffs surnamed
Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958. The said deceased
left several properties, which were inherited by the
plaintiffs including the land in question which parcel
of land was originally registered in accordance with
the Land Registration Act on December 14, 1933,
and was registered and/or transferred in the name
of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo on July 31, 1934. After
the death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
plaintiffs herein took possession of the said parcel of
land which is a riceland, but they found out that the
southern portion of the same with an area 4,303
square meters, more or less, upon verification, was
possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P.
Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos.
Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said
portion while her co-defendants co-possessed the
same as her tenants. The plaintiffs demanded of the
defendants to surrender to the former possession of
the portion of land and/or vacate it but they
refused and failed to do so, and the defendant
Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be the
owner of the same while her co-defendants
continued recognizing her as the owner thereof
instead of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that
because of the defendants' occupancy of the
aforementioned plaintiffs' portion of land with the
area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to the
exclusion of the latter, the said plaintiffs failed to
realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes
of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the
harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the
reimburse the fruits receive.
defendants
must
HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No.

14513 issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
predecessor of the plaintiffs. The original registration
which includes the disputed land was not vitiated

by error or fraud. The defendants, by their own
admission, are in possession of the disputed land.
There is no evidence that they were possessors in
bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when
they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the
service of the summons they "shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received.
-------------------------(5)----------------------------Mendoza and Enriquez v. De Guzman
Malcolm, J.
FACTS: In the cadastral proceedings of the
municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, a piece of land
identified as lot No. 687 was adjudicated in favor of
Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts
pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the
part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have been
indemnified for the improvements existing on the
land. Mendoza has possessed it since 1916. By virtue
of this judgment, De Guzman presented a motion
requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot
No. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25,
1924. Since then De Guzman has had dominion
over the land. Being unable to come to an
agreement as to the amount which should be
allowed for the improvements made on the land,
Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an
action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of
the necessary and useful expenses incurred by
Manuel
de
Guzman
in
introducing
the
improvements; (b) require the defendant to render
an accounting of the fruits received by him and
order that the value of the fruits be applied to the
payment of the necessary and useful expenses;
and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to
the plaintiffs. Max. B. Solis, one of the persons who
were ejected from the land, asked leave to
intervene, alleging, among other things, that De
Guzman had transferred all his rights in the
improvements and in the lot to him with the
exception of two hundred coconut trees. This
petition was granted. At the trial which followed
and at the instance of the parties, two
commissioners were appinted with instructions to
inspect the land and to count the number of
coconut trees planted thereon, determining the
number of fruit-bearing trees and those that are not
fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same.
After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered
judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel

de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have
the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin
Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as
compensation for the necessary and useful
expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for
Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo
Solis; and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and
Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25, 1924,
one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel de
Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis.
As on the date when this judgment was rendered,
that is on September 23, 1927, the amount that the
plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant
and intervenor exceeded the amount that the
latter were to pay the former, the defendant and
intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and its
improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the
difference, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly
declared
the
amount
to
be
paid
as
"indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful
expenditures incurred by the defendant.
HELD: Yes. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the
original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion."
However one may speculate as to the true
meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether
correctly
translated
as
"compensation"
or
"indemnity," the amount of the "indemnizacion" is
the amount of the expenditures mentioned in
articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the
present case is the amount of the necessary and
useful expenditures incurred by the defendant.
Necessary expenses have been variously described
by the Spanish commentators as those made for
the preservation of the thing; as those without
which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as
those that augment the income of the things upon
which they are expanded. Among the necessary
expenditures are those incurred for cultivation,
production, upkeep, etc. Here the plaintiffs have
chosen to take the improvements introduced on
the land and are disposed to pay the amount of
the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the
defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not
exactly a posessor in good faith with in the meaning
of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary
and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should
account to the owners of the estate for any rents,
fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
Robles and Martin v. Lizarraga Hermanos

G.R. No. L-16736, December 22, 1921, 42 Phil. 584
Romualdez, J.
FACTS: Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of
October, 1916, leaving six children, to wit,
Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias, Felix, and
Purificacion,
surnamed
Robles,
and
some
properties, among which is house No. 4 on Iznart
Street in the city of Iloilo. The children and heirs of
Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with
Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and settlement of
their accounts, by virtue of which the competent
court awarded to said partnership the properties
left by the deceased, including the aforesaid house
No. 4 on Iznart Street. Evarista Robles, one of the
heirs, since before the death of her mother
Anastasia de la Rama, has been with her husband
occupying the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart
Street, at the beginning, by permission of her
mother, later on by the consent of her coheirs, and
lastly by agreement with the partnership, Lizarraga
Hermanos, to whom it had been awarded, having
made some improvements on the house, the value
of which is fixed at four thousand five hundred
pesos (P4,500), and paying to said partnership forty
pesos (P40) monthly as rent of the upper story. On
March 18, 1918, Lizarraga Hermanos notified
Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April next
the rent of the upper story of the house would be
raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she
did not agree to the new rate of rent, she might
vacate the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay
such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house,
and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit against her for
ejectment.
Evarista
Robles
sued
Lizarraga
Hermanos afterwards to recover the value of the
improvements.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of
the aforesaid improvements and has the right to
demand payment of their value.
2.) Whether or not she has any right to retain the
building until the said value is paid to her.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Robles is the owner of the
improvements. The expenditures incurred in these
improvements were not necessary inasmuch as
without them the house would have continued to
stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as
with them the house better serves the purpose for
which it was intended, being used as a residence,
and the improvements consisting of the addition of

a dining room, kitchen, closet, and bathroom in the
lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable,
suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it is
beyond doubt that such improvements are useful
to the building. Since the improvements are useful
and Robles possession is in good faith, applying
Article 453, it is beyond question that Evarista Robles
is the owner of such improvements, and entitled to
reimbursement therefor.
2.) Yes. It is a fact that the value of the
improvements in question has not as yet been paid
by Lizarraga Hermanos. Wherefore, if Evarista
Robles and her husband are entitled to retain the
building until the value of such improvements is
paid them, Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any
right to oust them from the building, nor, therefore,
to be indemnified for any damages caused by the
refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate
rights. Hence, due to the non-reimbursement of the
aforesaid useful expenditures, the possessor in good
faith has the right of retention until she has been
fully reimbursed with the same.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-54526, August 25, 1986, 143 SCRA 623
Martinez, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1965, petitioner MWSS (then
known as NAWASA) leased around one hundred
twenty eight (128) hectares of its land (hereafter,
subject property) to respondent CHGCCI (formerly
the International Sports Development Corporation)
for twenty five (25) years and renewable for
another fifteen (15) years or until the year 2005, with
the stipulation allowing the latter to exercise a right
of first refusal should the subject property be made
open for sale. The terms and conditions of
respondent CHGCCI's purchase thereof shall
nonetheless be subject to presidential approval.
Pursuant to Letter of instruction (LOI) No. 440 issued
on July 29,1976 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos directing petitioner MWSS to negotiate the
cancellation
of
the
MWSS-CHGCCI
lease
agreement for the disposition of the subject
property, Oscar Ilustre, then General Manager of
petitioner MWSS, sometime in November of 1980
informed respondent CHGCCI, through its president
herein respondent Pablo Roman, Jr., of its
preferential right to buy the subject property which
was up for sale. Valuation thereof was to be made
by an appraisal company of petitioner MWSS'
choice, the Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. which, on

January 30, 1981, pegged a fair market value of
P40.00 per square meter or a total of P53,800,000.00
for the subject property. Upon being informed that
petitioner MWSS and respondent CHGCCI had
already agreed in principle on the purchase of the
subject property, President Marcos expressed his
approval of the sale as shown in his marginal note
on the letter sent by respondents Jose Roxas and
Pablo Roman, Jr. dated December 20, 1982.The
Board of Trustees of petitioner MWSS thereafter
passed Resolution 36-83, approving the sale of the
subject property in favor of respondent SILHOUETTE,
as assignee of respondent CHGCCI. The MWSSSILHOUETTE sales agreement eventually pushed
through. Per the Agreement dated May 11, 1983
covering said purchase, the total price for the
subject property is P50,925,200, P25 Million of which
was to be paid upon President Marcos' approval of
the contract and the balance to be paid within
one (1) year from the transfer of the title to
respondent SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at
12% per annum. The balance was also secured by
an irrevocable letter of credit. A Supplemental
Agreement was forged between petitioner MWSS
and respondent SILHOUETTE on August 11, 1983 to
accurately
identify
the
subject
property.
Subsequently, respondent SILHOUETTE, under a
deed of sale dated July 26, 1984, sold to
respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67) hectares
of the subject property at P110.00 per square
meter. Of the total price of around P74 Million, P25
Million was to be paid by respondent AYALA
directly to petitioner MWSS for respondent
SILHOUETTE's account and P2 Million directly to
respondent SILHOUETTE. P11,600,000 was to be paid
upon the issuance of title in favor of respondent
AYALA, and the remaining balance to be payable
within one (1) year with 12% per annum interest.
Respondent AYALA developed the land it
purchased into a prime residential area now known
as the Ayala Heights Subdivision. Almost a decade
later, petitioner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed an
action against all herein named respondents
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
seeking for the declaration of nullity of the MWSSSILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent
conveyances involving the subject property, and
for the recovery thereof with damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS failed to provide
appropriate security measures over its own records;
Circumstances led NBI to believe that the
fraudulent encashment as an inside job.
HELD: Yes. The records likewise show that MWSS

failed to provide appropriate security measures
over its own records thereby laying confidential
records open to unauthorized persons. MWSS's own
Fact Finding Committee, in its report submitted to
their General Manager underscored this laxity of
records control. It observed that the "office of Mr.
Ongtengco (Cashier VI of the Treasury Department
at the NAWASA) is quite open to any person known
to him or his staff members and that the check
writer is merely on top of his table. Relying on the
foregoing statement of Mr. Ongtengco, the NBI
concluded in its Report dated 2 November 1970
that the fraudulent encashment of the 23 checks in
question was an "inside job". Thus the NBI believe
that the fraudulent act was an inside job or one
pulled with inside connivance at NAWASA. The
serial numbers of the checks in question conform
with the numbers in current use of NAWASA, aside
from the fact that these fraudulent checks were
found to be of the same kind and design as that of
NAWASA's own checks. While knowledge as to such
facts may be obtained through the possession of a
NAWASA check of current issue, an outsider without
information from the inside can not possibly
pinpoint which of NAWASA's various accounts has
sufficient balance to cover all these fraudulent
checks. None of these checks, it should be noted,
was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Title 6: Usufruct
-------------------------(1)----------------------------Bachrach v. Seifert and Elianoff
Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no
forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald
Bachrach, in his last will and testament made
various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of
his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of
108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge
Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000
shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on
the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary
McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant
of the estate, petitioned the lower court to
authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as
administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock
dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that
said dividend, although paid out in the form of
stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to
her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Seifert and
Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed
said petition on the ground that the stock dividend
in question was not income but formed part of the
capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman. While
appellants admit that a cash dividend is an
income, they contend that a stock dividend is not,
but merely represents an addition to the invested
capital.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dividend is an income and
whether it should go to the usufructuary.
HELD: Yes. The usufructuary shall be entitled to
receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of
the property in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock
are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000
shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original
investment. They represent profits, and the delivery
of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is
equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said
shares may be sold independently of the original
shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal
may be sold independently of its mother. If the
dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in
stock, it should be held to be income. A dividend,
whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and,
consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking
into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a
cash dividend can be declared only out of profits

of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the
capital it would be a serious violation of the law.
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is
considered part of the capital and belongs to the
remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule,
all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the
lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The
Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our
statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals,
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes
and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed
a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos with
Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed
ownership over the subject land, together with all its
improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa
Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory
conditions that upon her death or marriage, the
donee shall revert the said property to anyone of
Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a
"Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion" was made conveying to
Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it
to R & B Insurance with an annotation of Usufruct
in favor of her stepmother, Justa Kausapin. Unable
to pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa
Kausapin executed another agreement or
Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique
D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and
pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of
Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral
survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the
owner. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to
Dominium Realty Const. Corp. (Dominium), a sister
company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to
introduce some improvements already when R & B
insurance informed them that they are the owners
of the property where these improvements are
being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by
Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes was
valid.
HELD: No. The court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that
Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of

Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to
repudiate Justa Kausapins allegation that she did
not execute such a deed and she never allowed to
use the land as security for the loan. It was found
that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was
spurious and it follows that the original title she had
for the property was also null and void so as the
mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand,
Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the
authenticity of the the kasundudan in favor of his
stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent
from for her financial support.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------Fabie v. Gutierrez David
Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the
usufructuary of the income of certain houses
located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth
clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y
Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property
abovementioned is the respondent Juan Grey,
while those of the Ongpin property are other person
not concern herein. Previous to September 1944
litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff
and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the
Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the
administration of the houses mentioned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the
petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action
and as such within the jurisdiction of said court, or
an action founded on property right and therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted by the parties that the
petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the
income of the property in question and that the
respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is
likewise admitted that by virtue of a final judgment
entered in Civil Case No. 1659 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and
the owner, the former has the right to collect all the
rents of said property for herself with the obligation
on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums, and make
all necessary repairs thereon, and in case default
on her part the owner shall have the right to do all
those things, in which event he shall be entitled to
collect all subsequent rents of the property
concerned until the amount paid by him and the

expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after which
the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There
is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the
respective interests of the parties in the property in
question. The naked title to the property is to
admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the
right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to
pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make
the necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in
the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during
her lifetime.
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth
clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y
Grey, which was quoted in the decision and by
which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary
during her lifetime of the income of the property in
question, we find that the said usufructuary has the
right to administer the property in question. All the
acts of administration to collect the rents for
herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums thereon
were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary
-------------------------(3)----------------------------Vda. De Aranas v. Aranas
G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 415
Paras, J.
FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman
Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had
executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and
Testament which was admitted to probate on
August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr.
Teodoro
Aranas
stipulated
the
special
administration of the remainder of his estate (after
returning to his brothers Aniceto and Carmelo or
their heirs all properties acquired by him including
10 parcels of land inherited by him from his parents)
by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable
nephew and designating him also as recipient of
1/2 of the produce of said properties after
deducting the expenses for the administration and
the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the
Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the
testator's soul. Said pertinent provision reads as
follows: It is my will that the lands I had bought
from other persons should be converged and
placed under a special administrator. The special
administrator of these lands, for his office, should
receive one half of all the produce from which shall
be deducted the expenses for the administration,
and the other half of the produce should be

received by the Roman Catholic Church and
should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable
nephew, should be the first special administrator of
said properties, without bond, until his death or until
he should not want to hold the said office anymore.
Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas
can hold the said office of special administrator,
and none other than they. Their father, my brother
Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who
among them shall hold the said office, but upon
the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his
said sons will have power to select the one among
them ourselves. The special administration is
perpetual.
ISSUE: Whether or not perpetual inalienability and
administration of the estate of the late Fr. Teodoro
Aranas is null and void for being violative of Article
870 of the NCC.
HELD: No. Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the
right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the
benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or
exploitation) of another's property, with the
obligation to return, at the designated time, either
the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent.
This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual
as there is a limitation namely his death or his
refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of
these properties is limited by his refusal and/or
death and therefore it does not run counter to Art.
870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners.
Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to
dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from
the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the
other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which
has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from
disposing of said naked ownership without
prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct.
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as
usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the
desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward
him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered
during the time when said testator was seriously ill or
bed-ridden.
-------------------------(4)----------------------------Locsin v. Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989, 173 SCRA 454
Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract
of agricultural land known as Hacienda Villa
Regalado. A portion of this land known as Lot No.
2-C-A-3 was subject to lifetime usufructuary rights of
respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was
cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered
the rentals to respondent. In 1972, PD 27 was
enacted, decreasing the Emancipation of
Tenants. The tract of land owned in common by
the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject
to petitioners usufructuary rights, fell within the
scope of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners
sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian
Reform(DAR) as to who should be entitled to
receive the rental payments which continued to be
made by the tenants to respondent. The DAR
District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental
payments
were
properly
considered
as
amortization payments for the land and as such
should pertain to the landowners and not the
usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was
extinguished by PD 27 and who, between the
naked owner and the usufructuary, should be
entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants
beginning October 21, 1972.
HELD: Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed
as a jus in re aliena in favour of Helen Schon was
effectively extinguished by PD 27. To hold, as
private respondent apparently urges would
obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform
statute. PD 27 was enacted to emancipate the
tenants from bondage of the soil by giving to the
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they
were cultivating. Ownership over the lands
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved
from the registered owner to the tenants. The Court
holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared
part of the land reform area and subjected to the
Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on
October 21, 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted
amortization payments on the cost of the land that
they were required to pay under PD 27. These
payments, therefore, legally pertain to the
petitioners as part of the compensation for the
dominion over the land of which they were
deprived of by operation of PD 27.
Title 7: Easements and Servitudes

Valisno v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398
Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges
that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Nueva
Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata
Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other
vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano,
on the bank of the Pampanga River. At the time of
the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing
Adrianos land. Later, Adriano levelled a portion of
the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of
the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating
his 57 hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint
for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications (Bureau PWC).
Bureau PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of
restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a
reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In
the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at
his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate
his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint
for damages. However, the Secretary of Bureau
PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisnos
complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos water rights
which had been granted in1923 ceased to be
enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation
canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights
since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence,
the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land
which Honorata received from her fathers estate
did not acquire any water rights with the land
purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no
right to pass through the defendant's land to draw
water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that
under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies
between persons claiming a right to water from a
stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Bureau-PWC and his decision on the matter is final,
unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within
thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity
of the decision of the Public Works Secretary
collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in
Valisnos evidence to show that the resolution was
not valid. It dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim. Valisnos motion for reconsideration

was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the
Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act
(Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should
apply to this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Adrianos
land for the passage of water from the Pampanga
River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of
the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to
continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the
Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated, as
a title in order that he easement may continue
actively and passively, unless at the time,
theownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the
deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common on by two or
more persons (Civil Code).
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the
Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a
tract of irrigated land which previously received its
waters from a single point is divided through
inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title,
between two or more owners, the owners of the
higher estates are under obligation to give free
passage to the water as an easement of conduit
for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without
right to any compensation therefore unless
otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the
"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold,
ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas
Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations
over the parcel of land above- described, together
with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G"
suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No.
5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and
discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and
footvalves," and the water rights and such other

improvements appertaining to the property subject
of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right
was the primary consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage
ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of
the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of
necessity in a water ditch running across the
grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the
water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an
easement by grant may also have qualified as an
easement of necessity does detract from its
permanency as property right, which survives the
determination of the necessity. As an easement of
waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he
is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984),
such as Adrianos act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the
Pampanga River.
Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al.
G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84
Montemayor, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the
continuous and uninterrupted use of a road which
traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in
going to Igualdad Street and the market place of
Naga City for more than 20 years and that the
Rocos have long recognized and respected the
private legal easement of a right of way of said
plaintiffs.
On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a
number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiffs
right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle
of the said road and then later, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently
planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire
and closed hermitically the road passage way
thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it.
The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired
the easement of right of way over the land thru
prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted
use of the narrow strip of land as passage way.
However, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the
CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way

can be acquired by prescription.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right
of way may not be acquired thru prescription
because though it may be apparent, it is
nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and
therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code,
can be acquired only by a virtue of a title.
Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription because prescription requires that the
possession be continuous and uninterrupted.
Taedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86
Padilla, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas
owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two
lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common
use of the occupants of both lots. Cardenas sold
Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Taedo and the
other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Taedo as
a security for the payment of loan with an
agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to
herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Upon learning of the said sale, Taedo offered to
redeem the property from Sim but the latter
refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on
Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also
asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building
enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Taedo was then
constrained to file an action for legal redemption
and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil
Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses
claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B
and that Eduardo Taedo has no right to redeem
the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the
land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than
the land owned by Taedo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to
continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot
7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land
and its subsequent sale to different owners who do
not have the same interest.
HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil
Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the
easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed
of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did
Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe

and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A
before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence,
the use of the septic tank is continued by operation
of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita
Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.
Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties
situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City,
on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The
private respondents, on the other hand, are the
owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner
began the construction of its beach hotel, the
private respondents, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road,
passed through a passageway which traversed the
petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed
the aforementioned passageway when it began
the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless
opened another route across its property through
which the private respondents, as in the past, were
allowed to pass. Later, or sometime in August, 1982,
when it undertook the construction of the second
phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its
property thus closing even the alternative
passageway
and
preventing
the
private
respondents from traversing any part of it.
Therefore, an action for injunction with damages
was filed against the petitioner by the private
respondents before the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu.
The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984
finding that the private respondents had acquired
a vested right over the passageway in controversy
based on its long existence and its continued use
and enjoyment by the private respondents and also
by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate
Court held as without basis the trial court's finding
that the private respondents had acquired a
vested right over the passageway in question by
virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed
out that an easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the
New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of
a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding,
the appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the
interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of
its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not

treating the easement here sought by appellees
Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco
as one that is not dependent upon the claims of
the parties but a compulsory one that is legally
demandable by the owner of the dominant estate
from the owner of the servient estate."
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be
granted to private respondent over the land of
Costabella.
HELD: No. It is already well-established that an
easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by
prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate
court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood
correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct
pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court
did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision
and the dismissal of the complaint after holding
that no easement had been validly constituted
over the petitioner's property. Instead, the
Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible
error by considering the passageway in issue as a
compulsory
easement
which
the
private
respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate,
may demand from the petitioner the latter being
the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the
owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four requisites, to wit:
(1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. In the case at bar, there is absent any
showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites
mandated by law.
Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate
bounded on north by the servient estate owned by
respondents and an estate owned by Magsino, all
of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The
servient estate is bound on the north by the
national highway. To provide access to the

highway, a one meter road path was paved
through in which half of its width was taken from the
estate of Magsino and the other half from the
estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a
nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts
were used to haul the plants from his estate to and
from his nursery and the highway, using the one
meter road path. As his business grew, he bought a
jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and
soil catering to the now bigger demand. The
problem however was that the jeepney cannot
pass through the road path since its width would
not be accommodated by a one meter width.
Petitioner made a request upon the respondent to
sell to him 1 meters of their property so that the
pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney to
pass through. The respondents refused. Petitioner
went to court praying that he would be granted
the additional land to the right of way already
constituted but the trial court rendered a decision
adverse to the petitioner because there was no
such necessity as it was shown that there was the
presence of dried river bed only 80 meters away
from the property of the petitioner which he may
use as an alternative route. The CA affirmed said
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be
granted his prayer to buy the additional land to
increase the existing one meter road path.
HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river
bed, upon thorough investigation, it was found to
be an inadequate right of way because a
concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would
have to jump over said bridge which has a height
of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. It was
also found that during the rainy season, the same
was impassable as it became flooded. This right of
way could not provide adequate access to the
highway thereby when an estate has no access to
a public road, it may demand for a right of way.
Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is
the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the right of way.
In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew
larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport
his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to
do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently
make such transportation of his plants, the right of
way had to be widened to accommodate the
width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The
petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land

to the existing right of way.
Case v. Heirs of Tuason
Torres, J.
FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason
and Leocadia Santibaez alleged that the parties
whom he represents are owners in common of the
property adjoining that of the petitioner Edwin Case
on the southwest. The latter, extended his southwest
boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs
of Tuason and Santibaez. They alleged that the
true dividing line between the property of the
petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging
to the respondents, and that about two years ago,
when Case made alterations in the buildings
erected on his land, he improperly caused a
portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the
heirs of the late Tuason and Santibaez.
HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of
the late Tuason and Santibaez for the reason,
among others, that in the public document by
which one of their original ancestors acquired on
the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed
by them, it appears that property was then already
inclosed by a stone wall.
The wall supports only the property of the
respondents and not that of the petitioner, can not
be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire
length would belong to the adjoining building
owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to
sustain such claim, and besides, the building
erected thereon disproves the pretension of the
petitioner.
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of
party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or
exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among
others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the
common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to
the three cases dealt with in the said article of the
code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary
appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining
properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in
controversy belongs to one of the property owners,
or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such

presumption and support a presumption against
the party wall.
It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion
was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively
owned by the respondents, inasmuch as the latter
have proven by means of a good title that has not
been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of
their ancestors and principals acquired the property
the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which
the building was erected; it must therefore be
understood that in the purchase of the property the
wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily
included.
Choco v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132
Mapa, J.
FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house,
has made several openings and windows in the
walls of the house on both sides overlooking then
property of the plaintiff; that at the time the
defendant was building his house, and the windows
and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs
protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made
written protest and demand on the defendant, and
the defendant received the written protest and
referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence,
appears to have suggested an amicable and
adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was
not made, and this action was brought. The Trial
Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
Severina and Flora Choco, and against the
defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever prohibiting
the opening of the window stated, which must be
closed, and forever prohibiting the opening of the
windows and openings marked, which must be
closed or made to conform to the requirements of
law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate
embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not
ordering in his judgment the final and perpetual
closing of the large window opened in the balcony
of the back part of the appellee's house and that,
though the appellant's lot can be seen through the
window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.
HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it
opens on the boundary line between the said lot
and that the appellee and is situated
perpendicularly above a part of the wall that
belongs to the appellants. This opinion is

corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's
witness who took the said photographs, in so far as
he said that "a part of the window in question is in
front of the plaintiffs' property, since between it and
the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the
distance required by law that of two meters in
the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second,
therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the
provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows: Windows with direct views, or
balconies or any similar openings projecting over
the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if
there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters
between the wall in which they are built and said
estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be
opened over said property, unless there is a
distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack of
the distance required by law, the window in
question must be closed, and consequently the
judgment appealed from should be modified in this
sense, as regards this window.
Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co.,
Inc.
G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the
owner of the land in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in
the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the
name of the private respondent Bio Hong Trading
Co., Inc. The private respondents title came from a
prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties
thereto reserved as easement of way. As a
consequence, there is an annotation which was
entered wherein a construction of private alley has
been undertaken. However, the petitioner averred
that they and their neighbors have been using the
private alley and maintained and contributed to its
upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this, the
private respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered used. The petitioner
commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent to have the gates removed and to
allow full access to the easement. The court a quo
issued ex parte an order directing the private
respondent to open the gates. However, the Court
of Appeals ordered the restoration of the
annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not impair
the private respondents title, and that since the
private respondent had acquired title to the
property,
merger
brought
about
an
extinguishment of the easement. The petitioner

then averred that the very deed of sale executed
between the private respondent and the previous
owner of the property excluded the alley in
question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the alley as an easement,
notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been
extinguished by merger.
HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger
took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of
the private respondent corporation. According to
the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of
the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in
the same person. Merger then, as can be seen,
requires full ownership of both estates. One thing
ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in
question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one
constituted not in favor of a particular tenement
but rather, for the benefit of the general public as
stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal
servitude, there is therefore no owner of a
dominant tenement to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as
we said, presupposes the existence of a prior
servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of
no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in
favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine
merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713
Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro
Park Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress
to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of
its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. On the
other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the
registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision,
adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision. Prior to its
purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and
registered housing subdivision in the name of
Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to
6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it
from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by
ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado
Homes does not have any existing road or passage
to the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed

access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial
Ipapo has been specifically provided in the
subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision which was duly approved by the
defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted
permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of
the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and
from MacArthur Highway. However no contract of
easement of right of way was ever perfected by
both parties. Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with
a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones,
thereby preventing its use by the Llenados. Llenado
instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way.
The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered another
judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued
and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant
damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the
CA, the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering
Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the
objects that prevent passage on road 5 and to pay
the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of
indemnity for the easement of right of way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a
compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil
Code, the preconditions provided under Articles
649 and 650 thereof must be established. These
preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649,
par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the
prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of
way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. On
the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel Homes
which is bought by Llenado, there is an indication
of an access road through IPAPOs property

although it was not properly paved, a dirt road will
suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply
with the first requirement. If the servitude requested
by
Llenado
is
allowed,
other
subdivision
developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily
prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions
for access roads merely for registration purposes.
Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the
very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957
was enacted, that is, to protect subdivision buyers
from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers
who renege on their duties to develop their
subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved
subdivision plans, would be defeated.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of
right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.
Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the servitude, the same should not
be imposed.
The complaint for easement of right of way filed by
Llenado in the lower court did not contain a prayer
for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro
in the event that the easement of right of way is
constituted. Thus, the existence of the second
requisite has likewise not been established. Private
respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo
riceland was no longer being cultivated. Indications
are that it has already been abandoned as a
ricefield. There was no reason for private
respondent's failure to develop the right of way
except the inconvenience and expenses it would
cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been
met. Failing to establish the existence of the
prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a
compulsory easement of right of way over Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
Quimen v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with
her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in
Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did,
with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and
Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located

directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is
the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot
No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2)
equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero,
father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros.
Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her
uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was
then acting as his administratrix. According to
Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property
for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access
to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her
to buy the lot with the assurance that she would
give her a right of way on her adjoining property.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot
she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But
when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of
the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by
Anastacia from passing through her property. Later,
Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio
Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind
the property of her parents who provided her a
pathway between their house from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of
strong materials and occupies the entire frontage
of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine
meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the
municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and
egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so
that one has to pass through the back entrance
and the facade of the store to reach the road.
Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper
court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's
property. The report was that the proposed right of
way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's
property facing the public highway, starting from
the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending
inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning
left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store.
However, the trial court dismissed her complaint.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioners property and that the way proposed by
Yoland would cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property
of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property

and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid
grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
without an adequate outlet to a public highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts
of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way
being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.
While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are
permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest
distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other
words, where the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a
store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which
although longer will only require an avocado tree
to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
De Jesus, et. al. v. Homart Corporation, et. al.
G.R. No. 44191 R, August 28, 1974, 19 CA Rep. 831
FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners
of the building located in Tondo, Manila. They
brought an action for damages against Homart
Corporation
and
Howmill
Manufacturing
Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the
plaintiff on the same street where a sixty storey
concrete building was constructed. Plaintiffs allege
that the defendants failed to observe the necessary
care and precautions to protect the construction of
the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support, thereby causing it to sink in
some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack
in some places; and by the careless manner of
handling the cement used the roofings of the

building of the plaintiff were damaged with the
accumulated debris piled thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been
taken by the defendants in constructing the
building in question so as to prevent causing
damage to the building of the plaintiff.
HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides
No property shall make such excavations upon his
land as to deprive any adjacent land or building
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. A reading of
Article 684 shows that the duty of an adjacent
owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an
absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of
care and precaution made by the proprietor in
making the excavation or building on his land.
Plaintiffs house which adjoins the seven storey
concrete building constructed by the defendants
had sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the
left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the
weakening of subjacent support and to the weight
of the seven storey concrete building constructed
by the defendant, as the excavation made
necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the
plaintiffs land. Defendants having failed to provide
the plaintiffs land and house with sufficient lateral
and subjacent support are liable for damages.
La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in
Quezon City and Marikina, and when they sold to
Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their
landholdings, it was expressly provided in the Deed
of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line
between the property sold and the adjoining
property of the Tuasons shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from
the property sold to the Philippine Building
Corporation and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the Tuasons. Philippine
Building Corporation then sold and assigned with
the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of
land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage and
the obligation in the seven and one-half roadway.
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the
estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine
Building Corporation into a residential village known
as LA VISTA Subdivision. Thus the boundary between

LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO was the
15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan
Road. The Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of
the 15-meter wide boundary, while ATENEO
deferred improvement on its share and erected
instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the
boundary.
ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the
land which the latter developed into a subdivision
now known as LOYOLA Grand Villas. Solid Homes
Inc. now claims to have an easement of right-ofway along Mangyan Road through which they
could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA however instructed its security guards to
prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.,
from traversing Mangyan Road, and even
constructed concrete posts that prevented the
residents of LOYOLA from passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before the Regional
Trial Court and prayed that LA VISTA been joined
from preventing and obstructing the use and
passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan
Road. The lower court recognized the easement of
right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc., and ordered LA VISTA to pay
damages. On appeal by LA VISTA, the decision of
the lower court was affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of rightof-way over Mangyan Road.
HELD: Yes. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA
VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and
the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of rightof-way over Mangyan Road. A voluntary easement
is quite evidently manifested in the stipulation in the
Deed of Sale with mortgage executed by them.
When the easement was established by their
contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions
for its observance by all whom in the future might
succeed them in dominion. It is thus very apparent
that the parties and their respective predecessorsin-interest intended to establish an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual
benefit, both as dominant and servient estates.
With this, the free ingress and egress along
Mangyan Road created by the voluntary
agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc.,
is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625,

New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on
the servient estate not to obstruct the same.
LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to
LOYOLA from Mangyan Road, however, this should
not be taken into consideration since the opening
of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity.
Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim
that they were tenants or lessees of the land owned
by Reta. The land has been converted into a
commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject
them. They claim that since they are legitimate
tenants or lessees of such land, they have the right
of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance
with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517,
the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed that
the amicable settlement executed between Reta
and Ricardo Roble, one of the petitioners, was
void ab initio for being violative of PD No. 1517. On
the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since
it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform
Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed
complaint for the exercise of the right of first refusal
under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court.
However, such complaint was dismissed and such
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other
petitioners have the right of first refusal.
HELD: No. The land involved has not been
proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In
fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National
Housing Authority requesting that said land be
declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have
the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be
necessary if the property was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517
pertains
to
areas
proclaimed
as
ULRZ.
Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right
under the said law since the land involved is not an

ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and
privileges granted by the said decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years
or more; (2) must have built his home on the land
by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for
the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within
the said category cannot be considered
"legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to
the right of first refusal to purchase the property
should the owner of the land decide to sell the
same at a reasonable price within a reasonable
time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with
Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the other
hand, failed to present evidence of a lease
agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta
allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees
for P186 from where he gathered tuba.
This
arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and
not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his
house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a
personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil
Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or
not, the conclusion would still be the same since the
agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease.
Thus, Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by
PD No. 1517.
With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted
that he had verbal agreements with them. This
notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate
tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal
under PD No. 1517.
From the moment Reta
demanded that the petitioners vacate the
premises, the verbal lease agreements, which were
on a monthly basis since rentals were paid
monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of
the lease.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to
exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to
sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had
the right of first refusal, the situation which would
allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or
intended sale of the land has not happened. PD
No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property
intends to sell it to a third party.
Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999, 301 SCRA 52
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc.
(MFI) and petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc.
(PCRI) executed a Memorandum of Undertaking
(MOU) wherein PCRI acceded to MFIs request to
redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and won
by the former in the ensuing public auction. The
MOA was conditioned upon the agreement that
the petitioner shall be given a right of way on the
existing private road which forms part of the area to
be redeemed by private respondents. Later, PCRI
filed an injunctive suit against MFI alleging, inter
alia, that the latter, in violation of the terms of the
MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make excavations
on one side of the access road for the installation of
water. The trial court granted the petition for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. On appeal, the CA set aside the assailed
order of the trial court; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari. PCRI contends that it is entitled
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction as may be gleaned from the following
provision in the MOU: The above cited lot, being an
existing private road, will remain open to ingress
and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of
PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its
successors=in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering private respondent
to allow petitioner to undertake excavations along
the access road for the purpose of installing water
pipes.
Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of
the terms ingress and egress. They give
petitioner the right to use the private road as means
of entry into and exit from its property on the
northwestern side o f the compound. The question
concerns the meaning of the phrase for whatever
kind of passage. The trial court read this phrase to
mean that petitioner had the right to make
excavations on the side of the access road in order
to install a network of pipes. The word passage
does not, however; clearly and unmistakably
convey a meaning that includes a right to install
water pipes on the access road. The ordinary
meaning of the word, as defined in Websters
Dictionary, is that act or action of passing:
movement or transference from one place or point
to another. this legal meaning is not different. It

means, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, the
act of passing; transit; transition.
Villanueva v. Velasco
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered
owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific
Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. When petitioner bought the parcel of
land there was a small house on its southeastern
portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter
wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses
granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of
Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even before
he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed
the aforementioned small house that encroached
upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also
unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for
easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and
Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of
easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued, ordering the
Gabriels to provide the right of way and to
demolish the small house encroaching on the
easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco
issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to
Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that
the writ of demolition could not apply to his
property since he was not a party to the civil case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property
binds petitioner.
HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of
real property, a servitude like a right of way can
exist even if they are not expressly stated or
annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title
because servitudes are inseparable from the
estates to which they actively or passively belong.
Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of
easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as
a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated
by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is
provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of
the easement is removed before the execution of
the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in

accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of
Appeals
Pardo, J.
FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in
Cagayan was issued and registered in the name of
private respondent Dick Manglapus predecessorin-interest, Vicente Manglapus. The land was
granted to the latter subject to the provisions of
sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 which provide that except in favor of
the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be
inalienable and shall not be subject to
encumbrance for a period of 5 years from the date
of this patent and shall not be liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of that period. Subsequently, private
respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from
Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale and was later
registered 11 years later from the issuance of
patent. Meanwhile, petitioner National Irrigation
Administration entered into a contract with Villamar
Development Construction. Under the contract,
petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan.
NIA then entered a portion of petitioners land and
made diggings and fillings thereon. Private
respondent then filed a complaint for damages
alleging that petitioners diggings and fillings
destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that
no reasonable compensation was paid for its
taking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay
Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a
portion of his property for use as easement of a right
of way.
HELD: No. We find that NIA is under no obligation.
We sustain the appeal. We agree with NIA that the
Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original
Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of
land contained a reservation granting the
government a right of way over the land covered
therein.
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a
reservation and condition that the land is subject to
to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law,
especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109, 110,

111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended. This reservation, unlike the other
provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by
any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides
that lands granted by patent, shall further be
subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty
meters in width for public highways, railrods,
irrigation, ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and
telephone lines, and similar works as the
Government or any public or quasi-public service or
enterprises,
including
mining
or
forest
concessionaires may reasonably require for
carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that
Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and
the latter voluntary easements. In the present
case, we find and declare that a legal easement of
a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The
land was originally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling
would be otherwise if the land were originally
private property, in which case, just compensation
must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of a right of way.
---------------------(Additional)-----------------------Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 145
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. and private
respondent Crispin Lat are adjoining landowners in Lipa City. The
land of Lat is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while
Remmans land is devoted to its piggery business. The latters
land is 1 meters higher in elevation than that of respondent
Lat. Meanwhile, respondent noticed that petitioners waste
disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating of
Lats plantation. He made several representations with petitioner
but they fell on deaf ears. Consequently, the trees growing on
the flooded portion where it was inundated with water
containing pig manure, started to wither and die. Private
respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that the
acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the
overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from petitioners
piggery farm. Petitioner denied the allegations and claimed that
the construction of additional lagoons was already adopted to
contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any
damage to the adjoining estate. Petitioner also argued that the
damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the damages were due to a fortuitous
event.
HELD: No. We cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to
the findings opions expressed by the lower courts: Even assuming
that the heavy rains constituted an act of God; by reason of

their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized,
rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damges. In National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649 (1993), the
Supreme Court held: Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard
to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for
the loss or damages sustained by private respondents since they,
the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was
not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a
human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened.
The effect tehn of the force majeure in question may be
deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the
property of appelle, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable
law is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it is
provided that lower estates are obliged to receive the waters
which naturally and without the intervention of man descend
from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they
carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct
works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of
the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which provides that lower estates
are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the
intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or eath which they carry with them. The owner of the lower
estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural
flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase this natural flow.
As worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural
easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher estate are those which are artificially collected in manmade lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the
owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality
(now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila
G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 235
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Respondent Municipality of Pasig needed an access
road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig where 60 to
70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The
road has to be at least three meters in width, as required by the
Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of
conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the
road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791 square
meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco
and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, which is abutting E.R. Santos
Street.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the
property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer. The municipality then filed a complaint

against the Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 of the Republic Act No. 7160 or otherwise known as
the Local Government Code. The Cuancos then contended
that they had sold the said property to petitioner Jesus is the Lord
Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) as evidenced by a
deed of sale. When apprised about the complaint, petitioner
JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-inintervention which was granted.
The petitioner JILCSFI asserted that the respondent must comply
with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of
right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at
the point lease prejudicial to the servient state, and that there
must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner
also claimed that the portion of the lot sought to be
expropriated is located at the middle protion of the petitioners
entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves,
and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school
building and worship center.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner JILCSFIs contentions are
tenable.
HELD: No. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply
with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way
under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location and route of the land to be
taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public
good and there is genuine necessity of public character.
Governmentmay not capriciously choose what private property
should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing
a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses,
who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although
there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity,
no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area
except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is
more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity
for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute
necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity
will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the
necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners
property and not elsewhere. We note that the wheras clause of
the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest
and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to
E.R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that
the said portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the
best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed
to adduce a preponderance of evidence.
-------------------------(2)----------------------------HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO

BALANDAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952
BENGZON, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the
owner of an ice-plantfactory in the City of San
Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installedtwo
tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling
purposes of its engine.While the factory compound
was surrounded with fence, the tanksthemselves

were not provided with any kind of fence or top
covers. Theedges of the tanks were barely a foot
high from the surface of the ground. Through the
wide gate entrance, which is continually open,
motor vehicleshauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and any one couldeasily enter
the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard
assigned onthe gate.At about noon of April 16,
1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely8
years old, while playing with and in company of
other boys of his ageentered the factory premises
through the gate, to take a bath in one of
saidtanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only tobe fished out later,
already a cadaver, having been died of
"asphyxiasecondary to drowning." The Court of
Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
took theview that the petitioner maintained an
attractive nuisance (the tanks), andneglected to
adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accidents to personsentering its premises. It applied
the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated
asfollows: One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities orappliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who
fails toexercise ordinary care to prevent children
from playing therewith orresorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby,even if the child is technically a trespasser
in the premises. The principal reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance
inquestion although its danger is apparent to those
of age, is so enticing oralluring to children of tender
years as to induce them to approach, get on or use
it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such children.
ISSUE: Is a swimming pool or water tank an
instrumentality or appliancelikely to attract the little
children in play and considered as an
attractivenuisance?
HELD: The Supreme Court held in the negative,
basing its decision from thegreat majority of
American
decisions
where
such
doctrine
originated.
Theattractive
nuisance
doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of
water,artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
some unusual condition orartificial feature other
than the mere water and its location. Further,
theCourt cited the explanation of the Indiana
Appellate Court which holds that:Nature has
created streams, lakes and pools which attract
children. Lurkingin their waters is always the danger

of drowning. Against this danger childrenare early
instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to
know thedanger; and if the owner of private
property creates an artificial pool on hisown
property, merely duplicating the work of nature
without adding any newdanger, he is not liable
because of having created an "attractive
nuisance.As petitioner's tanks are not classified as
attractive nuisance, the questionwhether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions
becomesimmaterial. And the other issue submitted
by petitioner that the parentsof the boy were
guilty of contributory negligence precluding
recovery,because they left for Manila on that
unlucky day leaving their son under thecare of no
responsible individual needs no further discussion.
--------------------------------------------------------Title 9: Registry of Property (no Case)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book three: Different modes of Acquiring Ownership

Acap v. Court of Appeals
Padilla, J.
FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey
of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by
OCT R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. m.
The title was issued and is registered in the name of
spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma.
After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto
inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly
notarized document entitled Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap had been
the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering
an area of 9,500 sq. m. When ownership was
transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido,
Acap continued to be the registered tenant
thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to
Pido and thereafter, upon Pidos death, to his
widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when
Pido died interstate and on 27 November 1981, his
surviving heirs executed a notarized document
denominated as Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre,
wherein they declared to have adjudicated upon
themselves the parcel of land in equal share, and
that they waive, quitclaim all right, interests and
participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy
de los Reyes. The document was signed by all of
Pidos heirs. Edy de los Reyes did not sign said
document. It will be noted that at the time of
Cosme Pidos death, title to the property continued
to be registered in the name of the Vasquez
spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship
with Waiver of Rights in his favor, de los Reyes filed
the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a
notice of an adverse claim against the original
certificate of title. Thereafter, delos Reyes sought for
Acap to personally inform him that he had become
the new owner of the land and that the lease
rentals thereon should be paid to him. Delos Reyes
alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral
lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10
cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982,
Acap allegedly complied with said obligation. In
1983, however, Acap refused to pay any further
lease rentals on the land, prompting delos Reyes to
seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The
MAR invited Acap, who sent his wife, to a
conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. The
wife stated that the she and her husband did not
recognize delos Reyess claim of ownership over
the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4)
years, delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Acap, alleging
that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and
failed to pay the agreed annual rental of 10 cavans
of palay despite repeated demands. On 20 August
1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of
heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode
of acquiring ownership by private respondent over
the lot in question.
HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a
real right over a thing arising from a juridical act,
however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise
to ownership over the res. That right or title must be
completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed
by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are
acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.
While title is the juridical justification, mode is the
actual process of acquisition or transfer of
ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of
acquiring ownership are generally classified into
two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e.,
through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter,
donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously
confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,
equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale.
They are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of
the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in
money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a
declaration of heirship and waiver of rights
operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs
adjudicate and divide the estate left by the
decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in
effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a
sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary
rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract

or deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of
ownership where there is an abdication or
intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to
relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are coheirs in the succession. Private respondent, being
then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido,
cannot conclusively claim ownership over the
subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver
document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative
mode of acquiring ownership.
--------------------------------------------------------Title 1: Occupation
Title 2: Intellectual Creation
Title 3: Donation
De Luna v. Abrigo
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a
lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the
Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and
made subject to certain terms and conditions and
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor
of the donated property in case of violation or noncompliance. The foundation failed to comply with
the conditions of the donation. De Luna "revived"
the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a
document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos"
subject to terms and conditions which among
others, required it to construct a chapel, a nursery
and a kindergarten school in the donated property
within five (5) years from execution. The automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated area in case
of violation of the conditions was also provided. The
foundation, through its president, accepted the
donation. A "Deed of Segregation" was later
executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby
the area donated was adjudicated to the
foundation. The heirs of de Luna later filed a
complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms
and conditions of the donation were not complied
with by the foundation. Thus, it prayed for the
cancellation of the donation and the reversion of
the donated land to the heirs. The foundation
invoked, among others, the defense of prescription
of action. The court dismissed the complaint. It ruled
that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-
compliance with any of the conditions of the

donation shall prescribe in four years (4) counted
from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the
four-year period for filing the complaint for
revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and
expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was
brought on September 23, 1980 or more than five
(5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was
already barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for
judicial decree of revocation of the donation in
question as contemplated in Article 764 of the New
Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years
and not an action to enforce a written contract
which prescribes in ten (10) years.
HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with
an onerous cause. It was made subject to the
burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel,
a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated
property within five years from execution of the
deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within for (4) years from the noncompliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, the said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article
733 providing that onerous donations are governed
by the rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on
contracts and the general rules on prescription and
not the rules on donations are applicable in the
case at bar.
Furthermore, while the judicial action for the
rescission of a contract is generally not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be
automatically revoked and cancelled for violation
of any of its terms and conditions, however, where
one of the parties contests or denies the rescission,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without
judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper. Judicial
action will be necessary as without it, the
extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and
subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack
thereon should become barred by acquiescence,
estoppel or prescription.
In the instant case, trial court was therefore not
correct in holding that the complaint is barred by
prescription under Article 764 because Article 764

does not apply to onerous donations. As provided
in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the
contract of donation, shall be made within five (5)
years from its execution. The complaint which was
filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the
ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a
written contract pursuant to Article 1144 par. 1,
counted from April 9, 1976.
Reyes v. Mosqueda
G.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual
executed a Deed of Donation of real property
located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St. Tondo, Manila in
favor of Ofelia Parungao, a minor, with her mother,
Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for
and in her behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged
that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime on November 2,
1966 executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor
covering the said property. Parungao, upon
reaching the age of majority was able to register
the Deed of Donation with the Register of Deeds in
Manila and was issued a TCT.
On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of
absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of
Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and Emmanuel Reyes.
Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance
of the deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the
TCT in the name of Parungao null and void and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which
meant that the property was already transferred to
Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa.
HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given
by the donor in the deed of donation is not a
determinative factor which makes the donation
inter vivos or mortis causa. It is the body of the
document of donation and the statements
contained therein and not the title that should be
considered in ascertaining the intent of the donor.
In the case, the donor used the term donation
Mortis Causa but from the stipulations of the deed,
it can be clearly inferred that he was actually

executing a donation Inter Vivos to Ursula.
tainted with illegal cause or consideration, of which

donor and donee were participants.
The transfer of ownership over the properties

donated
to
Ursula
was
immediate
and
independent of the death of Dr. Pascual since it
was a donation Inter Vivos. The provision as regards
the reservation of properties for the donor's
subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the
deed of donation confirms the intention of the
donor to give the naked ownership of the
properties to Ursula immediately after the execution
of the deed of donation. Hence, he could not have
donated the property again in 1969 in favor of
Parungao since the lot was already transferred to
Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
Liguez v. Court of Appeals

Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by
petitioner-appellant against the widow and heirs of
the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of
land in barrio Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal
owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land,
executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador
P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943. The defense interposed
was that the donation was null and void for having
an illicit causa or consideration, which was the
plaintiff's entering into marital relations with
Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the
property had been adjudicated to the appellees as
heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since
1949.
It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the
donated land originally belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria
Ngo; that the latter had met and berated Conchita
for living maritally with her husband, sometime
during June of 1943; that the widow and children of
Lopez were in possession of the land and made
improvements thereon; that the land was assessed
in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and later in
that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation
was never recorded.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that
the deed of donation was inoperative, and null and
void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had no right
to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff
appellant; and (2) because the donation was
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable

that Lopez would not have conveyed the property
in question had he known that appellant would
refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation was an
implied condition to the donation, and being
unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation itself.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally
guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be
left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this
Court as barring the party from pleading the
illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action
or as a defense. Memo auditor propriam
turpitudinem allegans.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land
on the strength of a donation regular on its face. To
defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and
prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the
part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since
Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from setting
up that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and
successors in interest, can have no better rights
than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being
thus precluded from pleading the defense of
immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total
or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be
decided by different legal principles. In this regard,
the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez
could not donate the entirety of the property in
litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo,
because said property was conjugal in character
and the right of the husband to donate community
property is strictly limited by law
Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54
Paras, J.
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta
Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the
questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar
either as a purported donation or by way of
purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration
thereof. The donation or sale was consummated
while Restituta was already married to her husband
Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his
supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a

Torrens Title over the land which was later on
granted pronouncing him (married to Resitiuta) as
the owner of the land.
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into
between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and
Restituta with the consent of her husband for a
period of 10 years. The lease of contract having
expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against
Tan Queto. The unlawful detainer case was won by
the spouses in the Municipal Court but on appeal in
the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a
barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the
owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became
the owners of a parcel of land with the house
thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan
Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto
constructed on the disputed land a concrete
building without any objection from Restituta.
Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto
for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for
recovery of the land with damages.
The respondent courts decision which later on was
affirmed by the Supreme court led to the
reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed
lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a
conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future
hereditary estate of her parents. Hence, this petition
for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share
of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her
parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal,
not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot
cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it
was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749,
Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for
the formalities of a will were not complied with. The
allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to
RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her
mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the
contractual transmission of future inheritance is
generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN
and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a
consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712,
Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable
amount) as the cause or consideration of the
transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having

been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title
(the money used being presumably conjugal there
being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal
funds of her own).
Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340
Cruz, J.
FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate
in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land
with buildings and improvements in the Quezon
Province. On May 20, 1946, perfectas siblings
Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument
entitled Extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero. In it
they disposed that in according to Perfectas
wishes and in consideration of love and affection,
the said property be donated to private
respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfectas
niece,
who
will
assume
the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National
Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same
document, the done accepted the donation in a
public instrument. The instrument was never
registered nor the title transferred to Saluds name
although she immediately took possession of the
land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the
possession of the land to her mother Juana, who
was then staying with her brother Claudio and his
family. During the period they were occupying the
land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25,
1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale
conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later,
Claudio had the land registered in his name.
Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On
June 30, 1965, the private respondents Salud and
Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the
reconveyance of the property on the ground that
the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious
and the registration in his name was null and void.
Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by
Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately
concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement
was a donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared
themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free to
give the land to whomever they pleased and for
whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose

to respect Perfectas wishes and carry out her
intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was
no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no
question that Felipe and Juana could have simply
disregarded their sisters sentiments and decided
not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that
they did no do this speaks well of their integrity and
their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extrajudicial settlement also reflects their own affection
for Salud which constituted the valid consideration
for their own act of liberality.
if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,

taking into account the whole estate of the donor
at the time of the donation of the child (Articles
760, 761 and 763 of the NCC). Of course, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must
allege and establish the requirements prescribed by
law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction
of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in
the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does
not allege that the subject donation impairs the
legitime of the adopted child. Indeed, it contains
no indication at all of the total assets of the donor.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals

Plana, J.
Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the

contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the
donor has another piece of land worth P273,420 in
1977. The legal situation of petitioner-donor is made
worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that the grandfather of the donees was the owner
pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the
effect of which is to reduce the value of the
donation which can then more easily be taken
from the portion of the estate within the free
disposal of petitioner.
FACTS: In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow,

donated a 235.5 sq. m. residential lot in San Isidro,
Taytay, Rizal together with the two-door apartment
erected thereon to her grandnieces (private
respondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all
surnamed De Leon). The property was accordingly
transferred to the names of private respondents.
In 1974, Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto,
a minor, after which she extrajudicailly tried to
revoke the donation, but the donee resisted,
alleging that: (1) the property in question was coowned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late
Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence
the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance;
and (2) Eduvigis owns another property, an
agricultural land of more than two hectares
situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the
donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of
the adoptive child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for
revocation of donation, invoking Article 760, par. 3
of the NCC. The trial court rendered a decision
revoking the donation. On appal, The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the
subject donation.
HELD: Yes. In the case of the subsequent adoption
of a minor by one who had previously donated
some or all of his properties to another, the donor
may sue for the annulment or reduction of the
donation within 4 years from the date of adoption,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of

Appeals
G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300
Regalado, J.
FACTS: On August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de
Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of
donation in favor of herein petitioner Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of
land located at Cavite. The deed of donation
provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the
property within a period of 100 years from the
execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a
violation of such condition would render ipso facto
null and void the donation and the property would
revert to the estate of the donors.
However, on June 30, 1980 while within the
prohibitive period to dispose, petitioner executed a
deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of the petitioner-spouses Florencio
and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of
P114,000.00. Hence, private respondents filed a
complaint for the nullification of the deed of
donation. In their answer, the petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
action has been barred by prescription because
the complaint was filed four years after the sale,
and that the complaint states no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation in favor

of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may
be revoked.
HELD: No. The complaint in the case at bar cannot
be barred by prescription because the applicable
prescriptive period is not the 4-year period provided
in Article 764 of the New Civil Code, rather it is the
10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply
because the deed of donation provides for the
automatic reversion of the property to the original
owner in case of violation of any condition. The
Court in the previous case of De Luna v. Abrigo has
already settled such prescriptive period.
However, although the action cannot be dismissed
on the ground of prescription, the same should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The cause of action of the private respondents is
based on the fact that the petitioner sold the lot
during the 50th year of the prohibitive period of 100
years. Such prohibitive period imposed by the
respondents was unreasonable because applying
in analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the New Civil
Code, the donor cannot order a prohibitive period
of disposition exceeding 20 years. As such, the said
condition regarding the prohibitive period being
contrary to law shall be considered as null and void
pursuant to Art. 727 of the New Civil Code but the
donation shall remain valid and subsisting. Thus,
respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation,
and the sale of the property by the petitioner to the
Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal effects.
Eduarte v. Court of Appeals
Francisco, J.
FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of
a parcel of land with an area of 12,199 square
meters. He executed a deed entitled Donation
InterVivos ceding one-half portion thereof to his
niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel
of land was ceded to Doria by Calapine. Doria
then donated a portion of 157 square meters to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He also sold,
transferred and conveyed unto the spouses
Eduarte the parcel of land, saving the 700 square
meters on which Dorias house was erected.
However, Pedro Calapine filed a complaint against
Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc.
and the spouses Eduarte claiming that his signature
to the deed of donation was a forgery. He prays for

the revocation of the donation made in favour of
Doria, to declare null and void the deeds of
donation and sale that she had executed in favor
of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc.
and the spouses Eduarte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in
bad faith of the donated property.
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere
possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered torrens title to real property. When herein
petitioners purchased the subject property from
Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT
No. T-23205 under the latter's name. And although
Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such
fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein
petitioners absent any showing that they had any
knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus,
they cannot be obliged to look beyond the
certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its
fade and sans any annotation or notice of private
respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to
the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are
purchasers in good faith and for value as they
bought the disputed property without notice that
some other person has a right or interest in such
property, and paid a full price for the same at the
time of the purchase or before they had notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the
property. And having established beyond doubt
that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over
the disputed property which she subsequently sold
to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be
adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to
petitioners as declared by the trial court and
respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting
damages to the true owner and original plaintiff,
Pedro Calapine.
Petition granted.
Quilala v. Alcantara
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala
executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of
two pages. The first page contains the deed of
donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion
by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as
donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the Acknowledgment, which states

merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged that
the donation was her free and voluntary act and
deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the
second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala
and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand
margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the
other witness The deed of donation was registered
with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT
No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was
issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died.
Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984.
Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the
surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile,
respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara,
Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be
Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the above-described
property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted
against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the
Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The
trial court found that the deed of donation,
although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the
donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public
instrument, thus rendering the donation null and
void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming with modification the decision of
the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action without prejudice to the filing of
probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will
and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void
for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee
Violeta Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the
deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness
on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the
other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the
instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the
law merely is to ensure that each and every page

of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence,
a contracting party affixes his signature on each
page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing
to everything that is written thereon at the time of
signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the
signature is merely directory. The fact that one of
the parties signs on the wrong side of the page
does not invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the
requirement in the above-quoted provision is
deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment
by the donee before the notary public does not
also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot
be considered a private document in part and a
public document in another part. The fact that it
was acknowledged before a notary public
converts the deed of donation in its entirety a
public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is
the conveyance that should be acknowledged as
a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee
signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is
explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized
deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes
and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed
a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With
Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed
ownership over the subject land, together with all its
improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa
Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory
conditions that upon her death or marriage, the
DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of
Jose Hemedes children.
On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of
Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" conveying
to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and
mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation

of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa
Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage, R & B
Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property.
However, Justa Kausapin executed another
agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his
stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax
declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon.
The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a
cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes
as the owner.
1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently

transferred all her real property to her children in
bad faith and in fraud of creditors, including her;
that LIM conspired and confederated with her
children in antedating the questioned Deed of
Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors'
prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the
fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties
to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of
Siguan and rescinded the Contract, but was
reversed by the CA.
Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium

Realty Const. Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of
Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce
some improvements already when R & B insurance
informed them that they are the owners of the
property where these improvements are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation

executed by respondent may be rescinded for
being in fraud of her alleged creditor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by

Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes
valid.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed
the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed
to comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the
civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa
Kausapins allegation that she did not execute such
a deed and she never allowed to use the land as
security for the loan. It was found that the deed of
conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows
that the original title she had for the property was
also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B
Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed
an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the
kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique
Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her
financial support.
Siguan v. Lim
Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation
conveying parcels of land and purportedly
executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her
children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
On 23 June 1993, petitioner filed an accion
pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind
the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare
as null and void the new transfer certificates of title
issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed.
Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art.

1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts
which are rescissible, and among them are "those
contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when the
latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them."
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors
is known as accion pauliana. For this action to
prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to
the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the
debtor has made a subsequent contract
conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person;
(3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy
his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent;
(5) the third person who received the property
conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an
accomplice in the fraud. The general rule is that
rescission requires the existence of creditors at the
time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this
must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial
pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without
any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury
nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the
plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to
the fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment
enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be
subsequent to the alienation, it is merely
declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date
when the credit was constituted. In the instant
case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner
was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of
donation was purportedly executed on 10 August
1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of
the contract of donation, still her action for
rescission would not fare well because the third
requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil

Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors
may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot
in any manner collect the claims due them. It is,
therefore, "essential that the party asking for
rescission prove that he has exhausted all other
legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20
Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did
so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the
questioned deed is not maintainable even if the
fraud charged actually did exist."
Noceda vs. Court of Appeals
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind
a parcel of land having an area of 66,530 square
meters. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant
Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially
settled the partition of the land with Directo getting
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and Arbizo got 41,810 square meters.
Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her
share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew
being the son of her deceased sister However
another extrajudicial settlement-partition was
executed. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria
Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant
Noceda got only one-fifth each.
Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house
on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo
fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated
portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in
1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier
constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts (3)
and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo
without her consent. Directo demanded from
Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment
of donation, against defendant Noceda
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute
ingratitude to warrant revocation of the donation.
HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda
occupied not only the portion donated to him by
private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he
also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs
to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act
of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge

and consent is an act of usurpation which is an
offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee
against the donor. The law does not require
conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude
prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from
the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact;
(b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the
action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in
order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed.
No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to
prove his allegation.
Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio
Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947,
respectively and were childless, leaving 6 parcels of
land situated in Pangasinan. Leoncia De Guzman
was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman and
Tranquilina de Guzman.
Sometime in 1989, the Meneses(heirs of Anatalia de
Guzman) filed a complaint for annulment, partition
and damages against the heirs of Cesario
Velasquez(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the
latters' refusal to partition the properties of the
Spouses Aquino.
The complaint alleged that before Leoncias death,
she told that the documents of donation and
partition which she and her husband earlier
executed were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give away all the properties to
Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman
who is one of her sisters had several children to
support; and that Cesario Velasquez and his mother
allegedly promised to divide the properties equally
and to give the plaintiffs one-half thereof. Plaintiffs
further claim that after the death of Leoncia,
defendants forcibly took possession of all the
properties
and
despite
plaintiffs' repeated
demands for partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the documents
covering the properties in question since they do
not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino

spouses, to order the partition of the properties
between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares
and to order the defendants to render an
accounting of the produce of the land from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until
partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim
alleging that during the lifetime of spouses Aquino,
they had already disposed of their properties in
favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners
Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following
manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were
conveyed to defendants' late parents
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman,
by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter
Nuptias dated February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to
defendants' late parents Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed
of conveyance dated July 14, 1939;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to
defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia
Velasquez by virtue of a deed of
conveyance (Donation Intervivos) dated
April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the
same were owned and possessed by third
parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving
credibility to Santiago Meneses testimony;
declaring the Donation Intervivos, the Deed of Sale,
the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Sale to third
parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void
insofar as 1/2 of the 6 parcels are concerned
legitimately belong to the plaintiffs; and ordering
the defendants to pay damages. Defendants
appealed the decision to respondent CA which
affirmed the same. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the petitioners but the same was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired
absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties
in question.
HELD: Yes. Private respondent Santiago Meneses
failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of
Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in
favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman

since he failed to adduce any evidence to support
his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity.
On the other hand, petitioners were able to show
by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses
during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of
land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura
de donation propter nuptias, (b) Deed of donation
inter vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a
P500 consideration: (d) Deed of Conveyance with
a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same
Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. It was
reversible error for the court to overlook the
probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership
results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee and the
donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino
spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia
Velasquez who were then 19 and 10 years old
respectively was accepted through their father
Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of
donation and made part of it, and was signed by
the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking
there was delivery and acceptance of the deed,
and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably.
The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for
the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of
the Civil Code.
The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third
and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses
Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation
propter nuptias can be revoked by the nonperformance of the marriage and the other causes
mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code. The
alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e.,
that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give
away all their properties since Anatalia had several
children to support is not one of the grounds for
revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter
nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of

the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance
dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila
Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second
parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights
and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman including the previous deeds of
conveyance over the second parcel in the
complaint and such deed of sale became the basis
for the issuance of TCT in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The best proof
of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title
and it requires more than a bare allegation to
defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal
presumption of regularity of issuance. Notably,
during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered
into contracts of mortgage and lease over the
property as annotated at the back of the
certificate of title which clearly established that he
exercised full ownership and control over the
property.
Petitioners were able to establish that these four
parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by
the Aquino spouses, hence, they no longer formed
part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the
time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth
parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also
conveyed to third persons and they do not claim
any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the action of partition
cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be
partitioned by private respondents have already
been delivered to petitioners and therefore no
longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. No co-ownership exists between
private respondents and petitioners.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA 598
Melo, J.
FACTS: Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina
Gonzales were registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land. Petitioners are the successors-ininterest or the children and grandchildren of the
deceased spouses. On the other hand, private
respondents are the farmers and tenants of said
spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of
land even before World War II either personally or
through their predecessors-in-interest. Marina
Gonzales died intestate and appointed as
administratix was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to

the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his
grandchildren but was not registered. When
Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect, the
landholdings of the said spouses were placed
under Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents
were then issued the corresponding Certificates of
Land Transfer. The administratix of the spouses
estate, Lilia Gonzales filed an application for
retention requesting that their property be
excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. Initially,
it was denied but was approved due to the deed
of donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the
deed of donation which was not registered when
P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from
the Operation Land Transfer.
HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter
alia that in order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the
done must satisfy. Corollarily, Article 709 of the
same Code explicitly states that the titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property,
which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the
Registry of Property shall not prejudice third
persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be
inferred that as between the parties to a donation
of immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be contained
in a public document. It is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and effective. However, in order
to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Property. In the case at
bar, the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in
favor of his grand children, although in writing and
duly notarized, has not been registered in
accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be
binding upon private respondents who did not
participate in said deed nor had no actual
knowledge thereof.
Imperial v. Court of Appeals
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel
of land with an area of 32,837 sq. m. and located in
Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the lot for Php
1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner in

this case. Petitioner and Victor Imperial, adopted
son of Leoncio, agreed that despite the
designation of the contract as Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transaction is in fact a Donation. Two years
after, Leoncio filed a complaint for the Annulment
of Donation. It was however resolved through a
compromise agreement under the following terms
and conditions: (1) Leoncio recognized and agreed
the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner;
and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000
sq.m. portion of the donated land.
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having

accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his rights
shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and

Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was
substituted in the complaint for annulment. He
moved for the execution of judgment and it was
granted. After 15 years, Victor died and was
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon.
Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the
subject property. Villalon died leaving his heirs,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon, respondents in this case.
In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the
annulment of the donation. Allegedly, it impairs the
legitime of Victor Imperial.
The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues

upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so,
since only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may
be determined. It took 24 years since the death of
Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus, the action has
long prescribed. Not only has prescription set in,
they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. Fifteen
years after the death of Leoncio, Victor died.
Ricardo Villalon, Victors sole heir, died four years
later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication
of any interest to contest the donation of his
deceased father.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to
question the inofficious donation and seek its
reduction.
2.) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is
applicable in the reduction of the inofficious
donation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the
judgment approving the compromise agreement
has already been rendered. Victor merely
participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement. When Victor substituted Leoncio, he
was not deemed to have renounced his legitime.
He was therefore not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction. Nor are Victors
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This
is in accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the
new Civil Code, to wit:
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the
donors death have a right to the legitime and their
heirs and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction of the inofficious donation xxx.
and
2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code,

actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten years from the right of action
accrues. Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious
donations required under Article 771 of the New
Civil Code to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs.
Republic of the Philippines v. Silim

G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1
Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat
donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in
favor of the Bureau of Public Schools of the
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In
the Deed of Donation, the respondents imposed
the condition that the said property should be
used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only. This donation was accepted by the District
Supervisor of the Bureau, through an Affidavit of
Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was thereafter constructed on the
donated land. However, another school building
that was also supposed to be allocated for the
donated parcel of land could not be released
since the government required that it be built upon
a 1 hectare parcel of land. By reason of this, the
District Supervisor and the vice-mayors wife
entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with a bigger lot
owned by the latter. Consequently, the school
buildings were constructed on this new school site
and the school building previously erected on the
donated land was dismantled and transferred to

the new location. One day, respondents were
surprised when he saw the vice-mayor constructing
a house on the donated land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a valid donation
despite non-notation of the acceptance in the
Deed of Donation, as required in Article 749.
2.) Whether or not the condition on the donation
was violated.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The purpose of the formal requirement
for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such
is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at
bar, a school building was immediately constructed
after the donation was executed. Respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the school building
put up on the donated lot. The actual knowledge
by respondents of the construction and existence
of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement
that the acceptance of the donation by the donee
be communicated to the donor.
2.) No. There was no violation even after the
donated lot was exchanged for another one. The
purpose of the donation remains the same, which is
for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of
the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact,
the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was
in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of
the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot
paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building
which could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.
donee enjoy the fruits of the land during their

lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or dispose
of the land during the lifetime of the donors without
their prior consent and approval. Consequently,
Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels of
land's tax declaration to her name and paid the
taxes on them.
Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses
Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed
of revocation recovering the six parcels of land
subject to the deed of donation inter vivos.
Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court
against the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for
quieting of title over the parcels of land and
alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego
Danlag and that she accepted the donation
openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership
over the donated properties, and transferred the
tax declarations to her name. She also alleged that
the donation inter vivos was coupled with
conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its
perfection, she had complied with all of them; that
she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude;
and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to
revoke the donation and then in selling the two
parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses.
In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the
Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null
and void because it was obtained by Mercedes
through machinations and undue influence. Even
assuming it was validly executed, the intention was
for the donation to take effect upon the death of
the donor and that the donation was void for it left
the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at
all.
Gestopa v. Court of Appeals

Quisumbing, J.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter

vivos or a donation mortis causa.
FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six

parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three
deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which were
in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All deeds
contained the reservation of the rights of the donors
to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber
the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if
deemed necessary. The spouses then executed
another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of
Mercedes which contained the condition that the
donors, Danlag spouses, shall continue to enjoy the
fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter

vivos. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision that the reservation by the donor of
lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to
Mercedes the ownership over the donated
properties; that the right to sell belonged to the
donee, and the donor's right referred to that of
merely giving consent; that the donor changed his
intention by donating inter vivos properties already
donated mortis causa; that the transfer to
Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining
to the donated properties implied that the
donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did
not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated

to her.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the
deed's provisions must be read together. The
granting clause shows that Diego donated the
properties out of love and affection for the donee.
This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the
donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
over the properties. Third, the donor reserved
sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating
that the donor intended to part with the six parcels
of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation
is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, are not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his
usufructuary interests. The limitation on the right to
sell during the donors' lifetime implied that
ownership had passed to the donees and donation
was already effective during the donors' lifetime.
Hence, the moment that it was accepted by
Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the
properties was transferred.
--------------------(Additional)-----------------------Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro
Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple
was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five
illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein.
Lauro executed a document denominated Deed
of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real
Properties in favor of the petitioners. On the
document, it appears that the signature of his wife,
Placida which indicates that she gave her marital
consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro
executed it when he was already very sick and
bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request,
their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing
his signature on the document. Lydia left but later
returned on the same day and requested Lauros
unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said
document. After Lauros death, his wife, Placida

and petitioners jointly administered the properties,
50% of the produce went to his wife. As wifes share
in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed
a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming
any partition in the execution of the subject
document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its
terms or under the surrounding circumstances has
validly transferred title to the disputed properties to
the petitioners.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is
actually a gratuitous disposition of property a
donation although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon
the petitioners the condition that he and his wife,
Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the
fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their
subsistence and support. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where
the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the deed of donation and in
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the
donation is not manifested either in the deed itself
or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an
instrument of donation is patently void. The Court
declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein
are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio
as the supposed seller declared under oath that
she signed the deeds without knowing what they
were. The significant circumstance meant, the
Court added, that her consent was not merely
marred by vices of consent so as to make the
contracts voidable, but that she had not given her
consent at all.

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Title 1- Classification of Property

Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and

movables and used only for expediency to

FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from

Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,

Tsai v. Court of Appeals

secure an obligation under the principle of

of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition was

in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza

recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of

the properties specified in the order. Upon carrying

tax amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS

The Administrative orders authorizing the study of

Government. The subdivision of the land and

general are outside the commerce of man and

defined as land between high and low waters

those of the 50 properties in question which are

Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and

It is intended for public use meaning that it is

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

foreshore land than that in the definition provided

housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb

partly as enabling component to finance the

is required is not absolute but only substantial

distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she

certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On December

Soriano entered into extrajudicial settlement of his

sublease the property. On October 25, 1984,

Garcia v. Court of Appeals

thing with or without right. Possession may be had in

delinquency and ordered the issuance of a

such approval was made known to it. The so-called

1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied

HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith.

resulting from action reasonably calculated to

decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for

Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was

(enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing

but she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot.

into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the

possession does not possess by force. The use of

each must use his own land in a reasonable

recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the

rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is

aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on that

Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair

control and possession of the property sold, in view

who built or planted to pay the price of the land,

and Isidro occupied a total of 101sqm of Florencios

day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges

HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New

affirming the trial courts decision, it elevated the

faith for whom the work done and improvements

before many of the respondents received notices

improvements. They were unaware of anyone

the land, and the sower the proper rent.

was three lots away, increased by two meters.

-------------------------(6)----------------------------Spouses Del Ocampo v. Abesia

for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the

the other hand, the owner of the materials is

The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply

HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of

-------------------------(7)----------------------------Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation