Professional Documents
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BRETT KIMBERLIN,
Appellant,
v.
No. 16-1657
Mr. Kimberlin has filed this appeal asserting that he has standing to
challenge the Appellees alleged failure to advise and consent to an appointment of
a justice to the Supreme Court. In Mr. Kimberlins Appellants Lead Brief
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(Docket #8), filed on July 6, 2016, Mr. Kimberlin claimed that he has standing in
part because:
Plaintiff [sic] is involved with several cases pending in federal court
that will most likely be considered by the Supreme Court. First, will
be a petition for certiorari from the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Kimberlin v. Walker. The mandate in that case was issued on June 23,
2016 so Appellant will file a Petitioner [sic] for Certiorari within 90
days, which will definitely be considered in the upcoming term.
pp. 4-5. The Kimberlin v. Walker, Mr. Kimberlin is referring to is almost
certainly referring to Kimberlin v. Walker, et al., No. 380966V (Md. Mont. Co.
Cir. Ct. 2013), affd Md. Ct. of Spec. App., Sept. Term 2014 Nos. 1553 and 2099,
Sept. Term 2015 No. 365 (Md. App. 2016) cert. den. Md. Ct. of App., Pet. Dkt. No.
93 (2016).
Mr. Hoge is one of the parties to that case,1 as well as Kimberlin v. Frey, No.
GJH-13-3059 (D. Md. 2013)2 and Kimberlin v. Hunton & Williams, LLP, et al.,
No. 15-CV-00723-GJH (D. Md. 2015). Mr. Kimberlins avowed goal in this
litigation is to gain an advantage in those other cases. Therefore, for the same
In the name of full disclosure, undersigned counsel is also a party to that case.
Although currently the only defendant named in that case is J. Patrick Frey, Esq.,
initially the case was against many persons and companies, including Mr. Hoge
and, in the name of full disclosure, undersigned counsel. All but Mr. Frey were
dismissed, and the case against Mr. Frey at the close of discovery. Mr. Kimberlin
has made it clear that he intends to appeal those dismissals when the case against
Mr. Frey is resolved.
2
2
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reason that Mr. Kimberlin claims to have an interest in the outcome of this case,
Mr. Hoge also has an interest in the outcome of this case.
Further, Mr. Hoge brings to this appeal something the Appellees are likely to
lack: an intimate knowledge of most of those other cases Mr. Kimberlin claims are
likely to come before the Supreme Court.
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Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) and (C), Mr. Walker certifies
that the accompanying brief is printed in 14 point typeface, with serifs, and,
including footnotes, contains no more than 14,000 words. According to Microsoft
Word, it contains approximately 494 words.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 8, 2016, all parties by U.S. Mail as the following addresses:
Brett Kimberlin, 8100 Beech Tree Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20817
Senator Mitch McConnell, 317 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington,
D.C. 20510
Senator Charles Grassley, 135 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington,
D.C. 20510
/s/ Aaron J. Walker
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__________________________________________________________________________________as the
(party name)
appellant(s)
appellee(s)
petitioner(s)
respondent(s)
amicus curiae
intervenor(s)
movant(s)
______________________________________
(signature)
________________________________________
_______________
Voice Phone
________________________________________
_______________
Fax Number
________________________________________
________________________________________
_________________________________
Address
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on _________________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record
through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the
addresses listed below:
______________________________
Signature
01/19/2016 SCC
____________________________
Date
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Caption: __________________________________________________
2.
3.
08/05/2015 SCC
-1-
YES
NO
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4.
Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(b))?
YES NO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:
5.
6.
Signature: ____________________________________
YES
NO
Date: ___________________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
**************************
I certify that on _________________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:
_______________________________
(signature)
________________________
(date)
-2-
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NO. 16-1657
_________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District Of Maryland
(Hon. George J. Hazel, District Judge, presiding)
_________
INFORMAL OPPOSITION BRIEF OF INTERVENOR
WILLIAM HOGE III
_________
Aaron J. Walker, Esq.
Va Bar# 48882
7537 Remington Road
Manassas, Virginia 20109
(703) 216-0455
AaronJW1972@gmail.com
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ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
iv
ARGUMENT
I.
II.
III.
iii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Brickwood Contrs. v. Datanet Engineering, 369 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004)
Kimberlin v. Frey, No. GJH-13-3059 (D. Md. 2013) 8-Error! Bookmark not defined.
Kimberlin v. McConnell, et al., No. GJH 16-01211 (D. Md. 2016)
passim
Kimberlin v. Walker, et al., No. 380966V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2013), affd Md.
Ct. of Spec. App., Sept. Term 2014 Nos. 1553 and 2099, Sept. Term 2015 No. 365
(Md. App. 2016) cert. den. Md. Ct. of App., Pet. Dkt. No. 93 (2016)
passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
Md. R. 2-121
iv
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Did the district court correctly rule that Mr. Kimberlin lacked standing
to sue?
2.
Did the district court correctly make its ruling sua sponte?
3.
Did the district court lawfully discriminate between lawyers and pro
se litigants?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 22, 2016, Mr. Kimberlin sued Senators Mitch McConnell and
Charles Grassley in their official capacities, for their failure to consent to the
appointment of Merrick Garland to the United States Supreme Court. Specifically,
Mr. Kimberlin argued that by failing to act in a timely fashion, the Senate has
waived its right to withhold consent under U.S. CONST. art. II, 2, para. 2, cl. 2,
and, therefore, Mr. Garland is entitled to be seated on the Supreme Court. On June
3, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of MarylandJudge Hazel,
presidingdismissed the case sua sponte, citing a lack of standing. In part, Judge
Hazel wrote that rather than showing a concrete injury, Mr. Kimberlins claim of
injury is speculative and prospective as he has no case before the Supreme
Court. Memorandum Opinion, Kimberlin v. McConnell, et al., No. GJH 1601211 (D. Md. 2016) (ECF No. 3), p. 2.
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Mr. Kimberlin challenges this sua sponte dismissal on three grounds. First,
he challenges the lower courts decision to dismiss the case sua sponte. Second, he
challenges the lower courts determination that he lacks standing. Finally, he
asserts that the rule that prevents pro se litigants from writing their own summons
is unlawfully discriminatory.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPELLANT HAS ATTEMPTED TO MISLEAD THIS COURT
ABOUT THE STATUS OF KIMBERLIN V. WALKER, ET AL., AND HE HAS
NO OTHER CASE RIPE FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW
In Mr. Kimberlins Appellants Lead Brief (Docket #8), filed on July 6,
2016, Mr. Kimberlin claimed that he had standing in part because:
Plaintiff [sic] is involved with several cases pending in federal court
that will most likely be considered by the Supreme Court. First, will
be a petition for certiorari from the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Kimberlin v. Walker. The mandate in that case was issued on June 23,
2016 so Appellant will file a Petitioner [sic] for Certiorari within 90
days, which will definitely be considered in the upcoming term.
pp. 4-5. The Kimberlin v. Walker, Mr. Kimberlin is referring to is almost
certainly Kimberlin v. Walker, et al., No. 380966V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2013),
affd Md. Ct. of Spec. App., Sept. Term 2014 Nos. 1553 and 2099, Sept. Term 2015
No. 365 (Md. App. 2016)1 cert. den. Md. Ct. of App., Pet. Dkt. No. 93 (2016).
http://www.courts.state.md.us/appellate/
2
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See http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/petitions/201606petitions.html
(stating that cert was denied on June 24, 2016).
3
Undersigned counsel has a certified copy of this motion, which can be filed with
this Court if there is any question as to the documents authenticity.
3
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the Maryland Court of Appeals to take a second look at his petition for writ of
certiorari before them.
Therefore, on the face of Exhibit A, it is not a certainty that Mr. Kimberlin
will be filing for a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court anytime soon. If
Mr. Kimberlins bid for reconsideration is granted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals, that court might eventually grant cert. Further, upon granting cert., the
Maryland Court of Appeals might find reversible error in the conduct of the trial
below and vacate the judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. In turn,
upon retrial, Mr. Kimberlin might win his case outright, eliminating the need for
any further appeals on his part. The point of laying out that scenario isnt to say it
is likelyMr. Hoge believes that Mr. Kimberlins chance of any success on appeal
is negligiblebut to say that by filing a motion to reconsider, Mr. Kimberlin has
changed the chances of filing a petition for certiorari from a certainty that
depended solely on his own determination and finances to a mere possibility.
Either that, or Mr. Kimberlin also believes that the Maryland Court of
Appeals is certain to deny reconsideration.
assessment, then how can he ask for reconsideration before the Maryland Court of
Appeals in good faith?
The same problem plagues every other case that the Mr. Kimberlin claims
will most likely be considered by the Supreme Court.
4
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Kimberlin has a number of cases before this Court, and othersmore than he has
listed, in fact. However, in order to believe that all of those cases are likely to be
considered by the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Kimberlin has to believe that
that every lawsuit he presently has in a trial court is doomed to fail, either by
dismissal, summary judgment, or a loss at trialand that every subordinate appeal,
be it before this Court or the appellate courts of Maryland, is equally doomed to
fail. In such a scenario, Mr. Kimberlin would be arguing that his cases are so
meritless that he will inevitably lose every trial and appeal until he fails upward to
the United States Supreme Court. However, if Mr. Kimberlin claims that such a
string of defeats were inevitable, how can he simultaneously claim that those cases
have merit? And how can he claim that he is likely to convince five justices
including, presumptively, Merrick Garlandto rule in his favor?
Finally, it is worth noting that Mr. Kimberlin has no lawful interest in the
outcome of Public Citizen v. FEC, Case No. 14-00148 (D. D. C. 2014). The
Plaintiffs listed in that suit are Public Citizen, Inc., ProtectOurElections.org, Craig
Holman and Kevin Zeese.
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II.
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CASE SUA SPONTE
Mr. Kimberlin also believes it is somehow improper for the district court to
have done what district courts do all the time: dismiss cases sua sponte for want of
subject matter jurisdiction. Not only is what the court below did lawful, it is
mandatory. As stated by this Court in Brickwood Contrs. v. Datanet Engineering,
369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004):
Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only
the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the
statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89
L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred
by the parties, nor can a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction be
waived by the parties. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630,
122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). Accordingly, questions of
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the
proceedings and may (or, more precisely, must) be raised sua sponte
by the court.
The requirement of standing is one part of the requirement that there must be
subject matter jurisdiction, Miller v. Brown, 462 F. 3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, sua sponte dismissal for standing is not only appropriate, but
mandatory.
The cases Mr. Kimberlin cite to the contrary are inapposite and can be
distinguished quickly.
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56, but that relates to summary judgment, not dismissal. On pages seven and eight
of Mr. Kimberlins informal brief, he quotes from a long passage in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 US 490, 501 (1975), stating that it is within the trial courts power to
allow or to require the plaintiff to supply ... further particularized allegations of
fact deemed supportive of plaintiffs standing. Mr. Kimberlin misinterprets this
grant of permission as a command. Likewise, on page nine of Mr. Kimberlins
informal brief, he cites a dissent in Cochran v. Morris, 73 F. 3d 1310 (4th Cir.
1996), but that dissenter was talking about the propriety of dismissing actions
under Rule 12(b)(6).
governed by Rule 12(b)(1) and required by Rule 12(h)(3). Simply put, he has
found no authority that prevents a court below from doing what it is required to
dodismiss the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it is
lacking.
III.
IT IS NOT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION TO TREAT
MR. KIMBERLIN DIFFERENTLY BECAUSE HE IS PRO SE
Finally, in an extraordinary display of chutzpah, Mr. Kimberlin complains
that he was treated differently because he is a pro se, being unable to write his own
summons. Undersigned counsel has squared off against Mr. Kimberlin in court for
over four years and cannot think of the last time Mr. Kimberlin hasnt begged
some court for some special dispensation because he is a pro se litigant.
7
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For instance, in Kimberlin v. Frey, No. GJH-13-3059 (D. Md. 2013), Mr.
Kimberlin tried to write a summons of his own without the permission of the court.
That is, he was caught red-handed forging a summons. Specifically, he created a
false summons naming a non-party in his case, and mailed it to that non-party in an
attempt to falsely convince them that they were a defendant in the suit. When
forced to respond to an order to show cause, Mr. Kimberlin blamed this forgery on
a misunderstanding of the process, which Plaintiff [Kimberlin] as a pro se litigant
did not understand[.] See Verified Response to February 21, 2014 Order to Show
Cause Re Twitchy4 Summons (ECF No. 102) 1, filed in Kimberlin v. Frey.5
Apparently, he believes that one must go to law school to learn not to forge
documents.
Likewise, ECF No. 124 in that same case quotes from a transcript from
Kimberlin v. Walker, et al. In the transcript, Mr. Kimberlin was caught altering
evidence of initial service of process. Under Maryland Law, one of the methods of
initial service of process is by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted
delivery. Md. R. 2-121(a). However, Mr. Kimberlin did not choose the restricted
delivery option; instead he altered the certified mail green card to make it falsely
appear that he served a defendant properly when he had not. When the proof that
4
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he had altered this evidence became undeniable, he offered his pro se status as an
excuse, to ill effect:
MR. KIMBERLIN:
THE COURT:
MR. KIMBERLIN:
Okay, okay
THE COURT:
Now, when it suits him, Mr. Kimberlin is a champion of equality between pro se
litigants and lawyers representing clients? How convenient.
Of course, the actual distinction in the rule isnt between represented and
unrepresented parties, but between lawyers and non-lawyers. Because of their
expertise and their ethical constraints, lawyers are presumed to be more likely to
bring meritorious suits and not to file improper summons. This discrimination in
the rules, therefore, is rationally related to the difference between pro se parties and
attorneys and, therefore, it is lawful.
WHEREFORE, this Court should dismiss the appeal or summarily affirm the court
below, and this Court should provide any other relief that is just and equitable.
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July 11,
Friday,
July2016
8, 2016, 2016
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Respectfully submitted,
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EXHIBIT A
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INTHE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Petition No. 93
September Term, 2016
BRETT KIMBERLIN,
v.
AARON WALKER, et al.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Now comes Petitioner Brett Kimberlin and moves this Court to conduct a de novo
reconsideration of its June 24, 2016 denial of his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on
the very serious ground of conflict of interest by Judge Lynne Battaglia. In support
of this motion, Petitioner states the following:
1. This Court denied the petition on June 24, 2016. Petitioner received a copy
of the denial by United States Mail on June 29,2016.
2. Petitioner then began researching the filing of a Petitioner for Certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court on two issues-(1) the conflict of Court's Article 9104 with Rock v. Arkansas} 483 U.S. 44 (1987), and (2) the conflict created regarding
the standard of proof of falsity in a defamation case.
3. During Petitioner's research, he discovered that one ofthe judges in this
Court who considered the Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari was Lynne Battaglia,
whose name was familiar to Petitioner. Petitioner did not know that Judge Battaglia
was a judge in this Court, and so he then researched Judge Battaglia's bio and
confirmed that in 1997, she was personally involved in prosecuting Petitioner while
United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. Judge Battaglia was not simply a
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the death penalty should not have participated in any decision involving the
defendant in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court where the former DA was later a
Supreme Court Judge. In the words of the Court: "Under the Due Process Clause
there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant,
personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's
case."
S. The Court went on to find the error was not harmless even if the judge's vote
was not a deciding factor in the case.
"An unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error
that is "not amenable" to harmless-error review, regardless of whether
the judge's vote was dispositive, Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S.
129, 141. Because an appellate panel's deliberations are generally
confidential, it is neither possible nor productive to inquire whether
the jurist in question might have influenced the views of his or her
colleagues during the decisionmaking process. Indeed, one purpose of
judicial confidentiality is to ensure that jurists can reexamine old
ideas and suggest new ones, while both seeking to persuade and being
open to persuasion by their colleagues. It does not matter whether
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1/
8. In light of Williams, this Court should correct this error rather than requiring
Petitioner to seek a remand from the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, Petitioner moves this Court to conduct a full de novo reconsideration
Certificate of Service
ndent Walker
this 3rd day of July, 2016
Brett
AFFIDAVIT
I swear under penalty of perjury that the abov