Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 878
Defendants Terrance Charles Spitz, Tom Lloyd Crouch, and Tom Roland
appeal their convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine, and Spitz and
Crouch appeal their convictions for possessing methamphetamine with intent to
distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. On appeal
all defendants claim that the government's conduct was so outrageous as to
violate their due process rights. Roland makes two other arguments: (1) by
finding him guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine and not guilty of
possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, the jury rendered
The defendants attempt to distinguish Russell by noting that at the time of that
decision, P2P had not yet been classified as a controlled substance. Thus, unlike
The defendants also attempt to distinguish Russell by noting that the Russell
defendants were predisposed to engage in the criminal behavior, as evidenced
by their having operated a methamphetamine manufacturing laboratory for
seven months prior to the government's involvement, while in the instant case
the defendants had no preexisting laboratory, and the government, in effect,
induced the defendants to set up one. Although it appears no laboratory existed
before Littrell was given the P2P, substantial evidence indicates Littrell was
very interested in obtaining P2P so he and his associates could produce
methamphetamine, R. II, Exhibit A, and that at least some of the defendants
were experienced in its manufacture. R. II, Exhibit A, 10-11. We read Russell
as approving a government agent's supply of P2P to individuals with a
preexisting interest in manufacturing methamphetamine, whether or not they
had a preexisting laboratory.
II
8
Finally, Roland complains that the prosecutor did not provide him with a
complete transcript of the hearing on Littrell's guilty plea. The omitted portions
include (i) statements by Littrell's counsel that Littrell had recently been beaten
up by "persons who may or may not be connected with codefendants in this
case," R. III, 140, and was afraid for his life, (ii) the terms of Littrell's guilty
plea agreement, (iii) the trial court's determination that Littrell was competent
to plead guilty, and knowingly and voluntarily was waiving his criminal trial
rights, and (iv) Littrell's sentencing date. Roland also complains that the
prosecutor did not provide him with a copy of a doctor's report finding Littrell
competent to plead guilty. Roland contends that in failing to provide him with a
complete transcript of Littrell's guilty plea hearing and the doctor's competency
report, the prosecutor deprived Roland of the effective ability to cross-examine
Littrell, who testified as a government witness.
10
We can easily reject Roland's complaint about the doctor's competency report.
During the competency hearing, the trial court ordered the report sealed, but
made it available to counsel upon request. R. III, 146. The prosecutor,
therefore, did not possess the report, and Roland does not allege that the trial
court denied him access to it.
11
12
AFFIRMED.
The government argues that because Hastings gave P2P to Littrell, not the
defendants, and because the defendants never had any contact with government
agents prior to the defendants' arrest, they lack standing to challenge the
government's conduct. To have standing, a party must allege "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness"
that Article III requires. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952,
20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691,
703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). In the instant case, since Spitz, Roland, and
Crouch all have been detrimentally affected by the government's conduct, they
have standing to complain. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381-82
(3d Cir. 1978)
Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 274 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 302,
54 L.Ed.2d 191 (1977)