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2d 252
21 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 138, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,734
Milnor H. Senior, III, Robert I. Cohen and Michael J. Vos, Denver, Colo.,
for defendant-appellant.
Jorge E. Castillo, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy judge did decide that the
obligation was in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. See III R. 3941. We reject Charlotte's contention that Edward failed to preserve this issue on
appeal to the district court. An appellee may defend the judgment won below
on any ground supported by the record without filing a cross appeal. See Koch
v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1441 n. 14 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 262, 102 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988). The district court
found the ruling on the nature of the obligation to be a fact finding that was
sufficiently supported by the record such that it could not be found to be clearly
erroneous. In re Robinson, 113 B.R. 687, 689-90 (D.Colo.1990). After
reviewing the record, we agree.
AFFIRMED.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without
oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(f); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument
Charlotte apparently has never suggested that Edward is obligated according to
the terms of the new second deed of trust. See Brief of Appellee at 15-16 ("We
do not contend, and we have never contended, that the Husband's liability to
the Wife should be measured by any yardstick other than the one defined by
the original obligation.")